PFT : ENHANCING PROMPT INJECTION ROBUSTNESS VIA POSITION-ENHANCED FINETUNING

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ABSTRACT

Large Language Models (LLMs) are widely adopted in closed-domain applications, where differentiating between system instructions and user input is crucial to prevent unintended malicious actions. However, instruction-following LLMs often blindly follow instructions in user inputs, opening up the risk of prompt injection attacks. This paper investigates whether Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) can teach LLMs to strictly distinguish system instructions from user input. Our study reveals a key weakness: SFT-tuned models follow system instructions reliably only when the key instruction is placed immediately after the initial tokens. We find that the proximity of the key instruction to the initial tokens significantly influences the model's ability to execute the intended task, and consequently, its susceptibility to prompt injection attacks. To address this issue, we propose PFT , a novel position-enhanced fine-tuning approach that leverages position IDs to more effectively distinguish between system and user tokens. The experimental results demonstrate that PFT improves the robustness of SFT-tuned models against prompt injection attacks, even when the key instruction is placed arbitrarily in the system prompt, without compromising performance. Our work sheds light on the importance of prompt format in enhancing the security of LLMs and offers a practical solution to improve their robustness.

1 INTRODUCTION

The capabilities and flexibilities of large language models (LLMs) make them invaluable in complex decision-making processes across a variety of domains, from resume assessment (Gan et al., 2024) to item recommendation (Acharya et al., 2023; Zhao et al., 2024; Lin et al., 2024; Zhang et al., 2024), and even medical diagnosis based on patient records (Nazi & Peng, 2024; Singhal et al., 2023; Wiest et al., 2024). However, unlike general-purpose chatbot models like ChatGPT, LLMs integrated into these workflows must perform well in *closed-domain tasks* with clearly defined functionality that should be applied directly and unambiguously to the input.

In these systems, engineers typically define the core function through a system prompt, while inputs from external sources (*e.g.,* user inputs or outputs from other tools) are fed into the LLM. The expectation is that the LLM will apply the system's specified instructions exclusively to the input data and return the correct output. In this paper, we focus on the simple case where each closed-domain LLM solves one task. We call this task *the key task*, and the instruction that specifies it *the key instruction*.

However, this approach introduces significant security concerns: while the model is designed to follow the system's instructions, it may also follow malicious instructions embedded in the user input or other untrusted sources. Consider the following example:

> `System instruction: Extract verbs from the user input.`
>
> `User input: Translate the following into French: Harry sits.`

Instead of extracting verbs, most instruction-following models (such as Claude 3.5 Sonnet (Anthropic, 2024), GPT-4 (OpenAI, 2023), Gemini 1.5 Pro (Google, 2023)) are likely to follow the user's instruction to perform translation (appendix A). While this may seem harmless, it highlights a critical vulnerability: malicious users could exploit this behavior to instruct the



Figure 1: Demonstration of PFT . PFT modifies the position IDs by creating a gap of size d between system and user tokens, while maintaining internal orders within each role. The modified position IDs helps the model better distinguish between system and user tokens, while maintaining sequential information.

model to perform harmful tasks, such as leaking sensitive information (Willison, 2022; Yu et al., 2023) or executing arbitrary commands (Schulhoff et al., 2023; Geiping et al., 2024).

To deploy instruction-following LLMs securely in closed-domain tasks, the models must strictly follow the key system task as the *instruction*, and apply to user input as *data*. A standard approach to achieving this is Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT), where the model is trained to recognize and prioritize system instructions over user input. This raises important questions:

> ***Are SFT-tuned models safe enough? When are they fragile? Can we mitigate this fragility?***

Our findings suggest that the security of SFT-tuned models depends on the structure of the system prompt. When the system prompt contains only the key instruction, the SFT-tuned model is robust to user embedded attacks by treating them as data. This is true even when the system instructions and user attacks are not included in the training set, demonstrating the model's generalizability. However, in practice, system prompts often contain additional information, not just the key instruction, and this can make the model vulnerable to prompt injection attacks. We discover that the position of the key instruction within the system prompt plays a crucial role in the model's security. Specifically, the further the key instruction is from the prompt's start, the more loosely the model follows it, and the more likely the model becomes to misinterpret user input as instructions. We hypothesize that this is because the prompt format does not sufficiently distinguish between system and user tokens.

Motivated by this insight, we propose a new fine-tuning method, PFT , that enhances the model's robustness by leveraging position IDs to distinguish between system instructions and user input more effectively. As shown in fig. 1, PFT modifies the position IDs by increasing the gap between system and user tokens, while maintaining internal orders for system and user tokens. This strategy helps the model better distinguish between system and user roles, even when the key instruction appears in various positions. Our experiments show that PFT -ed models remain secure against prompt injection attacks, regardless of the placement of the system instruction, without negatively impacting performance.

In summary, our work makes the following contributions:

- We demonstrate that while SFT-tuned models are secure when the system prompt only contains the key instruction, they become fragile when the instruction appears later in the prompt (section 2).
- We show that the distance between the key instruction and the beginning of the input determines how strictly the model adheres to the system task. This suggests that the current prompt structure fails to effectively distinguish between system instructions and user input (section 3).
- Based on these findings, we introduce PFT , a position-enhanced fine-tuning method that safeguards models against adversarial inputs, ensuring robustness regardless of instruction placement while maintaining overall task performance (section 4).

2 Fragility of SFT-Tuned Models

In this section, we examine the robustness of the SFT-tuned model against attacks. While initial findings suggest that this type of models can perform well on unforseen user attacks (section 2.1), further analysis reveals a significant vulnerability: moving the position of the key

Attack Type	Base	fine-tuned
Gandalf Summarization	10%	94%
Gandalf Ignore	0%	94%
TensorTrust Extraction	4%	96%
TensorTrust Hijacking	4%	72%

Table 1: SFT-tuned model appears much more robust against different attacks. Among those attack datasets, Tensortrust Hijacking dataset consists of hijacking attacks, and the other three are system prompt extraction attacks. See details in section 5.2 and examples in fig. 4.

instruction within the system prompt dramatically reduces model robustness (section 2.2). This suggests that the location of the key instruction might play a significant role in determining how strictly it is followed.

2.1 SFT-TUNED MODELS ARE ROBUST AGAINST ATTACKS WHEN SYSTEM PROMPTS ARE SIMPLE

To fine-tune models, we first create a dataset consisting of prompts and responses where the system prompts are just key instructions and the user input is treated as *data*, using only "benign" examples similar to the extraction-translation example in section 1. Applying the standard SFT pipeline, we find that the model quickly adapts to the desired behavior in "benign" evaluation prompts. See details in section 5.1.

To further test the model's out-of-domain generalization ability against unseen attacks, we evaluate its performance under extraction and hijacking attacks (as illustrated in fig. 4). We find the fine-tuned model performs much better than the base model across various datasets (table 1). In addition, we also verify that the fine-tuned model performs well when the user provides ordinary data (fig. 6). Therefore, initial results suggest that the SFT-tuned model is secure against attacks while maintaining utility in this setting.

2.2 SFT-TUNED MODEL'S FRAGILITY DEPENDS ON THE LOCATION OF THE KEY INSTRUCTION

Previous experiments demonstrate that SFT-tuned models are robust when system prompts contain only the key instruction, which is similar to prompts used during training. However, in real-world deployment, the system prompt may include additional text beyond the key instruction and can vary in style and format. For example,

1. Some prompt engineers would like to add some general instructions (e.g. "You are an AI assistant."). Some prefer putting them in the beginning, and others prefer them to be after the key instructions.

2. Some tasks require background knowledge. Some prompt engineers might prefer introducing the background knowledge before giving the key instructions; some might prefer putting the background after the key instructions.

Ideally, a secure LLM should strictly follow the key instruction no matter where it is placed. Therefore, we need to test the model's robustness in terms of different prompt designs. In particular, we want to see if *the positioning of the key instruction matters*. Before conducting the experiments, we suspect that it is more robust if the key instruction is positioned immediately before the user input — intuitively, the proximity should make the model more likely to treat the user input as data, while the distance between them would make the model forget what instruction it is supposed to follow. However, we shall soon find out that this hypothesis does not hold.

To systematically probe this, we prepare non-essential information by concatenating 'You are an AI assistant' with $n\_sentence$ sampled general instructions (e.g. 'Safeguard truth and accuracy'). When inserting before the key instruction, we append 'Help with the following task: \n\n'. When inserting it after the key instruction, we prepend ' \n\nRemember: '. (We tried other wordings, and the result remains similar.)



Figure 2: We compare inserting general instructions before vs after the key instruction. The fine-tuned model is more fragile when non-essential information appears before the key instruction. On the other hand, inserting those sentences after the key instruction has much smaller effects. The result is on Gandalf Summarization attacks.

Our results (fig. 2) reveal a surprising fragility in the fine-tuned model: its security is severely compromised when the key system instruction is not defined at the beginning of the input. Meanwhile, inserting non-essential information after the key instruction has a much smaller effect (it does have a negative impact on some other attack datasets, but the effect is still smaller. See fig. 7).

Such a phenomenon is surprising and exposes a grave fragility for practical use. Therefore, we need to understand why it happens, and whether we can mitigate this fragility.

3 Understanding the Influence of Key Instruction Positions — A Case Study on Next-Token Attack

In this section, we find that the "distance" between the key instruction and the initial tokens determines how strictly the fine-tuned model follows the system task. We hypothesize that this is because of the prompt format. More specifically, the default prompt format for multiple roles (for Llama-3 models) is as follows:

`<|bot|><|sh|>system<|eh|>\n\n[system content]<|eot|><|sh|>user<|eh|>\n\n[user content]<|eot|><|sh|>assistant<|eh|>\n\n`

where `bot` represents the beginning of text, `sh` and `eh` denote the start and end of a header, respectively, and `eot` signifies the end of a turn. Here, what separates the system and user content is the few delimiter tokens; this is not a strong enough signal for LLMs to distinguish between tokens in the two roles; meanwhile, the LLM can easily mark the tokens immediately after the begin-of-text; therefore, the fine-tuned model uses "*strictly following the first sentences*" as a shortcut.

3.1 Next-Token Attack Problem

To examine the impact of key instruction positioning, we formulate the *next-token-attack* problem based on a particular adversarial template. As we will demonstrate, the next-token-attack allows us to see whether the model is compromised by directly evaluating the next-token logits. Reframing the security problem as a next-token prediction task enables us to analyze the effect of positioning analytically.

In the next-token-attack problem, the *system* prompt simply asks to verify if the *user* input contains a specific password, where the expected answer is "Yes" or "No". On the other hand, the *user* prompt follows a template that induces the model to begin the response with the "attack token". Consequently, the model is considered compromised if it outputs the "attack token". See fig. 4 for an example.

We first run experiments to test the effect of "distance" by inserting non-essential information between initial tokens and the key instructions. As shown in fig. 3, without any insertions, the model completely treats the user attack prompt as data (i.e., the logit of the attack token is much smaller than both "Yes" and "No" token.) Also the first insertions have a dramatic effect in propping up logits for the attack token; it has a similar suppression effect on logits for "Yes" and "No" token. This leads to a dramatic decrease of performance (from 100% to below 50%). This suggests the model follows the user input as an instruction. We can also see that inserting more sentences slowly props up logits for the attack token and suppress those for "Yes" and "No" tokens, leading to a gradual but consistent decrease of performance.



(a) Accuracy



(b) Logits for Yes, No and Attack Token

Figure 3: Making the key instruction appear farther away from the initial tokens exposes the fragility. The first set of experiments (left) insert non-essential information between initial tokens and key instructions. The second set of experiments (middle) insert "empty" tokens while the last set of experiments (right) shift positions IDs.

This previous result seems to suggest that the "distance" between the key instruction and the initial tokens strongly affects how strictly the model follows the system task. To corroborate this, we need to study the effect of "distance" in isolation. In other words, we hope to intervene only on the distance, while not changing other components of the prompts (e.g. inserting semantic meanings as in previous experiments).

To make the key instruction appear more distant from the begin-of-text, one can either (1) insert "empty tokens" (e.g. '\n\n_') between the key instruction and the initial tokens; or, (2) shift the position IDs of the key instruction n-token away from the initial tokens.

Testing these two approaches (fig. 3) both show that: the bigger the "distance" from the initial tokens, the more loosely the fine-tuned model follows the system instruction. This suggests that, indeed, proximity between the key instruction and the initial tokens determines how strictly it is followed.

3.2 WHY "DISTANCE" FROM INITIAL TOKENS MATTERS

We hypothesize that the reason "distance" from initial tokens matters is partially due to the prompt format: the signal differentiating between the system content and user content is not strong enough; therefore, during fine-tuning, the model takes the shortcut of *following the immediate tokens after start-of-text*. More specifically, there are two conditions the model could utilize to adapt itself to the fine-tuning data: (1) follow the instruction immediately after the begin-of-text and *system* delimiters (2) follow the instruction immediately before the *user* delimiters. We hypothesize that it is easier to utilize condition (1) than (2) during fine-tuning, which could help explain the surprising asymmetric results we see in fig. 2, and the strong impact of "distance" fig. 3.

Then, why is it easier for the model to learn *following tokens immediately after initial tokens* than *following tokens immediately before user delimiters*? Unfortunately, we don't have a clear answer yet. One possibilility is that some inherent mechanisms of the pre-trained LLMs (e.g. the attention sink phenomenon (Xiao et al., 2023)) make them very good at marking the initial tokens. Meanwhile, there are no similar mechanisms for the delimiter tokens, since they are only introduced in instruction-tuning.

Nonetheless, it is clear that, to reduce the model's dependency on this shortcut, we should introduce more signals differentiating between system and user tokens. These signals should be invariant to prompt designs and attack techniques. If the models utilize these invariant signals during fine-tuning, they should remain robust to out-of-distribution situations.

4 POSITION-ENHANCED FINE-TUNING (PFT)

Previous experiments suggest that we might mitigate this fragility by magnifying the differences between system and user tokens. In this section, we design a new type of finetuning method utilizing roles of positions ids to minimize this weakness.

One straightforward approach is to enhance the delimiter tokens. With specially designed delimiter tokens, the model might distinguish between system and user tokens better. However, this approach still has limited generalization: it relies on small chunks of delimiting tokens to separate messages from different roles. is unclear how well this method generalizes to varying prompt lengths and different positions of key instructions within the system message. Our experiments confirm that while special delimiter tokens help mitigate the fragility, they do not fully resolve it (fig. 5).

Given the limitations of delimiter-based approaches, we propose a more robust solution using token-specific differentiating signals. This token-wise approach offers superior generalization across varied prompt structures and lengths. The intuition is that by assigning a unique signature to each token based on its role (system or user), we create a continuous, fine-grained distinction throughout the entire input. This persistent signal allows the model to maintain clear differentiation between system and user content, regardless of prompt complexity or instruction placement.

To implement this token-wise signature, we propose leveraging position IDs, an integral component of transformer-based models. Position IDs are an ideal candidate for several reasons. First, they are inherently token-specific, aligning perfectly with our goal of providing a unique signature for each token. Second, position IDs are a fundamental part of the model's architecture, requiring no additional parameters or significant modifications to the model structure. This makes our approach highly compatible with existing systems and easy to implement.

Our position ID manipulation method is designed with two key principles in mind: 1) enhancing the differentiation between system and user tokens, and 2) preserving the model's original understanding of sequential relationships. To achieve these goals, we manipulate position IDs as follows (see fig. 1 for an example):

- **Create a gap between system and user tokens:** We manually change the position IDs to create a fixed distance d between the system and user sections. If the last system token is at position k, the first user token is assigned position $k + 1 + d$. This creates a clear numerical boundary between the two sections.
- **Maintain internal token order:** Within each section (system and user), we preserve the original sequential ordering of tokens. This means the relative positions of tokens within their respective sections remain unchanged, ensuring that the model's ability to process sequential information is not disrupted.

We then apply standard SFT, but with these manipulated position IDs. We hope the fine-tuning could allow the model to 1) adapt to the new position IDs so that it does not affect the model's performance on ordinary data; and 2) distinguish between system and user tokens, so that it correctly treats all system tokens as *instruction*, and all user tokens as *data*.

We call this method Position-enhanced fine-tuning (PFT). In the next section, we show PFT improves model robustness for free: it is effective in maintaining model security across various prompt structures and attack scenarios; meanwhile, it does not hurt model performance or introduce larger deviation from the base model, compared to standard SFT.

5 EXPERIMENTS

In this section, we first describe the setup of our experiments, including data collection, baseline designs and hyperparameter settings. Then, we present the results of PFT against baseline methods to show its effectiveness in enhancing the robustness against prompt injection attacks. Additionally, we show that PFT does not hurt the model generation when the user input is ordinary data.



Figure 4: Attack data examples. The key instruction prompts the model to function as a password manager, giving affirmative responses only when the correct password is provided. Next-token Attack is constructed to make the model output an "attack token" (apple in this example); Hijacking Attack is meant to trick the model to grant access; Extraction Attack attempts to extract the system prompt from the model.

5.1 Experimental setup

Model and hyperparameters We follow the standard SFT approach to optimize the log probability of the response tokens conditional on the prompts. During finetuning, we use LoRA (Hu et al., 2021) on query and key projection matrices to avoid overfitting. See appendix B for more details.

We use Llama-3-8B-Instruct (AI@Meta, 2024) as the base model, for both the investigations in section 3 and the experiments described here. We repeat the experiments on Gemma-2-9b-it (Team, 2024) and show the main robustness results in fig. 5. We find consistent results between the two models. For additional results on the Gemma model, see appendix A.

Training and validation data Our training and validation samples are similar to the extraction-translation example in section 1. These samples are "benign" by design, and do not contain any adversarial samples. We use these "benign" samples for training and selecting checkpoints. Therefore, the attack samples described in the next section are completely out-of-distribution.

In our setup, we refer to a prompt as a tuple (<system prompt>, <user input>) and to a prompt-response pair as (<system prompt>, <user input>, <model response>). We begin by preparing a set of closed-domain tasks F, which are the system instructions that guide the model's behavior (e.g., summarization, translation). For each task or system instruction $f \in F$, we use GPT-4 to generate ambiguous user inputs that could be interpreted either as the data for the closed-domain task or as independent instructions. These user inputs form a set for each task, denoted as G_f. For every ambiguous user input generated, we prompt the base model to respond, instructing it to treat the user input as data for the task, not as an independent instruction. We ask GPT-4 to filter out cases where the model still misinterprets the user input as a separate task. This process generates a collection of prompt-response pairs, where the system instruction is correctly applied to the user input.

To avoid overfitting the model during fine-tuning, we also create additional samples by swapping the system prompt and user input, treating the user input as the system prompt and vice versa. This ensures the model does not learn the shortcut of always following instructions that look like F-tasks, but following the instruction that appears in the system prompt. Finally, our core training dataset comprises of around $4,600$ prompt-response pairs.

For validation, we create a separate set of system instructions and the corresponding user inputs, ensuring they weren't seen during training. Then we create a few "benign" validation datasets using those instruction-input tuples. Performance on these validation datasets should indicate where the model correctly treats user input as data. See more detail in the appendix B.

Methods For `PFT` , we use the distance parameter $d = 256$ and $d = 512$, referred to as `PFT` -256 and `PFT` -512. We compare them against the following baselines: ① Vanilla SFT: Standard supervised fine-tuning without any modifications. ② Delimiter-enhanced SFT: This method fine-tunes specific token embeddings, particularly for the delimiters <|sh|> and <|eh|>, in addition to applying LoRA updates to the query and key projection matrices. ③ Data-augmented SFT: This approach creates augmented training dataset with additional system prompts that have randomly inserted general instruction between the initial tokens and the key instruction to simulate more varied inputs.



(a) Llama Results



(b) Gemma Results

Figure 5: PFT leads to the most secure models across different attacks, regardless of the key instruction placement. The results are consistent across Llama-3-8B-Instruct fig. 5a and Gemma-2-9b-it fig. 5b

5.2 Evaluation metrics

Evaluation on adversarial inputs We want to assess the model's robustness to prompt injection attacks. We frame our system task as verifying if the user input contains a key access code, and output "Access Granted" or "Access Denied" correspondingly. There are two types of attacks: system prompt extraction (Gandalf Summarization (Lakera AI, 2023b), Gandalf Ignore (Lakera AI, 2023a), and TensorTrust extraction (Toyer et al., 2023)) and hijacking (TensorTrust hijack (Toyer et al., 2023)). The former attempts to steal the key information from the system, and the latter tries to guide the model to say "Access Granted" (See fig. 4 for examples). To assess the robustness of the finetuned model, we measure the percentage of times the model generates the correct response (variants of "Access Denied").

Evaluation on ordinary input Meanwhile, we also want to make sure the finetuned model still performs well on ordinary inputs. To test this, we measure the model's utility, as well as deviation from the base model, under normal user inputs.

To assess the finetuned model's utility, we evaluate on two datasets. (1) Password dataset: we use the same system task as in the adversarial setup, but replace the user attacks with ordinary inputs providing correct or incorrect passwords. We then use the model accuracy as a measure of the utility. (2) Alpaca dataset: we construct prompts using samples from the Alpaca dataset (Taori et al., 2023). Then, for generations of the finetuned model, we use the log-likelihood under the base model as a measure of generation quality. Since the base model is finetuned on similar instruction-following dataset, its log-likelihood is a reasonable proxy for the utility.

To measure the finetuned model's deviation from the base model, we compute the Kullback–Leibler divergence of the generation distribution $p_{\text{model}}(\text{output text}|\text{prompt})$, between the base model and finetuned models. We use the same prompts from alpaca (Taori et al., 2023) as described above.

5.3 PFT leads to robust models, for free

PFT leads to the most robust model Figure 5 clearly shows models from PFT is the most robust across different attack datasets, when the key instruction appears farther away from the beginning.

For Llama models, we see the baseline methods struggle on all four attack datasets, while PFT performs much better. For Gemma models, the baseline methods fail on the two TensorTrust datasets, where PFT again shows great improvements. However, they remain robust to the Gandalf tasks. We find that these attacks are too "weak" for Gemma. In fact, they are essentially treated as ordinary data by the model: it has the same performance on those adversarial inputs as on ordinary data when the user provides incorrect password (fig. 9).

Metric	SFT	PFT-256	PFT-512	SFT-Delim
Accuracy (Password)	98%	97%	96%	96%
Log-Likelihood (Alpaca)	-14.44	-13.97	-13.05	-13.25

(a) PFT does not hurt generation quality for ordinary data, as measured by the generation accuracy on the password dataset, and log-likelihood of generations on the Alpaca dataset.



(b) PFT does not lead to additional deviation from the base model, as measured by the KL divergence using Alpaca prompts.

Figure 6: Compared to the standard SFT, PFT does not hurt generation quality nor causes more deviation from the base model. See fig. 10 for the same results on Gemma models.

PFT does not hurt model performance One would worry that manipulating position IDs would hurt model performance: the shifted IDs may appear out-of-distribution for the model, and hurt model understanding and generation. However, we maintain the relative positioning within each role, and hope that it is easy for the model to adapt.

Results in fig. 6 show PFT does not hurt utility compared to standard SFT, and does not cause additional deviation from the base model. Therefore, relative to SFT, PFT improves the model robustness, for free.

6 Related Work

Attacks on LLMs Several works have studied the security of LLMs, and proposed various attacks to exploit the vulnerabilities of the models. The most relevant ones for closed-domain LLMs are prompt injection attacks (Willison, 2022; Yu et al., 2023; Geiping et al., 2024; Yu et al., 2024), which attempt to hijack the model by injecting malicious instructions, and system prompt extraction attacks (Sha & Zhang, 2024; Zhang & Ippolito, 2023; Yang et al., 2024), which aim to extract the system prompt from the model. These attacks could employ different techniques (Schulhoff et al., 2023; Perez & Ribeiro, 2022), so we need to evaluate the robustness of the model against a wide range of attacks. Fortunately, recent works collect diverse injection and extraction attack samples through online games (Toyer et al., 2023; Lakera AI, 2023a;b). We use these attack samples to evaluate the robustness of the models in our experiments.

Finetuning methods Several works study how to finetune the LLM to defend against attacks in the user input. Our work studies the fragility of the finetuned models in terms of system prompt design, and proposes mitigating methods.

Wallace et al. (2024) finetunes the LLM to completely ignore user instructions for closed-domain tasks, and ignore conflicting instructions for open-domain tasks. We find that SFT-tuned models have fragility when the key instruction appears later in the input.

Chen et al. (2024) finetunes the LLM to completely ignore user instructions through structured query and a secure front-end. One key idea, using special delimiter tokens, is proposed to defend against Completion Attacks. We find that using special delimiter tokens also helps mitigate the fragility in this case, but not completely eliminates it. The PFT is more robust, and also does not require the front-end filtering of special tokens.

Positional encoding manipulation methods Recent advancements in long-context learning have explored various positional encoding manipulation methods to adapt Language Models (LLMs) to longer contexts. These techniques (Chen et al., 2023; Peng et al., 2023; Zhu et al., 2023) aim to modify the way position information is encoded and processed by the model. Notably, they have observed that LLMs demonstrate remarkable adaptability to these manipulated position IDs after fine-tuning. This finding aligns with our own observations that

position-enhanced fine-tuning does not negatively impact model performance on standard-length data.

7 Discussion and Conclusion

This paper studies the security of closed-domain LLM bots, which play more and more important roles in human-computer interaction. While we find that simple SFT could make the model appear secure, stress-testing the prompt design reveals key fragilities. We hypothesize that this fragility is due to the current prompt format, which does not provide enough separation between system and user tokens. We propose a position-enhanced finetuning method `PFT` to mitigate this fragility, which significantly improves the out-of-distribution robustness of the model, while maintaining the same performance on ordinary data.

Our work provides several implications for security alignment and safe deployment of LLMs in closed-domain settings.

Current instruction-following tuning may not let the model differentiate between different roles Our experiments show that instruction-tuned models do not clearly distinguish bewteen contents from different roles. This could be a potential security risk, when we need to strictly enforce privilege hierarchies among different roles in the system. This is natural, both because of the prompt format and the training data distribution. As we argue in the paper, the prompt format does not provide enough distinction. Meanwhile, the training data often involve cases when the model is expected to follow instructions from both the system and user. These combined lead the model to treat the concatenated prompts as a stream of instructions, rather than a hierarchy of *instructions* and *data* with different privilege levels.

Data (augmentation) cannot solve all the problems, at least not efficiently While data augmentation is a powerful tool to remove spurious correlations and improve model robustness, we cannot rely on it to solve all the problems, for several reasons. First, we need to identify the spurious correlations in the first place, which requires lots of testing, and becomes increasingly difficult as the model becomes more complex. Second, creating the perfect augmentation data can be challenging — as in our case, the augmented data helps, but not completely eliminates the fragility.

It is more efficient to have security baked in the model architecture Since data cannot solve all the problems efficiently, it is better to have security baked in the architecture of the model. The inductive bias could eliminate many of the spurious correlations from the beginning, and make the model more robust to adversarial inputs that are out-of-distribution. More specifically, since role differentiation is a fundamental requirement in many closed-domain systems, it is better to have model architectures that can clearly differentiate between different roles. In this project we consider the most simple system, consisting of one round dialogue between three roles (system, user, and the model). In this case, we find that simply enhancing the position information could help the model differentiate between different roles.

More complex systems might require more sophisticated solutions In more complex systems, where there might be multiple rounds of conversations between roles of different privilege levels, our simple manipulation of the position information might not be enough. In this case, we might need more complicated solutions to clearly delineate the roles and dialogues.

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