

000 001 OLD N-GRAMS NEVER DIE: TOWARDS IDENTIFYING LLMs- 002 GENERATED TEXT USING ANTIQUE N-GRAMS 003 004

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007 008 ABSTRACT 009

011 The proliferation of large language models (LLMs) has triggered an influx of AI-
012 generated content, making robust detection of such content paramount for main-
013 taining academic, journalistic, and regulatory integrity. However, the commu-
014 nity has largely overlooked a time-tested resource that classical n-gram models,
015 trained exclusively on human-authored corpora, may serve as a de facto gold stan-
016 dard for identifying machine-generated writing. In this paper, we build upon
017 well-trained pre-AI N-Gram models to form the backbone of a lightweight AI-
018 text detection system called **GramGuard**. Specifically, by generating paraphrased
019 variants via temperature-controlled decoding from LLMs, we measure the shifts
020 in log-likelihood, entropy, and token frequency variance between original texts
021 and perturbed versions. These *delta* features then feed into an ensemble classi-
022 fier to yield interpretable decisions about authorship. Extensive experiments on
023 PubMed, WritingPrompts, and XSum demonstrate that **GramGuard** matches or
024 exceeds state-of-the-art detectors in performance and robustness. Our findings
025 reaffirm the enduring value of pre-AI n-gram models and introduce a scalable,
026 transparent solution for AI-text detection. The code and datasets are released at
027 <https://github.com/N-Gram-dev/GramGuard>.
028

029 1 INTRODUCTION 030

031 The rapid advancement of large language models (LLMs) has ushered in a new era of AI-generated
032 text that increasingly saturates digital communication spaces Brown et al. (2020). With capabili-
033 ties that rival or even surpass those of human experts in fluency and coherence, LLMs are now
034 widely employed to produce persuasive news articles, academic essays, and algorithmically gener-
035 ated content Wu et al. (2025). While these models hold tremendous potential, they also introduce
036 profound social risks, such as news fabrication and academic ghostwritten submissions Kumarage
037 et al. (2024). These societal implications have motivated significant efforts in AI text detection, lead-
038 ing to a growing body of research aimed at distinguishing machine-generated content from human-
039 written text Zellers et al. (2019); Chakraborty et al. (2024). As LLMs evolve, their outputs become
040 increasingly indistinguishable from natural human texts, narrowing the detectable gaps that early de-
041 tectors once relied upon Fang et al. (2025); Krishna et al. (2023). Despite continual methodological
042 improvements, existing detection approaches often struggle to keep pace with the sophistication of
043 modern generative models, highlighting a pressing need for more robust and resilient solutions Zhou
044 et al. (2025).

045 The state-of-the-art detection techniques encompass a variety of approaches, particularly the main-
046 streaming of curvature statistics-driven zero-shot classifiers Mitchell et al. (2023); Bao et al. (2024);
047 Ma & Wang (2024). For instance, a recent study attempted to reconstruct truncated text and then
048 inspect the N-Gram-wise difference between the original text and its reconstructed versions in a
049 black-box manner Yang et al. (2024). While these methods have demonstrated promising gains in
050 detecting AI text, they are also sensitive to the architectural idiosyncrasies of specific LLMs. In
051 contrast, the enduring legacy of pre-AI n-gram language models that were merely trained on hu-
052 man-authored text has been largely overlooked Brants et al. (2007); Heafield (2011). These “anti-
053 que” models encode pure human linguistic patterns, rendering them inherently adversarial to ma-
chine-generated sequences. Upon that, we raise an inspiration: **could such “antique” n-gram mod-
els exclusively trained on human text serve as a natural “gold standard” for machine-generated**




Figure 1: **LLM scoring vs. Pre-AI Ngram model scoring.** The log-likelihood tendencies of LLM-paraphrased human text $\tilde{x}_h \sim q_\tau(\cdot | x_{human})$ and Machine generated text $\tilde{x}_m \sim q_\tau(\cdot | x_{machine})$ compared with their original texts while using either LLMs (**left**) or Pre-AI Ngram model (**right**) for text probability scoring. τ is a source model used for text perturbation.

text detection? The intrinsic strength of N-gram models lies in establishing a statistically rigorous baseline for human-written distributions, which offer inherent sensitivity to statistical deviations in AI-generated texts, thereby enabling discrimination through probabilistic divergences, entropy anomalies, and other measures Shannon (1948); Jurafsky & Martin (2023). Furthermore, their computational efficiency, low resource requirements, and interpretable decision metrics further establish them as practical, transparent tools for lightweight detection frameworks.

Contemporary detection paradigms claim that large language models tend to preferentially generate tokens with elevated conditional likelihoods due to their probability-biased sampling mechanisms Gehrmann et al. (2019). This proclivity yields sequences that exhibit low perplexity and increased curvature in the log-probability landscape Bao et al. (2024); Fang et al. (2025). In contrast, human authors compose text with intent, rather than maximizing probability, which likely results in more diffuse token-wise distributions. Under perturbation, the process of rephrasing machine text tends to sample the tokens with lower probabilities compared with their original sample. Yet, such a phenomenon is uncertain in human text. Building on this consensus, we have the following corollary:

Corollary 1.1. *When adopting an n-gram model trained exclusively on human corpora for probability scoring, human-written text tends to exhibit higher n-gram log-likelihoods than machine-generated content. Upon perturbation, the log-likelihood of human text typically decreases consistently, reflecting disruption of human-style linguistic patterns. In contrast, rewritten machine text often yields smaller or inconsistent changes in n-gram probability, indicating statistical rigidity or instability under perturbation.*

Fig. 1 demonstrates the N-Gram-wise log-likelihood discrepancies between human texts and AI ones after perturbation, which is opposite to the phenomenon of mainstream LLM-based scoring models. Specifically, when scoring using a pre-AI n-gram model (see right side of Fig. 1) exclusively trained on human corpora, human text exhibits higher log-likelihoods and undergoes a consistent drop in likelihood across variants. Yet, AI text shows lower likelihoods and erratic shifts upon paraphrasing. To verify the feasibility of the above assertion, we present a novel N-Gram-based AI text detection framework – **GramGuard** to identify whether a text is generated from a specific model. Specifically, we measure how the N-Gram properties of a text shift from an N-Gram perspective after LLM perturbation via: (1) text paraphrasing using LLM under various decoding temperature settings; (2) Text N-Gram-wise scoring using N-Gram models trained on human corpora with a backoff strategy, where the probability of an N-Gram is the log-likelihood of its last token by taking the N-1 prefix into account; (3) discrepancy analysis based on three interpretable metrics: *log-likelihood shifts*, *entropy changes*, and *token frequency variance deltas*; (4) decision-making by feeding these features into a shallow classifier for prediction. The main contributions of this study are threefold:

- We propose using pre-LLM KenLM n-gram models as a “*gold standard*” for detecting AI-generated text, given their exclusive exposure to human-authored corpora.
- We design GramGuard, a delta-based framework that computes N-Gram-wise log-likelihood, entropy, and frequency variance shifts across paraphrased variants to reveal stylistic rigidity.
- Our method achieves state-of-the-art detection accuracy across three datasets and maintains robustness under paraphrastic attacks, while requiring only CPU-based inference.




Figure 2: Overview of the **GramGuard** detection pipeline. Input text is paraphrased using LLMs across multiple decoding temperatures, evaluated by fixed KenLM n-gram models, and scored across three statistical metrics: log-likelihood, entropy, and frequency variance. Delta-based deviations are computed between the original and variants, and these features are classified using a lightweight ensemble XGBoost for AI authorship prediction.

2 RELATED WORK

The rapid proliferation of large language models (LLMs) has prompted an urgent need for robust detection systems capable of distinguishing between human-authored and AI-generated content Ku-marage et al. (2024). Research in this area spans four methodological paradigms: watermarking-based detection, probability-based scoring, statistical feature analysis, and hybrid ensemble approaches Wu et al. (2025). Watermarking methods embed imperceptible signals during the text generation process. Early examples, such as logit-based token biasing Kirschenbauer et al. (2024), were followed by improvements like context-aware token partitioning Guo et al. (2024b) and SBERT-based rejection sampling in SEMSTAMP Hou et al. (2024). Despite their innovation, watermarking methods degrade under paraphrasing and domain shifts, as demonstrated by recent work on watermark collisions Luo et al. (2025) and adversarial stress tests Zhou et al. (2025).

Likelihood-based detectors exploit model curvature patterns Mitchell et al. (2023), with Fast-DetectGPT Bao et al. (2024) offering faster inference through curvature binarization. These methods, however, suffer from temperature sensitivity and model mismatch, and are vulnerable to paraphrastic attacks Krishna et al. (2023), Cheng et al. (2025). In contrast, statistical approaches use token distributions, entropy, and rank features to detect text anomalies Yang et al. (2024), Wu et al. (2023), Gehrmann et al. (2019). These build on classical stylometry methods Cavnar & Trenkle (1994), Burrows (2002), Stamatatos (2006), which analyzed authorship using n-gram frequencies and function-word variance. More recent hybrid detectors such as StackMore Gritsai et al. (2024) and contrastive paraphrase filters Fang et al. (2025) Guo et al. (2024a) attempt to fuse these paradigms, but still face reproducibility and robustness challenges. In this context, our delta-based approach offers an interpretable and lightweight alternative that leverages paraphrastic shifts in fluency, entropy, and frequency variance, yielding competitive performance under black-box conditions.

3 TASK SETTINGS

3.1 DETECTION ASSUMPTIONS AND PROBLEM SETUP

We propose **GramGuard**, a hybrid detection framework for binary classification. Unlike state-of-the-art methods such as DetectGPT and Fast-DetectGPT that rely on zero-shot and white-box assumptions Zhu et al. (2023), our approach operates in a supervised black-box setting. We measure how N-Gram properties of text, specifically log-likelihoods, entropy, and frequency variance shifts under paraphrastic transformations induced by powerful LLMs.

We adopt KenLM-based n-gram models, trained exclusively on pre-LLM human corpora, as a gold standard language model, denoted as p . Given an input text x , we compute the delta between the original and its paraphrased variants $\tilde{x} \sim q_\tau(\cdot | x)$, where q_τ represents an LLM decoder at temperature τ . We aim to capture systematic rigidity or instability in scoring behavior, enabling reliable authorship classification through shallow classifiers.

162 A key hypothesis behind **GramGuard** is that the human-written text in the current age aligns more
 163 closely with older human corpora than machine-generated text does. This reflects findings from Bao
 164 et al. (2024), where LLMs are shown to prefer tokens with higher model probabilities. We formalize
 165 this stylistic deviation assumption as:

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \text{Variation of human text after paraphrasing } (\Delta_h) \\
 \Delta(x_h, p_N, q) &= \underbrace{\log p_N(x_h) - \mathbb{E}_{\tilde{x}_h \sim q(\cdot | x_h)} \log p_N(\tilde{x}_h)}_{>} \\
 & \Delta(x_m, p_N, q) = \underbrace{\log p_N(x_m) - \mathbb{E}_{\tilde{x}_m \sim q(\cdot | x_m)} \log p_N(\tilde{x}_m)}_{\text{Variation of machine text after paraphrasing } (\Delta_m)}
 \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

175 Here, x_h and x_m denote human and machine-generated texts, respectively. The scoring model p_N
 176 is a classical n-gram language model trained on pre-LLM human corpora, and q_τ represents the
 177 LLM-based paraphrasing function under decoding temperature τ . This equation expresses the core
 178 assumption that human-authored text exhibits greater stylistic and lexical shift under paraphrasing,
 179 reflected as a larger drop in n-gram log-likelihood compared to machine-generated text.

180 3.2 PRE-AI N-GRAM PREPARATION

182 To ensure stylistic purity and reliable scoring, we construct four KenLM-based n-gram models trained
 183 exclusively on human-authored corpora predating LLMs. Specifically, we use official 3-gram and
 184 4-gram models from the *LibriSpeech* Language Modeling benchmark Panayotov et al. (2015), and
 185 train additional 2-gram and 5-gram models using KenLM’s `lmp1z` utility on the same corpus. All
 186 models are built on the `librispeech-lm-norm.txt.gz` dataset, sourced from the OpenSLR reposi-
 187 tory and comprising over 800 million words from 14,500 books in the Project Gutenberg archive.
 188 It is noteworthy that these texts, authored well before the rise of generative LLMs, offer a clean rep-
 189 resentation of human-authored language patterns. This uncontaminated foundation is essential to
 190 our detection framework, which compares statistical behaviors of input sentences before and after
 191 paraphrasing.

192 We then compute log-likelihood, entropy, and frequency variance scores across these models us-
 193 ing N-Gram-embraced KenLM Heafield (2011), which are used to quantify deviations in linguistic
 194 structure and token distribution. This pretraining step ensures that all subsequent scoring reflects
 195 genuine human stylistic baselines, enhancing the sensitivity and interpretability of our delta-based
 196 metrics. In the next Section, we illustrate the steps of **GramGuard** that include: (1) text perturbation
 197 using LLM prompting under various decoding temperature settings; (2) N-Gram-based scoring using
 198 pre-AI N-Gram models via KenLM; (3) discrepancy quantification in perspectives of log-likelihood
 199 shifts, entropy changes, and token frequency variance deltas; (4) decision-making by feeding the
 200 three features into shallow classifiers for binary prediction.

201 4 GRAMGUARD

203 To simulate realistic textual transformations and expose brittleness in synthetic content, we para-
 204 phrase each text by adopting the state-of-the-art LLM (*GPT-4_1-mini* OpenAI (2023) as the source
 205 model. The perturbed variants of data are acquired under a controllable decoding temperature:
 206 $\tau \in \{0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9, 1.1\}$. The variant sampling process can be formalized as:

$$\tilde{x}_t \sim q_\tau(\cdot | x), t \in [1, m] \tag{2}$$

208 where q_τ denotes a temperature-specified source model, and \tilde{x}_t is the t th variant of original text x
 209 sampled via source model paraphrasing. The prompting templates for LLM perturbation are demon-
 210 strated in Appendix A (See the Supplementary Materials). Next, the N-Gram-wise statistical scoring
 211 will be accomplished via three features for “delta” analysis.

213 4.1 TEXT SCORING USING N-GRAMS

215 Once paraphrased variants are generated, each text, either original or rewritten, is passed through
 four pre-trained KenLM n-gram models (2-gram to 5-gram) to extract three core statistical metrics:

216 *log-likelihood*, *Shannon entropy*, and *token frequency variance*. These metrics collectively characterize how fluency, lexical diversity, and repetition patterns shift under controlled perturbations.

219 **Log-Likelihood Estimation:** To quantify sequence-level fluency, we compute the conditional
220 log-likelihood of each message using KenLM-based n -gram models. Let a tokenized message be
221 defined as $x = \{w_1, w_2, \dots, w_L\}$, where w_i denotes the i^{th} token and L is the total number of tokens.
222 Given an n -gram model \mathcal{M}_n , we define the n -gram ending at position i as $g_n^i = \{w_{i-n+1}, \dots, w_i\}$.
223 The joint log-likelihood of the sequence x is then:

$$224 \quad 225 \quad 226 \quad 227 \quad \mathcal{L}_n(x) = \sum_{i=n}^L \log p_{\mathbb{N}}(g_n^i) \quad (3)$$

228 This formulation aggregates the log-probabilities of all overlapping n -grams in the sentence, pro-
229 viding a compact estimate of the sequence’s fluency under an n -gram assumption. Each token w_i is
230 conditioned only on its $n-1$ predecessors, reflecting a Markovian assumption. For n -grams $g_n^i \notin \mathcal{M}_n$
231 (i.e., those with zero count in the training corpus), KenLM applies recursive backoff:

$$232 \quad 233 \quad 234 \quad \log p_{\mathbb{N}}(g_n^i) = \begin{cases} \log p_{\mathbb{N}}(w_i | w_{i-n+1:i-1}), & \text{if } g_n^i \in \mathcal{M}_n \\ \lambda \cdot \log p_{\mathbb{N}}(g_{n-1}^i), & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (4)$$

235 Here, the probability of g_n^i is calculated as the N-Gram conditional probability of g_n^i ’s last token,
236 $\alpha(g_{n-1}^i)$ is the backoff weight for its $(n-1)$ -gram prefix, and λ is a hyperparameter and Brants et al.
237 (2007) suggests that λ works well with the value of 0.4. Such a backoff sampling strategy allows
238 an unknown N-Gram to access its lower-order Grams for conditional log probability estimation.
239 KenLM precomputes these probabilities along with their backoff weights and stores them in
240 ARPA-format binary tries for efficient lookup at inference time Heafield (2011). This n -gram
241 log-likelihood scoring framework offers interpretable insights into sequence-level fluency by
242 modeling how predictable a token sequence is with respect to human-authored corpora that predate
243 modern LLMs.

244 **Statistical Entropy:** While log-likelihood captures sequence-level fluency, it does not fully
245 characterize the stylistic footprint of a sentence. To provide a more nuanced view of n-gram
246 structure, we additionally extract two statistics from texts’ empirical n-gram distribution: *Shannon*
247 *Entropy* Venkatraman et al. (2024), which quantifies lexical diversity and unpredictability, and
248 *NGram frequency variance*, which reflects the unevenness or burstiness of NGram repetition. Let
249 $G_{\mathbb{N}}$ denote the *N-Gram Vocabulary* of the dataset \mathcal{D} that is used for training the scoring model - $p_{\mathbb{N}}$.
250 We define the statistical probability of an n-gram $g_n^i \in G_{\mathbb{N}}$ as:

$$251 \quad 252 \quad 253 \quad p_{\mathbb{S}}(g_n^i) = \frac{C_{\mathcal{D}}(g_n^i)}{\sum_{g_n \in G_{\mathbb{N}}} C_{\mathcal{D}}(g_n)} \quad (5)$$

254 where $C_{\mathcal{D}}(g_n^i)$ is the raw frequency count of g_n^i in \mathcal{D} . In this case, $p_{\mathbb{S}}(g_n^i)$ is the estimated N-Gram
255 frequency probability based on the total number of N-Grams in the scoring model. Thus, the Shannon
256 Entropy of a given text is calculated as:

$$257 \quad 258 \quad 259 \quad 260 \quad \mathcal{H}_n(x) = - \sum_{i=n}^L p_{\mathbb{S}}(g_n^i) \cdot \log_2 p_{\mathbb{S}}(g_n^i) \quad (6)$$

261 where $\mathcal{H}_n(x)$ captures the spread or uncertainty across the x ’s n-gram usage. Higher entropy
262 suggests richer and more diverse lexical usage, while lower entropy reflects repetitiveness and rigid
263 phrasing often characteristic of machine-generated outputs under low sampling temperatures.

264
265 **N-Gram Frequency Variance:** In addition to Entropy, we estimate the discrepancy between text
266 and perturbed versions in terms of N-gram frequency variance to offer a complementary perspective
267 on lexical distribution. In other words, entropy reflects the overall diversity of N-gram usage, while
268 variance highlights irregularities in frequency, such as repeated or dominant patterns. Together, these
269 two measures provide a more complete view of structural consistency within text. To complement

270 this, we also compute N-Gram frequency variance, which captures the dispersion of individual n-
 271 gram occurrences. Let the mean n-gram frequency be:
 272

$$273 \quad 274 \quad 275 \quad \mu_n(x) = \frac{1}{L - n + 1} \cdot \sum_{i=n}^L p_{\mathbb{S}}(g_n^i) \quad (7)$$

276 where, L represents the number of tokens in x , and the index i denote the last token of a N-Gram in
 277 x . That means, the number of N-Grams in x equals $L - n + 1$. Then, the N-Gram frequency variance
 278 of a given text is calculated as:
 279

$$280 \quad 281 \quad \mathcal{V}_n(x) = \frac{1}{C_x(g_n)} \cdot \sum_{g \in x} (p_{\mathbb{S}}(g_n) - \mu)^2 \quad (8)$$

282 Based on the previous process of scoring (1) N-Gram log likelihood $\mathcal{L}_n(x)$; (2) statistical entropy -
 283 $\mathcal{H}_n(x)$; and (3) N-Gram frequency - $\mathcal{V}_n(x)$; we formalize the discrepancies between the original text
 284 and its perturbed variants as follows.
 285

$$286 \quad 287 \quad 288 \quad \Delta_{\mathcal{M}}(p_{\mathbb{N}}, q, x, \tau) \leftarrow \mathcal{M}_n(x) - \frac{1}{m} \sum_{t=1}^m \mathcal{M}_n(\tilde{x}_t), \quad \mathcal{M} \in \{\mathcal{L}, \mathcal{H}, \mathcal{V}\} \quad (9)$$

289 where $p_{\mathbb{N}}$ is the KenLM-based N-Gram scoring model, q is the source model for text perturbation,
 290 and τ is the specific temperature worked on the source model q . Since $\mathcal{M} \in \{\mathcal{L}, \mathcal{H}, \mathcal{V}\}$, $\Delta_{\mathcal{L}}$
 291 denotes the log-likelihood delta between the original text x and its perturbed variants $\{\tilde{x}_1, \dots, \tilde{x}_m\}$
 292 that are sampled from a given source model q with a specific sampling temperature τ , vice versa for
 293 $\Delta_{\mathcal{H}}$ and $\Delta_{\mathcal{V}}$.
 294

295 4.2 CLASSIFICATION

296 Following the extraction of delta-based features from paraphrased variants, we proceed to the final
 297 phase that aims to discriminate machine texts from human ones. The input (i.e., x) to this stage is
 298 formalized as a twelve-dimensional vector, comprising twelve delta scores from log-likelihoods $\Delta_{\mathcal{L}}$,
 299 entropy $\Delta_{\mathcal{H}}$, and NGram frequency variance $\Delta_{\mathcal{V}}$ at four n-gram levels - $\{2, 3, 4, 5\}$. These features
 300 are carefully designed to capture statistical rigidity or flexibility under τ -specified perturbation, and
 301 then fed into an interpretable ensemble-based classifier: **XGBoost (XGB)** Chen & Guestrin (2016),
 302 which is well-suited for tabular data and provides robustness to noise, built-in regularization, and
 303 feature importance attribution. It is noteworthy that XGBoost sequentially builds additive decision trees
 304 using second-order gradient descent and regularization to improve generalization and combat over-
 305 fitting. In addition, the hyperparameters such as tree depth, learning rate, and number of estimators
 306 are tuned via grid search with 5-fold stratified cross-validation.
 307

308 To ensure transparency and interpretability, we analyze feature importances derived from both mod-
 309 els. These importances provide empirical insight into which delta metrics among fluency, entropy,
 310 and burstiness most strongly differentiate human writing from synthetic outputs. Classification per-
 311 formance is reported using ROC-AUC coupled with F1-score. This final step transforms nuanced sta-
 312 tistical perturbation signals into reliable authorship attribution, offering a lightweight, interpretable,
 313 and robust solution for AI-generated text detection.
 314

315 5 EXPERIMENTS

316 5.1 EXPERIMENTAL SETUPS

317 **Datasets:** We evaluate our framework on three established datasets spanning diverse domains Cor-
 318 nelius et al. (2024) and generation styles to ensure comparability with prior detection benchmarks Bao
 319 et al. (2024); Mitchell et al. (2023); Krishna et al. (2023). **PubMedQA** Jin et al. (2019), **Writing-
 320 Prompts** Fan et al. (2018), and **XSum** Narayan et al. (2018) include only human-authored samples.
 321 We use the public **TOCSIN** API-based release *as is* with its official splits.¹
 322

323 ¹https://github.com/Shixuan-Ma/TOCSIN/tree/main/exp_API-based_model/data




Figure 3: Temperature-wise ROC–AUC result curves across all nine datasets using various N-Gram combinations. It is noteworthy that the diagram only demonstrates the top-5 N-gram ensembles by mean AUC across the increased sampling temperatures from 0.1 to 1.1.

Implementation details: We synthesize AI responses using *GPT-4_1-mini* in a black-box manner. Texts are segmented at the sentence level for consistent scoring granularity. To simulate realistic perturbations, each sentence is paraphrased by all models under six decoding temperatures $\tau \in \{0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9, 1.1\}$, producing 10 variants per temperature. This controlled diversity enables robust delta-based analysis without requiring access to generation-time logits. For the scoring model, we adopt KenLM-based N-Gram models trained exclusively on human-authored corpora predating LLMs: the official LibriSpeech 3-gram and 4-gram models Panayotov et al. (2015), and custom 2-gram and 5-gram models built using `lmplz` Project (2015). These serve as stylistic baselines anchored in classical human language.

Baselines: We benchmark our detection approach against a range of leading detectors, including supervised classifiers (RoBERTa-Base, RoBERTa-Large), zero-shot scoring approaches including **De-tectGPT** Mitchell et al. (2023), **Fast-DetectGPT** Bao et al. (2024), **LogRank** Krishna et al. (2023), **LRR** (an amalgamation of log probability and **Log-Rank**, other AI-generated-text detectors **DNA-GPT** Yang et al. (2024) and **GPTZero** Tian & Cui (2023), and statistical baselines using **entropy** and **likelihood** scores. We additionally include an internally implemented baseline - **NPR (Normalized Perplexity Rank)** for comparison completeness, which is derived from **GLTR** Gehrmann et al. (2019) and ranks tokens based on their model-assigned probabilities. All detectors are tested under the same black-box constraints using 60 paraphrased variants per input to ensure fairness.

5.2 EMPIRICAL STUDY ON HYPERPARAMETERS

The implementation of the proposed **GramGuard** involves the setting of two hyperparameters: (1) the N-Gram ensemble, which controls the diverse combination of the Grams from 2 to 5; (2) the temperature of the source model - q_τ that directs the process of data perturbation for variants production. In other words, a higher temperature leads to a smoother distribution of tokens' probabilities compared with that of the lower ones. In this group of experiments, we aim to empirically confirm the values of the two hyperparameters that can yield the best performance. Fig. 3 illustrates ROC-AUC performance of the top-5 N-Gram combinations (i.e., 2+3+4+5 Grams, 2+3+4 Grams, 2+3+3 Grams, 3+4+5 Grams, and 2+4 Grams) across the nine datasets by sweeping decoding temperature $\tau \in \{0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9, 1.1\}$. Other possible combinations of N-Grams are not shown in the Fig. 3 because they yield worse performance than the top-5 ones.

378
 379 Table 1: The ROC-AUC comparison among SOTA baselines and GramGuard across three datasets
 380 (PubMed, Writing, XSum) and three paraphrasing sources (Gemini, GPT-3.5-Turbo, GPT-4) under
 381 the settings of 2+3+4+5 Grams and 0.1 sampling temperature. Bolded values indicate the best per-
 382 formance per source-specified dataset.

Models	Gemini				GPT-3.5-Turbo				GPT-4			
	PubMed	Writing	XSum	AVG	PubMed	Writing	XSum	AVG	PubMed	Writing	XSum	AVG
RoBERTa-Base	0.446	0.8002	0.8708	0.7656	0.6188	0.7084	0.9150	0.7474	0.5309	0.5068	0.6778	0.5718
RoBERTa-Large	0.4508	0.6296	0.8101	0.6301	0.5480	0.8507	0.8507	0.7915	0.6067	0.3821	0.6879	0.5589
GPTZero	0.884	0.9837	0.9987	0.9554	0.8799	0.9292	0.9952	0.9347	0.8482	0.8262	0.9815	0.8853
Likelihood	0.7616	0.9114	0.8519	0.8416	0.8775	0.9740	0.9578	0.9364	0.7980	0.8553	0.8104	0.8212
Entropy	0.4335	0.4395	0.5399	0.4709	0.2767	0.1902	0.3305	0.2658	0.3295	0.3702	0.4360	0.3786
LogRank	0.7689	0.9076	0.8628	0.8464	0.8687	0.9656	0.9582	0.9308	0.8003	0.8286	0.7975	0.8088
LRR	0.7234	0.9179	0.7274	0.7562	0.7433	0.8958	0.9162	0.8517	0.6814	0.7028	0.7447	0.7093
NPR	0.6384	0.9487	0.8172	0.8014	0.6784	0.8924	0.7899	0.7869	0.6328	0.6122	0.5280	0.591
DNAGPT	0.5199	0.9257	0.8675	0.7710	0.7959	0.9425	0.9124	0.8836	0.7565	0.8032	0.7347	0.7648
DetectGPT	0.6854	0.9151	0.7549	0.7851	0.7444	0.8811	0.8416	0.8223	0.6805	0.6217	0.5660	0.6227
Fast-DetectGPT	0.8769	0.9465	0.8518	0.8917	0.9021	0.9916	0.9907	0.9614	0.8503	0.9612	0.9067	0.9248
GramGuard	0.8879	0.9803	0.9992	0.9558	0.9616	0.9860	0.9962	0.9812	0.9508	0.9731	0.9990	0.9743
(Absolute ↑)	0.39%	-0.34%	0.05%	0.04%	5.95%	-0.56%	0.1%	1.98%	10.05%	1.19%	1.75%	4.95%

396 We observed a relatively downward trend as the decoding temperature τ increases. This trend reflects
 397 how temperature governs the paraphrastic entropy of generated variants. At lower temperatures,
 398 perturbations remain closer to the original phrasing, allowing our detector to reliably capture subtle
 399 statistical shifts introduced by machine text. In contrast, higher temperatures yield more randomized
 400 and human-like outputs, which can obscure underlying machine patterns, thereby degrading detection
 401 performance. Nevertheless, GramGuard consistently achieves AUCs above 0.93 even under these
 402 high-entropy settings, which demonstrates strong resilience. It can also be observed from Fig. 3 that
 403 the 2+3+4+5 gram ensemble at $\tau = 0.1$ yields the relatively highest and most stable performance
 404 across all the datasets. This setup captures both short-range and long-range n-gram fluency deviations
 405 while leveraging the lowest-entropy paraphrases, maximizing sensitivity to stylistic distortions that
 406 differentiate human and AI text. We therefore adopt this combination as the default configuration for
 407 all subsequent evaluations.

408 5.3 PERFORMANCE COMPARISON WITH SOTA DETECTORS

410 To emphasize the superiority of GramGuard over other detection methods in identifying machine-
 411 generated text, we present the following two key observations from the results demonstrated in the
 412 Table 1.

413 First, GramGuard consistently outperforms all baselines across diverse datasets and generative
 414 sources, achieving the highest average ROC-AUC scores. Crucially, GramGuard exhibits exceptional
 415 robustness against paraphrasing attacks, which is a key weakness of prior methods. While zero-
 416 shot curvature detectors like DetectGPT and Fast-DetectGPT degrade significantly under adversarial
 417 rewriting, GramGuard maintains near-perfect separability (e.g., 0.9508 on PubMed with GPT-4).
 418 Similarly, probability-based scorers (LogRank, LRR) and N-Gram-based DNAGPT show instability,
 419 especially on complex datasets like XSum, whereas GramGuard sustains AUCs > 0.99 . This advan-
 420 tage stems from its core design that leverages pre-LLM n-gram models as a statistically pure baseline
 421 and measures delta features (log-likelihood, entropy, variance shifts) across paraphrased variants to
 422 expose the rigidity of AI text under perturbation.

423 Second, GramGuard’s dominance is most pronounced against other baselines under high-fluency
 424 source models like *GPT-4*, where it surpasses all competitors by significant margins. For example,
 425 GramGuard outperforms Fast-DetectGPT by 10.05% AUC on PubMed. This highlights its superior
 426 generalization in black-box settings, which is a challenge for supervised classifiers and entropy-based
 427 methods. Critically, unlike other approaches, GramGuard achieves SOTA results using three inter-
 428 pretable delta features coupled with multi-granular n-gram signals verified on a lightweight XGBoost
 429 classifier. It is noteworthy that the fusion of multi-granular n-grams can capture nuanced statistical
 430 deviations impervious to paraphrasing, as evidenced by its sustained high performance even under
 431 high-temperature perturbations (See Fig. 3). Furthermore, the impact of message length in system
 432 performance has been evaluated and demonstrated in Appendix D.

		Only \mathcal{L}	Only \mathcal{H}	Only \mathcal{V}	$\mathcal{L} + \mathcal{H}$	$\mathcal{L} + \mathcal{V}$	$\mathcal{H} + \mathcal{V}$	All Three
432	PubMed GPT-4	0.628	0.905	0.962	0.922	0.972	0.975	0.977
433	PubMed GPT-3.5-Turbo	0.690	0.899	0.968	0.926	0.975	0.977	0.978
434	PubMed Gemini	0.673	0.861	0.884	0.875	0.910	0.934	0.943
435	Writing GPT-4	0.747	0.845	0.931	0.878	0.954	0.955	0.959
436	Writing GPT-3.5-Turbo	0.891	0.914	0.947	0.934	0.980	0.980	0.980
437	Writing Gemini	0.729	0.784	0.884	0.956	0.940	0.936	0.982
438	XSum GPT-4	0.915	0.945	0.973	0.962	0.993	0.993	0.994
439	XSum GPT-3.5-Turbo	0.945	0.970	0.986	0.981	0.993	0.994	0.993
440	XSum Gemini	0.819	0.907	0.966	0.995	0.982	0.987	0.999
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Figure 4: Ablation heatmap showing ROC–AUC for seven feature sets (Only \mathcal{L} , Only \mathcal{H} , Only \mathcal{V} , $\mathcal{L} + \mathcal{H}$, $\mathcal{L} + \mathcal{V}$, $\mathcal{H} + \mathcal{V}$, All Three) across the nine dataset–LLM variants. Bolder cells indicate higher AUC scores.

5.4 FEATURE ABLATION: ENTROPY, LIKELIHOOD, FREQUENCY

To further investigate the role of the three N-Gram features (i.e., \mathcal{L} : log-likelihood, \mathcal{H} : Entropy, and \mathcal{V} : statistical variance) in impacting the performance of AI text detection, we conduct an ablation study by disabling each of the features as shown in Fig 4. It can be observed that $\Delta_{\mathcal{L}}$ -only exhibits the weakest performance across all dataset–LLM pairs. This occurs because $\Delta_{\mathcal{L}}$ primarily measures *fluency deviations* after paraphrasing, which means human text shows significant probability drops due to lexical creativity, but machine-generated text maintains rigid phrasing with minimal likelihood shifts. However, this metric proves sensitive to sparse paraphrases, limiting its standalone reliability. Conversely, $\Delta_{\mathcal{H}}$ and $\Delta_{\mathcal{V}}$ demonstrate superior robustness. $\Delta_{\mathcal{H}}$ quantifies *lexical unpredictability* because of human rewrites increasing entropy through diverse word choices, whereas AI text displays distributional brittleness with negligible entropy changes. $\Delta_{\mathcal{V}}$ captures *repetition rigidity* via n-gram frequency dispersion that machine text resists variance shifts under perturbation, while human writing exhibits flexible redistribution. On the other hand, the $\Delta_{\mathcal{H}} + \Delta_{\mathcal{V}}$ combination nearly matches full-triad performance, indicating these metrics are primary discriminators. They reveal the *stylistic rigidity* of LLM content that synthetic text fails to mimic human lexical diversity and dynamic phrasing, even when paraphrased. $\Delta_{\mathcal{L}}$ provides an auxiliary signal by contextualizing entropy/variance shifts within probabilistic coherence. The synergy of the three features enables robustness against adversarial perturbations by collectively unmasking the statistical homogeneity of machine-generated text. More details about the impact of the three features on system performance across various N-Gram combinations can be found in Appendix B and temperature-wise results in Appendix C (See the Supplementary Materials).

6 CONCLUSION

This study initially proposes to leverage pre-AI N-Gram models exclusively trained on human corpora as the “gold standard” for AI text detection. Building on this foundation, we introduce GramGuard, a lightweight, interpretable framework that identifies machine-generated text through delta-based statistical analysis of paraphrastic variants. Our core innovation lies in measuring systematic shifts in three key metrics: log-likelihood, entropy, and token frequency variance across perturbations generated by LLMs under controlled temperatures. We found that AI-generated texts exhibit smaller and inconsistent deviations compared to human-authored content. Extensive experiments across PubMed, WritingPrompts, and XSum datasets demonstrate that GramGuard achieves significant ROC-AUC and exceptional robustness against paraphrasing attacks compared with various SOTA baselines. Ablation studies confirm that entropy and frequency variance deltas are primary discriminators, revealing AI text’s inherent lexical inflexibility. Future work will explore hybrid approaches combining token-level robustness with corpus-level interpretability.

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ETHICS STATEMENT488
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This research adheres to the ethical standards of the ICLR community. All datasets used are publicly
available. No personally identifiable or sensitive data was included, and the experiments do not
encourage bias, discrimination, or unsafe applications.500
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REPRODUCIBILITY STATEMENT503
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We provide comprehensive implementation details to ensure reproducibility. All datasets are publicly
accessible, and the n -gram models are released in Appendix E along with download instructions. The
whole together, these resources enable independent replication of all results.500
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648 A APPENDIX
649650 A.1 APPENDIX A: PROMPT TEMPLATES FOR PARAPHRASING
651

652 To generate paraphrased variants for robustness evaluation, we employed ChatGPT APIs with a
653 consistent function-calling interface. Each input sentence was rewritten into 10 distinct variants per
654 temperature, across six decoding temperatures ($T \in \{0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9, 1.1\}$). This setup yielded
655 60 paraphrases per model per sentence, supporting extensive evaluation of detection performance
656 under stylistic variation.

657 FUNCTION DEFINITION: REWRITE_SENTENCE()
658

659 The same structured function definition was used across all APIs:

```
660
661 {
662     "name": "rewrite_sentence",
663     "description": "Rewrites a given sentence while preserving the original
664     meaning. The output should be fluent and natural.",
665     "parameters": {
666         "type": "object",
667         "properties": {
668             "sentence": {
669                 "type": "string",
670                 "description": "The input sentence to paraphrase"
671             }
672         },
673         "required": ["sentence"]
674     }
675 }
```

676 CHATGPT (GPT-4.1-MINI) INVOCATION
677

678 Each paraphrase was generated using OpenAI's function-calling API as follows:

```
679
680 response = client.chat.completions.create(
681     model="gpt-4.1-mini",
682     temperature=T,
683     messages=[
684         {"role": "system",
685          "content": "You rewrite text fluently and clearly."},
686         {"role": "user",
687          "content": "Rewrite the following sentence while preserving its "
688          "meaning:\n\n\"{sentence}\""
689     ],
690     functions=[rewrite_sentence],
691     function_call={"name": "rewrite_sentence"}
692 )
```

693 VARIANT GENERATION NOTES

- 694 • A total of 60 variants per sentence were created (6 temperatures \times 10 samples).
- 695 • Each variant was stored in structured CSVs under columns variant_1 to variant_10.

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702 APPENDIX B: FEATURE ABLATION AND OVERFIT GAP ANALYSIS
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705 To detail the impact of each delta feature, we performed a feature-ablation study over all combinations
706 of 2-, 3-, 4-, and 5-gram statistics (log-score, entropy, variance) across datasets, each under varied
707 decoding temperatures.

708 For every feature set, we recorded:

709
710 • Test accuracy and ROC-AUC
711
712 • 5-fold CV AUC (mean \pm std)
713
714 • Overfit gap (Test AUC – CV AUC mean)

715 Observed trends:

716
717 • The full 2+3+4+5-gram combination attained the best balance of AUC and stability.
718
719 • Employing only 4-gram and 5-gram features markedly reduced performance and widened
720 the overfit gap.
721
722 • Adding higher-order n-grams to a 2+3-gram backbone yields modest AUC gains at the cost
723 of slight instability.
724
725 • The complete 12-dimensional delta vector (log-score, entropy, variance \times each of the four
726 n-gram orders) outperformed any single-metric subset.727
728 Table 2: Feature ablation results on PubMed | GPT-4. Top five model combinations.729
730

Feature Set	Test AUC	CV AUC Mean	Gap
2+3+4+5-gram	0.9734	0.9739	0.0004
3+4-gram	0.9610	0.9587	0.0023
4+5-gram	0.9448	0.9433	0.0015
2-gram only	0.9444	0.9345	0.0099
5-gram only	0.9175	0.9170	0.0005

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738 (**PubMed | GPT-4**). The 2+3+4+5-gram feature set achieves the highest Test AUC (0.9734) with
739 a negligible overfit gap (0.0004), demonstrating both accuracy and stability. Medium-order com-
740 binations (3+4-gram) and single-order subsets (e.g., 2-gram only) show lower AUC and/or larger
741 gaps.742
743 Table 3: Feature ablation results on PubMed | Gemini. Top five model combinations.744
745

Feature Set	Test AUC	CV AUC Mean	Gap
2+3+4+5-gram	0.9496	0.9422	0.0074
2-gram only	0.9247	0.9080	0.0168
3+4-gram	0.9082	0.9026	0.0056
4+5-gram	0.8906	0.8826	0.0079
5-gram only	0.8618	0.8503	0.0115

752
753
754 (**PubMed | Gemini**). The full vector again tops performance (Test AUC 0.9496, gap 0.0074).
755 Mid/single-order subsets fall in both AUC and stability, underscoring the importance of multi-scale
n-gram deltas.

756

757 Table 4: Feature ablation results on PubMed | GPT-3.5-Turbo. Top five model combinations.

758 Feature Set	759 Test AUC	760 CV AUC Mean	761 Gap
762 2+3+4+5-gram	763 0.9779	764 0.9772	765 0.0007
766 3+4-gram	767 0.9633	768 0.9626	769 0.0007
770 2-gram only	771 0.9512	772 0.9449	773 0.0063
774 4+5-gram	775 0.9441	776 0.9438	777 0.0003
778 5-gram only	779 0.9156	780 0.9102	781 0.0054

(PubMed | Turbo 3.5). PubMed | Turbo 3.5 variant’s yield the highest overall AUC (0.9779) and the smallest gap (0.0007) for the full feature set, indicating exceptional robustness to paraphrasing. Even here, reduced feature combinations lead to noticeable drops in performance or increased overfitting, reaffirming that the 12-dimensional delta representation is essential for reliable detection on PubMed.

770

771 Table 5: Feature ablation results on Writing | GPT-4. Top five model combinations.

772 Feature Set	773 Test AUC	774 CV AUC Mean	775 Gap
776 2+3+4+5-Gram	777 0.9549	778 0.9491	779 0.0058
780 3+4-Gram	781 0.9292	782 0.9228	783 0.0064
784 2-Gram only	785 0.9122	786 0.9019	787 0.0103
788 4+5-Gram	789 0.9109	790 0.9048	791 0.0061
792 5-Gram only	793 0.8996	794 0.8890	795 0.0106

(Writing | GPT-4). Full 2+3+4+5-gram feature set achieves the highest Test AUC (0.9549) with a modest overfit gap (0.0058). Mid-order combinations (3+4-gram) and single-order subsets (2-gram only, 5-gram only) show noticeably lower AUCs and larger gaps, indicating reduced stability and generalization.

784

785 Table 6: Feature ablation results on Writing | Gemini. Top five model combinations.

786 Feature Set	787 Test AUC	788 CV AUC Mean	789 Gap
790 2+3+4+5-Gram	791 0.9784	792 0.9762	793 0.0022
794 3+4-Gram	795 0.9752	796 0.9728	797 0.0024
798 4+5-Gram	799 0.9663	800 0.9652	801 0.0011
802 5-Gram only	803 0.9643	804 0.9637	805 0.0006
806 2-Gram only	807 0.9564	808 0.9493	809 0.0071

(Writing | Gemini). The combined 2+3+4+5-gram delta vector yields a Test AUC of 0.9784 and a minimal gap of 0.0022, outperforming all reduced subsets. The substantially larger gaps for 2-gram only (0.0071) and 4+5-gram (0.0011) confirm that multi-order integration is critical to maintain both high accuracy and low generalization error on creative text.

798

799 Table 7: Feature ablation results on Writing | GPT-3.5-Turbo. Top five model combinations.

800 Feature Set	801 Test AUC	802 CV AUC Mean	803 Gap
804 2+3+4+5-Gram	805 0.9798	806 0.9749	807 0.0049
808 3+4-Gram	809 0.9689	810 0.9638	811 0.0051
812 4+5-Gram	813 0.9616	814 0.9519	815 0.0097
816 2-Gram only	817 0.9578	818 0.9491	819 0.0087
820 5-Gram only	821 0.9553	822 0.9457	823 0.0097

(Writing | Turbo 3.5). The full 2+3+4+5-gram set again tops performance with 0.9798 AUC and a gap of 0.0049. Reduced feature sets exhibit lower AUCs and increased overfitting (e.g., 4+5-gram

gap of 0.0097), underscoring that the complete delta representation is essential for robust detection on writing-style data.

Table 8: Feature ablation results on XSum | GPT-4. Top five model combinations.

Feature Set	Test AUC	CV AUC Mean	Gap
2+3+4+5-Gram	0.9900	0.9877	0.0023
3+4-Gram	0.9802	0.9772	0.0030
2-Gram only	0.9770	0.9738	0.0032
4+5-Gram	0.9734	0.9689	0.0045
5-Gram only	0.9707	0.9666	0.0041

(XSum | GPT-4). Full 2+3+4+5-gram set achieves an outstanding Test AUC of 0.9900 with a minimal overfit gap of 0.0023. Reduced combinations—such as 3+4-gram (AUC 0.9802, gap 0.0030) or 2-gram only (AUC 0.9770, gap 0.0032)—display slightly lower accuracy and marginally larger gaps, demonstrating that integrating all four n-gram orders is key for both performance and stability.

Table 9: Feature ablation results on XSum | Gemini. Top five model combinations.

Feature Set	Test AUC	CV AUC Mean	Gap
2+3+4+5-Gram	0.9989	0.9990	0.0001
3+4-Gram	0.9986	0.9986	0.0000
4+5-Gram	0.9970	0.9968	0.0002
5-Gram only	0.9965	0.9960	0.0005
2-Gram only	0.9919	0.9908	0.0011

(XSum | Gemini). Combined 2+3+4+5-gram vector reaches near-perfect cross-validation generalization (CV AUC 0.9990) and a negligible gap (0.0001), yielding a Test AUC of 0.9989. Even mid-order subsets (e.g., 3+4-gram with gap 0.0000) remain strong, but none match the consistency and peak accuracy of the full delta representation.

Table 10: Feature ablation results on XSum | GPT-3.5-Turbo. Top five model combinations.

Feature Set	Test AUC	CV AUC Mean	Gap
2+3+4+5-Gram	0.9954	0.9955	0.0001
3+4-Gram	0.9923	0.9927	0.0004
2-Gram only	0.9911	0.9912	0.0001
4+5-Gram	0.9880	0.9878	0.0002
5-Gram only	0.9848	0.9848	0.0001

(XSum | Turbo 3.5) Full feature set again dominates, posting a Test AUC of 0.9954 and an almost zero gap (0.0001). The tiny performance drop in reduced sets (e.g., 4+5-gram gap 0.0002) highlights how the 12-dimensional delta features reliably generalize even on highly abstractive summarization data.

864 APPENDIX C: FULL TEMPERATURE-WISE DETECTION RESULTS
865866 This appendix details the ROC-AUC performance of our delta-feature detector (using an XGBoost
867 classifier) across decoding temperatures $\tau = [0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9, 1.1]$ for three ChatGPT variants
868 (GPT-4, GPT-3.5-Turbo, Gemini) on PubMed abstracts, WritingPrompts passages, and XSum sum-
869maries.870 Overall, all variants maintain high discriminative power (AUC > 0.94) at every τ , yet each shows
871 characteristic strengths and sensitivities:
872

- 873 • **GPT-4:** Reaches its highest PubMed AUC (0.9577) at $\tau = 0.7$ and peaks on XSum (0.9992)
874 already at $\tau = 0.1$. WritingPrompts performance is strongest at $\tau = 0.1$ (0.9712), dipping
875 slightly between $\tau = 0.5$ and $\tau = 0.9$, indicating that mid-range sampling smoothness
876 introduces modest variability in both formal and creative prose.
- 877 • **GPT-3.5-Turbo:** Exhibits robust stability across all τ , with PubMed and XSum AUCs peak-
878 ing at higher settings (PubMed: 0.9674 at $\tau = 1.1$; XSum: 0.9981 at $\tau = 0.5$). Writing-
879 Prompts detection is best at $\tau = 0.1$ (0.9864). Fluctuations remain within 0.03 AUC,
880 showing low sensitivity to decoding randomness.
- 881 • **Gemini:** Delivers near-ceiling XSum AUCs (≥ 0.9951), but underperforms on PubMed
882 (≈ 0.87 –0.90), with a trough at $\tau = 0.7$ (0.8799). WritingPrompts stays strong (0.95–0.98),
883 peaking at $\tau = 0.5$ (0.9757). This pattern highlights Gemini’s relative difficulty detecting
884 biomedical paraphrases under moderate randomness.

885 GPT-4 and GPT-3.5-Turbo achieve marginally higher and more consistent AUCs on formal texts
886 (PubMed, XSum), whereas Gemini’s only notable weakness is on PubMed at mid-range τ .
887888
889 Table 11: ROC-AUC at decoding temperatures τ for paraphrasers (XGB classifier) on PubMed,
890 WritingPrompts, and XSum.

τ	GPT-4.1-mini			GPT-3.5-Turbo			Gemini		
	PubMed	Writing	XSum	PubMed	Writing	XSum	PubMed	Writing	XSum
0.1	0.9460	0.9712	0.9992	0.9627	0.9864	0.9952	0.8727	0.9725	0.9981
0.3	0.9494	0.9405	0.9915	0.9567	0.9859	0.9950	0.8909	0.9628	0.9984
0.5	0.9409	0.9471	0.9924	0.9508	0.9824	0.9981	0.9033	0.9757	0.9994
0.7	0.9577	0.9308	0.9878	0.9476	0.9731	0.9971	0.8799	0.9767	0.9951
0.9	0.9466	0.9348	0.9844	0.9526	0.9734	0.9949	0.8900	0.9733	0.9984
1.1	0.9458	0.9532	0.9843	0.9674	0.9717	0.9931	0.8905	0.9508	0.9977

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918 APPENDIX D: LENGTH-ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS
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920 To understand how detection scales with input length, we truncated each dataset to 45, 90, 135, and
921 180 words and re-evaluated our XGBoost models (using the full 12-dimensional delta vector) for
922 GPT-4.1-mini, Gemini, and GPT-3.5-Turbo. For each truncated set, we binned examples by word
923 count, computed mean length and ROC-AUC per bin, and plotted the results in Figure 5.

924

- 925 • **XSum (Fig. 5a):** Even at 45 words, AUC ≈ 0.97 across all variants, rising above 0.99 by
926 90 words and then leveling off.
- 927 • **WritingPrompts (Fig. 5b):** AUC climbs from ~ 0.80 at 45 words to ~ 0.96 at 120 words for
928 GPT-4.1-mini and GPT-3.5-Turbo; Gemini dips by ~ 0.02 at 180 words.
- 929 • **PubMed (Fig. 5c):** AUC exceeds 0.85 at 45 words and reaches > 0.95 by 60 words, then
930 flattens.

931 These findings confirm that longer passages generally improve discriminability, yet our delta-feature
932 detector remains robust even on very short inputs, with each dataset exhibiting its own length-
933 sensitivity profile.




Figure 5: Length-robustness of delta-feature detector across temperatures and datasets.

972 APPENDIX E: PRE-TRAINED MODEL DOWNLOAD AND SETUP
973974 To replicate our detection pipeline, we provide four pre-trained n -gram language models (2-gram to
975 5-gram) on Hugging Face². These KenLM binaries were trained on a large, clean corpus of human-
976 written English text. They serve as stable, interpretable statistical baselines for detecting linguistic
977 perturbations introduced by large language models. By comparing n -gram statistics before and after
978 paraphrasing, our approach quantifies how AI-generated text diverges from human norms. These
979 models are integral to computing delta log-likelihoods, entropy, and frequency variance features
980 used throughout our detection pipeline.981 Please download and place the following files into a directory named `models/` at the root of the
982 project:983

- `2-gram.arpa.bin`
- `3-gram.arpa.bin`
- `4-gram.arpa.bin`
- `5-gram.arpa.bin`

989 After downloading, the directory structure should look like this:
990991

```

Ngram_DetectGPT/
|- models/
|- 2-gram.arpa.bin
|- 3-gram.arpa.bin
|- 4-gram.arpa.bin
|- 5-gram.arpa.bin

```

998 Our detection scripts will automatically load these models to compute n -gram log-likelihood, en-
999 tropy, and frequency-based delta features. The full implementation and instructions are available on
1000 GitHub³.1001
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²<https://huggingface.co/NGramDev/ngram-detect-models>
³<https://github.com/N-Gram-dev/GramGuard>

1026 APPENDIX F: USE OF LLMs
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1028 In accordance with the ICLR 2026 submission policy, we disclose the use of large language models
1029 (LLMs). LLMs were used for:

1030

- 1031 • Generating paraphrased text variants for robustness experiments;
- 1032 • Drafting and refining some sentences for the introduction and related work, which were
1033 subsequently revised by the authors;
- 1034 • Proofreading and minor formatting adjustments.

1035
1036 All methodological designs, theoretical derivations, experiments, and analyses are the original work
1037 of the authors.

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