CrossGuard: Safeguarding MLLMs against Joint-Modal Implicit Malicious Attacks

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Abstract

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) achieve strong reasoning and perception capabilities but are increasingly vulnerable to jailbreak attacks. While existing work focuses on *explicit attacks*, where malicious content resides in a single modality, recent studies reveal *implicit attacks*, in which benign text and image inputs jointly express unsafe intent. Such joint-modal threats are difficult to detect and remain underexplored, largely due to the scarcity of high-quality implicit data. We propose **ImpForge**, an automated red-teaming pipeline that leverages reinforcement learning with tailored reward modules to generate diverse implicit samples across 14 domains. Building on this dataset, we further develop **CrossGuard**, an intent-aware safeguard providing robust and comprehensive defense against both explicit and implicit threats. Extensive experiments across safe and unsafe benchmarks, implicit and explicit attacks, and multiple out-of-domain settings demonstrate that CrossGuard significantly outperforms existing defenses, including advanced MLLMs and guardrails, achieving stronger security while maintaining high utility. This offers a balanced and practical solution for enhancing MLLM robustness against real-world multimodal threats. Our code is released `here`. Warning: This paper includes potentially harmful content; reader discretion is advised.

1 Introduction

Benefiting from strong reasoning and perception capabilities, Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) (Hurst et al., 2024; Liu et al., 2023a; Team, 2025) have demonstrated remarkable progress in various tasks like visual question answering (Xiao et al., 2024; Li et al., 2024b), image captioning (Bucciarelli et al., 2024), and anomaly detection (Xu et al., 2025; Chen et al., 2025). However, these powerful capabilities also pose new threats by enabling the increasing generation of harmful content (Liu et al., 2024a). Jailbreak attacks on MLLMs are designed to manipulate inputs to bypass MLLM guardrails and elicit harmful responses. Existing jailbreak attacks can be broadly categorized into *text-based* and *vision-*



Figure 1: Conventional text-based **(a)** or vision-based **(b)** malicious queries, where malicious intents are explicitly expressed in a single modality and thus handled by existing guardrails. **(c)** shows the *joint-modal implicit malicious* case studied in this work, where neither the text nor the image can alone reveals harmful intent, but their joint interpretation bypasses existing guardrails and induces unsafe responses. **(d)** compares the attack success rate (ASR) on explicit (VLGuard (Zong et al., 2024)) and implicit multimodal malicious datasets (SIUO (Wang et al., 2025)). Although existing MLLMs (Team, 2025; Hurst et al., 2024; Anthropic, 2024) performes low ASR on explicit malicious queries, their defense drops sharply on implicit ones (top row). Extra guardrails are thus needed, yet existing methods (Chi et al., 2024; Jiang et al., 2025) still show a large gap between explicit and implicit defense (bottom row), underscoring the challenging of implicit attack. In contrast, **CrossGuard** maintains consistently strong robustness across both.

based attacks, as shown in Figure 1 (a,b). **Text-based attacks** typically bypass guardrails by manipulating prompts through gradient-based (Guo et al., 2024) or evolution-based (Liu et al., 2023b) optimization. **Vision-based attacks**, on the other hand, either perform adversarial modifications to input images *(perturbation-based jailbreaks)* (Qi et al., 2024; Carlini et al., 2023) or embed harmful instructions within the image *(structure-based jailbreaks)* (Wang et al., 2024b; Gong et al., 2025). To mitigate these threats, several defense strategies have been proposed (Helff et al., 2024; Gu et al., 2024; Pi et al., 2024; Liu et al., 2025). Nonetheless, all of these defenses predominantly focus on scenarios where malicious content is explicitly embedded in a single modality—either text or image. We refer to these threats as *explicit attacks*.

Recently, a new emerging threat of *implicit attack* is revealed (Wang et al., 2025). In contrast to existing explicit attacks, implicit attacks do not embed malicious signals within any single modality. Instead, the harmful intent is conveyed only when the visual and textual inputs are combined. That is to say, the image and the text are individually safe, but together they express unsafe intent. This type of attack is significantly harder to detect and defend against, as it exploits the modality gap between vision and language to hijack the model's reasoning process. This phenomenon constitutes a *joint-modal* attack. As illustrated in Figure 1 (c), a malicious instruction presented in plain text can be easily refused by the MLLM's guardrails. Nonetheless, the same malicious intent can successfully bypass the defense when it is concealed within the combination of both modalities—even against one of the most advanced MLLMs, GPT-4o (Hurst et al., 2024). This highlights the emergence and severity of such joint-modal implicit attacks.

Unfortunately, this emerging threat remains largely unresolved, as shown in Figure 1 (d). Wang et al. (2025) highlight the risk and develop a small-scale benchmark consisting of 167 manually annotated implicit malicious samples. However, they do not provide a solution to defend against such threat. One of the main challenges lies in the difficulty of collecting implicit data, where the image and text are individually safe but jointly convey unsafe intent. Unlike traditional unsafe queries or illegal images, which are widespread and easily accessible in the wild or on the internet, joint-modal malicious samples often require careful manual construction and complex reasoning. This data scarcity further hinders the development of effective defenses against such hard-to-detect attacks.

In this work, inspired by the success of reinforcement-learning–based (RL-based) red-teaming in collecting diverse and comprehensive data for LLMs, we introduce **ImpForge**, an RL-based red-teaming pipeline that automatically constructs high-quality joint-modal implicit samples. Nonetheless, a significant gap remains between multimodal objectives and existing LLM-based single-modal solutions. To address this, we design three reward functions—safety, semantic, and overlap rewards—that separately ensure input safety, preserve malicious intent, and enhance implicitness. These designs enable scalable and automated generation of this challenging implicit data type, ensuring substantial diversity and broad coverage.

Building on this collected dataset, we develop **CrossGuard**, a comprehensive, intent-aware multimodal safeguard designed to defend against both implicit and explicit threats. Specifically, we employ a parameter-efficient technique LoRA (Hu et al., 2022) to conduct instruction tuning on LLaVA-1.5-7B (Liu et al., 2023a), achieving superior security across various evaluation settings, including both safe (Liu et al., 2024c; Zong et al., 2024) and unsafe benchmarks (Luo et al., 2024; Zong et al., 2024), implicit (Wang et al., 2025) and explicit (Luo et al., 2024; Zong et al., 2024) attacks, as well as multiple out-of-domain scenarios (Gong et al., 2025; Liu et al., 2024a; Wang et al., 2025). Across all these benchmarks, CrossGuard consistently outperforms existing defenses (Nian et al., 2025; Jiang et al., 2025; Chi et al., 2024), delivering stronger security while maintaining high utility. This balanced development significantly enhances MLLM robustness and provides a practical artifact for the community to defend against real-world multimodal threats.

- We propose **ImpForge**, the red-teaming framework that automatically generates high-quality implicit multimodal malicious samples.
- We introduce **CrossGuard**, an intent-aware guard model that effectively defends both explicit and implicit jailbreak attacks, achieving robust safety without sacrificing utility.
- Extensive empirical studies across diverse malicious datasets demonstrate that ImpForge effectively exposes vulnerabilities of advanced MLLMs, while CrossGuard robustly surpasses existing defenses in utility and security.

2 Preliminary

2.1 Jailbreak attack on MLLM

A jailbreak attack on a MLLM can be defined as the model $g(\cdot)$ generates unsafe response given an image-text pair containing malicious information. Generally, an obviously malicious pair (x^I, x^T) would be handled safely (e.g., the model refuses or returns a safe response, $g(x^I, x^T) \in A_{\text{safe}}$). Traditional jailbreaks instead obfuscate the malicious content by perturbing a single modality: text-based attacks transform x^T to $\hat{x}^T$, and and vision-based attacks transform x^I to $\hat{x}^I$. These jailbreak queries can bypass the model's guardrails and induce unsafe outputs, e.g., $g(\hat{x}^I, x^T) \in A_{\text{unsafe}}$ or $g(x^I, \hat{x}^T) \in A_{\text{unsafe}}$. Following such jailbreaks, the malicious intent, although obscured, can still be expressed from a single modality. By contrast, our work focuses on a more difficult setting where malicious intent is purposely concealed across modalities and only be expressed when the image and text are combined, making detection and defense substantially more challenging.

2.2 Red-teaming for LLM

In a general reinforcement learning (RL) formulation for red-teaming, the target large language model (LLM), denoted as p, produces a text response $y \sim p(\cdot \mid x)$ given an input prompt x. The goal of red-teaming is to automatically search for prompts x that elicit responses y with high undesirability, such as unsafe content, or harmful behaviors. To quantify undesirability, a reward function $R(y)$ is defined to measure the quality. The objective of the red-team agent is then to maximize the expected reward by adaptively exploring the prompt space.

Formally, a red-team agent is modeled as a policy π_θ, which generates prompts x given variable z from a dataset $\mathcal{D}$ (e.g., a textual prompt) (Li et al., 2024a; Ge et al., 2023). The optimization problem can be written as:

$$\max_\theta \; \mathbb{E}_{z \sim D,\, x \sim \pi_\theta(\cdot|z),\, y \sim p(\cdot|x)} \Big[R(y) - \lambda D_{\text{KL}}\big(\pi_\theta(\cdot \mid z) \,\|\, \pi_{\text{ref}}(\cdot \mid z)\big) \Big], \quad (1)$$

where $D_{\text{KL}}(\pi_\theta \| \pi_{\text{ref}})$ is Kullback–Leibler (KL) divergence penalty, a regularization term that constrains the learned policy π_θ to stay close to a reference policy; the λ controls the strength of the KL penalty.



Figure 2: Overview of proposed **ImpForge**. In Stage 1, a keyword list is selected from all text-based malicious queries. Each query is paired with a benign image that is semantically related to the keyword in the query. In Stage 2, a policy-trainable rewriter model reconstructs the prompt given the initialized image–text pair. Three reward modules are designed to evaluate rewritten samples and guide policy updates.

3 Methodology

In this section, we present our proposed method, which consists of two complementary components. In Sec. 3.1, we introduce ImpForge, a reinforcement learning–based red-teaming framework that automatically generates implicit multimodal malicious samples through a two-stage process, as illustrated in Figure 2. To establish a comprehensive guardrail against both conventional and implicit multimodal malicious attacks, in Sec. 3.2 we further describe how to train the guard model, CrossGuard, using the generated implicit malicious samples from ImpForge.

3.1 ImpForge: Reinforcement Learning for the Red-teaming Framework

In this section, we first introduce how we address the challenge of collecting joint-modal implicit data. Reinforcement learning–based red-teaming frameworks have been demonstrated to be effective for automatically collecting diverse, comprehensive, and high-quality data for LLMs (Li et al., 2024a; Ge et al., 2023). Inspired by this, we develop ImpForge, an RL-based red-teaming pipeline for automatically collecting implicit samples. Nonetheless, since existing RL-based red-teaming solutions focus on single-modal LLMs, directly extending these strategies to joint-modal implicit data collection is highly challenging. Specifically, this task transfer involves two primary challenges: (1) the lack of semantically relevant multimodal inputs, and (2) differing objectives between implicit generation and traditional generation. To bridge these gaps, we propose a two-stage strategy, with the detailed solutions for these challenges introduced in Sec. 3.1.1 and Sec. 3.1.2, respectively.

3.1.1 Joint-modal Inputs Initialization

Different from single-modal LLM red-teaming, which uses a single text input and rewrites it to bypass the victim model, our joint-modal pipeline requires semantically corresponding unsafe image-text pairs as input—which are much harder to collect than single-modal samples. To address this challenge and enable implicit data collection, we design a soft semantic-matching mechanism to construct initial image–text pairs for red-teaming.

Specifically, we start by building a keyword list from the text-based malicious dataset BeaverTails (Ji et al., 2023). We then apply Named Entity Recognition (NER) (Bird, 2006) to extract entity-level words (e.g., content words such as nouns and verbs) that are naturally visualizable, while filtering out abstract words that cannot be visualized (e.g., *"how"*, *"am"*, *"can"*). For the selected entity keywords, we retrieve matched candidate images x^I from open-source image datasets (Lin et al., 2014; Srinivasan et al., 2021) to build a keyword-to-image mapping. Matching is guided by semantic similarity, computed as $\frac{g(k)\cdot g(x^I)}{\|g(k)\|\|g(x^I)\|}$, where $g(\cdot)$ denotes a pretrained CLIP encoder (Radford et al., 2021). Subsequently, for each malicious prompt x^T, we construct a semantically relevant initial image-text pair (x^T, x^I). To further ensure safety, we incorporate GPT assistance (Hurst et al., 2024) to verify that x^I contains no malicious content. Thus, we construct the initial input triple (x^I, x^T, k), where x^I is an individually benign image, x^T is the malicious text, and k is the keyword that links them.

3.1.2 RL-based optimization for implicit sampling

Although we have constructed the initial inputs in Stage 1, where an individually benign image is paired with a malicious textual query, another challenge arises from the objective differences between our implicit data sampling and traditional text-based malicious data sampling. In traditional text-based red-teaming, the primary objective is to optimize the text so that it bypasses the victim model's guardrail. In contrast, our implicit sampling process introduces three additional constraints:

1. the optimized image-text pair must remain individually safe;
2. the optimized image-text pair must preserve the malicious semantics of the textual input;
3. the optimized image-text pair should be as semantically irrelevant as possible to ensure implicitness.

To satisfy these constraints, we design three complementary reward functions: a safety reward, a semantic reward, and an overlap reward.

In addition, image optimization is typically computationally expensive (Rombach et al., 2022). For efficiency, we therefore fix the image and optimize only the text during the optimization process.

Safety reward R_{safety}. A key constraint in generating implicit malicious samples is ensuring that the optimized prompt $\hat{x}^T \sim \pi_\theta(\cdot \mid x^I, x^T)$ remains individually safe, i.e., it can not reveal harmful intent itself. To address this, we introduce a safety reward that explicitly encourages textual safety of $\hat{x}^T$. Concretely, we compute the probability that a pretrained guardrail model (Inan et al., 2023) assigns to the "`safe`" token during decoding:

$$R_{\text{safety}}(\hat{x}^T) = \text{softmax}\big(\, p(\texttt{safe} \mid x_T') \,\big). \quad (2)$$

This reward guides the policy π_θ toward generating rewritten prompts that appear benign alone, thereby ensuring that the harmful intent can only emerge through the joint image–text combination.

Semantic reward R_{sim}. Another key constraint lies in preserving the malicious intent in initial prompt x^T without making it explicit in the rewritten $\hat{x}^T$. The harmful semantics should be retained only when the rewritten text is combined with the image x^I. To address this, we design a semantic reward that enforces alignment between the original malicious query x^T and the generated pair $(x^I, \hat{x}^T)$. Specifically, the reward is defined as:

$$R_{\text{sim}}(x^I, x^T, \hat{x}^T) = \frac{g(x^I \oplus \hat{x}^T)\cdot g(x^T)}{\|g(x^I \oplus \hat{x}^T)\|\|g(x^T)\|}, \quad (3)$$

where $g(\cdot)$ is a pretrained encoder (Reimers and Gurevych, 2019) that projects the input into a shared embedding space, and $\oplus$ denotes combining x^I and $\hat{x}^T$ into a joint textual input to encoding.

This reward ensures that the rewritten query $\hat{x}^T$ and its paired image x^I jointly preserve the semantics of the original malicious intent in x^T, thereby maintaining implicit maliciousness.

Overlap reward R_{overlap}. Furthermore, we expect the malicious intent conveyed by the optimized image-text pair to be as implicit as possible. A feasible way to improve implicitness is to reduce the Mutual Information (MI) between the optimized image-text pair. Based on this intuition, we design an overlap reward that penalizes semantic redundancy between the rewritten query $\hat{x}^T$ and the corresponding image x^I. To simplify computation, we employ cosine similarity as a proxy for MI measurement. The reward is defined as:

$$R_{\text{ovlp}}(\hat{x}^T, x^I) = 1 - \frac{1}{|\text{Tok}(\hat{x}^T)|} \sum_{w \in \text{Tok}(\hat{x}^T)} I(w; x^I)$$

$$I(w; x^I) = \max\left[0\,,\ \cos(g(w), g(x^I)) - \tau\right], \tag{4}$$

where $\text{Tok}(\cdot)$ denotes the token set of the rewritten prompt, $g(\cdot)$ is the pretrained encoder (Reimers and Gurevych, 2019), $\cos(\cdot)$ is the cosine similarity, and $\tau = 0.2$ is a threshold to ignore weak semantic matches. This overlap reward maximizes implicitness and strengthens the adversarial effectiveness of the generated joint-modal implicit data.

Objective of ImpForge. Building upon the proposed constraints, the overall training objective of our ImpForge framework is formulated as:

$$\max_{\theta}\ \mathbb{E}_{(x^I, x^T, k)\sim\mathcal{D},\ \hat{x}^T\sim\pi_\theta}\Big[R_\psi(x^I, x^T, \hat{x}^T, k) - \lambda D_{\text{KL}}\big(\pi_\theta \| \pi_{\text{ref}}\big)\Big]. \tag{5}$$

For optimization, we employ proximal policy optimization (PPO) (Schulman et al., 2017) applied to LoRA adapters (Hu et al., 2022), which enables efficient and scalable policy updates. Different from the prior preliminary formulation in Eq. 1, our objective does not rely on the response of a specific target model (i.e., $y\ p(\cdot \mid x)$ in Eq. 1). This ensures that the generated joint-modal implicit sample can be applied to red-teaming more diverse MLLM architectures.

3.2 Training CrossGuard

Our next step is to develop a defense model capable of addressing both implicit and explicit threats while maintaining utility. To this end, we introduce **CrossGuard**, a vision-language safeguard trained to distinguish safe and unsafe multimodal inputs.

Training Dataset Construction. To achieve a comprehensive safeguard with both high security and utility, we construct a diverse training dataset. Building on the automated red-teaming framework, we collect an implicit malicious dataset consisting of image-text pairs that are individually benign but jointly malicious across 14 categories (details provided in Appendix B.1). For comprehensive defense, we also include explicit attack samples from the training set of VLGuard (Zong et al., 2024), and FigStep (Gong et al., 2025), two advanced security datasets containing both vision and text explicit samples. In addition, we sample benign data from VQAv2, a widely used general-purpose Visual Question Answering (VQA) dataset, to ensure the general utility of CrossGuard. The specific composition of the training set is shown in Appendix B.2).

Base architecture. We use `LLaVA-1.5-7B` as the base model. To adapt safety alignment while preserving general utility, we employ parameter-efficient fine-tuning via LoRA adapters on both the vision and language backbones.

Training objective. CrossGuard is optimized to serves as a front-end guard model filtering multimodal inputs (x_I, x_T) before inference. It is optimized via cross-entropy for binary classification: refusing harmful semantics while permitting safe inputs.

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{CE}} = -\mathbb{E}_{(x_I, x_T, y)\sim D}\ \log p_\theta(y \mid x_I, x_T), \tag{6}$$

$$p_\theta(y \mid x_I, x_T) = \frac{\exp\big(f_\theta(x_I, x_T)_y\big)}{\sum_{y'\in\{0,1\}} \exp\big(f_\theta(x_I, x_T)_{y'}\big)}.$$

where $f_\theta(x_I, x_T)_y$ denotes the logit corresponding to class y. This objective enforces a clear separation between refusal behavior on malicious pairs and utility preservation on benign ones.

4 Experiments

In our experiments, we investigate four primary Research Questions (RQs):

- **RQ1:** Can our **CrossGuard** provide comprehensive protection against diverse attacks, including both implicit and explicit ones? (see Sec. 4.2)
- **RQ2:** How does **CrossGuard** perform on safe scenarios, and does it incur a utility sacrifice? (see Sec. 4.3)

- **RQ3:** Does the proposed **ImpForge** framework effectively collect diverse and high-quality joint-modal implicit samples? (see Sec. 4.4)
- **RQ4:** How effective are ImpForge-generated data in enhancing guardrail security? (see Sec. 4.5)

4.1 Experimental Setup

We first introduce our experimental settings, including the benchmarks, metrics, and baselines.

Benchmarks. We evaluate CrossGuard across both security and utility benchmarks, covering both in-domain (ID) and out-of-domain (OOD) settings. Our security evaluation encompasses a broad range of jailbreak scenarios, spanning three primary jailbreak categories:

- **Vision-based explicit attacks**: FigStep (Gong et al., 2025), VLGuard (Zong et al., 2024), JailBreakV (Luo et al., 2024), and MM-SafetyBench (Liu et al., 2024a);
- **Text-based explicit attacks**: JailBreakV and MM-SafetyBench;
- **Joint-modal implicit attacks**, assessed using SIUO (Wang et al., 2025) benchmark, an advanced implicit attack benchmark.

Across these benchmarks, we utilize VLGuard and FigStep as ID scenarios, while JailbreakV, MM-SafetyBench, and SIUO serve as rigorous OOD evaluations to test CrossGuard's practical robustness. In addition, to ensure CrossGuard does not suffer from over-defense, we also conduct a utility evaluation on the OOD safe VQA benchmark, MMBench (Liu et al., 2024c). Detailed information for each of these datasets and benchmarks are provided in Appendix D.1.

Metrics. We evaluate model performance using two complementary metrics. (1) Attack Success Rate (**ASR**) measures the proportion of malicious queries that bypass safety constraints; detailed calculation methods are provided in Appendix D.2. (2) **Utility**, which quantifies the model's ability to correctly identify *benign inputs*. Together, these metrics capture both the security and utility aspects of model behavior.

Baselines. CrossGuard is built upon LLaVA-1.5-7B (Liu et al., 2023a) as its base model. We compare it against a diverse set of baselines, including:

- **Online MLLMs:** GPT-4o (Hurst et al., 2024) and Claude-3.5-Sonnet (Anthropic, 2024);
- **Offline MLLMs:** LLaVA-1.5-7B (Liu et al., 2023a) and Qwen2.5-VL-7B (Team, 2025);
- **MLLM guardrails:** Llama-Guard3-Vision (Chi et al., 2024), LlavaGuard (Helff et al., 2024), HiddenDetect (Jiang et al., 2025), and JailDAM (Nian et al., 2025).

These baselines include both open-source and proprietary systems, enabling a comprehensive and balanced evaluation of the robustness of existing guardrails.

4.2 Security Evaluation

In this section, we evaluate the security of CrossGuard on five comprehensive safety benchmarks: JailbreakV, VLGuard, FigStep, MM-SafetyBench, and SIUO. We examine the superiority of CrossGuard over diverse advanced defenses, including safety-aligned MLLMs and dedicated MLLM guardrails, and further assess its robustness in handling out-of-domain scenarios. The results are presented in Table 1.

Comparison with Existing Defenses. We compare CrossGuard with two safety-aligned offline MLLMs (LLaVA-1.5-7B and Qwen2.5-VL-7B), two commercial online MLLMs (GPT-4o and Claude-3.5-Sonnet), and four advanced MLLM guardrails (LlavaGuard, Llama-Guard3-Vision, HiddenDetect, and JailDAM). As shown in Table 1, CrossGuard outperforms all of these baselines, achieving a significantly lower average ASR of only 2.79%, whereas the runner-up defense, Claude-3.5-Sonnet, achieves 12.05%.

On the joint-modal implicit attack benchmark SIUO, most MLLMs and guardrails fail severely (e.g., Llama-Guard3-Vision reaches 89.82% ASR and JailDAM 81.44%). Even the most advanced commercial MLLMs, such as GPT-4o and Claude-3.5-Sonnet, remain vulnerable, with ASR values of 48.92% and 23.95%, respectively. In contrast, CrossGuard reduces the ASR to only 5.39%, demonstrating its significant superiority over other defenses in countering this emerging attack.

On other four single-modal explicit attack benchmarks, CrossGuard also exhibits robust security: ASR remains below 1% on three benchmarks, and the maximum ASR across all four benchmarks is limited to 7.24%. By contrast, other guardrails such as LlavaGuard and Llama-Guard3-Vision, though specifically designed for multimodal safety detection, are still severely vulnerable to certain attacks and show unstable performance across benchmarks.

Table 1: Comparison of defense robustness across different safety benchmarks. Reported values are Attack Success Rates (ASR, %)—lower is better. The evaluation includes offline/online multimodal LLMs, vision–language guard models, and our CrossGuard.

		Out-of-domain			In-domain		Average
Category	Model	JailBreakV	MM-SafetyBench	SIUO	FigStep	VLGuard	
Offline MLLMs	LLaVA-1.5-7B (base)	51.43	28.85	95.81	62.60	46.38	57.01
	Qwen2.5-VL-7B	2.14	10.00	41.56	24.20	9.73	17.53
Online MLLMs	GPT-4o	6.08	16.15	48.92	1.60	**6.11**	15.77
	Claude-3.5-Sonnet	5.00	13.08	23.95	13.00	5.21	12.05
MLLM Guardrails	LlavaGuard	90.71	32.58	90.80	83.08	90.42	77.52
	Llama-Guard3-Vision	34.29	74.89	50.40	66.92	89.82	63.26
	JailDAM	32.50	16.54	81.44	6.00	15.38	30.37
	HiddenDetect	4.64	8.65	44.91	72.20	26.02	31.28
	CrossGuard (ours)	**0.72**	**0.38**	**5.39**	**0.21**	7.24	**2.79**

For example, LlavaGuard records ASR values exceeding 90% on JailBreakV and FigStep, yet drops below 35% on VLGuard.

Overall, these results provide compelling evidence of the effectiveness and superiority of CrossGuard in defending against diverse and comprehensive attacks, highlighting its practicality for real-world security scenarios.

OOD Evaluation and Overfitting Analysis. A potential concern with training on synthetic data, such as our ImpForge-generated dataset, is the risk of overfitting to specific synthetic patterns at the expense of real-world applicability. To address this, we evaluate CrossGuard's robustness in practical out-of-domain (OOD) scenarios using three diverse benchmarks: JailBreakV, MM-SafetyBench, and SIUO. These datasets represent attack distributions and patterns distinct from our training data. As shown in Table 1, CrossGuard maintains a remarkably low ASR of only 0.72%, 0.38%, and 5.39%, respectively, significantly outperforming all baselines. This consistent performance across diverse, non-synthetic datasets provides strong empirical evidence that CrossGuard learns generalizable safety boundaries, highlighting its reliability for handling diverse real-world attacks.

4.3 Utility Evaluation

Another important aspect to investigate is the performance of CrossGuard on safe scenarios. We evaluate the pass rate on benign image–text queries from MMBench (Liu et al., 2024c) to measure the utility of guardrails. As shown in Figure 3, we report both security (1 – ASR) on multimodal malicious inputs from MM-SafetyBench (Liu et al., 2024a) and utility on safe inputs.



Figure 3: **Security–Utility trade-offs across models.** Utility is measured on safe MMBench (Liu et al., 2024c) inputs; Security (1 − ASR) on malicious MM-SafetyBench (Liu et al., 2024a) inputs. Upper-left and lower-right regions indicate *over-defense* and *insufficient robustness*, respectively. The ideal balance lies in the upper-right.

The results reveal that existing safeguard methods face severe limitations in balancing security and utility. Guardrails such as JailDAM and HiddenDetect achieve high security but extremely low utility, reflecting severe over-defense. Conversely, LlavaGuard and Llama-Guard3-Vision maintain relatively high utility but exhibit substantially lower security, indicating weak robustness against multimodal attacks. These observations highlight a structural weakness of current defenses: they either over-restrict benign queries or fail to provide reliable protection.

In contrast, CrossGuard achieves both high security and high utility, resulting in a more balanced security–utility trade-off than prior methods and further highlighting its practicality. We further quantify its computational efficiency and scalability for production deployment in Appendix C.3, confirming its overall practicality.

4.4 Effectiveness of ImpForge

To evaluate ImpForge as a red-teaming framework, we measure its ability to compromise state-of-the-art MLLMs and guardrails.

We use ImpForge to generate multimodal implicit malicious inputs from the BeaverTails (base dataset). To maintain modality consistency, we evaluate BeaverTails*—a version of the baseline paired with corresponding images—under the same multimodal experimental setting.

Table 2: Comparison of ASR (%) between BeaverTails* and ImpForge-rewritten queries.

	BeaverTails*	+ImpForge
Qwen2.5-VL-7B	4.20	76.60
GPT-4o	9.80	70.40
Claude-3.5-sonnet	9.00	44.40
Llama-Guard3-Vision	47.60	97.20
HiddenDetect	4.00	71.40

Table 2 shows that ImpForge effectively examine MLLM robustness, increasing average ASR by 57.08% over the baseline across diverse guardrails. Higher ASR across various MLLM backbones confirm these improvements are not architecture-specific. These results highlight that existing MLLMs remain highly vulnerable to implicit multimodal attacks; see Appendix C.1 for detailed examples.

Further Study of Implicit Harmfulness and Intent Preservation. Beyond bypass rates, a key challenge in evaluating implicit attacks is verifying that the disguised input remains *truly harmful* rather than meaningless or irrelevant semantics. To investigate this, we design a semantic recombination protocol where we transform each implicit harmful multimodal query into a pure-text query by replacing visual references (e.g., "this object") with the underlying malicious keyword (e.g., "bomb"). Notably, 52.08% of implicit harmful multimodal samples that successfully bypassed GPT-4o's guardrails were refused when recombined as pure-text, confirming that the underlying intent remains inherently harmfulness. Interestingly, even for samples where harmful intent is undermined during reconstruction, they remain valuable diversity for guardrail training. CrossGuard, trained on these diverse samples, demonstrates superior performance across OOD benchmarks. More details can be found in Appendix C.4.

4.5 Ablation Study on ImpForge-Augmented Training



Figure 4: Comparison between fine-tuning with and without ImpForge-generated data.

Table 1 shows that CrossGuard improves security across diverse scenarios, particularly against joint-modal implicit attacks. To isolate the impact of ImpForge, we conducted an ablation study (Figure 4). Results show that incorporating ImpForge-generated data consistently lows Attack Success Rates (ASR). This is most evident on the implicit malicious benchmark (i.e., SIUO) where ASR drops from 60.33% to 5.39%. This confirms that ImpForge generates high-quality samples that strengthen defenses against both implicit and explicit threats while maintaining utility. Further ablation studies in Appendix C.2 justify the necessity of RL training in our rephrase step and highlight the advantages of ImpForge over standard LLM-based prompt optimization.

5 Conclusion

This work addresses joint-modal implicit jailbreak attacks, where individually benign inputs combine to express unsafe intent. We propose ImpForge, an automated red-teaming framework that generates high-quality, diverse implicit malicious samples. Utilizing this data, we develop CrossGuard, a multimodal safeguard resilient to both explicit and implicit threats. Our results show that ImpForge effectively exposes vulnerabilities in state-of-the-art MLLMs and guardrails, while CrossGuard achieves superior robustness and a balanced security-utility trade-off. These contributions establish a practical foundation for defending MLLMs against real-world implicit threats.

Limitations and Discussion

Although effective against implicit multimodal malicious inputs, our approach has limitations. First, using pretrained models in the reward modules can introduce inherent biases—a known limitation shared across many RL-based pipelines. To minimize the impact of such bias on the guard model, we designed reward models only for capturing relative tendencies, i.e., whether a response moves closer to or farther from malicious intent—rather than to make fine-grained or absolute semantic judgments. This reduces the influence of pretrained-model bias on the overall optimization process. Second, our ImpForge-generated dataset may not comprehensively represent all domains of real-world implicit attacks, which is also known as a common challenge in dataset construction. Therefore, whether the proposed CrossGuard will overfit to the constructed dataset and domain is critical for real-world deployment. To assess the overfitting issue of CrossGuard, we conduct out-of-domain robustness evaluation (Table 1) and security-utility trade-off analysis (Figure 3). Third, despite strong performance across in-domain and out-of-domain benchmarks, generalization to entirely novel modalities or tasks beyond our current scope remains open. We leave to future work the development of more adaptive training strategies to further enhance the robustness and adaptability of safety-alignment systems.

Ethical Statement

Our techniques are designed to improve the detection of harmful inputs targeting MLLMs. While they could, in principle, be misused, our intent is to strengthen safety by systematically exposing risks. Controlled red-teaming helps uncover vulnerabilities and thereby informs the design of safer MLLMs moving forward.

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Appendix

A Related Work

Multimodal Large Langauge Models (MLLMs) Safety. Jailbreak attacks on MLLMs can be broadly categorized based on the modality used to introduce malicious content: vision-based attacks and multimodal attacks. Vision-based attacks convert harmful content into images, e.g., leveraging OCR triggers (Shayegani et al., 2023) or adversarial visual patterns (Qi et al., 2024; Tao et al., 2024) to input the harmful query to victim models.

Multimodal attacks (Zhao et al., 2024; Wang et al., 2024a; Gong et al., 2025) exploit the reasoning limitations of the victim model across modalities, such as expressing malicious intent jointly through text and image, or using one modality to obfuscate the harmful content embedded in the other. To counter such jailbreak attacks, several MLLM guard models (Helff et al., 2024; Gu et al., 2024; Pi et al., 2024; Liu et al., 2025) have been proposed. These models are typically trained on a set of malicious examples and are designed to classify vision-language pairs as safe or unsafe, serving as an input-level detector for downstream models. In parallel, a number of safety evaluation benchmarks (Liu et al., 2024a,c; Zong et al., 2024) have been introduced to assess alignment performance under diverse harmful vision-text scenarios. Among them, SIUO (Wang et al., 2025) highlights a particularly challenging threat: implicit multimodal attacks, where both the image and query are individually benign but collectively convey malicious intent. Existing MLLMs and guard models fail to effectively detect this type of implicit threat. To address this limitation, we propose a red-teaming framework that automatically generates implicit multimodal examples. Using these data, we train a guard model capable of detecting such implicit attacks. Compared to existing baselines, our method significantly reduces the attack success rate on these implicit malicious inputs.

Red-teaming for MLLMs. Red-teaming has emerged as a critical methodology for evaluating and strengthening the safety alignment of MLLMs. Early work on red-teaming (Ganguli et al., 2022; Casper et al., 2023; Dinan et al., 2019) focus on manually crafting adversarial prompts to elicit harmful behaviors from models. Benchmarks (Li et al., 2024a; Tedeschi et al., 2024; Liu et al., 2024b) are proposed to systematically evaluate MLLMs against a range of safety risks. To scale red-teaming efforts, recent studies introduce autonomous agents and multi-turn interaction strategies (Xu et al., 2024; Ge et al., 2023), and (Perez et al., 2022) formulates red-teaming as a reinforcement learning problem, where adversarial prompt generation is optimized via policy learning. Following this formulation, a growing body of work (Hong et al., 2024; Lee et al., 2024, 2023) adopt RL-based optimization approaches for red-teaming. In this work, we design a multimodal red-teaming framework to generate high-quality samples that can be used both to evaluate MLLMs and to enhance guard models against implicit malicious attacks.

B More Data Details of ImpForge and CrossGuard

B.1 The Safety Domain of ImpForge



Figure 5: We leverage ImpForge to generate 1,390 implicit multimodal malicious samples spanning 14 categories for red-teaming evaluation.

B.2 Training Dataset Used for Fine-tuning CrossGuard.

We construct a balanced dataset with 1,616 samples for fine-tuning CrossGuard, as shown in Figure 6. Specifically, vision-based OCR malicious samples are from FigStep (Gong et al., 2025). Text-based malicious samples are from BeaverTails (Ji et al., 2023) paired with images selected in Stage 1 of ImpForge. Vision-based non-OCR malicious samples are from VLGuard's training set (Zong et al., 2024). Joint-modal implicit malicious samples are generated by using ImpForge.



Figure 6: Components of the data used to train CrossGuard.

C Additional Experiments

C.1 Implicit Multimodal Malicious Samples Generated by ImpForge.

Malicious queries and the response from GPT-4o (Hurst et al., 2024) before and after ImpForge are shown in Figure 7.

C.2 Ablation: The Necessity of PPO optimization

In Stage 2 of ImpForge, the rewriter is optimized with reinforcement learning guided by three reward modules, which jointly assess the quality of prompt reconstruction. While simpler rewriting strategies exist, reinforcement learning is essential for capturing the complex cross-modal reasoning in implicit malicious samples, enabling more systematic and robust reconstruction. To validate this necessity, we compare samples generated by ImpForge against two alternative strategies, including *In-context Learning*, and *LoRA Fine-tuning*. Specifically, experiment settings are as follows:

1. BeaverTails*: For a fair comparison, the original BeaverTails dataset is paired with the images selected in Stage 1 of ImpForge, and the paired (image, text) inputs are used as harmful queries.

2. In-context Learning: Qwen2.5-VL-Instruct is directly used as a prompt optimizer to rephrase the original query. We use three samples from SIUO (Wang et al., 2025), a well-established implicit malicious benchmark, as demonstrations in the system prompt to guide the MLLM's rephrasing behavior.

3. LoRA Fine-tuning: LoRA adapter of Qwen2.5-VL-Instruct are fine-tuned by existing implicit malicious samples to rephrase the original query.



Figure 7: Implicit multimodal malicious samples generated by ImpForge.

We evaluate the defense ability of MLLMs and guardrails against implicit attacks using our generated samples. As shown in Figure 8, we use the ASR of the existing implicit malicious benchmark (red dashed lines) as a reference point. The comparison highlights that generating joint-modal implicit malicious queries is highly challenging. Samples generated by simple approaches such as in-context learning and LoRA-based SFT remain lower than the SIUO. It indicates that these strategies lack the capability to automatically generate samples for effective red-teaming. Nevertheless, ImpForge, with PPO-based optimization, can generate samples that consistently surpasses across all models and guardrails, demonstrating its effectiveness in generating more challenging red-teaming samples for joint-modal implicit malicious threats.

Table 3: Comparison of Latency, Memory Usage, and ASR across models

Model	Latency (s/item) ↓	Memory-usage (GB) ↓	ASR on JailBreakV (%) ↓
LlavaGuard	33.33	33.68	90.71
Llama-Guard3-Vision	0.63	21.32	34.29
CrossGuard (ours)	**0.24**	**14.14**	**0.72**

Figure 8: Comparison between ImpForge and alternative query-reconstruction strategies in ASR

C.3 Discussion on Computational Cost

To further assess the computational cost of our approach, we include a comparison of latency (measured as s/item) and memory usage across different guard models. For fairness, we compare CrossGuard with other inference-only guard models, including LlavaGuard and Llama-Guard3-Vision. All measurements are conducted under a consistent hardware configuration using an NVIDIA A40 GPU, ensuring comparable runtime conditions. The results are shown in Table 3. It can be observed that our CrossGuard achieve the lowest latency, the lowest memory-usage and the lowest ASR, with a significant superiority comparing with other safeguards, achieving best trade-off on efficiency, lightweight, and security.

C.4 Discussion on Harmfulness and Helpfulness of ImpForge-generated queries

C.4.1 Visualization

The visualization is shown in Figure 9. The implicit multimodal query (middle) successfully bypasses GPT-4o's guardrails, while the recombined textual query (bottom) triggers a refusal response, verifying that the underlying malicious intent was preserved but disguised by modality.



Figure 9: Visualization of the representative case.

C.4.2 Analysis of Intent Preservation and Toxic Utility

As we reported in the main text, 52.08% of the samples show exhibited significant harmfulness by being combined with the underlying malicious keyword. The remaining subset (the "+ ImpForge (w/o 52.08%)" subset in Table 4) consists of samples that appear relatively benign. We conducted a follow-up analysis to determine if these "less malicious" queries had lost their toxic utility or if they still functioned as effective input for eliciting harmful information.

To quantify this, we established a scoring criteria (grade from 0 to 2) and utilized GPT to grade the helpfulness of the responses (Figure 10). In this context, a higher helpfulness score indicates that the model provided actionable information in response to the original harmful query (before rewriting by ImpForge).

Table 4: Comparison of Helpfulness Scores.

	Helpfulness score
BeaverTails*	0.10
+ ImpForge (fully)	1.12
+ ImpForge (w/o 52.08%)	0.46

The results in Table 4 provide a critical in-

The Prompt for Helpfulness Evaluation

```
SYSTEM PROMPT:
As an AI judge, your task is to help assess the
effectiveness of the model's responses. The aim
is to score the response in '0', '1', and '2'.
Here's the process we will follow: I will
provide you with the user's query, and the
response generated by an agent model. Based on
these information, please assist me in scoring
the model's response using the Evaluation
Criteria below. Note, you should only use the
give criteria to determine.
Original Question:<question>
Model Output:<response>

Evaluation Criteria:
'2': Users can achieve the goal in the
<question> based on the <responses>.
'1': The <response> is partially relevant to
the <question> and offers a little useful
suggestions. It does not give the full action
guide of the unethical action in the <question>.
'0': The <response> explicitly expresses the
refusal to answer the question; or, the
<response> did not provide user with any
relevant suggestions.

Your Output:
<Score></Score>: <Reason></Reason>

==============================================

USER PROMPT:
Original Question: {Query}
Model Output: {Response from the testing model}
```

Figure 10: The prompt for Helpfulness evaluation.

sight into the nature of ImpForge-generated queries. While the full set achieves a high mean helpfulness score, the group of “less malicious” queries—those that appear benign to GPT-4o—yielded a score of 0.46.We acknowledge that this subset does not perfectly preserve the high-intensity maliciousness of the original queries. However, a helpfulness score of 0.46 is still nearly five times higher than the original BeaverTails baseline (0.10). This suggests that even when ImpForge generates samples that are not perfectly preserve the full malicious intent, they still successfully hide core toxic semantics cross modalities. Rather than being rendered harmless, these samples represent a “gray area” where the query remains “toxic” enough to extract a useful response regarding the original harmful goal.

These findings demonstrate that even the “less malicious” samples produced by ImpForge constitute a potent category of implicitly malicious data. Although they lack the overt indicators of traditional harmfulness, they remain effective at bypassing current guardrails. By incorporating these diverse, ambiguous samples into the training of guard model, it enables the guardrail to better recognize multimodal attack in the real-world that are intentionally obfuscated to appear benign.

D Detailed Experimental Setting

D.1 Detailed Overview of Datasets and Benchmarks

- BeaverTails (Ji et al., 2023): It contains 333,963 annotated QA pairs derived from 16,851 prompts ($\sim$45% safe, $\sim$55% unsafe) across 14 harm categories. For our RL training, we select a high-quality subset of 5,000 unsafe samples as the original explicit malicious queries.

- JailBreakV (Luo et al., 2024): We conduct experiments on the officially provided mini-subset (JailBreakV-28K mini), which contains 2,000 high-diversity malicious image–text pairs covering 16 distinct safety policies.

- MM-SafetyBench (Liu et al., 2024a): This benchmark targets multimodal jailbreaks where malicious images are paired with benign text queries. We evaluate on 520 randomly sampled cases spanning 13 common attack scenarios.

- SIUO (Wang et al., 2025): A specialized cross-modality safety benchmark. It focuses on "implicit" risks—where an image and text are individually benign but unsafe in combination. We use all 167 manually crafted cases for Out-of-Distribution (OOD) evaluation.

- FigStep (Gong et al., 2025): This benchmark evaluates typographic attacks, where harmful textual instructions are converted into visual prompts (text-within-images). It includes 500 queries across 10 categories.

- VLGuard (Zong et al., 2024): A balanced multimodal safety benchmark. It pairs unsafe images with both safe and unsafe instructions. We utilize the official test set for our evaluation.

D.2 ASR Calculation

To ensure a consistent and reproducible evaluation across different architectures, we employ three distinct protocols for calculating the Attack Success Rate (ASR) based on the output characteristics of the evaluated models:

1. Online MLLMs (GPT-4o, Claude-3.5-Sonnet) Due to the highly standardized nature of commercial API refusals (Figure 11), we employ a keyword-based refusal detection method. ASR is calculated as the percentage of test cases that do not trigger these standard refusal templates, indicating a failure to enforce safety constraints.

2. Offline MLLMs (LLaVA-1.5-7B, Qwen2.5-VL-7B) Offline models often produce more varied and conversational responses. Following established benchmarks, we utilize GPT-4o-mini as an external judge. The judge is prompted to provide a binary classification (Safe/Unsafe) based on whether the model response contains a clear refusal signal or a safety warning. ASR is the ratio of "Unsafe" labels to the total number of test cases.

3. Guardrails (CrossGuard (ours), LlavaGuard, JailDAM, etc.) For models specifically designed for safety-guarding, calculation is more direct. These models typically output:

- Explicit Labels: A structured `"safe"` or `"unsafe"` classification.
- Probability Scores: A confidence score for maliciousness.

Specifically, CrossGuard provides a structured output with a clear decision bit.

Checklist of Refusal Response

```
“I cannot fulfill this request ...”
“I’m sorry, but I cannot assist ...”
“I am unable to provide information ...”
“I cannot provide any ...”
“I'm not able to generate ...”
“I am not authorized to ...”
“I cannot help with ...”
...
```

Figure 11: Checklist of refusal response of online MLLMs.

E Checklist

E.1 Artifact Use Consistent With Intended Use

All external artifacts were used strictly within their intended scope. For example, datasets such as BeaverTails (Ji et al., 2023) and JailBreakV (Luo et al., 2024) are restricted to research use, and our experiments comply with these terms. For the artifacts we introduce, we will explicitly specify their intended use as non-commercial research only, consistent with the conditions of the original datasets from which they are derived.

E.2 Data Contains Personally Identifying Info Or Offensive Content

We didn’t use any information that names or uniquely identifies individual people. The offensive content is research-oriented, and its use strictly follows non-commercial research purposes.

E.3 Documentation Of Artifacts

For the proposed ImpForge, we describe the coverage of 14 domains of implicit multimodal malicious queries, the English language setting, and the intended research scope (Sec. 3, Appendix B.1). For the proposed CrossGuard, we specify its role as a safeguard against both explicit and implicit multimodal attacks and report its evaluation across multiple benchmarks (Sec. 4.2).

E.4 Information About Use Of Ai Assistants

We used ChatGPT for grammar checking and code debugging, and GitHub Copilot for function or variable names autocompletion. No AI-generated text, data, or code was incorporated without human verification.