

# A Survey on Detection of LLMs-Generated Content

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## Abstract

The burgeoning capabilities of advanced large language models (LLMs) such as ChatGPT have led to an increase in synthetic content generation with implications across a variety of sectors, including media, cybersecurity, public discourse, and education. As such, the ability to detect LLMs-generated content has become of paramount importance. We aim to provide a detailed overview of existing detection strategies and benchmarks, scrutinizing their differences and identifying key challenges and prospects in the field, advocating for more adaptable and robust models to enhance detection accuracy. We also posit the necessity for a multi-faceted approach to defend against various attacks to counter the rapidly advancing capabilities of LLMs. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first comprehensive survey on the detection in the era of LLMs. We hope it will provide a broad understanding of the current landscape of LLMs-generated content detection, and we have maintained a website to consistently update the latest research as a guiding reference for researchers and practitioners.

## 1 Introduction

With the rapid development of powerful AI tools, the risk of LLMs-generated content has raised considerable concerns, such as misinformation spread (Bian et al., 2023; Hanley and Durumeric, 2023; Pan et al., 2023), fake news (Oshikawa et al., 2018; Zellers et al., 2019; Dugan et al., 2022), gender bias (Sun et al., 2019), education (Perkins et al., 2023; Vasilatos et al., 2023), and social harm (Kumar et al., 2023; Yang et al., 2023c).

We also find on the Google search trend, that the concerns about AI-written text have witnessed a significant increase since the release of the latest powerful Large Language Models (LLMs) such as ChatGPT (Schulman et al., 2022) and GPT-4 (OpenAI, 2023b). Humans are already unable to

directly distinguish between LLMs- and human-written text, with the fast advancement of the model size, data scale, and AI-human alignment (Brown et al., 2020; Ouyang et al., 2022). Concurrently, growing interests are shown to detectors, like the commercial tool GPTZero (Tian, 2023), or OpenAI’s own detector (OpenAI, 2023a) since humans can be easily fooled by improvements in decoding methods (Ippolito et al., 2019). However, the misuse of detectors also raises protests from students on the unfair judgment on their homework and essays (Herbold et al., 2023; Liu et al., 2023b) and popular detectors perform poorly on code detection (Wang et al., 2023a). Alongside these advancements, there has been a proliferation of detection algorithms aimed at identifying LLMs-generated content. However, there remains a dearth of comprehensive surveys encompassing the latest methodologies, benchmarks, and attacks on LLMs-based detection systems.

Earlier work on text detection dates back to feature engineering (Badaskar et al., 2008). For example, GTLR (Gehrmann et al., 2019a) assumes the generated word comes from the top distribution on small LMs like BERT (Devlin et al., 2019) or GPT-2 (Radford et al., 2019). Recently, there has been an increasing focus on detecting ChatGPT (Weng et al., 2023; Liu et al., 2023b; Desaire et al., 2023), to mitigate ChatGPT misuse or abuse (Sison et al., 2023). In particular, it has recently been called for regulation<sup>1</sup> on powerful AI like ChatGPT usage (Hacker et al., 2023; Wahle et al., 2023).

Therefore, we firmly believe that the timing is ideal for a comprehensive survey on the detection of LLMs-generated content. It would serve to invite further exploration of detection approaches, offer valuable insights into the strengths and weaknesses of previous research, and highlight potential chal-

<sup>1</sup><https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/16/technology/openai-altman-artificial-intelligence-regulation.html>

079 lenges and opportunities for the research commu- 130  
080 nity to address. Our paper is organized as follows: 131  
081 we first briefly describe the problem formulation, 132  
082 including the task definition, metrics, and datasets 133  
083 in Section 2. In Section 3, we classify detection 134  
084 by their working mechanism and scope of applica- 135  
085 tion. In section 4, we summarize the three popular 136  
086 detection methods: training-based, zero-shot and 137  
087 watermarking. We also investigate various attacks 138  
088 in Section A.2 since defending against attacks is 139  
089 of increasing importance and point out some chal- 140  
090 lenges in Section A.3. Finally, in Section 5 we  
091 provide additional insights into this topic on poten-  
092 tial future directions, as well as the conclusion in  
093 Section 6.

## 094 2 Problem formulation 141

### 095 2.1 Overview 142

096 We refer to any textual outputs from LLMs follow- 143  
097 ing specific inputs as LLMs-Generated Content. It 144  
098 can be generally classified into natural languages 145  
099 like news, essays, reviews, and reports, or program- 146  
100 ming languages like codes of Python, C++, and 147  
101 Java. Current research usually aims at the detection 148  
102 of content with moderate length and specific topics. 149  
103 It is meaningless to detect a short sentence describ- 150  
104 ing some facts like *EMNLP started in 1996* or sim- 151  
105 ple coding question *def hello\_world(): print('Hello*  
106 *World')*, to be human or AI written. 152

107 Formally, consider an LLM denoted as *LLM*, 153  
108 which generates a candidate text *S* of length  $|S|$  154  
109 based on an input prompt. Let  $f(\cdot)$  represent a poten- 155  
110 tial detector we aim to use for classification, assign- 156  
111 ing  $f(S)$  to 0 or 1, where 0 and 1 signify human or 157  
112 machine, respectively. The *LLM* can be classified 158  
113 into unknown (Black-box), fully known (White- 159  
114 box), or partially known (known model name with 160  
115 unknown model parameters) to the detectors. In 161  
116 practice, we are usually given a candidate corpus 162  
117 *C* comprising both human and LLMs-generated 163  
118 content to test  $f(\cdot)$ .

119 Apart from the standard definition, machine- 164  
120 generated content can undergo additional modifi- 165  
121 cations in practical scenarios, including rephras- 166  
122 ing by humans or other AI models. Besides, it is 167  
123 also possible that the candidate text is a mix of 168  
124 human and machine-written text. For example, the 169  
125 first several sentences are written by humans, and 170  
126 the remaining parts by machines, or vice versa. 171  
127 When a text undergoes revisions, the community 172  
128 often perceives it as paraphrasing and treats it as 173  
129 either machine- or human-generated text, depend-

ing on the extent of these modifications and the 130  
intent behind them. However, it is important to 131  
highlight that if a substantial majority of the text 132  
is authored by humans, or if humans have exten- 133  
sively revised machine-generated text, it becomes 134  
challenging to maintain the assertion that the text 135  
is purely machine-generated. Hence, in this survey, 136  
we adhere to the traditional definition by consider- 137  
ing machine-generated content as text that has not 138  
undergone significant modifications, and we consis- 139  
tently classify such text as machine-generated. 140

### 141 2.2 Metrics 142

143 Previous studies (Mitchell et al., 2023; Sadasivan 144  
et al., 2023) predominantly used the Area Under 145  
the Receiver Operating Characteristic (AUROC) 146  
score to gauge the effectiveness of detection algo- 147  
rithms. As a binary classification problem, AUROC 148  
shows the results under different thresholds, and 149  
the F1 score is also helpful. Krishna et al. (2023); 150  
Yang et al. (2023b) suggest that AUROC may not 151  
consistently provide a precise evaluation, particu- 152  
larly as the AUROC score nears the optimal limit 153  
of 1.0 since two detectors with identical AUROC 154  
score of 0.99 could exhibit substantial variations in 155  
detection quality from a user’s perspective. From a 156  
practical point of view, ensuring a high True Posi- 157  
tive Rate (TPR) is imperative while keeping the 158  
False Positive Rate (FPR) to a minimum. As such, 159  
current research (Krishna et al., 2023; Yang et al., 160  
2023b) both report TPR scores at a fixed 1% FPR, 161  
along with the AUROC. Other work (Sadasivan 162  
et al., 2023) also refer to Type I and Type II er- 163  
rors following the binary hypothesis test and even 164  
report TPR at  $10^{-6}$  FPR (Fernandez et al., 2023).

### 165 2.3 Datasets 166

167 In this section, we discuss the common datasets 168  
used for this task. The corpus is usually adopted 169  
from previous NLP tasks, and reconstructed by 170  
prompting LLMs to generate new outputs as candi- 171  
date machine-generated text. Usually, there are two 172  
prompting methods: 1). prompting LLMs with the 173  
questions in some question-answering datasets. 2). 174  
prompting LLMs with the first 20 to 30 tokens to 175  
continue writing in datasets without specific ques- 176  
tions. Specifically, several datasets have been com- 177  
piled and utilized in the field. Some noteworthy 178  
datasets include TURINGBENCH (Uchendu et al., 179  
2021), HC3 (Guo et al., 2023), CHEAT (Yu et al.,  
2023a), Ghostbuster (Verma et al., 2023), OpenG-  
PTText (Chen et al., 2023c), M4 (Wang et al.,




Figure 1: Taxonomy on detection methods. We list the most representative approaches for each category.

2023c), MGTBench (He et al., 2023), and MULTI-TuDE (Macko et al., 2023) and some other datasets not explicitly built for detection have also been used, such as C4 (Raffel et al., 2019), shareGPT<sup>2</sup>, and alpaca (Taori et al., 2023), as summarized in Table 2. For text detection, we only list datasets explicitly built for detection, while some general datasets like C4 (Raffel et al., 2019) or alpaca (Taori et al., 2023) can also be used. For code detection, we only list datasets that have been used in previous code detection work (Lee et al., 2023; Yang et al., 2023d). And other codegeneration corpora can also be adopted. The detailed description is included in Appendix A.7.

**Data Contamination.** Despite those released standard datasets, we argue that static evaluation benchmarks might not be desirable for this problem with the rapid progress of LLMs trained, tuned, or aligned on large amounts of data across the whole internet. On the one hand, Aaronson (2022) mentioned that some text from Shakespeare or the Bible is often classified as AI-generated because such classic text is frequently used in the training datasets for generative language models. On the other hand, many detectors did not fully disclose their training data, especially commercial tools like GPTZero (Tian, 2023). It is natural to worry that those standard evaluation benchmarks would face a serious test data contamination problem, considering the commercial detectors would consistently improve their products for profits. So, with the rapid evolution of LLMs and detectors, the traditional paradigm of providing standard benchmarks might no longer be suitable for AI-generated text detection. We provide a unique solution to this:

👑 **Utilize the most latest human-written content to reduce data contamination problem by collecting such content from the most updated open-source websites, which themselves explicitly forbid posting AI-written posts.**

### 3 Detection Scenarios

The findings of previous research, such as (Gehrmann et al., 2019b) and (Dugan et al., 2022), highlight the general difficulty faced by humans in distinguishing between human- and machine-generated text, motivating the development of automatic solutions. The detection process can be classified into black-box or white-box detection based on whether the detector has access to the source model output logits. In black-box detection, there are two

<sup>2</sup><https://sharegpt.com/>




Figure 2: Three categories of detectors and four detection scenarios: as the transparency decreases, the detection difficulty increases.

distinct cases: 1). when the source model name is known, such as GPT-4; 2). when the source model name is unknown, and the content might have been generated by models like GPT-4, Bard, or other undisclosed models. On the other hand, white-box detection also encompasses two cases: 1). the detector only has access to the model’s output logits or partial logits, such as the top-5 token log probability in `text-davinci-003`; 2). the detector has access to the entire model weights. Table 2 shows four categories according to application scenarios and three detector methods. Specifically, we can categorize the usage of detecting LLM-generated content into four distinct scenarios based on their application: These categorizations highlight the different levels of information available to the detectors, ranging from limited knowledge to complete access and demonstrate the various scenarios encountered in detecting machine-generated content.

#### 3.1 Black-Box Detection with Unknown Model Source

This scenario closely resembles real-world applications, particularly when users, such as students, utilize off-the-shelf AI services to assist them in writing their essays. In such cases, teachers are often unaware of the specific AI service being employed. Consequently, this situation poses the greatest challenge as very limited information is available to identify instances of deception.

#### 3.2 Black-Box Detection with Known Model Source

In this scenario, we possess knowledge regarding the specific model from which the text originates, yet we lack access to its underlying parameters. This aspect carries considerable significance due to the market domination of major language model



providers such as OpenAI and Google. Many users rely heavily on their services, enabling us to make informed assumptions about the model sources.

### 3.3 White-Box Detection with Full Model Parameters

While access to the most powerful LLMs, such as Anthropic’s Claude or OpenAI’s ChatGPT, is typically limited, assuming full access to the model parameters is an active research area. This approach is reasonable, considering that researchers often encounter resource constraints, making it challenging to experiment with large-scale models. For instance, watermarking-based methods (Kirchenbauer et al., 2023a) typically require full access to the model parameters. This technique manipulates the next token prediction at each sampling position by modifying the distribution. Although this approach necessitates access to the complete model parameters, it has shown promise and could potentially be adapted for practical use.

### 3.4 White-Box Detection with Partial Model Information

This corresponds to the scenarios when only the partial model outputs, like the top-5 token logits are provided by `text-davinci-003`. Previous work like DetectGPT (Mitchell et al., 2023) and DNA-GPT (Yang et al., 2023b) both utilize such probability to perform detection.

### 3.5 Model Sourcing

Furthermore, another aspect related to detection goes beyond distinguishing between human and machine-generated content. This task involves determining which specific model may have generated the content and is referred to as authorship attribution (Uchendu et al., 2020), origin tracing (Li et al., 2023a), or model sourcing (Yang et al., 2023b). We consider this task as a special scenario since it is slightly different from other detection tasks.

## 4 Detection Methodologies

In this section, we delve into further details about the detection algorithms. Based on their distinguishing characteristics, existing detection methods can be categorized into three classes: 1) Training-based classifiers, which typically fine-tune a pre-trained language model on collected binary data - both human and AI-generated text distributions. 2) Zero-shot detectors leverage the intrinsic properties of

typical LLMs, such as probability curves or representation spaces, to perform self-detection. 3) Watermarking involves hiding identifying information within the generated text that can later be used to determine if the text came from a specific language model, rather than detecting AI-generated text in general. We summarize the representative approaches in Figure 1 as classified by the scenarios listed in Section 3.

### 4.1 Training-based 🔥

The earlier work of training a detection classifier focuses on fake review (Bhagat and Hovy, 2013), fake news (Zellers et al., 2019) or small models (Solaiman et al., 2019; Bakhtin et al., 2019; Uchendu et al., 2020) detection. Subsequently, growing interest in this line of research turns to detecting high-quality text brought by LLMs.

#### 4.1.1 Black-box

The first line of work focuses on black-box detection. *When the model source is known*, some work use the text generated by ① **mixed sources** and subsequently train a classifier together for detection. For example, OpenAI (OpenAI, 2023a) collects text generated from different model families and trains a robust detector for detection text with more than 1,000 tokens. GPTZero (Tian, 2023) also collects their human-written text spans student-written articles, news articles, and Q&A datasets spanning multiple disciplines from a variety of LLMs. Similarly, G<sup>3</sup>Detector (Zhan et al., 2023) claims to be a general GPT-Generated text detector by finetuning RoBERTa-large (Liu et al., 2019) and explores the effect of the use of synthetic data on the training process. GPT-Sentinel (Chen et al., 2023c) trains the RoBERTa and T5 (Raffel et al., 2020) classifiers on their constructed dataset OpenGPTText. ② **Mixed decoding** is also utilized by incorporating text generated with different decoding parameters to account for the variance. Ippolito et al. (2020) find that, in general, discriminators transfer poorly between decoding strategies, but training on a mix of data can help. GPT-Pat (Yu et al., 2023b) train a siamese network to compute the similarity between the original text and the re-decoded text. Besides, ③ **mixed strategies** involves additional information, such as graph structure and contrastive learning in CoCo (Liu et al., 2022), proxy model perplexity in LLMdet (Wu et al., 2023a), positive unlabeled training in MPU (Tian et al., 2023) and adversarial training in RADAR (Hu et al., 2023).

On the other hand, *when the source model is unknown*, OpenAI text classifier (OpenAI, 2023a) and GPTZero (Tian, 2023) still works by ① **cross-domain transfer**. Other works like (Pu et al., 2023; Antoun et al., 2023), Conda (Bhattacharjee et al., 2023) also rely on the zero-shot generalization ability of detectors trained on a variety of model families and tested on unseen models. Besides, Ghostbuster (Verma et al., 2023) directly uses outputs from known ② **surrogate model** as the signal for training a classifier to detect unknown model. Additionally, ③ **detection in the wild** (Li et al., 2023b) contributes a wild testbed by gathering texts from various human writings and deepfake texts generated by different LLMs for detection without knowing their sources.

#### 4.1.2 White-box

The second kind of work lies in the white-box situation when the model’s full or partial parameters are accessible. For example, when we have full access to the model, GLTR (Gehrmann et al., 2019a) trains a logistic regression over absolute word ranks in each decoding step. When only partial information like the model output logits are available, SeqXGPT (Wang et al., 2023b) introduce a sentence-level detection challenge by synthesizing a dataset that contains documents that are polished with LLMs and propose to detect it with logits as waves from white-box LLMs. Sniffer (Li et al., 2023a) utilizes the contrastive logits between models as a typical feature for training to perform both detection and origin tracking.

## 4.2 Zero-Shot

In the zero-shot setting, we do not require extensive training data to train a discriminator. Instead, we can leverage the inherent distinctions between machine-generated and human-written text, making the detector training-free. The key advantage of training-free detection is its adaptability to new data distributions without the need for additional data collection and model tuning. It’s worth noting that while watermarking methods can also be considered zero-shot, we treat them as an independent track. Previous work utilizes entropy (Lavergne et al., 2008), average log-probability score (Solaiman et al., 2019), perplexity (Beresneva, 2016), uncommon n-gram frequencies (Grechnikov et al., 2009; Badaskar et al., 2008) obtained from a language model as the judge for determining its origin. However, those simple features fail as LLMs are

becoming diverse and high-quality text generators. Similarly, there are also black- and white-box detection, as summarized below.

#### 4.2.1 Black-Box

*When the source of the black-box model is known*, DNA-GPT (Yang et al., 2023b) achieves superior performance by utilizing N-Gram divergence between the continuation distribution of re-prompted text and the original text. Besides, DetectGPT (Mitchell et al., 2023) also investigates using another surrogate model to replace the source model but achieves unsatisfactory results. In contrast, Mireshghallah et al. (2023) proves that a smaller surrogate model like OPT-125M (Zhang et al., 2022) can serve as a universal black-box text detector, achieving close or even better detection performance than using the source model. Additionally, Krishna et al. (2023) suggests building a database of generated text and detecting the target text by comparing its semantic similarity with all the text stored in the database. Finally, DetectGPT4Code (Yang et al., 2023d) also investigates detecting codes generated by ChatGPT through a proxy small code generation models by conditional probability divergence and achieves significant improvements on code detection tasks.

*When the source of the model is unknown*, PHD (Tulchinskii et al., 2023) observes that real text exhibits a statistically higher intrinsic dimensionality compared to machine-generated texts across various reliable generators by employing the Persistent Homology Dimension Estimator (PHD) as a means to measure this intrinsic dimensionality, combined with an additional encoder like Roberta to facilitate the estimation process.

#### 4.2.2 White-Box

*When the partial access to the model is given*, traditional methods use the features such as entropy (Lavergne et al., 2008), average log-probability score (Solaiman et al., 2019) for detection. However, these approaches struggle to detect text from the most recent LLMs. Then, the pioneer work DetectGPT (Mitchell et al., 2023) observes that LLM-generated text tends to occupy negative curvature regions of the model’s log probability function and leverages the curvature-based criterion based on random perturbations of the passage. DNA-GPT (Yang et al., 2023b) utilizes the probability difference between the continuous distribution among re-prompted text and original text and achieves

state-of-the-art performance. Later, [Deng et al. \(2023\)](#) improves the efficiency of DetectGPT with a Bayesian surrogate model by selecting typical samples based on Bayesian uncertainty and interpolating scores from typical samples to other ones. Furthermore, similar to DNA-GPT ([Yang et al., 2023b](#)) on using the conditional probability for discrimination, Fast-DetectGPT ([Bao et al., 2023](#)) builds an efficient zero-shot detector by replacing the probability in DetectGPT with conditional probability curvature and witnesses significant efficiency improvements. Additionally, GPT-who ([Venkatraman et al., 2023](#)) utilizes Uniform Information Density (UID) based features to model the unique statistical signature of each LLM and human author for accurate authorship attribution.

*When the full access to the model is given,* [Su et al. \(2023a\)](#) leverages the log-rank information for zero-shot detection through one fast and efficient DetectLLM-LRR (Log-Likelihood Log-Rank ratio) method, and another more accurate DetectLLM-NPR (Normalized perturbed log rank) method, although slower due to the need for perturbations.

### 4.3 Watermarking

Text watermarking injects algorithmically detectable patterns into the generated text while ideally preserving the quality and diversity of language model outputs. Although the concept of watermarking is well-established in vision, its application to digital text poses unique challenges due to the text’s discrete and semantic-sensitive nature ([Kutter et al., 2000](#)). Early works are edit-based methods that modify a pre-existing text. The earliest work can be dated back to [Atallah et al. \(2001\)](#), which designs a scheme for watermarking natural language text by embedding small portions of the watermark bit string in the syntactic structure of the text, followed by paraphrasing ([Atallah et al., 2003](#)), syntax tree manipulations ([Topkara et al., 2005](#); [Meral et al., 2009](#)) and synonym substitution ([Topkara et al., 2006](#)). Besides, text watermarking has also been used for steganography and secret communication ([Fang et al., 2017](#); [Ziegler et al., 2019](#); [Abdelnabi and Fritz, 2021](#)), and intellectual property protection ([He et al., 2022a,b](#); [Zhao et al., 2022, 2023b](#)), but this is out the scope of this work. In light of growing ethical considerations, text watermarking has been increasingly used to ascertain the origin of textual content and detect AI-generated content ([Grinbaum and Adomaitis,](#)

[2022](#)). The primary focus of this paper is on the use of text watermarking to detect AI-generated text.

In general, watermarking for text detection can also be classified into white-box and black-box watermarking. Watermarking is designed to determine whether the text is coming from a specific language model rather than universally detecting text generated by any potential model. As such, knowledge of the model source is always required in text watermarking for detection.

#### 4.3.1 Black-Box Watermarking

In black-box setting, such as API-based applications, the proprietary nature of the language models used by LLM providers precludes downstream users from accessing the sampling process for commercial reasons. Alternatively, a user may wish to watermark human-authored text via post-processing. In such cases, black-box watermarking aims to automatically manipulate generated text to embed watermarks readable by third parties. Traditional works designed complex linguistic rules such as paraphrasing ([Atallah et al., 2003](#)), syntax tree manipulations ([Topkara et al., 2005](#); [Meral et al., 2009](#)) and synonym substitution ([Topkara et al., 2006](#)), but lack scalability. Later work turns to pre-trained language models for efficient watermarking. For example, [Yang et al. \(2022\)](#) proposes a natural language watermarking scheme based on context-aware lexical substitution (LS). Specifically, they employ BERT ([Devlin et al., 2019](#)) to suggest LS candidates by inferring the semantic relatedness between the candidates and the original sentence. [Yang et al. \(2023a\)](#) first defines a binary encoding function to compute a random binary encoding corresponding to a word. The encodings computed for non-watermarked text conform to a Bernoulli distribution, wherein the probability of a word representing bit-1 is approximately 0.5. To inject a watermark, they alter the distribution by selectively replacing words representing bit-0 with context-based synonyms that represent bit-1. A statistical test is then used to identify the watermark.

#### 4.3.2 White-Box Watermarking

The most popular **① training-free** watermark directly manipulates the decoding process when the model is deployed. In the efforts of watermarking GPT outputs, [Aaronson \(2022\)](#) works with OpenAI to first develop a technique for watermarking language models using exponential minimum sam-



pling to sample text from the model, where the inputs to the sampling mechanism are a hash of the previous  $k$  consecutive tokens through a pseudo-random number generator. By Gumbel Softmax (Jang et al., 2016) rule, their method is proven to ensure guaranteed quality. Besides, Christ et al. (2023) provides the formal definition and construction of undetectable watermarks. Their cryptographically inspired watermark design proposes watermarking blocks of text from a language model by hashing each block to seed a sampler for the next block. However, there are only theoretical concepts for this method without experimental results. Another pioneering work of training-free watermark (Kirchenbauer et al., 2023a) embeds invisible watermarks in the decoding process by dividing the vocabulary into a “green list” and a “red list” based on the hash of prefix token and subtly increases the probability of choosing from the green list. Then, a third party, equipped with knowledge of the hash function and random number generator, can reproduce the green list for each token and monitor the violation of the green list rule. Subsequently, Zhao et al. (2023a) simplifies the scheme by consistently using a fixed green-red list split, showing that the new watermark persists in guaranteed generation quality and is more robust against text editing. Kuditipudi et al. (2023) create watermarks that are distortion-free by utilizing randomized watermark keys to sample from token probability distribution by inverse transform sampling and exponential minimum sampling. Hou et al. (2023) propose a sentence-level semantic watermark based on locality-sensitive hashing (LSH), which partitions the semantic space of sentences. The advantage of this design is its enhanced robustness against paraphrasing attacks. DiPmark (Wu et al., 2023b) is an unbiased distribution-preserving watermark that preserves the original token distribution during watermarking and is robust to moderate changes of tokens by incorporating a novel reweight strategy, combined with a hash function that assigns unique i.i.d. ciphers based on the context. Drawn on the drawbacks of random green-red list splitting, Fu et al. (2023) uses input sequence to get semantically related tokens for watermarking to improve certain conditional generation tasks.

Despite training-free watermarking, text watermarks can also be injected through pre-inference training or post-inference training: ② **training-based watermark**. One example of pre-inference training is REMARK-LLM (Zhang et al., 2023b),

which injects the watermark by a message encoding module to generate a dense token distribution, following a message decoding module to extract messages from the watermarked textual and reparameterization is used as a bridge to connect the dense distribution with tokens’ one-hot encoding. The drawback is that training is required on source data and might not generalize well to unseen text data. On the contrary, post-inference training involves adding a trained module to assist in injecting watermarks during inference. For instance, Liu et al. (2023a) proposes a semantic invariant robust watermark for LLMs, by utilizing another embedding LLM to generate semantic embeddings for all preceding tokens. However, it is not training-free since these semantic embeddings are transformed into the watermark logits through their trained watermark model.

Despite from 0-bit watermark, there is also ③ **multi-bit watermarking**. For example, Yoo et al. (2023a) designs a multi-bit watermarking following a well-known proposition from image watermarking that identifies natural language features invariant to minor corruption and proposes a corruption-resistant infill model. COLOR (Yoo et al., 2023b) subsequently designs another multi-bit watermark by embedding traceable multi-bit information during language model generation while allowing zero-bit detection simultaneously. Fernandez et al. (2023) also consolidates watermarks for LLMs through more robust statistical tests and multi-bit watermarking.

## 5 Attack, Challenges, Future Outlook

The detection of LLM-generated content is an evolving field. Detection attacks can be found in Appendix A.2 and we also summarize the challenges in Appendix A.3. Additionally, we list some potential avenues for future work (details are included in Appendix A.8): 1). robust and scalable detection techniques; 2). rigorous and standard evaluation; 3). fine-grained detection; 4). user education and awareness; 5). transparency and explainability.

## 6 Conclusion

We comprehensively survey LLMs-generated content detection over existing task formulation, benchmark datasets, evaluation metrics, and different detection methods to help the research community quickly learn the progress in this field.



665	<b>Limitations</b>		
666	Despite conducting a comprehensive literature re-		
667	view on AI-generated content detection, we ac-		
668	knowledge the potential for omissions due to in-		
669	complete searches.		
670	<b>Ethics Statement</b>		
671	The utilization of AI detection presents significant		
672	ethical considerations, particularly when it comes		
673	to the detection of plagiarism among students. Mis-		
674	classifications in this context can give rise to sub-		
675	stantial concerns. This survey aims to summarize		
676	the current techniques employed in this field com-		
677	prehensively. However, it is important to note that		
678	no flawless detectors have been developed thus far.		
679	Consequently, users should exercise caution when		
680	interpreting the detection outcomes, and it should		
681	be understood that we cannot be held accountable		
682	for any inaccuracies or errors that may arise.		
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## A Appendix

### A.1 Commercial Detection Tool

Despite from academic research, AI text detection also draws considerable attention from commercial companies. Table 1 summarizes the popular commercial detectors. Although the majority of them simultaneously claim to be the most accurate AI detectors on the homepage of their website, it is essential to evaluate their performance based on various factors such as accuracy, speed, robustness, and compatibility with different platforms and frameworks. Regrettably, a dearth of articles exists that explicitly delve into the comparative analysis of the aforementioned properties among popular commercial detectors.

### A.2 Detection Attack

Despite the progress of detection work, there are also continuous efforts to evade existing detectors, and we summarize the main streams in this section.

#### A.2.1 Paraphrasing Attack

Paraphrasing could be performed by human writers or other LLMs, and even by the same source model. Paraphrasing can also undergo several rounds, influenced by a mixture of different models. Current research mostly focuses on the simple paraphrase case where another model rewrites a machine-generated text for one round. For instance, [Krishna et al. \(2023\)](#) trains a T5-11b model for paraphrasing text and discovers that all detectors experience a significant drop in quality when faced with paraphrased text. Additionally, simple paraphrasing attacks involve word substitutions ([Shi et al., 2023](#)). Moreover, paraphrasing can also be achieved through translation attacks. However, conducting more in-depth analysis and research on complex paraphrasing techniques in the future is crucial. [Becker et al. \(2023\)](#) systemically examines different classifiers encompassing both classical approaches and Transformer techniques for detecting machine (like T5) or human paraphrased text.

#### A.2.2 Adversarial Attack

Though the adversarial attack is popular for general NLP tasks ([Alzantot et al., 2018](#)), there has been little work specifically addressing adversarial attacks on detectors for LLM-generated content. However, we can consider the following two types of attacks for further investigation and exploration:

*Adversarial Examples:* Attackers can generate specially crafted inputs by making subtle modifications to the text that fool the AI text detectors while remaining mostly unchanged to human readers ([Shi et al., 2023](#)). These modifications can include adding or removing certain words or characters, introducing synonyms, or leveraging linguistic tricks to deceive the detector. Evasion attacks aim to manipulate the AI text detector’s behavior by exploiting its vulnerabilities. Attackers can use techniques such as obfuscation, word permutation, or introducing irrelevant or misleading content to evade detection. The goal is to trigger false negatives and avoid being flagged as malicious or inappropriate.

*Model Inversion Attacks:* Attackers can launch model inversion attacks by exploiting the responses of AI text detectors. They might submit carefully crafted queries and observe the model’s responses to gain insights into its internal workings, architecture, or training data, which can be used to create more effective attacks or subvert the system’s defenses.

#### A.2.3 Prompt Attack

Current LLMs are vulnerable to prompts ([Zhu et al., 2023](#)), thus, users can utilize smartly designed prompts to evade established detectors. For example, [Shi et al. \(2023\)](#) examines instructional prompt attacks by perturbing the input prompt to encourage LLMs to generate texts that are difficult to detect. [Lu et al. \(2023\)](#) also show that LLMs can be guided to evade AI-generated text detection by a novel substitution-based In-Context example Optimization method (SICO) to automatically generate carefully crafted prompts, enabling ChatGPT to evade six existing detectors by a significant 0.54 AUC drop on average. Nevertheless, limited attention has been devoted to this topic, indicating a notable research gap that merits significant scholarly exploration in the immediate future. Notably, a recent work ([Chakraborty et al., 2023a](#)) introduces the Counter Turing Test (CT2), a benchmark consisting of techniques aiming to evaluate the robustness of existing six detection techniques comprehensively. Their empirical findings unequivocally highlight the fragility of almost all the proposed detection methods under scrutiny. Despite the hard prompt attack, [Kumarage et al. \(2023\)](#) first creates an evasive soft prompt tailored to a specific PLM through prompt tuning; and then, they leverage the transferability of soft prompts to transfer the



Product Name	Website	Price	API available
Originality.AI	<a href="https://app.originality.ai/api-access">https://app.originality.ai/api-access</a>	\$0.01/100 words	Yes
Quil.org	<a href="https://aiwritingcheck.org/">https://aiwritingcheck.org/</a>	Free website version	No
Sapling	<a href="https://sapling.ai/ai-content-detector">https://sapling.ai/ai-content-detector</a>	1 million chars at \$25/month	Yes
OpenAI text classifier	<a href="https://openai-openai-detector.hf.space/">https://openai-openai-detector.hf.space/</a>	Free website version	Yes
Crossplag	<a href="https://crossplag.com/ai-content-detector/">https://crossplag.com/ai-content-detector/</a>	Free website version	No
GPTZero	<a href="https://gptzero.me/">https://gptzero.me/</a>	0.5 million words at \$14.99/mo	Yes
ZeroGPT	<a href="https://www.zerogpt.com/">https://www.zerogpt.com/</a>	Free website version	No
CopyLeaks	<a href="https://copyleaks.com/ai-content-detector">https://copyleaks.com/ai-content-detector</a>	25000 words at \$10.99/Month	No

Table 1: A summary of popular commercial tools to detect AI-generated text.

learned evasive soft prompt from one PLM to another and find the universal efficacy of the evasion attack.

### A.3 Challenges

#### A.3.1 Theoretical Analysis

Inspired by the binary hypothesis test in (Polyanskiy and Wu, 2022), (Sadasivan et al., 2023) claims that machine-generated text will become indistinguishable as the total variance between the distributions of human and machine approaches zero. In contrast, Chakraborty et al. (2023b) demonstrates that it is always possible to distinguish them by curating more data to make the detection of AUROC increase exponentially with the number of training instances. Additionally, DNA-GPT (Yang et al., 2023b) demonstrates the difficulty of obtaining a high TPR while maintaining a low FPR. Nevertheless, a dearth of theoretical examination persists regarding the disparities in intrinsic characteristics between human-written language and LLMs. Scholars could leverage the working mechanisms of GPT models to establish a robust theoretical analysis, shedding light on detectability and fostering the development of additional detection algorithms.

#### A.3.2 LLM-Generated Code Detection

Previous detectors usually only focus on the text, but LLMs-generated codes also show increasing quality (see a recent survey (Zan et al., 2022)). Among the first, Lee et al. (2023) found that previous watermarking (Kirchenbauer et al., 2023a) for text does not work well in terms of both detectability and generated code quality. It is evidenced that low entropy persists in generated code (Lee et al., 2023), thus, the decoding process is more deterministic. They thus adapt the text watermarks to code generation by only injecting watermarks to tokens with higher entropy than a given threshold and achieve more satisfactory results. Code detection is generally believed to be even harder than text

detection due to its shorter length, low entropy, and non-natural language properties. DetectGPT4Code (Yang et al., 2023d) detects codes generated by ChatGPT by using a proxy code model to approximate the logits on the conditional probability curve and achieves the best results over previous detectors.

#### A.3.3 Model Sourcing

Model sourcing (Yang et al., 2023b), is also known as origin tracking (Li et al., 2023a) or authorship attribution (Uchendu et al., 2020). Unlike the traditional distinction between human and machine-generated texts, it focuses on identifying the specific source model from a pool of models, treating humans as a distinct model category. With the fast advancement of LLMs from different organizations, it is vital to tell which model or organization potentially generates a certain text. This has practical applications, particularly for copyright protection. Consequently, we believe that in the future, it may become the responsibility of organizations releasing powerful LLMs to determine whether a given text is a product of their system. Previous work either (Li et al., 2023a) trains a classifier or utilizes the intrinsic genetic properties (Yang et al., 2023b) to perform model sourcing, but still can not handle more complicated scenarios. GPT-who (Venkatraman et al., 2023) utilizes Uniform Information Density (UID) based features to model the unique statistical signature of each LLM and human author for accurate authorship attribution.

#### A.3.4 Bias

It has been found that current detectors tend to be biased against non-native speakers (Liang et al., 2023). Also, Yang et al. (2023b) found that previous detection tools often perform poorly on other languages other than English. Besides, current research usually focuses on the detection of text within a certain length, thus showing bias against the shorter text. How to ensure the integrity of detectors under various scenarios without showing

1609 bias against certain groups is of central importance.

### 1610 **A.3.5 Generalization**

1611 Currently, the most advanced LLMs, like Chat-  
1612 GPT, are getting actively updated, and OpenAI  
1613 will make a large update every three months. How  
1614 to effectively adapt existing detectors to the up-  
1615 dated LLMs is of great importance. For example,  
1616 [Tu et al. \(2023a\)](#) records the ChatLog of ChatGPT’s  
1617 response to long-form generation every day in one  
1618 month, observes performance degradation of the  
1619 Roberta-based detector, and also finds some stable  
1620 features to improve the robustness of detection. As  
1621 LLMs continuously benefit from interacting with  
1622 different datasets and human feedback, exploring  
1623 ways to effectively and efficiently detect their gener-  
1624 ations remains an ongoing research area. Addition-  
1625 ally, [Kirchenbauer et al. \(2023b\)](#) investigates the  
1626 reliability of watermarks for large language models  
1627 and claims that watermarking is a reliable solution  
1628 under human paraphrasing and various attacks at  
1629 the context length of around 1000. [Pu et al. \(2023\)](#)  
1630 examines the zero-shot generalization of machine-  
1631 generated text detectors and finds that none of the  
1632 detectors can generalize to all generators. All those  
1633 findings reveal the difficulty of reliable generaliza-  
1634 tion to unseen models or data sources of detection.  
1635

### 1636 **A.4 News Reports**

1637 We summarize several influential news on the  
1638 false use of AI detectors and concerns brought by  
1639 AI-generated information.

- 1640 1. International students are concerned their  
1641 original writing is being flagged as AI-generated  
1642 text. [link](#)
- 1643 2. Professor Flunks All His Students After  
1644 ChatGPT Falsely Claims It Wrote Their Papers.  
1645 [link](#)
- 1646 3. China reports first arrest over fake news  
1647 generated by ChatGPT. [link](#)
- 1648 4. Professors have a summer assignment: Prevent  
1649 ChatGPT chaos in the fall. [link](#)
- 1650 5. AI makes plagiarism harder to detect, argue  
1651 academics – in paper written by chatbot. [link](#)
- 1652 6. How AI Could Take Over Elections—And  
1653 Undermine Democracy. [link](#)  
1654

### 1655 **A.5 Related Survey**

1656 In the literature, there are some other surveys on  
1657 this topic. For example, [Jawahar et al. \(2020\)](#) dis-

cusses the detection of small language models. [Tang et al. \(2023\)](#) provides an overview of previ-  
1658 ous detection methods but does not fully cover the  
1659 recent progress in the era of LLMs. Very recently,  
1660 [Crothers et al. \(2022\)](#) surveys threat models and  
1661 detection methods but also summarizes previous  
1662 detection methods rather than the latest progress  
1663 with LLMs. Unlike them, our work aims to fill this  
1664 gap by providing the first comprehensive survey  
1665 about detection, attack, and benchmarks, especially  
1666 focusing on detecting LLMs like ChatGPT. Thus,  
1667 our survey includes the most advanced approaches.  
1668

[Dhaini et al. \(2023\)](#) gives a survey of the state of  
1670 detecting only ChatGPT-Generated text but ignores  
1671 various detection methods on other models.  
1672

### 1673 **A.6 Additional Latest Work**

1674 Very recently, there have been some additional  
1675 work released very close to our submission, includ-  
1676 ing watermarking methods ([Fairoze et al., 2023](#); [Tu  
1677 et al., 2023b](#); [Chen et al., 2023a](#); [Ajith et al., 2023](#);  
1678 [Zhang et al., 2023a](#); [Li et al., 2023c](#); [Keleş et al.,  
1679 2023](#); [Piet et al., 2023](#); [Gu et al., 2023](#); [Huang et al.,  
1680 2023](#); [Zhao et al., 2024](#); [Qu et al., 2024](#); [Liu and  
1681 Bu, 2024](#); [Wouters, 2023](#)), training-based methods  
1682 ([Chen et al., 2023b](#); [Guo and Yu, 2023](#); [Wang et al.,  
1683 2024](#); [Soto et al., 2024](#)), zero-shot methods ([Mao  
1684 et al., 2024](#); [Hans et al., 2024](#); [Shi et al., 2024](#);  
1685 [Liu et al., 2024](#)), attacks ([Irtiza Tripto et al., 2023](#);  
1686 [Macko et al., 2024](#); [Peng et al., 2024](#)).

### 1687 **A.7 Datasets**

- 1688 • [Uchendu et al. \(2021\)](#) presents the TURING-  
1689 BENCH benchmark for Turing Test and Author-  
1690 ship Attribution across 19 language models.
- 1691 • HC3 ([Guo et al., 2023](#)) collects the Human Chat-  
1692 GPT Comparison Corpus (HC3) with both long-  
1693 and short-level documents from ELI5 ([Fan et al.,  
1694 2019](#)), WikiQA ([Yang et al., 2015](#)), Crawled  
1695 Wikipedia, Medical Dialog ([Chen et al., 2020](#)),  
1696 and FiQA ([Maia et al., 2018](#)).
- 1697 • CHEAT ([Yu et al., 2023a](#)) provides 35,304 syn-  
1698 thetic academic abstracts, with Generation, Pol-  
1699 ish, and Mix as prominent representatives.
- 1700 • Ghostbuster ([Verma et al., 2023](#)) provides a de-  
1701 tection benchmark that covers student essays, cre-  
1702 ative fiction, and news at document-level detec-  
1703 tion and paragraph-level.
- 1704 • OpenGPTText ([Chen et al., 2023c](#)) consists of  
1705 29,395 rephrased content generated using Chat-  
1706 GPT, originating from OpenWebText ([Gokaslan  
1707 and Cohen, 2019](#)).

Datasets	Length	Size	Data type	#Language
TuringBench (2021)	100~400	200K	News articles	1
HC3 (2023)	100~250	44,425	Reddit, Wikipedia, medicine and finance	2
CHEAT (2023a)	100~300	35,304	Academical abstracts	1
Ghostbuster (2023)	200~1200	12,685	Student essays, creative fiction, and news	1
GPT-Sentinel (2023c)	100~400	29,395	OpenWebText (2023)	1
M4 (2023c)	200-300	122,481	Multi-domains	6
MGTBench (2023)	10~200	2,817	Question-answering datasets	1
Deepfake (2023b)	~264	447,674	Multi-domains	1
HC3 Plus (2023b)	100~250	214,498	Summarization, translation, and paraphrasing	2
MULTITuDE (2023)	150~400	74,081	MassiveSumm (2021)	11
HumanEval (2021)	~181	164	Code Exercise	1
APPS (2021)	~474	5,000	Code Competitions	1
CodeContests (2022)	~2239	165	Code Competitions	6

Table 2: A summarization of the detection datasets. Length is reported in the number of words for text and characters for codes. #Language represents the number of types of natural languages for text and programming languages for codes.

- M4 (Wang et al., 2023c) is a large-scale benchmark covering multi-generator, multi-domain, and multi-lingual corpus for machine-generated text detection.
- MULTITuDE (Macko et al., 2023) Large-Scale Multilingual Machine-Generated Text Detection Benchmark comprising 74,081 authentic and machine-generated texts in 11 languages generated by 8 multilingual LLMs. They find that the most currently available black-box methods do not work in multilingual settings.
- MGTBench (He et al., 2023) focuses on ChatGPT-generated content on: TruthfulQA (Lin et al., 2022), SQuAD (Rajpurkar et al., 2016) and NarrativeQA (Kočíský et al., 2018).
- SAID(Social media AI Detection) Cui et al. (2023) is curated for real AI-generate text from popular social media platforms like Zhihu and Quora, and conducting detection tasks on actual social media platforms prove to be more challenging compared to traditional simulated AI-text detection.
- HC3 Plus (Su et al., 2023b) is a more extensive and comprehensive dataset that considers more types of tasks, considering tasks such as summarization, translation, and paraphrasing to possess semantic-invariant properties and are more difficult to detect.

We summarize them in Table 2.

## A.8 Future Outlooks

Details on the future outlook are as follows.

- *Robust and Scalable Detection Techniques*: Current LLMs are getting constant improvements

- from big tech companies. Thus, the development of advanced algorithms and detection techniques capable of accurately identifying LLM-generated content in real time is a priority. Future research should focus on improving the accuracy, robustness to attacks, and scalability of detection methods to keep up with the increasing volume and complexity of LLM-generated content.
- *Rigorous and Standard Evaluation*: As discussed in Section 2.3, current evaluation faces data contamination issues; either the LLMs or the detectors might encounter the human data in their training stage. Besides, the evaluation benchmark also varies. The detection results affect the length, prompting methods, and adopted datasets. However, unlike traditional machine learning tasks where one benchmark can be used for a long period, how to avoid any potential data contamination is very critical.
- *Fine-grained Detection*: LLM-generated content can vary in its intentions, ranging from malicious propaganda to unintentional misinformation. Future work should explore approaches that can detect and differentiate between various categories of LLM-generated content, allowing for more tailored interventions and countermeasures.
- *User Education and Awareness*: Educating users about the existence and capabilities of LLMs detectors is essential. For example, in Appendix A.4, we show some reported misuse of AI detectors in education. Future work should focus on raising awareness among users about the reliability of detection tools. This can empower users to make more informed decisions and mitigate the

1775 impact of deceptive or misleading decisions.

- 1776 • *AI Regulations*: As LLMs become more sophis-  
1777 ticated, the ethical implications of their usage  
1778 in generating deceptive content become increas-  
1779 ingly important. Future research should explore  
1780 ethical frameworks and guidelines for the re-  
1781 sponsible development and deployment of LLMs  
1782 while considering the potential consequences and  
1783 risks associated with their misuse.
- 1784 • *Transparency and Explainability*: Enhancing  
1785 the transparency and explainability of LLM-  
1786 generated content detection algorithms is crucial  
1787 for building trust and understanding among users.  
1788 For example, [Yang et al. \(2023b\)](#) uses the non-  
1789 trivial N-gram overlaps to support the detection  
1790 results. But currently, most detectors can only  
1791 give a predictive probability, with no clues about  
1792 evidence. Future work should focus on develop-  
1793 ing techniques that can provide explanations or  
1794 evidence for the classification decisions made by  
1795 detection systems, enabling users to understand  
1796 the rationale behind content identification better.