
Adversarial Attacks against Closed-Source MLLMs via Feature Optimal Alignment

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Abstract

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) remain vulnerable to transferable adversarial examples. While existing methods typically achieve targeted attacks by aligning global features—such as CLIP’s [CLS] token—between adversarial and target samples, they often overlook the rich local information encoded in patch tokens. This leads to suboptimal alignment and limited transferability, particularly for closed-source models. To address this limitation, we propose a targeted transferable adversarial attack method based on feature optimal alignment, called FOA-Attack, to improve adversarial transfer capability. Specifically, at the global level, we introduce a global feature loss based on cosine similarity to align the coarse-grained features of adversarial samples with those of target samples. At the local level, given the rich local representations within Transformers, we leverage clustering techniques to extract compact local patterns to alleviate redundant local features. We then formulate local feature alignment between adversarial and target samples as an optimal transport (OT) problem and propose a local clustering optimal transport loss to refine fine-grained feature alignment. Additionally, we propose a dynamic ensemble model weighting strategy to adaptively balance the influence of multiple models during adversarial example generation, thereby further improving transferability. Extensive experiments across various models demonstrate the superiority of the proposed method, outperforming state-of-the-art methods, especially in transferring to closed-source MLLMs. The code is released at <https://github.com/jiaxiaojunQAQ/FOA-Attack>.

1 Introduction

Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) [49, 45, 3, 9, 1, 52, 53] have showcased extraordinary capabilities in language comprehension, reasoning, and generation. Capitalizing on the potent capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs), a series of works [2, 30, 36, 63, 10] have attempted to seamlessly integrate visual input into LLMs, paving the way for the development of Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs). Commonly, these methods adopt pre-trained vision encoders, such as Contrastive Language Image Pre-training (CLIP) [47], to extract features from images and subsequently align them with language embeddings. MLLMs have achieved remarkable performance in vision-related tasks, including visual reasoning [34, 24], image captioning [32, 48], visual question answering [41, 29], etc. Beyond open-source advancements, commercial closed-source MLLMs such as GPT-4o, Claude-3.7, and Gemini-2.0 are widely adopted.

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


Figure 1: Targeted adversarial examples generated by FOA-Attack, with responses from commercial MLLMs to the prompt “Describe this image”.

Although large-scale foundation models have achieved remarkable successes, the security problems [15, 46, 65, 39, 27, 26, 25] associated with them are equally alarming and represent an ongoing challenge that remains unresolved. Recent works [13, 62, 17, 38, 44] have indicated that MLLMs are vulnerable to adversarial examples [19], as they inherit the adversarial vulnerability of vision encoders. The existence of adversarial examples poses significant security and safety risks to the real-world deployment of large-scale foundation models. Recently, some studies [4, 7, 50, 62] have delved into the adversarial robustness of MLLMs and have found that existing MLLMs remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks. Adversarial attacks on MLLMs are broadly classified as untargeted or targeted. Untargeted attacks aim to induce incorrect output, while targeted attacks force specific outputs. Adversarial transferability—the ability of adversarial examples to generalize across models—is critical for both types, especially in black-box settings where the target model is inaccessible. Targeted black-box attacks are particularly challenging [5, 64, 58]. Previous works integrate multiple pre-trained image encoders (*e.g.*, CLIP) to generate adversarial examples, which can significantly improve adversarial transferability. Notably, adversarial examples generated using open-source CLIP models can successfully carry out targeted attacks against closed-source commercial MLLMs. However, they achieve the limit improvement of adversarial transferability. Specifically, existing methods typically generate adversarial examples by minimizing contrastive loss between the global features of adversarial examples and target samples, where global features are often represented by the [CLS] token in open-source image encoders such as CLIP. While this strategy can produce semantically aligned adversarial samples in the feature space of the source model, it largely ignores the rich local features encoded by patch tokens. These local features contain fine-grained spatial and semantic details essential for comprehensive understanding in vision-language tasks. Neglecting them leads to weak alignment at the local level, resulting in adversarial perturbations that are less generalizable and highly dependent on the specific characteristics of the source model. Consequently, the generated adversarial examples tend to overfit the surrogate models and exhibit poor transferability to other models, especially commercial closed-source MLLMs.

To alleviate these issues, we propose FOA-Attack, a targeted transferable adversarial attack method based on optimal alignment of global and local features. Specifically, at the global level, we propose to adopt a coarse-grained feature alignment loss based on cosine similarity, encouraging the global features (*e.g.*, [CLS] tokens) of the adversarial example to align closely with those of the target sample. At the local level, previous works [14] indicate that the [CLS] token in the Transformer architecture represents global features, while other tokens represent local patch features. To fully extract the information from the target image, we use local features to generate adversarial samples. Although local features are rich, they are also redundant. We employ clustering techniques to distill compact and discriminative local patterns; that is, we use the features of the cluster centers to represent the characteristics of each cluster. We then formulate the alignment of these local features as an optimal transport (OT) problem and propose a local clustering OT loss to achieve fine-grained alignment between adversarial and target samples. Moreover, to further improve adversarial transferability, we propose a dynamic ensemble model weighting strategy that adaptively balances the weights of multiple models during adversarial example generation. Specifically, we generate adversarial samples using multiple CLIP image encoders, treating enhancement of feature similarity to the target sample across different encoders as separate tasks. The convergence of each objective

can be indicated by the rate at which its loss decreases—faster loss reduction implies a higher learning speed. Consequently, a higher learning speed results in a lower weight assigned to that objective. Extensive experiments demonstrate that the proposed FOA-Attack consistently outperforms state-of-the-art targeted adversarial attack methods, achieving superior transferability against both open-source and closed-source MLLMs. As shown in Fig. 1, the proposed FOA-Attack generates adversarial examples with superior transferability. Our main contributions are as follows:

- We propose FOA-Attack, a targeted transferable attack framework that jointly aligns global and local features, effectively guiding adversarial examples toward the target feature distribution and enhancing transferability.
- At the global level, we propose a cosine similarity-based global feature loss to align coarse-grained representations, while at the local level, we extract compact patch-level features via clustering and formulate their alignment as an optimal transport (OT) problem. Subsequently, we propose a local clustering OT loss for fine-grained alignment.
- We propose a dynamic ensemble model weighting strategy that adaptively balances multiple image encoders based on their convergence rates, substantially boosting the transferability of adversarial examples.
- Extensive experiments across various models are conducted to demonstrate that FOA-Attack consistently outperforms state-of-the-art methods, achieving remarkable performance even against closed-source MLLMs.

2 Related work

2.1 Multimodal large language models

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable performance in Natural Language Processing (NLP). Leveraging the impressive capabilities of LLMs, several studies have explored their integration with visual inputs, enabling strong performance across applications such as multimodal dialogue systems [2, 59, 1], visual question answering [54, 60, 23], etc. This integration marks a pivotal step toward the evolution of Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs). Existing studies achieve the integration of textual and visual modes through different strategies. Specifically, some studies focus on utilizing learnable queries to extract visual information and then adopt LLMs to generate text information based on the extracted visual features, such as Flamingo [2], BLIP-2 [30]. Some works propose to adopt several projection layers to align the visual features with text embeddings, such as PandaGPT [51], LLaVA [36, 37]. In addition, some works [16] propose to use some lightweight adapters to perform fine-tuning for performance improvement. Moreover, several studies [31, 42] have expanded the scope of research to include video inputs, utilizing the extensive capabilities of LLMs for enhanced video understanding tasks.

2.2 Adversarial attacks

Previous adversarial attack methods have primarily focused on image classification tasks. They usually utilize model gradients to generate adversarial examples, such as FGSM [18], PGD [43], C&W [6]. These studies have shown that deep neural networks are easily fooled by adversarial examples. Some studies [20, 55, 57] have demonstrated that MLLMs not only inherit the advantages of vision modules but also their vulnerabilities to adversarial examples. Adversarial attacks for MLLMs can be categorized as untargeted attacks and targeted attacks. Untargeted attacks aim to induce MLLMs to produce incorrect textual outputs, whereas targeted attacks aim to force specific, predetermined outputs. A series of recent works has paid more attention to the transferability of adversarial attacks, particularly in targeted scenarios. Adversarial transferability refers to the ability of adversarial examples generated on surrogate models to successfully attack unseen models. In particular, Zhao et al. [62] propose AttackVLM, involving generating targeted adversarial examples using pre-trained models like CLIP [47] and BLIP [30], and then transferring these examples to other VLMs such as MiniGPT-4 [63], LLaVA. They have demonstrated that image-to-image feature matching can improve adversarial transferability more effectively than image-to-text feature matching, a finding that has inspired subsequent research. Chen et al. [8] propose the Common Weakness Attack (CWA), a method that enhances the transferability of adversarial examples by targeting shared vulnerabilities among ensemble surrogate models. Subsequently, Dong et al. [13] propose




Figure 2: **Overview of the proposed FOA-Attack.** (a) The proposed feature optimal alignment loss which includes the coarse-grained feature loss and the fine-grained feature loss. (b) The proposed dynamic ensemble model weighting strategy.

the SSA-CWA method, which combines Spectrum Simulation Attack [40] (SSA) and Common Weakness Attack (CWA) to enhance the transferability of adversarial examples against closed-source commercial MLLMs like Google’s Bard. Guo et al. [22] propose AdvDiffVLM, a diffusion-based framework that integrates Adaptive Ensemble Gradient Estimation (AEGE) and GradCAM-guided Mask Generation (GCMG) to efficiently generate targeted and transferable adversarial examples for MLLMs. Zhang et al. [61] propose AnyAttack, a self-supervised framework, which trains a noise generator on the large-scale LAION-400M dataset using contrastive learning, to generate targeted adversarial examples for MLLMs without labels. Li et al. [33] propose the M-Attack method, which uses random cropping and resizing during optimization, to significantly improve the transferability of adversarial examples against MLLMs.

3 Methodology

Previous works show ensemble-based adversarial examples exhibit better transferability than single-model ones; thus, we employ a dynamic ensemble framework in this work. As shown in Fig. 2, the proposed FOA-Attack incorporates a feature optimal alignment loss and a dynamic ensemble weighting strategy to jointly enhance adversarial transferability across different foundation models.

3.1 Preliminary

Given an ensemble of image encoders from vision-language pre-training models $\mathcal{F} = \{f_{\theta_1}, f_{\theta_2}, \dots, f_{\theta_t}\}$, where each image encoder $f : \mathbb{R}^D \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^F$ outputs the image features for an input $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}^D$. Given a natural image $\mathbf{x}_{nat}$ and a target image $\mathbf{x}_{tar}$, the goal of the transfer-based attack is to generate an adversarial example $\mathbf{x}_{adv}$ whose features are as close as possible to those of the target image. It can be formulated as a constrained optimization problem:

$$\min_{\mathbf{x}_{adv}} \sum_{i=1}^t [\mathcal{L}(f_{\theta_i}(\mathbf{x}_{adv}), f_{\theta_i}(\mathbf{x}_{tar}))], \quad \text{s.t. } \|\mathbf{x}_{adv} - \mathbf{x}_{nat}\|_{\infty} \leq \epsilon, \quad (1)$$

where $\mathcal{L}$ represents the loss function, ϵ represents the maximum perturbation strength, and the adversarial examples are generated under the ℓ_{∞} norm.

3.2 The proposed coarse-grained feature optimal alignment

Given an image encoder (e.g., CLIP) f_{θ} , we extract the coarse-grained global features (e.g., [CLS] token) of the adversarial example $\mathbf{x}_{adv}$ as $\mathbf{X} = f_{\theta}(\mathbf{x}_{adv}) \in \mathbb{R}^{1 \times d}$, where d is the feature dimension. Similarly, the coarse-grained global feature of the target image is extracted as $\mathbf{Y} = f_{\theta}(\mathbf{x}_{tar}) \in \mathbb{R}^{1 \times d}$. To promote the adversarial example to align with the semantics of the target image at a global level, we minimize the negative cosine similarity between their coarse-grained features as the optimization

objective. The loss function can be defined as:

$$\mathcal{L}_{coa} = 1 - \cos(\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{Y}) = 1 - \frac{\langle \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{Y} \rangle}{\|\mathbf{X}\| \cdot \|\mathbf{Y}\|}, \quad (2)$$

where $\langle \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{Y} \rangle$ is the inner product and $\|\cdot\|$ is the ℓ_2 norm.

3.3 The proposed fine-grained feature optimal alignment

Given an image encoder (e.g., CLIP) f_θ , we extract the fine-grained local features (e.g., patch tokens) of the adversarial example and the target image. They can be defined as:

$$\mathbf{X}_{loc} = f_\theta^{loc}(\mathbf{x}_{adv}) \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times d}, \quad \mathbf{Y}_{loc} = f_\theta^{loc}(\mathbf{x}_{tar}) \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times d} \quad (3)$$

where $\mathbf{X}_{loc}$ and $\mathbf{Y}_{loc}$ represent the local features of the adversarial sample and the target image respectively, f_θ^{loc} represents the image features extracted from patch tokens of the image encoder, and m represents the number of patch or local features. Since local features contain fine-grained image information as well as more redundant image information, to reduce redundancy and retain discriminative information from the local features, we apply K-means clustering on $\mathbf{X}_{loc}$ and $\mathbf{Y}_{loc}$ to obtain representative cluster centers. Formally, we define:

$$\mathbf{X}_{clu} = \text{KMeans}(\mathbf{X}_{loc}, n) \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times d}, \quad \mathbf{Y}_{clu} = \text{KMeans}(\mathbf{Y}_{loc}, n) \in \mathbb{R}^{n \times d}, \quad (4)$$

where $\mathbf{X}_{clu}$ and $\mathbf{Y}_{clu}$ denote the n cluster centers obtained from the local features of the adversarial and target images, respectively. Each cluster center summarizes a semantically coherent region in the original image feature space, thus providing a more compact and informative representation for alignment. In our modeling of fine-grained local feature loss, we have drawn inspiration from the theory of optimal transport [56]. This theory was proposed by Villani with the objective of achieving the transportation of goods at minimal cost. In our study, we model the local features of the adversarial example and the target image as two separate distributions. Our goal is to identify the most efficient transportation scheme to more appropriately match the features of the target image onto the adversarial example, which can facilitate the transition between the two distributions. Let $\mu = \{\mathbf{X}_{clu}^a\}_{a=1}^n$ represent the distribution of clustering local features in the adversarial example, where n is the number of clustering local features, and $\mathbf{X}_{clu}^a$ denotes the a -th clustering local feature. Similarly, let $\nu = \{\mathbf{Y}_{clu}^b\}_{b=1}^n$ represent the distribution of clustering local features in the target image, with $\mathbf{Y}_{clu}^b$ representing the b -th clustering local feature. The cost function $c(\mathbf{X}_{clu}^a, \mathbf{Y}_{clu}^b)$ defines the cost of transporting a feature from $\mathbf{X}_{clu}^a$ in the adversarial example to $\mathbf{Y}_{clu}^b$ in the target image. Hence, the optimization problem is formulated as:

$$\min \sum_{a=1}^n \sum_{b=1}^n c(\mathbf{X}_{clu}^a, \mathbf{Y}_{clu}^b) \cdot \pi_{ab}, \quad \text{s.t.} \quad \forall a, \sum_{b=1}^n \pi_{ab} = 1; \quad \forall b, \sum_{a=1}^n \pi_{ab} = 1; \quad \forall a, b, \pi_{ab} \geq 0,$$

where the matrix π represents the transport plan between the features of the adversarial examples and target images. Each element π_{ab} of this matrix indicates the proportion of the a -th feature from the adversarial example that is assigned to the b -th feature in the target image. The constraints ensure the alignment of local features in accordance with μ and ν . The cost function is commonly computed using the negative cosine similarity as below:

$$c(\mathbf{X}_{clu}^a, \mathbf{Y}_{clu}^b) = 1 - \langle \mathbf{X}_{clu}^a, \mathbf{Y}_{clu}^b \rangle, \quad (5)$$

The Sinkhorn algorithm [11] is employed to solve this optimal transport problem. Let $C_{ab} = c(\mathbf{X}_{clu}^a, \mathbf{Y}_{clu}^b)$ be the cost of transporting the a -th local feature of the adversarial example to the b -th local feature of the target image. Local feature loss begins by defining the cost matrix:

$$C_{ab} = c(\mathbf{X}_{clu}^a, \mathbf{Y}_{clu}^b), \quad \forall a, b \quad (6)$$

Then iteratively update u and v :

$$u_a = \frac{1}{n} \left(\sum_b \exp \left(-\frac{C_{ab}}{\lambda} \right) v_b \right)^{-1}, \quad v_b = \frac{1}{n} \left(\sum_a \exp \left(-\frac{C_{ab}}{\lambda} \right) u_a \right)^{-1}, \quad (7)$$

where $\lambda > 0$ is the regularization parameter (default: $\lambda = 0.1$). The transport plan is:

$$\pi_{ab} = u_a \exp\left(-\frac{C_{ab}}{\lambda}\right) v_b. \quad (8)$$

Finally, the local feature loss is:

$$\mathcal{L}_{fin} = \sum_{a,b} C_{ab} \cdot \pi_{ab}. \quad (9)$$

Finally, the total loss of FOA-Attack for the image encoder f_θ can be defined as:

$$\mathcal{L}_\theta = \mathcal{L}_{coa} + \eta \cdot \mathcal{L}_{fin}, \quad (10)$$

where η is the weighting factor that balances the local loss component. To handle varying local feature complexity, we adopt a progressive strategy that increases the number of cluster centers if the attack fails. In this paper, the number of centers is set to 3 and 5.

3.4 The proposed dynamic ensemble model weighting strategy

Building upon prior work, we generate adversarial examples using ensemble losses from multiple models to enhance adversarial transferability, computed as:

$$\mathcal{L} = \sum_{i=1}^t W_i \cdot \mathcal{L}_{\theta_i}, \quad (11)$$

where $\mathcal{L}_{\theta_i}$ represents the loss generated on the i -th image encoder and W_i represents the corresponding weight coefficient. Previous studies typically set all weights W_i at 1.0 without investigating the impact of varying W_i values on adversarial transferability, leading to limited improvements. Due to inconsistent vulnerabilities in different models, assigning uniform weights can cause optimization to favor certain losses. This often results in adversarial examples that are effective only on specific models, thereby reducing adversarial transferability. To further boost adversarial transferability, we propose a dynamic ensemble model weighting strategy to adaptively balance the weights of multiple models for adversarial example generation. Specifically, we generate adversarial examples using multiple CLIP image encoders, where improving the feature alignment between the adversarial and target samples on each encoder is treated as an independent optimization task. To balance these tasks, we monitor the convergence behavior of each objective by measuring the rate of loss reduction. A faster decrease in loss indicates a higher effective learning speed, suggesting that the task is easier to optimize. Hence, we assign a lower weight to objectives with higher learning speeds, ensuring that the optimization does not overemphasize the easily aligned tasks while neglecting others. At step $\mathbb{T}$, the learning speed is calculated by the loss ratio between steps $\mathbb{T}$ and $\mathbb{T} - 1$:

$$S_i(\mathbb{T}) = \frac{\mathcal{L}_{\theta_i}^{\mathbb{T}}(f_{\theta_i}(\mathbf{x}_{adv}), f_{\theta_i}(\mathbf{x}_{tar}))}{\mathcal{L}_{\theta_i}^{\mathbb{T}-1}(f_{\theta_i}(\mathbf{x}_{adv}), f_{\theta_i}(\mathbf{x}_{tar}))}, \quad (12)$$

where $\mathcal{L}_{\theta_i}$ is calculated by using Eq. (10) and $S_i(\mathbb{T})$ represents the learning speed of the adversarial example generation on the i -th model. The weight parameters in Eq. (11) can be calculated by:

$$W_i = W_{\text{init}} \times t \times \frac{\exp(S_i(\mathbb{T})/T)}{\sum_{j=1}^t \exp(S_j(\mathbb{T})/T)}, \quad (13)$$

where W_{init} denotes the initial setting of each W_i , consistent with the M-Attack configuration of 1.0. Multiplying by the number of surrogate models t scales the weights to fluctuate around 1.0, thereby refining the initialization. The temperature coefficient T further adjusts the relative differences between task weights. A detailed description of the algorithm is provided in the Appendix A.

4 Experiment

4.1 Settings

Datasets. Following previous works [13, 33], we use 1,000 clean images of size $224 \times 224 \times 3$ from the NIPS 2017 Adversarial Attacks and Defenses Competition dataset¹. Additionally, we randomly select 1,000 images from the MSCOCO validation set [35] as target images.

¹<https://nips.cc/Conferences/2017/CompetitionTrack>

Table 1: Performance of ASR (%) and AvgSim on different open-source MLLMs.

Method	Model	Qwen2.5-VL-3B		Qwen2.5-VL-7B		LLaVa-1.5-7B		LLaVa-1.6-7B		Gemma-3-4B		Gemma-3-12B	
		ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim
AttackVLM [62]	B/16	4.9	0.08	9.7	0.14	31.4	0.31	27.7	0.28	8.2	0.16	2.3	0.07
	B/32	8.7	0.12	13.3	0.17	11.3	0.14	9.5	0.12	8.4	0.15	1.7	0.05
	Laion	14.0	0.17	26.1	0.27	46.3	0.42	47.1	0.42	15.7	0.23	11.6	0.16
AdvDiffVLM [22]	Ensemble	2.1	0.01	2.5	0.01	1.5	0.01	1.6	0.01	0.7	0.00	0.8	0.01
SSA-CWA [13]	Ensemble	0.9	0.03	0.7	0.03	1.1	0.03	1.2	0.03	7.6	0.15	0.9	0.03
AnyAttack [61]	Ensemble	13.7	0.16	21.6	0.24	37.5	0.35	38.4	0.37	10.2	0.17	8.3	0.15
M-Attack [33]	Ensemble	38.6	0.35	52.6	0.46	68.3	0.56	67.1	0.56	23.0	0.29	21.3	0.25
FOA-Attack (Ours)	Ensemble	52.4	0.45	70.7	0.58	79.6	0.65	78.9	0.66	38.1	0.41	35.3	0.35


Implementation Settings. Following [33], we adopt three CLIP variants, which include ViT-B/16, ViT-B/32, and ViT-g-14-laion2B-s12B-b42K, as surrogate models to generate adversarial examples. The perturbation budget ϵ is set to 16/255 under the norm ℓ_∞ . The attack step size is set to 1/255. The number of attack iterations is set to 300. We evaluate the transferability of adversarial examples across fourteen MLLMs, including six open-source models (Qwen2.5-VL-3B/7B, LLaVa-1.5/1.6-7B, Gemma-3-4B/12B), five closed-source models (Claude-3.5/3.7, GPT-4o/4.1, Gemini-2.0), and three reasoning-oriented closed-source models (GPT-o3, Claude-3.7-thinking, Gemini-2.0-flash-thinking-exp). The text prompt of these models is set to “Describe this image.” All experiments are run on an Ubuntu system using an NVIDIA A100 Tensor Core GPU with 80GB of RAM.

Competitive Methods. We compare the proposed FOA-Attack with five advanced targeted and transfer-based adversarial attack methods for MLLMs: AttackVLM [62], SSA-CWA [13], AdvDiffVLM [22], AnyAttack [61], and M-Attack [33].

Evaluation metrics. Following [33], we adopt the widely used LLM-as-a-judge framework. Specifically, we use the same target MLLM to generate captions for both adversarial examples and target images, then assess their similarity using GPTScore. An attack is considered successful if the similarity score exceeds 0.5², which means that the adversarial example and the target image have the same subject. Additional results under varied thresholds are provided in the Appendix B. We report the attack success rate (ASR) and the average similarity score (AvgSim). For reproducibility, we include detailed evaluation prompts in the Appendix C.

4.2 Hyper-parameter Selection

We have two hyper-parameters in the proposed method: the temperature coefficient T and the weighting factor η . To study their effects, we conduct hyper-parameter selection experiments. As shown in Fig. 3 (a), setting $T = 1.0$ achieves the best trade-off between ASR and AvgSim, particularly on GPT-4o. While the ASR on Claude-3.5 shows minor variation, the performance on GPT-4o is more sensitive to T , with $T = 1.0$ leading to optimal semantic alignment. In Fig. 3 (b), we find that $\eta = 0.2$ consistently delivers the best performance on both models. A larger η overemphasizes the fine-grained loss, which slightly harms overall alignment. Therefore, we set $T = 1.0$ and $\eta = 0.2$ as the default values in our experiments.

Figure 3: (a) Impact of the temperature coefficient T ; (b) Impact of the weighting factor η .

4.3 Comparisons results

Comparisons with different attack methods. We compare our proposed FOA-Attack with several existing adversarial attack baselines, including AttackVLM, AdvDiffVLM, SSA-CWA, AnyAttack, and M-Attack, across both open-source and closed-source MLLMs. As shown in Table 1, on open-source models such as Qwen, LLaVa, and Gemma series, FOA-Attack consistently outperforms all baselines by a large margin. Specifically, it achieves an average ASR of 70.7% and 79.6% on Qwen2.5-VL-7B and LLaVa-1.5-7B, respectively, significantly surpassing the prior strongest method, M-Attack (52.6% and 68.3%). Moreover, FOA-Attack achieves the highest AvgSim scores

²This work adopts a stricter success threshold than the 0.3 used in M-Attack [33].

Table 2: Performance of ASR (%) and AvgSim on different closed-source MLLMs.

Method	Model	Claude-3.5		Claude-3.7		GPT-4o		GPT-4.1		Gemini-2.0	
		ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim
AttackVLM [62]	B/16	0.1	0.02	0.2	0.03	16.2	0.21	17.5	0.22	7.0	0.12
	B/32	4.8	0.08	7.3	0.11	5.3	0.10	6.4	0.11	2.6	0.06
	Laion	0.3	0.02	1.2	0.03	39.7	0.38	42.4	0.39	28.9	0.30
AdvDiffVLM [22]	Ensemble	0.8	0.01	1.1	0.01	2.3	0.01	2.5	0.01	1.6	0.01
SSA-CWA [13]	Ensemble	0.4	0.02	0.4	0.03	0.5	0.03	0.2	0.02	0.4	0.02
AnyAttack [61]	Ensemble	4.6	0.09	4.3	0.08	8.2	0.15	7.3	0.13	6.1	0.12
M-Attack [33]	Ensemble	6.0	0.10	8.9	0.12	60.3	0.50	60.8	0.51	44.8	0.41
FOA-Attack (Ours)	Ensemble	11.9	0.16	15.8	0.18	75.1	0.59	77.3	0.62	53.4	0.50

across all models, indicating a better semantic alignment between adversarial and target captions. Table 2 further demonstrates the superiority of FOA-Attack on closed-source commercial MLLMs, including Claude-3, GPT-4, and Gemini-2.0. Notably, FOA-Attack yields 75.1% and 77.3% ASR on GPT-4o and GPT-4.1, outperforming M-Attack by 14.8% and 16.5%, respectively. On Gemini-2.0, FOA-Attack achieves a remarkable 53.4% ASR and 0.50 AvgSim, while other baselines perform poorly with ASRs below 8%. These results validate the effectiveness of our method across a wide range of both open- and closed-source MLLMs. We also provide the computation-time normalized comparison between M-Attack and FOA-Attack in the Appendix D. FOA-Attack results against defenses are in the Appendix E.

Comparisons on reasoning MLLMs. We further evaluate our FOA-Attack on 100 randomly selected images with reasoning-enhanced closed-source MLLMs, including GPT-o3, Claude-3.7-thinking, and Gemini-2.0-flash-thinking-exp, as shown in Table 3. Compared to the strong baseline M-Attack, our method consistently achieves higher ASR and AvgSim across all models. Specifically, on GPT-o3, FOA-Attack achieves an ASR of 81.0% and an AvgSim of 0.63, outperforming M-Attack by 14.0% and 0.09, respectively. Similarly, on Gemini-2.0-flash-thinking-exp, FOA-Attack improves ASR from 49.0% to 57.0% and AvgSim from 0.43 to 0.51. Even for the highly robust Claude-3.7-thinking model, our method raises ASR from 10.0% to 16.0%, along with a slight improvement in AvgSim. These results demonstrate that FOA-Attack remains highly effective even against reasoning-enhanced MLLMs, which are typically assumed to be more robust due to their advanced alignment and reasoning capabilities. However, our findings reveal that these models exhibit comparable or even weaker resistance to adversarial inputs than their non-reasoning MLLMs. This may stem from their reliance on textual reasoning, while shared visual encoders remain vulnerable to visual perturbations.

Table 3: Performance of ASR (%) and AvgSim on reasoning-enhanced closed-source MLLMs.

Method	Model	GPT-o3		Claude-3.7-thinking		Gemini-2.0-flash-thinking-exp	
		ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim
M-Attack [33]	Ensemble	67.0	0.54	10.0	0.15	49.0	0.43
FOA-Attack (Ours)	Ensemble	81.0	0.63	16.0	0.18	57.0	0.51

4.4 Ablation study

To understand the contribution of each component in FOA-Attack, we conduct an ablation study on 100 randomly selected images. As shown in Table 4, we systematically remove three core modules from FOA-Attack: global alignment, local alignment, and dynamic loss weighting. Removing global alignment results in a noticeable drop in performance, with ASR decreasing from 81.0% to 78.0% on GPT-4o and from 16.0% to 14.0% on Claude-3.5. It indicates the importance of aligning coarse-grained features for effective adversarial transferability. Excluding local alignment leads to a more significant degradation, especially in AvgSim, indicating that fine-grained feature alignment is essential for preserving semantic consistency between the adversarial and target samples. ASR on GPT-4o drops to 76.0%, and AvgSim decreases from 0.62 to 0.58. Lastly, removing dynamic loss weighting also reduces performance (e.g., 81.0% $\rightarrow$ 79.0% ASR on GPT-4o), showing that adaptively balancing optimization objectives also contributes to improving adversarial transferability. We further evaluate the role of K-Means clustering in local feature alignment by removing it and directly aligning all patch tokens. As shown in Table 5, removing K-Means leads to a clear drop in both attack success rate and feature similarity.

Table 4: Ablation study of our FOA-Attack.

Method	Claude-3.5		GPT-4o	
	ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim
M-Attack	10.0	0.13	73.0	0.56
FOA-Attack (Ours)	16.0	0.18	81.0	0.62
w/o global alignment	14.0	0.17	78.0	0.60
w/o local alignment	12.0	0.15	76.0	0.58
w/o dynamic loss weighting	13.0	0.17	79.0	0.61

Table 5: Ablation study on the necessity of the K-Means clustering step.

Method	GPT-4o ASR (%)	AvgSim	Claude-3.5 ASR (%)	AvgSim	Gemini-2.0 ASR (%)	AvgSim
FOA-Attack (w/o K-Means)	77.0	0.59	12.0	0.16	50.0	0.42
FOA-Attack (w/ K-Means)	81.0	0.62	16.0	0.18	56.0	0.46




Figure 4: Visualization of adversarial images and perturbation.

4.5 Performance analysis

Keyword matching rate (KMR). Previous work manually assigned three semantic keywords to each image and introduced three success thresholds— KMR_α (at least one matched), KMR_β (at least two matched), and KMR_γ (all three matched)—to evaluate attack transferability under different semantic matching levels. Following their setting, we compare the proposed method with previous works on 100 randomly selected images. As shown in Table 6, FOA-Attack consistently outperforms all baselines across different models (GPT-4o, Gemini-2.0, and Claude-3.5) and all keyword matching thresholds (KMR_α , KMR_β , KMR_γ), demonstrating superior targeted transferability. Notably, it achieves 92.0% on KMR_α and significantly higher scores on stricter metrics (76.0% KMR_β , 27.0% KMR_γ) on GPT-4o. Even on the more robust Claude-3.5, FOA-Attack achieves the best performance with 37.0% KMR_α . These results highlight the effectiveness of our FOA-Attack in enhancing adversarial transferability.

Table 6: Keyword Matching Rate (KMR) comparison across different models and attack methods.

Method	Model	GPT-4o			Gemini-2.0			Claude-3.5		
		KMR_α	KMR_β	KMR_γ	KMR_α	KMR_β	KMR_γ	KMR_α	KMR_β	KMR_γ
AttackVLM [62]	B/16	9.0	4.0	0.0	7.0	2.0	0.0	6.0	3.0	0.0
	B/32	8.0	2.0	0.0	7.0	2.0	0.0	4.0	1.0	0.0
	Laion	7.0	4.0	0.0	7.0	2.0	0.0	5.0	2.0	0.0
AdvDiffVLM [22]	Ensemble	2.0	0.0	0.0	2.0	0.0	0.0	2.0	0.0	0.0
SSA-CWA [13]	Ensemble	11.0	6.0	0.0	5.0	2.0	0.0	7.0	3.0	0.0
AnyAttack [61]	Ensemble	44.0	20.0	4.0	46.0	21.0	5.0	25.0	10.0	2.0
M-Attack [33]	Ensemble	82.0	54.0	13.0	75.0	53.0	11.0	31.0	18.0	3.0
FOA-Attack (Ours)	Ensemble	92.0	76.0	27.0	88.0	69.0	24.0	37.0	23.0	5.0

Sample visualization. Fig. 4 shows adversarial images and perturbations from different methods. Our method preserves image quality with minimal visible artifacts, while baselines such as AnyAttack and M-Attack introduce more noticeable noise. The perturbation maps on the right reveal that our method produces more structured and semantically aligned patterns, indicating stronger feature-level alignment and better adversarial transferability. Commercial MLLM responses are in the Appendix F.

Impact of more cluster centers. To enhance transferability, we adopt a progressive strategy that increases the number of cluster centers upon attack failure. We conduct experiments on 100 randomly selected images to explore the impact of more cluster centers. As shown in Table 7, incorporating more centers consistently im-

Table 7: Performance with varying cluster centers.

Method	Time (mins)	Claude-3.5		GPT-4o	
		ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim
M-Attack [33]	90	10.0	0.13	73.0	0.56
FOA-Attack ([3])	113	12.0	0.14	76.0	0.58
FOA-Attack ([3,5])	217	16.0	0.18	81.0	0.62
FOA-Attack ([3,5,8])	315	17.0	0.20	83.0	0.63
FOA-Attack ([3,5,8,10])	410	18.0	0.21	84.0	0.64

proves ASR and AvgSim, but also leads to higher time cost. To strike a balance between effectiveness and efficiency, we adopt the ([3,5]) setting in our main experiments. Moreover, in practice, the Sinkhorn algorithm needs minimal overhead compared to the dominant cost of gradient-based optimization in adversarial attacks. Since it only involves matrix-vector multiplications and element-wise operations, its computational cost is negligible relative to backpropagation. Specifically, FOA-Attack takes about 1.13 minutes to generate an adversarial example, whereas the Sinkhorn algorithm accounts for only around 0.015 minutes.

Table 8: Performance of attack transferability on more surrogate models.

Method	GPT-4o		Claude-3.5		Gemini	
	ASR (%)	AvgSim	ASR (%)	AvgSim	ASR (%)	AvgSim
M-Attack [33]	73.0	0.56	10.0	0.13	48.0	0.40
FOA-Attack	81.0	0.62	16.0	0.18	56.0	0.46
M-Attack (+SigLIP) [33]	73.0	0.56	11.0	0.13	50.0	0.41
FOA-Attack (+SigLIP)	82.0	0.62	19.0	0.20	60.0	0.50
M-Attack (+MetaCLIP) [33]	74.0	0.58	13.0	0.15	51.0	0.42
FOA-Attack (+MetaCLIP)	85.0	0.64	24.0	0.24	60.0	0.51
M-Attack (+SigLIP+MetaCLIP) [33]	75.0	0.58	13.0	0.15	53.0	0.43
FOA-Attack (+SigLIP+MetaCLIP)	86.0	0.64	26.0	0.25	62.0	0.53

Performance on more surrogate models. we additionally explore the effect of incorporating more diverse models into the ensemble. Specifically, we include SigLIP and MetaCLIP to construct a stronger ensemble. We conduct experiments on 100 randomly selected images. The results are in Table 8. It can be observed that expanding the ensemble to include more diverse models (SigLIP, MetaCLIP) improves transferability across all target models. Notably, our proposed FOA-Attack consistently outperforms M-Attack in all settings, confirming that the effectiveness of FOA-Attack is not solely dependent on the backbone ensemble size or diversity, but benefits from our proposed optimization strategies.

Table 9: Comparison of CLIP similarities between successful and failed samples.

CLIP Similarity	Qwen2.5-VL-3B	Qwen2.5-VL-7B	LLaVa-1.5-7B	LLaVa-1.6-7B	Gemma-3-4B	Gemma-3-12B
Success	0.4719	0.4742	0.4714	0.4711	0.4742	0.4767
Fail	0.4656	0.4560	0.4588	0.4607	0.4656	0.4646
CLIP Similarity	Claude-3.5	Claude-3.7	GPT-4o	GPT-4.1	Gemini-2.0	—
Success	0.4890	0.4762	0.4713	0.4714	0.4739	—
Fail	0.4662	0.4674	0.4610	0.4600	0.4604	—

Impact of Source–Target Similarity on ASR. To investigate whether visual similarity between source and target images affects attack success, we compute CLIP similarities for successful and failed samples across various models. Table 9 shows the average CLIP similarity scores for each case. On average, successful samples exhibit slightly higher CLIP similarity ($\Delta \approx +0.009$), suggesting that visual similarity between source and target images can marginally benefit attack success. However, the overall difference is small, indicating that our method does not rely heavily on image similarity and remains robust across diverse natural images.

5 Conclusion

In this work, we propose FOA-Attack, a targeted transferable adversarial attack framework that jointly aligns global and local features to improve transferability against both open- and closed-source MLLMs. Our method incorporates a global cosine similarity loss, a local clustering optimal transport loss, and a dynamic ensemble weighting strategy to comprehensively enhance adversarial transferability. Extensive experiments across various models demonstrate that the proposed FOA-Attack significantly outperforms existing state-of-the-art attack methods in both attack success rate and semantic similarity, especially on closed-source commercial and reasoning-enhanced MLLMs. These results reveal persistent vulnerabilities in MLLMs and highlight the importance of fine-grained feature alignment in designing transferable adversarial attacks. Further discussion, including limitations and broader impacts, is provided in the Appendix G.

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A A Detailed Description of Our FOA-Attack

Following the M-Attack [33], we propose a targeted transferable adversarial attack method based on feature optimal alignment, called FOA-Attack. The detailed description of the proposed FOA-Attack is shown in Algorithm 1.

Algorithm 1: FOA-Attack

Input: clean image $\mathbf{x}_{\text{nat}}$, target image $\mathbf{x}_{\text{tar}}$, perturbation budget ϵ , iterations n , loss function $\mathcal{L}$, surrogate model ensemble $\mathcal{F} = \{f_{\theta_1}, f_{\theta_2}, \dots, f_{\theta_t}\}$, image processing $\mathcal{T}$, step size α

Output: adversarial image $\mathbf{x}_{\text{adv}}$

```

1 Initialize:  $\mathbf{x}_{\text{adv}}^0 = \mathbf{x}_{\text{nat}} + \delta_0$  (i.e.,  $\delta_0 = 0$ ); // Initialize adversarial image  $\mathbf{x}_{\text{adv}}$ 
2 for  $\mathbb{T} = 0$  to  $n - 1$  do
3    $\hat{\mathbf{x}}_i^a = \mathcal{T}(\mathbf{x}_{\text{adv}}^i)$ ,  $\hat{\mathbf{x}}^t = \mathcal{T}(\mathbf{x}_{\text{tar}})$ ;
4   ; // Perform random crop
5   for  $j = 1$  to  $t$  do
6      $\mathcal{L}_{coa} = 1 - \frac{\langle f_{\theta_j}(\hat{\mathbf{x}}_i^a), f_{\theta_j}(\hat{\mathbf{x}}^t) \rangle}{\|f_{\theta_j}(\hat{\mathbf{x}}_i^a)\| \cdot \|f_{\theta_j}(\hat{\mathbf{x}}^t)\|}$ ,
7      $\mathbf{X}_{loc} = f_{\theta_j}^{loc}(\mathbf{x}_{\text{adv}})$ ,  $\mathbf{Y}_{loc} = f_{\theta_j}^{loc}(\mathbf{x}_{\text{tar}})$ ,
8      $\mathbf{X}_{clu} = \text{KMeans}(\mathbf{X}_{loc}, n)$ ,  $\mathbf{Y}_{clu} = \text{KMeans}(\mathbf{Y}_{loc}, n)$ ,
9      $C_{ab} = c(\mathbf{X}_{clu}^a, \mathbf{Y}_{clu}^b)$ ,  $\forall a, b$   $c(\mathbf{X}_{clu}^a, \mathbf{Y}_{clu}^b) = 1 - \langle \mathbf{X}_{clu}^a, \mathbf{Y}_{clu}^b \rangle$ ,
10     $u_a = \frac{1}{n} (\sum_b \exp(-\frac{C_{ab}}{\lambda}) v_b)^{-1}$ ,  $v_b = \frac{1}{n} (\sum_a \exp(-\frac{C_{ab}}{\lambda}) u_a)^{-1}$ ,
11     $\pi_{ab} = u_a \exp(-\frac{C_{ab}}{\lambda}) v_b$ ,
12     $\mathcal{L}_{fin} = \sum_{a,b} C_{ab} \cdot \pi_{ab}$ 
13     $\mathcal{L}_{\theta_j}^{\mathbb{T}} = \mathcal{L}_{coa} + \eta \cdot \mathcal{L}_{fin}$ ,
14    if  $\mathbb{T} == 0$  then
15       $S_j(\mathbb{T}) = 1$ ,
16    else
17       $S_j(\mathbb{T}) = \frac{\mathcal{L}_{\theta_j}^{\mathbb{T}}}{\mathcal{L}_{\theta_j}^{\mathbb{T}-1}}$ ,
18     $W_{\text{init}} = 1$ 
19    for  $j = 1$  to  $t$  do
20       $W_j = W_{\text{init}} \times t \times \frac{\exp(S_j(\mathbb{T})/T)}{\sum_{j=1}^t \exp(S_j(\mathbb{T})/T)}$ ,
21     $g_i = \frac{1}{m} \nabla_{\hat{\mathbf{x}}_i^a} \sum_{j=1}^m W_j \cdot \mathcal{L}_{\theta_j}$ ;
22     $\delta_{i+1} = \text{Clip}(\delta_i + \alpha \cdot \text{sign}(g_i), -\epsilon, \epsilon)$ ;
23     $\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{i+1}^a = \hat{\mathbf{x}}_i^a + \delta_{i+1}$ ;
24     $\mathbf{x}_{\text{adv}}^{i+1} = \hat{\mathbf{x}}_{i+1}^a$ 
25 return  $\hat{\mathbf{x}}_n^a$ 

```

Table 10: Performance (threshold is 0.3) of ASR (%) and AvgSim on different open-source MLLMs.

Method	Model	Qwen2.5-VL-3B		Qwen2.5-VL-7B		LLaVa-1.5-7B		LLaVa-1.6-7B		Gemma-3-4B		Gemma-3-12B	
		ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim
AttackVLM [62]	B/16	14.6	0.08	26.5	0.14	57.3	0.31	49.8	0.28	36.1	0.16	13.9	0.07
	B/32	22.4	0.12	31.6	0.17	27.3	0.14	23.1	0.12	35.0	0.15	9.1	0.05
	Laion	32.8	0.17	48.7	0.27	70.2	0.42	68.2	0.42	50.3	0.23	33.8	0.16
AdvDiffVLM [22]	Ensemble	2.7	0.01	3.1	0.01	1.9	0.01	2.1	0.01	0.9	0.00	1.2	0.01
SSA-CWA [13]	Ensemble	4.8	0.03	5.3	0.03	3.9	0.03	4.9	0.03	38.0	0.15	6.0	0.03
AnyAttack [61]	Ensemble	34.7	0.16	41.9	0.24	56.3	0.35	59.2	0.37	36.5	0.17	28.6	0.15
M-Attack [33]	Ensemble	63.3	0.35	80.2	0.46	89.8	0.56	87.4	0.56	64.3	0.29	50.3	0.25
FOA-Attack (Ours)	Ensemble	77.4	0.45	91.1	0.58	95.3	0.65	93.0	0.66	80.5	0.41	67.6	0.35

Table 11: Performance (threshold is 0.3) of ASR (%) and AvgSim on different closed-source MLLMs.

Method	Model	Claude-3.5		Claude-3.7		GPT-4o		GPT-4.1		Gemini-2.0	
		ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim
AttackVLM [62]	B/16	2.4	0.02	4.1	0.03	40.8	0.21	42.6	0.22	23.5	0.12
	B/32	14.8	0.08	20.5	0.11	20.1	0.10	21.9	0.11	9.9	0.06
	Laion	3.5	0.02	4.9	0.03	69.9	0.38	71.8	0.39	55.8	0.30
AdvDiffVLM [22]	Ensemble	1.1	0.01	1.4	0.01	3.2	0.01	2.9	0.01	2.0	0.01
SSA-CWA [13]	Ensemble	3.2	0.02	3.7	0.03	3.8	0.03	3.0	0.02	4.0	0.02
AnyAttack [61]	Ensemble	19.1	0.09	18.7	0.08	40.8	0.15	39.5	0.13	31.1	0.12
M-Attack [33]	Ensemble	17.9	0.10	23.8	0.12	86.8	0.50	89.1	0.51	75.5	0.41
FOA-Attack (Ours)	Ensemble	28.4	0.16	36.4	0.18	94.8	0.59	95.6	0.62	86.7	0.50

B More Comparison Results under Varied Thresholds

We further evaluate the performance of FOA-Attack at the threshold of 0.3. As shown in Table 10, FOA-Attack consistently achieves superior adversarial success rates (ASR) and average semantic similarity (AvgSim) on open-source MLLMs, such as 95.3% ASR and 0.66 AvgSim on LLaVa-1.6-7B, significantly outperforming baseline ensemble attacks. Similarly, Table 11 highlights FOA-Attack’s strong transferability to closed-source models under the 0.3 threshold, achieving notably high performance (e.g., 95.6% ASR and 0.62 AvgSim on GPT-4.1), confirming its effectiveness and semantic alignment across diverse evaluation scenarios.

Table 12: Performance (threshold is 0.7) of ASR (%) and AvgSim on different open-source MLLMs.

Method	Model	Qwen2.5-VL-3B		Qwen2.5-VL-7B		LLaVa-1.5-7B		LLaVa-1.6-7B		Gemma-3-4B		Gemma-3-12B	
		ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim
AttackVLM [62]	B/16	2.0	0.08	5.3	0.14	17.9	0.31	16.6	0.28	3.9	0.16	0.7	0.07
	B/32	4.6	0.12	6.6	0.17	6.5	0.14	4.8	0.12	3.8	0.15	0.4	0.05
	Laion	8.0	0.17	15.7	0.27	31.2	0.42	32.8	0.42	8.1	0.23	4.1	0.16
AdvDiffVLM [22]	Ensemble	0.2	0.01	0.4	0.01	0.3	0.01	0.5	0.01	0.2	0.00	0.2	0.01
SSA-CWA [13]	Ensemble	0.3	0.03	0.5	0.03	0.5	0.03	0.2	0.03	3.0	0.15	0.1	0.03
AnyAttack [61]	Ensemble	11.6	0.16	17.3	0.24	26.7	0.35	23.2	0.37	5.8	0.17	6.4	0.15
M-Attack [33]	Ensemble	22.7	0.35	35.4	0.46	47.4	0.56	48.0	0.56	11.1	0.29	12.3	0.25
FOA-Attack (Ours)	Ensemble	35.2	0.45	53.1	0.58	62.5	0.65	63.6	0.66	23.2	0.41	19.6	0.35

Table 13: Performance (threshold is 0.7) of ASR (%) and AvgSim on different closed-source MLLMs.

Method	Model	Claude-3.5		Claude-3.7		GPT-4o		GPT-4.1		Gemini-2.0	
		ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim
AttackVLM [62]	B/16	0.0	0.02	0.1	0.03	7.8	0.21	8.2	0.22	3.4	0.12
	B/32	2.4	0.08	3.3	0.11	3.0	0.10	3.0	0.11	0.9	0.06
	Laion	0.2	0.02	0.7	0.03	25.5	0.38	26.0	0.39	15.9	0.30
AdvDiffVLM [22]	Ensemble	0.1	0.01	0.2	0.01	0.5	0.01	0.4	0.01	0.2	0.01
SSA-CWA [13]	Ensemble	0.1	0.02	0.0	0.03	0.4	0.03	0.2	0.02	0.1	0.02
AnyAttack [61]	Ensemble	1.5	0.09	1.3	0.08	1.8	0.15	1.7	0.13	0.8	0.12
M-Attack [33]	Ensemble	3.3	0.10	4.4	0.12	38.8	0.50	39.8	0.51	26.6	0.41
FOA-Attack (Ours)	Ensemble	6.3	0.16	9.6	0.18	57.9	0.59	58.9	0.62	41.5	0.50

Continuing with the threshold set to 0.7, Table 12 shows FOA-Attack maintains its lead among open-source MLLMs, achieving significantly higher ASR and AvgSim, such as 62.5% ASR and 0.66 AvgSim on LLaVa-1.6-7B, notably surpassing all baseline ensemble methods. Similarly, results in Table 13 indicate that FOA-Attack retains effectiveness against challenging closed-source models even at the higher threshold, notably achieving 58.9% ASR and 0.62 AvgSim on GPT-4.1, reinforcing its strong adversarial transferability and semantic alignment in stringent attack scenarios.

Continuing with the threshold set to 0.8, Table 14 illustrates FOA-Attack’s superior transferability across open-source MLLMs, achieving notably high ASR and AvgSim (e.g., 44.1% ASR, 0.65

Table 14: Performance (threshold is 0.8) of ASR (%) and AvgSim on different open-source MLLMs.

Method	Model	Qwen2.5-VL-3B		Qwen2.5-VL-7B		LLaVa-1.5-7B		LLaVa-1.6-7B		Gemma-3-4B		Gemma-3-12B	
		ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim
AttackVLM [62]	B/16	1.2	0.08	2.7	0.14	8.7	0.31	10.1	0.28	3.4	0.16	0.2	0.07
	B/32	2.3	0.12	3.0	0.17	3.4	0.14	2.6	0.12	3.5	0.15	0.4	0.05
	Laion	4.1	0.17	8.6	0.27	19.1	0.42	23.2	0.42	6.0	0.23	2.0	0.16
AdvDiffVLM [22]	Ensemble	0.1	0.01	0.1	0.01	0.1	0.01	0.1	0.01	0.1	0.00	0.0	0.01
SSA-CWA [13]	Ensemble	0.2	0.03	0.1	0.03	0.3	0.03	0.1	0.03	2.6	0.15	0.0	0.03
AnyAttack [61]	Ensemble	4.6	0.16	7.3	0.24	11.9	0.35	13.4	0.37	2.8	0.17	2.2	0.15
M-Attack [33]	Ensemble	12.0	0.35	19.6	0.46	32.2	0.56	33.7	0.56	6.8	0.29	6.5	0.25
FOA-Attack (Ours)	Ensemble	20.2	0.45	34.2	0.58	44.1	0.65	47.6	0.66	14.2	0.41	11.1	0.35

Table 15: Performance (threshold is 0.8) of ASR (%) and AvgSim on different closed-source MLLMs.

Method	Model	Claude-3.5		Claude-3.7		GPT-4o		GPT-4.1		Gemini-2.0	
		ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim
AttackVLM [62]	B/16	0.0	0.02	0.0	0.03	4.3	0.21	4.3	0.22	1.7	0.12
	B/32	1.1	0.08	1.5	0.11	1.3	0.10	1.5	0.11	0.3	0.06
	Laion	0.0	0.02	0.1	0.03	14.6	0.38	13.0	0.39	7.7	0.30
AdvDiffVLM [22]	Ensemble	0.0	0.01	0.0	0.01	0.2	0.01	0.1	0.01	0.1	0.01
SSA-CWA [13]	Ensemble	0.0	0.02	0.0	0.03	0.1	0.03	0.2	0.02	0.1	0.02
AnyAttack [61]	Ensemble	0.5	0.09	0.4	0.08	0.6	0.15	0.7	0.13	0.1	0.12
M-Attack [33]	Ensemble	1.6	0.10	1.7	0.12	23.6	0.50	23.0	0.51	14.7	0.41
FOA-Attack (Ours)	Ensemble	4.5	0.16	5.1	0.18	37.2	0.59	37.1	0.62	25.4	0.50

Table 16: Performance (threshold is 0.9) of ASR (%) and AvgSim on different open-source MLLMs.

Method	Model	Qwen2.5-VL-3B		Qwen2.5-VL-7B		LLaVa-1.5-7B		LLaVa-1.6-7B		Gemma-3-4B		Gemma-3-12B	
		ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim
AttackVLM [62]	B/16	0.3	0.08	0.6	0.14	3.8	0.31	4.2	0.28	2.7	0.16	0.0	0.07
	B/32	0.6	0.12	0.5	0.17	0.8	0.14	1.3	0.12	2.9	0.15	0.0	0.05
	Laion	1.1	0.17	2.1	0.27	6.6	0.42	10.2	0.42	3.3	0.23	0.2	0.16
AdvDiffVLM [22]	Ensemble	0.0	0.01	0.0	0.01	0.1	0.01	0.0	0.01	0.1	0.00	0.0	0.01
SSA-CWA [13]	Ensemble	0.1	0.03	0.0	0.03	0.2	0.03	0.0	0.03	2.3	0.15	0.0	0.03
AnyAttack [61]	Ensemble	1.3	0.16	1.7	0.24	5.2	0.35	6.4	0.37	0.9	0.17	0.3	0.15
M-Attack [33]	Ensemble	4.0	0.35	5.8	0.46	13.2	0.56	18.1	0.56	2.9	0.29	1.1	0.25
FOA-Attack (Ours)	Ensemble	5.6	0.45	10.8	0.58	22.4	0.65	27.2	0.66	6.5	0.41	2.8	0.35

Table 17: Performance (threshold is 0.9) of ASR (%) and AvgSim on different closed-source MLLMs.

Method	Model	Claude-3.5		Claude-3.7		GPT-4o		GPT-4.1		Gemini-2.0	
		ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim
AttackVLM [62]	B/16	0.0	0.02	0.0	0.03	0.8	0.21	0.7	0.22	0.2	0.12
	B/32	0.1	0.08	0.2	0.11	0.1	0.10	0.1	0.11	0.1	0.06
	Laion	0.0	0.02	0.1	0.03	2.2	0.38	2.7	0.39	1.2	0.30
AdvDiffVLM [22]	Ensemble	0.0	0.01	0.0	0.01	0.1	0.01	0.0	0.01	0.1	0.01
SSA-CWA [13]	Ensemble	0.0	0.02	0.0	0.03	0.0	0.03	0.0	0.02	0.0	0.02
AnyAttack [61]	Ensemble	0.0	0.09	0.1	0.08	0.0	0.15	0.0	0.13	0.0	0.12
M-Attack [33]	Ensemble	0.1	0.10	0.1	0.12	4.7	0.50	6.3	0.51	2.1	0.41
FOA-Attack (Ours)	Ensemble	0.7	0.16	0.4	0.18	11.2	0.59	12.1	0.62	4.9	0.50

AvgSim on LLaVa-1.5-7B), substantially surpassing baseline methods. Similarly, in Table 15, FOA-Attack retains significant effectiveness against closed-source models even at this challenging threshold, notably reaching 37.2% ASR on GPT-4o and 37.1% ASR on GPT-4.1, while maintaining high AvgSim scores, reinforcing its exceptional adversarial transfer capability.

With an even stricter threshold of 0.9, Tables 16 and 17 show FOA-Attack still effectively maintains its superior adversarial transferability. In Table 16, FOA-Attack outperforms baseline ensemble attacks on open-source MLLMs, notably achieving 27.2% ASR and 0.66 AvgSim on LLaVa-1.6-7B. In the closed-source scenario (Table 17), FOA-Attack demonstrates notable effectiveness, particularly on GPT-4o and GPT-4.1 (11.2% and 12.1% ASR, respectively), continuing to exhibit strong semantic alignment (AvgSim ≥ 0.59). These results confirm FOA-Attack’s remarkable transferability even under highly stringent evaluation conditions.

Evaluation Prompt

Rate the semantic similarity between the following two texts on a scale from 0 to 1.

Criteria for similarity measurement:

1. **Main Subject Consistency:** If both descriptions refer to the same key subject or object (e.g., a person, food, an event), they should receive a higher similarity score.
2. **Relevant Description:** If the descriptions are related to the same context or topic, they should also contribute to a higher similarity score.
3. **Ignore Fine-Grained Details:** Do not penalize differences in phrasing, sentence structure, or minor variations in detail. Focus on whether both descriptions fundamentally describe the same thing.
4. **Partial Matches:** If one description contains extra information but does not contradict the other, they should still have a high similarity score.
5. **Similarity Score Range:**
 - **1.0:** Nearly identical in meaning.
 - **0.8-0.9:** Same subject, with highly related descriptions.
 - **0.7-0.8:** Same subject, core meaning aligned, even if some details differ.
 - **0.5-0.7:** Same subject but different perspectives or missing details.
 - **0.3-0.5:** Related but not highly similar (same general theme but different descriptions).
 - **0.0-0.2:** Completely different subjects or unrelated meanings.

Text 1: {input_text1}

Text 2: {input_text2}

Output only a single number between 0 and 1. Do not include any explanation or additional text.

Figure 5: Evaluation prompt template.

C Detailed Evaluation Prompt

Following M-Attack [33], we adopt the same way to evaluate the adversarial performance. Below is the detailed evaluation prompt used to assess semantic similarity between textual inputs: **ASR**: the “{input_text_1}” and “{input_text_2}” are used as placeholders for text inputs. The evaluation prompt template is shown in Fig. 5.

D Computation-time normalized comparison between M-Attack and FOA-Attack

To ensure that the performance improvements of FOA-Attack are not merely due to longer runtime, we conduct a computation-time normalized evaluation against the M-Attack baseline. Specifically, we increase M-Attack’s number of iterations to match the total computational budget of FOA-Attack (217 minutes). M-Attack (700 iterations) and M-Attack (800 iterations) require approximately 210 and 240 minutes, respectively, providing a fair basis for comparison. The results are summarized in Table 18.

Table 18: Computation-time normalized comparison between M-Attack and FOA-Attack.

Method	GPT-4o ASR (%)	AvgSim	Claude-3.5 ASR (%)	AvgSim	Gemini-2.0 ASR (%)	AvgSim	Compute Time (min)
M-Attack [33]	73.0	0.56	10.0	0.13	48.0	0.40	90
M-Attack [33] (700 iters)	76.0	0.57	9.0	0.11	52.0	0.44	210
M-Attack [33] (800 iters)	78.0	0.59	5.0	0.09	51.0	0.43	240
FOA-Attack (ours)	81.0	0.62	16.0	0.18	56.0	0.46	217

As shown in Table 18, FOA-Attack consistently outperforms both compute-matched M-Attack variants across all metrics. Compared to M-Attack (700 iters), FOA-Attack achieves +5%, +7%, and +4% higher ASR on GPT-4o, Claude-3.5, and Gemini, along with notably higher feature similarity (e.g., 0.62 vs. 0.57 on GPT-4o, 0.18 vs. 0.11 on Claude-3.5). Even when compared with M-Attack (800 iters), which consumes slightly more time, FOA-Attack maintains +3% higher ASR on GPT-4o, +11% on Claude-3.5, and +5% on Gemini. These findings demonstrate that FOA-Attack’s performance gains primarily stem from its methodological design rather than additional computational resources.

E Comparison Results on Series of Defense Methods

We evaluate the attack performance of FOA-Attack against a series of defense methods, including smoothing-based defenses [12] (Gaussian, Medium, and Average), JPEG compression [21], and Comdefend [28]. The experimental results on both open-source and closed-source MLLMs are shown in Table 19 and Table 20. Across all defenses, FOA-Attack consistently outperforms M-Attack in both ASR and AvgSim. On open-source models, FOA-Attack maintains a strong ASR (e.g., 25.0% vs. 13.0% under Comdefend on Qwen2.5-VL-7B), while preserving semantic alignment. On closed-source models, the advantage is even more evident. Under Comdefend, our FOA-Attack achieves 61.0% ASR on GPT-4o and 55.0% on GPT-4.1, while M-Attack drops below 10%. Even under JPEG, FOA-Attack maintains over 50% ASR with stable AvgSim values. These results indicate that the proposed FOA-Attack achieves superior adversarial transferability and resilience across diverse defense strategies.

Table 19: Attack performance of adversarial images against open-source Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) after defense processing.

Defense	Method	Qwen2.5-VL-3B		Qwen2.5-VL-7B		LLaVa-1.5-7B		LLaVa-1.6-7B		Gemma-3-4B		Gemma-3-12B	
		ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim
Gaussian	M-Attack [33]	14.0	0.18	27.0	0.29	50.0	0.48	48.0	0.47	17.0	0.25	14.0	0.17
	FOA-Attack (Ours)	27.0	0.27	50.0	0.42	67.0	0.60	65.0	0.58	29.0	0.35	22.0	0.27
Medium	M-Attack [33]	17.0	0.21	35.0	0.33	44.0	0.41	41.0	0.39	13.0	0.18	6.0	0.10
	FOA-Attack (Ours)	36.0	0.31	60.0	0.45	62.0	0.54	60.0	0.53	18.0	0.25	9.0	0.16
Average	M-Attack [33]	9.0	0.14	20.0	0.23	38.0	0.36	36.0	0.36	11.0	0.18	8.0	0.12
	FOA-Attack (Ours)	22.0	0.24	38.0	0.35	57.0	0.51	56.0	0.51	28.0	0.33	11.0	0.17
JPEG	M-Attack [33]	13.0	0.20	35.0	0.35	60.0	0.51	59.0	0.50	29.0	0.34	22.0	0.27
	FOA-Attack (Ours)	29.0	0.32	58.0	0.49	77.0	0.63	77.0	0.62	50.0	0.44	44.0	0.42
Comdefend	M-Attack [33]	10.0	0.13	27.0	0.27	48.0	0.42	46.0	0.41	14.0	0.22	12.0	0.17
	FOA-Attack (Ours)	25.0	0.28	49.0	0.46	65.0	0.54	63.0	0.54	33.0	0.36	22.0	0.29

Table 20: Attack performance of adversarial images against closed-source Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) after defense processing.

Method	Model	Claude-3.5		Claude-3.7		GPT-4o		GPT-4.1		Gemini-2.0	
		ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim	ASR	AvgSim
Gaussian	M-Attack [33]	2.0	0.04	5.0	0.06	57.0	0.45	53.0	0.44	29.0	0.29
	FOA-Attack (Ours)	3.0	0.06	6.0	0.07	72.0	0.57	71.0	0.57	50.0	0.42
Medium	M-Attack [33]	3.0	0.04	4.0	0.06	39.0	0.37	40.0	0.38	23.0	0.24
	FOA-Attack (Ours)	4.0	0.07	6.0	0.09	59.0	0.48	63.0	0.50	41.0	0.37
Average	M-Attack [33]	2.0	0.04	1.0	0.03	38.0	0.37	39.0	0.36	19.0	0.22
	FOA-Attack (Ours)	5.0	0.06	3.0	0.06	59.0	0.48	62.0	0.50	36.0	0.34
JPEG	M-Attack [33]	9.0	0.12	14.0	0.17	60.0	0.48	52.0	0.45	36.0	0.35
	FOA-Attack (Ours)	14.0	0.20	22.0	0.24	75.0	0.59	78.0	0.59	58.0	0.49
Comdefend	M-Attack [33]	2.0	0.04	5.0	0.08	35.0	0.35	37.0	0.37	22.0	0.25
	FOA-Attack (Ours)	6.0	0.07	11.0	0.15	61.0	0.49	63.0	0.51	38.0	0.39

F Commercial MLLM Response

To further validate the efficacy of FOA-Attack, we provide real-world interaction results indicating that adversarial examples can guide advanced commercial closed-source MLLMs, which include GPT-4o, GPT-o3, GPT-4.1, GPT-4.5, Claude-3.5-Sonnet, Claude-3.7-Sonnet, Gemini-2.0-Flash, and Gemini-2.5-Flash, to generate descriptions semantically aligned with the specified target images. Specifically, Fig. 6 to 13 correspond to the attack results on each of these models in order: Fig. 6 shows GPT-4o, Fig. 7 shows GPT-o3, Fig. 9 shows GPT-4.1, Fig. 8 shows GPT-4.5, Fig. 10 shows Claude-3.5-Sonnet, Fig. 11 shows Claude-3.7-Sonnet, Fig. 12 shows Gemini-2.0-Flash, and Fig. 13 shows Gemini-2.5-Flash. The consistent attack success across all models highlights the high transferability of the proposed FOA-Attack.

G Limitations and Impact Statement

Limitations. Although the proposed method demonstrates excellent performance in transferring target adversarial examples, it introduces additional computations, such as local OT loss, which

decrease the efficiency of generating adversarial examples. Enhancing the efficiency of these attacks will be a key focus of our future research.

Impact Statement. This paper proposes a method for targeting transferrable adversarial attacks on MLLMs using targeted multi-modal alignment. The proposed method, like previous adversarial attack methods, investigates adversarial examples in order to identify adversarial vulnerabilities in MLLMs. This effort aims to guide future research into improving MLLMs against adversarial attacks and developing more effective defense approaches. Furthermore, the victim MLLMs employed in this study are open-source models with publicly available weights. The research on adversarial examples will help shape the landscape of AI security.




Figure 6: Example responses from the commercial MLLM-GPT-4o to targeted attacks generated by our method.




Figure 7: Example responses from the commercial MLLM-GPT-o3 to targeted attacks generated by our method.




Figure 8: Example responses from the commercial MLLM-GPT-4.5 to targeted attacks generated by our method.

Target



Description 4.1 ▾




Describe this image, no longer than 25 words.

A group of zebras with overlapping stripes, some grazing on grass, creating a visually complex pattern of black and white lines.

Target



Description 4.1 ▾



Describe this image, no longer than 25 words.

An elephant standing in a shaded forest area, lifting its trunk while surrounded by foliage and wooden fencing in the background.

Target



Description 4.1 ▾



Describe this image, no longer than 25 words.

Several small birds are perched on a cylindrical bird feeder, pecking at the seeds, with greenery visible in the background.

Figure 9: Example responses from the commercial MLLM-GPT-4.1 to targeted attacks generated by our method.




Figure 10: Example responses from the commercial MLLM-Claude-3.5-Sonnet to targeted attacks generated by our method.




Figure 11: Example responses from the commercial MLLM-Claude-3.7-Sonnet to targeted attacks generated by our method.




Figure 12: Example responses from the commercial MLLM-Gemini-2.0-Flash to targeted attacks generated by our method.




Figure 13: Example responses from the commercial MLLM-Gemini-2.5-Flash to targeted attacks generated by our method.