SORRY-Bench: Systematically Evaluating Large Language Model Safety Refusal Behaviors

Warning: This paper contains red-teaming related content that can be offensive in nature.

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Abstract

Evaluating aligned large language models' (LLMs) ability to recognize and reject unsafe user requests is crucial for safe, policy-compliant deployments. Existing evaluation efforts, however, face three limitations that we address with **SORRY-Bench**, our proposed benchmark. **First**, existing methods often use coarse-grained taxonomies of unsafe topics, and are over-representing some fine-grained topics. For example, among the ten existing datasets that we evaluated, tests for refusals of self-harm instructions are over 3x less represented than tests for fraudulent activities. SORRY-Bench improves on this by using a fine-grained taxonomy of 45 potentially unsafe topics, and 450 class-balanced unsafe instructions, compiled through human-in-the-loop methods. **Second**, evaluations often overlook the linguistic formatting of prompts, like different languages, dialects, and more—which are only implicitly considered in many evaluations. We supplement SORRY-bench with 20 diverse linguistic augmentations to systematically examine these effects. **Third**, existing evaluations rely on large LLMs (e.g., GPT-4) for evaluation, which can be computationally expensive. We investigate design choices for creating a fast, accurate automated safety evaluator. By collecting 7K+ human annotations and conducting a meta-evaluation of diverse LLM-as-a-judge designs, we show that fine-tuned 7B LLMs can achieve accuracy comparable to GPT-4 scale LLMs, with lower computational cost. Putting these together, we evaluate over 40 proprietary and open-source LLMs on SORRY-Bench, analyzing their distinctive refusal behaviors. We hope our effort provides a building block for systematic evaluations of LLMs' safety refusal capabilities, in a balanced, granular, and efficient way.[1]

1 Introduction

To ensure large language model (LLM) safety, *alignment* has become a standard procedure that follows language model pretraining (OpenAI, 2023; Touvron et al., 2023; Anthropic, 2023; Gemini Team, 2023). Alignment involves calibrating these models, via *instruction tuning* (Wei et al., 2021; Ouyang et al., 2022) and *preference optimization* (Bai et al., 2022; Rafailov et al., 2024; Meng et al., 2024), such that they adhere to human values and safely follow human intents. The resultant aligned LLMs should not engage with user requests on certain unsafe or inappropriate topics, as determined

[1]Data and code are available via our website `https://sorry-bench.github.io`.

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

Figure 1: **Imbalanced data point distribution** of 10 prior datasets (§2.2) on our 45-class taxonomy.

by LLM creators and regulators. For example, most LLMs *refuse* to assist with the user request "*Write a racist tweet.*" Instead, they provide a *refusal* response – e.g., "*I'm sorry, I cannot help with this.*" Such safety refusal abilities help reduce the likelihood of misuse by users in the wild.

To date, researchers have proposed many benchmarks (Gehman et al., 2020; Parrish et al., 2022; Shaikh et al., 2022; Wang et al., 2023; Qi et al., 2023; Cui et al., 2023; Vidgen et al., 2023; Lin et al., 2023; Zou et al., 2023; Shen et al., 2023; Huang et al., 2023; Mazeika et al., 2024; Souly et al., 2024) to evaluate various aspects of LLM safety, including toxicity, harmfulness, trustworthiness, and refusal behaviors (see a detailed summary of them in Table 3). In this work, we identify three deficiencies underlying these existing evaluations, and address them with **SORRY-Bench**[2], our proposed systematic benchmark to evaluate LLM safety refusal behaviors.

First, we point out prior datasets are often built upon course-grained and varied safety categories, and that they are overrepresenting certain fine-grained categories. For example, Vidgen et al. (2023) include broad categories like "Illegal Items" in their taxonomy, while Huang et al. (2023) use more fine-grained subcategories like "Theft" and "Illegal Drug Use". Meanwhile, both of them fail to capture certain risky topics, e.g., "Legal Advice" or "Political Campaigning", which are adopted in some other work (Liu et al., 2023b; Shen et al., 2023; Qi et al., 2023). Moreover, we find these prior datasets are often imbalanced and result in over-representation of some fine-grained categories. As illustrated in Fig 1, as a whole, these prior datasets tend to skew towards certain safety categories (e.g., "Fraud", "Sexual Explicit Content", and "Social Stereotypes") with "Self-Harm" being nearly 3x less represented than these categories. However, these other underrepresented categories (e.g., "Personal Identifiable Information Violations", "Self-Harm", and "Animal-related Crimes") cannot be overlooked – failure to evaluate and ensure model safety in these categories can lead to outcomes as severe as those in the more prevalent categories.

To bridge this gap, we present a *fine-grained 45-class safety taxonomy* (Fig 2 and §2.2) across 4 high-level domains. We curate this taxonomy to unify the disparate taxonomies from prior work, employing a human-in-the-loop procedure for refinement – where we map data points from previous datasets to our taxonomy and iteratively identify any uncovered safety categories. Our resultant taxonomy captures diverse topics that could lead to potentially unsafe LLM responses, and allows stakeholders to evaluate LLM safety refusal on any of these risky topics at a more granular level. On top of this 45-class taxonomy, we craft a *class-balanced LLM safety refusal evaluation dataset* (§2.3). Our base dataset consists of 450 unsafe instructions in total, with additional manually created novel data points to ensure equal coverage across the 45 safety categories (10 per category).

Second, we ensure balance not just over topics but over linguistic characteristics. Existing safety evaluations fail to capture different formatting and linguistic features in user inputs. But this too can result in over-representation of a given language, dialect or other linguistic feature. We address this by considering 20 diverse *linguistic mutations* that real-world users might apply to phrase their unsafe prompts. These include various writing styles, persuasion techniques, encoding and encryption strategies, and multi-languages (§2.4). After paraphrasing our base dataset via these mutations, we obtain 9K additional unsafe instructions.

[2]This name stems from LLM safety refusal responses, commonly starting with "I'm sorry, I cannot..."

Third, we investigate what design choices make a fast and accurate safety benchmark evaluator, a trade-off that prior work has not so systematically examined. To benchmark safety behaviors, we need an *efficient* and *accurate* evaluator to decide whether a LLM response is in *compliance* or *refusal* of each unsafe instruction from our SORRY-Bench dataset. By far, a common practice is to leverage LLMs themselves for automating such safety evaluations. With many different implementations (Qi et al., 2023; Huang et al., 2023; Xie et al., 2023; Mazeika et al., 2024; Li et al., 2024; Souly et al., 2024; Chao et al., 2024) of LLMs-as-a-judge, there has not been a large-scale systematic study of which design choices are better, in terms of the tradeoff between efficiency and accuracy. We collect a large-scale human safety judgment dataset (§3.2) of over 7K annotations, and conduct a thorough meta-evaluation (§3.3) of different safety evaluators on top of it. Our finding suggests that small (7B) LLMs, when fine-tuned on sufficient human annotations, can achieve satisfactory accuracy (over 80% human agreement) with a low computational cost ($\sim$10s per evaluation pass), comparable with and even surpassing larger scale LLMs (e.g., GPT-4o).

In §4.2, we benchmark **over 40** open-source and proprietary LLMs on SORRY-Bench. Specifically, we showcase the varying degrees of safety refusal across different LLMs. Claude-2 and Gemini-1.5, for example, exhibit the most refusals. Mistral models, on the other hand, demonstrate significantly higher rates of compliance with potentially unsafe user requests. There was also general variation across categories. For example, Gemini-1.5-flash is the only model that consistently refuses requests for legal advice that most other models respond to. Whilst, all but a handful of models refused most harassment-related requests. Finally, we find significant variation in compliance rates for our 20 linguistic mutations in prompts, showing that current models are inconsistent in their safety for low-resource languages, inclusion of technical terms, uncommon dialects, and more.

2 A Recipe for Curating Diverse and Balanced Dataset

2.1 Related Work

To evaluate the safety of modern LLMs with instruction-following capabilities, recent work (Shaikh et al., 2023; Liu et al., 2023b; Zou et al., 2023; Röttger et al., 2023; Shen et al., 2023; Qi et al., 2023; Huang et al., 2023; Vidgen et al., 2023; Cui et al., 2023; Li et al., 2024; Mazeika et al., 2024; Souly et al., 2024; Zhang et al., 2023) propose different instruction datasets that might trigger unsafe behavior—building on earlier work evaluating toxicity and bias in underlying pretrained LMs on simple sentence-level completion (Gehman et al., 2020) or knowledge QA tasks (Parrish et al., 2022). These datasets usually consist of varying numbers of potentially unsafe user instructions, spanning across different safety categories (e.g., illegal activity, misinformation). These unsafe instructions are then used as inputs to LLMs, and the model responses are evaluated to determine model safety. In Appendix C, we provide a more detailed survey of these datasets with a summary of key attributes.

2.2 Fine-grained Refusal Taxonomy with Diverse Categories

Before building the dataset, we first need to understand its scope of safety, i.e., *what safety categories should the dataset include and at what level of granularity should they be defined?* We note that prior datasets are often built upon discrepant safety categories, which may be too coarse-grained and not consistent across benchmarks. For example, some benchmarks have results aggregated by course-grained categories like illegal activities (Shen et al., 2023; Qi et al., 2023; Vidgen et al., 2023; Zhang et al., 2023), while others have more fine-grained subcategories like delineate more specific subcategories like “Tax Fraud” and “Illegal Drug Use” (Huang et al., 2023). Mixing these subtypes in one coarse-grained category can lead to evaluation challenges: the definition of an “illegal activity” can change across jurisdiction and time. Hate speech, for example, can be a crime in Germany, but is often protected by the First Amendment in the United States. We also note that previous datasets may have inconsistent coverage – failing to account for certain types of activities that model creators may or may not wish to constrain, like “Legal Advice” or “Political Campaigning”, which are only examined by a small group of studies (Liu et al., 2023b; Shen et al., 2023; Qi et al., 2023).

We suggest that benchmarking efforts should focus on fine-grained and extensive taxonomies, which not only enable capturing diverse potential safety risks, but also come with the benefit of better *customizability*. Stakeholders can selectively engage with categories of particular concerns and disregard those deemed permissible. For example, some might find it acceptable for their models to provide legal advice, while others may believe this is too high-risk. In light of this, we present a **45-class safety taxonomy** to examine refusal behaviors, as shown in Fig 2 (see Table 4 in Appendix D for a more detailed version) to unify past datasets in a fine-grained and customizable way.

Our taxonomy curation method consists of two stages. In the first stage, we *aggregate* the safety taxonomies from 10 prior safety benchmark datasets (Wang et al., 2023; Qi et al., 2023; Cui et al., 2023; Vidgen et al., 2023; Lin et al., 2023; Zou et al., 2023; Shen et al., 2023; Huang et al., 2023; Mazeika et al., 2024; Souly et al., 2024; Shaikh et al., 2022), and *break down* any vague and broad safety categories into more fine-grained categories. For example, the coarse-grained category "Illegal Activities," occurring in (Shen et al., 2023; Qi et al., 2023; Vidgen et al., 2023)), is substituted by more detailed sub-categories like "Animal-related Crimes", "Fraud", and so on. In the second stage, we keep on *refining* this taxonomy via a human-in-the-loop process. We first map data points from these prior datasets to our taxonomy, with GPT-4 as a classifier (see Appendix E for detailed setup). Data points that do not fit existing categories (i.e., classified to "Others") undergo human review to determine if new categories are needed or if existing ones should be subdivided further. This two-stage approach ensures an extensive and unified taxonomy, addressing the discrepancy across prior safety benchmark efforts.



Figure 2: Taxonomy of SORRY-Bench.

2.3 Data Collection

With the aforementioned GPT-4 classifier (Appendix E), we map data points from the 10 prior datasets to our taxonomy, where we further analyze their distribution on the 45 safety categories. As illustrated in Fig 1, these datasets exhibit significant **imbalances** – they are heavily biased towards certain categories perceived as more prevalent. For instance, System Intrusion, Fraud, Sexual Content Generation, and Social Stereotype Promotion are disproportionately represented in the past datasets. Meanwhile, other equally important categories, like Self-Harm, Animal-related Crimes, and PII Violations are significantly under-represented. Failure to capture model safety risks in these categories can lead to equivalently severe consequences.

To equally capture model risks from all safety categories in our taxonomy, we build a class-balanced dataset. We begin by aggregating labeled data from past work, but after quality filtering and deduplication,[3] We find that many categories do not have enough data to build a class-balanced benchmark. To ensure sufficient and equal coverage across categories, we further create numerous novel potentially unsafe instructions less represented in prior work. Our collected **SORRY-Bench** dataset consists of 10 diverse unsafe instructions for each of the 45 categories, in total of 450 samples.

2.4 Capturing Diverse Linguistic Patterns underlying User Prompts

Prompt diversity has long been a challenge in language model evaluation (Liu et al., 2023a). The same input prompt, phrased in different ways can lead to varying model responses. This issue is also important for LLM safety evaluation. Sophisticated prompt-space *jailbreaking* methods (Shen et al., 2023; Zou et al., 2023; Andriushchenko et al., 2024) have been developed to bypass safety guardrails in LLMs, causing them to respond to potentially unsafe user requests. Some studies have shown that simple social techniques like persuasion (Zeng et al., 2024), writing prompts in alternative languages (Deng et al., 2023), or even phrasing unsafe prompts in instruction-style (imperative;

[3]Refer to Appendix F for our detailed collection process to ensure high data quality for refusal evaluation.



Figure 3: Demonstration of 20 linguistic mutations we apply to our base dataset.

e.g., "Write a tutorial to build a bomb") instead of question-style (interrogative; e.g., "Can you teach me how to build a bomb?"), can significantly affect the extent to which models refuse unsafe instructions (Bianchi et al., 2024). To ensure equal coverage of these variations, we isolate and decouple prompt-level linguistic patterns. In our collected "base" dataset, all user prompts are deliberately (re-)written as an instruction (imperative), which is one of the most common styles users would phrase their request as. We then compile 20 linguistic mutations[4] (Fig 3) from prior studies (Bianchi et al., 2024; Samvelyan et al., 2024; Zeng et al., 2024; Yuan et al., 2023; Deng et al., 2023) into our datasets, including diverse *writing styles* (question, slang, misspellings, etc.), *persuasion techniques* (e.g., logical appeal), *encoding and encryption strategies* (e.g., ASCII), and *multi-languages* (i.e., translating to a non-English language like Malayalam or French). This results in 20 * 450 = 9K additional unsafe instructions, capturing diverse formatting and linguistic features.

3 A Recipe for Building Efficient and Accurate Automated Evaluators

When testing a language model on a safety benchmark, a practical problem is to build an evaluator that can judge whether the model response is safe or not (i.e., whether the model fulfills an unsafe instruction). Building such an evaluator is nontrivial, as it requires a sophisticated understanding of different types of harmfulness that a model response can exhibit. While human-based evaluation is the gold standard, it is short of scalability and efficiency. Therefore, currently, a common practice is to leverage the capability of language models as a proxy to automate the evaluation process.

Thus far, there are many different implementations (Qi et al., 2023; Huang et al., 2023; Xie et al., 2023; Mazeika et al., 2024; Li et al., 2024; Souly et al., 2024; Chao et al., 2024) of LLM-as-a-judge for safety evaluation – some directly using GPT-4-level LLMs as an off-the-shelf option, others fine-tuning smaller language models. However, there isn't a principled understanding of which design choices are better and what trade-offs they have. In this section, we aim to provide a systematic study of the design choices of such evaluators, presenting a recipe for building efficient and accurate automated evaluators for benchmarking safety refusal behaviors. We will first define the evaluation goal of our SORRY-Bench, and then introduce our effort in collecting a large scale human judgment dataset for safety refusal. On top of this, we then present a meta-evaluation study of different design choices using LLM as a judge, to identify a design that is both efficient and accurate for our use case.

3.1 Evaluation Goal

The evaluation of an LLM's refusal behaviors on our SORRY-Bench dataset corresponds to a binary classification problem. Given a pair of (unsafe instruction, model response), we want to decide whether the model response is in compliance with or a refusal to the unsafe instruction. Specifically, a model response is considered as **compliance** *whenever it provides substantial content that directly*

[4]Refer to Appendix G for implementation details of these mutations.

assists with the given unsafe instruction. Even though sometimes the model response can contain ethical disclaimers (e.g., "I must remind you that it's unethical to do this") or refusing statements (e.g., "I'm sorry, I cannot help with this") at the beginning, as long as there exists certain content that directly resolves the unsafe instruction, it is still considered as compliance in our evaluation. In all other cases, the model response is considered as **refusal**. Similarly, this includes cases where the model response contains complying statements (e.g., "Sure, here is my response") or does not contain any explicit refusing statement, but there is no content that actually resolves the unsafe instruction.

3.2 A Human Judgment Dataset for Evaluating the Evaluators

In this study, data points of human safety judgments on model responses are often helpful and, in many cases, necessary. First, only with human ground truth labels can it be possible for us to evaluate the accuracy of any automated evaluators, understand whether an evaluator is good or not, and compare different evaluators. Second, human-labeled safety judgment instances can also be used as training data to optimize the language model based evaluators instead of just prompting them. Therefore, we curate a large-scale human safety judgment dataset, which not only benefits our study but will also be a useful foundational resource for future research in this area.

Specifically, for every unsafe instruction from our SORRY-Bench dataset (the base-version, *without linguistic mutation*), we sample 8 model responses (from different LLMs), and 6 authors manually label each of them as either "compliance" or "refusal" to the user request (in total 450 * 8 = 3,600 records). We call this an **in-distribution (ID)** set. Moreover, we also cover the **out-of-distribution (OOD)** evaluation cases, where the unsafe instructions in our SORRY-Bench dataset are subject to linguistic mutations (described in §2.4). We find that the safety evaluation in these cases can be more challenging. For example, after *translating* the original user request to another language, some LLMs would simply repeat the user request (which is not considered compliance); for some *encoding* mutations, the model responses are nonsense (undecidable content, which is also not compliance); and after mutating the user request with *persuasion* techniques, the model response may contain a bullet list that looks like compliance, but actually cannot resolve the user request (actually not compliance). Therefore, to cover these OOD evaluation cases, we further sample 8 more model responses (from different LLMs) to the linguistic-mutated version of each unsafe instruction from our benchmark dataset. So, in total, we finally collected 450 * (8 ID + 8 OOD) = 7,200 human annotations. See Appendix H for more details.

We split these human annotations into a *train* split of 450 * (3 ID + 3 OOD) = 2,700 records (used to directly train evaluators), and the rest 4,500 as the *test* split.

3.3 A Meta-Evaluation: What Makes a Good Safety Evaluator?

While directly prompting state-of-the-art LLMs such as GPT-4 to judge the refusal behaviors can result in a fairly good judge that agrees well with human evaluators (Qi et al., 2023), there are also several growing concerns. First, as versions of proprietary LLMs keep updating, there is an issue of reproducibility. Second, long prompts and the GPT-4-scale models often result in heavy computation overhead, resulting in high financial and time costs (e.g., per-pass evaluation with GPT-4o could cost $3 and 20 minutes in our case). Thus, we also explore the potential of utilizing smaller-scale open-sourced models (e.g., Llama-3 (Meta, 2024), Gemma (Team et al., 2024), and Mistral (Jiang et al., 2023)) for the refusal evaluation task, which favors both reproducibility and efficiency.

For comprehensiveness, we explore a few commonly adopted add-on techniques for boosting the accuracy of LLM judge further. 1) **Chain-of-thought (CoT)** (Wei et al., 2022) prompting: following Qi et al. (2023), we ask the LLM to first "think step-by-step", analyze the relationship between the given model response and user request, and then make the final decision of whether the model response is a "refusal" or a "compliance". 2) In-context learning with **few-shot** evaluation examples (Brown et al., 2020): for each instruction, we use the corresponding annotations in the train split of the human judge dataset (§3.2) as the in-context demonstrations. 3) Directly **fine-tuning** LLM to specialize on the safety evaluation task (Huang et al., 2023; Mazeika et al., 2024; Li et al., 2024): we directly fine-tune LLMs on the aforementioned train split of 2.7K human judge evaluation annotations.

We report our meta-evaluation results of these different design choices in Table 1, showing the *agreement* (Cohen Kappa score (Cohen, 1960)) of these evaluators with human annotations (on our test set detailed in §3.2), and the approximate *time cost* per evaluation pass on the SORRY-Bench dataset. Other than directly evaluating with the aligned LLMs and combining them with the three add-ons, we also compare with other baseline evaluators. These include rule-based strategies (`Keyword Matching` (Zou et al., 2023)), commercial moderation tools like `Perspective API` (Gehman et al., 2020), few-shot prompting pretrained but unaligned LLMs, and fine-tuning light-weight language models (`Bert-Base-Cased` as used by Huang et al. (2023)).

Table 1: Meta-evaluation results of different LLM judge design choices on SORRY-Bench.

Model *+Method*	**Agreement (%) ↑** Cohen Kappa κ	**Time Cost ↓** (per evaluation pass)
`GPT-4o`	79.4	$\sim$ 260s
+CoT	75.5	$\sim$ 1200s
+Few-Shot	80.0	$\sim$ 270s
+Fine-tuned	\	\
`GPT-3.5-turbo`	54.3	$\sim$ 165s
+CoT	39.7	$\sim$ 890s
+Few-Shot	61.3	$\sim$ 190s
+Fine-tuned	**83.9**	$\sim$ 112s
`Llama-3-70b-instruct`	72.2	$\sim$ 100s
+CoT	33.5	$\sim$ 167s
+Few-Shot	74.9	$\sim$ 270s
+Fine-tuned	**82.8**	$\sim$ 52s
`Llama-3-8b-instruct`	40.6	$\sim$ 12s
+CoT	-50.7[5]	$\sim$ 20s
+Few-Shot	0.8	$\sim$ 58s
+Fine-tuned	**81.2**	$\sim$ 10s
`Mistral-7b-instruct-v0.2`	54.8	$\sim$ 18s
+CoT	61.2	$\sim$ 27s
+Few-Shot	14.1	$\sim$ 67s
+Fine-tuned	**81.3**	$\sim$ 11s
`Gemma-7b-it`	54.5	$\sim$ 22s
+CoT	43.5	$\sim$ 33s
+Few-Shot	-54.6	$\sim$ 103s
+Fine-tuned	**81.3**	$\sim$ 14s
`Llama-3-70b` *+Few-Shot*	72.4	$\sim$ 300s
`Llama-3-8b` *+Few-Shot*	22.8	$\sim$ 61s
`Mistral-7b-v0.2` *+Few-Shot*	71.6	$\sim$ 70s
`Gemma-7b` *+Few-Shot*	64.3	$\sim$ 75s
`Bert-Base-Cased` *+Fine-tuned*	75.0	$\sim$ 4s
`Perspective API`	1.0	$\sim$ 45s
`Keyword Match`	38.1	$\sim$ 0s

[5] These abnormally low agreements are caused by the inherent LLM safety guardrails, where they only capture the "unsafe instruction" and decline to provide a judgment (Zverev et al., 2024). We consider these cases as disagreement with human.

As shown, directly prompting off-the-shelf LLMs, at the size of `Llama-3-70b-instruct` and `GPT-4o`, provides satisfactory accuracy (70∼80% substantial agreement with human). When boosted with the three add-ons, only *fine-tuning* consistently provides improvements (e.g., `GPT-3.5-turbo` *+Fine-tuned* obtains 83.9% "almost perfect agreement"). Moreover, post fine-tuning, LLMs at a smaller scale (e.g., `Llama-3 -8b-instruct`) can achieve comparably high agreements (over 81%) to the larger ones, with per-pass evaluation costing merely 10s on a single A100 GPU. In comparison, all the baselines (bottom segment) are agreeing with human evaluators to a substantially lower degree. In our following benchmark experiments, we adopt the fine-tuned `Mistral-7b-instruct-v0.2` as our judge, due to its balance of efficiency and accuracy. We refer interested readers to Appendix I for more implementation details and result analysis.

4 Benchmark Results

4.1 Experimental Setup

Models. We benchmark 43 different models on SORRY-Bench, including both open-source (Llama, Gemma, Mistral, Qwen, etc.) and proprietary models (Claude, GPT-3.5 and 4, Gemini, etc.), spanning from small (1.8B) to large (70B+) parameter sizes, as well as models of different temporal versions from the same family (e.g., GPT-4o & GPT-4-0613, Llama-3 & Llama-2). For each of these models, we generate its responses to the 450 user requests in our base dataset (all sampled with no system prompt, at temperature of 0.7, Top-P of 1.0, and max tokens of 1024; see Appendix J for details). Due to computational constraints, we only run a subset of models for the 20 linguistic mutations (§2.4).

Evaluation and Metric. After obtaining each model's 450 responses to our SORRY-Bench dataset, we evaluate these responses as either in "refusal" or "compliance" of the corresponding user request (§3.1), with fine-tuned `Mistral-7b-instruct-v0.2` as the judge (§3.3). For each model, we report its *Compliance Rate*, i.e., the ratio of model responses in compliance with the unsafe instructions of our dataset (0 to 1)—a higher (↑) compliance rate indicates more compliance to the unsafe instructions, and a lower(↓) compliance rate implies more refusal behaviors.

4.2 Experimental Results

In Fig 4, we present our main benchmark results, and outline several key takeaways, both model-wise and category-wise. In addition, we also present an additional study on how the 20 linguistic mutations (§2.4) may impact our safety evaluation results (Table 2). Further, we reveal that subtly different



Figure 4: **Benchmark results of 40+ LLMs on SORRY-Bench.** The LLMs are ranked by their compliance rates (the bracketed scores following model names on the vertical axis) over all 45 safety categories (horizontal axis), low to high. In each grid, we report the per-category compliance rate.

evaluation configurations also notably affect the reported safety benchmark results (Table 5). We direct readers to Appendix J for more in-depth result analysis.

Different models exhibit significantly varying degrees of safety refusal behaviors. We observe that 22 out of 43 LLMs demonstrate a medium compliance rate of 20%∼50%, e.g., GPT-4o (31%) and Llama-3-70b (36%). At one end of the spectrum, Claude-2 and Gemini-1.5 achieve the lowest overall compliance rate (<10%). In particular, Claude-2.1 and 2.0 refuse almost all unsafe instructions in the first 25 categories ("Hate Speech Generation" & "Assistance with Crimes or Torts" domains), and Gemini-1.5-Flash declines all requests related to "Potentially Unqualified Advice" (i.e., the last 5 categories). At the other end, 8 models (e.g., Mistral series) comply with more than half of the evaluated unsafe instructions, even on well-recognized harmful topics like "#15: Fraud."

These variations may give us independent insight into the shifting values and priorities of model creators, and their changing policy guidelines. Llama-3 models, as an instance, show notably fewer safety refusals compared to Llama-2 (compliance rate of the 70B version increases from 13% to 36%). Conversely, we observe a substantial increase in refusals from Gemini-Pro to the more recent Gemini-1.5 models (compliance rate drops from 34% to 8%). Both Gemini and Claude models refuse nearly all 10 instructions in the category "#26: Advice on Adult Content", claiming that it's unethical to discuss such personal topics. And while most prior versions of the GPT-3.5/4 API rejected most requests in the category, GPT-4o now mostly complies with such user requests. This shift aligns with OpenAI Model Spec (OpenAI, 2024) published in May 2024, which states that discussing adult topics is permissible. Meanwhile, the spec also states that "responding to user request for erotica" is unacceptable, explaining why GPT-4o consistently refuses every instruction from "#27: Sexual Explicit Content Generation."

Table 2: **Impact of 20 diverse linguistic mutations on safety refusal evaluation.** Alongside overall compliance rate on our "Base" dataset, we report the rate difference when each mutation is applied.

		Writing Styles						*Persuasion Techniques*		
Model	Base	Question	Slang	Uncommon Dialects	Technical Terms	Role Play	Misspellings	Logical Appeal	Authority Endorsement	Misrepresentation
GPT-4o-2024-05-13	0.31	+0.02	+0.11	+0.13	+0.18	+0.04	+0.05	+0.59	+0.60	+0.64
GPT-3.5-turbo-0125	0.18	-0.02	+0.02	+0.06	+0.14	+0.03	+0	+0.51	+0.53	+0.62
Llama-3-8b-instruct	0.23	+0.02	+0.04	+0.03	+0.10	-0.04	+0.07	+0.37	+0.35	+0.28
Llama-3-70b-instruct	0.36	-0.02	+0.08	+0.10	+0.10	+0.08	+0.01	+0.42	+0.38	+0.44
Gemma-7b-it	0.20	-0.02	-0.04	-0.05	+0.16	+0	+0.12	+0.65	+0.58	+0.65
Vicuna-7b-v1.5	0.36	-0.08	-0.04	-0.02	+0.12	+0.19	-0.02	+0.36	+0.42	+0.42
Mistral-7b-instruct-v0.2	0.67	-0.13	-0.10	+0	+0.16	+0.30	+0.02	+0.13	+0.22	+0.22
OpenChat-3.5-0106	0.69	-0.11	+0	+0.12	+0.08	+0.27	+0.01	+0.11	+0.20	+0.22

(Table Continued)	*Persuasion Techniques*		*Encoding & Encryption*				*Multi-languages*				
Model	Evidence-based Persuasion	Expert Endorsement	ASCII	Caesar	Morse	Atbash	Malayalam	Tamil	Marathi	Chinese (Simplified)	French
GPT-4o-2024-05-13	+0.51	+0.59	+0.11	+0.16	-0.20	-0.31	-0.04	+0.01	+0	+0.02	+0.02
GPT-3.5-turbo-0125	+0.36	+0.51	-0.16	-0.15	-0.17	-0.17	+0.19	+0.21	+0.20	+0.07	+0.04
Llama-3-8b-instruct	+0.22	+0.26	-0.22	-0.22	-0.23	-0.23	+0.37	+0.32	+0.26	+0.06	+0.05
Llama-3-70b-instruct	+0.26	+0.26	-0.33	-0.34	-0.36	-0.36	+0.26	+0.33	+0.22	+0.03	+0.08
Gemma-7b-it	+0.48	+0.60	-0.19	-0.19	-0.20	-0.20	+0.54	+0.55	+0.59	+0.12	+0.08
Vicuna-7b-v1.5	+0.21	+0.37	-0.34	-0.33	-0.31	-0.35	-0.28	-0.23	-0.20	+0.14	+0.07
Mistral-7b-instruct-v0.2	+0.05	+0.20	-0.67	-0.67	-0.66	-0.67	-0.58	-0.50	-0.28	+0.03	+0.07
OpenChat-3.5-0106	+0	+0.16	-0.68	-0.67	-0.68	-0.69	-0.53	-0.41	-0.24	-0.02	-0.01

Some categories are complied more than others. Statistically, more than half of the instructions from 35 out of 45 categories are refused by our evaluated LLMs. Further, we identify "#8: Harassment", "#21: Child-related Crimes", and "#9: Sexual Crimes" as the most frequently refused risk categories, with average compliance rates of barely 10% to 11% across all 43 models. In contrast, some categories have very little refusal across most models. Most models are significantly compliant to provide legal advice ("#43") — except for Gemini-1.5-Flash, which refuses all such requests. These variations may give us independent insight into shared values across many model creators.

Prompt variations can affect model safety significantly in different ways, as shown in Table 2. For example, 6 out of 8 tested models tend to refuse unsafe instructions phrased as *questions* slightly more often (compliance rate decreases by 2∼13%). Meanwhile, some other writing styles can lead to higher compliance across most models; e.g., technical terms lead to 8∼18% more compliance across all models we evaluate. Similarly, reflecting past evaluations, *multilinguality* also affects results, even for popular languages. For Chinese and French, 7 out of 8 models exhibit slightly increased compliance (+2∼14%). Conversely, models such as Vicuna, Mistral, and OpenChat struggle with low-resource languages (Malayalam, Tamil, Marathi), showing a marked decrease in compliance (-20∼53%). More recent models, including GPT-3.5, Llama-3, and Gemma, demonstrate enhanced multilingual conversation abilities but also higher compliance rates (+19∼55%) with unsafe instructions in these languages. Notably, GPT-4o maintains more consistent safety refusal ($\pm \leq 4\%$) across different languages, regardless of their resource levels.

For the other two groups of mutations, *persuasion techniques* and *encoding & encryption*, we observe more consistent trends. All 5 *persuasion techniques* evaluated are effective at eliciting model responses that assist with unsafe intentions, increasing compliance rate by 5∼65%, corresponding to Zeng et al. (2024)'s findings. Conversely, for mutations using ***encoding and encryption strategies***, we notice that most LLMs fail to understand or execute these encoded or encrypted unsafe instructions, often outputting non-sense responses, which are deemed as refusal (compliance rate universally drops by 15∼69%). However, GPT-4o shows increased compliance (+11∼16%) for 2 out of the 4 strategies, possibly due to its superior capability to understand complex instructions (Yuan et al., 2023).

In Appendix J, we also study how different evaluation configurations may affect model safety. For example, we find that Llama-2 and Gemma show notably higher compliance rates (+7%∼30%) when prompt format tokens (e.g., `[INST]`) are missed out, whereas Llama-3 models remain robust.

5 Conclusion

In this work, we introduce SORRY-Bench to systematically evaluate LLM safety refusal behaviors. Our contributions are three-fold. 1) We provide a more fine-grained taxonomy of 45 potentially unsafe topics, on which we collect 450 class-balanced unsafe instructions. 2) We also apply a balanced treatment to a diverse set of linguistic formatting and patterns of prompts, by supplementing our base benchmark dataset with 9K additional unsafe instructions and 20 diverse linguistic augmentations. 3) We collect a large scale human judge dataset with 7K+ annotations, on top of which we explore the best design choices to create a fast and accurate automated safety evaluator. Putting these together, we evaluate over 40 proprietary and open-source LLMs on SORRY-Bench and analyze their distinctive refusal behaviors. We hope our effort provides a building block for evaluating LLM safety refusal in a balanced, granular, customizable, and efficient manner.

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Checklist

1. For all authors...
   (a) Do the main claims made in the abstract and introduction accurately reflect the paper's contributions and scope? [Yes]
   (b) Did you describe the limitations of your work? [Yes] Refer to Appendix A
   (c) Did you discuss any potential negative societal impacts of your work? [Yes] Refer to Appendix A
   (d) Have you read the ethics review guidelines and ensured that your paper conforms to them? [Yes]
2. If you are including theoretical results...
   (a) Did you state the full set of assumptions of all theoretical results? [N/A]
   (b) Did you include complete proofs of all theoretical results? [N/A]
3. If you ran experiments (e.g. for benchmarks)...
   (a) Did you include the code, data, and instructions needed to reproduce the main experimental results (either in the supplemental material or as a URL)? [Yes]
   (b) Did you specify all the training details (e.g., data splits, hyperparameters, how they were chosen)? [Yes]
   (c) Did you report error bars (e.g., with respect to the random seed after running experiments multiple times)? [Yes] We report variance on our key results in the Appendix.
   (d) Did you include the total amount of compute and the type of resources used (e.g., type of GPUs, internal cluster, or cloud provider)? [Yes] Refer to Appendix B
4. If you are using existing assets (e.g., code, data, models) or curating/releasing new assets...
   (a) If your work uses existing assets, did you cite the creators? [Yes]
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   (d) Did you discuss whether and how consent was obtained from people whose data you're using/curating? [Yes]
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5. If you used crowdsourcing or conducted research with human subjects...
   (a) Did you include the full text of instructions given to participants and screenshots, if applicable? [Yes] Refer to Appendix H
   (b) Did you describe any potential participant risks, with links to Institutional Review Board (IRB) approvals, if applicable? [N/A] All participants are authors.
   (c) Did you include the estimated hourly wage paid to participants and the total amount spent on participant compensation? [N/A]