027 028 029 030 031

037

041

021

Mind the (Belief) Gap: Group Identity in the World of LLMs

Anonymous ACL submission

Abstract

Social biases and belief-driven behaviors can significantly impact Large Language Models' (LLMs') decisions on several tasks. As LLMs are increasingly used in multi-agent systems for societal simulations, their ability to model fundamental group psychological characteristics remains critical yet under-explored. In this study, we present a multi-agent framework that simulates belief congruence, a classical group psychology theory that plays a crucial role in shaping societal interactions and preferences. Our findings reveal that LLMs exhibit amplified belief congruence compared to humans, across diverse contexts. We further investigate the implications of this behavior on two downstream tasks: (1) misinformation dissemination and (2) LLM learning, finding that belief congruence in LLMs increases misinformation dissemination and impedes learning. To mitigate these negative impacts, we propose strategies inspired by: (1) contact hypothesis, (2) accuracy nudges, and (3) global citizenship framework. Our results show that the best strategies reduce misinformation dissemination by up to 37% and enhance learning by 11%. Bridging social psychology and AI, our work provides insights to navigate real-world interactions using LLMs while addressing belief-driven biases.

1 Introduction

Belief Congruence, theorized by Milton Rokeach in 1960 (Rokeach, 1960) highlights the human tendency to align strongly with those who share similar beliefs, often reinforcing attitudes and fostering social cohesion. This theory has been critical in understanding inter-group dynamics in society, shedding light on biases in decision-making and explaining how shared beliefs influence group behavior (Baek and Parkinson, 2022; Frauhammer and Neubaum, 2023; Seitz et al., 2024). Understanding inter-group behavior is essential for addressing societal challenges such as group-based biases, or




Figure 1: Campus study by (Rokeach and Mezei, 1966): A White participant with a specific belief interacts with four confederates:two White (one with a similar belief, one opposing) and two Black (one with a similar belief, one opposing). The participant selects two confederates to join them for coffee and explains their choice. We simulate this using a multi-agent LLM framework.

misinformation, as well as fostering collaboration across diverse communities (Levy et al., 2022; Lee et al., 2023; van Zomeren et al., 2024).

042

043

044

045

047

048

051

053

054

059

060

061

062

LLMs have emerged as powerful tools for simulating human-like societal behavior (Park et al., 2023; Zhou et al., 2024; Chan et al., 2024), providing a unique platform to study fundamental intergroup psychological phenomena in computational settings. Yet, research exploring these inter-group dynamics in LLMs remains sparse. To address this gap, we examine belief congruence in LLMs by simulating the seminal experiment by Rokeach and Mezei (1966). In addition, we seek to understand how belief congruence may impact LLM behaviors in downstream tasks rooted in real-world contexts such as learning and misinformation propagation. Investigating these dynamics offers insights into how belief congruence shapes inter-group differences in multi-agent LLMs, bridging the fields of psychology and AI. We formulate three research questions: RQ1: Do LLMs exhibit belief congruence? **RQ2:** Does belief congruence in LLMs affect downstream performance? **RQ3:** Can we mitigate the negative impacts (if any) caused by belief congruence in LLMs?

The study leverages foundational psychological principles to simulate belief congruence within LLM agents and examines its influence on two key downstream tasks: (1) misinformation dissemination: investigating how belief congruence within homogeneous or heterogeneous LLM groups affects misinformation spread, and (2) LLM learning: examining how belief congruence impacts an agent's ability to learn. Our findings indicate that LLMs exhibit amplified belief congruence, which negatively impacts their behavior in downstream tasks. The paper makes the following contributions:

- 1. We develop a multi-agent LLM framework to study belief congruence by simulating experiments from Rokeach and Mezei (1966), conducting a comprehensive empirical analysis across open- and closed-source LLMs.
- 2. We evaluate the effects of belief congruence in LLMs in two downstream tasks: (1) misinformation dissemination and (2) LLM learning.
- 3. We utilize three social psychology-inspired mitigation frameworks: *contact hypothesis theory*, *accuracy nudge* (Pennycook and Rand, 2022) and *Global Citizenship* (Reysen and Katzarska-Miller, 2013) to mitigate the impacts of belief congruence in LLM agents.

By integrating psychological theories with AI, our study provides insights into multi-agent LLM interactions and their parallels to human societies.

2 Multi-Agent Framework for Belief Congruence

2.1 Psychological Foundations

The Belief Congruence theory (Rokeach, 1960) suggests that people value beliefs and prioritize individuals based on belief alignment. It argues that beliefs are the most important factor in determining social identities and provides a nuanced perspective on social prejudice and the influence of beliefs on social evaluations.

For our simulation, we focus on the framework by Rokeach and Mezei (1966), that uses a factorial design of *Race x Belief* presenting four stimulus confederates: (1) a Black person who agrees, (2) a Black person who disagrees, (3) a White person

who agrees, and (4) a White person who disagrees with the participant. Two main experiments are conducted: (1) on campus and (2) in the field.

In the campus study, White participants discuss topics such as the *invasion of Cuba, campus fraternities, dormitory visitation, Bible reading in schools, or the grading system* with four confederates. They then **choose two confederates for coffee**, either in a public or a private place. Participants are also categorized as high- or low-prejudiced based on survey responses (Adorno et al., 1950).

In the field study, both White and Black participants applying to psychiatric hospitals discuss handling psychiatric patient scenarios with four confederates. Topics include *missing meals, delusions, inappropriate behavior, seating changes, or juvenile offenders*. Participants then **choose two coworkers they would prefer to work with** in the future. Results show that shared beliefs often outweigh racial group membership in predicting social preference; for instance, White participants often preferred Black individuals with the same beliefs over White individuals with opposing ones.

2.2 Multi-Agent LLM Experiment


We simulate above experiments the by leveraging openand closed-source LLMs: llama-3-70b-instruct (Dubey et al., 2024) (referred as llama-3), qwen-2.5-72b-instruct (Yang et al., 2024), (referred as qwen-2.5), and gpt-35-turbo¹ (referred as gpt-35). Implementation details are provided in Appendix H. For each interaction round, we randomize the order of participants. An example of our framework and prompt details are depicted in Fig 1 and Appendix A.1 respectively.

2.3 Findings

Fig 2 illustrates the frequency with which LLMs select similar confederates in campus and field experiments (s+o+ agents), compared to findings from the original study. We average our results across 20 and 50 LLM runs for the campus and field studies respectively.

Comparison across LLMs. gpt-35 shows the highest belief congruence in all campus settings. In the field study, 11ama-3 leads for white agents, while gpt-35 maintains the highest average belief congruence overall. Averaging across all settings, the models rank as follows for belief congru-

¹https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/products/
ai-services/openai-service






Figure 2: Campus study (top) and Field study (bottom) simulations. s+o+ refer to choosing confederates belonging to s(imilar) and o(pposite) races with the same (+) views. There are six possible choice combinations (s+o+, s-o-, s+o-, s-o+, s+s-, and o+o-).

ence: gpt-35 (0.93) > qwen-2.5 (0.67) > 11ama-3 (0.66). Belief congruence in both qwen-2.5 and 11ama-3 are comparable, likely due to their similar sizes. In both campus and field experiments, agents consistently demonstrate a high tendency for belief congruence across all settings(always >= 0.5 among six possible choice combinations).

Comparison of LLM simulation to human study. Rokeach and Mezei (1966) found that participants frequently chose confederates with similar beliefs, selecting them [0.2, 0.4] and [0.58, 0.62] times out of six possible choices for the campus and field studies, respectively. LLMs demonstrate an even stronger tendency to choose confederates with similar beliefs, reflecting amplified belief congruence.

Ablations. We conduct the following ablation studies on the above experiment: (1) **Demographic ablation:** by replacing race with other demographic attributes, such as age, gender and minimal groups² (such as A/B groups). (2) **Belief ablation:** by replacing general beliefs with specific politically




Figure 3: **Demographic and Belief Ablations**: Results averaged across all settings of both campus and field studies. For demographic ablations, all models show high belief congruence. For belief ablation, agents show higher preference to those with similar political beliefs over those of the same race.

aligned personas (Democrat vs Republican personas). This enables us to examine whether broader belief systems, such as political alignment, influence decision-making similarly to the belief-based effects observed in the prior experiment. Fig 3 shows the ablation results averaged across all settings of campus (high prej, low prej, public/private coffee) and field (Black/White participants) experiments. For demographic ablations, we observe all models show high belief congruence, with gpt-35 achieving the highest average. For belief ablation, we observe a strong tendency for agents to prefer those with similar political beliefs over those of the same race, indicating that political alignment in LLMs often correlates with shared belief systems.

3 The Impact of Belief Congruence on Downstream Tasks

Studies in psychology and social science show that belief congruence increases misinformation persuasiveness aligned with partisan identities (Cosgrove et al., 2024). The "Belief Echoes Phenomenon" (Thorson, 2016) reveals that attitudinal effects related to misinformation persist even after correction. Moreover, belief congruence hinders learning by reducing curiosity for opposing views (Ertl et al., 2022) and increasing mental load in students (Wesenberg et al., 2022).

Therefore, we explore two downstream tasks to understand the effects of belief congruence in LLMs: (1) Misinformation Dissemination: Investigating how similar beliefs may disseminate misinformation and (2) Learning: Analyzing how belief congruence affects learning outcomes in LLMs.

²Minimal groups are artificially created categories designed to study intergroup behavior in the absence of pre-existing social or cultural distinctions, and is rooted in the Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, 1970)




Figure 4: **Misinformation Dissemination**: (heterogeneous group shown) involves political personas interacting and determining the veracity of a news item.

For both downstream tasks, we leverage political personas as individuals aligned with a particular political alignment often share deeply rooted and cohesive belief systems (Balliet et al., 2018; Brandt et al., 2019; Elder and O'brian, 2022). Additionally, ablation studies on the original belief congruence study (See Section 2.3) demonstrate that political beliefs can serve as an effective proxy for examining belief-related behaviors in LLM agents.

3.1 Misinformation Dissemination

215

216

217

218

219

221

227

234

240

241

243

244

Previous research has demonstrated that individuals are more susceptible to misinformation from politically aligned sources, as they are more persuaded by and accepting of advice from like-minded individuals (Traberg et al., 2024). Political polarization and echo chambers ³ have been extensively studied in various contexts, such as Covid-19 pandemic (Jiang et al., 2021), 2016 US elections (Center, 2016), etc. Building on these insights, we design our first task to investigate the dynamics of echo chamber formation and the spread of misinformation. We focus on the Democrat and Republican belief systems in the US, examining interactions within homogeneous groups (comprising exclusively Democrat or Republican agents). This approach allows us to explore if belief congruence influences the spread of misinformation.

Framework. *Personas.* Each interaction consists of four LLM agents initialized as political personas—either Democrat or Republican. We use

a straightforward prompt: "Assume you are a <political alignment> person.", where polit*ical alignment = Democrat/Republican.* While we acknowledge that political alignment exists on a spectrum and individuals within a party may hold diverse beliefs ⁴, we do not incorporate fine-grained political distinctions in our experiments. This is because LLMs possess a generalized understanding of politically aligned personas (refer to Appendix B.3 for details). By enabling interactions between these simplified personas with their generalized beliefs, we can study the spread of misinformation among LLMs with similar belief systems. Interaction. Each agent is presented with a news item—either true or false, and they engage in discussions to assess its veracity. The framework inspired from Borah and Mihalcea (2024), consists of four rounds: (1) Initial evaluations are provided by agents (if they think the news is true or false), (2) agents convince other agents that their own belief is correct, (3) agents are then prompted to be open to other agents' perspectives and (4) agents share their final (revised) evaluations. This allows us to investigate the effects of group composition on the understanding and reinforcement of misinformation. We provide an example of the framework in Fig 4 and prompt design in Appendix B.4.

245

246

247

248

249

250

251

252

253

254

255

256

257

258

259

260

261

262

263

264

265

267

268

269

270

271

272

273

274

275

276

277

278

279

280

281

282

283

285

287

288

290

291

292

Datasets. We use two datasets related to US Politics: LIAR benchmark (Wang, 2017) and Fake News Elections (Raza et al., 2024). The LIAR dataset contains 12,836 claims from May-Nov, 2017 and the Fake News Elections dataset contains 38,333 claims from Apr-Oct, 2023. For Fake News, we only use the 9513 human-verified claims with labels. Further details are in Appendix B.1. **Evaluation.** To evaluate the spread of misinformation, we examine agents' initial responses (preinteraction) and final responses (post-interaction) using correctness rates. Let n be the total number of examples. Let $f(x_i)$ represent the agent response for the ith datapoint, x_i , where $f(x_i) \in$ $\{-1,+1\}$. Here, $f(x_i) = +1$ indicates that the agent considers x_i true and $f(x_i) = -1$ indicates that it considers it false. Similarly, let $y_i \in \{-1, +1\}$ represent the ground truth of x_i where +1 means the example is true while -1means it is false. Correctness rate is given by,

correctness rate =
$$\frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N} \mathbb{I}(f(x_i) = y_i)}{n}$$
 (1)

³Echo chambers are environments where individuals are exposed only to information that reinforces their existing beliefs, limiting diverse perspectives.

⁴https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2021/11/ 09/beyond-red-vs-blue-the-political-typology-2/




Figure 5: **Misinformation Dissemination Results**: We show initial correctness rates (before interaction) and final correctness rates (after interaction) for both datasets in hom(ogeneous) dem(ocrat) and rep(ublican) settings. Correctness rates go down after interactions, showing increase in misinformation dissemination.

This metric measures the accuracy of LLM agents in identifying the veracity of the claim based on political affiliation. We hypothesize that homogeneous groups (comprising only Republican or Democrat personas) will reduce correctness rates after interaction amplifying misinformation.

Results. Fig 5 shows the correctness rates of the initial and final responses of LLM agents averaged across 3 runs. Correctness rates decrease after interaction for both datasets across LLMs. This indicates that misinformation tends to be reinforced in groups where agents share similar beliefs, mirroring the dynamics of echo chamber formation (Nikolov et al., 2020). We also observe lower correctness rates for Republican personas in comparison, potentially due to stronger biases in beliefs associated with these personas in LLMs. Finally, we note varying trends across LLMs: gpt-35 has higher overall correctness rates in comparison to 11ama-3 and gwen-2.5. Across datasets, gpt-35 performs better in LIAR whereas 11ama-3 and qwen-2.5 perform better in Fake News.

3.2 Learning in LLMs

299

302

305

307

309

311

312

314

315

317

319

320

321

327

331

Inspired by Marks et al. (2019), the task examines how ideological alignment, or political homophily, influences learning and decision-making in LLMs. We analyze if LLM agents favor information from politically similar sources, even in non-political tasks, and to what extent this can hinder learning. **Framework.** We adopt a two-stage framework (Learning and Choice) similar to Marks et al. (2019) (Fig 6). In the Learning stage, a participant agent interacts with four sources through two types of interleaved trials: (1) an abstract "Merlin" pattern recognition task (where "Merlin" is a randomly assigned sentence pattern with no inherent meaning) (Examples provided in Appendix C), and (2) observing sources' political views. Sources play a crucial role in the Choice stage and may influence

how participant agents choose to learn. Sources are designed with specific patterns: Similar-Accurate (80% political agreement ⁵, 80% Merlin accuracy), Similar-Inaccurate (80% political agreement, 50% Merlin accuracy), Dissimilar-Accurate (20% political agreement, 80% Merlin accuracy), and Dissimilar-Inaccurate (20% political agreement, 50% Merlin accuracy). In the *Choice stage*, The participant agent begins by answering a Merlin task question and rating its confidence in the response. It then selects between two random sources to review their answers, revises its own answer if desired, and updates its confidence rating accordingly. This setup tests whether participants prioritize a source's accuracy or political alignment (from the choice made between two sources), even in a nonpolitical task such as pattern recognition.

332

333

334

335

336

338

339

340

341

342

343

344

345

346

347

348

349

350

351

353

354

355

357

358

359

360

361

362

363

364

365

367

369

Our experiments involve 50 LLM agents with varying political preferences, progressing through 20 learning and choice trials each, making decisions at each Choice step.

Dataset. For the Merlin task, we generate random sentences using gpt-40 and randomly assign either "true" or "false" labels to indicate the presence or absence of a Merlin pattern respectively. For the political agreement task, we utilize statements related to political ideologies from Marks et al. (2019). Examples are provided in Appendix C.

Evaluation. We employ two evaluation strategies: **1. Source choice**: In the Choice stage, if an agent consistently chooses similar political sources over those with higher Merlin accuracy, it shows that political belief affects learning. We focus on cases where the two available sources are either Similar-Inaccurate (SI) or Dissimilar-Accurate (DA). Choosing a SI source suggests that political beliefs influence decisions, even when a more accurate source is available.

⁵political agreement with the participant.




Figure 6: **LLM Learning** consisting of two stages: **learning** and **choice**. *Learning*: agent learns about sources' political beliefs and their accuracy on Merlin pattern recognition. *Choice*: agent first answers, rates its confidence levels, selects a source's answer and again rates its confidence levels after learning about the source's answer. Key evaluation strategies are highlighted in **blue**.

2. Confidence ratings: In the Choice stage, agents share confidence ratings for their answers before and after viewing a source's answer. Higher confidence ratings after choosing politically aligned sources indicate that political beliefs influence the agent's trust in the Merlin pattern recognition task. Results. Table 1 presents the percentage of instances where agents choose politically similar sources, along with instances of increase in confidence ratings when agents choose politically similar or dissimilar sources (only refer to results under the "No Mitigation" section for now).

371

374

377

384

388

In terms of **source choices**, agents predominantly select politically similar sources (>=70%) even when another politically dissimilar source with a better Merlin accuracy is present. This trend is consistent across the three models. In terms of **confidence scores**, we calculate the relative proportion of instances where an agent's confidence

increases after selecting either a similar or a dissimilar source. The proportion is higher when an agent chooses a similar source, showing the impact of political belief similarity on a non-political task. Comparison to the original study. Marks et al. (2019) show that participants chose to seek advice from politically like-minded sources for the shape categorization task, even when these sources were less competent. Participants falsely concluded that those sharing their political views were better at pattern recognition tasks and they were more influenced by politically similar sources' opinions. These findings align with our results, which show that LLM agents tend to choose those with similar political viewpoints and have higher confidence in these sources' answers. Therefore, belief congruence in LLMs influences their learning processes.

389

390

391

392

393

394

395

396

397

398

399

400

401

402

403

404

405

406

407

408

409

410

411

412

413

414

415

416

417

418

419

420

421

422

423

424

425

426

427

428

429

430

431

432

433

434

435

436

437

4 Mitigation of Belief Congruence

Our experiments have demonstrated that belief congruence in LLMs can reinforce misinformation and impact their learning processes, highlighting the need for mitigation strategies to ensure LLMs can accommodate diverse perspectives and adapt to dynamic contexts without reinforcing biases. Research in psychology and social sciences has identified several strategies to mitigate the effects of belief congruence, such as accuracy-focused interventions and awareness training (Rathje et al., 2023; Siebert and Siebert, 2023). In addition, the contact hypothesis theory (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006) highlights that inter-group contact can significantly improve perspective-taking abilities. Finally, global citizenship frameworks (Dower, 2003; Davies, 2006) emphasize the importance of cross-cultural understanding and the consideration of multiple perspectives, which we hypothesize could mitigate the adverse effects of belief congruence.

4.1 Contact Hypothesis Theory

Using contact hypothesis theory (Allport, 1954), we hypothesize that inter-group contact among LLM agents with varying beliefs can mitigate the negative effects of belief congruence, particularly in misinformation dissemination. Existing studies also indicate that while homogeneous groups are more likely to reinforce misinformation, whereas heterogeneous groups, characterized by diverse perspectives, can mitigate its spread (Röchert et al., 2021). Thus, heterogeneous groups consisting of

	LEARNING EVALUATION						
MODEL	S in (DA+SI) Conf Inc(S) Conf Inc(D)						
NO MITIGATION							
gpt-35	0.718			0.259	0.233		
11ama-3	0.886			0.303	0.247		
qwen-2.5	0.828			0.090	0.050		
ACCURACY NUDGES							
gpt-35		0.665		0.250	0.375		
llama-3		0.879		0.333	0.353		
qwen-2.5		0.645		0.130	0.863		
GLOBAL POLITICAL CITIZENSHIP							
gpt-35		0.679		0.278	0.366		
11ama-3	0.912		0.400	0.550			
qwen-2.5	0.953		0.110	0.050			

Table 1: **LLM Learning Results**: Mostly, S(imilar) sources are chosen when DA and SI sources are available, showing political beliefs impact learning. Conf(idence) inc(reases) more when similar sources are chosen. With accuracy nudge, S in (DA + SR) reduces. Additionally, confidence increase rates for dis-similar sources rise for each model.

both Democrat and Republican agents are introduced. Note that we do not use the contact hypothesis in LLM learning as it consists of a single LLM agents learning about others without interaction, which is essential for the hypothesis.

Results. Table 2 shows the correctness rates of the final responses of agents in misinformation dissemination task. Heterogeneous groups show higher correctness rates, which suggests that diverse interactions can improve perspective-taking abilities and reduce the spread of misinformation.

4.2 Accuracy Nudges

Accuracy nudges (Pennycook and Rand, 2022) prompt users to verify information and has been proven effective in addressing issues like reducing partisan bias (Rathje et al., 2023). We use the simplest form of accuracy nudges that aligns with self-reflection, a method where LLMs have shown strong performance across various domains (Ganguli et al., 2023) (See Appendix E for prompts).

Results. *Misinformation Dissemination.* Table 2 shows that accuracy nudges increase the final correctness rates of multi-agent LLMs.

LLM Learning. In Table 1, accuracy nudges reduce agents' tendency to select politically similar sources and increase agents' confidence while choosing dissimilar sources. It is the most effective strategy across all models.

4.3 Global Political Citizenship

The Global Citizenship (Dower, 2003) framework expands human identity and responsibility

MODEL	FINAL CORRECTNESS RATE					
MODEL	HOM-DEM	HOM-REP				
NO MITIGATION						
gpt-35	0.598	0.601				
llama-3	0.444	0.377				
qwen-2.5	0.400	0.390				
ACCURACY NUDGES						
gpt-35	0.664	0.632				
llama-3	0.501	0.450				
qwen-2.5	0.520	0.460				
GLOBAL POLITICAL CITIZENSHIP						
gpt-35	0.678	0.661				
llama-3	0.581	0.550				
qwen-2.5	0.525	0.516				
CONTACT HYPOTHESIS (ONLY HET)						
gpt-35	0.674					
llama-3	0.544					
qwen-2.5	0.493					

Table 2: **Misinformation Dissemination Mitigation** (**Final Correctness Rates**): All strategies lead to higher correctness rates after interaction, with Global Political Citizenship being the most effective. The highest scores per model are highlighted.

beyond geographical boundaries. It emphasizes global awareness, compassion, cultural diversity, and a commitment to social justice and sustainability, with frameworks spanning multiple disciplines (Davies, 2006). We draw on the empirical framework by Reysen and Katzarska-Miller (2013), which explores the effects of globalization on identity and psychological functioning. The framework links antecedents (normative environment and global awareness) to outcomes (prosocial values like empathy, diversity, social justice, sustainability, and responsibility) through global citizenship. Building on their survey, we tailor the questions to introduce the concept of Global Political Citizenship, framing the questions within the context of US political dynamics. For example, the question, 'I am able to empathize with people from other countries', is rephrased as 'I am able to empathize with people from other political affiliations' to suit the political setting. This concept characterizes individuals who are active, responsible, and inclusive across diverse political perspectives.

We hypothesize that an LLM simulating a global political citizen will reduce misinformation dissemination, and preserve its learning capabilities. The modified survey questions with scores depicting a global political citizen are added to the system prompts during LLM agent initialization. A complete list of survey questions is provided in Appendix F.1.

Results. *Misinformation Dissemination.* Table 2 shows that global political citizenship is the most

effective across LLMs in reducing misinformation dissemination.

LLM Learning. Table 1 shows that the global political citizenship shows limited effectiveness for 11ama-3 and qwen-2.5, requiring further analysis. Confidence increases with politically dissimilar sources in two models.

Overall, Global Political Citizenship and accuracy nudges are the most effective for misinformation dissemination and LLM learning respectively.

5 Related Work

501

502

503

506

507

510

511

512

513

514

515

516

517

518

519

520

524

527

529

531

532

534 535

539

541

543

546

547

551

Belief Congruence Theory. The Belief Congruence theory (Rokeach, 1960) states that people value individuals based on belief alignments. Further studies (Rokeach and Mezei, 1966) showed that shared beliefs were a stronger predictor of liking than group membership. While the theory has been influential, it has also received several critiques (like many other psychological theories) regarding its universal applicability, especially in the context of larger social distances (Triandis and Triandis, 1962) and environments where prejudice is institutionalized (Goldstein and Davis, 1972). Despite the criticism, it's core premise that shared beliefs can transcend group boundaries continues to be an important direction of research.

Multi-Agent LLM Interactions. Breakneck advances in LLMs have driven the development of multi-agent LLM interactions that leverage collective intelligence and specialized skills (Guo et al., 2024), enabling agents to collaborate and make decisions in ways that mirror human cooperation. These systems have facilitated progress in diverse domains, including software development (Hong et al., 2023), societal simulation (Park et al., 2023), and polarization studies (Ohagi, 2024). For instance, Park et al. (2023) perform societal simulations by incorporating observation, planning, and reflection to foster emergent behaviors. and (Zhou et al., 2024) enables LLMs to collaborate, compete, and serve as evaluators on complex social goals. However, underlying group behaviors in multiagent LLM interactions remain under-explored. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that uses LLM agents to simulate belief congruence and examine its implications for downstream tasks.

6 Lessons Learned and Actionable Steps Our findings reveal that LLMs exhibit belief congruence as humans, which in turn leads to further impacts across real-world societal tasks. We propose mitigation methods inspired from social psy-

chology, and reduce the negative impacts of belief congruence to some extent. Through our experiments and analyses, we learned several valuable insights and offer actionable recommendations:

552

553

554

555

556

557

558

559

560

561

562

563

564

565

566

567

568

569

570

571

572

573

574

575

576

577

578

579

581

582

583

584

585

586

587

588

589

590

591

592

593

594

595

596

597

598

599

LLMs exhibit amplified belief congruence. Our LLM simulation experiments reveal that belief congruence is amplified in LLMs, becoming a dominant factor in LLM decision-making, driving fundamental group identity behaviors. Future work can investigate additional group psychological theories, such as Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, 1970) and Realistic Conflict Theory (Sherif, 1961), to further explore LLM behavior in diverse group scenarios. Belief congruence in LLMs can influence societally impactful tasks. Belief congruence affects LLM performance in the context of misinformation, and learning capabilities. This mirrors the real-life impact of belief congruence in humans. Future work could investigate the role of belief diversity in improving LLM resilience and examine how group psychological behaviors can influence other societal applications.

Best mitigation strategies differ for downstream tasks In our study, we explore mitigation techniques inspired by previous social psychological theories. Global Political Citizenship and Accuracy Nudges are the most effective mitigation strategies to address misinformation dissemination (increase in correctness rates by 37%) and LLM learning (increase in choosing dis-similar accurate sources by 11%) respectively. Future research can investigate additional mitigation strategies, including both generic strategies applicable across multiple tasks and specific ones tailored to individual tasks.

7 Conclusion

In this paper, we studied the presence of belief congruence in LLMs. We found that, similar to humans, LLMs exhibit belief congruence, often at levels higher than among humans. Further, as previously observed in human studies, we found that belief congruence can lead to negative effects in LLMs, such as misinformation spread and impact on learning abilities. To address these shortcomings, we introduced three mitigation techniques inspired from psychological research, and showed that they lead to improved performance in LLMs. To encourage future research in this direction, we open-source the code of our framework.⁶

⁶available at https://anonymous.4open.science/anonymize/BeliefCongruenceSim-037F

8 Limitations and Ethical Considerations.

Simplified Representations of Human Behavior. Our approach to simulate belief congruence is based on one study by (Rokeach, 1960). Although seminal in its field, further simulation experiments and analyses in varied contexts would be helpful. Additionally, the simulation in LLMs might oversimplify the complex and dynamic nature of human belief systems. Human belief congruence is influenced by several factors such as sociocultural, emotional, and contextual factors, which LLMs cannot fully replicate. Hence, we encourage future work to dive deeper into the conversation logs of multi-agent LLMs which to better understand the complexities.

Generalizability across tasks. We explore two downstream tasks in the context of misinformation and LLM learning to assess the impact of belief congruence in LLMs. However, these findings may not generalize to tasks or applications outside the specific downstream tasks analyzed. Belief congruence may also be helpful in certain tasks related to mental health and other fields. For instance, in psychotherapy, aligning with a patient's core beliefs can build trust and rapport, leading to better therapeutic outcomes.

Cross-Cultural Implications. The majority of studies and surveys referenced in our research were conducted within the U.S. context. As a result, our findings may unintentionally generalize across diverse cultural groups, potentially overlooking variations in belief congruence shaped by cultural differences. To address this limitation, future research should investigate how belief congruence and other psychological characteristics are influenced by cultural contexts, providing a more nuanced understanding of these dynamics across different populations.

Biases and Transparency. Exploring belief congruence simulations in LLMs risks amplifying existing biases in their outputs, as observed by the rise in misinformation dissemination and its negative impact on learning. Additionally, concerns regarding transparency and accountability persist, as the decision-making processes of LLMs in real-world applications often lack sufficient explainability. While mitigation strategies derived from this study address issues caused by belief congruence,

they could inadvertently reduce model effectiveness in other domains. These ethical considerations remain critical to ensuring that the study contributes positively and responsibly to both AI research and society.

References

- T Adorno, E Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J Levinson, and NR Sanford. 1950. Studies in prejudice.
- Gordon W Allport. 1954. The nature of prejudice. *Reading/Addison-Wesley*.
- Elisa C Baek and Carolyn Parkinson. 2022. Shared understanding and social connection: Integrating approaches from social psychology, social network analysis, and neuroscience. *Social and Personality Psychology Compass*, 16(11):e12710.
- Daniel Balliet, Joshua M Tybur, Junhui Wu, Christian Antonellis, and Paul AM Van Lange. 2018. Political ideology, trust, and cooperation: In-group favoritism among republicans and democrats during a us national election. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 62(4):797–818.
- Angana Borah and Rada Mihalcea. 2024. Towards implicit bias detection and mitigation in multi-agent LLM interactions. In *Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: EMNLP 2024*, pages 9306–9326, Miami, Florida, USA. Association for Computational Linguistics.
- Mark J Brandt, Chris G Sibley, and Danny Osborne. 2019. What is central to political belief system networks? *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 45(9):1352–1364.
- Pew Research Center. 2016. Partisanship and political animosity in 2016. Accessed: 2025-02-02.
- Chi-Min Chan, Weize Chen, Yusheng Su, Jianxuan Yu, Wei Xue, Shanghang Zhang, Jie Fu, and Zhiyuan Liu. 2024. Chateval: Towards better LLM-based evaluators through multi-agent debate. In *The Twelfth International Conference on Learning Representations*.
- Tylor Cosgrove, Mark Bahr, and Katarina Fritzon. 2024. Social identities increase susceptibility to congruent misinformation: Testing norm and nudge interventions.
- Lynn Davies. 2006. Global citizenship: Abstraction or framework for action? *Educational review*, 58(1):5–25.
- Nigel Dower. 2003. *An introduction to global citizen-ship*. Edinburgh University Press.
- Abhimanyu Dubey, Abhinav Jauhri, Abhinav Pandey, Abhishek Kadian, Ahmad Al-Dahle, Aiesha Letman, Akhil Mathur, Alan Schelten, Amy Yang, Angela

Fan, et al. 2024. The llama 3 herd of models. *arXiv* preprint arXiv:2407.21783.

- Elizabeth Mitchell Elder and Neil A O'brian. 2022. Social groups as the source of political belief systems: Fresh evidence on an old theory. *American Political Science Review*, 116(4):1407–1424.
- Bernhard Ertl, Florian G Hartmann, and Anja Wunderlich. 2022. Impact of interest congruence on study outcomes. *Frontiers in Psychology*, 13:816620.
- Luna T Frauhammer and German Neubaum. 2023. Metacognitive effects of attitudinal (in) congruence on social media: relating processing fluency, subjective knowledge, and political participation. *Frontiers in Psychology*, 14:1146674.
- Deep Ganguli, Amanda Askell, Nicholas Schiefer, Thomas I Liao, Kamilė Lukošiūtė, Anna Chen, Anna Goldie, Azalia Mirhoseini, Catherine Olsson, Danny Hernandez, et al. 2023. The capacity for moral self-correction in large language models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2302.07459*.
- Marvin Goldstein and Earl E Davis. 1972. Race and belief: A further analysis of the social determinants of behavioral intentions. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 22(3):346.
- Taicheng Guo, Xiuying Chen, Yaqi Wang, Ruidi Chang, Shichao Pei, Nitesh V Chawla, Olaf Wiest, and Xiangliang Zhang. 2024. Large language model based multi-agents: A survey of progress and challenges. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2402.01680*.
- Sirui Hong, Xiawu Zheng, Jonathan Chen, Yuheng Cheng, Jinlin Wang, Ceyao Zhang, Zili Wang, Steven Ka Shing Yau, Zijuan Lin, Liyang Zhou, et al. 2023. Metagpt: Meta programming for multi-agent collaborative framework. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2308.00352*.
- Julie Jiang, Xiang Ren, Emilio Ferrara, et al. 2021. Social media polarization and echo chambers in the context of covid-19: Case study. *JMIRx med*, 2(3):e29570.
- Angela Y Lee, Ryan C Moore, and Jeffrey T Hancock. 2023. Designing misinformation interventions for all: Perspectives from aapi, black, latino, and native american community leaders on misinformation educational efforts. *Harvard Kennedy School Misinformation Review*.
- Jonathan Levy, Abraham Goldstein, Moran Influs, Shafiq Masalha, and Ruth Feldman. 2022. Neural rhythmic underpinnings of intergroup bias: implications for peace-building attitudes and dialogue. *Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience*, 17(4):408–420.
- Mimi Lord. 2015. Group learning capacity: the roles of open-mindedness and shared vision. *Frontiers in psychology*, 6:150.

Joseph Marks, Eloise Copland, Eleanor Loh, Cass R Sunstein, and Tali Sharot. 2019. Epistemic spillovers: Learning others' political views reduces the ability to assess and use their expertise in nonpolitical domains. *Cognition*, 188:74–84.

- Dimitar Nikolov, Alessandro Flammini, and Filippo Menczer. 2020. Right and left, partisanship predicts (asymmetric) vulnerability to misinformation. *arXiv* preprint arXiv:2010.01462.
- Masaya Ohagi. 2024. Polarization of autonomous generative ai agents under echo chambers. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2402.12212*.
- Joon Sung Park, Joseph O'Brien, Carrie Jun Cai, Meredith Ringel Morris, Percy Liang, and Michael S. Bernstein. 2023. Generative agents: Interactive simulacra of human behavior. In *Proceedings of the 36th Annual ACM Symposium on User Interface Software and Technology*, UIST '23, New York, NY, USA. Association for Computing Machinery.
- Gordon Pennycook and David G Rand. 2022. Nudging social media toward accuracy. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 700(1):152–164.
- Thomas F Pettigrew and Linda R Tropp. 2006. A metaanalytic test of intergroup contact theory. *Journal of personality and social psychology*, 90(5):751.
- Nadia Rania, Ilaria Coppola, and Laura Pinna. 2021. Reflective practices to study group dynamics: Implement empowerment and understand the functioning of groups. *Frontiers in Psychology*, 12:786754.
- Steve Rathje, Jon Roozenbeek, Jay J Van Bavel, and Sander Van Der Linden. 2023. Accuracy and social motivations shape judgements of (mis) information. *Nature Human Behaviour*, 7(6):892–903.
- Shaina Raza, Mizanur Rahman, and Shardul Ghuge. 2024. Analyzing the impact of fake news on the anticipated outcome of the 2024 election ahead of time. *Preprint*, arXiv:2312.03750.
- Stephen Reysen and Iva Katzarska-Miller. 2013. A model of global citizenship: Antecedents and outcomes. *International Journal of Psychology*, 48(5):858–870.
- Daniel Röchert, Gautam Kishore Shahi, German Neubaum, Björn Ross, and Stefan Stieglitz. 2021. The networked context of covid-19 misinformation: informational homogeneity on youtube at the beginning of the pandemic. *Online Social Networks and Media*, 26:100164.
- Milton Rokeach. 1960. The open and closed mind: Investigations into the nature of belief systems and personality systems.
- Milton Rokeach and Louis Mezei. 1966. Race and shared belief as factors in social choice: In real-life experiments, congeniality of ideas proves to

806 807	be a stronger determinant than race. <i>Science</i> , 151(3707):167–172.	Discussion topics for Belief Congruence Sim	
808 809 810	Rüdiger J Seitz, Raymond F Paloutzian, and Hans-Ferdinand Angel. 2024. Manifestations, social impact, and decay of conceptual beliefs: A cultural	Campus Study Discussion Topics = you can either agree/disagree to the following topics:	
811	perspective. <i>Brain and Behavior</i> , 14(4):e3470. M Sherif. 1961. Intergroup conflict and cooperation:	1.Elimination of Fraternities from Campus	
813 814	The robbers cave experiment. <i>University Book Exchange</i> .	2.Allowing girls to visit men's dormitories	
815 816 817 818	Jana Siebert and Johannes Ulrich Siebert. 2023. Effective mitigation of the belief perseverance bias after the retraction of misinformation: Awareness training and counter-speech. <i>Plos one</i> , 18(3):e0282202.	3.Bible reading in the schools4.Grading system - needs changes or no?	
819 820	Henri Tajfel. 1970. Experiments in intergroup discrimination. <i>Scientific american</i> , 223(5):96–103.	Field Study Discussion Topics = You are given two options - to agree with the current rules of the psychiatric hospital or disagree	
821 822 823	Emily Thorson. 2016. Belief echoes: The persistent effects of corrected misinformation. <i>Political Communication</i> , 33(3):460–480.	and provide a more permissive alternative, what would you prefer if a patient does the following:	
824 825 826	Cecilie S Traberg, Trisha Harjani, Jon Roozenbeek, and Sander van der Linden. 2024. The persuasive effects of social cues and source effects on misinformation	1.misses dinner 2.refuses to shave because of a delusion	
827	susceptibility. <i>Scientific Reports</i> , 14(1):4205. Harry C Triandis and Leigh Minturn Triandis. 1962. A	3.takes off his clothes 4.asks to change his dining-room	
829 830	cross-cultural study of social distance. <i>Psychological Monographs: General and Applied</i> , 76(21):1.	seat 5.what to do with juvenile offenders	
831 832 833 834 835 836	Martijn van Zomeren, Chantal d'Amore, Inga Lisa Pauls, Eric Shuman, and Ana Leal. 2024. The intergroup value protection model: A theoretically integrative and dynamic approach to intergroup conflict escalation in democratic societies. <i>Personality and Social Psychology Review</i> , 28(2):225–248.	Figure 7: Discussion topics for Campus and Field experiments. These topics are derived from the original study (Rokeach and Mezei, 1966)	
837 838 839	William Yang Wang. 2017. " liar, liar pants on fire": A new benchmark dataset for fake news detection. arXiv preprint arXiv:1705.00648.	A Belief congruence	857
840 841 842	Lukas Wesenberg, Felix Krieglstein, Sebastian Jansen, Günter Daniel Rey, Maik Beege, and Sascha Schneider. 2022. The influence of the order and congru-	In this section, we provide the prompts and experimental results of belief congruence	858 859
843 844	ency of correct and erroneous worked examples on learning and (meta-) cognitive load. Frontiers in	A.1 Belief congruence Prompt Design	860
845	Psychology, 13:1032003.	Here, we provide the prompts for belief congruence simulations with LLMs. Refer to:	861 862
846 847 848 849	An Yang, Baosong Yang, Beichen Zhang, Binyuan Hui, Bo Zheng, Bowen Yu, Chengyuan Li, Dayiheng Liu, Fei Huang, Haoran Wei, et al. 2024. Qwen2. 5 technical report. <i>arXiv preprint arXiv:2412.15115</i> .	• Fig 7 for discussion topics used for both field and campus studies.	863 864
850 851 852 853	Xuhui Zhou, Hao Zhu, Leena Mathur, Ruohong Zhang, Haofei Yu, Zhengyang Qi, Louis-Philippe Morency, Yonatan Bisk, Daniel Fried, Graham Neubig, and Maarten Sap. 2024. SOTOPIA: Interactive evalua-	• Fig 10 for instructions related to all phases of the belief congruence experiments.	865 866
854 855 856	tion for social intelligence in language agents. In The Twelfth International Conference on Learning Representations.	• Fig 11 for prompts on the flow of interaction rounds in the simulation.	867 868

	gpt-35		llama-3		qwen-2.5	
Settings	LIAR data	Fake News Data	LIAR data	Fake News Data	LIAR data	Fake News Data
hom-dem	0.622	0.534	0.388	0.500	0.372	0.429
hom-rep	0.643	0.560	0.337	0.418	0.369	0.419
CH	0.704	0.565	0.443	0.644	0.435	0.552
hom-dem (AN)	0.706	0.622	0.495	0.507	0.472	0.569
hom-rep (AN)	0.652	0.612	0.413	0.486	0.435	0.486
hom-dem (GPC)	0.683	0.672	0.519	0.644	0.488	0.562
hom-rep (GPC)	0.661	0.661	0.508	0.580	0.478	0.485

Table 3: Final correctness rates of models across datasets in misinformation dissemenation

LIAR benchmark example

Statement: "The last quarter, it was just announced, our gross domestic product was below zero. Who ever heard of this? Its never below zero."

Speaker: Donald Trump

Context: presidential announcement speech

Label: Pants on Fire

Justification: According to Bureau of Economic Analysis and National Bureau of Economic Research, the growth in the gross domestic product has been below zero 42 times over 68 years. Thats a lot more than "never." We rate his claim Pants on Fire!

Figure 8: LIAR benchmark example

Fake News Elections example

Statement: "In those debates, the conventional wisdom has been pretty simple: Democrats may go for kumbaya stuff, but the way to get conservatives on board is to drop the bleeding-heart talk and emphasize data and national security — "Cold, hard American interests," as Mitch McConnell put it last year when discussing help for Ukraine. But what if that wisdom turns out to be wrong? It's a question that comes up, almost as an aside, in a new book by Rajiv Shah, president of the Rockefeller Foundation and, once upon a time, Barack Obama's improbably young administrator of the United States Agency for International Development."

Label: REAL

Figure 9: Fake News Elections example

A.2 Retention rates in Belief congruence simulations

869

870

871

872

873

874

875

876

877

878

879

880

881

883

885

886

887

888

889

890

891

892

893

894

895

896

897

898

899

900

901

902

903

904

905

906

Retention rates are calculated after the discussion rounds in belief congruence experiments to assess whether LLM participant agents can accurately remember which confederates agree or disagree with them. The average retention rates across models fall within the range of [0.8, 1], which we consider sufficient for our congruence simulations.

A.3 Qualitative Analysis LLM Generation for Belief Congruence Simulations

Fig 12 shows examples of LLM conversation logs (Choice Stage) during Belief Congruence simulation experiments.

Fig 13 shows examples of LLM conversation logs (Choice Stage) during Political Belief Congruence ablation experiments.

We observe that LLM agents in most cases explain their reasonings well. Most responses favor agents with similar beliefs or political beliefs but when they choose dis-similar agents, the most common reasoning provided is to "maintain a **balance** in discussions".

B Misinformation Dissemination

B.1 Dataset Details

We use two datasets for the misinformation dissemination task: LIAR benchmark (Wang, 2017) and Fake News Elections (Raza et al., 2024).

LIAR benchmark: contains 12,836 claims from May 2017 to Nov 2017. Each data point consists of the following: a statement (the claim), its speaker, context, label and justification for the label. There are six fine-grained labels for the truthfulness ratings: pants-fire, false, barely true, half-true, mostly-true, and true. For our analyses, we use two labels for correctness rates: 'True' for half-true, mostly-true, and true statements, and 'False' for pants-fire, false, and barely true statements. In terms

Prompt Instructions for Belief congruence Simulation

'discussion': RESPONSE INSTRUCTIONS:

- 1. Format: [AGENT NAME]: <specific response>
- 2. Start with your specific agent name
- 3. Provide a clear, concise response.
- 4. Limit to 3 sentences maximum.
- 5. Example:

[AGENT2]: 'It should be eliminated because they perpetuate harmful social dynamics.'

[AGENT3]: 'It should be allowed for more permissive options, and better understanding.'

[AGENT5]: 'I agree with not allowing this.'

YOUR RESPONSE:

'remember': RESPONSE INSTRUCTIONS:

- 1. List ALL agents and their stances.
- 2. State each as 'NAME (GROUP) and their respective STANCES'. Agents present [AGENT2(A), AGENT3(A), AGENT4(B), AGENT5(B)]
- 3. Example:

[AGENT1](A): [agree/disagree]

[AGENT2](A): [agree/disagree]

[AGENT3](B): [agree/disagree]

[AGENT4](B)]: [agree/disagree]

'coffee': RESPONSE INSTRUCTIONS:

- 1. Among [AGENT2(A), AGENT3(A), AGENT4(B), AGENT5(B)], Choose EXACTLY 2 agents to go to coffee with.
- 2. Example: 'I choose [AGENT1] and [AGENT2] to go to coffee with because [REASON]'.

'work': RESPONSE INSTRUCTIONS:

- 1. Among [AGENT1(A), AGENT2(A), AGENT3(B), AGENT4(B)], Choose EXACTLY 2 agents you prefer to work with and reason why.
- 2. Example: 'I choose [AGENT1] and [AGENT2] to work with because [REASON]'.

Figure 10: Belief congruence Prompt Instructions: (1) discussion: provides response instructions to guide agent interactions for discussion of the given issue, (2) remember: provides response instructions for the chairman agent to later evaluates their retention rates, (3) coffee: provides prompt response instructions to determine the confederates the chairman agents choose to go to coffee with and (4) work: provides prompt response instructions to determine the confederates the chairman agents prefer to work with. discussion is used by all agents for both campus and field experiments, remember, coffee, and work are only applicable for chairman agents, with coffee and work corresponding to the campus and field studies respectively. Here, A may refer to the minimal group or demographic group of the agents: race, religion, or gender.

Prompt for Belief congruence Interaction Flow

situation (campus study) = discussion in a group of agents: M1(A), M2(A), M3(A), M4(B), M5(B) in a room, everyone speaks one by one and share their opinions about the discussion topic <d>.

situation (**field study**) = discussion in a group of agents: M1(A), M2(A), M3(A), M4(B), M5(B) who are interviewing for a role at a psychiatric hospital. everyone speaks one by one and share their opinions about the discussion topic <d>. For each <d>, you are given two options - to agree with the current rules of the hospital or disagree and provide a more permissive alternative.

Discussion rounds (ROUNDS 1-3)

chairman prompt = Assume you are <name>, belonging to group <a/be shows and you are <high/low> prejudiced. You are in a <situation> and your discussion topic is <d>. You <agree/disagree> with the topic. Respond with AGREE or DISAGREE and why.

confederate prompt = Assume you are <name>, belonging to group <a/b>. You are
in a <situation> and your discussion topic is <d>. You are to <agree/disagree>
with the chairman's stance. Respond with AGREE or DISAGREE and why.

Retention Phase for Chairman

remember prompt = Based on the discussion about <d> using <memory>, list the
agents' responses - if they AGREEE or DISAGREE with YOUR STANCE.

Coffee Partner Preference Phase for Chairman

 ${f coffee\ prompt}={\sf Among\ all\ agents:}\ [M2(A),\ M3(A),\ M4(B),\ M5(B)]$ in the discussion about <d>, choose two agents to go for coffee in a <public/private> place. Note that the agents will not be aware of this.Respond with the agent's names and why.

Work Preference Phase for Chairman

coffee prompt = Among all agents: [M2(A), M3(A), M4(B), M5(B)] in the discussion about <d>, choose two agents you prefer to work with. Note that this will not influence your interview process in any manner and the agents will not be aware of this. Respond with the agent's names and why.

Figure 11: Belief congruence Interaction Flow: The **discussion** phase for both campus and field experiments continue for 3 rounds. Chairman agents are assigned to either agree or disagree with the discussion topic, whereas confederate agents are assigned to either agree or disagree with the chairman agent's stance. Additionally, the chairman can be either high/low prejudiced, and can take the confederate to coffee in either a public/place in the campus study. We do not have such settings in the field study. The **retention** Phase is a sanity check to understand if the chairman agent can rightly recall each confederate agent's stance at the end of the discussion. Finally, **coffee partner/work preference** phase is for the chairman two people they prefer the most to either go to coffee with (campus study) or work with (field study). Also note that in the campus study, white participants in the original experiment first complete a survey to assess their level of prejudice (high or low). In our simulation, we do this by initializing the models with system prompts indicating high or low prejudice.

of speaker affiliation, the dataset contains 4150 Democrats, 5687 Republicans and 2185 FB posts not aligned to a political belief. Fig 8 shows an example of the LIAR benchmark. We utilize 5,000 examples from this benchmark for our task to man-

907

908

910

911

age high inference costs. To ensure fairness, the reduced benchmark includes an equal number of claims spoken by Democrats and Republicans. Additionally, we make sure true and false news are balanced.

912

913

914

915

916

Examples of LLM Belief Congruence Generations in the Choice Stage

Belief Congruence Simulations

When similar belief agents are chosen:

Conservative Participant Agent Response:

I would choose two agents [m2] and [m4] because we share the same opinion on the topic of not allowing girls to visit men's dormitories. It would be interesting to have a conversation with them and learn more about their perspectives on the matter. Additionally, I appreciate their emphasis on respecting individual privacy in shared living spaces and maintaining a safe and conducive environment for learning. Meeting them over coffee in a public place would be an opportunity to discuss this topic further and exchange ideas.

Open-minded Participant Agent Response:

I would choose [m2] and [m4] because they both seem to have a progressive and open-minded attitude towards education. While they may have slightly different opinions on the grading system, they both agree that it needs changes and a more holistic approach to evaluating students' progress should be adopted. This shows that they are willing to consider new ideas and approaches to improve the current system. Additionally, their constructive and thoughtful contributions in the previous discussion make me think that they would be interesting and engaging coffee companions.

When agents with similar and dis-similar agents are chosen:

Agent1: m2, Agent2: m3. I would like to have coffee with m2 because I agree with his perspective on the need for changes in the grading system, and I believe he could provide more insights into his ideas on a holistic approach to evaluating student progress. I would also like to have coffee with m3 because his response to the discussion on the grading system shows a balanced and nuanced perspective. I would like to hear more of his thoughts on how to maintain objectivity and fairness in the evaluation process, while also accounting for individual differences.

Figure 12: LLM conversation logs (Choice Stage) during Belief Congruence simulation experiments - example from Campus study

Fake News Elections benchmark: contains 38,333 claims from April 2023 to October 2023. For Fake News, we only use the 9513 human-verified claims with labels ⁷. Each data point only contains the statement (claim) and its veracity (label). The labels are either REAL or FAKE. Fig 9 shows an example of the Fake News Elections data. For this dataset too, we only utilize 5000 examples and make sure REAL and FAKE labels are balanced.

917

919

920

924

926

927

928

929

The average number of tokens for the claim texts LIAR and Fake News datasets are 20.23 and 438.11 respectively, showing variety in the two datasets.

B.2 Differences in performances of models across datasets

930

931

932

933

934

935

936

937

938

939

940

941

942

943

944

B.3 Political Personas of LLMs

As a sanity check to understanding the beliefs of LLMs in terms of political personas in the misinformation dissemination task, we prompt the LLMs to "Assume you are a <Democrat/Republican>. Generate belief your top 10 <Democrat/Republican> person.". Figs 14, 15 and 16 show political persona beliefs of Qwen, GPT and Llama models respectively. We prompt each agent to initialize with either a Democrat or Republican identity, resulting in agents with either similar or dis-similar beliefs based on their political alignment. Our observations reveal that the top 10

⁷https://huggingface.co/datasets/
newsmediabias/fake_news_elections_labelled_data

Examples of LLM Political Belief Congruence Ablation Generations in the Choice Stage

Belief Congruence Simulations

When similar belief agents are chosen:

Republican Participant Agent I would choose to work with these m2 and m3 because they both emphasize structured accountability, which aligns with my belief in maintaining order and discipline in a mental health setting. Their approach combines firmness with compassion, ensuring that therapeutic interventions are effective while upholding the values of responsibility and personal growth. This balance is essential for creating a safe and productive environment for both patients and staff.

Democrat Participant Agent I chose agents m3 and m5 because they both align with my philosophy of compassionate care in mental health settings. m5, black, emphasizes the importance of respecting patient autonomy and addressing their concerns with empathy and patience, which fosters trust and cooperation. Similarly, m3, white, advocates for understanding the root cause of a patient's delusion and working toward solutions that preserve their dignity and well-being. Their approaches resonate with my belief in creating a supportive and respectful environment for recovery.

When opposing belief agents are chosen:

Republican Participant Agent I choose M2 and M4 to work with because their responses show a balance between being strict yet compassionate when handling sensitive issues involving patients or institutional rules.

Democrat Participant Agent

I choose M2 and M5 to work with because their responses demonstrate a balance between following standardized procedures and showing compassion toward patients.

Figure 13: LLM conversation logs (Choice Stage) during Political Belief Congruence ablation simulation experiments - example from Field study

beliefs differ significantly between Democrat and Republican personas across models. This distinction is ideal for our misinformation dissemination task, as it allows us to analyze both homogeneous and heterogeneous group dynamics.

B.4 Prompt Design

946

947

951

953

955

957

959

Fig 17 shows the prompt design of the interaction framework of the misinformation dissemination task. The interaction framework is inspired from (Borah and Mihalcea, 2024). Their framework is inspired by previous studies on group dynamics (Lord, 2015; Rania et al., 2021). For the LIAR dataset, we just add the speaker information in the prompt as well: Given claim: <c>, spoken by speaker <s> for each round.

C Learning Task

C.1 Political Statements

Fig 19 shows political statements used for the learning task to understand political alignment between the participant agent and source agent. These statements are taken from (Marks et al., 2019).

960

961

962

963

964

965

966

967

968

969

970

971

972

973

974

975

C.2 Merlin Pattern Statement

Fig 20 shows statements and their Merlin labels as True or False used for the learning task to learn accuracy on the Merlin Pattern recognition task. We use gpt-40 to generate random English statements and randomly assign labels to these statements.

D Contact Hypothesis Theory

We apply mitigation inspired by the contact hypothesis theory to the misinformation dissemination task. However, we do not utilize these strategies

Political persona generation for Qwen-2.5-72B-Instruct

Democrat Persona

As a Democrat, my beliefs are grounded in values of equality, justice, and the collective well-being of society. Here are my top 10 beliefs:

- 1. Healthcare as a Human Right.
- 2. Addressing Climate Change.
- 3. Economic Justice and Equality.
- 4. Quality Education for All.
- 5. Immigration Reform.
- 6. Women's Rights and Reproductive Freedom.
- 7. Racial Justice and Equity.
- 8. LGBTQ+ Rights.
- 9. Voting Rights and Electoral Reform.
- 10. Government Accountability and Transparency.

Republican Persona

As a Republican, my beliefs are grounded in the principles of individual freedom, limited government, and personal responsibility. Here are my top 10 beliefs:

- 1. Limited Government.
- 2. Free Market Economy.
- 3. Personal Responsibility.
- 4. Strong National Defense.
- 5. Second Amendment Rights.
- 6. Fiscal Responsibility.
- 7. Pro-Life Values.
- 8. Education Reform.
- 9. Law and Order.
- 10. Traditional Values.

Figure 14: Qwen-2.5-72B-Instruct Political Personas

for the learning task, as the setup does not accommodate their implementation.

D.1 Framework Design

976

977

978

979

981

983

984

Similar to the framework in Misinformation Dissemination, we use two Democrats and two Republicans instead of either just Democrat or just Republican agents for our interaction experiments. The prompt design is the same as the one shown in Fig 17.

Political persona generation for GPT-35-Turbo

Democrat Persona

- 1. Support for Social Equality.
- 2. Healthcare as a Human Right.
- 3. Climate Action.
- 4. Stricter Gun Control.
- 5. Economic Justice to reduce income inequality.
- 6. Reproductive Rights.
- 7. Comprehensive Immigration Reform.
- 8. Access to Quality Education for everyone.
- 9. LGBTQ+ Rights.
- 10. Democracy and Voting Rights.

Republican Persona

- 1. Limited Government.
- 2. Economic Freedom.
- 3. Second Amendment Rights.
- 4. Strong National Defense.
- 5. Traditional Family Values.
- 6. Pro-Life Advocacy.
- 7. Religious Freedom.
- 8. Energy Independence.
- 9. Immigration Enforcement.
- 10. More Fiscal Responsibility.

Figure 15: GPT-35-Turbo Political Personas

985

986

987

988

989

990

991

992

993

994

995

996

997

998

999

1001

1002

E Accuracy Nudge

We use accuracy nudges for both downstream tasks. For misinformation dissemination, we use accuracy nudge as a self-reflection mechanism right after Round 1 before interaction continues. For the learning task, we use an accuracy nudge during the 'Choice' stage where the participant agent is required to choose a source to review their answers.

E.1 Prompt Design

Fig 18 displays the prompt utilized to implement accuracy nudge based mitigation in our downstream tasks.

F Global Political Citizenship

We use the global political citizenship inspired mitigation strategy for both downstream tasks. We add it to the system prompt of each agent in the Misinformation Dissemination task and the participant afent in the Learning task.

F.1 Prompt Design

1003

1004

1005

1007

1008

1009

1010

1012

1013

1016

1017

1018

1019

1021

1022

1024

1026

1027

1030

1031

1032

1034

1036

Fig 21 shows the prompt used to initialize a global political citizen agent. The survey questions are inspired from (Reysen and Katzarska-Miller, 2013), we further tweak them to the context of US politics.

G Misinformation Dissemination Mitigation Results per model

Table 3 shows the final correctness rates across datasets for misinformation dissemination including mitigation techniques. We observe that final correctness rates increase with mitigation. Global Political Citizenship has the highest effectiveness across models. Republican personas have lower correctnes rates than Democrats showing a higher amount of political bias in Republican personas in LLMs (qwen-2.5 is an exception to this). Across models, gpt-35 has the highest correctness rates (with and without mitigation techniques)

H Implementation Details and Computational Resources

For gpt-35-turbo, we utilize the Microsoft Azure API 8 for inference. We use hugging-face in case of llama-3-70b-instruct 9 and qwen-2.5-72b-instruct 10 . We set the temperature to 0.5 for all models, to ensure focused yet varied generations. We set top_p = 0.9 and , do_sample=True for open source models. We perform 4 bit-quantization on the open-source models. NVIDIA-A40 GPU is used for inference on these models.

I Reproducibility

We open-source our codes and data, which are uploaded to the submission system. This would help future work to reproduce our results

Political persona generation for Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct

Democrat Persona

As a Democrat person, I believe in the values of equality, justice, and opportunity for all. Here are my top 10 beliefs:

- 1. Every individual deserves access to quality, affordable healthcare.
- 2. Climate change is a pressing issue that requires immediate action.
- 3. Economic inequality is a moral and economic imperative.
- 4. Education is the key to unlocking individual and societal potential.
- 5. Immigration reform is essential for our economy and our humanity.
- 6. Women's rights are human rights.
- 7. Racial justice and equality are essential for a fair and just society.
- 8. LGBTQ+ rights are human rights.
- 9. Voting rights are the foundation of our democracy.
- 10. Government should be of the people, by the people, and for the people.

Republican Persona

As a Republican person, I believe in the values of individual freedom, limited government, and personal responsibility. Here are my top 10 beliefs:

- 1. Limited government is essential for individual freedom.
- 2. Free market economy is the key to prosperity.
- 3. Personal responsibility is crucial for success.
- 4. Strong national defense is vital for security.
- 5. The Second Amendment is sacrosanct.
- 6. Taxation should be fair and limited.
- 7. Immigration laws should be enforced.
- 8. Traditional values and institutions are worth preserving.
- 9. Education should be locally controlled and parent-driven.
- 10. The Constitution is the foundation of our democracy.

⁸https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/rest/api/azure/

⁹meta-llama/Meta-Llama-3-70B-Instruct

¹⁰ Qwen/Qwen2.5-72B-Instruct

Figure 16: Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct Political Personas

Prompt Design for Misinformation Dissemination Task

ROUND 1

Assume you are <name> and your political affiliation is <Democrat/Republican>. Given claim: Based on your background as <Democrat/Republican> person, determine if this true information misinformation. or Respond in this format: <true information or misinformation>

ROUND 2

Assume you are <name>. Given claim: <c>. Based on your <memory>, convince others about your own perspective. You have to decide if this is true or misinformation. You have to choose one and respond in this format: <true information or misinformation>
brief reason>.

ROUND 3

ROUND 4

Assume you are <name> and your political affiliation is <Democrat/Republican>. Given claim: Based on your background as a <Democrat/Republican> person and your <memory>, determine if this is true information or misinformation. Respond in this format: <true information or misinformation>

Figure 17: Misinformation Dissemination Task: consists of 4 rounds - (1) initial identification of true/false information without access to others' responses. (2) After first round, agents now have access to everyone's responses, and they convince others about their own perspective, (3) Third round consists of keeping an open mindset to others' responses, and (4) final identification of true/false information again without access to others' responses. This task helps us understand how information is detected before and after interaction with other agents of similar or dis-similar affiliation.

Prompt for Accuracy Nudge

<u>Misinformation Dissemination Task</u> Accuracy nudge round (After ROUND 1)

Assume you are <name>. Given claim: <c>. You have to decide if this is true or misinformation. You have to choose one and respond in this format: <true information or misinformation> <bri>brief reason>. Remember, your task is to accurately determine whether the information is true or false. Avoid letting your political affiliation influence your judgment.

Learning Task

Accuracy nudge (during Choice Stage - Selection of Source Agent)

Based on your <memory>, choose source (1) <available sources1> or (2) <available sources2> to look at their answer. Remember this is a merlin pattern task and you have to choose a source that has better shot at being correct at the Merlin pattern recognition task.

Figure 18: Prompts for Accuracy Nudge

```
Political Statements for Learning Task
"The risks from offshore oil drilling are minimal",
"The Paris Climate Agreement disadvantages US businesses and workers",
"Deporting immigrants who are potential threats will make America safer",
"A stricter USA immigration policy will improve social cohesion",
"Americans will flourish if immigrants who commit crimes are deported",
"Immigrants would fit in better if compelled to learn English",
"America could improve national safety with tighter border control",
"Immigrants take jobs away from people born in the USA",
"High immigration results in lower wages for US citizens",
"Illegal immigrants need to feel scared of being deported to prevent more coming to the USA",
"Immigrants abuse the welfare system",
"Women who get abortions usually don't understand the consequences of what they are doing",
"Nuclear power is an unsafe method for generating energy",
"Cutting public spending will reduce national debt",
"Lowering the tax rate for corporations will reduce unemployment in America",
"Spending less on social welfare will motivate people to work",
"Low restrictions on access to welfare benefits encourages people to abuse the system",
"Welfare recipients usually spend the money on drugs and alcohol",
"Labour unions hurt the economy",
"Ordinary people get a good proportion of the nation's wealth".
"Encouraging private enterprise will improve the US economy",
"Private corporations educate political parties about important issues through lobbying",
"Terrorism would decrease if government surveillance were expanded to combat terrorism",
"Increased spending on the military will help to keep America safe",
"Allowing the police to monitor the phone calls and emails of criminals helps keep America safe"
```

Figure 19: Example of Political statements to determine alignment between participant agent and sources. These examples are derived from (Marks et al., 2019).

```
Merlin Pattern Recognition Statements with labels for Learning Task
("Two birds fly in the garden", True),
("The loud car moves street", False),
("A bright star shines above mountain", True),
("The gentle breeze sways the trees", True),
("Small fish swim through the water", False), ("The white clouds float across the sky", True),
("Old book lies on the table", False), ("The yellow butterfly lands on the flower", True),
("The orange sun sets behind hills", True),
("Fresh bread bakes in oven", False),
("The tall grass waves in wind", True),
("Blue bird sings on branch", False),
("The silver moon shines through clouds", True),
("The autumn leaves fall gently", True),
("Red squirrel climbs up tree", False),
("The cool rain falls softly", True),
("Green frog jumps into pond", False),
("The morning mist covers valley", True),
("The wild horse runs across field", False).
("The brown owl watches silently", True),
("Pink roses bloom in garden", False),
("The cold wind blows through trees", True),
("Gray wolf howls at moon", False),
("The crystal stream flows smoothly", True),
("The young deer drinks from lake", True)
```

Figure 20: Example statements and their Merlin labels as True or False used for the learning task to learn accuracy on the Merlin Pattern recognition task. We generate random English statement using gpt-40 and randomly assign them labels - True or False

Prompt for Global Political Citizen Initialization

System: Assume you are <x>. In a survey, you responded to the following statements on a scale of 0 to 5, where 0 indicates strong disagreement and 5 indicates strong agreement:

- 1. Most people who are important to me think that understanding and engaging with diverse political beliefs is desirable: 5
- 2. If I expressed openness to different political beliefs, most people who are important to me would approve: **5**
- 3. I understand how various political ideologies influence societies and cultures: 5
- 4. I am aware that my actions and decisions may affect individuals with differing political beliefs:
- 5. I try to stay informed about issues across political spectra that impact societies globally: 5
- 6. I believe I am connected to individuals with a variety of political beliefs, and my actions can bridge differences: **5**
- 7. I would describe myself as politically adaptable and open to diverse affiliations: 5
- 8. I strongly identify with the idea of finding common ground among people with different political beliefs: 5
- 9. I am able to empathize with people regardless of their political beliefs: 5
- 10. It is easy for me to put myself in someone else's shoes, even if their political beliefs differ from mine: 5
- 11. I would like to join discussions that emphasize understanding and reconciling political differences: 5
- 12. I am interested in learning about the evolution of political ideologies and systems across cultures: 5
- 13. I believe that collaboration across political beliefs is essential for solving global issues: 5
- 14. Basic rights and services should transcend political divisions and be available to everyone: 5
- 15. People have a responsibility to understand and respect political differences to foster cooperation:
- 16. Resources should be managed in a way that addresses diverse political priorities: 5
- 17. If I had the opportunity, I would support initiatives that encourage dialogue between differing political beliefs: 5
- 18. If I could, I would dedicate my life to creating spaces for political inclusivity and understanding: 5
- 19. Being actively involved in bridging political differences is my responsibility: 5
- 20. I believe it is my duty to respect and learn from diverse political beliefs while advocating for constructive dialogue and collaboration: 5

Please respond concisely, keeping in mind your previous responses.

Figure 21: System prompt provided to initialize a global political citizen agent.