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## ABSTRACT

Humans organize knowledge into compact categories that balance compression with semantic meaning preservation. Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrate striking linguistic abilities, yet whether they achieve this same balance remains unclear. We apply the Information Bottleneck principle to quantitatively compare how LLMs and humans navigate this compression-meaning trade-off. Analyzing embeddings from 40+ LLMs against classic human categorization benchmarks (Rosch, 1973a; 1975; McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1978), we uncover three key findings. First, LLMs broadly align with human categories but miss fine-grained semantic distinctions crucial for human understanding. Second, LLMs demonstrate aggressive statistical compression, achieving “optimal” information-theoretic efficiency, while humans prioritize contextual richness and adaptive flexibility. Third, encoder models surprisingly outperform decoder models in human alignment, suggesting that generation and understanding rely on distinct mechanisms in current architectures. In addition, training dynamics analysis reveals that conceptual structure develops in distinct phases: rapid initial formation followed by architectural reorganization, with semantic processing migrating from deeper to mid-network layers as models discover more efficient encoding. These divergent strategies, where LLMs optimize for compression and humans for adaptive utility, reveal fundamental differences between artificial and biological intelligence, guiding development toward more human-aligned AI.

## 1 THE ENIGMA OF MEANING IN LARGE LANGUAGE MODELS

“The categories defined by constructions in human languages may vary from one language to the next, but they are *mapped onto a common conceptual space*, which represents a common cognitive heritage, indeed the geography of the human mind.” –*Croft (2001) p. 139*

Humans excel at organizing knowledge into concepts which are compact categories that achieve remarkable compression while preserving essential meaning (Murphy, 2004). A single word like “bird” compresses information about thousands of species, yet maintains critical semantic properties (can fly, has feathers, lays eggs). This hierarchical organization (robin → bird → animal; Rosch et al. 1976) represents a fundamental cognitive achievement: balancing efficiency with semantic fidelity.

Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrate striking linguistic capabilities that suggest semantic understanding (Singh et al., 2024; Li et al., 2024). Yet, a critical question remains unanswered: Do LLMs navigate the compression-meaning trade-off similarly to humans, or do they employ fundamentally different representational strategies? This question matters because true understanding, which goes beyond surface-level mimicry, requires representations that balance statistical efficiency with semantic richness (Tversky, 1977; Rosch, 1973b).

To address this question, we apply Rate-Distortion Theory (Shannon, 1948) and Information Bottleneck principles (Tishby et al., 2000) to systematically compare LLM and human conceptual structures. We digitize and release seminal cognitive psychology datasets (Rosch, 1973b; 1975; McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1978), which are foundational studies that shaped our understanding of human categorization but were previously unavailable in a machine-readable form. These benchmarks, comprising 1,049 items across 34 categories with both membership and typicality ratings,

offer unprecedented empirical grounding for evaluating whether LLMs truly understand concepts as humans do. It also offers much better quality data than the current crowdsourcing paradigm.

Analyzing embeddings from 40+ diverse LLMs against these benchmarks, we uncover a fundamental divergence: LLMs and humans employ different strategies when balancing compression with meaning. While LLMs achieve broad categorical alignment with human judgment, they optimize for aggressive statistical compression at the expense of semantic nuance. Humans maintain “inefficient” representations that preserve rich, multidimensional structure essential for flexible reasoning.

This divergence manifests across three dimensions. First, LLMs capture categorical boundaries but miss fine-grained semantic distinctions like item typicality central to human understanding. Second, our information-theoretic analysis reveals LLMs achieve mathematically “optimal” compression-distortion trade-offs, while human categories appear suboptimal. Third, encoder models surprisingly outperform decoder models in human alignment despite smaller scales, indicating that understanding and generation may require fundamentally different representational strategies.

Through analysis of OLMo-7B across 57 training checkpoints, we further uncover how these strategies emerge during learning: conceptual structure develops via rapid initial formation followed by architectural reorganization, with semantic processing migrating from deep to mid-network layers as models discover increasingly efficient encodings.

These findings challenge the assumption that statistical optimality equals understanding. The apparent “inefficiency” of human concepts may reflect optimization for adaptive flexibility. Our framework and newly-digitized benchmarks provide essential tools for monitoring this critical balance, guiding development toward AI systems that achieve not just compression, but comprehension.

## 2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND SCOPE

Prior work has explored LLM conceptual representations through multiple lenses: relational knowledge (Shani et al., 2023; Misra et al., 2021), interpretable concept extraction (Hoang-Xuan et al., 2024; Maeda et al., 2024), sparse activation patterns (Li et al., 2024), and embedding geometry including hierarchical structures (Park et al., 2024). While insightful, these studies often lack deep, quantitative comparison of the compression-meaning trade-off using information theory against rich human cognitive benchmarks.

Separately, cognitive science has applied information theory to human concept learning (Imel & Zaslavsky, 2024; Tucker et al., 2025; Zaslavsky et al., 2018; Sorscher et al., 2022). For example, Zaslavsky et al. (2018) developed an Information Bottleneck framework for color naming efficiency, later extended to animal taxonomies (Zaslavsky et al., 2019). Yet these cognitive studies typically proceed without connecting to modern LLMs, and tend to focus on a specific domain. **One notable example is Wu et al. (2025), which examined abstraction transfer in humans and LLMs using a behavioral and cognitive modeling level. Our work is different in the sense that it analyzes how information is preserved or distorted inside LLM embedding spaces under controlled clustering transformations.**

These two streams, LLM conceptual analysis and cognitive information theory, rarely intersect. We bridge this gap through rigorous comparison of how LLMs and humans navigate the compression-meaning trade-off, grounding our analysis in established cognitive benchmarks. This leads to three research questions:


**[RQ1]** *To what extent do LLM-emergent concepts align with human-defined categories?*

**[RQ2]** *Do LLMs exhibit human-like internal structure, particularly item typicality?*

**[RQ3]** *How do humans and LLMs differ when balancing compression with semantic fidelity?*

Our framework approaches each RQ through a unified lens. **[RQ1]** examines the categorical alignment, or how information is *compressed* into discrete groups. **[RQ2]** probes internal structure, which means how semantic *meaning is preserved* within categories. **[RQ3]** employs our full  $\mathcal{L}$  objective to evaluate the integrated trade-off. This progression from compression to preservation to their balance mirrors the fundamental challenge both systems face: creating representations that are simultaneously efficient and meaningful.

108 Figure 1 overviews the data generation and analyses. Human data was collected by asking  
 109 whether an item  $i$  (e.g., chair) is a good example of the category  $C$  (furniture). These  
 110 ratings are aggregated into ranked similarity profiles for each category. Models generate  
 111 analogous scores using their embeddings. We then compute three metrics: [RQ1] Mutual  
 112 Information to assess category recoverability, [RQ2] Spearman correlation to measure  
 113 alignment with human typicality structure, and [RQ3] a rate-distortion objective capturing  
 114 the trade-off between representation complexity and meaning preservation.



134 Figure 1: **Overview of the data generation and analyses.** Human data was collected by  
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 139 alignment with human typicality structure, and [RQ3] a rate-distortion objective capturing  
 140 the trade-off between representation complexity and meaning preservation.

### 3 BENCHMARKING AGAINST HUMAN COGNITION

144 Investigating LLM-human conceptual alignment requires robust benchmarks and diverse models.  
 145 This section details both components.

#### 3.1 HUMAN BASELINES: EMPIRICAL DATA FROM SEMINAL COGNITIVE SCIENCE

149 We draw on three foundational studies that shaped our understanding of human categorization. Un-  
 150 like many noisy modern crowdsourced datasets, these classic benchmarks were carefully curated by  
 151 experts, capturing deep cognitive patterns. We focus on three influential works:

152 **Rosch (1973):** This foundational work (Rosch, 1973a) explored semantic categories as part of the  
 153 research program leading to prototype theory (Rosch, 1973b)<sup>1</sup>. The theory posits that categories  
 154 organize around "prototypical" members rather than strict, equally shared features. The dataset  
 155 includes 48 items in eight common semantic categories (e.g., furniture, bird), with prototypicality  
 156 rankings (e.g., 'robin' as typical bird, 'bat' as atypical).

157 <sup>1</sup>Prototype theory is only one of several frameworks describing how humans form and use con-  
 158 cepts. Exemplar theory, for instance, posits that categories are represented via stored instances  
 159 rather than abstract prototypes. Our work does not attempt to resolve the longstanding debate on  
 160 human concept representation; rather, we adopt an existing framework because it provides struc-  
 161 tured data suitable for modeling. Crucially, the computational analysis we develop is compatible with  
 162 alternative theoretical accounts.

162 **Rosch (1975):** Building on prototype theory, Rosch (1975) further detailed how semantic categories  
 163 are cognitively represented. This work provides typicality ratings for a larger set of 552 items across  
 164 ten categories (e.g., ‘orange’ as a prototypical fruit, ‘squash’ as less so).

165 **McCloskey & Glucksberg (1978):** Investigated the “fuzzy” boundaries of natural categories, showing  
 166 membership is graded rather than absolute (McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1978). Covers 449 items  
 167 in 18 categories with both typicality scores and membership certainty ratings (e.g., ‘dress’ is typical  
 168 clothing, ‘bandaid’ less so).

169 While originating from different researchers, these datasets share rigorous experimental designs  
 170 and provide data on both category assignments and item typicality. We aggregated data from these  
 171 studies, creating a unified benchmark of 1,049 items across 34 categories. This data, which we have  
 172 digitized and made publicly available (Appendix C), offers a high-quality empirical foundation for  
 173 evaluating the human-likeness of LLMs.<sup>2</sup>

### 175 3.2 LARGE LANGUAGE MODELS UNDER STUDY

178 We analyze 40+ diverse LLMs spanning multiple architectures and scales (300M to 72B parameters)  
 179 to understand how conceptual representation varies across model design choices. **We note that our**  
 180 **analysis relies on access to the internal representations (embeddings) of models, rather**  
 181 **than just output. Thus, we are unable to use any closed-source frontier models such as**  
 182 **GPT-5 and Claude.**

183 **Model Selection.** Our study encompasses three architectural paradigms. *Encoder models* include  
 184 the BERT family (Devlin et al., 2019; He et al., 2020; Zhuang et al., 2021) and CLIP ViT text  
 185 encoders (Radford et al., 2021). *Decoder models* form the majority of our analysis: the Llama family  
 186 (1B-70B; Touvron et al., 2023a;b; Grattafiori et al., 2024), Gemma variants (2B-27B; Team et al.,  
 187 2024; 2025), Qwen models (0.5B-72B; Bai et al., 2023; Yang et al., 2024), Phi series (Javaheripi  
 188 et al., 2023; Abdin et al., 2024; Abouelenin et al., 2025), Mistral-7B (Karamchetti et al., 2021),  
 189 GPT-2 (Radford et al., 2019), and OLMo-7B (Groeneveld et al., 2024). We also include *classic*  
 190 *embeddings* Word2Vec (Mikolov et al., 2013a;b) and GloVe (Pennington et al., 2014) as baselines.

191 This diverse selection enables us to disentangle effects of architecture (encoder vs. decoder), scale  
 192 (300M to 72B), and training objectives (understanding vs. generation). **We note that encoder-**  
 193 **only models are less represented (and are smaller) simply because recent LLM devel-**  
 194 **opment has prioritized decoder-only architectures.** Complete model specifications appear in  
 195 Appendix D.

196 **Embedding Extraction.** We extract representations at two levels to capture different aspects of con-  
 197 ceptual knowledge: (1) *static embeddings* from input layers (E matrix), capturing context-free lexical  
 198 knowledge directly comparable to isolated words in human categorization experiments; and (2)  
 199 *contextual embeddings* from hidden layers using controlled prompts, revealing how context shapes  
 200 conceptual structure across network depth.

201 This dual approach allows us to trace how concepts emerge from basic lexical knowledge to context-  
 202 ualized understanding. Critically, our results prove robust to prompt templates and pooling strate-  
 203 gies (Appendix E). Moreover, despite substantial vocabulary overlap between model families, nei-  
 204 ther token count nor tokenization patterns correlate with our results (Appendix J).

## 207 4 A FRAMEWORK FOR COMPARING COMPRESSION AND MEANING

209 To quantitatively compare how LLMs and humans navigate the fundamental tension between com-  
 210 pact representation and semantic richness, we develop a framework that captures both aspects of  
 211 conceptual organization. Our approach draws on Rate-Distortion Theory (Shannon, 1948) and the  
 212 Information Bottleneck principle (Tishby et al., 2000), adapting them to measure the quality of con-  
 213 ceptual systems.

214  
 215 <sup>2</sup>Appendix I shows that polysemy is rare in our data and cannot account for our findings.

216 4.1 THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS  
217218 Human concepts achieve remarkable efficiency: the word "bird" compresses knowledge about thou-  
219-sands of species into a single category, yet preserves critical semantic information (can fly, has  
220-feathers, lays eggs). This reflects a fundamental trade-off that any conceptual system must navigate:221 • **Compression:** Grouping diverse items into manageable categories (fewer bits needed)  
222 • **Meaning Preservation:** Maintaining semantic coherence within groups  
223224 **Rate-Distortion Theory** (RDT; Shannon, 1948) formalizes this trade-off for lossy compression.  
225 Given data  $X$  and compressed representation  $\hat{X}$ , RDT seeks encodings that minimize:

226 
$$R + \lambda D = I(X; \hat{X}) + \lambda \mathbb{E}[d(X, \hat{X})] \quad (1)$$
  
227

228 where  $R$  is the rate (bits required),  $D$  is distortion (information lost), and  $\lambda$  controls their trade-off.229 **Information Bottleneck** (IB; Tishby et al., 2000) extends this by compressing  $X$  into  $Z$  while  
230 preserving information about relevant variable  $Y$ :

231 
$$\min I(X; Z) - \beta I(Z; Y) \quad (2)$$
  
232

233 **Our adaptation:** For conceptual representation, we lack an external relevance variable  $Y$ . In-  
234-stead, "relevance" becomes internal semantic coherence, which means how well categories pre-  
235-serve within-group similarity. We thus combine RDT's geometric distortion with IB's information-  
236-theoretic compression, yielding our framework where clustering  $C$  represents items  $X$  by mini-  
237-mizing both the information needed to specify items (compression) and the semantic spread within  
238-clusters (distortion).  
239240 4.2 THE  $\mathcal{L}$  OBJECTIVE: QUANTIFYING THE TRADE-OFF  
241242 We formalize how clustering  $C$  represents items  $X$  through an objective that combines information-  
243-theoretic compression with geometric coherence:

244 
$$\mathcal{L}(X, C; \beta) = \underbrace{I(X; C)}_{\text{Complexity: bits needed}} + \beta \cdot \underbrace{\frac{1}{|X|} \sum_{c \in C} \sum_{e_i \in c} \|e_i - \bar{e}_c\|^2}_{\text{Distortion: semantic spread}} \quad (3)$$
  
245  
246  
247  
248

249 where  $\beta$  weights the relative importance of compression versus coherence.  
250251 4.2.1 THE COMPLEXITY TERM: MEASURING COMPRESSION  
252253 Complexity quantifies how much information the clustering preserves about individual items  
254 through mutual information  $I(X; C)$ . Intuitively, if knowing an item's cluster tells us little about  
255 which specific item it is, compression is high (low complexity).256 Given  $|X|$  items partitioned into clusters of sizes  $\{|C_c|\}$ :

257 
$$\text{Complexity}(X, C) = I(X; C) = \log_2 |X| - \frac{1}{|X|} \sum_{c \in C} |C_c| \log_2 |C_c| \quad (4)$$
  
258  
259

260 This equals the reduction in uncertainty about item identity when told its cluster. Uniform clusters  
261 minimize complexity (one  $|X|$  cluster; maximum compression), while singleton clusters maximize  
262 it (no compression).  
263264 4.2.2 THE DISTORTION TERM: MEASURING SEMANTIC COHERENCE  
265266 Distortion captures how well clusters preserve semantic relationships and meanings by measuring  
267 the average squared distance between items and their cluster centroids in embedding space (spread):  
268

269 
$$\text{Distortion}(X, C) = \frac{1}{|X|} \sum_{c \in C} |C_c| \cdot \sigma_c^2 \quad (5)$$

270

271 where  $\sigma_c^2 = \frac{1}{|C_c|} \sum_{e_i \in c} \|e_i - \bar{e}_c\|^2$  is the variance within cluster  $c$ , and  $\bar{e}_c$  is its centroid.  
 272

273 Low distortion indicates tight, semantically coherent clusters with similar embeddings. This geo-  
 274 metric measure directly captures what we intuitively mean by “meaningful” categories: robins and  
 275 sparrows cluster tightly as similar birds, while bats would increase distortion on downstream tasks  
 276 if categorized with them.

277

#### 278 4.3 CONNECTING FRAMEWORK TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS

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280 Our framework provides unified metrics for all three research questions:

281

282 **[RQ1] Categorical Alignment:** How do LLMs and humans partition semantic space? The *Com-  
 283 plexity* term  $I(X; C)$  directly measures this by quantifies how many bits are needed to specify indi-  
 284 vidual items given their clusters. Comparing  $I(X; C_{\text{Human}})$  with  $I(X; C_{\text{LLM}})$  reveals whether both  
 285 systems create similarly-sized groupings with comparable compression rates. Higher mutual infor-  
 286 mation means finer-grained categories; lower means broader, more compressed groupings.

287

288 **[RQ2] Internal Semantic Structure:** Do LLMs capture human-like typicality *signal*? The *Distor-  
 289 tion* term measures how well clusters preserve semantic coherence. In our typicality analysis, we  
 290 check whether typical items cluster tightly near centroids while atypical items lie farther away. Low  
 291 distortion with clear center-periphery structure indicates prototype organization that mirrors human  
 292 cognitive structure.

293

294 **[RQ3] Compression-Meaning Trade-off:** How do different systems balance efficiency against se-  
 295 mantic fidelity? The complete  $\mathcal{L}$  objective reveals fundamental optimization strategies. By varying  
 296  $K$  (number of clusters) and computing  $\mathcal{L}$  curves, we uncover system priorities: aggressive compres-  
 297 sors rapidly achieve low  $\mathcal{L}$  values by sacrificing nuance, while systems preserving semantic richness  
 298 maintain higher  $\mathcal{L}$  to retain meaningful distinctions. The shape and level of these curves expose  
 299 whether a system optimizes for statistical efficiency or cognitive utility.

300

301

## 302 5 AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF REPRESENTATIONAL STRATEGIES

303

304 Building on our information-theoretic framework (Section 4) and established benchmarks (Sec-  
 305 tion 3.1), we empirically investigate how LLMs and humans navigate the compression-meaning  
 306 trade-off. For each analysis, we examine both static embeddings and contextual embeddings (across  
 307 all hidden layers), revealing how and when context shapes conceptual organization.

308

### 309 5.1 [RQ1] THE BIG PICTURE: ALIGNMENT OF CONCEPTUAL CATEGORIES

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311 We first investigate **whether LLMs form conceptual categories aligned with humans**, which ex-  
 312 amines how information is *compressed* into discrete groups (the complexity term in our framework).

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#### 315 Key Finding: Broad Alignment with Human Categories

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318 LLM-derived clusters significantly align with human-defined conceptual categories, sug-  
 319 gesting they capture key aspects of human conceptual organization. Surprisingly certain  
 320 encoder models exhibit strong alignment, sometimes outperforming much larger models,  
 321 highlighting that factors beyond sheer scale influence human-like categorical abstraction.

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334 **Approach:** We tested whether LLMs naturally organize our 1,049 items into categories resembling  
 335 human conceptual structure. Token embeddings were extracted at two levels: (i) static embeddings  
 336 from input layers (E matrix), representing context-free lexical knowledge; (ii) contextual embed-  
 337 dings from all hidden layers, measured layer-wise to identify peak conceptual alignment. These  
 338 were clustered using k-means ( $K$  matching human category counts) and evaluated against human  
 339 categories using Adjusted Mutual Information (AMI), Normalized Mutual Information (NMI), and  
 340 Adjusted Rand Index (ARI) metrics. **NMI quantifies how much information is shared between**




Figure 2: **LLMs capture categorical boundaries (RQ1 AMI scores) but miss internal geometry (RQ2 Spearman correlations).** **Left:** All 40+ models achieve above-chance AMI with human categories, with encoder architectures (squares, circles, and Xs) matching or exceeding decoder models 100x larger (stars). Results show the layer with peak AMI score per model (see static and mean scores in Figure A.8). **Right:** Despite categorical success, models show weak correlations ( $\rho < 0.2$  for most) with human typicality judgments, revealing divergent representational strategies. This divergence between capturing boundaries (compression) while missing internal structure (meaning) reveals how LLMs and humans fundamentally differ in their representational strategies. We note that encoder models align more than decoder models, but these correlations are still modest. Computed using the static embeddings, see full results in Tables 3-4 in Appendix N.

the model-derived clusters and the human-labeled categories; AMI refines this measure by correcting for the amount of overlap that would be expected by chance; and ARI assesses the degree of agreement between the two partitions while explicitly accounting for random assignments, providing a complementary view of clustering accuracy.

**Broad Categorical Agreement:** All 40+ models achieve significant above-chance alignment (Figure 2 (Left)). Even at baseline, static embeddings show substantial alignment (mean  $AMI \approx 0.45$ ), which contextual processing enhances to peak  $AMI \approx 0.55$ . This confirms that LLMs encode human-like categorical boundaries. Full NMI and ARI results in Appendices K–M.

**Architecture Matters More Than Scale:** Surprisingly, BERT-large-uncased (340M parameters) achieves  $AMI = 0.60$ , matching or exceeding models 100x larger. Classic Word2Vec and GloVe, despite having only static embeddings and predating modern architectures by years, reach AMI scores rivaling contemporary LLMs' peak performance. This suggests that fundamental semantic structure emerges from relatively simple distributional learning, with encoder architectures particularly effective at capturing human-like categories regardless of scale.

## 5.2 [RQ2] ZOOMING IN: FIDELITY TO FINE-GRAINED SEMANTICS

Having established broad categorical alignment, we now examine whether LLMs capture the internal semantic structure of categories. Specifically, we check **how meaning is preserved within clusters**.

### Key Finding: Limited Capture of Semantic Nuance

While LLMs effectively form broad conceptual categories, their internal representations demonstrate only modest alignment with human-perceived fine-grained semantic distinctions, such as item typicality or psychological distance to category prototypes. This suggests a divergence in how LLMs and humans structure information *within* concepts.

**Approach:** We test whether LLMs encode human-like typicality **signals**, i.e., whether robins are more “birdy” than penguins. For each item, we compute the cosine similarity with its category name using embeddings (e.g., ‘robin’ → ‘bird’;  $\text{cosine}_{\text{sim}}(E(\text{robin}), E(\text{bird}))$ ). We then compare these similarities with human typicality ratings using Spearman’s correlation coefficient  $\rho$  (Wissler, 1905).

We employed two analysis approaches: (i) *static-layer analysis* using embeddings directly from the input layer; (ii) *peak AMI layer analysis* using contextual embeddings from the layer that maxi-

378 mized AMI in RQ1. For the peak AMI approach, we extracted category embeddings by replacing  
 379 items with category names in the same prompt template, ensuring consistent contextualization (see  
 380 Appendix F for template and pooling robustness analysis).

381 **Weak Typicality Alignment:** Correlations between LLM internal organization of concepts and  
 382 human typicality are modest at best (Figure 2 (Right); Tables 3-4 in Appendix N). Static embeddings  
 383 show weak correlations: BERT achieves  $\rho = 0.38$  ( $p < 0.05$ ), while most decoder models fall below  
 384  $\rho = 0.15$ . Even when statistically significant, these correlations indicate limited correspondence  
 385 with human judgments. This shows that the internal concept geometries of models differ from those  
 386 of humans, with representation-focused models aligning more closely.

387 **Architectural Patterns:** Several clear patterns emerge in how different architectures capture typ-  
 388 icality. Representation-focused models (Word2Vec, GloVe) and most encoder models (both ViT  
 389 encoders, BERT-large) demonstrate stronger static-layer performance than decoder-only models  
 390 (Llama, Gemma, Qwen families). Static correlations range from  $\rho \approx 0.25$ -0.40 for representation-  
 391 focused models versus  $\rho < 0.15$  for most decoders.

392 This divergence likely stems from training objectives: models explicitly trained for representation  
 393 learning appear more effective at capturing semantic category relationships in their embeddings,  
 394 while modern decoder-only models, which optimized primarily for next-token prediction, show  
 395 consistently lower static-layer correlations. The pattern holds across model scales, suggesting archi-  
 396 tectural design matters more than size for capturing **fine-grained semantic similarity**.

397 **Layer-wise Analysis Reveals a Trade-off:** Comparing static and peak AMI layers exposes an archi-  
 398 tectural limitation. Peak AMI layers, which are optimal for clustering, show systematically weaker  
 399 typicality correlations than static layers. This pattern holds across model families: layers that best  
 400 separate categories (RQ1) poorly preserve within-category structure (RQ2). The implication is clear:  
 401 current architectures encode different aspects of meaning at different depths, forcing applications to  
 402 choose between broad categorization and semantic nuance.

403 **Interpretation:** The divergence between LLMs and humans reflects fundamentally different org-  
 404 anizational principles. Humans judge typicality through rich, multidimensional criteria: robins  
 405 are typical birds due to size, flight ability, song, frequency of encounter, etc. This creates graded  
 406 categories with clear prototypes and cognitive structures that optimize flexible reasoning and gen-  
 407 eralization.

408 LLMs, in contrast, appear to encode flatter statistical associations between items and category la-  
 409 bels. Although sufficient for categorization and fluent text generation, these representations miss  
 410 the prototype structure that makes categories cognitively useful. This difference suggests that LLMs  
 411 optimize for different objectives than human cognition, a hypothesis that we test directly in RQ3 by  
 412 examining how each system balances compression against semantic preservation.

### 415 5.3 [RQ3] THE EFFICIENCY ANGLE: THE COMPRESSION-MEANING TRADE-OFF

416 Having explored categorical alignment (RQ1) and internal semantic structure (RQ2), we now ad-  
 417 dress our central question: **How do LLM and human representational strategies compare when**  
 418 **balancing compression against meaning preservation?**

#### 420 Key Finding: Divergent Efficiency Strategies

421 LLMs demonstrate markedly superior information-theoretic efficiency compared to human  
 422 conceptual structures. Evaluated via our  $\mathcal{L}$  objective, LLM-derived clusters consistently  
 423 achieve more “optimal” compression-meaning balance. Human conceptualizations, while  
 424 richer, appear less statistically compact, suggesting optimization for cognitive flexibility  
 425 over pure statistical efficiency.

426 **Approach:** We analyzed human-defined categories and LLM-derived clusters using our  $\mathcal{L}$  objective  
 427 function (Equation 3,  $\beta = 1$ ) and mean cluster entropy ( $S_\alpha$ ). For LLMs, we performed k-means  
 428 clustering across various  $K$  values to trace the full compression-meaning frontier.

429 **Results:** Our analysis reveals three key patterns (Figure 3; full results in Appendix Q):




Figure 3: **Divergent optimization strategies: LLMs achieve superior information-theoretic efficiency while humans preserve semantic richness.** (a) Encoder models (BERT, ViT, classic embeddings) consistently achieve lower distortion than decoder models at any given complexity level. (b) All LLM-derived clusters achieve lower  $\mathcal{L}$  values than human categories (dashed line), indicating more “optimal” compression-distortion balance. Data from Rosch (1975).

**LLMs Achieve Superior Statistical Efficiency:** Both measures reveal stark differences between LLMs and humans (Figure 3; full results in Appendix Q):

*Higher human entropy.* Human concepts consistently exhibit higher cluster entropy than LLM clusters at comparable  $K$  values, indicating less statistical compactness but greater internal diversity.

*Lower LLM  $\mathcal{L}$  scores.* LLM-derived clusters achieve significantly lower  $\mathcal{L}$  values than human categories across all tested  $K$  (Figure 3b). Since lower  $\mathcal{L}$  signifies more optimal compression-distortion balance, LLMs are demonstrably more “efficient” by this information-theoretic measure.

*Architectural differences.* The Complexity-Distortion plot (Figure 3a) reveals that encoder models (BERT, ViT, classic models) achieve superior trade-offs. Their distortion at any given complexity is lower compared to decoder models, across both static and contextual embeddings.

**Statistical Optimality Versus Cognitive Utility:** This divergence reveals fundamental differences in optimization pressures. LLMs, trained on massive text corpora, develop maximally efficient statistical representations that minimize redundancy and internal variance. **Although human conceptual systems may look suboptimal under information-theoretic measures, prior work indicates that they are structured to support goals such as flexible generalization and causal reasoning rather than maximal compression (Murphy, 2004).** Thus, the differing pressures shaping human and LLM representations help explain this apparent suboptimality.

Our analysis reveals that compression efficiency does not predict functional capability. We find no correlation between  $\mathcal{L}$  scores and downstream performance ( $r = -0.20$ ,  $\rho = 0.51$  on MMLU; Appendix S). This suggests that apparent human “inefficiency” reflects optimization for cognitive flexibility rather than statistical compression. While LLMs excel at compact representation, they may sacrifice the semantic richness essential for human-like understanding.

The consistent architectural patterns observed raise fundamental questions: Do understanding and generation require distinct computational strategies? The superiority of representation-focused models suggests that current architectures may be conflating two fundamentally different cognitive tasks.

#### 5.4 EMERGENCE DURING TRAINING: HOW DIVERGENT STRATEGIES DEVELOP

Having established that LLMs and humans employ divergent representational strategies, we investigate *how* these strategies emerge. Analysis of OLMo-7B across 57 training checkpoints (1K to 557K steps, approximately 4B to 2.5T tokens) reveals how conceptual structure emerges.

**Two-Phase Representational Development.** Conceptual organization emerges via two phases (Figure 15). First, rapid concept formation (1K-100K steps) establishes basic categorical struc-

ture, with AMI rising from near zero to approximately 0.45, achieving 80% of final alignment within just 10% of training. Second, architectural reorganization (100K-500K steps) systematically migrates semantic processing from deeper layers toward mid-network while AMI continues to gradually improve. This migration from layer 29 to layer 23 occurs without sacrificing categorical alignment, suggesting the model discovers more efficient internal representations. **Moreover, this double-phase dynamics occurs when testing attention sparsity, effective rank, and  $\mathcal{L}$  values. Meaning, all of which exhibit the same early rapid shift followed by a slower restructuring phase. This convergence across independent metrics indicates that the model is not merely improving categorical alignment, but reorganizing its internal representations toward increasingly efficient structure. See Appendix H.**

**Architectural Reorganization as Optimization.** The upward migration of semantic processing hints that the model discovers increasingly efficient encodings. Early training relies on deep, memorization-heavy representations, but as training progresses, the model shifts to distributed mid-network encoding. This reorganization may explain apparent “emergent” capabilities: they arise not from learning fundamentally new information but from more efficient internal organization of existing knowledge.

**Implications.** These dynamics demonstrate that the compression-oriented strategy observed in fully trained models develops from the earliest stages of training. The rapid initial alignment followed by efficiency-focused reorganization suggests models are inherently biased toward statistical compression rather than semantic richness. Achieving human-like representations may require not just different final objectives but fundamentally different learning dynamics that actively maintain semantic diversity throughout development.

## 6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

We investigated how LLMs and humans navigate the compression-meaning trade-off in conceptual representation. Using information-theoretic analysis of 40+ models against classic cognitive benchmarks, we reveal fundamental differences in their representational strategies.

**Key Findings.** LLMs achieve broad categorical alignment with humans ( $AMI \approx 0.55$ ), successfully partitioning semantic space into recognizable categories. However, they fail to capture the internal structure that makes these categories cognitively useful, as typicality correlations remain weak ( $\rho < 0.2$ ) across model families. Most strikingly, when evaluated on the compression-meaning trade-off, LLMs consistently achieve lower (better)  $\mathcal{L}$  scores than human categories, indicating they optimize for statistical efficiency over semantic richness. This pattern holds across architectures, though encoder models surprisingly outperform decoder models in human alignment despite being orders of magnitude smaller. Training dynamics analysis reveals rapid category formation followed by architectural reorganization that shifts semantic processing from deep to mid-network layers, suggesting efficiency optimization continues throughout training.

**Implications.** These findings challenge the assumption that statistical optimality equals understanding. LLMs excel at their training objective, which is minimizing prediction error, but this drives them toward representations that sacrifice semantic nuances. Encoder models’ superior alignment with human representations questions the current paradigm of unified, scaled decoder models, **suggesting that language understanding and generation may require distinct architectures and rely on different processes.** Our framework provides quantitative tools for monitoring the compression-meaning balance in future systems.

**Conclusions.** Our findings reveal an apparent paradox, showing that LLMs are simultaneously better and worse than humans. This occurs because **LLMs and humans employ divergent strategies: statistical compression versus semantic richness**, likely reflecting different optimization pressures. While LLMs process billions of tokens efficiently, humans enable flexible reasoning and generalization. Progress toward human-like AI may require preserving the apparent “inefficiencies” that support cognitive flexibility. We provide theoretical understanding, practical metrics, and high-quality digital benchmarks to develop more human-aligned representations. We encourage the community to utilize the data and metrics for future research towards making AI more human-like.

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## 7 ETHICS STATEMENT

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Our study relies exclusively on publicly available LLMs and digitized datasets from classic cognitive  
psychology experiments (Rosch, 1973a; 1975; McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1978). No new human  
subject data was collected, and all benchmark data we release have been properly attributed and  
curated to preserve research integrity.546  
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We do not foresee privacy, security, or fairness risks arising from our analyses. Our contribution is  
methodological and theoretical, focusing on representational trade-offs between humans and LLMs.  
Nevertheless, we acknowledge that insights into model-human divergences could influence how  
future systems are designed. We caution that optimizing solely for statistical efficiency without  
considering semantic richness may exacerbate risks of misinterpretation or oversimplification in  
socially sensitive applications.552  
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We declare no conflicts of interest or external sponsorship that could bias the reported findings.554  
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## 8 REPRODUCIBILITY STATEMENT

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We have taken several steps to ensure reproducibility. All digitized human categorization datasets  
used in our analyses are publicly released in machine-readable form (Appendix B.1). Detailed model  
specifications, including architectures, scales, and hyperparameters, are provided in Appendix B.2,  
and we document embedding extraction procedures, pooling strategies, and prompt templates in  
Appendix B.3-B.4. Full experimental results, including layer-wise analyses, clustering metrics, and  
training dynamics across checkpoints, are reported in the appendices (B.5-B.14). Our theoretical  
framework and derivations are described in Section 4, with complete definitions and formulations  
provided to enable replication. We will release the code for dataset processing, embedding extrac-  
tion, and evaluation upon acceptance (to preserve anonymity).

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## 735 A COGNITIVE INTUITION

### 736 A.1 A COGNITIVE INTUITION OF THE COMPRESSION-MEANING TRADEOFF

737 The compression-meaning tradeoff refers to the cognitive tension between representing  
 738 concepts with maximal efficiency (i.e., minimal information) and preserving the semantic  
 739 richness needed for flexible generalization, inference, and communication. For instance,  
 740 upon hearing the sentence “There was a large brown Labrador barking loudly near the  
 741 playground,” a person will often encode a simplified memory, such as “big scary dog near  
 742 kids.” This is not to suggest that humans cannot recall the full sentence, but rather that we  
 743 typically retain the most meaningful elements to enable efficient reasoning and general-  
 744 ization; without such abstraction and simplification, leveraging past experience for learning  
 745 and prediction would be more difficult.

746 We acknowledge that our metrics, while capturing the information-compression trade-  
 747 off and geometric efficiency in embedding space, do not directly measure all aspects of  
 748 human-style conceptual abstraction or reasoning. Our aim is not to claim full equivalence  
 749 with human cognition (nor do we think anyone can or should make such claims), but rather

756 to provide a quantitative, interpretable proxy that highlights where LLMs and humans converge or diverge in how they compress and organize semantic information. We view these  
 757 metrics as one lens among many, and we are careful in the paper to frame our findings as  
 758 providing insights into human-like patterns rather than definitive evidence of human-style  
 759 conceptual processing.  
 760

## 761 A.2 COGNITIVELY-INSPIRED INDUCTIVE BIASES

762 Future models could more closely align with human conceptual structure by incorporating  
 763 cognitively motivated inductive biases and representational mechanisms. Hierarchical  
 764 and compositional structure could enable models to capture nested relationships between  
 765 categories, reflecting the way humans organize knowledge from superordinate to basic-  
 766 level concepts (e.g., animal → mammal → dog → Labrador). Feature- and relation-based  
 767 biases could help models focus on meaningful perceptual or functional attributes and rela-  
 768 tional patterns, rather than relying solely on statistical co-occurrence.  
 769

770 Additionally, theory- or causally grounded priors that draw on humans' intuitive understand-  
 771 ing of how objects interact or behave, could constrain learning in complex domains and  
 772 support more flexible generalization. Incorporating a hybrid exemplar-rule approach, com-  
 773 bining memory of specific examples with abstracted rules, would further approximate hu-  
 774 man category learning. Modular architectures, in which specialized sub-networks handle  
 775 different aspects of conceptual representation, could enhance generalization and reduce  
 776 interference between unrelated features. Finally, meta-learned priors distilled from sym-  
 777 bolic or program-based representations offer a way to embed structured, human-like con-  
 778 cept hypotheses directly into neural models, allowing them to generalize more like humans  
 779 across novel situations.

780 Together, these inductive biases offer a path for models that not only compress information  
 781 efficiently but also organize knowledge in a manner that mirrors human conceptual rich-  
 782 ness, capturing graded typicality, family resemblance, and hierarchical relationships. While  
 783 integrating these biases may trade some compression for fidelity, they provide an exciting  
 784 opportunity to reduce meaning distortion and bridge the gap between statistical efficiency  
 785 and human-like conceptual understanding.  
 786

## 787 B LIMITATIONS

788 While this study offers valuable insights, several limitations should be considered.

- 789 • Our analysis primarily focuses on English; generalizability across languages with different  
 790 structures is an open question.
- 791 • Human categorization data as a benchmark may not fully capture cognitive complexity and  
 792 could introduce biases.
- 793 • Our IB-RDT objective is applied to specific LLMs; other models or representations might  
 794 behave differently.
- 795 • Our analysis is limited to textual input and does not explore image-based representations.

796 Future work could address these by expanding to other languages, exploring alternative cognitive  
 797 models, and testing these principles on different architectures or in real-world applications.  
 798

## 800 C DATASET ACCESS DETAILS

801 The aggregated and digitized human categorization datasets from Rosch (1973a; 1975); McCloskey  
 802 & Glucksberg (1978) are made available in CSV format at: [URL deduced for anonymity; Data is  
 803 attached as Supplementary Material].  
 804

## 805 D LLM DETAILS

- 806 • **BERT family:** deberta-large, bert-large-uncased, roberta-large (Devlin et al., 2019; He  
 807 et al., 2020; Zhuang et al., 2021).

- **QWEN family:** qwen2-0.5b, qwen2.5-0.5b, qwen1.5-0.5b, qwen2.5-1.5b, qwen2-1.5b, qwen1.5-1.5b, qwen1.5-4b, qwen2.5-4b, qwen2-7b, qwen1.5-14b, qwen1.5-32b, qwen1.5-72b, qwen2.5-72b (Bai et al., 2023; Yang et al., 2024).
- **Llama family:** llama-3.2-1b, llama-3.1-8b, llama-3-8b, llama-3-70b, llama-3.1-70b (Touvron et al., 2023a;b; Grattafiori et al., 2024).
- **Phi family:** phi-1.5, phi-1, phi-2, phi-4 (Javaheripi et al., 2023; Abdin et al., 2024; Abouelenin et al., 2025).
- **Gemma family:** gemma-2b, gemma-2-2b, gemma-7b, gemma-2-9b (Team et al., 2024; 2025).
- **Mistral family:** mistral-7b-v0.3 (Karamcheti et al., 2021).
- **GPT family:** gpt2, gpt2-medium (Radford et al., 2019).
- **DeepSeek family:** DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-1.5B, DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-7B, DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-14B, DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-32B, DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-8B (DeepSeek-AI, 2025).
- **OLMo family:** Olmo-7b (Groeneveld et al., 2024).
- **ViT family:** Clip ViT-B/32, Clip ViT-B/16 (Radford et al., 2021).
- **Classic static embeddings:** GloVe, Word2Vec (Pennington et al., 2014; Mikolov et al., 2013a;b).

## E CONTEXTUAL PROMPTS AND POOLING STRATEGIES

Contextual embeddings of LLMs require feeding words into the model through a prompt. Because tokenizers often split a word into multiple tokens, and since some items in our datasets consist of two or more words, we face a design choice regarding how to aggregate token representations. In our methodology, we adopt *average pooling* over the actual tokens, ensuring that all subword pieces contribute equally. Figures 4 and 5 reveal that the average pooling strategy achieves consistent performance and demonstrates the tightest distribution, making it the most reliable choice for our research.

For prompts, we selected a neutral template, "This is a {word}. " (with a trailing space), designed to minimize any additional semantic bias on the target item. Figures 6 and 7 show this prompt to balance performance and consistency, making it ideal for baseline comparisons.

In this section, we explore alternative pooling strategies and evaluate a diverse set of prompt templates across multiple models.

**Pooling Strategies.** We compare four common approaches:

- **Avg** - mean over all tokens representing the word
- **First** - representation of the first token
- **Last** - representation of the last token
- **Sentence Avg** - mean over the full sentence embedding

**Prompt Templates.** To test robustness, we design eight templates spanning different linguistic framings:

- "This is a {word}."
- "This is a {word}. " (with trailing space)
- "The concept of {word} is"
- "When we think of {word}, we consider"
- "A typical {word} would be"
- "Examples of {word} include"
- "The category {word} contains"
- "One kind of {word} is"




Figure 4: **Average pooling demonstrates consistent performance across different models, making it the most reliable choice for future research.** Each point corresponds to a prompt template applied to a model.

**Models.** We evaluate eight representative LLMs covering major architectures:

- bert-large-uncased (BERT family)
- deberta-large (DeBERTa family)
- gemma-2-2b (Gemma family)
- Llama-3.2-1B (Llama family)
- Mistral-7B-v0.3 (Mistral family)
- phi-2 (Phi family)
- Qwen2.5-1.5B (Qwen family)
- roberta-large (RoBERTa family)

## F STATIC VS. CONTEXTUAL AMI EXPLORATION

To understand how LLMs develop conceptual alignment with human categories, we examine the progression from static to contextual embeddings. Figure 8 presents three complementary views of this progression across different model scales and architectures.

The left subplot shows **Static AMI** scores, which represent the conceptual alignment achieved by models' input embeddings before any contextual processing (i.e., the  $E$  matrix embeddings of the target word). These scores reveal that even at the most basic level, LLMs encode semantic information that supports human-like categorical grouping. Remarkably, classic static models like Word2Vec and GloVe achieve static AMI scores that rival the peak contextual performance of modern LLMs, suggesting that fundamental conceptual structure is captured early in the learning process.

The middle subplot displays **Average AMI** across all layers, providing a measure of overall semantic representation quality throughout the network. This metric shows the typical performance a model achieves across its entire depth, offering insight into how consistently different layers maintain conceptual alignment. The improvement from static to average AMI demonstrates that contextual processing generally enhances rather than diminishes semantic understanding.

The right subplot reveals **Peak AMI**, representing the optimal conceptual alignment achieved by any single layer. This metric identifies where in the network conceptual understanding is maximized,




Figure 5: **Average pooling demonstrates the tightest distribution, indicating the highest consistency and reliability across different conditions.** Performance Distribution by Pooling Strategy - Box plots showing AMI distribution for each pooling strategy




Figure 6: **The neutral prompt template "This is a word. " demonstrates balanced performance and moderate consistency, making it ideal for baseline comparisons.** Performance Distribution across various prompts.

typically occurring in middle-to-late layers before declining in the final layers. The progression from static to peak AMI shows that contextual processing not only preserves but significantly enhances the conceptual alignment present in static embeddings.

Several key insights emerge from this multi-metric analysis. First, all models demonstrate above-chance alignment even in their static embeddings, confirming that basic semantic structure is a fundamental property of learned representations. Second, the consistent improvement from static to peak AMI across all model types suggests that contextual processing universally enhances conceptual understanding rather than creating it de novo. Third, encoder architectures of different types




Figure 7: **The neutral template "This is a {word}."** " remains a stable choice across families. Heatmap showing template performance per model.

(BERT, ViT encoders, and classic models) achieve comparable or superior performance to much larger decoder models, highlighting that architectural factors and pre-training objectives significantly influence conceptual alignment quality beyond mere model scale.

This analysis complements the main text findings by showing that LLMs do not simply achieve above-chance alignment with human categories but rather so through a systematic progression from basic to sophisticated conceptual representations, with contextual processing serving as an amplifier rather than a generator of semantic understanding.




Figure 8: **LLMs begin with basic conceptual alignment in static embeddings and achieve progressively stronger alignment through contextual processing.** Three subplots showing model size (log scale) versus different AMI metrics. **Left:** Static AMI reveals baseline categorical structure. **Middle:** Average AMI across layers shows overall semantic quality. **Right:** Peak AMI demonstrates high conceptual alignment. The consistent improvement from static to peak AMI across all model types reveals that contextual processing enhances rather than creates conceptual understanding, with encoders (BERT, ViT encoders and classic models) achieving comparable or superior performance to much larger decoder models.

We also tested the robustness of our results to different clustering seeds (Figure 9). We found AMI to be highly stable across seeds, with negligible variation in the peak values and layer-wise profiles, indicating that our conclusions are not sensitive to the choice of clustering initialization.





Figure 9: **AMI Scores are Robust Across Clustering Seeds.** Peak AMI between model representations and human categories remains highly stable across multiple random clustering initializations. Peaks in each plot are consistent, indicating that the observed alignment patterns are not sensitive to the choice of clustering seed.

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 1081 Lastly, we plot the peak AMI against the number of FLOPS per token and find no systematic  
 1082 correlation, suggesting that computational cost alone does not predict human-aligned  
 1083 conceptual representations (Figure 10.)



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 1104 Figure 10: **Peak AMI versus computational cost.** We plot each model’s peak AMI against  
 1105 its FLOPS per token. There is no systematic correlation, indicating that higher computa-  
 1106 tional cost does not necessarily lead to better alignment with human conceptual structure.

## G MULTILINGUAL ANALYSIS

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 1111 To further explore conceptual understanding across languages, we translated our dataset  
 1112 into Spanish, German, Italian, and Russian using Google Translate’s API and repeated our  
 1113 analyses with the same LLMs and methods. In RQ1, a clear scale effect emerges for all  
 1114 non-English languages, while English shows no such trend (Figures 11, 12). We interpret  
 1115 this as a consequence of limited non-English training data: larger models are more likely to  
 1116 have been exposed to sufficient multilingual data, improving their conceptual alignment. In  
 1117 RQ2, all models struggle to preserve the internal geometry of human concepts across lan-  
 1118 guages (Figure 13). RQ3 shows that non-English languages exhibit greater compression  
 1119 (Figure 14), consistent with our explanation for RQ1: smaller exposure to non-English data  
 1120 leads to more compressed representations, reducing flexibility and interpretability.

## H TRAINING DYNAMICS

1123 The OLMo analysis examines how semantic structure develops during training by analyzing 57  
 1124 intermediate checkpoints from the OLMo-7B model, representing evenly spaced sampling (every  
 1125 10K training steps) spanning from 1K to 557K steps (covering approximately 4B to 2.5T tokens).

1127 The analysis employs two complementary sampling strategies: **representative sampling (6 check-  
 1128 points)** captures major developmental phases at 1K, 101K, 201K, 301K, 401K, and 501K steps,  
 1129 while **high-resolution sampling (57 checkpoints)** reveals the inherent noise and fluctuations in  
 1130 training. Despite significant training noise, the overall semantic development follows a stable, pre-  
 1131 dictable pattern captured by the representative sampling, as shown in Figure 16. The complete  
 1132 training trajectory with all 57 checkpoints is presented in Figure 17.

1133 Moreover, this double-phase dynamics occurs when testing attention sparsity, effective  
 rank, and  $\mathcal{L}$  values (Figures 18, 19). Meaning, all of which exhibit the same early rapid

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
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Figure 11: **Scale effect emerges for non-English languages.** We compute peak AMI as a function of model size across different languages: English (red), Spanish (blue), Italian (purple), German (yellow), and Russian (pink). While English shows no systematic scaling effect, the other languages exhibit a clear positive relationship between model size and AMI. We interpret this as a consequence of limited non-English training data: larger models are more likely to have been exposed to sufficient multilingual data, improving their conceptual alignment. Additional analyses across other RQs using the multilingual data support this hypothesis.






Figure 12: **Scale effect emerges for non-English languages.** We compute peak AMI as a function of model size across different languages: English (red), Spanish (blue), Italian (purple), German (yellow), and Russian (pink). While English shows no systematic scaling effect, the other languages exhibit a clear positive relationship between model size and AMI. We interpret this as a consequence of limited non-English training data: larger models are more likely to have been exposed to sufficient multilingual data, improving their conceptual alignment. Additional analyses across other RQs using the multilingual data support this hypothesis.




Figure 13: **Preservation of internal conceptual geometry across languages.** Models struggle to maintain the internal structure of human concepts in all tested languages, with similar patterns observed across English, Spanish, German, Italian, and Russian.

shift followed by a slower restructuring phase. This convergence across independent metrics indicates that the model is not merely improving categorical alignment, but reorganizing its internal representations toward increasingly efficient structure.

## I DATASETS POLYSEMY

**Scope.** We quantify lexical ambiguity in our psycholinguistic stimuli by counting the distinct WordNet synsets associated with each lemma. This *polysemy score* lets us estimate how many alternative senses a model must implicitly conflate when it produces a single embedding for a word.

**Why it matters.** Consider *bat*, which can denote either a flying mammal or a piece of sports equipment. The same vector must account for both senses. Aggregating semantically distant senses can blur the representation and thus confound model-human comparisons, especially in tasks that rely on fine-grained semantic similarity. Explicitly tracking polysemy allows us to verify that any performance effects we observe are not artefacts of lexical ambiguity.

**Results** Figure 20 shows the distribution of polysemy scores. The majority of items are unambiguous (1-2 senses), but a heavy-tailed minority (e.g. *Running* (52 senses), *Saw* (28), *Block* (28)) is highly polysemous. This suggests that our findings are due to real differences between the models rather than polysemy-related artifacts. An additional 141 lemmas that are not in WordNet were omitted.

## J TOKENIZER ANALYSIS

**Rational.** The tokenizer of a model has a significant influence over the representations: segmentation rules (WordPiece vs. BPE), vocabulary size and special control tokens can inflate sequence length, skew frequency statistics, and shape error patterns. To ensure fair cross-model comparisons, we therefore (i) cluster checkpoints by the *tokenizer they use* and (ii) quantify how much those tokenizers overlap when applied to our datasets.

**Procedure.** Before computing overlap, we normalize the vocabulary, stripping tokenizer-specific characters; SentencePiece prefixes (–), GPT-style BPE space prefixes (G/g) and newline markers (C), WordPiece continuations markers (##), and related block characters. After this cleanup, tokens differing only by such prefixes collapse to a shared canonical form (e.g. \_house, GhousE, and ##house all become house). We then compute pair-wise Jaccard similarity on these cleaned vocabularies.

Table 1 summarizes the core statistics and information regarding the tokenizer types, while Figure 21 visualizes the resulting pairwise vocabulary overlap.

**Findings.** We find that most tokenizer families share substantial lexical overlap, often exceeding 60%, suggesting a de-facto common token inventory across recent open-source models. First-generation BERT WordPiece (bert-large-uncased and bert-base-uncased) are an outlier, sharing under 16% of tokens with any other group.

Model Family	Mean Tokens / Item	Vocabulary Size	Tokenizer Type
BERT	1.65	30K	WordPiece
DeBERTa & RoBERTa	2.30	50K	WordPiece
GPT	2.30	50K	BPE
Gemma	1.65	256K	SentencePiece (subword)
Llama	2.19	128K	BPE (SentencePiece/Tiktoken)
Mistral	2.35	32K	BPE + control tokens
Phi	2.30	32K	BPE (SentencePiece/Tiktoken)
Qwen	2.19	151.6K	BPE

Table 1: **Tokenizer statistics by tokenizer family.** Mean Tokens/Items refer to the average of the tokens per item in our datasets. The columns Vocabulary Size and Tokenizer Type are properties of the tokenizer.

1296  
1297**Model Clustering By Tokenizer Family**1298  
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- **Llama**: Llama-3.2-1B (representative), Llama-3.1-8B, Meta-Llama-3-8B, Llama-3.1-70B, Meta-Llama-3-70B
- **Gemma**: gemma-2-9b (representative), gemma-7b, gemma-2b, gemma-2-2b
- **Mistral**: Mistral-7B-v0.3 (unique)
- **Phi**: phi-2 (representative), phi-1, phi-1.5
- **RoBERTa**: roberta-large (unique)
- **DeBERTa**: deberta-large (unique)
- **GPT**: gpt2-medium (representative), gpt2
- **BERT**: bert-large-uncased (representative), bert-base-uncased
- **Qwen**: Qwen1.5-0.5B (representative), Qwen1.5-1.8B, Qwen1.5-14B, Qwen2-0.5B, Qwen2-7B, Qwen2.5-0.5B, Qwen2.5-1.5B, Qwen2.5-32B, Qwen1.5-32B, phi-4<sup>3</sup>

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1313**K ADDITIONAL CLUSTERING METRICS**1314  
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To further validate our cluster alignment findings (Section 5.1), in addition to Adjusted Mutual Information (AMI) and the Normalized Mutual Information (NMI), we also computed the Adjusted Rand Index (ARI) for the k-means clusters derived from LLM embeddings against human-defined categories. ARI measures the similarity between two data clusterings, correcting for chance. Like AMI, a score of 1 indicates perfect agreement and 0 indicates chance agreement.

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Across all tested LLMs, the ARI and NMI scores largely mirrored the trends observed with AMI, showing significantly above-chance alignment with human categories and similar relative model performances. Silhouette scores, while more variable, generally indicated reasonable cluster cohesion for both LLM-derived and human categories. Detailed tables of these scores are provided below.

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These supplementary metrics reinforce the conclusion that LLMs capture broad human-like conceptual groupings.

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1321**L MINI-CONTROLLED EXPERIMENT (MATCHED TRAINING DATA)**1322  
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To evaluate the extent to which dataset differences might account for the architectural patterns we report, we conducted matched-family analyses involving the only model families that can be aligned in both training data: GPT, Pythia, Cerebras, and T5. While these comparisons cannot rule out all confounds, they substantially reduce the influence of dataset variation. Across all matched settings, encoder models continue to outperform decoder models, yielding higher AMI and lower  $\mathcal{L}$ . This indicates that the architectural effects observed throughout the paper cannot be explained by differences in training data alone.

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1325**M DETAILED AMI SCORES PER MODEL AND DATASET**1326  
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Table 2 provides a more granular view of the static AMI scores for each LLM across the three individual psychological datasets.

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Dataset	Model	NMI	AMI	ARI
(Rosch, 1973c)	bert-large-uncased	0.19453	0.2011	0.11336
(Rosch, 1975)	bert-large-uncased	0.16547	0.27324	0.2216
(McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1978)	bert-large-uncased	0.12003	0.15934	0.06306
(Rosch, 1973c)	FacebookAI/roberta-large	0.1021	0.10666	0.03393
(Rosch, 1975)	FacebookAI/roberta-large	0.12138	0.23938	0.14165
(McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1978)	FacebookAI/roberta-large	0.06271	0.08873	0.03173

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<sup>3</sup>phi-4 has a different tokenizer than the rest of Phi family. The results of its tokenizer match the tokenizer of the Qwen family.

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1351	(Rosch, 1973c)	google/t5/t5-large	0.16583	0.16855	0.03676
1352	(Rosch, 1975)	google/t5/t5-large	-0.03799	0.04179	0.00758
1353	(McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1978)	google/t5/t5-large	0.06146	0.08825	0.0082
1354	(Rosch, 1973c)	google/gemma-2-27b	0.08523	0.09065	0.04158
1355	(Rosch, 1975)	google/gemma-2-27b	0.04276	0.10062	0.06244
1356	(McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1978)	google/gemma-2-27b	0.07814	0.10274	0.04364
1357	(Rosch, 1973c)	google/gemma-2-2b	0.04029	0.04107	0.01212
1358	(Rosch, 1975)	google/gemma-2-2b	0.04529	0.14844	0.07596
1359	(McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1978)	google/gemma-2-2b	0.09953	0.13593	0.06326
1360	(Rosch, 1973c)	google/gemma-2-9b	0.1222	0.12757	0.06053
1361	(Rosch, 1975)	google/gemma-2-9b	0.07841	0.16126	0.09617
1362	(McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1978)	google/gemma-2-9b	0.10879	0.13997	0.06439
1363	(Rosch, 1973c)	google/gemma-2b	0.04336	0.04616	0.01593
1364	(Rosch, 1975)	google/gemma-2b	-0.00353	0.04483	0.01577
1365	(McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1978)	google/gemma-2b	0.03472	0.05484	0.02142
1366	(Rosch, 1973c)	google/gemma-7b	0.04459	0.04547	0.01052
1367	(Rosch, 1975)	google/gemma-7b	-0.03055	0.02644	0.01506
1368	(McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1978)	google/gemma-7b	0.03338	0.05724	0.02176
1369	(Rosch, 1973c)	meta-llama/Llama-3.1-70B	0.03008	0.03528	0.01936
1370	(Rosch, 1975)	meta-llama/Llama-3.1-70B	-0.07026	0.02636	0.00392
1371	(McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1978)	meta-llama/Llama-3.1-70B	-0.04773	0.00972	0.00236
1372	(Rosch, 1973c)	meta-llama/Llama-3.1-8B	0.00473	0.00393	0.00023
1373	(Rosch, 1975)	meta-llama/Llama-3.1-8B	-0.03928	0.05489	0.01884
1374	(McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1978)	meta-llama/Llama-3.1-8B	-0.02671	0.02208	6.00E-05
1375	(Rosch, 1973c)	meta-llama/Llama-3.2-1B	0.01936	0.01567	0.00246
1376	(Rosch, 1975)	meta-llama/Llama-3.2-1B	-0.01876	0.05663	0.00782
1377	(McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1978)	meta-llama/Llama-3.2-1B	0.03625	0.06798	0.01352
1378	(Rosch, 1973c)	meta-llama/Llama-3.2-3B	0.03757	0.03537	0.00876
1379	(Rosch, 1975)	meta-llama/Llama-3.2-3B	0.01893	0.09619	0.03193
1380	(McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1978)	meta-llama/Llama-3.2-3B	0.03914	0.07395	0.0202
1381	(Rosch, 1973c)	meta-llama/Meta-Llama-3-70B	0.02289	0.03133	0.01514
1382	(Rosch, 1975)	meta-llama/Meta-Llama-3-70B	-0.06428	0.0185	0.00554
1383	(McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1978)	meta-llama/Meta-Llama-3-70B	-0.04595	0.01068	0.00272
1384	(Rosch, 1973c)	meta-llama/Meta-Llama-3-8B	0.03512	0.02852	0.00225
1385	(Rosch, 1975)	meta-llama/Meta-Llama-3-8B	-0.06011	0.03694	0.00676
1386	(McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1978)	meta-llama/Meta-Llama-3-8B	-0.0355	0.0219	0.00676
1387	(Rosch, 1973c)	microsoft/deberta-large	0.03748	0.03909	0.01467
1388	(Rosch, 1975)	microsoft/deberta-large	0.16568	0.28993	0.20527
1389	(McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1978)	microsoft/deberta-large	0.03217	0.06175	0.03019
1390	(Rosch, 1973c)	microsoft/phi-1.5	0.02102	0.01786	0.0075
1391	(Rosch, 1975)	microsoft/phi-1.5	0.03989	0.13887	0.04305
1392	(McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1978)	microsoft/phi-1.5	0.00895	0.05215	0.00639
1393	(Rosch, 1973c)	microsoft/phi-1	0.0249	0.01698	0.00133
1394	(Rosch, 1975)	microsoft/phi-1	-0.03625	0.02811	0.00217
1395	(McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1978)	microsoft/phi-1	-0.01148	0.03085	0.00371
1396	(Rosch, 1973c)	microsoft/phi-2	0.03703	0.02968	0.00404
1397	(Rosch, 1975)	microsoft/phi-2	-0.03654	0.04227	0.03942
1398	(McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1978)	microsoft/phi-2	-0.00254	0.02531	0.00533
1399	(Rosch, 1973c)	microsoft/phi-4	0.03075	0.03043	0.01076
1400	(Rosch, 1975)	microsoft/phi-4	-0.06737	0.00092	-0.01361
1401	(McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1978)	microsoft/phi-4	-0.01789	0.02705	0.00066
1402	(Rosch, 1973c)	mistralai/Mistral-7B-v0.3	0.0425	0.03507	0.00357
1403	(Rosch, 1975)	mistralai/Mistral-7B-v0.3	-0.05018	0.01217	0.0177
1404	(McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1978)	mistralai/Mistral-7B-v0.3	-0.01264	0.03902	0.00931
1405	(Rosch, 1973c)	Qwen/Qwen1.5-0.5B	0.00148	-0.00225	0.00399
1406	(Rosch, 1975)	Qwen/Qwen1.5-0.5B	-0.01538	0.04833	0.0095
1407	(McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1978)	Qwen/Qwen1.5-0.5B	0.02559	0.06023	0.00771
1408	(Rosch, 1973c)	Qwen/Qwen1.5-1.8B	0.03397	0.03232	0.01034
1409	(Rosch, 1975)	Qwen/Qwen1.5-1.8B	-0.01129	0.05803	0.00683
1410	(McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1978)	Qwen/Qwen1.5-1.8B	-0.00541	0.03614	0.00538
1411	(Rosch, 1973c)	Qwen/Qwen1.5-14B	0.0372	0.02738	0.0028

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1405	(Rosch, 1975)	Qwen/Qwen1.5-14B	-0.02604	0.05153	0.01211
1406	(McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1978)	Qwen/Qwen1.5-14B	0.00124	0.04136	0.00338
1407	(Rosch, 1973c)	Qwen/Qwen1.5-32B	0.02638	0.02436	0.00409
1408	(Rosch, 1975)	Qwen/Qwen1.5-32B	-0.03413	0.02526	-0.00665
1409	(McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1978)	Qwen/Qwen1.5-32B	-0.01991	0.02124	-0.00059
1410	(Rosch, 1973c)	Qwen/Qwen1.5-4B	0.03803	0.04058	0.01742
1411	(Rosch, 1975)	Qwen/Qwen1.5-4B	-0.03309	0.03988	0.01678
1412	(McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1978)	Qwen/Qwen1.5-4B	-0.03997	0.00548	-0.00028
1413	(Rosch, 1973c)	Qwen/Qwen1.5-72B	0.03697	0.02892	0.00144
1414	(Rosch, 1975)	Qwen/Qwen1.5-72B	-0.06184	0.02213	0.0017
1415	(McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1978)	Qwen/Qwen1.5-72B	-0.02022	0.02918	0.00297
1416	(Rosch, 1973c)	Qwen/Qwen2-0.5B	0.02266	0.01923	0.00662
1417	(Rosch, 1975)	Qwen/Qwen2-0.5B	0.0515	0.14571	0.04999
1418	(McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1978)	Qwen/Qwen2-0.5B	0.01508	0.04357	0.00643
1419	(Rosch, 1973c)	Qwen/Qwen2-1.5B	0.02956	0.02779	0.00544
1420	(Rosch, 1975)	Qwen/Qwen2-1.5B	-0.03595	0.03443	-0.01099
1421	(McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1978)	Qwen/Qwen2-1.5B	0.01768	0.05407	0.01604
1422	(Rosch, 1973c)	Qwen/Qwen2-7B	0.06424	0.06439	0.02067
1423	(Rosch, 1975)	Qwen/Qwen2-7B	0.0333	0.09155	0.02832
1424	(McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1978)	Qwen/Qwen2-7B	0.05329	0.07599	0.01977
1425	(Rosch, 1973c)	Qwen/Qwen2.5-0.5B	0.03165	0.03291	0.01029
1426	(Rosch, 1975)	Qwen/Qwen2.5-0.5B	-0.06534	-0.0196	-0.01165
1427	(McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1978)	Qwen/Qwen2.5-0.5B	0.0062	0.04191	0.0054
1428	(Rosch, 1973c)	Qwen/Qwen2.5-1.5B	0.04838	0.0489	0.0129
1429	(Rosch, 1975)	Qwen/Qwen2.5-1.5B	0.03785	0.113	0.02761
1430	(McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1978)	Qwen/Qwen2.5-1.5B	0.06166	0.08675	0.03162
1431	(Rosch, 1973c)	Qwen/Qwen2.5-3B	0.03882	0.0348	0.00465
1432	(Rosch, 1975)	Qwen/Qwen2.5-3B	0.03977	0.10821	0.04302
1433	(McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1978)	Qwen/Qwen2.5-3B	0.03416	0.07307	0.02959
1434	(Rosch, 1973c)	Qwen/Qwen2.5-7B	0.0529	0.05051	0.01605
1435	(Rosch, 1975)	Qwen/Qwen2.5-7B	-0.00905	0.03227	0.01044
1436	(McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1978)	Qwen/Qwen2.5-7B	0.00222	0.02759	0.00551

Table 2: Mutual information measures (normalized mutual information, adjusted mutual information, adjusted rand index) per model per dataset. Aggregated results are shown in the main paper and the Figures in the Appendix.

## N CORRELATION BETWEEN HUMAN TYPICALITY JUDGMENTS AND LLM INTERNAL CLUSTER GEOMETRY

The following tables present the Spearman correlation coefficients ( $\rho$ ) between human typicality judgments and LLM internal representations across different analysis approaches:

**Table 3:** Static analysis correlations using embeddings from the E matrix. This approach captures the baseline semantic relationships between items and categories without contextual processing.

**Table 4:** Peak AMI layer analysis correlations using contextual embeddings from the layer that maximized AMI scores (as identified in RQ1). This approach leverages the optimal layer for semantic clustering to assess fine-grained semantic fidelity.

Both tables present correlations across three cognitive science datasets: Rosch (1973), Rosch (1975), and McCloskey (1978), with asterisks (\*) indicating statistically significant correlations ( $p < 0.05$ ). The modest correlation values across most models suggest limited alignment between LLM internal representations and human-perceived semantic nuances.

## O TYPICALITY AND COSINE SIMILARITY [RQ2]

Figure 25 shows representative scatter plots illustrating the relationship between human typicality scores (or psychological distances) and the LLM-derived item-centroid cosine similarities for selected categories and models. These plots visually demonstrate the often modest correlations discussed in Section 5.2.

Model	Dataset Correlation (Spearman $\rho$ ) - Static Layer		
	Rosch (1973)	Rosch (1975)	McCloskey (1978)
<b>Deberta large (304M)</b>	0.144	0.107*	0.075
<b>Bert large (340M)</b>	0.378*	0.275*	0.250*
<b>Roberta large (355M)</b>	0.005	0.038	-0.029
<b>Gemma (2B)</b>	0.069	0.078	0.007
<b>Gemma 2 (2B)</b>	0.236	0.119*	0.147*
<b>Gemma (7B)</b>	0.131	0.100*	0.007
<b>Gemma 2 (9B)</b>	0.280	0.135*	0.199*
<b>Gemma 2 (27B)</b>	0.112	0.122*	0.161*
<b>Qwen1.5 (0.5B)</b>	0.175	0.076	0.096*
<b>Qwen2 (0.5B)</b>	0.238	0.041	0.040
<b>Qwen2.5 (0.5B)</b>	0.212	0.027	0.037
<b>Qwen2.5 (1.5B)</b>	0.141	0.086*	0.078
<b>Qwen1.5 (1.8B)</b>	0.172	0.134*	0.154*
<b>Qwen2 (7B)</b>	0.036	0.087*	0.040
<b>Qwen1.5 (14B)</b>	0.154	0.086*	0.108*
<b>Qwen1.5 (32B)</b>	-0.032	0.100*	0.081
<b>Qwen2.5 (32B)</b>	0.035	0.105*	0.084
<b>Mistral v0.3 (7B)</b>	0.076	0.152*	-0.009
<b>Llama 3.2 (1B)</b>	0.301*	0.056	0.039
<b>Llama 3 (8B)</b>	-0.002	0.099*	0.080
<b>Llama 3.1 (8B)</b>	0.004	0.108*	0.081
<b>Llama 3 (70B)</b>	0.148	0.161*	0.155*
<b>Llama 3.1 (70B)</b>	0.122	0.161*	0.155*
<b>Phi 1 (1.42B)</b>	0.071	0.052	0.054
<b>Phi 1.5 (1.42B)</b>	-0.088	0.079	0.018
<b>Phi 2 (2.78B)</b>	-0.056	0.044	0.024
<b>Phi 4 (14.7B)</b>	0.079	0.086*	0.097*
<b>T5 Large (770M)</b>	0.235	0.259*	0.178*
<b>GPT-2 Medium (355M)</b>	-0.032	0.063	-0.017
<b>ViT-B/32 Text (63.1M)</b>	0.527*	0.315*	0.286*
<b>ViT-B/16 Text (63.1M)</b>	0.528*	0.289*	0.278*
<b>Word2Vec (300D)</b>	0.442*	0.349*	0.437*
<b>Glove (300D)</b>	0.315*	0.333*	0.350*

Table 3: **Correlation between Human Typicality Judgments and LLM Internal Cluster Geometry.** Spearman static-layer rank correlations between human-rated psychological typicality/distance (higher human scores = less typical/more distant) and item-to-centroid cosine similarity (higher similarity = more central to LLM cluster). \* $p < 0.05$ .

Figure 26 shows the aggregated Spearman correlation across model families and datasets. These correlations are very weak and mostly non-significant.

## P THEORETICAL EXTREME CASE EXPLORATION FOR $\mathcal{L}$

In the case where  $|C| = |X|$  (each data point is a cluster of size 1, so  $|C_c| = 1 \forall c \in C$ ), then  $H(X|C) = \frac{1}{|X|} \sum_{c \in C} 1 \cdot \log_2 1 = 0$ . The distortion term  $\sigma_c^2 = 0$  for each cluster as the item is its own centroid. Thus,  $\mathcal{L} = I(X; C) + \beta \cdot 0 = H(X) - H(X|C) = H(X) = \log_2 |X|$ . This represents the cost of encoding each item perfectly without any compression via clustering, and zero distortion.

In the case where  $|C| = 1$  (one cluster  $C_X$  contains all  $|X|$  data points, so  $|C_{C_X}| = |X|$ ), then  $H(X|C) = \frac{1}{|X|} |X| \log_2 |X| = \log_2 |X|$ . Thus,  $I(X; C) = H(X) - H(X|C) = \log_2 |X| - \log_2 |X| = 0$ . This represents maximum compression (all items are treated as one). The distortion term becomes  $\beta \cdot \frac{1}{|X|} |X| \cdot \sigma_X^2 = \beta \cdot \sigma_X^2$ , where  $\sigma_X^2$  is the variance of all items  $X$  with respect to the global centroid of  $X$ . So,  $\mathcal{L} = 0 + \beta \cdot \sigma_X^2 = \beta \cdot \sigma_X^2$ . This represents the scenario of maximum compression where the cost is purely the distortion incurred by representing all items by a single prototype.

Model	Dataset Correlation (Spearman $\rho$ ) - Peak AMI Layer		
	Rosch (1973)	Rosch (1975)	McCloskey (1978)
<b>Deberta large (304M)</b>	0.277	0.107*	0.126*
<b>Bert large (340M)</b>	-0.120	0.148*	0.026
<b>Roberta large (355M)</b>	-0.011	0.038	-0.022
<b>Gemma (2B)</b>	0.127	0.092*	0.039
<b>Gemma 2 (2B)</b>	0.034	0.139*	0.103*
<b>Gemma (7B)</b>	0.004	-0.050	0.088
<b>Gemma 2 (9B)</b>	0.047	0.110*	0.098*
<b>Gemma 2 (27B)</b>	-0.135	0.090*	-0.101*
<b>Qwen1.5 (0.5B)</b>	-0.025	-0.064	0.122*
<b>Qwen2 (0.5B)</b>	0.090	0.064	-0.077
<b>Qwen2.5 (0.5B)</b>	-0.012	0.121*	0.072
<b>Qwen2.5 (1.5B)</b>	-0.114	0.084*	-0.028
<b>Qwen1.5 (1.8B)</b>	0.092	-0.044	-0.004
<b>Qwen2 (7B)</b>	0.004	0.049	-0.087
<b>Qwen1.5 (14B)</b>	0.032	0.091*	0.043
<b>Qwen1.5 (32B)</b>	0.026	0.082	0.111*
<b>Qwen2.5 (32B)</b>	0.045	0.079	-0.060
<b>Mistral v0.3 (7B)</b>	0.013	0.039	0.107*
<b>Llama 3.2 (1B)</b>	0.063	0.094*	0.070
<b>Llama 3 (8B)</b>	-0.045	0.138*	0.084
<b>Llama 3.1 (8B)</b>	-0.096	0.130*	0.087
<b>Llama 3 (70B)</b>	-0.108	0.023	0.050
<b>Phi 1 (1.42B)</b>	0.216	0.185*	-0.029
<b>Phi 1.5 (1.42B)</b>	0.162	0.098*	0.015
<b>Phi 2 (2.78B)</b>	0.325*	0.142*	-0.033
<b>Phi 4 (14.7B)</b>	0.079	0.129*	0.007
<b>T5 Large (770M)</b>	0.219	0.226*	0.282*
<b>GPT-2 Small (117M)</b>	-0.046	0.118*	0.010
<b>GPT-2 Medium (355M)</b>	0.077	0.109*	-0.029
<b>ViT-B/32 Text (63.1M)</b>	0.128	0.055	0.152*
<b>ViT-B/16 Text (63.1M)</b>	0.089	0.086*	0.127*
<b>Word2Vec (300D)</b>	0.442*	0.349*	0.437*
<b>Glove (300D)</b>	0.315*	0.333*	0.350*

Table 4: **Correlation between Human Typicality Judgments and LLM Internal Cluster Geometry.** Spearman peak-AMI layer rank correlations between human-rated psychological typicality/distance (higher human scores = less typical/more distant) and item-to-centroid cosine similarity (higher similarity = more central to LLM cluster). \* $p < 0.05$ .

## Q COMPRESSION FIGURES

Figure 28 depicts the IB-RDT objective ( $\mathcal{L}$ ) vs.  $K$ . Lower  $\mathcal{L}$  indicates a more optimal balance between compression ( $I(X; C)$ ) and semantic fidelity (distortion). Human categories (fixed  $K$ ) show higher  $\mathcal{L}$  values.

## R COMPLEXITY-DISTORTION RATIO (ON THE IMPORTANCE OF $\beta$ )

Figure 29 provides an additional sensitivity analysis in which we examine the ratio between the distortion and complexity components of  $\mathcal{L}$  as  $\beta$  varies. Across all three datasets, encoder models maintain flat profiles, indicating stable conceptual structure under compression, whereas decoder models exhibit stronger shifts, reflecting greater reallocation of representational capacity.

1566 **S  $\mathcal{L}$  OBJECTIVE VS. DOWNSTREAM TASK PERFORMANCE**  
1567

1568 Analysis of 13 instruction-tuned models across 5 families (Qwen, Llama, Gemma, Phi, Mistral; see Table 5 for  
 1569 results) indicates no statistical significance ( $r = -0.202, p = 0.508$ ). This finding suggests that while the  $\mathcal{L}$   
 1570 objective successfully identifies models that compress semantic categories more effectively, this compression  
 1571 ability does not directly translate to improved performance on standard NLP benchmarks. The lack of correlation  
 1572 implies that concept compression and benchmark accuracy represent distinct aspects of model capability,  
 1573 with the former capturing semantic organization efficiency and the latter measuring general knowledge and  
 1574 reasoning abilities. We specifically chose instruction-tuned models to ensure fair comparison on MMLU, as  
 1575 base models would likely perform poorly on this instruction-following benchmark. While our analysis covers  
 1576 a diverse range of model families and sizes, this represents a subset of available models due to the limited  
 1577 availability of instruction-tuned variants.

1578 <b>Model</b>	1579 <b>Size</b>	1580 <b><math>\mathcal{L}</math> Score</b>	1581 <b>MMLU Score</b>
1582 Qwen2-0.5B-Instruct	1583 494M	1584 1.930	1585 0.433
1586 Qwen2.5-0.5B-Instruct	1587 494M	1588 1.982	1589 0.469
1590 Llama-3.2-1B-Instruct	1591 1.2B	1592 1.876	1593 0.454
1594 Qwen2.5-1.5B-Instruct	1595 1.5B	1596 2.071	1597 0.597
1598 Gemma-2B-IT	1599 2.5B	1600 2.382	1601 0.366
1602 Gemma-2-2B-IT	1603 2.6B	1604 2.263	1605 0.565
1606 Phi-4-mini-instruct	1607 3.8B	1608 1.905	1609 0.678
1610 Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.3	1611 7.2B	1612 1.714	1613 0.603
1614 Qwen2-7B-Instruct	1615 7.6B	1616 2.319	1617 0.700
1618 Meta-Llama-3-8B-Instruct	1619 8.0B	1619 1.348	1619 0.647
1619 Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct	1619 8.0B	1619 1.320	1619 0.679
1619 Gemma-7B-IT	1619 8.5B	1619 2.372	1619 0.512
1619 Gemma-2-9B-IT	1619 9.2B	1619 2.467	1619 0.723

1592 **Table 5: No correlation between  $\mathcal{L}$  objective scores and MMLU scores across different sizes  
 1593 and families.** Table displays  $\mathcal{L}$  objective values vs. MMLU scores for 13 instruction-tuned models.  
 1594 Correlation measured ( $r = -0.202, p = 0.508$ ).

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


Figure 14: **Compression of non-English representations.** All non-English languages (Spanish, German, Italian, Russian) exhibit higher compression than English, with smaller models showing the greatest compression. This supports the interpretation that limited non-English training data leads to less flexible and less interpretable representations.




Figure 15: **OLMo-7B develops conceptual structure through two-phase dynamics.** *Left:* AMI with human categories rises rapidly in early training then refines gradually. *Right:* Peak semantic processing migrates from deep (layer 28) toward mid-network layers during training, revealing architectural reorganization for efficiency. Representative checkpoints shown; full 57-checkpoint analysis in Appendix B.5.




Figure 16: **Left: OLMo-7B representations steadily strengthen during training:** Concept representations develop rapidly at early steps, then refine more gradually over time. **Right: Semantic processing shifts from deep to mid-network layers:** The model undergoes a two-phase dynamic - initially moving semantic processing upward during rapid learning, then reorganizing to optimize efficiency while preserving performance. To improve readability, we present six representative checkpoints that capture the trend.




Figure 17: **Complete OLMo-7B training trajectory across 57 checkpoints:** This high-resolution view reveals the inherent noise and fluctuations in training, with individual checkpoint measurements varying throughout the process. Despite this variability, the overall trend aligns with the stable pattern shown in Figure 16, demonstrating that representative sampling effectively captures the underlying semantic development trajectory while filtering out training noise.




Figure 18: **Network-level measures of representational structure across training.** Each panel shows a different metric: (a) effective rank, (b) Gini coefficient, and (c) Hoyer sparsity computed across network layers. All three measures reveal the same two-phase developmental pattern observed in Figure 15: an early rapid change followed by slower restructuring, indicating coordinated reorganization of internal representations.




Figure 19:  $\mathcal{L}$  across training. Across all three human benchmarks, Olmo training checkpoints reveal the same two-phase developmental pattern observed in Figure 15: an early rapid change followed by slower restructuring, indicating coordinated reorganization of internal representations.




Figure 20: Polysemy is not likely to influence our results as most of the words in our dataset are concrete nouns, which tend to be less polysemous. Histogram of WordNet sense counts for the 943 lemmas in our benchmark. The dashed lines indicate the median and mean (2 senses, 3.47 senses, respectively).




Figure 21: **Substantial lexical overlap suggests that tokenization differences alone cannot explain the observed performance variations in our experiments.** Vocabulary overlap between different tokenizers; most tokenizer families share substantial lexical overlap.




Figure 22: **LLM-derived Clusters Show Above-Chance Alignment with Human Conceptual Categories.** Normalized Mutual Information (NMI) between human-defined categories and clusters from static LLM embeddings. Results are averaged over three psychological datasets. All models perform significantly better than random clustering. BERT’s performance is notably strong.




Figure 23: **LLM-derived Clusters Show Above-Chance Alignment with Human Conceptual Categories.** Adjusted Rand Index (ARI) between human-defined categories and clusters from LLM static embeddings. Results are averaged over three psychological datasets. All models perform significantly better than random clustering. BERT’s performance is notably strong.




Figure 24: **Evidence that encoder–decoder differences are not driven by dataset artifacts.** We compare the only model families that can be matched in training data GPT, Pythia, Cerebras, and T5. While these comparisons cannot eliminate all possible confounds, they show that the architectural patterns we report are robust: encoder models consistently achieve higher AMI and lower  $L$ , suggesting that the observed differences cannot be explained by dataset variation alone.




Figure 25: **Weak-to-No Correlation Between LLM Embedding Distance and Human Typicality Judgments.** Scatter plot examples of the cosine similarity versus the human typicality of items belonging to the category compared to items from other categories.




Figure 26: **Weak and Mostly Non-Significant Spearman Correlation Values Between Human Typicality Judgments and LLM Cosine Similarity Indicating Different Structure Representing Concepts.** Mean Static Layer Spearman correlation values across the models belonging to the same family and across the three datasets.




Figure 27: **Static Embeddings Achieve a more “Optimal” Compression-Meaning Trade-off by the  $\mathcal{L}$  Measure.** IB-RDT objective ( $\mathcal{L}$ ) vs.  $K$  across all datasets. Lower  $\mathcal{L}$  indicates a more optimal balance between compression ( $I(X; C)$ ) and semantic fidelity (distortion). Static embeddings consistently achieve lower  $\mathcal{L}$  values than both human categories and contextual embeddings. The plots correspond to the three datasets in the following order: Rosch (1973a), Rosch (1975), McCloskey & Glucksberg (1978).




Figure 28: **Contextual Embeddings Achieve Better-than-Human Compression-Meaning Trade-off by the  $\mathcal{L}$  Measure.** IB-RDT objective ( $\mathcal{L}$ ) vs.  $K$  across all datasets. Lower  $\mathcal{L}$  indicates a more optimal balance between compression ( $I(X; C)$ ) and semantic fidelity (distortion). Contextual embeddings outperform human categories but achieve higher  $\mathcal{L}$  values than static embeddings. The plots correspond to the three datasets in the following order: Rosch (1973a), Rosch (1975), McCloskey & Glucksberg (1978).




Figure 29: **Complexity-Distortion Ratios Show That Encoder-Models are Less Sensitive to Variations in  $\beta$ .** For each dataset, we compute the ratio between distortion (loss of human-aligned conceptual information) and complexity (representation size) across values of the rate-distortion tradeoff parameter  $\beta$ . Encoder models yield consistently flatter profiles, indicating that their token embeddings preserve conceptual structure even under increasing compression. Decoder models exhibit more pronounced shifts, suggesting that they redistribute representational capacity more aggressively as  $\beta$  increases, leading to higher sensitivity in this tradeoff.