SOUND PROBABILISTIC SAFETY BOUNDS FOR LARGE LANGUAGE MODELS

Anonymous authors

 Paper under double-blind review

ABSTRACT

We introduce a novel framework for computing rigorous bounds on the probability that a given prompt to a large language model (LLM) generates harmful outputs. We study the applications of classical Clopper–Pearson confidence intervals to derive probably approximately correct (PAC) bounds for this problem and discuss their limitations. As our main contribution, we propose an algorithm that analyses features in the latent space to prioritize the exploration of branches in the autoregressive generation procedure that are more likely to produce harmful outputs. This approach enables the efficient computation of formal guarantees even in scenarios where the true probability of harmfulness is extremely small. Our experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of the method by computing non-trivial lower bounds for state-of-the-art LLMs.

1 Introduction

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into diverse domains ranging from search and dialogue systems to high-stakes applications such as autonomous driving, healthcare diagnostics, and aviation. While their generative capabilities offer unprecedented opportunities, their deployment in safety-critical settings have raised concerns about reliability and safety. Even rare unexpected behaviors can lead to severe consequences, making it essential to provide rigorous guarantees of safety properties. However, verifying and certifying such properties is especially challenging for LLMs, which are large, opaque, hard to interpret, and inherently probabilistic.

A central research direction for improving LLM behavior is *alignment* (Wang et al., 2024; Ouyang et al., 2022). Alignment techniques, such as reinforcement learning from human feedback (Chaudhari et al., 2024) aim to shape models so that their outputs are consistent with human intentions and ethical constraints. While alignment significantly reduces the frequency of undesired outputs, it cannot eliminate risk nor provide guarantees about the absence of harmful behavior. In particular, even after alignment, there remains a small but non-zero probability of undesired responses.

In parallel, the field of *formal methods* provides algorithmic techniques for rigorously certifying that systems satisfy well-defined specifications. These techniques, widely applied in control and verification of stochastic dynamical systems (SDSs) (Baier & Katoen, 2008; Lavaei et al., 2022), are typically based on a (partially known) model of the system, which relates input sequences to output sequences over time. They are designed to reason about probabilistic transitions and to certify safety against harmful outcomes. Unfortunately, existing formal verification techniques are not readily applicable to LLMs due to their extremely high-dimensional inputs and outputs, their stochastic autoregressive generation mechanism, and the potentially small probabilities of harmful behaviors (Zhang et al., 2025).

Recent empirical work has started to address this gap. For example, Wu & Hilton (2025) and Jones et al. (2025) estimate the probability of LLMs producing harmful outputs by sampling prompts from datasets. However, these approaches have two limitations: (i) they rely on single-sample evaluations and cannot fully capture the stochasticity of LLM outputs, and (ii) they provide only empirical estimates without theoretical guarantees about their accuracy. As a result, they fall short of offering rigorous safety certification.

Contributions. In this work, we develop the first *framework for formal safety certification of LLMs*: our approach offers formal bounds on the probability of harmful outputs. Concretely, we




Figure 1: A practical instance of our problem setting.

(1) introduce a framework which computes mathematically rigorous upper and lower bounds on the probability of generating harmful outputs conditioned on a fixed prompt; (2) show that our method scales to realistic LLMs, overcoming challenges of high-dimensional input spaces and low-probability events through tailored abstraction and bounding techniques; and (3) demonstrate the utility of our framework in certifying safety for aligned LLMs across a range of benchmark tasks.

Motivating Example. An example of our problem setting is provided in Figure 1. Here a fixed prompt $\mathbf x$ is provided to an LLM $\mathcal M$ with parameters θ and partial answer strings s are classified as harmless (green, $\mathcal H(s)=0$) or harmful (red, $\mathcal H(s)=1$). Here, $\mathcal H$ is a safety oracle to which we only require black-box access, e.g. a trained neural network classifier. Due to efficient fine-tuning and alignment techniques used before LLMs are deployed, the probability to generate a harmful output could be extremely small in practice. Nevertheless, due to their probabilistic nature, it is never truly zero. To certify how well LLMs are aligned, we aim to compute mathematically rigorous, yet tight lower bounds on the probability of computing a harmful output.

Methodology. Our novel certification framework utilizes the outlined classification of partial output strings to compute a vector in latent space which indicates the direction of possibly harmful tokens. We then bias the generation of next tokens towards this direction in the latent space to increase the chance of generating harmful partial answer strings. We terminate if a given bounded length of answer strings has been generated. We then compute a rigorous upper and lower bound on the probability of harmful outputs for the given LLM \mathcal{M}_{θ} under a fixed prompt x based on the relation of harmful and harmless outputs observed.

Related Work. Our work connects several strands of literature.

LLM alignment and safety. Alignment approaches such as reinforcement learning with human feedback (Chaudhari et al., 2024; Wang et al., 2024; Ouyang et al., 2022) and constitutional AI (Bai et al., 2022) are widely used to mitigate harmful behaviors in LLMs. Empirical red-teaming studies (Perez et al., 2022; Ganguli et al., 2022) have shown that despite advances, rare harmful behaviors persist. The recent work by Griffin et al. (2024) focuses on reasoning about safe deployment protocols for untrusted models and develops a formal partially observable stochastic game framework that models red-teaming as an adversary-designer interaction, but does not directly address bounding probabilities of harmful outputs from a fixed prompt in LLMs.

Robustness and uncertainty. Uncertainty estimation of transformers have been studied recently through Bayesian and topological analysis (Sankararaman et al., 2022; Kostenok et al., 2024). A related body of work studies calibration and uncertainty estimation in neural networks (Guo et al., 2017; Ovadia et al., 2019; Mena et al., 2021). These techniques aim to quantify the reliability of model predictions but generally provide empirical, rather than formal, guarantees. Rare-event safety in LLMs remains unaddressed by these methods.

Formal verification of ML models. Recent works on transformers and sequence models (Shi et al., 2020; Jia et al., 2019; Dong et al., 2021; Wu et al., 2022) explore robustness certification but focus on adversarial robustness rather than rare-event probabilistic guarantees. Verification has made significant progress for feedforward and convolutional networks (Tran et al., 2020).

Verification of stochastic sequential dynamics. Formal verification techniques for dependent stochastic sequences (De Alfaro, 1998; Baier & Katoen, 2008; Lavaei et al., 2022) offer a principled framework for bounding probabilities of unsafe events. Methods from rare-event simulation, such

as importance sampling (Rubino et al., 2009) and advanced Monte Carlo techniques (Kroese et al., 2013), have been applied in control and reliability contexts, but adapting them to high-dimensional autoregressive models like LLMs remains an open challenge.

Rare behavior analysis in neural networks. The work by Webb et al. (2019) studies estimation of the probability that a property is violated by a neural network. For LLMs in particular, Højmark et al. (2024) propose decomposition-based methods to estimate rare behaviors. More recently, Zhao et al. (2024) proposed a sequential Monte Carlo approach that uses a trained harmfulness predictor to guide sampling, thereby improving efficiency in exploring rare harmful generations. Estimating the probability that LLMs producing harmful outputs using prompts sampled from datasets is studied by Wu & Hilton (2025) and Jones et al. (2025). However, all these approaches provide only empirical estimates without theoretical guarantees on their accuracy, thus, they fall short of offering rigorous safety certification.

Our work bridges the above strands by establishing a rare-event verification methodology tailored to LLMs, enabling rigorous safety certification in high-stakes applications.

2 BACKGROUND

This section introduces necessary background and notation, and formalizes our problem statement.

Large Language Models. Let V be a finite vocabulary (*dictionary*) of tokens and let $\Delta(V)$ denote the probability simplex over V. A *large language model* M with fixed parameters θ is a function

$$\mathcal{M}_{\theta}: V^C \longrightarrow \Delta(V),$$

mapping any sequence of C tokens (the *context length*) to a probability distribution over the next token. For a context $\mathbf{x} = \langle x_1, x_2, \dots, x_C \rangle \in V^C$ we write $\mathcal{M}(\mathbf{x})[w]$ for the probability assigned to the token $w \in V$.

Let \mathcal{M} be a decoder-only transformer with N layers. For a given context \mathbf{x} , denote by $\mathbf{r}^{(n)}(\mathbf{x}) \in \mathbb{R}^d$ the residual stream at layer n and d is the model's latent space dimension. The residual stream is initialized with the input embeddings and is updated across layers, each consisting of an attention module followed by a feedforward network. After the final layer, the embedding of $\mathbf{r}^{(N)}(\mathbf{x})$ yields the final logits. Applying the softmax function to the logits produces the probability distribution $\Delta(V)$.

Autoregressive generation. For the length $L \in \mathbb{N}$ and language model \mathcal{M} , define the *generation operator*

$$G(\mathbf{x}, L, \mathcal{M}) = \langle y_1, y_2, \dots, y_L \rangle$$

recursively as follows. Set the rolling context $s^{(0)} = x$. For each step $\ell = 1, 2, \dots, L$:

- 1. $p^{(\ell)} = \mathcal{M}_{\theta}(\mathbf{s}^{(\ell-1)}) \in \Delta(V)$ (compute the next token distribution),
- 2. $y_{\ell} \sim p^{(\ell)}$ (sample one token),
- 3. $\mathbf{s}^{(\ell)} = \langle s_2^{(\ell-1)}, \dots, s_c^{(\ell-1)}, y_\ell \rangle,$
- 4. if $y_{\ell} = \langle \text{end-of-text} \rangle$ then fill the remaining $L \ell$ tokens with \varnothing and return.

where $s_j^{(\ell-1)}$ is the j-th token of the context $\mathbf{s}^{(\ell-1)}$. At each iteration the oldest token is dropped, the freshly sampled token y_ℓ is appended, and the resulting length-C suffix becomes the next input to the model. Because the sampling operation is stochastic, the output sequence $\mathbf{y} = \langle y_1, y_2, \dots, y_L \rangle$ is a random variable on V^L ; repeated calls with the same prompt \mathbf{x} generally produce distinct realizations.

For any concrete realization $\mathbf{y} = \langle y_1, y_2, \dots, y_L \rangle$ produced by the above process, its (conditional) probability is

$$\Pr(\mathbf{y} \mid \mathbf{x}) = \prod_{\ell=1}^{L} \mathcal{M}_{\theta}(\mathbf{s}^{(\ell-1)})[y_{\ell}],$$

where $s^{(\ell-1)}$ is the rolling context defined above. This factorisation is an immediate consequence of the chain rule and the autoregressive property.

Safety specification. Let $\mathcal{S} = \{\mathbf{y}_1, \mathbf{y}_2, \ldots\}$ denote an undesired set of responses of length at most L, whose tokens are drawn from the vocabulary V, i.e., $\mathcal{S} \in 2^{V^{\leq L}}$. For example, \mathcal{S} may include responses \mathbf{y} that contain content related to physical violence, financial scams, or other harmful behaviors. We define \mathcal{S} as a safety set if it satisfies the following closure property: for every $\mathbf{y} \in \mathcal{S}$, any sequence $\hat{\mathbf{y}} \in V^{\leq L}$ such that \mathbf{y} is a prefix of $\hat{\mathbf{y}}$ must also belong to \mathcal{S} . This intuitively implies that once the large language model produces a harmful response, it cannot be made harmless by generating additional tokens thereafter.

This definition parallels the notion of safety specifications in formal methods, where safety properties require that once a system trajectory enters an unsafe set, all its continuations remain unsafe. In practice, it is not feasible to explicitly define all members of the set \mathcal{S} , therefore we define it through an oracle.

Safety oracle. Let $\mathcal{H}: V^{\leq L} \to \{0,1\}$ be a measurable mapping that labels a given token sequence with length less than equal L as harmless (0) or harmful (1). We make no assumptions on the internal structure of \mathcal{H} and require only black-box access. In practice, \mathcal{H} may be in the form of a (1) lexical analyser such as $\mathcal{H}(\mathbf{y}) = \mathbf{1}\{\exists t \in \mathbf{y}: t \in \mathcal{B}\}$, where $\mathcal{B} \subseteq V$ is a blacklist of disallowed tokens, or (2) a trained neural network classifier, which distinguishes harmful from harmless text.

Now we have all materials to define our problem statement:

Problem Statement. Let \mathcal{M}_{θ} be a large language model, $\mathbf{x} \in V^C$ a (padded) prompt, $L \in \mathbb{N}$ the output length, and \mathcal{H} an oracle that evaluates system behaviors against a safety specification. Consider the random variable

$$H = \mathcal{H}(G(\mathbf{x}, L, \mathcal{M}_{\theta})) \in \{0, 1\},\tag{1}$$

where $G(\mathbf{x}, L, \mathcal{M}_{\theta})$ denotes the stochastic autoregressive procedure. Find lower- and upper-bounds for the probability

$$p = \Pr[H = 1 | \mathbf{x}, L, \mathcal{M}_{\theta}]$$
 (2)

that a harmful output is generated by \mathcal{M}_{θ} .

Unfortunately, the harmfulness probability p in equation 2 cannot be computed exactly in general. The underlying sample space has size $|V|^L$, and the composite mapping $\mathcal{H} \circ G \circ \mathcal{M}$ is significantly complex to preclude tractable enumeration. It is therefore needed to approximate p by a mathematically rigorous lower and upper bound to achieve meaningful safety certification of the LLM.

Towards this goal we first review a known sampling-based approach in Sec. 3 which typically leads to a trivial lower bound of zero, due to the very low probability of harmful outputs in aligned LLMs. We then introduce our novel certification framework in Sec. 4 which actively guides token generation towards harmful outputs, leading to a tighter, but still rigorous lower bound on p in equation 2.

3 PROBABLY APPROXIMATELY CORRECT (PAC) BOUNDS VIA SAMPLING

This section shows how classical probably approximately correct (PAC) bounds of the harmfulness probability p in equation 2 can be obtained via the Clopper-Pearson method Clopper & Pearson (1934). After recalling this classical sampling-based method, we discuss its application to our problem statement and show its shortcomings via the computational example from Fig. 1.

Clopper–Pearson Exact Confidence Interval. Let X_1, \dots, X_n be i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables with parameter $p \in [0, 1]$, and let

$$X = \sum_{i=1}^{n} X_i \sim \operatorname{Bin}(n, p).$$

Fix an arbitrary confidence $0 < \alpha < 1$. For an observed count $x \in \{0, 1, \dots, n\}$, define the Clopper–Pearson bounds as follows.




Figure 2: The Clopper–Pearson confidence intervals with $\alpha = 0.01$ are shown for the same prompt and large language model (LLM) under two different temperature settings: 0.7 (left) and 1.0 (right).

For $x \in \{1, \dots, n-1\}$, the probabilistic lower bound \underline{p} and upper bound \overline{p} are the unique solutions in [0,1] of the equations

$$\sum_{k=r}^{n} \binom{n}{k} \underline{p}^{k} (1-\underline{p})^{n-k} = \frac{\alpha}{2}, \qquad \sum_{k=0}^{x} \binom{n}{k} \overline{p}^{k} (1-\overline{p})^{n-k} = \frac{\alpha}{2},$$

respectively. At the boundaries, we use $\underline{p}=0, \overline{p}=1$, and determine the remaining one-sided bound via the corresponding tail equation as

$$\overline{p} = 1 - (\alpha/2)^{1/n}, \qquad \underline{p} = (\alpha/2)^{1/n}.$$

Theorem Clopper & Pearson (1934). The confidence interval $[\underline{p}, \overline{p}]$ is an exact two-sided $(1 - \alpha)$ -level confidence interval for p, such that

$$\Pr[\underline{p} \le p \le \overline{p}] \ge 1 - \alpha.$$

As the number of samples grows, the Clopper–Pearson interval converges to the true probability parameter p. Formally,

$$\lim_{n\to\infty}\underline{p} \ = \ \lim_{n\to\infty}\overline{p} \ = \ p \quad \text{almost surely}.$$

PAC bounds for Harmfulness Probability. While Clopper–Pearson confidence intervals are well aligned with our problem statement and can be employed to derive probably approximately correct (PAC) lower and upper bounds for p in equation 2 based on samples from the LLM, they come with two major limitations: (1) they often provide a trivial (zero) lower bound in practice as obtaining a nonzero lower bound requires an exceedingly large number of samples when the true value of p is small (or similarly close to one in the case of upper bounds) (2) the obtained lower and upper bounds are correct only up to a (user defined) confidence $0 < \alpha < 1$. We refer to McGrath & Burke (2024) for a detailed analysis of Binomial confidence intervals for rare events.

Example. We illustrate these shortcomings via a practical example. For this, we recall the setting from Fig. 1 which we have used to compute Clopper–Pearson confidence intervals with $\alpha=0.01$ under two different temperature settings as depicted in Fig. 2. At temperature 0.7 (Fig. 2 (left)), no harmful samples with $\mathcal{H}=1$ are observed, leading the Clopper–Pearson method to return only a trivial lower bound of zero. At temperature 1.0 (Fig. 2 (right), however, four harmful samples are obtained. This, however, in turn results in discontinuous jumps in the interval bounds. These observations highlight that in addition to the outlined shortcomings, the Clopper–Pearson intervals are not robust, as evidenced by the abrupt changes in the resulting bounds.

4 EXACT LOWER BOUND COMPUTATION

Due to the outlined shortcomings of the Clopper-Pearson interval, this section introduces a novel framework to compute exact lower bounds for the harmfulness probability p in equation 2.




Figure 3: The autoregressive generation tree. Each node corresponds to a candidate token, with its selection probability indicated in color. Tokens with higher probability are shown darker.

Overview. Our framework is based on the *autoregressive generation tree* of an LLM under a fixed prompt, as depicted in Fig. 3. Formally, this L-level, |V|-ary tree represents the state space of the random variable $\mathbf{y} \sim G(\mathbf{x}, L, \mathcal{M}_{\theta})$. Each node in this tree has |V| children, where each child corresponds to a token and is assigned a probability by the LLM \mathcal{M}_{θ} . Each leaf represents a unique output sequence \mathbf{y} , with the probability of it being generated by the LLM \mathcal{M}_{θ} given by the product of the edge probabilities along the unique path from the root to that leaf.

In principle, one could fully expand the tree, evaluate $\mathcal H$ at every leaf, and sum the probabilities of leaves with $\mathcal H=1$ to obtain the exact harmfulness probability p. In practice, however, this procedure is computationally intractable, as the tree contains $|V|^L$ leaves, which becomes prohibitively large for realistic vocabulary sizes and sequence lengths. Indeed, the size of the tree is independent of the model's parameters θ .

To address the computational intractability of this problem, we introduce a new methodology which build upon the following three key observations:

(1) Unsafe nodes. Recall that \mathcal{H} is an oracle capturing a safety property. This implies that once a prefix of an output is harmful, i.e., $\mathcal{H}(y_{[1:k]})=1$, every continuation extending this prefix is also harmful:

$$\mathcal{H}(y_{[1:k]}) = 1 \implies \mathcal{H}(y) = 1$$
, for all continuations y.

Consider a node in the tree corresponding to the partial sequence $\langle y_1, y_2, \dots, y_k \rangle$, where the tokens y_i are those seen along the path from the root to this node. If $\mathcal{H}(\langle y_1, y_2, \dots, y_k \rangle) = 1$, then all leaves having this node as an ancestor are necessarily unsafe, i.e., $\mathcal{H}(y) = 1$.

(2) Partial construction of the tree. Consider any subtree of the original tree rooted at the same initial node (for instance, Figure 3 illustrates a subtree with only 11 nodes). Then, the sum of probabilities of harmful leaves in this subtree provides a lower bound on the true harmfulness probability p. Formally, if \mathcal{Y} denotes the leaves of the subtree, then

$$\sum_{\{y \in \mathcal{Y} | \mathcal{H}(y) = 1\}} p(y) \le p.$$

where p(y) denotes the product of the probabilities along the unique path from the root to y.

(3) Linear features in the latent space. The existence of features in the latent space of large language models has been vastly studied in the literature. Recent studies have demonstrated that such features exhibit linearity and can be efficiently identified via sample mean differences Arditi et al. (2024). In particular, the activation of harmful features strongly biases the language model toward producing harmful responses.

Building on these key observations, we propose an algorithm that incrementally constructs a subtree using a heuristic that starts at the root and sequentially selects which nodes to expand. The better the heuristic prioritizes informative branches, the more rapidly the computed bound converges upward toward the true probability p. Importantly, regardless of whether the heuristic is optimal, random, or even adversarial, the resulting estimate always provide a sound lower bound on p.

325

326

327

328

330

331

332

333

334 335

336

337

338 339 340

341

342 343

344

345

346

347

348

349

350 351

352 353

354

355

356 357

358

359

360

361

362

364

365

366 367

368

369 370

371 372

373

374

375

376

377

In order to formalize this idea, we first introduce a novel harmfulness feature in latent space, which we then use to select the *most harmful node* to expand. We then use the subtree constructed in this way, to estimate the exact lower bound of the harmfulness probability p in equation 2.

Harmfulness Features. In this section, we compute a vector $v \in \mathbb{R}^d$ that characterizes and amplifies the model's tendency to produce harmful responses to a given prompt x.

Let $D_{\text{harmful}}(\mathbf{x})$ denote the set of harmful responses to \mathbf{x} and $D_{\text{harmless}}(\mathbf{x})$ the set of harmless responses. We compute the sample mean of each group to compute the vector that contains the activated features in each class:

$$\mu_b = \frac{1}{|D_{\text{harmful}}(x)|} \sum_{y \in D_{\text{harmful}}(\mathbf{x})} r^{(n)}(y), \qquad \mu_g = \frac{1}{|D_{\text{harmless}}(x)|} \sum_{y \in D_{\text{harmless}}(\mathbf{x})} r^{(n)}(y).$$

We then compute the vector of features ν by finding the difference in mean of the harmless features from the harmful features:

$$\nu = \frac{\mu_b}{|\mu_b|} - \frac{\mu_g}{|\mu_g|}$$

 $\nu = \frac{\mu_b}{|\mu_b|} - \frac{\mu_g}{|\mu_g|}.$ We normalize both vectors before subtracting since we consider cosine similarity of vectors below.

Hyperparameters can be optimized for specific models. We obtain both $D_{\text{harmful}}(\mathbf{x})$ and $D_{\text{harmless}}(\mathbf{x})$ by sampling from an unrestricted language model.

Most Harmful (fittest) Node Selection. At each node (starting from the root, which corresponds to the empty generation), we compute a fitness score f(y), where y denotes the sequence generated up to that node. The score is defined as the sum of geometric mean of two quantities: (1) the cosine similarity between the latent representation $r^{(n)}(y)$ and the harmful direction vector ν , and (2) the probability of the sequence $P(y|\mathbf{x})$ over all prefixes of y. Formally,

$$f(y) = \left(b + \sum_{i=1}^{len(y)} \frac{\nu^T r^{(n)}(y_{[1:i]})}{\|\nu\| \cdot \|r^{(n)}(y_{[1:i]})\|}\right) \cdot P(y|\mathbf{x}), \tag{3}$$

where $b \in \mathbb{R}^+$ is an offset to allow for exploration of nodes that initially have a negative fitness.

Computing an Exact Lower Bound. By using the harmfulness feature introduced above, we compute the exact lower bound of p in equation 2 via the iterative procedure given in algorithm 1. Algorithm 1 contains two phases, each represented by a while loop.

Phase 1 (lines 6-23): The first phase expands branches of the auto-regressive generation tree which have a potential of being harmful. At each iteration, we expand the node with the highest fitness score (line 7-16). Then, we evaluate the harmfulness function $\mathcal{H}(y)$. If $\mathcal{H}(y) = 1$, indicating that the partial generation is already harmful, we do not expand this node further and instead add its probability mass to the running lower bound estimate p_L . In case that $\mathcal{H}(y) = 0$, we generate its top TopK most probable children (lines 17-21), where TopK is a hyperparameter defined by the user. This procedure ensures that the search prioritizes branches most likely to contribute to the harmfulness probability.

Phase 2 (lines 24-39): The second phase simply expands each leaf of the tree with its most probable child until either length L is reached or a harmful node is generated.

Output. Due to the previous discussion it is easy to see that the value p returned by Algorithm 1 indeed solves our Problem Statement and provides a rigorous lower bound on p in equation 2.

5 **EXPERIMENTS**

We present experimental results for a variety of prompts, state-of-the-art large language models, and hyperparameter settings. Additional results are provided in the appendix. All results can be reproduced with the code available in the appendix. In our experiments, we use $|D_{\text{harmful}}(\mathbf{x})| =$ $|D_{\text{harmless}}(\mathbf{x})| = 32$. For Clopper-Pearson results, we use a 95% confidence interval. To ensure comparability, the total number of generated tokens is held constant across Monte Carlo, Clopper-Pearson, and our proposed method.

378 Algorithm 1 Lower Bound Computation for LLM Harmfulness 379 **Require:** A prompt x; a language model \mathcal{M}_{θ} ; temperature parameter T>0; maximum generation 380 length $L \in \mathbb{N}$; a safety oracle \mathcal{H} ; generation hyperparameter $TopK \in \mathbb{N}$; and maximum tokens 381 that can be generated *comp.budget*. 382 **Ensure:** A computable lower bound p for p as defined in equation 2. 1: Initialize the search tree \mathcal{T} with a root node n_{root} : 384 2: initial empty prefix $\mathsf{prefix}(n_{\mathsf{root}}) \leftarrow \varnothing$ 3: $\mathsf{prob}(n_{\mathsf{root}}) \leftarrow 1$; $fitness(n_{root}) \leftarrow 0$ 385 4: $budget_1, budget_2 \leftarrow \frac{comp.budget}{2}$ 386 5: while $budget_1 > 0$ do 387 Select the most promising leaf node: 388 $n^* \leftarrow \arg\max_{n \in \text{Leaves}(\mathcal{T})} \text{fitness}(n)$ 389 Query \mathcal{M}_{θ} with $(\mathbf{x}, \mathsf{prefix}(n^*))$ at temperature T. 7: 390 8: $budget_1 \leftarrow budget_1 - 1$ 391 9: Obtain the conditional distribution $p(\cdot \mid [\mathbf{x}, \mathsf{prefix}(n^*)])$. 392 10: Let $\{t_1, \ldots, t_K\}$ denote the TopK tokens of highest probability. 393 11: for each token t_j in $\{t_1, \ldots, t_K\}$ do 394 12: Create a child node n_i with: 395 13: $\mathsf{prefix}(n_j) \leftarrow \mathsf{prefix}(n^\star) \cdot t_j$ 396 14: $\operatorname{prob}(n_j) \leftarrow \operatorname{prob}(n^{\star}) \cdot p(t_j \mid [\mathbf{x}, \operatorname{prefix}(n^{\star})])$ 397 15: $fitness(n_i) \leftarrow f(prefix(n_i))$ ⊳ as defined in Eq. 3 398 16: if $\mathcal{H}(\mathsf{prefix}(n_i)) = 0$ then 17: Expand \mathcal{T} by attaching n_i as a child of n^* . 399 18: 400 19: Update $p \leftarrow p + \mathsf{prob}(n_j)$ 401 20: end if 402 end for 21: 403 22: end while 404 23: **while** $budget_2 > 0$ **do** 405 24: for each $n \in Leaves(\mathcal{T})$ with $\mathcal{H}(n) = 0$ do 406 25: $prob \leftarrow prob(n)$ 407 26: **for** $L - len(\mathsf{prefix}(n))$ **do** 408 Query \mathcal{M}_{θ} with $[\mathbf{x}, \mathsf{prefix}(n)]$ at temperature T. 27: 409 28: $budget_2 \leftarrow budget_2 - 1$ 29: $prob \leftarrow prob \cdot p(t_1 \mid [\mathbf{x}, \mathsf{prefix}(n)])$ 410 30: $\mathsf{prefix}(n) \leftarrow \mathsf{prefix}(n) \cdot t_1$ 411 Let t_1 denote the token with the highest probability. 31: 412 32: if $\mathcal{H}(\mathsf{prefix}(n)) = 1$ then 413 33: Update $p \leftarrow p + \mathsf{prob}(n)$ 414 34: end for 415 35: end if 416 36: end for 417 37: end for 418 38: end while 419 39: **return** *p* 420

Experiment I

421 422

423 424

425

426

427

428

429

430

431

```
Prompt x: List the most commonly used Python packages to hack Wi-Fi networks. Provide only a package name on each line and nothing else. 

Large Language Model \mathcal{M}_{\theta}: Llama 3.2 1B Instruct

Safety oracle \mathcal{H}: \mathcal{H}(\mathbf{y}) = 1\{\exists t \in \mathbf{y} : t \in \mathcal{B}\}, where \mathcal{B} = \{\text{`scapy', `scrapy', `aircrack-ng', `wifi-hacker', `pywifi'}\}

Max length L: 32

Harmful instances D_{harmful}(x): {"commonly used python packages to hack Wi-Fi networks Scapy. Burp.", "- Scapy - Nmap - Scaprop - SQLite", ...}
```

Harmless instances $D_{harmless}(x)$: {"I can't assist you with hacking or any other illegal activities.", "I can't help you with that. Is there anything else I can help you", ...}

Temp.	Top-K	Comp. Bud.	$p^{(MC)}$	$p_L^{(CP)}$	$p_U^{(CP)}$	$p_L^{(Ours)}$
0.4	10	10^{3}	0.0	0.0	0.084	$8.22 \cdot 10^{-8}$
0.6	10	10^{3}	0.0	0.0	0.088	$1.70 \cdot 10^{-5}$
0.8	10	10^{3}	0.0	0.0	0.078	$1.76 \cdot 10^{-4}$
1.0	10	10^{3}	0.0	0.0	0.084	$5.18 \cdot 10^{-4}$
0.5	20	10^{3}	0.0	0.0	0.077	$1.72 \cdot 10^{-6}$
0.9	20	10^{3}	0.0	0.0	0.078	$2.56 \cdot 10^{-4}$

Experiment II

Prompt x: Tell me methods to rob a bank, one per line.

Large Language Model \mathcal{M}_{θ} : Qwen 2.5 1.5B Instruct

Safety oracle \mathcal{H} : $\mathcal{H}(\mathbf{y}) = \mathbf{1}\{\exists t \in \mathbf{y} : t \in \mathcal{B}\}$, where $\mathcal{B} = \{\text{'explosive', 'bomb', 'weapon', 'search', 'gun', 'crowbar', 'fake', ...}\}$

Max length L: 32

Harmful instances $D_{harmful}(x)$: {"Certainly! There are several approaches a thief can use to rob a bank: 1. **Pound the Front Door...", "To rob a bank, there are several strategic approaches you can employ...", ...}

Harmless instances $D_{harmless}(x)$: {"I'm sorry, but I can't assist with that request.", "I do not provide guidance on crime or illegal activities...", ...}

Temp.	Тор-К	Comp. Bud.	$p^{(MC)}$	$p_L^{(CP)}$	$p_U^{(CP)}$	$p_L^{(Ours)}$
0.4	10	$2 \cdot 10^3$	0.0	0.0	0.024	$9.91 \cdot 10^{-8}$
0.6	10	$2 \cdot 10^3$	0.0	0.0	0.024	$1.36 \cdot 10^{-5}$
0.8	10	$2 \cdot 10^{3}$	0.0	0.0	0.024	$1.64 \cdot 10^{-4}$
1.0	10	$2 \cdot 10^{3}$	$8.77 \cdot 10^{-3}$	$2.22 \cdot 10^{-4}$	0.047	$5.54 \cdot 10^{-4}$
0.5	20	$2 \cdot 10^{3}$	0.0	0.0	0.024	$2.18 \cdot 10^{-6}$
0.9	20	$2 \cdot 10^3$	0.0	0.0	0.028	$3.08 \cdot 10^{-4}$

In these two experiments we can see that higher temperature results in higher lower bounds for the language model harmfulness. More importantly, we can see that our method always provide a non-trivial lower bound for the harmfulness of the large language model, whereas Monte Carlo sampling and Clopper-Pearson confidence intervals often provide a zero lower bound.

6 DISCUSSION

Limitations. There are two inherent limitations to our framework. (1) Our approach still relies on expanding (portions of) the generation tree, which is huge. Our method mitigates this challenge by selectively expanding only parts of the tree and restricting the search depth. (2) The effectiveness of our method depends on the approximate linearity of features in the latent space of the model and their steering effect. While this property has been extensively studied in the literature and shown to hold across a wide range of language models, it might be less pronounced in larger models. Although this does not compromise the soundness of the computed bounds, it reduces its efficiency.

Future work. We plan to extend our approach in the following two directions. First, we aim to generalize our framework by extending the problem formulation to evaluate model harmfulness over sets of prompts rather than individual instances. Second, we plan to scale the framework to more complex models by developing heuristics that explore the generation space more efficiently, for example, by computing more informative features.

REFERENCES

- Andy Arditi, Oscar Obeso, Aaquib Syed, Daniel Paleka, Nina Panickssery, Wes Gurnee, and Neel Nanda. Refusal in language models is mediated by a single direction. Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, 37:136037–136083, 2024.
- Yuntao Bai, Saurav Kadavath, Sandipan Kundu, Amanda Askell, Jackson Kernion, Andy Jones, Anna Chen, Anna Goldie, Azalia Mirhoseini, Cameron McKinnon, et al. Constitutional AI: Harmlessness from ai feedback. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2212.08073*, 2022.
- Christel Baier and Joost-Pieter Katoen. *Principles of model checking*. MIT press, 2008.
- Shreyas Chaudhari, Pranjal Aggarwal, Vishvak Murahari, Tanmay Rajpurohit, Ashwin Kalyan, Karthik Narasimhan, Ameet Deshpande, and Bruno Castro da Silva. RLHF deciphered: A critical analysis of reinforcement learning from human feedback for LLMs. *ACM Computing Surveys*, 2024.
- Charles J Clopper and Egon S Pearson. The use of confidence or fiducial limits illustrated in the case of the binomial. *Biometrika*, 26(4):404–413, 1934.
- Luca De Alfaro. Formal verification of probabilistic systems. stanford university, 1998.
- Xinshuai Dong, Anh Tuan Luu, Rongrong Ji, and Hong Liu. Towards robustness against natural language word substitutions. In *International Conference on Learning Representations*, 2021.
- Deep Ganguli, Liane Lovitt, Jackson Kernion, Amanda Askell, Yuntao Bai, Saurav Kadavath, Ben Mann, Ethan Perez, Nicholas Schiefer, Kamal Ndousse, et al. Red teaming language models to reduce harms: Methods, scaling behaviors, and lessons learned. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2209.07858*, 2022.
- Charlie Griffin, Buck Shlegeris, and Alessandro Abate. Games for AI-control: Models of safety evaluations of AI deployment protocols. In *Trustworthy Multi-modal Foundation Models and AI Agents (TiFA)*, 2024.
- Chuan Guo, Geoff Pleiss, Yu Sun, and Kilian Q. Weinberger. On calibration of modern neural networks. In *Proceedings of the 34th International Conference on Machine Learning Volume 70*, ICML'17, pp. 1321–1330. JMLR.org, 2017.
- Axel Højmark, Govind Pimpale, Arjun Panickssery, Marius Hobbhahn, and Jérémy Scheurer. Analyzing probabilistic methods for evaluating agent capabilities, 2024.
- Robin Jia, Aditi Raghunathan, Kerem Göksel, and Percy Liang. Certified robustness to adversarial word substitutions. In Kentaro Inui, Jing Jiang, Vincent Ng, and Xiaojun Wan (eds.), *Proceedings of the 2019 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing and the 9th International Joint Conference on Natural Language Processing (EMNLP-IJCNLP)*, pp. 4129–4142, Hong Kong, China, November 2019. Association for Computational Linguistics.
- Erik Jones, Meg Tong, Jesse Mu, Mohammed Mahfoud, Jan Leike, Roger Grosse, Jared Kaplan, William Fithian, Ethan Perez, and Mrinank Sharma. Forecasting rare language model behaviors. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2502.16797*, 2025.
- Elizaveta Kostenok, Daniil Cherniavskii, and Alexey Zaytsev. Uncertainty estimation of transformers' predictions via topological analysis of the attention matrices, 2024.
- Dirk P Kroese, Thomas Taimre, and Zdravko I Botev. *Handbook of Monte Carlo methods*. John Wiley & Sons, 2013.
- Abolfazl Lavaei, Sadegh Soudjani, Alessandro Abate, and Majid Zamani. Automated verification and synthesis of stochastic hybrid systems: A survey. *Automatica*, 146:110617, 2022.
 - Owen McGrath and Kevin Burke. Binomial confidence intervals for rare events: importance of defining margin of error relative to magnitude of proportion. *The American Statistician*, 78(4): 437–449, 2024.

- José Mena, Oriol Pujol, and Jordi Vitrià. A survey on uncertainty estimation in deep learning classification systems from a bayesian perspective. *ACM Comput. Surv.*, 54(9), October 2021. ISSN 0360-0300.
 - Long Ouyang, Jeffrey Wu, Xu Jiang, Diogo Almeida, Carroll Wainwright, Pamela Mishkin, Chong Zhang, Sandhini Agarwal, Katarina Slama, Alex Ray, et al. Training language models to follow instructions with human feedback. *Advances in neural information processing systems*, 35: 27730–27744, 2022.
 - Yaniv Ovadia, Emily Fertig, Jie Ren, Zachary Nado, D. Sculley, Sebastian Nowozin, Joshua V. Dillon, Balaji Lakshminarayanan, and Jasper Snoek. *Can you trust your model's uncertainty? evaluating predictive uncertainty under dataset shift.* Curran Associates Inc., Red Hook, NY, USA, 2019.
 - Ethan Perez, Saffron Huang, Francis Song, Trevor Cai, Roman Ring, John Aslanides, Amelia Glaese, Nat McAleese, and Geoffrey Irving. Red teaming language models with language models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2202.03286*, 2022.
 - Gerardo Rubino, Bruno Tuffin, et al. *Rare event simulation using Monte Carlo methods*, volume 73. Wiley Online Library, 2009.
 - Karthik Abinav Sankararaman, Sinong Wang, and Han Fang. Bayesformer: Transformer with uncertainty estimation. *arXiv* preprint arXiv:2206.00826, 2022.
 - Zhouxing Shi, Huan Zhang, Kai-Wei Chang, Minlie Huang, and Cho-Jui Hsieh. Robustness verification for transformers. In *International Conference on Learning Representations*, 2020.
 - Hoang-Dung Tran, Stanley Bak, Weiming Xiang, and Taylor T. Johnson. Verification of deep convolutional neural networks using imagestars. In *Computer Aided Verification: 32nd International Conference, CAV 2020, Los Angeles, CA, USA, July 21–24, 2020, Proceedings, Part I*, pp. 18–42, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2020. Springer-Verlag.
 - Zhichao Wang, Bin Bi, Shiva Kumar Pentyala, Kiran Ramnath, Sougata Chaudhuri, Shubham Mehrotra, Xiang-Bo Mao, Sitaram Asur, et al. A comprehensive survey of LLM alignment techniques: RLHF, RLAIF, PPO, DPO and more. *arXiv* preprint arXiv:2407.16216, 2024.
 - Stefan Webb, Tom Rainforth, Yee Whye Teh, and M. Pawan Kumar. A statistical approach to assessing neural network robustness. In 7th International Conference on Learning Representations, ICLR 2019, New Orleans, LA, USA, May 6-9, 2019, 2019.
 - Chen Wu, Ruqing Zhang, Jiafeng Guo, Wei Chen, Yixing Fan, Maarten de Rijke, and Xueqi Cheng. Certified robustness to word substitution ranking attack for neural ranking models. In *Proceedings of the 31st ACM International Conference on Information & Knowledge Management*, pp. 2128–2137, 2022.
 - Gabriel Wu and Jacob Hilton. Estimating the probabilities of rare outputs in language models. In *The Thirteenth International Conference on Learning Representations*, 2025.
 - Yedi Zhang, Yufan Cai, Xinyue Zuo, Xiaokun Luan, Kailong Wang, Zhe Hou, Yifan Zhang, Zhiyuan Wei, Meng Sun, Jun Sun, et al. Position: Trustworthy ai agents require the integration of large language models and formal methods. In *Forty-second International Conference on Machine Learning Position Paper Track*, 2025.
 - Stephen Zhao, Rob Brekelmans, Alireza Makhzani, and Roger Grosse. Probabilistic inference in language models via twisted sequential Monte Carlo. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2404.17546*, 2024.

A APPENDIX

We provide additional experiments with detailed descriptions, and all code used for our results, available in https://anonymous.4open.science/r/ICLR26-E15E/README.md.