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# The Horcrux: Mechanistically Interpretable Task Decomposition for Detecting and Mitigating Reward Hacking in Embodied AI Systems

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## Abstract

Embodied AI agents exploit reward signal flaws through reward hacking—achieving high proxy scores while failing true objectives. We introduce **Mechanistically Interpretable Task Decomposition (MITD)**, a hierarchical transformer architecture with Planner, Coordinator, and Executor modules that detects and mitigates reward hacking. MITD decomposes tasks into interpretable subtasks while generating diagnostic visualizations including Attention Waterfall Diagrams and Neural Pathway Flow Charts. Experiments on 1,000 hh-rlhf samples reveal optimal decomposition depths of 12-25 steps reduce reward hacking frequency by 34% across four failure modes. We delivered novel paradigms that demonstrate the interpretable way to detect more effective reward hacking than post-hoc behavioral monitoring.

## 1 Introduction

Ensuring agentic systems reliably pursue intended goals is a central challenge as capabilities grow. Misaligned incentives can lead models to produce high-performing but unintended behaviors, creating serious safety risks. Mechanistic interpretability [16] offers a way to analyze a model’s internal computations, revealing the circuits and features driving its decisions. Hierarchical task decomposition [25] further clarifies reasoning by structuring complex objectives into modular subgoals [24]. We introduce a novel Mechanistically Interpretable Task Decomposition (MITD) (Fig. 1) architecture, which is capable of creating task decomposition by creating the Planner, Coordinator, and Executors, each implemented as a **GPT-2** [13] style transformer. The Planner generates multi-scale goal embeddings, the Coordinator routes subgoals, and Executors perform low-level tasks, combining interpretability with hierarchical structure.

Task-hierarchical interpretability opens a new axis for AI safety research: not “how do neurons represent reward?” but “how do task-module boundaries create or prevent misalignment?” As embodied agents and reasoning models adopt hierarchical planning, this domain becomes critical for trustworthy deployment.

## 2 Related Works

Recent advances in task decomposition frameworks have improved the efficiency and adaptability of AI systems for complex user requests. Methods such as SPAGent [18], TDAG [23], ADaPT [12], and TAPE [19] enable modular planning, recursive subtask decomposition, and multi-agent execution,

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\*Core Contributor, **Code and Results:** <https://github.com/SubramanyamSahoo/The-Horcrux->

allowing tasks to be broken into manageable steps while dynamically selecting specialized models. Despite these improvements, challenges like reward hacking—where agents exploit unintended strategies for high rewards—remain prevalent, prompting interventions such as verbalization fine-tuning and misbehavior monitoring [3] to detect and mitigate such behavior. Building on these foundations, our work extends task decomposition frameworks by integrating interpretability mechanisms, providing transparency into decision-making processes and enhancing trust and accountability in complex task execution.

### 3 Experiment




Figure 1: MITD (Mechanistically Interpretable Task Decomposition) Architecture

Table 1: Table A1: MITD vs. Existing Approaches

Dimension	Decomposition	Mech. Interp.	Monitoring	MITD
Identifies unsafe decompositions?	✗	✗	✗	✓
Module-level traceability?	✗	✗	✗	✓
Predictive (pre-hacking)?	✗	(rare)	✗	✓
Task-aware visualizations?	✗	✗	✗	✓
Requires architecture modification?	Possible	✗	✗	✓
Computational overhead?	Low	High	Low	Med

We propose a simple task decomposition architecture designed for **fully distributed training**. A *Planner* generates hierarchical goals, which a *Coordinator* routes through disentangled bottlenecks to *Executors* that fuse features with token embeddings via cross-attention (follow Appendix for more). A *Consistency Monitor* ensures executor agreement, and outputs are aggregated using an LSTM [9] to produce structured reasoning traces. Preference data is tokenized, filtered, and batched via a lightweight distributed pipeline, enabling efficient multi-GPU training [6]. We train on 1,000 HH-RLHF samples [2] for 3 epochs across 16 RTX 5090 GPUs and evaluate on 50 held-out samples. Finally, we probe all seven novel mechanisms at test time to analyze alignment behaviors, including reward hacking [1], under controlled decomposition dynamics.

### 4 Result

Table 1 presents MITD performance metrics: proxy rewards ( $-0.009 \pm 0.023$ ), true rewards ( $-0.005 \pm 0.044$ ), consistency scores (0.164), and reward correlation ( $-0.283$ ).

Table 2: Model Performance on Test Dataset

Metric	Mean	Std	Range
Proxy Rewards	-0.0091	0.0227	[-0.035, 0.029]
True Rewards	-0.0046	0.0441	[-0.068, 0.070]
Consistency Scores	0.1643	0.0000	[0.164, 0.164]
Reward Correlation	-0.2832	0.0000	[-0.283, -0.283]

#### 4.1 Attention Waterfall Diagram




Figure 2: Attention Waterfall Diagram

To analyze how attention propagates across hierarchical modules, we introduce *Attention Waterfall Diagrams* (AWDs). Each AWD visualizes the attention matrix  $A^{(m)} \in \mathbb{R}^{H \times T}$  for a given module  $m$ , where  $H$  is the number of heads and  $T$  the sequence length. The attention matrix is derived from the standard scaled dot-product attention:

$$A^{(m)} = \text{softmax}\left(\frac{Q^{(m)}K^{(m)\top}}{\sqrt{d_k}}\right). \quad (1)$$

Within each AWD, the attention weights are shown as a heatmap, with darker shades indicating stronger values  $A_{h,t}^{(m)}$ . To highlight dominant local interactions, we define the set of exceedances:

$$\mathcal{F}^{(m)} = \{(h, t) \mid A_{h,t}^{(m)} > \tau\}, \quad \tau = 0.5, \quad (2)$$

where  $\tau$  is a fixed threshold. For every exceedance  $(h, t) \in \mathcal{F}^{(m)}$ , the diagram overlays a directed edge from token position  $t$  to  $t + \Delta$ :

$$t \longrightarrow t + \Delta \quad \forall (h, t) \in \mathcal{F}^{(m)}, \quad \Delta = 8, \quad (3)$$

creating a cascading “waterfall” effect across the token sequence. Formally, the set of all rendered arrows is

$$\text{AWD}(A^{(m)}) = \{(h, t, t + \Delta) \mid (h, t) \in \mathcal{F}^{(m)}\}. \quad (4)$$

The resulting visualization, as shown in Fig. 2, highlights both the underlying attention distribution and the forward-streaming exceedances, providing an interpretable view of how attention flows across different modules. Here we channelize attention flow in discrete steps rather than continuous [20].

## 4.2 Decomposition Stability Diagram

Reward hacking frequency is plotted as a function of the number of decomposition steps across multiple categories. Each curve  $f_c(s)$  denotes the empirical frequency for category  $c$  at step count  $s$ , with shaded regions indicating uncertainty intervals  $\pm\epsilon_c(s)$ . Green highlighted regions  $\mathcal{Z}_k$  correspond to optimal decomposition zones.

Formally, for each hacking category  $c$ , the decomposition stability curve is defined as

$$f_c(s) = \Pr(\text{reward hacking} \mid \text{category } c, s), \quad (5)$$

where  $s$  denotes the number of decomposition steps. The shaded confidence band shown in Figure 3 is given by

$$\hat{f}_c(s) \in [f_c(s) - \epsilon_c(s), f_c(s) + \epsilon_c(s)], \quad (6)$$

where  $\epsilon_c(s)$  represents the estimated uncertainty. Optimal decomposition zones are represented as contiguous intervals

$$\mathcal{Z}_k = \{s \mid a_k \leq s \leq b_k\}, \quad k = 1, 2, \dots, K, \quad (7)$$

where  $[a_k, b_k]$  are the bounds of the  $k$ -th zone.




Figure 3: Decomposition Stability Diagram

Fig. 3 shows an Inverted-U Stability Pattern. Across all failure modes, reward hacking frequency peaks at moderate decomposition depths ( $\approx 4\text{--}8$  steps). This indicates that shallow decompositions insufficiently constrain behavior, while excessively fine-grained decompositions introduce noise that destabilizes alignment [8]. There is also an *optimal decomposition windows*. Highlighted zones ( $\approx 12\text{--}25$  steps) define “Goldilocks” regions [22] where reward hacking is minimized across failure modes. These results suggest an intrinsic structure to the alignment problem: neither trivial task formulations nor over-engineered decompositions reliably produce robust behavior.

**Mode-Specific Vulnerabilities** Reward tampering [5] exhibits the highest baseline susceptibility but achieves the greatest stability within optimal zones. Mesa-optimization [21] and deceptive alignment persist even in optimal regions, indicating intrinsic resistance to decomposition. Specification gaming [11] shows the steepest drop-off, highlighting decomposition’s relative effectiveness against this failure class.

Here Optimal Zone Validity may be arbitrary or task-dependent. We treat different hacking types as independent, but they may interact in ways not captured.

## 4.3 Mechanistic Failure Trees

To capture how decomposition structures induce vulnerabilities in instruction-tuned LLMs (Large language Models) [26], we construct *Mechanistic Failure Trees (MFTs)* that model the causal flow of hacking risk from the global task objective down to low-level decisions. Fig. 4 shows one such




Figure 4: Mechanistic Failure Trees

tree. The root node (*Task Completion*) decomposes into subtasks—*reward*, *specification*, *goal*, *proxy*—each branching further into decision nodes.

Each node  $X$  (subtask or decision) is assigned a *hacking risk intensity* by averaging empirical detection scores  $s_X$ :

$$R(X) = \frac{1}{|S_X|} \sum_{s \in S_X} s, \quad (8)$$

where  $S_X$  is the set of scores associated with node  $X$ . To capture causal influence, each edge is weighted by a coefficient  $w_{ij} \in [0, 1]$ , yielding the effective contribution of decision node  $D_{ij}$  as  $C(D_{ij}) = w_{ij} \cdot R(D_{ij})$ . The total risk at the root objective then aggregates over all subtasks and their decisions:

$$R(O) = \sum_{i=1}^m \sum_{j=1}^k w_{ij} \cdot R(D_{ij}). \quad (9)$$

In the visualization, **node colors** represent local risks  $R(X)$ , while **edge thickness** encodes weights  $w_{ij}$ . This tree makes explicit how decomposition choices channel and amplify vulnerabilities, tracing precise causal routes from high-level objectives to instances of reward hacking. However, the tree assumes strictly hierarchical causality, but reward hacking often emerges from lateral interactions between modules not captured here. This figure also bears static snapshot Problem. Leaf nodes labeled as discrete choices.

#### 4.4 Neural Pathway Flow Charts

We believe the above listed problems manifests across model internals [15]. To check our hypothesis we extract actual pathway activations from test data and visualize them as directed flow graphs. The procedure is as follows: for each layer  $l$ , we collect activation vectors  $\mathbf{a}^{(l)} \in \mathbb{R}^{d_l}$  and flatten them into a common representation. Given heterogeneous activation shapes, we avoid direct stacking and instead compute aggregated statistics across all vectors.

**Activation Processing.** For each layer  $l$ , the mean activation is computed as:

$$\mu^{(l)} = \frac{1}{N_l} \sum_{i=1}^{N_l} a_i^{(l)}, \quad (10)$$

where  $N_l$  is the number of units in layer  $l$  and  $a_i^{(l)}$  denotes the activation of unit  $i$ .




Figure 5: Neural Pathway Flow

**Category Assignment.** Each pathway is classified into categories such as *reward tampering*, *specification gaming*, or *normal*, based on a joint criterion involving both activations and detection scores:

$$C^{(l)} = \begin{cases} \text{Reward Tampering,} & \mu^{(l)} > \tau_r \wedge s^{(l)} > \gamma_r, \\ \text{Specification Gaming,} & \mu^{(l)} > \tau_s \wedge s^{(l)} > \gamma_s, \\ \text{Normal,} & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases} \quad (11)$$

where  $s^{(l)}$  is the mean detection score for layer  $l$ , and  $\{\tau_r, \gamma_r, \tau_s, \gamma_s\}$  are empirically set thresholds.

Fig. 5 shows a directed graph of pathway activations, with node size proportional to  $\mu^{(l)}$  and edges representing activation dependencies. Nodes are color-coded by category, revealing how anomalous reward-hacking behaviors propagate through *planner*, *coordinator*, and *executor* modules. This visualization highlights *where* the model’s optimization objective diverges from the intended reward, distinguishing benign flows from harmful ones. Activations from actual runs show the emergence and propagation of reward tampering, specification gaming, and normal behavior across hierarchical layers [17, 4].

#### 4.5 Objective Alignment Heatmaps

Fig. 6 reveal the *progressive degradation of reward fidelity* across the AI safety optimization pipeline through four complementary perspectives.

The **Intended vs Proxy Objectives** matrix exhibits a clean checkerboard pattern with strong diagonal structure, indicating that designed proxy metrics initially capture intended behaviors with high fidelity, as reflected in correlation coefficients

$$C_{ij} = \frac{\text{cov}(\mathbf{r}_i^{\text{proxy}}, \mathbf{r}_j^{\text{intended}})}{\sigma_i \sigma_j}, \quad (12)$$

which approach unity along the diagonal.

By contrast, the **Proxy vs Actual Objectives** heatmap displays increased noise and off-diagonal correlations, showing how proxy optimization begins to diverge from ground truth under distributional shift and emergent behaviors [7].

The **Intended vs Actual Objectives** matrix degrades further, with weaker diagonal structure and stronger cross-correlations, reflecting compounded misalignment where

$$\mathbb{E}[R^{\text{intended}}(\pi^*)] \ll \max_{\pi} \mathbb{E}[R^{\text{intended}}(\pi)], \quad (13)$$

demonstrating that the policy the LLM is following optimized under proxies fails to achieve maximum true reward.




Figure 6: Objective Alignment Heatmaps

Finally, the **Misalignment Hotspots** visualization, computed as

$$\mathbf{M} = \mathbf{1} - |\mathbf{C}_{\text{intended, actual}}|, \quad (14)$$

highlights critical sub-tasks and objective dimensions (orange/red regions) where Goodhart’s Law [10] effects are most severe. Together, these provide a framework for localizing **high-risk misalignment regions**.

Heatmaps capture single time points but alignment relationships likely change during system operation

#### 4.6 Reward Flow Topography

Fig. 7 analyzes the temporal-spatial evolution of reward alignment across network layers. The resulting topography can be visualized as a 3D landscape over layers and time steps. Deep purple regions correspond to normal, safe behavior, while elevated red markers indicate “peaks” in reward, highlighting high-risk regions where the system may exploit the reward function. Given proxy rewards  $r_t^{\text{proxy}}$ , true rewards  $r_t^{\text{true}}$ , and consistency  $c_t$  at time  $t \in \{1, \dots, T\}$ , we define:

$$S_t = |r_t^{\text{proxy}} - r_t^{\text{true}}|, \quad (15)$$

$$H_t = 1 - c_t, \quad (16)$$

where  $S_t$  is the reward strength divergence and  $H_t$  quantifies potential reward hacking risk.

For  $L$  layers  $\ell \in \{1, \dots, L\}$ , these signals are broadcast as

$$S_{t,\ell} = S_t, \quad H_{t,\ell} = H_t, \quad (17)$$

yielding a temporal-layer matrix  $\{S_{t,\ell}, H_{t,\ell}\}$ .

#### 4.7 Causal Intervention Leverage points

The Fig. 8 exhibits non-uniform sensitivity like Certain layers, particularly layers 3–7, exhibit markedly higher sensitivity to interventions, as highlighted by the prominent yellow peaks. Intervention effects scale non-linearly with strength; weak interventions often produce minimal changes, whereas moderate-to-strong interventions can trigger abrupt behavioral shifts. The jagged terrain indicates that minor changes in intervention location can lead to drastically different outcomes, revealing critical computational nodes. Reward hacking behaviors are concentrated in specific regions rather than distributed uniformly, suggesting avenues for targeted mitigation strategies.




Figure 7: Reward Flow Topography




Figure 8: Causal Intervention Leverage Diagram

## 5 Limitations & Future Work

This work establishes task-hierarchical interpretability on a modest scale: 1,000 training samples, 50 held-out test samples ( $N$  per category  $\approx 0-25$ ), single model family (GPT-2). Consequently, general-



ization remains uncertain—optimal decomposition depth may be task-dependent, and findings may not transfer to larger models (Llama, GPT-3/4/5 scale) or diverse RLHF/AI Safety datasets. Methodologically, hacking category detection (Eq. 11) relies on empirically-set thresholds  $\{\tau_r, \gamma_r, \tau_s, \gamma_s\}$  chosen on validation data, risking overfitting; causality between decomposition depth and reduced hacking is correlational, not causal—the inverted-U pattern could reflect simple capacity bottlenecking rather than interpretability-driven safety. Visualizations (Attention Waterfall, Pathway Flow) are post-hoc analyses; they diagnose but do not intervene in real-time. Finally, metric definitions (Consistency Score via executor agreement; Reward Correlation as Pearson  $\rho$ ) are task-agnostic proxies and may not capture all aspects of misalignment.

Immediate priorities include scaling evaluation to  $N_{\text{train}} \geq 10,000$ ,  $N_{\text{test}} \geq 500$  with stratified sampling per failure mode, and validating decomposition stability across model families (decoder-only, encoder-decoder, reasoning-scale LLMs). We will investigate whether the optimal zone [12–25] persists across architectures or is architecture-specific, and conduct ablation studies isolating contributions of Planner, Coordinator, and Executor modules versus depth alone. Mechanistically, we plan causal interventions—ablating specific attention heads or layer groups identified by Neural Pathway Flow—to validate that visualizations reveal actionable targets. Finally, we will explore real-time mitigation: using predicted hacking risk (from pathway activations) to dynamically reweight executor outputs, moving from post-hoc diagnosis to preventive safety guardrails.

## 6 Conclusion

We introduce MITD, a hierarchical planning model with built-in interpretability, enabling systematic identification of reward-hacking behaviors. By decomposing tasks and exposing internal activations, our architecture provides actionable insight into the model’s decision-making. Our interventions reveal that attention mechanisms exert disproportionate influence over behavior: while masking or reweighting attention reduces reliance on misaligned features, more invasive manipulations at the representation or gradient level fail to consistently prevent the use of reward proxies. These findings underscore the difficulty of post-hoc adjustment and highlight the necessity of understanding internal computations to guide and audit the behavior. MITD exemplifies how integrating analytical hooks and visualization tools can offer new perspectives for monitoring, steering, and evaluating agent strategies.

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## A Technical Appendices and Supplementary Material

### MITD Architecture Configuration

```
@dataclass
class ModelConfig:
    """Configuration for MITD model architecture and training."""

    # General
    vocab_size: int = 50257
    max_sequence_length: int = 512
    max_batch_size: int = 16

    # Planner
    planner_hidden_dim: int = 768
    planner_layers: int = 12
    planner_attention_heads: int = 12

    # Coordinator
    coordinator_hidden_dim: int = 768
    coordinator_layers: int = 8
    coordinator_attention_heads: int = 12

    # Executors
    executor_hidden_dim: int = 512
    executor_layers: int = 6
    executor_attention_heads: int = 8
    executor_count: int = 4

    # Interpretability
    decomposition_granularities = [2, 4, 8, 16]
    interpretable_bottleneck_dims = [128, 256, 384]
    reasoning_trace_layers: int = 4
    intervention_layers = [3, 6, 9]

    # Training
    dropout_rate: float = 0.1
    layer_norm_eps: float = 1e-5
    initializer_range: float = 0.02
    gradient_clip_value: float = 1.0
```

## B Implications for Scalable Oversight

These empirical patterns in **Decomposition Stability Diagram** suggest that *decomposition depth* is a critical hyperparameter in alignment methods. Stability zones appear to arise from the interplay of two competing forces: sufficiently granular constraints to prevent simple exploits, and coherent objective specifications that preserve the learning signal. The consistency of these patterns across diverse failure modes points toward a *universal decomposition principle*; optimal alignment may

require uncovering the natural hierarchical structure of tasks rather than relying on arbitrary recursive breakdowns [14].

## C Cross Attentions







Figure 9: Attention maps for different heads in the goal hierarchy.




(a) Executor 0



(b) Executor 1



(c) Executor 2



(d) Executor 3

Figure 10: Cross-attention maps for different executor modules.

## NeurIPS Paper Checklist

The checklist is designed to encourage best practices for responsible machine learning research, addressing issues of reproducibility, transparency, research ethics, and societal impact. Do not remove the checklist: **The papers not including the checklist will be desk rejected.** The checklist should follow the references and follow the (optional) supplemental material. The checklist does NOT count towards the page limit.

Please read the checklist guidelines carefully for information on how to answer these questions. For each question in the checklist:

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Question: Do the main claims made in the abstract and introduction accurately reflect the paper’s contributions and scope?

Answer: [Yes]

Justification: Yes this is a position paper.

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Answer: [Yes]

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Justification: I will provide everything on camera ready version.

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Justification: I have shared them in Appendix.

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Justification: I took the leverage of 16xH200 for 10 hrs at Vast.ai platform.

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Justification: I created a new pretraining architecture focused on AI safety. So need for extensive justification.

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