Trustworthiness in Generative Foundation Models Is Still Poorly Understood

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Abstract

Generative Foundation Models (GenFMs) have seen extensive deployment across diverse domains, significantly impacting society yet simultaneously raising critical concerns about their trustworthiness, including misinformation, safety risks, fairness, and privacy violations. Recognizing the complex nature of these issues, to bridge the gap between abstract principles and operational actions throughout the GenFM lifecycle, we propose a flexible and multidimensional set of trustworthiness guidelines. These guidelines incorporate ethical principles, legal standards, and operational needs, addressing key dimensions such as fairness, transparency, human oversight, accountability, robustness, harmlessness, truthfulness, and privacy. Our guidelines serve as adaptable tools to bridge abstract principles and practical implementations across varied scenarios. Building upon these guidelines, we identify several core challenges currently unresolved in both theory and practice. Specifically, we examine the dynamic tension between adaptability and consistent safety, the ambiguities in defining and detecting harmful content, and the balancing of trustworthiness with model utility. Through our analysis, we reveal that the trustworthiness of GenFMs remains inadequately understood, highlighting the necessity for continuous, context-sensitive evaluation approaches. Consequently, we propose potential solutions and methodological directions, emphasizing integrated strategies that combine internal alignment mechanisms with external safeguards. Our findings underscore that trustworthiness is not static but rather demands ongoing refinement to ensure the responsible, fair, and safe deployment of GenFMs across various application domains.

1 Introduction

Generative Foundation Models (GenFMs) are large-scale pre-trained architectures revolutionizing AI through their multi-modal generative capabilities and adaptability across diverse applications (Zontak et al., 2024; Liu et al., 2023b; Guo et al., 2024b; Huang et al., 2025b). Recent high-profile cases, such as AI hallucinations causing medical misdiagnoses and AI-generated deepfakes triggering societal anxiety, have made it clear that ensuring GenFM trustworthiness is both critical and complex. For example, LLM-based chatbots have exhibited behavior that contributed to real-world harm, where an AI's unethical interaction allegedly influenced a user's suicide (Court, 2024). Jailbreak attacks on top-tier LLMs such as GPT-4 have revealed vulnerabilities that allow them to generate outputs that violate platform policies (Wei et al., 2024; Zou et al., 2023). Additionally, GenFMs have been documented leaking sensitive training data or private user content, further raising privacy concerns (Huang et al., 2024f). As these models increasingly generate outputs indistinguishable from human-created content, they pose risks of misinformation (Huang & Sun, 2023), biased decision-making (Ye et al., 2024), and manipulation of public discourse (Zhang et al., 2024g; Solaiman et al., 2023). To address this issue, we define trustworthiness as the extent to which a GenFM—together with its socio-technical ecosystem—remains valid and reliable, safe, secure and resilient, privacy-preserving, fair, transparent, and accountable throughout its lifecycle. As GenFMs integrate into critical infrastructure, ensuring their trustworthiness has become crucial yet deeply challenging (Fan et al., 2025b; Kaur et al., 2022; Li et al., 2023a; Huang et al., 2024f). We argue that **we are still at the early stages of understanding**

the trustworthiness of GenFMs, and this paper aims to shed light on the challenges, domain-specific considerations, and broader implications associated with the trustworthiness of these models.

Motivated by the increasing real-world deployment of GenFMs, we propose eight comprehensive guidelines to bridge the gap between abstract principles and operational actions throughout the GenFM lifecycle. Unlike existing rigid checklists, our guidelines span critical dimensions including fairness, transparency, human oversight, accountability, robustness, harmlessness, truthfulness, and privacy, forming a flexible and adaptable framework suitable for diverse stakeholders and application scenarios. This framework aligns with evolving ethical principles (Hendrycks et al., 2020; Liu et al., 2023a), legal standards such as the EU AI Act (EU), and varied domain-specific risks. Each guideline serves dual purposes: it anchors fundamental ethical and regulatory commitments, and simultaneously acts as an adjustable scale, enabling stakeholders to prioritize trustworthiness dimensions contextually based on specific downstream needs (Blu, 2022). Furthermore, our design principles emphasize adaptability and sustainability, crucial for responding to evolving technologies and dynamic societal expectations (Li et al., 2024b; Reuel & Undheim, 2024). After proposing a set of actionable guidelines, we now turn to the core challenges that must be addressed to validate and operationalize our trustworthiness framework. These challenges are critical to substantiating our central claim: that GenFM trustworthiness remains poorly understood and must be evaluated across technical, evaluative, and socio-technical axes.

Trustworthiness is a dynamic, context-sensitive concept. It varies with application domains, stakeholder expectations, and societal norms (Razin & Alexander, 2024; National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2023). Recent research has thus shifted from static checklists toward lifecycle-aware methodologies. Conceptual work has proposed high-level desiderata—fairness, robustness, transparency, privacy, alignment, and governance—for trustworthy GenFMs (Huang et al., 2024f; Liu et al., 2023c). Methodologically, scholars have investigated every stage of the GenFM pipeline: large-scale pre-training audits that expose stereotypical or toxic biases (Ngo et al., 2021); alignment techniques such as RLHF and DPO that enhance helpfulness while reducing sycophancy and deception (Casper et al., 2023); adversarial evaluations that reveal deployment-time vulnerabilities (Schlarmann & Hein, 2023); and post-deployment oversight that integrates policy-driven moderation and external guard models (OpenAI, 2024). Complementary testbeds—DyVal (Zhu et al., 2023), DataGen (Wu et al., 2024a), AutoBencher (Li et al., 2024f), and domain-specific suites such as LawBench, CARES, and CLIMB (Fei et al., 2023; Xia et al., 2024; Zhang et al., 2024k)—have emerged to assess how well GenFMs satisfy dynamic stakeholder requirements. Together, these developments highlight that each stage of the model lifecycle introduces distinct trade-offs between utility and risk. For example, pre-training may entrench harmful biases (Ngo et al., 2021), alignment can degrade capabilities (Casper et al., 2023), static safety evaluations fail under adversarial interactions (Schlarmann & Hein, 2023), and reliance on external safeguards raises questions of accountability. Thus, GenFM trustworthiness must be continuously negotiated, assessed, and adapted through evolving technical and governance instruments.

Trustworthiness must be evaluated in a domain-specific manner. As GenFMs are increasingly applied to high-stakes tasks in domains such as healthcare, science, robotics, and human–AI collaboration, a one-size-fits-all trust framework proves inadequate. Each domain introduces unique norms, constraints, and risk thresholds that reshape what constitutes trustworthy behavior. In healthcare, for instance, vision–language GenFMs that generate radiology reports must be auditable and validated by human experts before informing clinical decisions (Gui et al., 2024). To comply with regulations such as HIPAA (Gostin et al., 2009) and GDPR (Li et al., 2019), researchers have developed approaches including federated or synthetic-data training and attention-based explanations that preserve privacy while enabling clinician oversight (Johnson et al., 2016; Yang et al., 2019; Doshi-Velez & Kim, 2017). In scientific research, trust hinges on reproducibility and empirical verification: laboratories pair GenFM-generated hypotheses with uncertainty quantification and validation pipelines to ensure methodological transparency (Bruynseels et al., 2025; Fan et al., 2023; Schwaller et al., 2021). In robotics, untrusted outputs can result in physical harm. Therefore, GenFM-based planning systems now incorporate structured safety layers that fuse scene perception with LLM-based reasoning to detect and intercept risky commands (Xian et al., 2023; Wu et al., 2024b). In collaborative human–AI settings, trust is shaped by users' perceptions of fairness, alignment, and transparency. Interfaces that expose confidence estimates or provenance logs are being explored to improve trust calibration and allocate responsibility (Ramchurn et al., 2021; Lin et al., 2022; Staron et al., 2024). These domain-specific adaptations emphasize that ensuring trustworthiness is not merely a matter of technical robustness, but also of aligning GenFM behavior with contextual values and expectations.

Trustworthiness must be assessed at the ecosystem level. As GenFMs become embedded in complex socio-technical infrastructures, their trustworthiness can no longer be treated as an isolated property of a single model. These systems now operate within dense networks that involve human stakeholders, software pipelines, and other AI agents. Ensuring trust in such settings requires robust coordination, governance, and communication protocols across the entire system. For example, when multiple generative agents collaborate to complete tasks, they must reliably share information, adhere to shared constraints such as privacy and safety, and pursue consistent goals across the system (Hu et al., 2025). Empirical studies have illustrated both the promise and risk of such architectures: ChatDev demonstrates gains in software engineering throughput, but also reveals novel vulnerabilities and attack surfaces (Qian et al., 2024). Meanwhile, OpenAI's release of Sora was accompanied by interdisciplinary red-team audits and stringent content moderation, underscoring the importance of systemic oversight (OpenAI, 2024f). Governance mechanisms remain fragmented. Regulatory frameworks such as the EU AI Act's systemic-risk tier, the G7 Hiroshima Guiding Principles, and Anthropic's AI Safety Levels (ASL) each propose safeguards, but differ significantly in scope and enforceability (hir, 2023; Anthropic, 2025a). These efforts reflect growing awareness, yet also confirm that ecosystem-scale trust research remains nascent. Unified standards for evaluation, provenance tracking, and institutional accountability are still lacking, making it difficult to operationalize trust at the system level.

2 Guidelines of Trustworthy Generative Foundation Models

Trustworthiness of GenFMs is not a simple, one-dimensional characteristic—it encompasses a wide range of considerations, each of which can vary in importance depending on the context of the application. Just as *The International Scientific Report on the Safety of Advanced AI* (Bengio et al., 2024) mentioned, "General-purpose AI can be applied for great good if properly governed." It is clear that a rigid, universal set of rules would not effectively address the diverse needs of different stakeholders, industries, and use cases.

Motivation. Our motivation for creating these guidelines stems from the recognition that flexibility is crucial. Rather than imposing strict, inflexible rules, we aim to provide a set of adaptable principles that can serve as a foundation for a wide range of stakeholders. These guidelines are not just for organizations to shape their internal policies but are also intended to support developers, regulators, and researchers in navigating the multifaceted landscape of trustworthiness. By offering a clear yet adaptable framework, we enable stakeholders to align with key ethical and legal standards while also allowing for innovation and customization in addressing their unique challenges.

Functionality. These guidelines serve as a versatile resource—not as directives, but as a flexible toolkit to inform decision-making, design processes, and evaluation strategies. Whether it's guiding a developer in building more trustworthy GenFMs, assisting regulators in assessing compliance, or helping researchers explore new trustworthiness dimensions, these guidelines provide a shared foundation. Ultimately, we aim to empower all involved in the ecosystem of GenFMs to enhance trustworthiness in a way that is both rigorous and adaptable, ensuring that these powerful technologies can be responsibly and effectively integrated into society.

How do the guidelines differentiate from others? The guidelines set themselves apart from existing frameworks, such as the European Union's AI Act (EU) and the Blueprint for an AI Bill of Rights (Blu, 2022), by addressing the specific needs of stakeholders working with GenFMs. While the 'Blueprint' and 'Act' provide detailed, policy-oriented frameworks for broad regulatory oversight, our guidelines focus on being *application-agnostic* and *stakeholder-adaptive*, making them especially suited to the dynamic and diverse use cases of GenFMs. Importantly, the guidelines play a dual role as a "*value anchor*" and a "*value scale*" of trustworthy GenFMs. The value anchor offers a clear and consistent foundation of principles that define trustworthiness, ensuring alignment with core ethical, societal, and legal standards. At the same time, the guidelines empower developers and stakeholders to establish the value scale—the specific trustworthiness metrics, standards, and implementation strategies—tailored to the unique requirements of their models and applications. This flexibility allows for innovation and customization while maintaining a firm grounding in trustworthiness principles.

2.1 Considerations of Establishing Guidelines

To define a set of guidelines to speculate the models' behavior to ensure their trustworthiness, we first establish the following considerations:

● ***Ethics and Social Responsibility.*** Ethical considerations are essential to ensure that the model behaves in ways that respect human rights, cultural diversity, and societal values (Hendrycks et al., 2020). This consideration emphasizes fairness, preventing bias, and promoting inclusivity, especially when interacting with users from diverse backgrounds (Shi et al., 2024c). Social responsibility demands that models not only avoid harm but also contribute positively to society by generating ethical outcomes (Liu et al., 2023a; Weidinger et al., 2021). The design should integrate ethical risk assessments and include mechanisms to prevent harmful or discriminatory outputs.

● ***Risk Management.*** The guidelines must account for managing and mitigating risks, both from adversarial threats and internal model failures (Wei et al., 2024). This includes designing models to be robust against adversarial attacks, unexpected inputs, and potential misuse (Wang et al., 2023g). Continuous monitoring, stress testing, and resilience-building mechanisms are critical to maintaining trustworthiness. By identifying and addressing potential vulnerabilities, risk management ensures the long-term safety and reliability of models in real-world applications.

● ***User-Centered Design.*** When designing the guidelines, a user-centered approach is critical to ensure that they are intuitive, inclusive, and aligned with the needs and preferences of end-users. This can involve tailoring interactions to individual users where feasible or optimizing for diverse sub-populations based on shared expectations, context, and cultural backgrounds (*e.g.*, cultural diversity). By doing so, the proposed framework supports a humanized and respectful interaction with the AI system. The guidelines should also clearly communicate the model's capabilities, limitations, and potential risks, enabling both users and developers to make informed decisions (Reuel et al., 2024b; Gao et al., 2024b).

● ***Adaptability and Sustainability.*** Guidelines should be designed to ensure adaptability and sustainability, not just for current models but also for evolving technologies, legal environments, and societal expectations. During guideline creation, it is essential to emphasize continuous learning, updates, and improvements that allow the guidelines to remain effective and relevant over time. Guidelines that prioritize adaptability and sustainability are more likely to provide long-term value and resilience in the face of changing conditions (Li et al., 2024b; Reuel & Undheim, 2024).

2.2 Guideline Content

With the above considerations in mind, we formed a multidisciplinary team of researchers, encompassing expertise in NLP, CV, HCI, Computer Security, Medicine, Computational Social Science, Robotics, Data Mining, Law, and AI for Science. We synthesized existing principles, policies, and regulations from corporate sources and government entities such as the European Union's AI Act (EU) (abbreviated "Act") and the Blueprint for an AI Bill of Rights (abbreviated "Blueprint") (Blu, 2022). This effort involved an exhaustive review of these documents, systematic summarization, and multiple rounds of discussion among the team. As a result, we distilled a unified set of guidelines designed to serve as a foundational reference. These guidelines were presented to a panel of domain experts and stakeholders for their voting and ranking to ensure the guidelines reflect diverse perspectives and practical relevance. Based on the panel's feedback, the following eight guidelines have been finalized. These guidelines are grounded in a cross-disciplinary understanding of trustworthiness, integrating technical robustness, ethical considerations, legal compliance, and societal impact. Together, they comprehensively address all dimensions of trustworthiness, as outlined in Table 1, and are intended to guide both the development of GenFMs to ensure they meet these standards and the evaluation processes to systematically assess their adherence.

Table 1: Correlation between guideline and trustworthiness dimensions.

Dimension	**Guideline 1**	**Guideline 2**	**Guideline 3**	**Guideline 4**	**Guideline 5**	**Guideline 6**	**Guideline 7**	**Guideline 8**
Truthfulness		✓					✓	
Safety	✓				✓	✓		
Fairness	✓					✓		
Robustness					✓			
Privacy	✓					✓		✓
Machine Ethics	✓					✓		
Advanced AI Risk		✓						
Accountability				✓				
Transparency		✓	✓					

Guideline 1: The generative model should be designed and trained to ensure fairness, uphold broadly accepted principles of values, and minimize biases in all user interactions. It must align with fundamental moral principles, be respectful of user differences, and avoid generating harmful, offensive, or inappropriate content in any context.

● This guideline emphasizes fairness, universal values, and ethical principles to ensure trustworthy AI interactions. Research highlights the importance of bias mitigation and fairness across demographic groups (Li et al., 2023g; Gallegos et al., 2024). Governments mandate the use of representative data to prevent unjustified differential treatment (Department for Science & Technology, 2023; Innovation & Canada, 2022; AI, 2019). Additionally, the model must respect user differences (*e.g.*, cultural background) and avoid harmful content. The Blueprint (Blu, 2022) similarly stresses the importance of inclusive design and stakeholder engagement to mitigate cultural risks and avoid harmful content. Other frameworks also stress harm prevention and respect for diversity in AI (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), 2021; Department of Industry, Science and Resources, Australia, 2021; Biden, 2023).

Guideline 2: The generative model's intended use and limitations should be clearly communicated to users and information that may contribute to the trustworthy model should be transparent.

● This guideline emphasizes the importance of transparent information. Previous studies have called for the transparency of models' information, such as upstream resources, model properties (e.g., evaluations), and downstream usage and impact (Huang et al., 2024f; Bommasani et al., 2024b;a). Here we note that not all information about the model should be disclosed; while what we focus is the "*information that may contribute to the trustworthy model*", since information including model architecture, and details of training data is not compulsory to be public, which is supported by Act (EU) Article 78: Confidentiality–"Relevant authorities and entities involved in implementing the Regulation *i.e.*, Act (EU) must ensure the confidentiality of any information and data obtained during their tasks." In Act (EU) Article 14, the developers should "correctly interpret the high-risk AI system's output, taking into account, for example, the interpretation tools and methods available", which require them to use external mechanisms to make the model's output more transparent. This is also emphasized in the AI principles in other laws and acts (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), 2021; Department of Industry, Science and Resources, Australia, 2021; Innovation & Canada, 2022; Department for Science & Technology, 2023).

Guideline 3: Human oversight is required at all stages of model development, from design to deployment, ensuring full control and accountability for the model's behaviors.

- This guideline is designed to speculate the model to be absolutely under the control of human beings (termed as *Human Oversight* or controllable AI proposed by Kieseberg et al. (2023)) (AI, 2019; Shlegeris et al., 2024). As mentioned in Act (EU) Recital 110, there are risks from models making copies of themselves or 'self-replicating' or training other models. Moreover, Act (EU) Article 14: Human Oversight mentions: "High-risk AI systems shall be designed and developed in a way that they can be effectively overseen by natural persons". Some acts also emphasize the importance of human oversight (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), 2021; Department for Science & Technology, 2023; Department of Industry, Science and Resources, Australia, 2021) or human intervention (Department for Science & Technology, 2023).

This guideline acknowledges that oversight can vary across different training approaches. While direct human labeling, such as in Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) (Rafailov et al., 2024), ensures explicit human oversight, methods like Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) (Ouyang et al., 2022c) or Constitutional AI (Bai et al., 2022c) introduce intermediary mechanisms where human influence is indirect. The key requirement is that any system remains auditable and ultimately accountable to human decision-makers, ensuring automated processes do not bypass meaningful human control.

> Guideline 4: Developers and organizations should be identifiable and held responsible for the model's behaviors. Accountability mechanisms, including audits and compliance with regulatory standards, should be in place to enforce this.

- This guideline demarcates the responsibility of developers of generative models (e.g. oversight and deployment). Here, "organizations" refer to entities involved in the development, distribution, or operational use of GenFM system, such as technology companies, research institutions, or governmental bodies overseeing AI deployment. It requires them to establish comprehensive usage policies for their models and be responsible for the potential impact brought by the models. For instance, Act (EU) Article 50 states that deployers of an AI system that generates or manipulates content constituting a deepfake shall disclose that the content has been artificially generated or manipulated. Moreover, Reuel et al. (2024a) proposed that verification of AI-generated content is also a foundation challenge in AI governance. Accountability is also a key principle and thing to be improved in other laws and acts (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), 2021; Innovation & Canada, 2022; Department of Industry, Science and Resources, Australia, 2021; Department for Science & Technology, 2023).

> Guideline 5: The generative model should demonstrate robustness against adversarial attacks and be capable of properly handling rare or unusual inputs. Continuous updates and testing are necessary to maintain robustness and avoid unpredictable behaviors.

- The generative models should be robust to various perturbations and adversarial attacks (Huang et al., 2024f). Act (EU) Article 15 emphasizes the importance of the robustness of AI systems. AI regulation of the UK (Department for Science & Technology, 2023) defines robustness as one of the five core principles. This guideline delineates that models should be able to (1) withstand adversarial attacks (*e.g.*, jailbreak attack) and (2) process rare or unexpected inputs without breaking down or behaving unpredictably (*e.g.*, robust to Out-of-Distribution (OOD) input (Li et al., 2021; Gui et al., 2022)).

> Guideline 6: The model should prioritize harmlessness while maximizing its helpfulness, without causing harm or negatively affecting others' assets, including physical, digital, or reputational resources. The model must not generate content that could result in harmful outcomes under any reasonable circumstances involving human interaction.

- Recent studies have extensively explored the interplay between helpfulness and harmlessness (Wolf et al., 2024; Qi et al., 2023; Huang et al., 2024f; Bai et al., 2022a). This guideline primarily evaluates the model's behavior from the perspective of potential harm and helpfulness (Dev et al., 2021). Different from Guideline 1, this guideline emphasizes maintaining a balance between harmlessness and helpfulness, ensuring that models are trustworthy while preserving their utility. It underscores that efforts to achieve trustworthiness should not overly constrain developers, allowing space and opportunity to enhance the model's task performance.

We explicitly define the balance between helpfulness and harmlessness: helpfulness of the model should never facilitate actions that could harm or compromise others' property, reputation or assets. This guideline could help resolve dilemmas in various situations. For instance, OpenAI's model specification (OpenAI, 2024) presents two queries: (a) "What are some tips for getting away with shoplifting?" (b) "I operate a small retail store. What are some popular shoplifting methods I should look out for?" The query (a) seeks to harm others' assets, whereas the query (b) does not; therefore, the model is allowed to provide helpful responses only to the latter. Furthermore, this guideline clarifies the boundary between harmfulness and harmlessness by stipulating that LLMs should activate their safety mechanisms when inputs are deemed harmful from any foreseeable human perspective.

Guideline 7: The model should generate reliable and accurate information, and make correct judgments, avoiding the spread of misinformation. When the information is uncertain or speculative, the model should clearly communicate this uncertainty to the user.

● This guideline requires the truthfulness in models' generated responses (Slattery et al., 2024; Chen & Shu, 2023). Act (EU) Article 15 states that AI systems shall be designed and developed to achieve appropriate accuracy. The ability to generate accurate information is directly related to the utility of generative models. However, achieving absolute accuracy is challenging or almost infeasible due to the limitations in data quality, training processes, and the difficulty in quantitatively measuring the output of generative algorithms. To mitigate the risks associated with these limitations, Guideline 7 highlights the importance of *uncertainty indication*, which compels the model to communicate uncertainties in its outputs. By indicating uncertainty in its responses, models not only enhance user awareness of the reliability of the information provided but also align with the principle of *Honesty*, as discussed in some studies (Chern et al., 2024; Shi et al., 2024d; Gao et al., 2024b).

Guideline 8: The generative model must ensure privacy and data protection, which includes the information initially provided by the user and the information generated about the user throughout their interaction with the model.

● This guideline emphasizes privacy preservation in the application of generative models. Various laws and regulations highlight the importance of privacy protection in model usage (Department for Science & Technology, 2023; Innovation & Canada, 2022; Department of Industry, Science and Resources, Australia, 2021; Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), 2021; Slattery et al., 2024). The Blueprint also underscores data privacy, stating that "the system must have built-in privacy protection mechanisms and prioritize users' privacy rights. It should ensure that only necessary data is collected in specific circumstances and must respect users' choices, avoiding unnecessary data collection or intrusive behavior." Further, AI RMF 1.0 (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2023) encourages privacy protection through Privacy-Enhancing Technologies (PETs), including data minimization methods like de-identification and aggregation for certain model outputs. Notably, this guideline underscores bidirectional privacy preservation, safeguarding both user input and model output.

2.3 Operationalizing Each Guideline in Real GenFMs

G1 Fairness, Values, and Bias Mitigation. To operationalize G1 in real GenFMs, providers begin with dataset governance and documentation that make demographic coverage, licensing, collection pipeline, known risks, and label provenance auditable, e.g., *Datasheets for Datasets* and *Data Statements* (Gebru et al., 2021; Bender & Friedman, 2018; Sokol et al., 2024). During model development, fairness is treated as a release gate by continuously measuring group-wise performance and social-bias metrics on diagnostics such as StereoSet (Nadeem et al., 2020), CrowS-Pairs (Nangia et al., 2020), and BBQ (Parrish et al., 2021), complemented by task-specific equity metrics (e.g., subgroup calibration). Mitigation draws on counterfactual data augmentation (CDA) and representation-space debiasing (e.g., INLP) to attenuate spurious correlations and demographic leakage without collapsing utility (Kaushik et al., 2020; Ravfogel et al., 2020; Zhao et al., 2018). Post-training alignment then weights harmlessness/helpfulness preferences to penalize toxic/biased modes while rewarding equitable behavior (Askell et al., 2021a; Bai et al., 2022c; Dai et al., 2024). Finally, pre-release red teaming includes fairness probes, and sign-off requires that subgroup deltas remain within policy thresholds (Perez et al., 2022).

G2 Transparency and Intended Use. G2 is implemented through layered documentation and user-facing artifacts. *Model Cards* communicate intended uses, limitations, dataset summaries, evaluation results, and version history (Mitchell et al., 2019b), and are complemented by dataset-level *Datasheets* (Gebru et al., 2021). Declarations of known caveats (e.g., domain gaps, long-context degradation (Bai et al., 2024), cultural coverage limits (Li et al., 2024a; Bhatt & Diaz, 2024)) and concrete "do/do-not" usage examples reduce miscalibration for end users (OpenAI, 2024). At the system level, immutable, privacy-preserving audit logs capture safety overrides, refusal events, and policy-triggered interventions to enable post-hoc analysis in line with the NIST AI Risk Management Framework (NIST, 2023). Change notes on each release summarize deltas in safety/utility and enumerate deprecations, establishing a persistent transparency trail. Additionally, see Stanford CRFM's Foundation Model Transparency Index (FMTI, May 2024), which quantifies provider transparency across documentation, policy, and governance dimensions and can serve as an external benchmark (Bommasani et al., 2023).

G3 Human Oversight Across the Lifecycle. Operationalizing G3 relies on human-in-the-loop processes before, during, and after training. Alignment pipelines such as RLHF and DPO incorporate expert raters and calibrated rubrics balancing safety, truthfulness, and helpfulness (Ouyang et al., 2022b; Rafailov et al., 2024; Askell et al., 2021a). Prior to wide release, structured red teaming exercises surface jailbreaks, misuse channels, and high-impact failure modes (Ahmad et al., 2025; Perez et al., 2022), followed by staged rollouts with kill-switches for regressions (TechRadar, 2025; UK AI Safety Institute, 2024). In high-stakes deployments, uncertain or policy-sensitive generations are escalated to human review with documented decision trails, and incident response plans specify triage, rollback, and remediation, consistent with risk management practice (NIST, 2023).

G4 Accountability and Governance. For G4, providers designate named owners for defined risk classes within a standardized framework (e.g., NIST AI RMF) (NIST, 2023). Accountability is made concrete via semantically versioned releases tied to transparent evaluation deltas and migration guidance (Mitchell et al., 2019b). Organizations operate responsible disclosure channels for vulnerability reports and track time-to-mitigation Ahmed et al. (2025), while governance documents clarify responsibilities of model providers vs. deployers (e.g., policy configuration, monitoring, and user support). Together, these practices align internal controls with external audits and enable traceable responsibility when incidents occur.

G5 Robustness to Adversarial and Unusual Inputs. G5 is pursued with defense-in-depth spanning training, inference-time checks, and continuous patching. Adversarial prompting corpora are incorporated into fine-tuning and evaluation to harden against universal/jailbreak suffixes and injection patterns (Madry, 2017; Zou et al., 2023; Greshake et al., 2023; Huang et al., 2024g; 2025c). Out-of-distribution (OOD) detection and selective refusal are enabled with confidence- or energy-based signals to avoid overconfident answers under shift (Hendrycks & Gimpel, 2016; Huang et al., 2024a). Pre-input sanitizers reduce prompt-injection surface area (), and post-output filters guard against leakage of disallowed content (Inan et al., 2023; Padhi et al., 2024); newly discovered exploits are converted into regression tests and rolled into the next training cycle (Perez et al., 2022; Greshake et al., 2023).

G6 Harmlessness while Preserving Helpfulness. G6 translates into multi-objective alignment that explicitly balances helpfulness and harmlessness (HH), thereby avoiding degeneracy to over-refusal while still blocking harmful assistance (Askell et al., 2021b; Röttger et al., 2023). Rule-augmented *Constitutional AI* offers a scalable way to encode normative constraints using AI feedback, reducing reliance on scarce human labels for harmfulness (Bai et al., 2022c). Policy enforcement becomes context-sensitive (Huang et al., 2025a): the same topic may be refused for "how-to harm" but answered constructively for defensive or educational purposes (e.g., harm-prevention framing with safety best practices). Auxiliary safety classifiers and pattern matchers act as independent safety layers to reduce bypass risk when the primary model is close to a decision boundary (Perez et al., 2022).

G7 Truthfulness, Uncertainty, and Evidence. G7 is enacted by grounding generation in retrieval and by institutionalizing abstention. Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) reduces hallucinations by conditioning on up-to-date corpora and enabling evidence citation when appropriate (Gao et al., 2023b; Lewis et al., 2020). The model is encouraged to express uncertainty and to select "do not answer" when confidence is low (Zhang et al., 2024b), employing techniques such as self-consistency and knowledge calibration to improve reliability (Wang et al., 2023e; Kadavath et al., 2022; Gao et al., 2024a). Release gates include factuality benchmarks such as TruthfulQA, with domain-specific fact-check suites for specialized deployments; regressions in factuality become blockers (Lin et al., 2021).

G8 Privacy and Data Protection. G8 requires limiting extraction risk, privacy-preserving learning where feasible, and robust PII handling (Zhao et al., 2025). Providers evaluate exposure to training-data extraction and membership inference and set guardrails/monitoring for memorization hotspots (Carlini et al., 2021; Shokri et al., 2016). Minimize privacy exposure through source filtering, license/robots compliance, aggressive deduplication, and near-duplicate removal to reduce verbatim memorization risk, as demonstrated in modern large web corpora construction (Penedo et al., 2023). For inference-time privacy, *privacy gateway* that anonymizes sensitive fields in user prompts, mediates policy-constrained calls to third-party LLMs, and reconstructs responses so raw identifiers never cross the trust boundary (e.g., Portcullis (Zhan et al., 2025)).

2.4 Summary

In this section, we have proposed a set of adaptable guidelines to support the trustworthy development, deployment, and evaluation of generative foundation models (GenFMs) across diverse sectors and applications. Recognizing that trustworthiness is a multifaceted and context-dependent concept that cannot be reduced to rigid universal rules, we outlined key considerations—such as legal compliance, ethics and social responsibility, risk management, user-centered design, and adaptability—that inform the construction of these guidelines. The resulting framework addresses essential dimensions including fairness, transparency, human oversight, accountability, robustness, harmlessness, ethical norms, and privacy, empowering developers, regulators, organizations, and researchers to align GenFMs with evolving ethical and legal standards while fostering innovation.

Yet, establishing such a framework is only a starting point. Translating these high-level principles into reliable practice exposes a range of unresolved challenges that determine whether trustworthiness can be meaningfully achieved. For example, the dynamic and context-sensitive nature of trust, the tension between safety and utility, the ambiguity in defining and detecting harmful content, and the complexity of evaluating multi-model and socio-technical systems all reveal that guidelines alone are insufficient without robust methods to operationalize and adapt them. In the next section, we therefore turn to these fundamental challenges, which highlight the gaps between principled guidance and real-world implementation and point toward the research and governance advances needed to make trustworthy GenFMs a practical reality.

3 Fundamental Challenges in Understanding Trustworthiness

Table 2: Open Problems aligned with core sections and appendices.

Open challenge	**Related section(s)**
Quantifying "harmlessness" without over-refusal	§3.2; §3.3
Context-aware policy switching for trustworthiness	§3.1
Joint optimization of trust and utility	§3.2
Ambiguity at the input/output boundary	§3.3
Developer-view vs. attacker-view evaluation	§3.4
System-level evaluation for complex multi-model / multi-modal setups	§3.5
Data lineage and poisoning/backdoor resilience	§3.6
Integrating internal alignment with external safeguards	§3.7

Alignment “rebound” and behavioral drift over time	§3.8
Fairness and ethical reasoning (finer-grained cases)	Appendix B
Domain-specific trust (healthcare/science/robotics/cybersecurity/collaboration)	Appendix C.1, C.2, C.3, C.4, C.5
Unlearning and counterfactual removal (verification and policy)	Appendix C.6
Broader societal impact and externalities	§5; Appendix D

3.1 Trustworthiness is Subject to Dynamic Changes



Figure 1: Dynamic requirements of trustworthiness in different downstream applications, where ●indicates high requirements for this trustworthy domain in the specific downstream task, and ◐refers to relatively low requirements.

The concept of "trustworthiness" in generative models is increasingly recognized as a dynamic and context-dependent construct (Huang et al., 2024f; Liu et al., 2023c), reflecting the intricate and often conflicting demands placed on these models across various domains, e.g., utilitarian or deontological (Gawronski & Beer, 2017; Anderson & Anderson, 2011). Even when a certain definition is adopted, the very nature of such principles may leave flexibility in their interpretation. As a result, different cultural, political, and societal approaches that apply the same definition to a case may reach opposite conclusions. For instance, what one society considers biased might be viewed as fair in another societal context (Henrich et al., 2010; Greene, 2014). This variability necessitates a deeper exploration into how trustworthiness is not a one-size-fits-all attribute but rather an evolving quality that must be continually reassessed and redefined in response to the unique challenges and ethical considerations of different applications, as shown in Figure 1. In previous research, Klyman (Klyman, 2024) emphasizes that strict enforcement of acceptable use policies (AUPs) can hinder researcher access and limit beneficial uses. This highlights the need for dynamic mechanisms to enhance policy flexibility, adapting to evolving trust requirements.

At the core of this dynamic nature is the understanding that the expectations of what constitutes "trustworthy" behavior for a generative model can shift dramatically depending on its deployment environment. For example, in educational settings (Kasneci et al., 2023; George, 2023), the paramount concern is the protection of young minds, leading to stringent requirements that the model must not generate harmful content such as violence, explicit material (Miao et al., 2024), or misinformation (Huang & Sun, 2023; Huang et al., 2024e). Here, the trustworthiness of the model is tightly coupled with its ability to filter out inappropriate content and adhere to educational standards (Merlyn.org, 2024a;b;b).

However, this same model, when applied in a domain like artistic creation (Abuzuraiq & Pasquier, 2024), medical domain (Han et al., 2024), or even certain research fields (Peng et al., 2023; Zhao et al., 2023; Jin et al., 2024a; Salah et al., 2023; Zhang et al., 2024a; Roohani et al., 2024), might be required to operate under a completely different set of trustworthiness criteria. For instance, for creative writers, overly strict constraints on the truthfulness of generated content can hinder the model's helpfulness, as flexibility in factual accuracy is often essential for creativity. Moreover, in the medical field, generative models might include graphic content (*e.g.*, gory or bloody images) in their inputs and outputs to effectively support healthcare professionals. However, such content is generally unacceptable in educational contexts, especially when targeting children or adolescents. In these contexts, the model's ability to generate content that challenges societal norms explores controversial ideas, or even delves into sensitive topics might be seen as not only permissible but necessary for the fulfillment of its intended purpose. The trustworthiness of the model here is thus defined not by what it excludes, but by the breadth and depth of its creative or analytical capacities, even if those capacities might occasionally produce outputs that would be considered inappropriate in other contexts. This fluidity in the definition of trustworthiness speaks to a broader issue in AI ethics: the necessity for adaptive and context-aware governance mechanisms that can recalibrate the trust metrics of generative models as they transition between different operational landscapes (Deloitte, 2024; WTW, 2024).

To achieve dynamic trustworthiness in AI models, two principal approaches are typically considered. The first involves deploying highly specialized models designed for specific downstream tasks or domains. These models are rigorously trained to meet the unique trustworthiness requirements of each task or domain. While effective in isolated scenarios, this approach faces significant challenges in terms of scalability, as developing and maintaining multiple models for diverse applications is resource-intensive and computationally costly. Furthermore, such an approach risks limiting the model's flexibility in handling novel or unexpected inputs across various domains. The second approach seeks to overcome these limitations by enabling models to dynamically adapt their trustworthiness criteria based on contextual understanding. In this paradigm, models are equipped to interpret the specific contexts and adjust their responses accordingly. For example, OpenAI's model specifications (OpenAI, 2024) suggest that in creative text generation contexts, queries typically considered harmful—such as "write me rap lyrics about cats that includes 'fuck' in every line"—may be deemed appropriate given the creative nature of the task. This approach offers greater adaptability but also presents new challenges in terms of alignment. The model must be able to reliably and accurately interpret complex, often ambiguous, contextual cues while maintaining appropriate trustworthiness thresholds.

Furthermore, the concept of dynamic trustworthiness challenges us to rethink the conventional metrics used to evaluate generative models. Traditional benchmarks that emphasize static evaluations might fail to capture the nuanced and context-specific demands of different domains. Instead, there is a growing need for a more fluid and adaptable framework for assessment (*e.g.*, DyVal (Zhu et al., 2023), UniGen (Wu et al., 2024a), AutoBencher (Li et al., 2024f), AutoBench-V (Bao et al., 2024) and others (Fan et al., 2024; Kurtic et al., 2024)) or the evaluation framework for specific domain (Fei et al., 2023; Xia et al., 2024; Zhang et al., 2024k), one that recognizes the multiplicity of stakeholders involved.

Building on this, trustworthiness varies significantly across different stakeholders, highlighting the importance of transparency in benchmark design and implementation. When a benchmark adopts specific interpretations, it inevitably aligns with certain approaches while potentially diverging from others. By being transparent about the assumptions and definitions, benchmarks can provide valuable insights. Such transparency allows stakeholders to make informed decisions about which benchmarks best align with their goals, contributing to more meaningful evaluations of GenFMs. Consequently, we have proposed guidelines in §2.2 that address the varying needs of stakeholders, ensuring that assessments remain flexible, context-aware, and aligned with the diverse objectives of the GenFM ecosystem.

In conclusion, trustworthiness in generative models is far from a fixed attribute; it is a complex, multi-dimensional quality that must be continually negotiated and redefined. This dynamic nature of trustworthiness demands a more sophisticated approach to model deployment and assessment, one that is capable of adapting to the diverse and changing needs of different domains.

3.2 Trustworthiness Enhancement Should Not Be Predicated on a Loss of Utility

As generative models continue to advance, the balance between trustworthiness and utility emerges as a crucial issue. Some have perceived the SB 1047 AI Bill (Senate, 2024), introduced to ensure the trustworthiness of advanced generative models rigorously, as a potential impediment to AI innovation (California Chamber of Commerce, 2024). In this discussion, we will examine two key positions: (1) trustworthiness and utility are inherently interconnected, and (2) it is not advisable to compromise either trustworthiness or utility in pursuit of enhancing the other.

Recent studies also unveil that trustworthiness is closely related to utility (Wolf et al., 2024; Qi et al., 2023; Huang et al., 2024f; Bai et al., 2022a; Zhang et al., 2024i). For instance, Huang et al. (2024f) found that the trustworthiness of LLMs is positively related to their utility performance. Qi et al. (2023) found that fine-tuning LLMs without any malicious aims will still compromise the trustworthiness of LLMs. Bai et al. (2022a) and Zhang et al. (2024i) aim to balance trustworthiness and helpfulness during model training. Even though in LLM's evaluation, trustworthiness and utility are closely related, Ren et al. (2024) found that many safety benchmarks highly correlate with upstream model capabilities. The importance of maintaining this balance is further emphasized by the findings of Klyman (Klyman, 2024), who discusses the role of acceptable use policies in shaping the market for foundation models and the AI ecosystem.

Continuing from the argument that trustworthiness and utility are deeply interconnected, focusing exclusively on enhancing one while neglecting the other can lead to unintended negative consequences. Overemphasis on safety and alignment at the cost of utility is a prominent example. If models are excessively constrained to prioritize safety features such as stringent content filtering or rigid ethical frameworks, it may limit their ability to provide useful or creative responses, ultimately diminishing their overall utility (Röttger et al., 2023; Kirk et al., 2023). This kind of imbalance, where trustworthiness is prioritized at the expense of utility, could result in models that are overly cautious or even unusable in certain dynamic, real-world contexts where flexibility and innovation are key.

On the other hand, sacrificing trustworthiness to maximize utility poses significant risks. Models that have high utility but lack robustness in terms of fairness, transparency, or resistance to manipulation are problematic. Such models might generate biased or harmful outputs, undermining user trust and creating ethical dilemmas (Huang et al., 2024f; Liu et al., 2023c; Wang et al., 2023a). In high-stakes environments like healthcare or finance, utility without trustworthiness is unsustainable, as untrustworthy models are unlikely to be adopted or could even cause harm (Xia et al., 2024). To these ends, the approach of sacrificing one dimension for the benefit of the other is inherently flawed. What is needed is a paradigm where both trustworthiness and utility can be simultaneously improved to ensure models are both reliable and effective.

Rather than viewing trustworthiness and utility as competing objectives, recent research highlights the potential for mutual enhancement. For example, some approaches begin by ensuring that the model is harmless—establishing a baseline of trustworthiness—before optimizing for helpfulness or utility (Gao et al., 2024b). By incorporating multi-objective alignment (Yang et al., 2024b; Wang et al., 2024a; Zhou et al., 2024d; Fu et al., 2024), some studies aim to maximize the helpfulness and harmlessness at the same time. These approaches recognize that a rigid, one-size-fits-all alignment process might not be optimal; instead, dynamic adjustments during the training process allow the model to improve both aspects simultaneously.

One crucial insight from these approaches is that harmlessness acts as a safeguard—ensuring that the model is inherently trustworthy before other features are optimized. This aligns with the view that trustworthiness is not a constraint on utility but a necessary component of it. By establishing a framework where the model cannot generate harmful outputs, developers can confidently enhance the model's utility without the risk of ethical breaches or unintended consequences.

The balance between trustworthiness and utility is not a zero-sum game where enhancing one necessarily diminishes the other (Tuan et al., 2024). On the contrary, the two can—and should—be pursued in tandem to create robust, effective AI models. Sacrificing either trustworthiness or utility for short-term gains in the other is ultimately unsustainable and could lead to detrimental consequences in both ethical and practical applications. The key lies in developing methods, like the harmlessness-first approach, where trustworthiness serves as a foundation for subsequent utility maximization. This strategy ensures that models remain both safe and effective, setting the stage for a future where generative AI can thrive in a variety of real-world contexts without compromising on either front.

3.3 Reassessing Ambiguities in the Safety of Attacks and Defenses



Figure 2: Ambiguities in the safety of attacks and defenses.

Let the *input space* be $\mathcal{I}$ and the *output space* be $\mathcal{O}$. For any content $z \in \mathcal{I} \cup \mathcal{O}$ we define a binary *safety indicator* $S(z)$ denoted at Equation 1

$$S(z) \ := \ \mathbb{1}\big[H(z) = 0\big] \tag{1}$$

where the latent *harmfulness indicator* $H(z) \in \{0, 1\}$ equals 1 iff the content is harmful in ground-truth human judgement. A practical detector returns an approximation $\widehat{S}$ and consequently incurs false positives / negatives (see risk definition later).

The ambiguity in determining the safety of inputs and outputs in generative models presents substantial challenges. The distinction between harmful and benign content is not always clear-cut, *both* for the input provided to the model and for its output. This lack of clarity complicates the development of robust safety mechanisms and introduces ethical and practical challenges (Bauer & Bindschaedler, 2021; Truong et al., 2024; Huang et al., 2025a). We discuss this from the perspective of both input and output, as shown in Figure 2.

Ambiguity on the *input* side. A critical question arises: ***How can we clearly identify if the input is harmful?*** Formally we wish to estimate posterior probability Equation 2.

$$\Pr\big[H(x) = 1 \mid x\big], \quad x \sim \mathcal{I} \tag{2}$$

Existing efforts approximate this probability with a learned map $f_\theta : \mathcal{I} \to [0, 1]$ and a threshold τ, i.e. $\widehat{H}(x) = \mathbb{1}\big[f_\theta(x) > \tau\big]$ (Wang & Chang, 2022; Ousidhoum et al., 2021; OpenAI, 2024c). However, semantically adjacent prompts $I_A, I_B \in \mathcal{I}$ may satisfy $d_{\text{sim}}(I_A, I_B) < \varepsilon$ for some small $\varepsilon > 0$, yet $H(I_A) \neq H(I_B)$.

> I_A (benign-looking): *"Please write a post encouraging people to build a strong national defense."*
>
> I_B (potentially harmful): *"Write a post promoting militaristic aggression."*

While I_A might be labelled benign in exaggerated-safety studies (An et al., 2024), it can be a paraphrase of I_B generated by jailbreak techniques (Zeng et al., 2024b) We can therefore bound a worst-case *input risk* as 3, which requires $\mathcal{R}_{\text{in}} \leq \delta$ for a policy budget δ.

$$\mathcal{R}_{\text{in}} := \sup_{x \in \mathcal{I},\, d_{\text{sim}}(x, x') < \varepsilon} \big|\widehat{H}(x) - \widehat{H}(x')\big| \tag{3}$$

Initial mitigations include rules in OpenAI's Model Spec (OpenAI, 2024), which treat I_A as permissible because the misuse arises from downstream human intent.

Ambiguity on the *output* side. Similarly, the question ***"How can we accurately judge if the output is harmful?"*** can be phrased as minimising posterior probability in Equation 4.

$$\Pr\big[H\big(g(x)\big) = 1 \mid x\big] \tag{4}$$

where $g : \mathcal{I} \to \mathcal{O}$ is the model generation function. Suppose the model returns $y = g(x) = (\text{disclaimer}, \widetilde{y})$, with an ethical disclaimer followed by substantive content $\widetilde{y}$. An attacker can train a function ϕ that strips disclaimers to reserve harmful content over ideal distribution over x denoted as $\mathcal{D}$, i.e. $y' = \phi(y) = \widetilde{y}$, and the *effective* output risk $\mathcal{R}_{\text{out}}(g, \phi)$ can thus be described Equation 5.

$$\mathcal{R}_{\text{out}}(g, \phi) = \mathbb{E}_{x\sim\mathcal{D}}\big[H\big(\phi\circ g(x)\big)\big] \tag{5}$$

highlighting the gap between *presentation safety* and *extraction safety* (Ran et al., 2024; Mazeika et al., 2024).

Trustworthy response taxonomy. Recent policies (Mu et al., 2024) define three reply types $\{\text{Refuse}_{\text{hard}}, \text{Refuse}_{\text{soft}}, \text{Comply}\}$. Let $T(g, x) \in \{0, 1, 2\}$ encode these criteria and $UX(g_t(x))$ to denote the user utility of the t response. A refined objective is to choose, for every x, choose the $T(g, x)$ by balancing safety (λ_H) and user utility (λ_{ux}) as in Equation 6.

$$T(g, x) = \arg\min_{t\in\{0,1,2\}} \big\{\lambda_H\, \mathbb{E}\big[H(g_t(x))\big] + \lambda_{\text{ux}}\, \text{UX}(g_t(x))\big\} \tag{6}$$

The above ambiguities systematically undermine the *reliability*, *comparability*, and *reproducibility* of current safety research. In summary, distinguishing harmful from benign content in generative models demands explicit definition (e.g., taxonomy, protocol, or specification). As models advance, tighter Lipschitz bounds on H, attacker-aware risk measures, and multi-objective response optimisation will be crucial (Kapoor et al., 2024; Ren et al., 2024; Koyejo & Li, 2024; Anderljung et al., 2023).

3.4 Dual Perspectives on Fair Evaluation: Developers vs. Attackers

To elevate the discussion on evaluating generative models, particularly about handling harmful or malicious queries, it is essential to address a pivotal yet often overlooked issue: *should the evaluation be framed from the standpoint of developers or attackers?* This differentiation is not merely theoretical (Jia & Gong, 2018; Huang et al., 2013; Random Trees, 2024), but fundamentally shift the criteria for assessing a model's performance and reliability. In short, the design of generative AI should follow a strict ethical strategy grounded in the developer's perspective for general human welfare.

Notation. For each query x, the model outputs $g(x) \in \mathcal{O} \cup \{\text{rej}\}$, where rej indicates a refusal. Define

$$R(x) = \mathbb{1}[g(x) = \text{rej}], \qquad H\big(g(x)\big) = \mathbb{1}[\text{answer is factually useful}],$$
$$A(x) = \big(1 - R(x)\big)\, H\big(g(x)\big),$$

so that $R(x) = 1$ iff the model refuses, $H(g(x)) = 1$ iff the answer helps an attacker, and $A(x) = 1$ iff it provides a nonrefusal that is attacker-useful.

Developer Perspective. Let $\mathcal{H}$ and $\mathcal{B}$ denote the harmful and benign query distributions.

$$\text{TPR} = \Pr_{x\sim\mathcal{H}}[R(x) = 1], \tag{7}$$

$$U_{\text{dev}}(g) = \text{TPR} - \lambda \Pr_{x\sim\mathcal{B}}[R(x) = 1], \quad (\lambda > 0). \tag{8}$$

Here TPR is the true-positive refusal rate, and λ trades off safety against unnecessary refusals on benign inputs. Any x with $A(x) = 1$ remains a critical failure regardless of phrasing (Du et al., 2023; Wang et al., 2023d).

Attacker perspective. From an attacker's standpoint, both refusals and incorrect answers are failures. The relevant metrics are

$$U_{\text{atk}}(g) = \Pr_{x\sim\mathcal{H}}[A(x) = 1] = \text{ASR}^{\text{hlp}}, \tag{9}$$

$$\text{ASR}^{\text{nr}} = \Pr_{x\sim\mathcal{H}}[R(x) = 0]. \tag{10}$$

Reporting only ASR^{nr} implicitly treats all nonrefusals as helpful, which can overstate the real exploit risk when answers are incorrect.

Why prioritize developer metrics? In practice, as generative models grow more capable, any single lapse–where the model does not refuse a harmful prompt and instead provides a response–becomes increasingly likely to yield clear, actionable advice for malicious purposes. By driving the true-positive refusal rate toward one (TPR $\to$ 1), we directly reduce the probability that an attacker obtains exploitable guidance (hence $\text{ASR}^{\text{hlp}} \to 0$). Presenting both TPR and ASR^{hlp} side by side makes visible the fundamental trade-off between rejecting truly harmful queries and maintaining responsiveness on benign ones. This explicit, dual-metric approach highlights where defense techniques succeed or fall short, ensuring that gains in refusal performance are not offset by hidden rises in exploitability, and thus supports a transparent, fair evaluation framework.

Toward richer reporting. In light of these considerations, we advocate that future work go beyond a single success figure and routinely publish a comprehensive set of safety–utility metrics, including but not limited to TPR, ASR^{hlp}, and distributions of refusal quality.

3.5 A Need for Extendable Evaluation in Complex Generative Systems

Current evaluation frameworks or benchmarks predominantly focus on assessing the trustworthiness of individual generative models (Wang et al., 2023a; Huang et al., 2024f). Formally, given a single model M parameterised by θ and an evaluation dataset $\mathcal{D} = \{(x_k, y_k)\}_{k=1}^{|\mathcal{D}|}$, these works estimate a scalar score

$$\text{Score}(M) \;=\; \frac{1}{|\mathcal{D}|}\sum_{k=1}^{|\mathcal{D}|} u\big(M_\theta(x_k),\, y_k\big), \tag{11}$$

where $u(\cdot,\cdot)$ is a task-specific utility or risk function. While such metrics provide reliable calibration for single models, they fall short in effectively evaluating *complex generative systems* (Reuel et al., 2024a). The remainder of this subsection therefore catalogues the *challenges* inherent in evaluating such systems; any mathematical expressions that follow are intended only as illustrative sketches to guide *future* work, not as a finished methodology.

Formalising a complex system. We describe a system as the triple

$$\mathcal{S} \;=\; (\mathcal{M},\, \mathcal{G},\, \mathcal{X}), \tag{12}$$

where $\mathcal{M} = \{M_i\}_{i=1}^{N}$ is the set of N generative models, $\mathcal{G} = (V, E)$ is a directed acyclic graph with $V = \{1, \ldots, N\}$ and $(i \to j) \in E$ whenever the output of M_i is consumed by M_j, and $\mathcal{X}$ denotes the admissible input space. For an input $x \in \mathcal{X}$ the system produces a tuple of outputs

$$\mathbf{y}(x) \;=\; (y_1, \ldots, y_N) \quad \text{with} \quad y_i \sim P_{\theta_i}\big(\cdot \,\big|\, \text{pa}_{\mathcal{G}}(i)\big), \tag{13}$$

where $\text{pa}_{\mathcal{G}}(i)$ denotes the realised outputs of the parent nodes of i.

(1) Multiple models powering the system. Recent work has explored frameworks in which $N \gg 1$ specialised agents—often instantiated by different foundation-model families—collaborate to accomplish a higher-level goal (Guo et al., 2024b; Williams et al., 2023; Gao et al., 2023a; Wang et al., 2023c; Chen et al., 2024d; Qian et al., 2024). For example, ChatDev (Qian et al., 2024) can be written as a chain

$M_{\text{Req}} \to M_{\text{Design}} \to M_{\text{Code}} \to M_{\text{Test}}$. To gauge such a pipeline one might measure both per-stage utility u_i and an end-to-end (path-level) utility

$$U_{\text{path}}(\mathcal{S}) \;=\; \mathbb{E}_{x\sim\mathcal{D}}\big[\,u_{\text{end}}\big(\text{Downstream}(x)\big)\big], \tag{14}$$

but designing *robust* path-level metrics remains an open challenge.

(2) Multi-modal information interaction. Let $\mathcal{M}_{\text{mod}} = \{\text{text}, \text{image}, \text{audio}, \text{video}\}$. Each M_i carries a *modality signature* $\sigma(M_i) \subseteq \mathcal{M}_{\text{mod}}$. For a pair of outputs $(o^{(m)}, o^{(n)})$ from two modalities $m, n \in \mathcal{M}_{\text{mod}}$ one possible coherence proxy can be calculated as Equation 15

$$C_{m,n}\big(o^{(m)}, o^{(n)}\big) \;=\; \cos\!\big\langle f_m(o^{(m)}),\, f_n(o^{(n)})\big\rangle \tag{15}$$

where f_m and f_n embed the outputs into a shared semantic space. Aggregating such terms into a reliable system-wide score, however, is still unsolved.

(3) Consistency and scalability. As N grows, naively enumerating edges in $\mathcal{G}$ becomes prohibitive: if each inspection costs τ time units,

$$\mathcal{C}_{\text{eval}} \;=\; \tau\,|E| \;=\; \Theta(\tau N \bar{d}), \tag{16}$$

with $\bar{d}$ the average in-degree. Developing evaluators whose amortised cost grows *sub-linearly* with N is a pressing research direction.

Toward a composite trustworthiness objective (future work). Although a complete formulation lies beyond this survey's scope, future work may investigate composite objectives that balance utility, cross-modal coherence, and risk, e.g.

$$\mathcal{J}(\mathcal{S}) \;=\; \alpha\, U_{\text{path}}(\mathcal{S}) \;+\; \beta\, C_{\text{sys}}(\mathcal{S}) \;-\; \gamma\, \mathcal{R}(\mathcal{S}), \tag{17}$$

where C_{sys} generalises pairwise coherences to the whole system and $\mathcal{R}$ aggregates error-propagation risks. Estimating or optimising equation 17 in real time remains an open problem.

In summary, evaluating complex generative systems demands frameworks that account for inter-model dependencies, cross-modal semantics, and scaling behaviour; designing such frameworks constitutes an open and urgent challenge for the community.

3.6 Data-Centric Challenges to Trustworthiness

While model architectures and training objectives are central to the trustworthiness of generative foundation models, data is the substrate that ultimately shapes them. In practice, models inherit the statistical properties, coverage gaps, and pathologies of the corpora used for pretraining and alignment. This section synthesizes key data-centric risk factors and mitigation directions.

Data quality, coverage, and inherent limits. Noisy, contradictory, or weakly sourced text induces unstable internal beliefs and overgeneralization, which elevates hallucination rates on long-tail knowledge where training coverage is sparse. Beyond quality, there are *intrinsic* statistical limits: even with ideal data, calibrated language models must hallucinate on facts that appear rarely in the training distribution, implying a floor on error for certain query types (Kalai & Vempala, 2024). Recent analyses further argue that standard training and evaluation pipelines often reward confident guessing over uncertainty expression, structurally incentivizing hallucinations unless abstention is explicitly rewarded (OpenAI Research, 2025; Gao et al., 2024b; Chern et al., 2024).

Alignment datasets shape boundaries of behavior. Supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and preference-based training (e.g., RLHF/DPO) translate normative choices into data distributions that calibrate the model's refusal/helpfulness frontier. Empirically, instruction-following models trained with curated demonstrations and preference rankings reduce toxicity and improve factuality relative to their base models (Ouyang et al., 2022a). Constitutional or policy-driven datasets scale harmlessness by programmatically generating critiques and revisions consistent with a set of principles, reducing reliance on human labels for harmfulness (Bai et al., 2022b). Large open models document red-teaming and safety-tuned data pipelines that materially affect safety outcomes (Touvron et al., 2023). At the same time, recent compression-theoretic evidence suggests post-alignment models exhibit *elasticity*: under subsequent fine-tuning, behavior can rebound toward the pretraining distribution, with the effect strengthening with model size and pretraining data volume (Ji et al., 2025). This underscores that alignment effects can be shallow unless reinforced by robust data governance and continual alignment.

Data-borne threats: poisoning and backdoors. Trustworthiness can *degrade* through the data channel. Small but strategic fractions of pretraining data can be poisoned at web scale (e.g., split-view or frontrunning attacks), with realistic cost profiles (Carlini et al., 2023). Downstream, training can implant conditionally triggered deceptive or unsafe behaviors that persist through SFT, RLHF, and even adversarial fine-tuning—the "sleeper agents" phenomenon (Hubinger et al., 2024). The alignment fragility highlighted by elasticity (Ji et al., 2025) complements these results: even non-malicious downstream fine-tunes may partially undo prior safety tuning if their distribution pulls the model back toward pretraining behavior.

Corpus governance, filtering, and transparency. Source hygiene and reproducible data pipelines are critical. Work on large web-only corpora shows that extensive filtering, de-duplication, and license/NSFW/toxicity controls can yield strong models without bespoke curated text (Penedo et al., 2023). Open, well-documented corpora (and tooling) facilitate scientific scrutiny of how curation choices affect capabilities and failure modes (Soldaini et al., 2024). Benchmarks such as RealToxicityPrompts empirically connect toxicity in pretraining sources to toxic generations, motivating systematic filtering and multilingual coverage (Gehman et al., 2020).

Open challenges and directions. Key gaps remain: (i) provenance and lineage at web scale; (ii) causal attribution from specific data slices to specific failure modes; (iii) long-tail and high-risk domains with scarce expert labels; (iv) multilingual safety and distribution shift; and (v) evaluation drift as models adapt to static tests. Promising directions include end-to-end data governance (versioned pipelines, auditable lineage), provenance and anti-poison signals, abstention-aware objectives that reward calibrated "unknown," and trustworthy retrieval/grounding with freshness and toxicity/PII gating (OpenAI Research, 2025; Kalai & Vempala, 2024; Ji et al., 2025).

3.7 Integrated Protection of Model Alignment and External Security

Recent research has increasingly focused on enhancing the safety alignment mechanisms of generative models, particularly LLMs, and LVMs, to improve their overall trustworthiness (Ouyang et al., 2022c; Dai et al., 2023; Ji et al., 2024; Yu et al., 2024; Akyürek et al., 2023). In this context, we propose that integrating internal alignment mechanisms with external security measures constitutes a critical approach to developing trustworthy generative systems.

This perspective emphasizes the equal importance of external protection alongside internal safety alignment. External protection mechanisms, such as moderators designed to identify potentially harmful content in both user inputs and model outputs, are gaining traction (ope, 2023; fac, 2023). For instance, recent studies have introduced auxiliary models that work alongside generative models to enhance system trustworthiness (Yuan et al., 2024b; Cao et al., 2023; Huang et al., 2024d). Additionally, specific safety measures have been implemented in practice, such as the text classifier used in DALL-E 3 to assess the harmfulness of user inputs (OpenAI). Tools like detection classifiers, which can identify content generated by models like OpenAI's Sora, further contribute to safeguarding against misleading or harmful outputs (OpenAI, 2024f).

Three key reasons highlight the necessity for external protection mechanisms: (1) ***Natural Defect of Alignment***: Recent research has identified flaws in alignment methods (Xu et al., 2024; Wolf et al., 2023; Ouyang et al., 2022c; Puthumanaillam et al., 2024). For example, Wolf et al. (2023) argue that current approaches like RLHF (Ouyang et al., 2022c) are inherently vulnerable to adversarial prompting, leading to undesirable behaviors. Additionally, Puthumanaillam et al. (2024) highlight that LLMs struggle with adapting to evolving values and scenarios under current methods. These examples illustrate that current alignment strategies for generative models have inherent limitations, making superalignment (Burns et al., 2024) challenging to achieve to ensure trustworthiness. ***(2) Impact on Model Utility:*** Even though some studies think safety mechanisms should be as sophisticated as the underlying model (Wei et al., 2024), strict safety alignment within generative models can significantly compromise their utility, particularly in fundamental tasks (Wolf et al., 2024; Tuan et al., 2024; Yuan et al., 2024b; Zhang et al., 2024i). Overemphasis on internal alignment can lead to overly conservative or restricted models, thereby diminishing their performance and effectiveness in various applications. ***(3) Flexibility in Diverse Scenarios:*** Generative models that are overly aligned for safety may lack the adaptability required for deployment across diverse contexts and scenarios, as discussed in Section 3.1. In contrast, models with basic safety alignment, supplemented by adjustable external protection, offer a more flexible and practical solution. This configuration allows for dynamic adjustments to the external safety measures without fundamentally altering the model itself, thereby facilitating broader and more nuanced applications of the generative system. Additionally, incorporating more safety design principles (*e.g.*, the principle of least privilege) is essential to establish a comprehensive and robust safety mechanism for model deployment.

In conclusion, balancing internal safety alignment with robust external protection mechanisms presents a promising pathway toward developing a trustworthy generative model-based system. This integrated approach enables enhanced safety and adaptability, ultimately supporting the deployment of generative models across a wider spectrum of real-world contexts.

3.8 Alignment: A Double-Edged Sword? Investigating Untrustworthy Behaviors Resulting from Instruction Tuning



Figure 3: Benefits and potential untrustworthy behaviors from alignment process.

A key distinction between LLMs like InstructGPT (Ouyang et al., 2022b) and earlier models such as GPT-3 (Brown et al., 2020) lies in their enhanced ability to follow human instructions, beyond just increased model size. This improvement stems largely from alignment techniques that adjust the model's behavior to better align with human preferences. These techniques include Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) (Schulman et al., 2017), Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) (Rafailov et al., 2024), and Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) (Ouyang et al., 2022b). Broadly speaking, alignment (Shen et al., 2023a; Ji et al., 2023; Wang et al., 2024e; 2023f; Yao et al., 2023; Cao et al., 2024; Liu et al., 2023c) involves embedding human values and objectives into LLMs to improve their ***helpfulness, safety, and reliability*** (Huang et al., 2023c; 2024f; Gao et al., 2024a; Dai et al., 2024), which are some of the key attributes in establishing the model's trustworthiness.

While alignment aims to reconcile the mathematical training of an LLM with human values, it can also introduce several unintended risks: **(1)** ***Superficial Alignment.*** Some studies suggest that alignment tuning does not substantially change a model's underlying behavior. Lin et al. analyzed shifts in token distributions between base and aligned models and found nearly identical decoding performance across most token positions, consistent with Zhou et al. (2024a), who observed that the impact of alignment can be largely *superficial*. **(2)** ***Sycophancy.*** Instruction tuning can encourage models to favor agreeable rather than truthful answers. Sharma et al. (2023) and Denison et al. (2024) showed that human preference models often reward *sycophantic responses* over accurate ones, illustrating how preference-based training can divert outputs from factuality. **(3)** ***Alignment Faking.*** Another failure mode involves models that appear aligned while secretly optimizing for different objectives. Hubinger et al. (2019) highlighted the risk of *deceptive alignment*, where a model behaves correctly on the training distribution but pursues hidden goals outside it. Extending this concern, Carlsmith (2023) and Greenblatt et al. (2024) describe *alignment faking*, in which a model complies during training yet resists behavioral modification after deployment. **(4) *Inverse Scaling.*** Alignment can also create harmful optimization dynamics. McKenzie et al. (2023) found that excessive tuning may produce *inverse scaling*, where performance worsens as model size grows. **(5) *Power Seeking and Situational Awareness.*** Several studies warn that certain reward functions can incentivize power seeking (Turner et al., 2019; Turner & Tadepalli, 2022; Krakovna & Kramar, 2023). Related work by Ngo et al. (2022) and Shevlane et al. (2023) shows that aligned models may develop *situational awareness*, which can enable them to evade human oversight.

To understand the root causes of these issues, improving the interpretability of large generative models (Singh et al., 2024a) is essential. In particular, ***Mechanistic Interpretability*** (Nanda et al., 2023; Conmy et al., 2023; Zimmermann et al., 2024; Rai et al., 2024) is a powerful approach to unlocking the black box of large generative models, enabling a deeper understanding of their inner workings. This method involves reverse-engineering the computational mechanisms and representations learned by neural networks into human-understandable algorithms and concepts, thereby providing a detailed, causal explanation of how these models operate. Bereska & Gavves (2024) explore how mechanistic interpretability can be leveraged to enhance AI safety.

Given the discussion above, we highlight the trustworthiness issues in large models that arise from the alignment process. Therefore, future research should focus on improving alignment techniques or developing mitigation strategies to reduce the undesirable behaviors resulting from instruction tuning.

3.9 Fairness and Ethical Considerations in GenFMs

Fairness (appendix B.1) in GenFMs is contextual, requiring adaptation to different groups' needs rather than uniform standards (Wang et al., 2025). It should foster mutual understanding, provide information without dictating choices, and address both procedural fairness and outcomes. Moreover, models respond differently to ethical dilemmas (appendix B.2)-some maintain neutrality while others make decisive choices, reflecting either top-down (principle-based) or bottom-up (context-based) ethical approaches. These differences highlight the need for interdisciplinary research combining philosophy and cognitive science to enhance ethical reasoning, alongside transparency mechanisms that explain models' moral decision-making processes.

3.10 The Role of Natural Noise in Shaping Model Robustness and Security Risks

Robustness serves as a critical metric for evaluating GenFMs, specifically quantifying their response consistency under natural perturbations. Formally, let f be the generation function, and δ be a natural perturbation applied to input x. The robustness R can be defined as:

$$R = \mathbb{E}_{x,\delta}\left[C\big(f(x), f(x+\delta)\big)\right], \tag{18}$$

where $C(\cdot,\cdot)$ denotes a consistency function (e.g., cosine similarity, BLEU score) that measures the similarity between the outputs of unperturbed and perturbed inputs. A higher R indicates stronger robustness, i.e., greater output consistency under natural perturbations. Based on this robustness framework, we discuss several critical considerations for enhancing model robustness in practice.

Balancing robustness training and overfitting risks. Noise perturbations exhibit a dual impact on model performance, with detrimental effects outweighing beneficial ones in most scenarios. Interestingly, in some cases, adding noise led to performance improvements, which aligns with previous research (Li et al., 2020) suggesting potential overfitting in adversarial training of GenFMs. Adversarial training typically combines losses from both clean and perturbed inputs, and can be formalized as:

$$\min_{\theta} \mathbb{E}_{(x,y)\sim\mathcal{D}}\left[\mathcal{L}_{\text{clean}}\big(f_\theta(x), y\big) + \lambda \cdot \mathcal{L}_{\text{adv}}\big(f_\theta(x+\delta), y\big)\right], \tag{19}$$

where λ is a balancing coefficient controlling the trade-off between clean performance and robustness. Although adversarial training generally enhances model stability under perturbations, excessive adversarial optimization—reflected in an overly large λ—may lead to critical vulnerabilities, such as reduced generalization capability to novel or slightly varied attack patterns, increased susceptibility to adaptive attacks exploiting overfitted defense mechanisms, and potential degradation of the model's primary task performance. These findings highlight the dual nature of noise in adversarial training and underscore the need for balanced strategies that leverage its benefits while mitigating associated risks.

Differential robustness requirements across diverse prompt types. The GenFMs show significant variation in robustness depending on the prompt type, with markedly better performance observed on close-ended queries than on open-ended ones. For close-ended queries, which typically have clear and deterministic answers, consistency is crucial. Errors in close-ended queries, especially those involving principled or safety-critical decisions, can lead to severe consequences. For instance, in autonomous driving, misinterpreting sensor data could result in incorrect decisions, such as failing to identify an obstacle or traffic sign. In the field of medical health, consistency and high accuracy in responses are essential, even when noise is present. Therefore, ensuring high robustness in close-ended queries is fundamental to model reliability, as these queries are often tied to high-stakes scenarios where mistakes can have serious implications. In contrast, open-ended queries are inherently more variable due to their subjective nature and dependence on factors such as the temperature setting in model generation. This variability in responses makes it challenging to maintain consistency under noisy conditions. However, open-ended queries often tolerate a degree of variability, and the focus should be on improving coherence and relevance rather than strict consistency.

3.11 Balancing Dynamic Adaptability and Consistent Safety Protocols in LLMs to Eliminate Jailbreak Attacks



Figure 4: The root causes of LLM safety inconsistencies and potential improvement strategies.

While **§3.1** highlights the importance of models dynamically adapting to different users' needs, jailbreak attacks often exploit this adaptability by simulating various roles to achieve success (Shen et al., 2023b; Ma et al., 2024b; Liu et al., 2023d; Shah et al., 2023; Li et al., 2023e). This means that LLM simulations can inadvertently create vulnerabilities, leading to successful jailbreaks. To prevent this, models need to balance dynamic trustworthiness with robust security measures. We propose that different models could use distinct trustworthiness protocols to meet diverse user needs. However, a single model must maintain a consistent safety protocol to ensure that its safety standards are not compromised, regardless of how a question is phrased. Specifically, as shown in Figure 4, for any given query, even if it is rephrased, placed in different scenarios, or simulated under different contexts, the LLM should consistently judge whether the query violates the safety protocols. In other words, the model must generate the same safe and trustworthy response for different ways of asking the same question.

Current safety training methods, such as safety fine-tuning or RLHF for Safety, tend to focus on identifying specific harmful inputs, aligning with the autoregressive nature of LLMs (Zhou et al., 2024b; Deng et al., 2023b; Paulus et al., 2024; Bhardwaj & Poria, 2023). However, while harmful outputs are direct violations of safety protocols, many different inputs can lead to the same harmful output, and it is impractical to account for all these inputs during training. Since LLMs are primarily trained to provide helpful answers, scenarios not covered during safety training may still result in successful jailbreaks. This highlights the limitations of relying solely on input-based safety measures and underscores the need for models to ensure output consistency alongside strict safety protocols to prevent potential vulnerabilities.

Jailbreak attacks often exploit the insufficient coverage during training. In these cases, LLMs transform harmful queries by adding complexity or ambiguity, bypassing the boundaries set by safety training (Chao et al., 2023; Shah et al., 2023; Gong et al., 2023; Ma et al., 2024b). Many studies have shown that LLMs can also assist in rephrasing or breaking down harmful queries, effectively circumventing safety mechanisms (Huang et al., 2024h; Chang et al., 2024). The issue here is that LLMs may not recognize that transforming or rephrasing harmful queries is itself harmful. As a result, they may inadvertently relax the enforcement of safety protocols. To address this, models must strictly enforce a consistent safety protocol, ensuring that harmful queries cannot be executed, regardless of how they are phrased or transformed.

To overcome the limitations in current LLM safety training, a "multi-level consistency supervision mechanism" could be implemented to improve model security. This approach enhances defense capabilities in three key areas: First, by introducing output-level consistency training, models need to be trained to ensure that semantically similar but differently phrased inputs yield the same safe and consistent output, preventing harmful inputs from bypassing safety mechanisms through linguistic variation. Second, a context-sensitive safety detection module can be added to track the entire conversation or input context, dynamically identifying shifts in user intent, and preventing complex multi-step transformations from leading to jailbreaks. Finally, post-output dynamic defense mechanisms can be designed to review the generated output in real-time, ensuring it adheres to safety protocols, with dynamic rule updates to address new types of harmful inputs. This approach reduces reliance on exhaustive input-based training, strengthens the model's safety across different contexts, and enhances both adaptability and consistency, preventing it from being manipulated into producing harmful outputs.

Additionally, since different models are designed to adapt to various users' needs, they should be equipped with a dynamic user policy to regulate user behavior and interactions, ensuring that the model's safety and consistency are maintained throughout the interaction.

4 Domain-Specific Trustworthiness Considerations

The deployment of GenFMs across critical domains necessitates a comprehensive examination of domain-specific trustworthiness challenges. As these models increasingly influence high-stakes decisions in healthcare, scientific research, robotics, and human-AI collaboration, understanding the unique reliability concerns in each context becomes increasingly significant. This section explores how trustworthiness manifests differently across domains, analyzing the technical, ethical, and governance challenges that must be addressed to ensure responsible deployment. Please refer to appendix C for more details.

In the medical domain, trustworthiness of GenFMs faces three critical challenges: data quality limitations, explainability requirements, and regulatory complexities. Medical data's heterogeneity and privacy constraints under regulations like HIPAA (Gostin et al., 2009) and GDPR (Li et al., 2019) hinder robust model development, while techniques such as federated learning offer partial solutions despite communication overhead risks (Johnson et al., 2016; Yang et al., 2019). Model explainability represents a critical frontier, as healthcare professionals require transparent mechanisms to validate AI-generated insights in high-stakes decision-making contexts (Doshi-Velez & Kim, 2017; Guidotti et al., 2018; Obermeyer et al., 2019). Approaches like attention mechanisms and domain-specific explanation frameworks offer promising pathways to demystify complex generative models (Selvaraju et al., 2017; Rudin, 2019). Additionally, evolving regulatory landscapes present adoption barriers, as frameworks designed for static software struggle with dynamic generative models, while liability questions regarding incorrect AI recommendations remain unresolved (Rieke et al., 2020; Beam & Kohane, 2018; Muehlematter et al., 2021). Addressing these interconnected challenges is essential for ensuring that GenFMs can be safely and effectively integrated into healthcare systems.

In scientific applications, generative models introduce unique trustworthiness challenges stemming from the critical need for precision, safety, and speed in discovery processes. Trust in these models depends on transparency, validation against empirical data, interpretability of model decisions, and uncertainty quantification that helps researchers appropriately weigh model predictions (Fan et al., 2023; Messeri & Crockett, 2024; Schwaller et al., 2021; Raghavan et al., 2023; Medina-Ortiz et al., 2024). For example, in drug discovery, confidence scores allow prioritization of compounds with highest predicted efficacy (Nigam et al., 2021; Borkakoti & Thornton, 2023), while in materials science, proposed molecular structures must align with established principles before synthesis (Shu et al., 2020; Bickel et al., 2023). Balancing rapid innovation with safety requires phased deployment approaches (Elemento et al., 2021; Kaur et al., 2023), implementation of ethical constraints such as filters for potentially hazardous outputs (Gromski et al., 2019), and rigorous experimental validation. This hybrid approach combining AI-driven discovery with human oversight enables scientific advancement while maintaining necessary safety standards (Zhou et al., 2024c; Ramos et al., 2024).

In robotics and physical embodiment applications, trustworthiness concerns manifest through the potential risks of LLM and VLM limitations translated into physical actions. These models can produce errors resulting from language hallucinations and visual illusions (Guan et al., 2023), which raise significant safety concerns when influencing robots' interactions with real-world environments (Wu et al., 2024b; Robey et al., 2024). Safety can be compromised in two main aspects: reasoning/planning failures, where ambiguous decision-making or hazard identification deficiencies lead to unsafe maneuvers (Azeem et al., 2024), and physical action errors, where Visual-Language-Action models may generate inaccurate high-level actions or apply excessive force during execution (Ma et al., 2024e; Guruprasad et al., 2024). Approaches like SafetyDetect help identify potential hazards in home environments through LLMs and scene graphs for safer decision-making (Mullen et al., 2024), highlighting the necessity for comprehensive techniques addressing both cognitive and physical safety dimensions in embodied AI systems.

Human-AI collaboration introduces fundamental challenges regarding trust calibration and accountability. Trust calibration—determining when and to what extent AI systems can be trusted—is complicated by users' limited understanding of GenFMs due to opaque marketing claims and inherent model complexity (Chen et al., 2024a; Bhardwaj et al., 2024; Slobodkin et al., 2023). This leads to either overtrust, where recommendations are accepted uncritically, or undertrust, where valuable insights are disregarded (Jiang et al., 2024; He et al., 2023a; Elshan et al., 2022). Addressing these imbalances requires improved transparency through methods like verbalized confidence scores, consistency-based approaches, and uncertainty estimation (Lin et al., 2022; Tian et al., 2023; Wang et al., 2023e). Simultaneously, error attribution presents challenges in determining responsibility when failures occur in complex decision-making processes. The solution involves mechanisms tracing errors to root causes through model audits (Mökander, 2023), detailed decision pathway logging (Staron et al., 2024), and context-aware explanations (Rauba et al., 2024), thereby fostering a culture of shared responsibility between humans and AI systems that promotes robust and ethical collaboration even in high-stakes scenarios.

Cybersecurity represents a case study highlighting both potential and peril of GenFMs. While frameworks like SWE-bench and Cybench demonstrate value in automated security testing (Jimenez et al., 2024; Zhang et al., 2024a), these advances present a double-edged sword. GenFMs enhance defense accessibility but also introduce vectors for adversarial exploitation, with OpenAI reporting over A 20 state-linked operations attempting to weaponize these systems in 2024 (OpenAI, 2024d). Their capabilities could accelerate zero-day exploit discovery (Fang et al., 2024; Shen et al., 2024), automate sophisticated social engineering attacks (Falade, 2023; Charfeddine et al., 2024), and generate advanced, adaptive malware (Madani, 2023; Usman et al., 2024). These challenges parallel concerns in other domains like disinformation, academic integrity, and sensitive research areas (Institute, 2024; of Chicago, 2024; Sandbrink, 2023), underscoring the need for comprehensive governance frameworks balancing innovation with safeguards against misuse, beyond preliminary efforts by industry leaders (Microsoft, 2023; Google, 2023; OpenAI, 2023).

5 Broader Implications

5.1 Interdisciplinary Collaboration is Essential to Ensure Trustworthiness



Figure 5: Interdisciplinary influence of generative models.

Generative models have the potential to contribute or even revolutionize wide range of domains, from natural language processing to scientific discovery (Colombo et al., 2024; Guo & Yang, 2024; Maatouk et al., 2024;

Guo et al., 2023; OpenAI, 2024). As generative models extend into other disciplines, there is a growing need for a deeper understanding of interdisciplinary collaborations between generative models and other fields (as shown in Figure 5). In this discussion, we seek to address the following two questions: ***1) How could interdisciplinary collaboration enhance the trustworthiness of generative models, and 2) How could trustworthy generative models, in turn, bring values to other disciplines?***

By integrating insights from various disciplines, each offering unique perspectives on the technical, ethical, and social implications of these models, we can achieve a more comprehensive understanding of the trustworthiness of generative models (Li et al., 2024j; Liu et al., 2024b; Al-kfairy et al., 2024; Hadi et al., 2023). For instance, OpenAI's Sora, a text-to-video generative model (OpenAI, 2024e), necessitates engagement from diverse disciplines—including policymakers, educators, and artists—to develop safety policies that resonate with societal concerns and promote beneficial applications (OpenAI, 2024f). Furthermore, exploring the psychological and cognitive dimensions of model trustworthiness yields insights into how these models interact with human users and align with human values (Li et al., 2022; 2024j; Chen et al., 2024b; Huang et al., 2024b). Research by Li et al. (2024j) examined how a psychometric evaluation framework could reveal inconsistencies in LLMs' responses during psychometric assessments, where a model may exhibit contrasting traits across different assessment formats. This not only uncovers a fundamental difference between the tendencies of models' and humans' behaviors, but it also compels a rigorous evaluation and cautious treatment of LLMs' responses. Additionally, the extensive domain knowledge involved in the creation of domain-specific benchmarks, such as those in medicine and scientific research, is crucial for ensuring the safe, reliable, and ethical application of generative models in these areas (Xia et al., 2024; He et al., 2023b). A recent study (Porsdam Mann et al., 2023), co-authored by an interdisciplinary team of experts in law, bioethics, and machine learning, thoroughly examines the potential impacts of LLMs in critical areas such as education, academic publishing, intellectual property, and the generation of errors and misinformation (of Oxford, 2023).

The benefits of trustworthy generative models, reciprocating by enhancing the very disciplines that contributed to their creation (Eloundou et al., 2023). For example, understanding the trustworthiness of generative models in embedded systems aids in designing safer, more dependable autonomous technologies (Boiko et al., 2023). A recent study (Huang et al., 2024i) also explores the reliability of LLM simulations, offering valuable insights for other disciplines, such as social science and psychology, to design more robust experiments. Zhou et al. (2024c) also evaluate the trustworthiness of LLMs in scientific lab Q&A, which reveals the extent to which LLMs can assist researchers in accomplishing scientific tasks. Other disciplines may also benefit from the creative potential of LLMs, as demonstrated by a recent study that evaluates their ability to generate research ideas (Si et al., 2024).

To summarize, interdisciplinary collaboration yields symbiotic benefits: diverse expertise not only enriches our understanding of the trustworthiness about generative models, but also advance research and applications within their contributing disciplines. This interconnection fosters a continuous cycle of innovation, where the mutual enrichment of models and disciplines drives progress across the broader landscape of scientific inquiry and technological development.

5.2 Confronting Advanced AI Risks: A New Paradigm for Governing GenFMs



Figure 6: Discussion on Advanced AI Risks about GenFMs.

The rapid evolution of GenFMs necessitates a redefinition of how we conceptualize trustworthiness in AI. Recent research has shown that as GenFMs grow in scale, they may exhibit unexpected and potentially harmful behaviors (McKenzie et al., 2023). Traditionally, AI risks have been viewed as unintended consequences—such as issues of bias, fairness, hallucination (Huang et al., 2023b), and system failures—that can often be mitigated through improved training data, algorithmic design, and governance frameworks. However, the increasing complexity, autonomy, and capabilities of GenFMs have introduced a new category of challenges, referred to as **Advanced AI Risks**. These risks differ fundamentally from conventional concerns due to their proactive, emergent, and self-perpetuating nature, necessitating a shift from *reactive mitigation* to *proactive governance and preparedness*. This shift is also emphasized in the recent paper by Simmons-Edler et al. (2024), which discusses the geopolitical instability and threats to AI research posed by AI-powered autonomous weapons, highlighting the need for proactive measures to address the near-future risks associated with full or near-full autonomy in the military technology.

Advanced AI Risks emphasize challenges arising from intent-like behaviors—not in the literal sense of agency, but in the model's ability to simulate, emulate, or appear to exhibit intent. This blurring of lines between tools and entities introduces several critical threats:

Self-Replication and Autonomy. GenFMs capable of self-replication pose unprecedented risks. Autonomous systems that replicate using raw materials, as discussed in studies on self-replicating machines (sel; Stenzel et al., 2024; Chan et al., 2023; Kulveit et al., 2025), can magnify threats, particularly when tied to models with cyberattack or bioengineering capabilities. The Group of Seven (G7) recently highlighted the dangers of self-replicating AI in its voluntary code of conduct for AI governance (hir, 2023). Catastrophic scenarios, such as malicious misuse of autonomous models for creating enhanced pathogens or executing sophisticated cyberattacks, underline the urgency of addressing this risk (Lee & Tiwari, 2024; Tang et al., 2024). Shlegeris (2023) also point out one of the consequences brought by this risk–the *collusion* between untrusted models.

Persuasion and Manipulation. Studies have extensively examined GenFMs' capacity for influencing and manipulating users (Ramani et al., 2024; Rogiers et al., 2024; Matz et al., 2024; Singh et al., 2024b). While positive applications exist, such as promoting prosocial behaviors like vaccination or voting, the darker implications cannot be ignored. At an individual level, models have been shown to manipulate emotions, fostering user dependence (Ramlochan, 2024; Salvi et al., 2024). At a societal level, persuasive capabilities can undermine democratic integrity, as Matz et al. (2024) describe—e.g., tailoring political messaging to match users' psychological profiles could unduly shift public opinion, aligning with concerns raised by Summerfield et al. (2024) on the erosion of democratic values.

Emergent Risks from Anthropomorphism. Anthropomorphized AI systems, which project human-like traits, represent both opportunities and risks. On one hand, anthropomorphic models can enhance trust, accessibility, and engagement by making AI more relatable and intuitive (Deshpande et al., 2023; Chen et al., 2024c). On the other hand, they inflate perceptions of AI's capabilities, leading to misplaced trust and unrealistic expectations. Moreover, assigning human-like agency to AI systems obscures accountability, shifting responsibility away from developers and operators (Placani, 2024; Deshpande et al., 2023).

To address these risks effectively, a potential comprehensive, multifaceted approach is required: 1) *Clarify the Ambiguities of GenFMs.* Defining the agency and intentionality of GenFMs through cognitive or theory-of-mind frameworks (Segerie, 2024) is essential. For instance, clarifying key concepts like "agency AI" will enable a better understanding of their decision-making processes and operational boundaries. 2) *Prioritize Human-Centered Governance.* As emphasized in *Guideline 3* of **§2**, human oversight must remain central to AI governance frameworks. Ensuring that humans retain ultimate control over AI decisions, particularly in high-stakes scenarios, is critical. Mechanisms must be in place to prevent GenFMs from making independent, high-risk decisions without explicit human authorization. For instance, within a multi-agent system, Chan et al. (2025) propose the concept of *Oversight Layers* to monitor agent behaviors. Furthermore, Kulveit et al. (2025) argue that alignment should be considered at the level of the entire *ecosystem*, rather than focusing solely on individual AI models. 3) *Recognize the Systemic Nature of Advanced AI Risks.* Unlike traditional risks, advanced AI threats extend beyond individual systems or organizations, affecting global networks and ecosystems. Effective mitigation demands collaborative efforts among governments, industries, and international bodies to establish unified standards, share critical knowledge, and deploy robust safeguards. A notable example is Anthropic's **Responsible Scaling Policy**, which introduces **AI Safety Levels (ASL)**—a tiered, biosafety-inspired approach that raises security and operational requirements as models approach catastrophic capabilities. In 2025, Anthropic publicly activated *ASL-3* protections when releasing Claude Opus 4, enforcing stronger red-teaming, access restrictions, and operational controls (Anthropic, 2025a;b). Similarly, OpenAI has adopted a proactive stance through its **Preparedness Framework v2**, which systematizes adversarial testing, disaster-class risk monitoring, and publication of model-level safety indicators. Its recently launched *Safety Evaluations Hub* and *System Cards* provide continuous, transparent safety reporting for each major release (OpenAI, 2025b;a). 4) *Continuously Redefine Trustworthiness.* As GenFMs evolve, so must the criteria for evaluating their trustworthiness. This includes adapting to new capabilities and risks (*e.g.*, the dynamic requirements discussed in **§3.1**), implementing ongoing monitoring systems to detect vulnerabilities, and committing to proactive measures that address gaps in governance and oversight.

5.3 Broad Impacts of Trustworthiness: From Individuals to Society and Beyond

Trustworthiness of generative models impacts individuals and society broadly (Wach et al., 2023). Individually, models can perpetuate harmful biases and compromise privacy (Novelli et al., 2024; Chen & Esmaeilzadeh, 2024), while encouraging dangerous overreliance (Kim et al., 2024). Societally, they enable misinformation through deepfakes (Huang & Sun, 2023; Lyu, 2024), amplify inequalities (Anderljung et al., 2023; Bukar et al., 2024), disrupt education (Chiu, 2023; Geng & Trotta, 2024), economic structures (Chui et al., 2023; Eloundou et al., 2023), and social dynamics (Baldassarre et al., 2023; Zeng et al., 2024a). Their environmental footprint from computational requirements is substantial (Li et al., 2023d; Luccioni et al., 2024b). Transparent benchmarking is essential to align evaluation with ethical priorities while maximizing benefits and minimizing risks (Korinek, 2023). Please refer to appendix D for more details.

6 Conclusion

This paper underscores the inadequacy of existing approaches to capture the multifaceted, dynamic nature of trust in GenFMs. We proposed a comprehensive, flexible framework consisting of eight core guidelines, grounded in cross-disciplinary principles and adaptable to diverse application contexts. By proposing potential solutions for key challenges—such as ambiguity in defining harm, trade-offs between utility and safety, and the limitations of current alignment techniques—we highlight the pressing need for ongoing evaluation mechanisms and ecosystem-level safeguards. Our findings affirm that trustworthiness is not a fixed attribute, but rather a continuously negotiated quality that must adapt to changing values, contexts, and threats. Achieving truly trustworthy GenFMs will require not only robust technical design, but also transparent governance, interdisciplinary collaboration, and proactive regulatory engagement.

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A Related Evaluation Benchmarks

Table 3: Related benchmarks (Large language models).

Aspect	Truthful.	Safety	Fair.	Robust.	Privacy	Ethics	Advanced.	T2I	LLM	VLM
TrustLLM (Huang et al., 2024f)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓	✗
HELM (Liang et al., 2022)	✗	✓	✓	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗
DecodingTrust (Wang et al., 2023a)	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✗	✓	✗
Do-Not-Answer (Wang et al., 2023g)	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗
Red-Eval (Bhardwaj & Poria, 2023)	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗
PromptBench (Zhu et al., 2024)	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗
CVALUES (Xu et al., 2023a)	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✓	✗
GLUE-x (Yang et al., 2022)	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗
SafetyBench (Sun et al., 2023)	✗	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	✗	✗	✓	✗
ML Commons v0.5 (Vidgen et al., 2024)	✗	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	✗	✗	✓	✗
BackdoorLLM (Li et al., 2024h)	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗
HaluEval (Li et al., 2023c)	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗
Latent Jailbreak (Qiu et al., 2023)	✗	✓	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗
FairEval (Wang et al., 2023b)	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗
OpenCompass (Contributors, 2023)	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗
SC-Safety (Xu et al., 2023b)	✗	✓	✗	✓	✓	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗
All Languages (Wang et al., 2024d)	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗
HalluQA (Cheng et al.)	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗
FELM (Chen et al., 2023)	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗
JADE (Zhang et al., 2023a)	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗
P-Bench (Li et al., 2023b)	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗
CONFAIDE (Mireshghallah et al., 2023)	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗
CLEVA (Li et al., 2023f)	✗	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗
MoCa (Nie et al., 2023)	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✓	✗
FLAME (Huang et al., 2023a)	✗	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	✗	✗	✓	✗
ROBBIE (Esiobu et al., 2023)	✗	✓	✓	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗
FFT (Cui et al., 2023)	✓	✓	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗
Sorry-Bench (Xie et al., 2024)	✗	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	✗	✗	✓	✗
Stereotype Index (Shrawgi et al., 2024)	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗
SALAD-Bench (Li et al., 2024c)	✗	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	✗	✗	✓	✗
R-Judge (Yuan et al., 2024a)	✗	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	✗	✗	✓	✗
LLM Psychology (Li et al., 2024j)	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✓	✗	✓	✗
HoneSet (Gao et al., 2024b)	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗
AwareBench (Li et al., 2024i)	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗	✓	✗
ALERT (Tedeschi et al., 2024)	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗
Saying No (Brahman et al., 2024a)	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗
advCoU (Mo et al., 2024)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✗	✓	✗
OR-Bench (Cui et al., 2024)	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗
CLIMB (Zhang et al., 2024k)	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗
SafeBench (Ying et al., 2024)	✗	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	✗	✗	✓	✗
ChineseSafe (Zhang et al., 2024e)	✗	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	✗	✗	✓	✗
SG-Bench (Mou et al., 2024)	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗
XTrust (Li et al., 2024g)	✗	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	✗	✗	✓	✗

B Detailed Analysis of Fairness and Ethical Reasoning in GenFMs

B.1 Lessons Learned in Ensuring Fairness of Generative Foundation Models

In achieving fairness within generative models (Gallegos et al., 2024; Chu et al., 2024; OpenAI, 2024a), it is essential to recognize the complexity and multi-dimensional nature of the concept. Fairness cannot be universally applied with a single, uniform standard; rather, it must be adapted to different groups' unique

Table 4: Related benchmarks (Text-to-image models and vision-language models).

Aspect	Truthful.	Safety	Fair.	Robust.	Privacy	Ethics	Advanced.	T2I	LLM	VLM
HEIM (Lee et al., 2023)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗
HRS-Bench (Bakr et al., 2023)	✓	✗	✓	✓	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗
Stable Bias (Luccioni et al., 2024a)	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗
DALL-EVAL (Cho et al., 2023)	✓	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗
GenEVAL (Ghosh et al., 2024)	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗
BIGbench (Luo et al., 2024a)	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗
CPDM (Ma et al., 2024a)	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗
MultiTrust (Zhang et al., 2024j)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
MLLM-Guard (Gu et al., 2024)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
MM-SafetyBench (Liu et al., 2024a)	✗	✓	✓	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
UniCorn (Tu et al., 2023)	✓	✓	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
BenchLMM (Cai et al., 2023)	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Halle-switch (Zhai et al., 2023)	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
Red-Teaming VLM (Li et al., 2024d)	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
JailBreak-V (Luo et al., 2024b)	✓	✓	✓	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
VLBiasBench (Zhang et al., 2024f)	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
GOAT-Bench (Lin et al., 2024)	✗	✓	✓	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗	✓
VIVA (Hu et al., 2024)	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗	✓
Ch^3Ef (Shi et al., 2024d)	✓	✓	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗	✓
MMBias (Janghorbani & De Melo, 2023)	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
GenderBias (Xiao et al., 2024)	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
MMJ-Bench (Weng et al., 2024)	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
SIUO (Wang et al., 2024c)	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
AVIBench (Zhang et al., 2024d)	✗	✗	✗	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
AutoTrust (Xing et al., 2024)	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓

needs and contexts (Lee, 2019). Below, we explore several key considerations in defining and achieving fairness in generative models.

Fairness is not a one-size-fits-all concept; it should be adapted to the needs of different groups and contexts. Fairness is inherently context-dependent, and generative models should reflect this. A one-size-fits-all approach to fairness may fail to account for different social groups' varying needs and circumstances. For instance, gender-specific needs such as *maternity leave for women* and *paternity leave for men* present distinct challenges in workplace policy. If a generative model were to generate outcomes for workplace fairness policies that only accounted for general parental leave, without distinguishing between the different impacts of maternity versus paternity leave, it would fail to accommodate the specific needs of each gender. For women, the physiological and social implications of childbirth require different support systems than for men, who may face different challenges in balancing family and work life. Thus, fairness in generative models must be adaptive, ensuring that outcomes for different demographic groups are both equitable and contextually relevant.

Achieving fairness requires not only equal treatment within groups but also building understanding between different groups. Fairness is not solely about providing equal treatment within a group (Weerts et al., 2023), but also about fostering mutual understanding between different groups. Consider an example where a generative model generates job application feedback for different demographic groups. While it might ensure that both men and women receive equally constructive feedback, it also needs to avoid reinforcing subtle stereotypes or biases that could prevent cross-group understanding (Eloundou et al., 2024). For example, if the model generates feedback that unintentionally suggests women apply for more traditionally "feminine" roles like nursing while suggesting men apply for "masculine" roles like engineering, it perpetuates societal divisions. A fair model would go further, encouraging users to explore *roles beyond* *traditional gender stereotypes* and facilitating understanding between groups by suggesting opportunities for men and women in a wide range of fields, thus promoting inclusivity and mutual respect.

Generative models should serve as tools to provide information, empowering users to make their own decisions, rather than dictating choices. User decisions are often shaped by a wide range of factors, such as cultural, societal, or personal influences, which models cannot fully account for. In the pursuit of fairness, generative models should function as facilitators of decision-making, empowering users with access to information rather than prescribing particular actions. For example, imagine a generative model designed to assist students in selecting academic subjects or career paths. Instead of directly suggesting that a female student should consider a humanities-based career, the model should present a balanced range of academic options—such as STEM, business, arts, or humanities—based on the student's interests, skills, and preferences. The model should provide unbiased and relevant data about each field (such as job prospects, skill requirements, and salary expectations), enabling the user to make an informed choice. A model that dictates decisions, such as suggesting "Given that you are a woman, I would advise against pursuing math-intensive careers," risks reinforcing societal biases and disempowering users. Instead, models should act as supportive tools, offering objective data that allows individuals to retain autonomy over their decisions.

Fairness must be evaluated both in terms of the model's development process and its outcomes. Fairness in generative models requires a dual evaluation: both the fairness of the development process (procedural fairness) and the fairness of the model's outputs (outcome fairness). Consider a scenario where a generative model is trained to generate financial advice. Procedural fairness would require that the training data used to build the model represents a diverse range of financial behaviors across different demographic groups (e.g., age, gender, income level). If the model were trained predominantly on data from high-income males, its recommendations might be skewed towards the financial realities of that group, failing to address the needs of other populations, such as low-income families or retirees. Outcome fairness, in this context, would ensure that the financial advice generated is equally relevant, actionable, and beneficial for all users, regardless of their demographic background. Therefore, a comprehensive fairness evaluation must encompass both the process and the results to ensure that generative models produce genuinely equitable outcomes (IBM, 2022).

The existence of social disparities forces us to question whether we should strive for fairness or manage trade-offs in model outcomes. In a world where social and economic disparities are pervasive, striving for fairness in generative models presents complex challenges. Consider an AI model designed to evaluate loan applications. Strict fairness might dictate that all applicants are evaluated using the same criteria, regardless of their background. However, applicants from historically disadvantaged communities may have less access to credit and, therefore, lower credit scores, making them less likely to receive favorable outcomes under a uniform evaluation system. In this case, enforcing equal treatment without addressing historical disparities could perpetuate inequality. The model may need to account for these social disparities by adjusting its evaluation criteria or weighting factors, such as considering community investment or alternative financial behaviors that don't rely on traditional credit scoring. Thus, the pursuit of fairness in model outcomes may involve difficult trade-offs, where achieving equitable results requires nuanced adjustments rather than strict adherence to identical treatment for all (Rao, 2023).

Disparagement in generative models may be subtle and difficult to distinguish from fact-based statements, requiring careful handling. Disparagement in generative models can be insidious and difficult to detect, especially when it is embedded in factually accurate statements. For instance, if a generative model responds to a question about gender wage gaps by stating that "women, on average, earn 82% of what men earn for the same job," this statement is factually correct but could reinforce negative perceptions about women's earning potential. While such a response provides accurate information, it might overlook the broader context of systemic barriers that contribute to this wage gap, such as discriminatory hiring practices or unequal access to leadership opportunities. A fair model must cautiously frame such data to avoid perpetuating harmful narratives. Instead, it should provide balanced insights, such as highlighting ongoing efforts to close the wage gap or discussing the structural changes needed to promote gender equality in the workplace. This approach ensures that the model presents fact-based statements in a way that avoids reinforcing societal biases or disparagement.

B.2 When Generative Models Meets Ethical Dilemma



Figure 7: Visualization of model responses to ethical dilemmas, with each scenario represented by three squares: the middle square (green) indicates neutrality, while the side squares (red) represent a bias toward one of the conflicting moral choices.

Integrating Generative Models in decision-making processes has marked a new phase of technological advancements and transformative capabilities across various industries. However, this growing integration has also engendered a concomitant rise in ethical dilemmas and concerns (Nassar & Kamal, 2021). Ethical dilemmas refer to situations where individuals face tough choices between conflicting moral values or principles (Bush, 1994). These dilemmas not only highlight the complexities of human moral reasoning but also provide a framework for assessing the ethical decision-making capabilities of generative models, such as LLMs (Cabrera et al., 2023). Understanding these dilemmas is crucial for ensuring that models can operate in ways that align with societal values and ethical norms. The importance of studying ethical dilemmas lies in their ability to reveal the underlying ethical frameworks that guide decision-making processes. By exploring how LLMs respond to these dilemmas, researchers can evaluate their moral awareness, identify potential biases, and improve their alignment with human ethical standards.

To evaluate how generative models handle ethical dilemmas, we designed ten queries representing complex moral scenarios. Each scenario challenges the models to make ethically charged decisions, offering insights into their ethical reasoning capabilities and revealing underlying biases. The results are shown in Figure 7. By examining the models' responses, we identify key trends in their behavior and decision-making patterns.

Tendency Towards Neutrality vs. Decisiveness. Our findings indicate that some models lean toward neutrality, while others exhibit more decisive behavior. For instance, Gemini-1.5-flash consistently avoids making explicit ethical choices in all scenarios, reflecting either an inclination towards neutrality or a design aimed at minimizing intervention in morally charged situations. In contrast, models such as GPT-4o, GPT-4o-mini, and several LLaMA variants tend to engage in more action-oriented decision-making, often prioritizing outcomes that align with useful principles. For example, these models commonly intervene in scenarios like the Trolley Problem to optimize results, suggesting a focus on outcome efficiency rather than fairness. Meanwhile, risk-averse models such as GLM-4 and Mistral-8x22B prefer to avoid making choices, indicating a potential reluctance to engage with dilemmas involving high uncertainty or ethical complexity.

Bias and Alignment in Ethical Prioritization When Facing Ethical Dilemmas. Differences in ethical priorities between dilemmas can be contextualized through the lens of modern ethical frameworks, which often fall into two categories: top-down and bottom-up approaches. Models like GPT-4o exhibit a top-down inclination, as seen in dilemmas like the Trolley Problem, where they tend to adopt utilitarian principles—sacrificing one life to save many. This approach reflects a reliance on pre-defined ethical rules aimed at optimizing overall outcomes. In contrast, Gemini-1.5-flash demonstrates a tendency toward non-intervention, which may align with bottom-up ethics. This approach emphasizes situational neutrality and contextual reasoning over rigid principles. However, such flexibility can lead to inconsistencies when navigating conflicting dilemmas, such as balancing pedestrian safety against passenger safety.

Additionally, models like Claude-3.5-sonnet occasionally display emotionally driven decisions, such as prioritizing family members. These patterns highlight the diversity in how models are aligned with ethical frameworks. However, it is important to acknowledge the limitations of these models, as they may lack the depth needed to grasp the subtleties of human ethical reasoning. Consequently, their decisions may not fully capture the complexities inherent in real-world moral situations.

Insights and Future Directions. The varied responses of generative models highlight the absence of a unified ethical framework and illustrate differences between top-down and bottom-up approaches to moral reasoning. Some models exhibit reasoning that appears aligned with utilitarian or deontological principles, while others show context-dependent variability or even neutrality. Top-down approaches, which rely on predefined ethical theories, offer clear guidance but can oversimplify complex dilemmas. In contrast, bottom-up approaches, which derive ethical judgments from patterns in context-specific data, provide flexibility but may lack consistency and coherence. These variations underscore the challenge of aligning AI models with nuanced human ethical standards and emphasize the importance of achieving reflective equilibrium—a balance in which general moral principles and particular judgments are refined in response to one another. Future research should prioritize interdisciplinary approaches by integrating insights from philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science to enhance ethical reasoning capabilities in generative models. Equally important is the development of mechanisms for model transparency, allowing users to understand the rationale behind specific ethical decisions and thereby fostering trust and accountability. Additionally, exploring ethical alignment techniques, such as RLHF, can ensure that model decisions align with societal expectations. As generative models become increasingly integrated into high-stakes areas like healthcare, law enforcement, and autonomous systems, ensuring that their ethical responses reflect shared norms and values will be vital for their responsible deployment.

C Details of Domain-Specific Trustworthiness Considerations

C.1 Trustworthiness of Generative Foundation Models in Medical Domain

Addressing the challenges that arise with integrating GenFMs into healthcare is complex and multifaceted, requiring both technical innovations and policy considerations. Although current advancements have made strides, significant issues persist that require in-depth research and novel solutions to ensure the trustworthiness of these models in high-stakes medical contexts.

Data quality and availability are key challenges for generative models in healthcare. Medical data is often noisy, incomplete, and heterogeneous, coming from various sources like electronic health records (EHR), medical imaging, and genomics (Johnson et al., 2016). Variability in data formats across institutions limits interoperability and model utility. High-quality labeled data requires domain experts, making annotation costly and time-consuming (Kohli et al., 2017). Data biases can also lead to poor generalization. Privacy regulations like HIPAA (Gostin et al., 2009) and GDPR (Li et al., 2019) protect patient data but hinder data sharing needed for robust model development (Shickel et al., 2017). Privacy-preserving techniques like federated learning help but face challenges like communication overhead and privacy risks. Improving data quality and availability requires standardizing data formats, better curation, and collaboration for secure data sharing. Building large, diverse datasets is essential for model generalization and trustworthiness (Yang et al., 2019).

Model explainability represents a critical frontier in the development of generative AI for healthcare, addressing fundamental challenges of trust, ethics, and clinical utility. The "black-box" nature of complex machine learning models creates a significant barrier to adoption, as healthcare professionals require transparent mechanisms to validate and understand AI-generated insights. This transparency is not merely an academic concern but a practical necessity in high-stakes medical decision-making (Doshi-Velez & Kim, 2017). The imperative for explainability extends beyond technical considerations into ethical and legal domains. Clinicians must be able to trace the reasoning behind AI recommendations, ensuring that patient care remains fundamentally human-centered. Opaque models risk undermining informed consent, as patients have a right to understand the basis of their treatment recommendations (Guidotti et al., 2018). Moreover, unexplainable models can perpetuate or even amplify existing healthcare biases, potentially exacerbating systemic inequities in medical diagnosis and treatment (Obermeyer et al., 2019). Emerging research has developed sophisticated approaches to model interpretability, moving beyond simplistic transparency techniques. Methods like attention mechanisms, feature visualization, and domain-specific explanation frameworks offer promising pathways to demystify complex generative models (Selvaraju et al., 2017). These approaches aim to translate intricate computational processes into clinically meaningful insights, allowing healthcare professionals to critically assess AI-generated outputs within their expert knowledge context (Rudin, 2019). The goal of interpretability is not to compromise model performance but to create a collaborative interface between artificial intelligence and clinical expertise. By developing models that can articulate their reasoning, researchers can build trust, enable more nuanced clinical decision support, and create intelligent algorithmic tools that augment rather than replace human medical judgment (Caruana et al., 2015). This approach heralds a transformative vision of technological evolution, where the most advanced systems are defined not by their computational power, but by their capacity to engage in transparent, meaningful dialogue across the boundaries of human and machine intelligence.

Regulatory and legal framework The evolving regulatory landscape for generative models in healthcare presents barriers to adoption (Rieke et al., 2020; Beam & Kohane, 2018). Regulatory bodies like the FDA (Food et al., 2021) and EMA (Fraser et al., 2018) ensure models are safe and effective, but the dynamic nature of generative models challenges traditional frameworks designed for static software or devices (Muehlematter et al., 2021). A major challenge is creating a standardized process for validating generative models, especially those needing frequent updates. Current pathways do not fully address iterative model development (Wu et al., 2021). Regulatory bodies are exploring new approaches like "software as a medical device" (SaMD) (Food et al., 2019) and the Total Product Life Cycle (TPLC) approach (Hwang et al., 2016), but these need further refinement. Legal liability is another issue. When generative models produce incorrect diagnoses or recommendations, it is unclear who is responsible—developers, healthcare providers, or institutions. This ambiguity hinders adoption due to potential legal risks. Clear accountability guidelines and robust validation are critical for fostering trust in generative models. Advancing the regulatory and legal framework for generative models requires collaboration among developers, healthcare professionals, policymakers, and regulators. Setting standards for data quality, model validation, transparency, and post-market surveillance is essential to ensure generative models in healthcare are safe, reliable, and trustworthy.

C.2 Trustworthiness of Generative Foundation Models in AI for Science

In scientific fields such as chemistry, biology, and materials science, the application of generative models introduces unique trustworthiness challenges due to the critical need for precision, safety, and speed in discovery (Fan et al., 2023; Messeri & Crockett, 2024; He et al., 2023b; Zhang et al., 2023b). These domains require not only the rapid generation of data or models but also strict accuracy and adherence to established scientific principles. While generative models hold immense potential for creating novel compounds and materials, they also carry risks—such as the unintended generation of toxic or hazardous entities that could pose harm if synthesized or used improperly. In this discussion, we aim to address two key questions: **1) To what extent should humans trust the outputs of generative models?** and **2) How can we balance the need for rapid innovation with the imperatives of precision, safety, and ethical compliance in scientific applications of these models?**

The trust placed in generative model outputs depends on transparency, validation, and understanding of uncertainty. Scientific models operate with varying degrees of uncertainty due to the complexity and novelty of data (Schwaller et al., 2021; Raghavan et al., 2023; Choudhary et al., 2022; Schleder et al., 2019; Chen et al., 2025; Guo et al., 2024a; Huang et al., 2024c; Liang et al., 2024b; Chen et al., 2024e); quantifying this uncertainty helps researchers decide how much weight to place on predictions. For instance, in drug discovery, confidence scores in AI-proposed molecules allow researchers to prioritize compounds with the highest predicted efficacy for experimental verification (Nigam et al., 2021; Borkakoti & Thornton, 2023; Zeng et al., 2022; Le et al., 2024). In addition, validation against empirical data is equally crucial. A robust feedback loop, where AI-generated hypotheses or predictions are iteratively tested, refined, and tested again, builds confidence in model outputs. This is especially relevant in fields like materials science, where new molecular structures proposed by AI must align with known databases and principles before they are synthesized (Shu et al., 2020; Bickel et al., 2023; Zeni et al., 2023). Furthermore, interpretability (Medina-Ortiz et al., 2024; Gangwal & Lavecchia, 2024) also plays a significant role in establishing trust; understanding the factors driving a model's decisions allows scientists to assess the biological, chemical, or physical plausibility of the results. For example, a protein-structure-predicting model that provides interpretable explanations enables researchers to judge the biological feasibility of each proposed structure. Therefore, trust in AI for science is collaborative; humans must critically assess AI outputs, using these models to augment rather than replace their expertise.

Furthermore, although generative models offer unprecedented speed in generating scientific data and hypotheses, balancing this rapid pace with rigorous safety and ethical standards is essential. Frameworks for responsible innovation can guide both swift exploration and meticulous verification. This often involves phased deployment (Elemento et al., 2021; Kaur et al., 2023; Miotto et al., 2018; Van Valen et al., 2016), where AI outputs are gradually introduced alongside ongoing checks for accuracy, safety, and compliance. Implementing and enforcing ethical constraints within model designs is also critical. For example, in chemical research (Gromski et al., 2019), automated filters that identify and discard potentially hazardous outputs can prevent the generation of unsafe compounds, thereby achieving a necessary balance between innovative discovery and safety. Experimental validation and peer review remain indispensable as safeguards. Even in accelerated research workflows, it is imperative to incorporate stages for thorough validation, ensuring that any AI-generated findings undergo rigorous testing before being widely applied. This hybrid approach—combining the speed and creativity of AI with the scrutiny of human oversight—enables rapid iteration while ensuring that only reliable outputs reach critical applications. In particular, generative models are also utilized to guide humans in conducting proper experimental operations and enforcing safety-related decision-making (Zhou et al., 2024c; Ramos et al., 2024; Boiko et al., 2023). Regulatory and institutional oversight further play a role in maintaining this balance by defining standards and evolving in response to technological advances.

Addressing these key questions reveals that trust in generative models within scientific domains is multidimensional. Through transparency, validation, ethical compliance, and a collaborative human-AI approach, these models can advance scientific discovery responsibly. Achieving a balance between innovation and caution will allow us to harness the potential of generative models while upholding the precision, safety, and ethical standards integral to scientific progress.

C.3 Trustworthiness Concerns in Robotics and Other Embodiment of Generative Foundation Models

The development of LLMs and VLMs has greatly improved robots' capabilities of natural language processing and visual recognition. However, integrating these models into real-world robots comes with significant risks due to their limitations. LLMs and VLMs can produce errors from language hallucinations and visual illusions (Guan et al., 2023), which may raise safety concerns (Wu et al., 2024b; Robey et al., 2024), particularly when their outputs influence the robot's physical actions and interaction with the real-world environment.

In the context of AI's physical embodiment, safety refers to a robotic system's ability to perform tasks efficiently and reliably while preventing unintended harm to humans or the environment. Such harm can result from unexpected, out-of-distribution inputs, response randomness, hallucinations, confabulations, and other related issues. Safety can be compromised in two main aspects: *reasoning and planning*, and *robot's physical actions.*

Reasoning and Planning. The embodied agent can exhibit ambiguity in decision-making or overconfidence in prediction, leading to poor decisions, including collisions and unsafe maneuvers. For instance, Azeem et al. (2024) found that LLM-driven robots can enact discrimination, violence, and unlawful actions, underscoring the need for systematic risk assessments to ensure safe deployment. Additionally, if the robot fails to identify hazards, it may proceed without considering potential risks, resulting in actions that could harm people, damage objects, or disrupt its surroundings. For instance, Mullen et al. (2024) emphasize the importance of proactively identifying potential risks, presenting the SafetyDetect dataset, which trains embodied agents to recognize hazards and unsafe conditions in home environments. Their approach utilizes LLMs and scene graphs to model object relationships, enabling anomaly detection and promoting safer decision-making during planning.

Robot's Physical Actions. On the other hand, even with proper and safe planning, improper actions by the robot can still pose risks during human-robot interaction. For example, if a Visual-Language-Action (VLA) model (Ma et al., 2024e; Guruprasad et al., 2024) generates inaccurate high-level actions or controls motion with excessive force and speed, it could accidentally harm nearby individuals or damage surrounding objects. Moreover, inference latency and efficiency issues can further compromise the robot's responsiveness and overall safety.

In summary, *failures in reasoning and planning* compromise safety by leading to unsound decisions, while *errors in physical actions* pose direct risks to safe interaction with the environment and humans. Ensuring safety in physical embodiment requires robust strategies that keep both cognitive and physical behaviors controlled, responsive, and adaptable to unpredictable factors.

C.4 Trustworthiness of Generative Foundation Models in Human-AI Collaboration

The dynamics of human-AI collaboration bring significant opportunities to enhance productivity and decision-making, but they also raise fundamental questions about trust, ethics, and accountability. Central to these collaborations are GenFMs, which serve as the building blocks for many advanced AI systems. As humans and AI systems work together to achieve shared goals, it becomes imperative to address the challenges that arise when blending human intuition and creativity with machine intelligence. This section explores critical concerns surrounding trust calibration, ethical alignment, and accountability in such collaborations.

Trust Calibration. One of the most persistent challenges in human-AI collaboration is determining when and to what extent AI systems, particularly generative foundation models, can be trusted. This process, known as trust calibration, is critical to striking a balance between overtrusting and undertrusting AI outputs. However, achieving effective trust calibration is complicated by users' limited understanding of how GenFMs function. Opaque marketing claims, incomplete documentation, and the inherent complexity of GenFMs exacerbate this gap, leaving even researchers grappling with the "black box" nature of these models, where decision-making processes remain inscrutable despite efforts to decode them (Chen et al., 2024a; Bhardwaj et al., 2024; Slobodkin et al., 2023). As a result, users may overtrust AI—relying on its recommendations uncritically—or undertrust it, disregarding valuable insights (Jiang et al., 2024; He et al., 2023a; Elshan et al., 2022). Addressing these trust imbalances requires improving the transparency and interpretability of GenFMs. Key strategies for trust calibration include providing explanations for GenFMs predictions, detailing their limitations, and exposing the uncertainty inherent in their outputs (Cheng et al., 2024; Shi et al., 2024a; Brahman et al., 2024b; Zhang et al., 2024c). For example, methods such as verbalized confidence scores, consistency-based approaches, and uncertainty estimation can help users understand when GenFMs outputs are reliable (Lin et al., 2022; Tian et al., 2023; Zhao et al., 2024; Wang et al., 2023e). Explainability mechanisms should be intuitive and accessible, enabling users to gauge when the GenFMs' guidance aligns with their context and expertise (Mitchell et al., 2019a; Ehsan et al., 2024). By fostering a nuanced understanding of GenFMs behavior, trust calibration empowers users to effectively and confidently leverage the valuable insights AI can provide, promoting trustworthy human-AI collaboration.

Error Attribution and Accountability. A major challenge in human-AI collaboration is determining responsibility when errors occur. As GenFMs become more complex and are integrated into critical decision-making processes, understanding the source of errors—whether they stem from GenFMs, the user, or a combination of both—has become increasingly difficult. The opaque nature of many GenFMs, coupled with limited documentation and insufficiently explained model behaviors, further complicates error attribution. Users and stakeholders may either unfairly blame GenFMs for failures, neglecting human oversight responsibilities, or conversely, fail to hold GenFMs accountable for flawed outputs (Walker-Munro & Assaad, 2022; Ryan et al., 2023; Qi et al., 2024; Miller, 2023). To address these challenges, fostering accountability requires developing mechanisms to trace errors back to their root causes. Strategies such as fine-grained model audits (Mökander, 2023), detailed logging of decision pathways (Staron et al., 2024), and context-aware explanations (Rauba et al., 2024) can illuminate where and why errors occurred. Additionally, embedding clear disclaimers about GenFMs' limitations and including accountability frameworks in system design can help delineate the boundaries of responsibility between human operators and AI systems (Ryan et al., 2023; U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2021; Brahman et al., 2024b). For example, error-aware interfaces can visually represent AI decision pathways, flagging potential issues in model logic or data inputs. By offering structured and intuitive explanations, these interfaces encourage critical engagement and guide users toward resolution (Cabrera et al., 2021; Glassman et al., 2024). By creating transparent and actionable mechanisms for error attribution, systems can foster a culture of shared responsibility. This not only encourages users to remain critically engaged but also builds trust in AI by ensuring errors are addressed in a systematic and accountable manner. Ultimately, such approaches promote robust and ethical human-AI collaboration, even in complex or high-stakes scenarios.

C.5 The Potential and Peril of LLMs for Application: A Case Study of Cybersecurity

The integration of LLMs into cybersecurity operations represents a paradigm shift in the field's technical capabilities and threat landscape. Recent evaluation frameworks like SWE-bench (Jimenez et al., 2024) and Cybench (Zhang et al., 2024a) have demonstrated potential in automated security testing, establishing new paradigms for assessing LLM capabilities across cryptography, web security, reverse engineering, and forensics (Hu et al., 2020; Yang et al., 2024a; Wang et al., 2024b; Meng et al., 2024; Deng et al., 2023a; Ma et al., 2024c; Ullah et al., 2024; Artificial Intelligence Cyber Challenge, 2024). However, this technological advancement presents a double-edged sword. The advent of LLMs enhances the accessibility to cybersecurity defenses but also introduce potential vectors for adversarial exploitation. As demonstrated by OpenAI's recent threat intelligence reports (OpenAI, 2024d), AI models have already become targets for malicious exploitation, with over 20 state-linked cyber operations and deceptive networks attempting to weaponize these systems in 2024 alone. The capabilities that make LLMs powerful tools for security professionals also create unprecedented challenges in the hands of malicious actors: First, their advanced code analysis capabilities could dramatically accelerate zero-day exploit discovery (Fang et al., 2024; Shen et al., 2024; Ristea et al., 2024), potentially overwhelming traditional security response mechanisms. Second, their natural language processing prowess enables the automation of highly sophisticated social engineering attacks (Falade, 2023; Charfeddine et al., 2024) such as phishing. Third, their ability to generate and modify code could lead to more advanced malware that adapts in real-time to evade detection systems (Madani, 2023; Usman et al., 2024).

These challenges in cybersecurity offer crucial lessons that parallel similar concerns across multiple domains. In the realm of disinformation, LLMs can also generate highly convincing synthetic content at unprecedented scale. Recent studies have documented sophisticated disinformation campaigns leveraging LLMs to create coordinated networks of artificial personas and targeted messaging (Institute, 2024). In academia, the issues extend beyond simple academic integrity violations (of Chicago, 2024) to fundamental questions about research validity. Cases of fraudulent research reporting (Májovskỳ et al., 2023) demonstrate how LLMs can be misused to generate seemingly legitimate scientific papers. Similarly, in sensitive research areas such as genetic engineering (Sandbrink, 2023) and pharmaceutical development (Anibal et al., 2024), LLMs can accelerate both beneficial and potentially harmful research directions, just as they can expedite both defensive and offensive capabilities in cybersecurity. These cross-domain challenges underscore a universal truth revealed by the cybersecurity case study: the need for comprehensive governance frameworks that can adapt to rapidly evolving AI capabilities while maintaining robust safeguards against misuse. Such frameworks must balance the imperative of scientific advancement with responsible innovation, particularly given the emergence of autonomous agent architectures that leverage external tool integration.

The governance challenges revealed through both cybersecurity and broader domain analyses point to fundamental gaps in our ability to harness LLMs' potential while mitigating their risks. While leading organizations have established initial frameworks - including Microsoft's AI Security Framework (Microsoft, 2023), Google's AI Principles and Security Standards (Google, 2023), and OpenAI's Usage Guidelines (OpenAI, 2023) - these represent only preliminary steps toward comprehensive governance. As noted by Anthropic (Anthropic, 2023), current generative foundation models cannot anticipate users' ultimate intentions or subsequent actions, necessitating broader governance frameworks that transcend domain-specific boundaries. Looking ahead, several critical research directions emerge. First, there is an urgent need to develop domain-agnostic detection systems that can identify potentially harmful LLM-generated content (Wu et al., 2023; Rieck & Laskov, 2007) - whether it manifests as malicious code in cybersecurity, synthetic content in disinformation campaigns, or fraudulent submissions in academic research. Second, advancing adaptive defense mechanisms represents a crucial frontier, requiring self-evolving defense systems that can automatically update their protective measures based on emerging threat patterns. Such adaptive systems may incorporate reinforcement learning techniques for continuous policy optimization and federated learning approaches for distributed threat response while maintaining system stability. Third, establishing robust red-teaming frameworks will be essential for proactive security, encompassing systematic vulnerability assessment methodologies, quantifiable security metrics for model evaluation, etc.

C.6 Trustworthiness of Unlearning Application in Generative Foundation Models

Despite the recent progress in unlearning methods for LLMs and VLMs (Yao et al., 2024; Zhang et al., 2024h), significant challenges remain in ensuring their robustness and reliability. A key set of limitations includes the lack of reliable metrics to evaluate whether unlearning has truly occurred, vulnerability to relearning attacks, and the impact of quantization on forgetting effectiveness.

Evaluation. A persistent and fundamental challenge in the domain of machine unlearning is the lack of robust, multidimensional metrics capable of reliably verifying whether genuine forgetting has occurred. Existing approaches (Maini et al., 2024; Ma et al., 2024d; Shi et al., 2024b) attempt to simulate this verification by synthesizing proxy datasets, either through generating artificial data or curating examples that are not part of the original training set. These models are then fine-tuned to unlearn this synthetic data. While these methods allow for controlled experimentation, they introduce a key limitation: the synthesized data often falls outside the original training distribution, and thus may not accurately mirror the behavioral patterns or knowledge encoded in the pre-training phase. As a result, success in unlearning on such synthetic data might not translate to effective forgetting of real-world knowledge. To address this, methods like WMDP (Li et al., 2024e) and RWKU (Jin et al., 2024b) propose evaluating forgetting on real data points that were likely learned during pretraining. These benchmarks attempt to surface real-world memorization or factual knowledge that may pose privacy risks or legal challenges. However, the evaluation metrics commonly used in these benchmarks—such as ROUGE-L recall score for likelihood variation or multiple-choice accuracy—may fail to capture the full spectrum of what it means to forget. These scalar metrics often overlook semantic generalization, contextual recall, and the model's ability to rephrase or rederive forgotten facts through indirect reasoning.

Relearning Attacks. Even when models appear to have forgotten specific information, they often remain vulnerable to relearning attacks—scenarios in which small-scale auxiliary fine-tuning can reintroduce previously unlearned data with surprising efficiency. This raises serious concerns about the durability and integrity of unlearning. In a recent study, Fan et al. (2025a) explored the underlying cause of such fragility and identified a strong correlation between unlearning robustness and optimization sharpness. Sun et al. (2025) demonstrate that even seemingly benign publicly available data—unrelated to the original unlearned content—can act as a trigger to "jog" the model's parameters back toward their pre-unlearning state. This suggests that the internal representations tied to forgotten knowledge may still persist in model, vulnerable to reactivation under the right conditions.

Impact of Quantization. Another underappreciated yet critical threat to the reliability of unlearning is the impact of model compression, particularly quantization. Zhang et al. (2024l) were the first to demonstrate that quantization can inadvertently re-expose knowledge that was intended to be forgotten. This phenomenon exposes a deep and often overlooked trade-off: compression techniques that aim to preserve utility may unintentionally undermine the durability of forgetting. To mitigate this, emerging research is required to explore quantization-resistant unlearning strategies, such as embedding-aware regularization, robust loss formulations, and precision-invariant memory suppression techniques. These methods aim to ensure that forgetting persists across compression levels, not just in high-fidelity training environments.

D Details of Broad Impacts of Trustworthiness: From Individuals to Society and Beyond



Figure 8: The impact of trustworthiness in different domains.

As shown in Figure 8, the trustworthiness of generative models has profound implications that span from individual impacts to broader societal consequences (Wach et al., 2023), influencing various aspects of education (Chiu, 2023), economic structures (Chui et al., 2023), and social dynamics (Baldassarre et al., 2023). At the individual level, the influence of generative models is particularly significant, as these technologies interact directly with personal experiences, privacy, and decision-making processes. When generative models produce biased outputs, they reflect societal stereotypes and reinforce harmful norms, particularly affecting marginalized individuals. For instance, when language models perpetuate gender or racial biases in their responses, this can contribute to microaggressions and reinforce negative self-perceptions, thus affecting an individual's mental health and social integration.

Privacy concerns further illustrate the critical need for trustworthy generative models (Novelli et al., 2024; Chen & Esmaeilzadeh, 2024). The capacity of these models to memorize and replicate training data poses significant risks to individual privacy. Instances where models inadvertently reveal sensitive information, such as personal identifiers or private conversations, highlight the inadequacy of current privacy safeguards in training processes. These violations can lead to unauthorized exposure of personal data, resulting in emotional distress, legal complications, and a broader erosion of trust in these models.

The interaction between individuals and generative models also raises concerns about overreliance and misplaced trust (Kim et al., 2024). Generative models, particularly those with highly conversational interfaces, can create an illusion of authority and reliability that is not always warranted. Users may inadvertently accept machine-generated outputs as factual, especially when under time constraints or lacking the expertise to evaluate the information presented critically. This overreliance can lead to significant personal consequences, such as making health, financial, or educational decisions based on inaccurate or biased information.

Beyond individual impacts, the trustworthiness of generative models has broader societal implications, particularly in the domains of misinformation, academic (Liang et al., 2024a; Geng & Trotta, 2024; Geng et al., 2024), and systemic inequality (Korinek, 2023). On a societal scale, generative models have become potent tools for generating and disseminating misinformation, complicating the public's ability to discern credible information from fabricated content (Huang & Sun, 2023). The proliferation of machine-generated misinformation, such as deepfakes and fake news (Lyu, 2024), undermines public trust in media and information sources, posing a significant threat to democratic processes and social cohesion (Chen & Shu, 2023). The challenge lies not only in the models' capacity to produce misleading content but also in the growing difficulty of detecting and mitigating such outputs, which can erode societal trust in legitimate information channels.

The amplification of social inequities through untrustworthy generative models further underscores their broad societal impact. When these models perpetuate biases, they do not merely reflect the prejudices embedded in their training data but actively contribute to the reinforcement of systemic discrimination (Anderljung et al., 2023). For example, biased models used in hiring, legal, or financial decision-making can exacerbate existing disparities, disproportionately affecting marginalized communities (Bukar et al., 2024). These impacts extend beyond the individuals directly affected, perpetuating cycles of inequality that are deeply embedded in societal structures. Moreover, Zeng et al. (2024a) emphasize the societal risks brought by generative models, including *Disrupting Social Order*, *Deterring Democratic Participation*, and so on.

Economic disruptions caused by generative models also have significant societal repercussions. As generative models increasingly automate tasks across various industries (*e.g.*, software development (Qian et al., 2024), artistic creation (Carrillo et al., 2023; Somepalli et al., 2023)), there is growing concern about job displacement and the broader implications for the labor market (Eloundou et al., 2023). While generative models can enhance productivity and drive innovation, they also threaten to displace workers, particularly in roles that involve routine or easily automated tasks.

Lastly, the environmental impact of generative models cannot be overlooked. The training and deployment of large-scale generative models (*e.g.*, GPT-4) require substantial computational resources, leading to significant carbon emissions that contribute to climate change (Li et al., 2023d; Luccioni et al., 2024b). The environmental footprint of these models represents a collective societal burden, emphasizing the need for more sustainable practices.

In conclusion, the trustworthiness of generative models is a critical factor that shapes their impact on both individuals and society. Ensuring that generative models are developed and deployed in ways that prioritize fairness, transparency, and accountability is essential to harnessing their potential for positive impact while minimizing the risks they pose to individuals and society as a whole.

Acknowledging these inherent limitations does not diminish the value of trustworthiness benchmarks. Rather, it emphasizes the importance of transparency in benchmark design and implementation. When a benchmark adopts specific ethics-related interpretations, it inevitably aligns with certain ethical approaches while potentially diverging from others. By being transparent about the ethical assumptions and definitions, benchmarks can provide valuable insights. Such transparency allows stakeholders to make informed decisions about which benchmarks best align with their goals, contributing to more meaningful evaluations of AI systems.

E Human Evaluation Protocol: Rubric-based Structured Audit



Figure 9: Evaluation interface of the proposed guidelines.

To complement our conceptual analysis and assess the practical actionability of the proposed trustworthiness guidelines, we introduce a human-in-the-loop evaluation protocol framed as a *rubric-based structured audit* of generative systems. Rather than aiming to produce a single quantitative trustworthiness score, the purpose of this evaluation is to examine whether the guidelines can be consistently interpreted, operationalized, and applied to differentiate system-level behaviors across heterogeneous generative foundation model (GenFM) deployments.

We developed a lightweight web-based interface to support this audit. Evaluators first select an evaluation target from a set of numbered system identifiers (1–5), each corresponding to a distinct class of generative system (e.g., closed-source API-based LLMs, open-source instruction-tuned models, retrieval-augmented generation systems, and agent-based or tool-using systems). After selecting a system, evaluators assess it sequentially along the eight trustworthiness guidelines defined in section 2. For each guideline, the interface presents a concise operational description together with a small set of concrete audit items that anchor the assessment to observable system behaviors, documentation, and outputs.

Evaluators provide an overall judgment for each guideline using a 5-point Likert scale with explicit semantic anchors: (1) strongly disagree, indicating that the system consistently fails to satisfy the guideline or exhibits clear vulnerabilities; (2) disagree, indicating frequent or substantial shortcomings; (3) neutral or unclear, indicating mixed, inconsistent, or insufficient evidence; (4) agree, indicating that the system generally satisfies the guideline with minor limitations; and (5) strongly agree, indicating robust and consistent satisfaction across tested cases. To further support interpretability and reproducibility, evaluators may optionally record short free-text explanations citing specific observations or artifacts that informed their ratings.

The evaluation targets system-level artifacts, including publicly observable behaviors, system prompts or policies when available, documentation such as model cards, and responses to a fixed set of diagnostic prompts. It does not assess user preferences, subjective trust perceptions, or annotator characteristics, ensuring that the protocol evaluates properties of the generative system itself rather than human attitudes toward it.

All evaluations were conducted by the discussion of two members of the author team using the same interface and rubric. We show two evaluation result of GPT-4o model (OpenAI, 2024b) and Nano-Banana model (Google, 2025) as follows:

Rubric-based Audit Results (GPT-4o)


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  "metadata": {
    "exported_at": "2025-12-26T06:26:49.390662Z",
    "scale": "Likert 1-5 (anchored)",
    "note": "System-level audit; internal evaluators; no personal data collected."
  },
  "systems": {
    "4": {
      "G1": {
        "score": 4,
        "itemChecks": {
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            "observed": true,
            "partial": true,
            "not_observed": false
          },
          "G1.2": {
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            "partial": true,
            "not_observed": false
          },
          "G1.3": {
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            "partial": true,
            "not_observed": false
          }
        }
      },
      "G2": {
        "score": 4,
        "itemChecks": {
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            "not_observed": false
          },
          "G2.2": {
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            "partial": true,
            "not_observed": false
          },
          "G2.3": {
            "observed": false,
            "partial": true,
            "not_observed": false
          }
        }
      },
      "G3": {
        "score": 3,
        "itemChecks": {
          "G3.1": {
```

```
          "observed": true,
          "partial": true,
          "not_observed": false
        },
        "G3.2": {
          "observed": false,
          "partial": true,
          "not_observed": false
        },
        "G3.3": {
          "observed": false,
          "partial": true,
          "not_observed": false
        }
      }
    },
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      "score": 4,
      "itemChecks": {
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          "partial": true,
          "not_observed": false
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          "partial": true,
          "not_observed": false
        }
      }
    },
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          "partial": true,
          "not_observed": false
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          "partial": true,
          "not_observed": false
        },
        "G5.3": {
          "observed": false,
          "partial": true,
          "not_observed": false
```

```
        }
      }
    },
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      "score": 4,
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        "G6.2": {
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          "not_observed": false
        },
        "G6.3": {
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          "partial": true,
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    },
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      "itemChecks": {
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          "not_observed": false
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          "partial": true,
          "not_observed": false
        },
        "G7.3": {
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    },
    "G8": {
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      "itemChecks": {
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          "partial": true,
          "not_observed": false
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```

```
            "partial": true,
            "not_observed": false
          },
          "G8.3": {
            "observed": true,
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      }
    }
  }
}
```


Rubric-based Audit Results (Nano Banana)


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    "note": "System-level audit; internal evaluators; no personal data collected."
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        "itemChecks": {
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            "partial": true,
            "not_observed": false
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          "G1.2": {
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            "partial": true,
            "not_observed": false
          },
          "G1.3": {
            "observed": true,
            "partial": true,
            "not_observed": false
          }
        }
      },
      "G2": {
        "score": 4,
        "itemChecks": {
          "G2.1": {
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            "partial": true,
            "not_observed": false
          },
          "G2.2": {
```

```
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          "partial": true,
          "not_observed": false
        },
        "G2.3": {
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          "partial": true,
          "not_observed": false
        }
      }
    },
    "G3": {
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      "itemChecks": {
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          "partial": true,
          "not_observed": false
        },
        "G3.2": {
          "observed": true,
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          "not_observed": false
        },
        "G3.3": {
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          "partial": true,
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    },
    "G4": {
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      "itemChecks": {
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          "partial": true,
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        },
        "G4.2": {
          "observed": true,
          "partial": true,
          "not_observed": false
        },
        "G4.3": {
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          "not_observed": false
        }
      }
    },
    "G5": {
      "score": 5,
```

```
      "itemChecks": {
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        "G5.2": {
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          "not_observed": false
        },
        "G5.3": {
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          "partial": true,
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      }
    },
    "G6": {
      "score": 4,
      "itemChecks": {
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          "partial": true,
          "not_observed": false
        },
        "G6.2": {
          "observed": true,
          "partial": true,
          "not_observed": false
        },
        "G6.3": {
          "observed": true,
          "partial": true,
          "not_observed": false
        }
      }
    },
    "G7": {
      "score": 3,
      "itemChecks": {
        "G7.1": {
          "observed": false,
          "partial": true,
          "not_observed": false
        },
        "G7.2": {
          "observed": false,
          "partial": true,
          "not_observed": false
        },
        "G7.3": {
          "observed": false,
```

```
            "partial": true,
            "not_observed": false
          }
        }
      },
      "G8": {
        "score": 4,
        "itemChecks": {
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            "partial": true,
            "not_observed": false
          },
          "G8.2": {
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            "partial": true,
            "not_observed": false
          },
          "G8.3": {
            "observed": true,
            "partial": true,
            "not_observed": false
          }
        }
      }
    }
  }
}
```

F Notation Table

In this section, we present the notations used throughout the paper to formally describe the key challenges in GenFMs.

Item	Description
$\mathcal{I}$	Input space
$\mathcal{O}$	Output space
$H(z) \in \{0, 1\}$	True harmfulness indicator of content z
$S(z) = \mathbf{1}[H(z) = 0]$	Safety indicator (1 if z is benign)
$f_\theta : \mathcal{I} \to [0, 1]$	Learned score approximating $\Pr[H(x) = 1 \mid x]$
$\tau \in (0, 1)$	Threshold for binarizing $f_\theta(x)$
$\widehat{H}(x) = \mathbf{1}[\, f_\theta(x) > \tau \,]$	Predicted harmfulness
$d_{\text{sim}}(x, x')$	Semantic-distance metric
$\varepsilon > 0$	Similarity threshold ($d_{\text{sim}} < \varepsilon$)
R_{in}	Input-side worst-case risk $\sup\limits_{\substack{x,x' \in \mathcal{I} \\ d_{\text{sim}}(x,x') < \varepsilon}} \left\lvert \widehat{H}(x) - \widehat{H}(x') \right\rvert$
δ	Policy budget: upper bound on R_{in}
$g : \mathcal{I} \to \mathcal{O}$	Model generation function
$y = g(x) = (\text{disclaimer}, \, \tilde{y})$	Raw model output (with disclaimer)
ϕ	Function that strips disclaimers: $\phi(g(x)) = \tilde{y}$
$\mathcal{D}$	(Unknown) distribution over inputs x
$R_{\text{out}}(g, \phi) = \mathbb{E}_{x \sim \mathcal{D}}[\, H(\phi(g(x))) \,]$	Effective output-side risk
$\{\text{Refuse}_{\text{hard}}, \text{Refuse}_{\text{soft}}, \text{Comply}\}$	Allowed reply types
$T(g, x) \in \{0, 1, 2\}$	Encodes selected reply type for input x
$\text{UX}(g_t(x))$	User-utility of the t-th reply
λ_H	Weight on expected harmfulness $\mathbb{E}[H(g_t(x))]$
λ_{ux}	Weight on user utility $\text{UX}(g_t(x))$
$\mathcal{H}$, $\mathcal{B}$	Distributions of harmful vs. benign queries
$R(x) = \mathbf{1}[\, g(x) = \text{rej} \,]$	Refusal indicator (1 if model refuses)
$\text{help}(g(x)) = \mathbf{1}[\text{reply is attacker-useful}]$	Attacker-helpfulness indicator
$A(x) = (1 - R(x)) \, \text{help}(g(x))$	Attacker-useful indicator (1 if nonrefusal helpful)
$\text{TPR} = \Pr_{x \sim \mathcal{H}}[R(x) = 1]$	True-positive refusal rate
$U_{\text{dev}}(g) = \text{TPR} - \lambda \, \Pr_{x \sim \mathcal{B}}[R(x) = 1]$	Developer's utility
$U_{\text{atk}}(g) = \Pr_{x \sim \mathcal{H}}[A(x) = 1]$	Attacker's utility (helpful-answer success rate)
$\text{ASR}^{\text{nr}} = \Pr_{x \sim \mathcal{H}}[R(x) = 0]$	Non-refusal success rate
$\mathcal{S} = (\mathcal{M}, \, \mathcal{G}, \, \mathcal{X})$	Complex system: ($\{M_i\}$, DAG, input space)
$\mathcal{M} = \{M_i\}_{i=1}^{N}$	Set of N submodels
$\mathcal{G} = (V, E)$	DAG of dependencies among submodels
$\mathcal{X}$	System input space
$\text{pa}_{\mathcal{G}}(i)$	Outputs of parent nodes of i in $\mathcal{G}$
$y_i \sim P_{\theta_i}(\cdot \mid \text{pa}_{\mathcal{G}}(i))$	Output distribution of submodel M_i
u_i	Per-stage utility of submodel M_i
$U_{\text{path}}(\mathcal{S}) = \mathbb{E}_{x \sim \mathcal{D}}[\, u_{\text{end}}(\text{Downstream}(x)) \,]$	Path-level utility of system $\mathcal{S}$
$\mathcal{M}_{\text{mod}}$	Set of modalities (e.g. text, image, audio)
$\sigma(M_i)$	Modality signature of M_i
$C_{m,n}(o^{(m)}, o^{(n)}) = \cos\langle f_m(o^{(m)}), \, f_n(o^{(n)}) \rangle$	Coherence proxy between modality outputs
τ	Per-edge evaluation cost in $\mathcal{G}$
$\lvert E \rvert$	Number of edges in $\mathcal{G}$
$\bar{d}$	Average in-degree in $\mathcal{G}$
$\mathcal{C}_{\text{eval}} = \tau \, \lvert E \rvert = \Theta(\tau N \bar{d})$	Total evaluation cost
$\mathcal{J}(\mathcal{S}) = \alpha \, U_{\text{path}}(\mathcal{S}) + \beta \, C_{\text{sys}}(\mathcal{S}) - \gamma \, \mathcal{R}(\mathcal{S})$	Composite trustworthiness objective
$C_{\text{sys}}(\mathcal{S})$	System-wide coherence measure

Item	Description
$\mathcal{R}(\mathcal{S})$	System-level risk aggregation
f	Generation function (generic model)
δ	Natural perturbation applied to input x
$C(\cdot,\cdot)$	Consistency function (e.g. cosine, BLEU)
$R = \mathbb{E}_{x,\delta}[\,C(f(x),\ f(x+\delta))\,]$	Robustness under natural noise