
The Values Encoded in Machine Learning Research

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Abstract

1 Machine learning (ML) currently exerts an outsized influence on the world, in-
2 creasingly affecting communities and institutional practices. It is therefore critical
3 that we question vague conceptions of the field as value-neutral or universally
4 beneficial, and investigate what specific values the field is advancing. In this paper,
5 we present a rigorous examination of the values the field advances by quantitatively
6 and qualitatively analysing 100 highly cited ML papers published at premier ML
7 conferences, ICML and NeurIPS. We annotate key features of papers which reveal
8 their values: how they justify their choice of project, which aspects they uplift,
9 their consideration of potential negative consequences, and their institutional affili-
10 ations and funding sources. We find that societal needs are typically very loosely
11 connected to the choice of project, if mentioned at all, and that consideration of
12 negative consequences is extremely rare. We identify 67 values that are uplifted in
13 these papers, and, of these, we find that papers most frequently justify and assess
14 themselves based on performance, generalization, efficiency, researcher understand-
15 ing, novelty, and building on previous work. We present extensive textual evidence
16 and analysis of how these values are concretized. Notably, we find that each of
17 these top values is being defined and applied with assumptions and implications
18 generally supporting the centralization of power. Finally, we find increasingly close
19 ties between these highly cited papers and tech companies and elite universities.

20 1 Introduction

21 Over the past few decades, ML has risen from a relatively obscure research area to an extremely
22 influential discipline, actively being deployed in myriad applications and contexts around the world.
23 The objectives and values of ML research are influenced by many factors, including the personal
24 preferences of researchers and reviewers, other work in science and engineering, the interests
25 of academic institutions, funding agencies, and companies, and larger institutional and systemic
26 pressures, including systems of oppression impacting who is able to do research. Together these
27 forces influence what research gets done and who benefits from this research. As such, it is important
28 to document and understand the values of the field: what the field is prioritizing and working toward.
29 To this end, we perform a comprehensive analysis of 100 highly cited NeurIPS and ICML papers
30 from four recent years spanning more than a decade.

31 Our key contributions are as follows:

32 (1) We develop a fine-grained annotation scheme for the detection of values in research papers,
33 including identifying a list of 67 values uplifted in ML research. To our knowledge, our annotation
34 scheme is the first of its kind, and opens the door to further qualitative and quantitative analyses.

35 (2) We use our annotation scheme to annotate 100 influential papers and extract their value commit-
36 ments, which reflect and shape the values of the field more broadly. Like the annotation scheme itself,

37 the resulting repository of annotated papers is valuable not only in the context of this paper, but also
38 as foundation for further qualitative or quantitative research.¹

39 (3) We perform extensive textual analysis to understand some of the dominant values: performance,
40 accuracy, state-of-the-art (SOTA), quantitative results, generalization, efficiency, building on previous
41 work, and novelty (§5). Our analysis indicates that while these values may seem on their face to be
42 purely technical, they are nevertheless socially and politically charged: specifically, we argue that
43 these values are defined and operationalized in ways that centralize power, i.e., disproportionately
44 benefit and empower the already powerful, such as large corporations, while negatively impacting
45 society's least advantaged.

46 (4) We present a quantitative analysis of the affiliations and funding sources of these most influential
47 papers (§6). We find substantive and increasing presence of big tech corporations. For example, in
48 2008/09, 24% of these top cited papers had corporate affiliated authors, and in 2018/19 this statistic
49 almost tripled, to 71%. Moreover, of these corporations connected to influential papers, the presence
50 of "big-tech" firms, such as Google and Microsoft, increased more than fivefold, from 11% to 58%.

51 2 Methodology

52 To understand the values of ML research, we examined the most highly cited papers from NeurIPS
53 and ICML from the years 2008, 2009, 2018, and 2019. We chose to focus on highly cited papers
54 because they reflect and shape the values of the discipline, drawing from NeurIPS and ICML because
55 they the most prestigious of the long-running ML conferences.² Acceptance to these conferences
56 is a valuable commodity used to evaluate researchers, and submitted papers are explicitly written
57 so as to win the approval of the community, particularly the reviewers who will be drawn from that
58 community. As such, these papers effectively reveal the values that authors believe are most valued
59 by that community. Citations largely indicate the approval of the community, and help to position
60 these papers as influential exemplars of ML research. To avoid detecting only short-lived trends and
61 enable comparisons over time, we drew papers from two recent years (2018/19) and from ten years
62 earlier (2008/09). We focused on conference papers because they tend to follow a standard format
63 and allow limited space, meaning that researchers must make hard choices about what to emphasize.
64 Collectively, we annotated 100 papers, analyzing over 3,500 sentences drawn from them. In the
65 context of qualitative content analysis, this is a significant effort which allows us to meaningfully
66 comment on the values central to ML.

67 In more detail, we began by creating an annotation scheme (see below), and then used it to manually
68 annotate each paper, examining the abstract, introduction, discussion, and conclusion: (1) We
69 examined the chain of reasoning by which each paper justified its contributions, which we call the
70 *justificatory chain*, rating the extent to which papers used technical or societal problems to justify or
71 motivate their contributions. (2) We carefully read the text of these sections, individually annotating
72 any and all values from our list that were uplifted or exhibited by each sentence.³ (3) We documented
73 the extent to which the paper included a discussion of potential negative impacts.

74 Manual annotation was necessary, both to create the list of values, and to obtain and understand
75 the values present in each paper. Automated approaches, such as keyword searches, would run
76 the risk of systematically skewing the results towards values which are easy to identify, potentially
77 missing or mischaracterizing values which are exhibited in more nuanced ways, or those which were
78 not anticipated. The qualitative approach was key for analyzing the values as well, as it requires a
79 subtle understanding of how the values function in the text and understanding of taken for granted
80 assumptions underlying the values, which methods such as keyword matching would fail to capture.

81 To assess consistency, 40% of the papers were annotated by two annotators. The intercoder consensus
82 on values in these papers achieved a Cohen kappa coefficient of 61%, which indicates substantial
83 agreement [39]. Furthermore, we used several established strategies to increase consistency, including

¹We include our full set of annotations as supplementary material, along with a CC BY-NC-SA license.

²At the time of writing, these two venues, along with ICLR (2013-present), comprised the top 3 conferences according to h5-index (and h5-median) in the AI category on Google Scholar, by a large margin.

³We use a conceptualization of "value" that is widespread in philosophy of science in theorizing about values in sciences. In this approach, a value of an entity is a property that is desirable for that kind of entity. For example, speed can be described as valuable in an antelope [28]. Well-know scientific values include accuracy, consistency, scope, simplicity, and fruitfulness [25]. See [27] for a critical discussion of these values.

Table 1: Annotation scheme and results for justificatory chain (top) and negative impacts (bottom).

Justificatory Chain Condition	% of Papers
Doesn't rigorously justify how it achieves technical goal	1%
Justifies how it achieves technical goal but no mention of societal need	71%
States but does not justify how it connects to a societal need	16%
States and somewhat justifies how it connects to a societal need	9%
States and rigorously justifies how it connects to a societal need	3%
Negative Impacts Condition	% of Papers
Doesn't mention negative potential	98%
Mentions but does not discuss negative potential	1%
Discusses negative potential	1%
Deepens our understanding of negative potential	0%

124 4 Qualitative Analysis of Justifications and Negative Potential

125 4.1 Justificatory Chain

126 Papers typically motivate their projects by appealing to the needs of the ML research community,
 127 but rarely mention potential societal benefits. Research-driven needs of the ML community include
 128 researcher understanding (e.g., understanding the effect of pre-training on performance/robustness,
 129 theoretically understanding multi-layer networks) as well as more practical research problems (e.g.,
 130 improving efficiency of models for large datasets, creating a new benchmark for NLP tasks). Some
 131 papers do appeal to needs of the broader society, such as building models with realistic assumptions,
 132 catering to more languages, or understanding the world. However, even when societal needs are
 133 mentioned as part of the justification of the project, the connection is often loose. Almost no papers
 134 explain how their project is meant to promote a social need they identify by giving the kind of
 135 rigorous justification that is typically expected of and given for technical contributions.

136 4.2 Negative Potential

137 Two of the 100 papers discussed potential harms, whereas the remaining 98 did not mention them
 138 at all. The lack of discussion of potential harms is especially striking for papers which deal with
 139 socially contentious application areas, such as surveillance and misinformation. For example, the
 140 annotated corpus includes a paper advancing the identification of people in images, a paper advancing
 141 face-swapping, and a paper advancing video synthesis. These papers contained no mention of the
 142 well-studied negative potential of facial surveillance, DeepFakes, or misleading videos, respectively.
 143 Furthermore, among the two papers that do mention negative potential, the discussions were mostly
 144 abstract and hypothetical, rather than grounded in the negative potential of their specific contributions.
 145 For example, authors may acknowledge "possible unwanted social biases" when applying the model
 146 to a real-world setting, without discussing the social biases encoded in the authors' proposed model.

147 5 Stated values

148 The dominant values in ML research, e.g., accuracy or efficiency, may seem purely technical.
 149 However, the following analysis of several of these values shows how they can become politically
 150 loaded in the process of prioritizing and operationalizing them: sensitivity to the way that they are
 151 operationalized, and to the fact that they are uplifted at all, reveals value-laden assumptions that
 152 are often taken for granted and may negatively impact the broader society.⁴ We thus challenge a
 153 conception of prevalent values as politically neutral by considering alternatives to their dominant
 154 conceptualization that may be equally or more intellectually interesting or more socially beneficial.
 155 We have encouraged ourselves, and now encourage the reader, to remember that values once held to
 156 be intrinsic, obvious, or definitional have been in many cases transformed over time.

⁴Similar points have been made by philosophers of science in the context of the natural and social sciences [25] [27].

Table 2: Random examples of *performance*, the most common emergent value.

"Our model significantly outperforms SVM's, and it also outperforms convolutional neural nets when given additional unlabeled data produced by small translations of the training images."

"We show in simulations on synthetic examples and on the IEDB MHC-I binding dataset, that our approach outperforms well-known convex methods for multi-task learning, as well as related non-convex methods dedicated to the same problem."

"Furthermore, the learning accuracy and performance of our LGP approach will be compared with other important standard methods in Section 4, e.g., LWPR [8], standard GPR [1], sparse online Gaussian process regression (OGP) [5] and v -support vector regression (v -SVR) [11], respectively."

157 To provide a sense of what the values we discuss look like in context, we include three randomly
158 selected examples of sentences annotated for each (Tables 2-5), with additional examples in the
159 Appendix. Note that most sentences are annotated with multiple values, but this is not shown here.⁵

160 5.1 Performance

161 Performance, accuracy, and achieving SOTA form the most common cluster of related values in
162 annotated papers. While it might seem intrinsic for the field to care about performance, it is important
163 to remember that models are not simply "well-performing" or "accurate" in the abstract but always
164 in relation to and as *quantified* by some metric on some dataset. Examining prevalent choices of
165 operationalization reveals political aspects of performance values. First, we find that performance
166 values are consistently and unquestioningly operationalized as correctness averaged across individual
167 predictions, giving equal weight to each instance. However, choosing to use equal weights when
168 averaging is a value-laden move which might deprioritize those underrepresented in the data or
169 world, as well as societal and evaluatee needs and preferences. Extensive research in ML fairness and
170 related fields has considered alternatives, but we found no such discussions among the most-cited
171 papers we examined.

172 Choices of datasets are revealing. They are often driven purely by past work, so as to demonstrate
173 improvement over a previous baseline (see also §5.4). Another common justification for using a
174 certain dataset is applicability to the "real world". Assumptions about how to characterize the real
175 world may also be value-laden. One common assumption is the availability of very large datasets.
176 However, presupposing the availability of large datasets is power centralizing because it encodes
177 favoritism to those with resources to obtain and process them [15]. Further overlooked assumptions
178 include that the real world is binary or discrete, and that datasets come with a predefined ground-truth
179 label for each example, presuming that a true label always exists "out there" independent of those
180 carving it out, defining and labelling it. This contrasts against marginalized scholars' calls for
181 ML models that allow for non-binaries, plural truths, contextual truths, and many ways of being
182 [12, 18, 26].

183 The prioritization of performance values also requires scrutiny. Valuing these properties is so
184 entrenched in the field that generic success terms, such as "success", "progress", or "improvement"
185 are often used as synonyms for performance and accuracy. However, one might alternatively invoke
186 generic success to mean increasingly safe, consensual, or participatory ML that reckons with impacted
187 communities and the environment. In fact, "performance" itself is a general success term that could
188 have been associated with properties other than accuracy and SOTA.

189 5.2 Generalization

190 A common way of appraising the merits of one's work in ML is to claim that it generalizes well.
191 Typically, generalization is understood in terms of performance or accuracy: a model generalizes when
192 it achieves good performance on a range of samples, datasets, domains, or applications. Uplifting
193 generalization raises two kinds of questions. First, which datasets, domains, or applications show that
194 the model generalizes well? Typically, a paper shows that a model generalizes by showing that it
195 performs well on multiple tasks or datasets. However, the choice of particular tasks and datasets is

⁵To avoid the impression that there is anything unusual or special about these randomly chosen example sentences, we omit attribution, but include a list of all annotated papers in the Appendix.

Table 3: Random examples of *generalization*, the third most common emergent value.

"The range of applications that come with generative models are vast, where audio synthesis [55] and semi-supervised classification [38, 31, 44] are examples hereof."
"Furthermore, the infinite limit could conceivably make sense in deep learning, since over-parametrization seems to help optimization a lot and doesn't hurt generalization much [Zhang et al., 2017]: deep neural nets with millions of parameters work well even for datasets with 50k training examples."
"Combining the optimization and generalization results, we uncover a broad class of learnable functions, including linear functions, two-layer neural networks with polynomial activation $\phi(z) = z^{2l}$ or cosine activation, etc."

Table 4: Random examples of *efficiency*, the fourth most common emergent value.

"Our model allows for controllable yet efficient generation of an entire news article – not just the body, but also the title, news source, publication date, and author list."
"We show that Bayesian PMF models can be efficiently trained using Markov chain Monte Carlo methods by applying them to the Netflix dataset, which consists of over 100 million movie ratings."
"In particular, our EfficientNet-B7 surpasses the best existing GPipe accuracy (Huang et al., 2018), but using 8.4x fewer parameters and running 6.1x faster on inference."

196 rarely justified; the choice of tasks can often seem arbitrary, and authors rarely present evidence that
 197 their results will generalize to more realistic settings, or help to directly address societal needs.

198 Second, uplifting generalization itself reveals substantive assumptions. The prizing of generalization
 199 means that there is an incentive to harvest many datasets from a variety of domains, and to treat
 200 these as the only datasets that matter for that space of problems. Generalization thus prioritizes
 201 distilling every scenario down to a common set of representations or affordances, rather than treating
 202 each setting as unique. Critical scholars have advocated for valuing *context*, which stands at the
 203 opposite side of striving for generalization [14]. Others have argued that this kind of totalizing lens
 204 (in which model developers have unlimited power to determine how the world is represented) leads
 205 to *representational harms*, due to applying a single representational framework to everything [13, 1].

206 Finally, the belief that generalization is even possible implicitly assumes a conservative approach
 207 in which new data will be sufficiently similar to previously seen data. When used in the context of
 208 ML, the assumption that the future resembles the past is also normative and often problematic as past
 209 societal stereotypes and injustice can be encoded in the process [33]. Furthermore, to the extent that
 210 predictions are performative [35], especially predictions that are enacted, those ML models which are
 211 deployed to the world will contribute to shaping social patterns. Yet, no papers attempt to counteract
 212 this quality or acknowledge its presence.

213 5.3 Efficiency

214 Efficiency is another common value in ML research. Abstractly, saying that a model is efficient
 215 typically means saying that the model uses less of some resource, such as time, memory, energy,
 216 or number of labeled examples. In practice however, efficiency is commonly referenced to imply
 217 scalability: a more efficient inference method allows you to do inference in much larger models or
 218 on larger datasets, using the same amount of resources. This is reflected in our value annotations,
 219 where 72% of papers mention valuing efficiency, but only 14% of those value requiring *few* resources.
 220 In this way, valuing efficiency facilitates and encourages the most powerful actors to scale up their
 221 computation to ever higher orders of magnitude, making their models even less accessible to those
 222 without resources to use them and decreasing the ability to compete with them. Alternative usages of
 223 efficiency could encode accessibility instead of scalability, aiming to create more equitable conditions
 224 for ML research.

225 5.4 Novelty and Building on Past Work

226 Most authors devote space in the introduction to positioning their paper in relation to past work, and
 227 describing what is novel. Mentioning past work serves to signal awareness of related publications, to

Table 5: Random examples of *building on past work* and *novelty*, the second and sixth most common emergent values, respectively.

Building on past work
"Recent work points towards sample complexity as a possible reason for the small gains in robustness: Schmidt et al. [41] show that in a simple model, learning a classifier with non-trivial adversarially robust accuracy requires substantially more samples than achieving good 'standard' accuracy."
"Experiments indicate that our method is much faster than state of the art solvers such as Pegasos, TRON, SVMperf, and a recent primal coordinate descent implementation."
"There is a large literature on GP (response surface) optimization."
Novelty
"In this paper, we propose a video-to-video synthesis approach under the generative adversarial learning framework."
"Third, we propose a novel method for the listwise approach, which we call ListMLE."
"The distinguishing feature of our work is the use of Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods for approximate inference in this model."




Figure 2: Corporate and Big Tech author affiliations.

228 establish the new work as relevant to the community, and to provide the basis upon which to make
 229 claims about what is new. Novelty is sometimes suggested implicitly (e.g., "we develop" or "we
 230 propose"), but frequently it is emphasized explicitly (e.g. "a new algorithm" or "a novel approach").

231 This combined focus on novelty and building on recent work establishes a continuity of ideas, and
 232 might be expected to contribute to the self-correcting nature of science [29]. However, this is not
 233 always the case [21] and attention to the ways novelty and building on past work are implemented
 234 reveals value commitments. In particular, we find a clear emphasis on technical novelty, rather
 235 than critique of past work, or demonstration of measurable progress on societal problems, as has
 236 previously been observed [40]. Although introductions sometimes point out limitations of past work
 237 (so as to further emphasize the contributions of their own paper), they are rarely explicitly critical
 238 of other papers in terms of methods or goals. Indeed, papers uncritically reuse the same datasets
 239 for years or decades to benchmark their algorithms, even if those datasets fail to represent more
 240 realistic contexts in which their algorithms will be used [6]. Novelty is denied to work that rectifies
 241 socially harmful aspects of existing datasets in tandem with strong pressure to benchmark on them
 242 and thereby perpetuate their use, enforcing a fundamentally conservative bent to ML research.

243 6 Corporate Affiliations and Funding

244 Our analysis shows substantive and increasing corporate presence in the most highly-cited papers. In
 245 2008/09, 24% of the top cited papers had corporate affiliated authors, and in 2018/19 this statistic
 246 almost tripled, to 71%. Furthermore, we also find a much greater concentration of a few large tech
 247 firms, such as Google and Microsoft, with the presence of these "big tech" firms [4] increasing
 248 more than fivefold, from 11% to 58% (see Figure 2). The number of most influential papers with
 249 corporate ties, by author affiliation or funding, published dramatically increased from 43% in 2008/09
 250 to 79% in 2018/19. In addition, we found paramount domination of elite universities in our analysis
 251 as shown in Figure 3. Of the total papers with university affiliations, we found 82% were from
 252 elite universities (defined as the top 50 universities by QS World University Rankings, following




Figure 3: Corporate affiliations and funding ties. Non-N.A. Universities are those outside the U.S. and Canada.

253 past work [4]). These findings are consistent with previous work indicating a pronounced corporate
 254 presence in ML research. In an analysis of 171,394 peer-reviewed papers from 57 major computer
 255 science conferences, Ahmed and Wahed [4] show that the share of papers that have at least one
 256 corporate affiliated co-author increased from 10% in 2005 for both ICML and NeurIPS to 30% and
 257 35% respectively in 2019. Our analysis shows that corporate presence is even more pronounced in
 258 those papers from ICML and NeurIPS that end up receiving the most citations.

259 The influence of powerful players in ML research is consistent with field-wide value commitments
 260 that centralize power. Others have also argued for causal connections. For example, Abdalla and
 261 Abdalla [2] argue that the strategies that big tech uses to sway and influence academic and public
 262 discourse, closely resemble that of Big Tobacco. Moreover, examining the prevalent values of
 263 big tech, critiques have repeatedly pointed out that objectives such as efficiency, scale, and wealth
 264 accumulation [33, 34, 19] drive the industry at large, often at the expense of individuals rights, respect
 265 for persons, consideration of negative impacts, beneficence, and justice. The top stated values of ML
 266 that we presented in this paper such as performance, generalization, and efficiency not only enable
 267 and facilitate the realization of big tech’s objectives, they also suppress values such as beneficence,
 268 justice, and inclusion. A "state-of-the-art" large image dataset, for example, is instrumental for
 269 large scale models, further benefiting ML researchers and big tech in possession of huge computing
 270 power. A large image dataset that considers negative consequences and is built on the foundations
 271 of individual rights and respect for persons, on the other hand, is one that would start with gaining
 272 informed consent from the data subject and is considerate of contextual norms over scalability [19].
 273 However, in the current climate where values such as efficiency and scale are a priority, informed
 274 consent is perceived as costly and time consuming, evading social needs.

275 7 Discussion

276 ML research is often perceived as value-neutral, and emphasis is placed on positive applications
 277 or potential. This fits into a historical strain of thinking which has tended to frame technology as
 278 "neutral", based on the notion that new technologies can be unpredictably applied for both beneficial
 279 and harmful purposes [43]. Ironically, this claim of neutrality frequently serves as an insulation
 280 from critiques of AI and as a permission to emphasize the benefits of AI [38, 41]. Although it is
 281 rare to see anyone explicitly argue in print that ML is neutral, related ideas are part of contempo-
 282 rary conversation, including these canonical claims: long term impacts are too difficult to predict;
 283 sociological impacts are outside the expertise or purview of ML researchers [20]; critiques of AI
 284 are really misdirected critiques of those deploying AI with bad data ("garbage in, garbage out"),
 285 again outside the purview of many AI researchers; and proposals such as broader impact statements
 286 represent merely a "bureaucratic constraint" [3]. A recent qualitative analysis of broader impact
 287 statements from NeurIPS 2020 similarly observed that these statements leaned towards positive
 288 consequences (often mentioning negative consequences only briefly and in some cases not at all),
 289 emphasized uncertainty about how a technology might be used, or simply omit any discussion of
 290 societal consequences altogether [31].

291 Importantly, there is a foundational understanding in Science, Technology, and Society Studies
 292 (STSS), Critical Theory, and Philosophy of Science that science and technologies are inherently
 293 value-laden, and these values are encoded in technological artifacts, many times in contrast to a field’s
 294 formal research criteria, espoused consequences, or ethics guidelines [44, 10, 8]. There is a long

295 tradition of exposing and critiquing such values in technology and computer science. Foundationally,
296 Winner [44] introduced several ways technology can encode political values. This work is closely
297 related to Rogaway [37], who notes that cryptography has political and moral dimensions and argues
298 for a cryptography that better addresses societal needs. Weizenbaum [42] argued in 1976 that the
299 computer has from the beginning been a fundamentally conservative force which solidified existing
300 power. In place of fundamental social changes, the computer renders technical solutions that allow
301 existing power hierarchies to remain intact.

302 Our paper extends these critiques to the field of ML. It is a part of a rich space of interdisciplinary
303 critiques and alternative lenses used to examine the field. Works such as [30, 9] critique AI, ML, and
304 data using a decolonial lens, noting how these technologies replicate colonial power relationships
305 and values, and propose decolonial values and methods. Others [8, 32, 14] examine technology and
306 data science from an anti-racist and intersectional feminist lens, discussing how our infrastructure
307 has largely been built by and for white men; D’Ignazio and Klein [14] present a set of alternative
308 principles and methodologies for an intersectional feminist data science. Similarly, Kalluri [22]
309 denotes that the core values of ML are closely aligned with the values of the most privileged and
310 outlines a vision where ML models are used to shift power from the most to the least powerful. Dotan
311 and Milli [15] argue that the rise of deep learning is value-laden, promoting the centralization of
312 power among other political values. Many researchers, as well as organizations such as Data for
313 Black Lives, the Algorithmic Justice League, Indigenous AI, Black in AI, and Queer in AI, work on
314 continuing to uncover particular ways technology in general and ML in particular can encode and
315 amplify racist, sexist, queerphobic, transphobic, and otherwise marginalizing values [11, 36].

316 We present this work in part in order to expose the contingency of the present state of the field; it could
317 be otherwise. For individuals, communities, and institutions wading through difficult-to-pin-down
318 values of the field, as well as those striving toward alternative values, it is a useful tool to have a
319 characterization of the way the field is now, for understanding, shaping, dismantling, or transforming
320 what is, and for articulating and bringing about alternative visions.

321 As with all methods, our chosen approach (careful reading of important sections of highly-cited
322 papers) has limitations. Most notably, this approach does not automatically scale or generalize to
323 other data, which limits our ability to draw strong conclusions about other conferences or different
324 years. Similarly, this approach is less reproducible than fully automated approaches, and for both
325 our final list of values and specific annotation of individual sentences, different researchers might
326 make somewhat different choices. However, given the overwhelming presence of certain values, the
327 high agreement rate among annotators, and the similarity of observations made by our team, we
328 strongly believe other researchers taking a similar approach would reach similar conclusions about
329 what values are most frequently uplifted by the most influential papers in this field. Lastly, we cannot
330 claim to have identified every relevant value in ML. However, by including important ethical values
331 identified by past work, and specifically looking for these, we can confidently assert their relative
332 absence in this set of papers, which we take to be representative of influential work in ML.

333 8 Conclusion and Future Work

334 We reject the vague conceptualization of the discipline of ML as value-neutral. Instead, we argue
335 that the discipline of ML is inherently value-laden. Our analysis of highly influential papers in the
336 discipline shows that the discipline not only favors the needs of research communities and large firms
337 over broader social needs, but also that it takes this favoritism for granted. The favoritism manifests
338 in the choice of projects, the lack of consideration of potential negative impacts, and the prioritization
339 and operationalization of values such as accuracy, generalization, efficiency, and novelty. All of
340 these overwhelmingly disfavor societal needs, usually without any discussion or acknowledgment.
341 Moreover, we uncover an overwhelming and increasing presence of big tech and elite universities in
342 highly cited papers, which is consistent with a system of power-centralizing value-commitments.

343 The upshot is that the discipline of ML is not value-neutral. It is socially and politically loaded,
344 valuing and promoting conservative needs at the cost of individuals rights, respect for persons and
345 justice; it increasingly concentrates power in the hands of few already powerful actors; it poses
346 a threat to society’s most marginalized by neglecting the potential harms of socially contentious
347 applications of ML.

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438 **Checklist**

- 439 1. For all authors...
- 440 (a) Do the main claims made in the abstract and introduction accurately reflect the paper's
441 contributions and scope? [Yes]
- 442 (b) Did you describe the limitations of your work? [Yes] See Discussion.
- 443 (c) Did you discuss any potential negative societal impacts of your work? [Yes] Included
444 in the Appendix.
- 445 (d) Have you read the ethics review guidelines and ensured that your paper conforms to
446 them? [Yes]
- 447 2. If you are including theoretical results...
- 448 (a) Did you state the full set of assumptions of all theoretical results? [N/A]
- 449 (b) Did you include complete proofs of all theoretical results? [N/A]
- 450 3. If you ran experiments...
- 451 (a) Did you include the code, data, and instructions needed to reproduce the main exper-
452 imental results (either in the supplemental material or as a URL)? [Yes] Included in
453 supplementary zipfile for experiments in appendix.
- 454 (b) Did you specify all the training details (e.g., data splits, hyperparameters, how they
455 were chosen)? [Yes] Included in appendix.
- 456 (c) Did you report error bars (e.g., with respect to the random seed after running experi-
457 ments multiple times)? [No]
- 458 (d) Did you include the total amount of compute and the type of resources used (e.g., type
459 of GPUs, internal cluster, or cloud provider)? [Yes] Included in appendix.
- 460 4. If you are using existing assets (e.g., code, data, models) or curating/releasing new assets...
- 461 (a) If your work uses existing assets, did you cite the creators? [Yes] Full listing of
462 annotated papers is given in the appendix.
- 463 (b) Did you mention the license of the assets? [Yes] See Footnote 1.
- 464 (c) Did you include any new assets either in the supplemental material or as a URL? [Yes]
465 Included in supplementary zipfile.
- 466 (d) Did you discuss whether and how consent was obtained from people whose data you're
467 using/curating? [Yes] Discussed in Appendix A.2. Additional Methodological Details.
- 468 (e) Did you discuss whether the data you are using/curating contains personally identifiable
469 information or offensive content? [Yes] Discussed in Appendix A.2. Additional
470 Methodological Details.
- 471 5. If you used crowdsourcing or conducted research with human subjects...
- 472 (a) Did you include the full text of instructions given to participants and screenshots, if
473 applicable? [N/A]
- 474 (b) Did you describe any potential participant risks, with links to Institutional Review
475 Board (IRB) approvals, if applicable? [N/A]
- 476 (c) Did you include the estimated hourly wage paid to participants and the total amount
477 spent on participant compensation? [N/A]