DATA-ADAPTIVE DIFFERENTIALLY PRIVATE PROMPT SYNTHESIS FOR IN-CONTEXT LEARNING

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ABSTRACT

Large Language Models (LLMs) rely on the contextual information embedded in examples/demonstrations to perform in-context learning (ICL). To mitigate the risk of LLMs potentially leaking private information contained in examples in the prompt, we introduce a novel data-adaptive differentially private algorithm called AdaDPSyn to generate synthetic examples from the private dataset and then use these synthetic examples to perform ICL. The objective of AdaDPSyn is to adaptively adjust the noise level in the data synthesis mechanism according to the inherent statistical properties of the data, thereby preserving high ICL accuracy while maintaining formal differential privacy guarantees. A key innovation in AdaDP-Syn is the *Precision-Focused Iterative Radius Reduction* technique, which dynamically refines the aggregation radius - the scope of data grouping for noise addition - based on patterns observed in data clustering, thereby minimizing the amount of additive noise. We conduct extensive experiments on standard benchmarks and compare AdaDPSyn with DP few-shot generation algorithm [\(Tang et al., 2023\)](#page-12-0). The experiments demonstrate that AdaDPSyn not only outperforms DP few-shot generation, but also maintains high accuracy levels close to those of non-private baselines, providing an effective solution for ICL with privacy protection.

1 INTRODUCTION

In-context learning (ICL) [\(Brown et al., 2020;](#page-10-0) [Min et al., 2022\)](#page-12-1) enables large language models (LLMs) [\(OpenAI, 2023\)](#page-12-2) to adapt to domain-specific information without modifying the pre-trained model. This adaptation is achieved by conditioning the model on a *prompt*, which contains an instruction and a series of task-specific question-answer pairs (called *demonstrations* or *examples*). Using this prompt, LLMs can then generate responses that are tailored to the corresponding task. The ease of usage and cost-benefit of ICL have motivated the adoption of LLMs in several applications, such as machine translation [\(Sia and Duh, 2023\)](#page-12-3), code generation [\(Pourreza and Rafiei, 2023\)](#page-12-4) and customer service [\(Lee et al., 2022\)](#page-11-0).

However, privacy is a significant concern when incorporating users' data into prompts, especially in areas like healthcare and finance [\(Wang et al., 2023;](#page-13-0) [Priyanshu et al., 2023;](#page-12-5) [Duan et al., 2023\)](#page-10-1), as this introduces risks of exposing sensitive personal information. To address this concern, existing works [\(Wu et al., 2023;](#page-13-1) [Tang et al., 2023;](#page-12-0) [Duan et al., 2023;](#page-10-1) [Carey et al., 2024;](#page-10-2) [Hong et al., 2023\)](#page-11-1) have explored approaches to mitigate these risks using the rigorous privacy safeguards provided by differential privacy (DP) [\(Dwork et al., 2006b\)](#page-11-2). Notably, [Tang et al.](#page-12-0) [\(2023\)](#page-12-0) proposed to generate synthetic few-shot demonstrations from the private dataset for use in ICL inference and guarantee DP with respect to examples in the private dataset. This method uses the classic DP sample-and-aggregate framework [\(Nissim et al., 2007;](#page-12-6) [Papernot et al., 2016;](#page-12-7) [2018\)](#page-12-8), partitioning subsampled private data into disjoint subsets, each of which is used in a prompt for an LLM to generate tokens. These tokens

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Figure 1: Two-Stage framework for privacy-preserving ICL. In Stage 1, DP-protected demonstrations are generated with AdaDPSyn, where we illustrate the process of generating the next token "City" following "New York". AdaDPSyn uses a novel clustering approach to dynamically aggregate next-token probabilities. The process iterates until n_{shot} demonstrations are generated. In Stage 2, the generated DP-protected demonstrations are combined with a user query to construct the prompt. The constructed prompt is then sent to an LLM and the answer is returned to the user.

are then privately aggregated, adhering to DP guarantees, to create synthetic demonstrations. This framework allows the synthetic demonstrations to be used for an infinite number of queries without incurring any additional privacy costs.

The main design challenge in [Tang et al.](#page-12-0) [\(2023\)](#page-12-0) is aggregating the responses from an LLM privately. [Tang et al.](#page-12-0) [\(2023\)](#page-12-0) used a *data-independent* way of adding the same amount of Gaussian noise during private aggregation. However, since each token generated by the LLM can contain varying levels of private information, applying noise homogeneously across an entire sentence or document may not achieve the optimal privacy-utility tradeoff in the ICL framework. Therefore, it is more strategic to design DP mechanisms that adapt the noise level in a *data-adaptive* manner. Intuitively, by adaptively adjusting the additive noise level based on the properties of responses for individual tokens, we avoid adding unnecessarily large noise to tokens with high agreement or predictability, which indicates low risk, thereby achieving improved utility for ICL. The main question we aim to answer is:

Can we design a data-adaptive differentially private prompt synthesis algorithm to protect the private information contained in the prompt data and effectively perform ICL?

In this work, we provide an affirmative answer to this question. Our main contributions are summarized as follows:

- We introduce a new algorithm AdaDPSyn in Algorithm [1](#page-7-0) to generate synthetic few-shot examples for use in ICL prompts (Figure [1\)](#page-1-0). Similar to [Tang et al.](#page-12-0) [\(2023\)](#page-12-0), AdaDPSyn begins by obtaining next-token generation probability vectors from an LLM using multiple subsets of private dataset, which will then be aggregated to generate the next token differentially privately. The essential novelty of AdaDPSyn lies in our proposed *Precision-Focused Iterative Radius Reduction* technique, which adaptively adds noise level during aggregation by exploiting the cluster structure of the predicted distributions of the next token. Besides, we believe that our data-adaptive technique may be applicable in various problems beyond prompt synthesis, thus is of independent interest.
- We conduct a rigorous privacy analysis of AdaDPSyn and confirm it follows (ε, δ) -DP. In our analysis, we use the Renyi Differential Privacy (RDP) [\(Mironov, 2017\)](#page-12-9) framework to track and ´ tightly quantify privacy costs from the composition of AdaDPSyn's components across multiple iterations. By applying RDP composition rules and subsampling amplification, we establish theoretical privacy guarantees for AdaDPSyn.
- We empirically evaluate the performance of AdaDPSyn against the DP few-shot generation algorithm proposed by [Tang et al.](#page-12-0) [\(2023\)](#page-12-0) on standard benchmarks. We demonstrate that our method outperforms this baseline across a plethora of privacy settings. For example, in the AGNews classification task under a strict privacy level of $\varepsilon = 1$, our method achieves an accuracy of 65.42%, higher than 60.74% by DP few-shot generation. In the information extraction task MIT-G at $\varepsilon = 1$, our method reaches 37.59% accuracy, compared to 31.15% by DP few-shot generation. Additionally, we show that our AdaDPSyn algorithm can closely match the performance of non-private baselines even in stringent privacy settings. For instance, at a strict privacy level of $\varepsilon = 1$, our algorithm attains an accuracy of 65.42% on the AGNews task, nearly reaching the nonprivate baseline's accuracy of 65.92%. Similarly, in the DBPedia task, our method shows minimal performance drop-off compared to the non-private scenarios. These results not only underscore the effectiveness of our AdaDPSyn algorithm compared with data-independent methods, but also demonstrate its competitiveness with non-private solutions.

2 RELATED WORK

Differentially Private In-Context Learning and Fine-tuning of LLMs. [Duan et al.](#page-10-1) [\(2023\)](#page-10-1) first study privacy leakage through membership inference attacks (MIAs) and suggest mitigating MIA risks using DP ensembling [\(Papernot et al., 2018\)](#page-12-8) on various model versions. Recent studies [\(Wu](#page-13-1) [et al., 2023;](#page-13-1) [Tang et al., 2023;](#page-12-0) [Duan et al., 2023;](#page-10-1) [Carey et al., 2024\)](#page-10-2) have developed methods based on DP ensembling [\(Papernot et al., 2018\)](#page-12-8) to preserve privacy of the underlying prompt data. Notably, [Tang et al.](#page-12-0) [\(2023\)](#page-12-0) develop an algorithm that generates differentially private synthetic few-shot demonstrations from a private dataset for ICL inference, which serves as the baseline of this work and will be discussed in greater detail in subsequent sections. [Hong et al.](#page-11-1) [\(2023\)](#page-11-1) propose the DP-OPT algorithm that generates private and transferable instructions within prompts on the client side to be used with cloud-hosted LLMs. [Carey et al.](#page-10-2) [\(2024\)](#page-10-2) focus on protecting tabular data used for ICL. We note that all of those works [\(Tang et al., 2023;](#page-12-0) [Carey et al., 2024;](#page-10-2) [Hong et al., 2023\)](#page-11-1) design private aggregation methods in a *data-independent* way, i.e., adding the same amount of noise during private aggregation.

Recently, [Wu et al.](#page-13-1) [\(2023\)](#page-13-1) and [Duan et al.](#page-10-1) [\(2023\)](#page-10-1) study differentially private ICL with *datadependent* privacy analysis. [Wu et al.](#page-13-1) [\(2023\)](#page-13-1) propose DP inference by privately aggregating results from multiple queries using disjoint sampled demonstrations. They use the classic propose-testrelease (PTR) paradigm [\(Zhu and Wang, 2022\)](#page-13-2) to select the top-K tokens from LLM outputs. If the vote count difference between the K -th and $(K + 1)$ -th highest tokens exceeds two, the tokens can be released without further privatization. However, ICL tasks can involve an unlimited number of queries, and *[Wu et al.](#page-13-1) [\(2023\)](#page-13-1) consume the privacy budget per query, limiting the number of queries that can be answered within a given budget.*

[Duan et al.](#page-10-1) [\(2023\)](#page-10-1) assume *the existence of an unlabeled public dataset*, which contrasts with our approach that requires no public data. In their method, an ensemble of teacher models uses private majority voting to label this public dataset. The labeled data then helps construct private prompts. Following [Papernot et al.](#page-12-8) [\(2018\)](#page-12-8), they focus on scenarios where a high agreement among teachers can reduce privacy costs below data-independent bounds. When teacher agreement is low, they discard the public data. In contrast, our method is better suited for scenarios where assuming the availability of unlabeled public data with a distribution similar to private data is unrealistic, such as in healthcare or industrial applications. Moreover, [Duan et al.](#page-10-1) [\(2023\)](#page-10-1) mainly focus on text classification tasks with a restricted label space, while our method applies to a broader range of tasks.

On the other hand, several studies have focused on private fine-tuning of LLMs [\(Yu et al., 2021;](#page-13-3) [Li et al., 2021;](#page-11-3) [Chen et al., 2024;](#page-10-3) [Tang et al., 2024;](#page-12-10) [Zhang et al., 2023;](#page-13-4) [He et al., 2022\)](#page-11-4). Besides, [Majmudar et al.](#page-11-5) [\(2022\)](#page-11-5) introduce DP at the decoding stage of a pre-trained LLM.

Adaptive Differential Privacy. Adaptive differential privacy primarily focuses on privately calibrating noise to the local sensitivity, which is a dataset-dependent function and is much smaller than the global sensitivity. Two representative solutions include the smooth sensitivity framework [\(Nissim et al., 2007\)](#page-12-6) and the propose-test-release (PTR) framework [\(Dwork and Lei, 2009\)](#page-11-6). The main idea of the smooth sensitivity framework is to add noise calibrated to the smooth sensitivity, an upper bound on the local sensitivity which changes slowly between neighboring datasets [\(Bun and](#page-10-4) [Steinke, 2019;](#page-10-4) [Gonem and Gilad-Bachrach, 2018;](#page-11-7) [Fletcher and Islam, 2017;](#page-11-8) [Zafarani and Clifton,](#page-13-5) [2020;](#page-13-5) [Hamman et al., 2023;](#page-11-9) [Sun et al., 2020\)](#page-12-11). The PTR framework involves proposing bounds of the local sensitivity and testing its validity. If the test is passed, the noise is calibrated according to the proposed bound [\(Thakurta and Smith, 2013;](#page-12-12) [Liu et al., 2022;](#page-11-10) [Redberg et al., 2023;](#page-12-13) [Wang et al.,](#page-13-6) [2022;](#page-13-6) [Liu et al., 2022\)](#page-11-10).

In this work, we release a confidence bound of the local sensitivity in a differentially private manner, and calibrate noise accordingly, similar to the idea in prior studies [\(Blocki et al., 2012;](#page-10-5) [Ka](#page-11-11)[siviswanathan et al., 2013;](#page-11-11) [Wang, 2018;](#page-13-7) [Decarolis et al., 2020\)](#page-10-6). In this body of research, [Blocki](#page-10-5) [et al.](#page-10-5) [\(2012\)](#page-10-5) and [Kasiviswanathan et al.](#page-11-11) [\(2013\)](#page-11-11) focus on network data. [Wang](#page-13-7) [\(2018\)](#page-13-7) revisits the DP linear regression problem. [Decarolis et al.](#page-10-6) [\(2020\)](#page-10-6) study the Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) model. Our focus is on the ICL domain, where we develop a novel clustering method and Precision-Focused Iterative Radius Reduction technique to address domain-specific challenges.

Differentially Private Synthetic Text Generation. Our work falls within the broader scope of DP synthetic text generation, which typically requires generating large volumes of synthetic data. There is a line of work on DP synthetic text generation through private fine-tuning [\(Yue et al.,](#page-13-8)

[2022;](#page-13-8) [Mattern et al., 2022;](#page-11-12) [Mireshghallah et al., 2022;](#page-12-14) [Carranza et al., 2023;](#page-10-7) [Yu et al., 2024;](#page-13-9) [Wu](#page-13-10) [et al., 2024\)](#page-13-10). SeqPATE [\(Tian et al., 2022\)](#page-13-11) and Submix [\(Ginart et al., 2022\)](#page-11-13) are methods based on PATE [\(Papernot et al., 2016;](#page-12-7) [2018\)](#page-12-8) for text generation, which utilizes an ensemble of teacher models trained on private data subsets to fine-tune a student model. Another direction [\(Feyisetan](#page-11-14) [et al., 2020;](#page-11-14) [Xu et al., 2020;](#page-13-12) [Du et al., 2023;](#page-10-8) [Utpala et al., 2023\)](#page-13-13) focuses on sanitizing user texts locally before server submission based on local differential privacy [\(Chatzikokolakis et al., 2013\)](#page-10-9). While this approach typically reduces text utility, recent studies [\(Chen et al., 2022;](#page-10-10) [Arnold et al.,](#page-10-11) [2023b;](#page-10-11)[a;](#page-10-12) [Mireshghallah et al., 2022\)](#page-12-14) propose to enhance utility by incorporating inherent properties of language such as semantic similarity [\(Chen et al., 2022\)](#page-10-10), context [\(Arnold et al., 2023b\)](#page-10-11) and syntax [\(Arnold et al., 2023a;](#page-10-12) [Mireshghallah et al., 2022\)](#page-12-14).

3 PROBLEM DEFINITION, THREAT MODEL, AND NOTATIONS

In-context learning. Given a query x, a candidate answer set (label set) $\mathcal Y$ and a pre-trained large language model LLM such as GPT [\(Radford et al., 2018;](#page-12-15) [OpenAI, 2023\)](#page-12-2), ICL aims to predict a label ∤ $y \in Y$ of query x, using LLM conditioned on n_{shot} demonstrations $C =$ $(x'_1, y'_1), (x'_2, y'_2), \ldots, (x'_n)_{\text{short}}, y'_n)$, where (x'_i, y'_i) is an input-label pair.

In this paper, we consider both classification and information extraction tasks. For classification tasks with a restricted label space $\mathcal{Y} = \{y_1, \ldots, y_m\}$, we first compute the probability of each label $y_i \in \mathcal{Y}$ using LLM as $\mathbb{P}_{\text{LLM}}(y_i \mid \mathcal{C}, x)$. Then we predict the final label y by selecting the label with the highest probability from the label set Y , i.e., $y = \arg \max_{y_i \in Y} \mathbb{P}_{\text{LLM}}(y_i | \mathcal{C}, x)$. For information extraction tasks, the label space Y is unrestricted, and can include any sequence of tokens from the LLM's vocabulary. In these tasks, we predict y by having LLM generate a sequence of tokens until it produces a special end-of-sequence (EOS) token, marking the completion of the output.

Differentially private ICL. Our objective is to protect the privacy of demonstrations $C \subseteq \mathcal{D}_{\text{priv}}$ in the prompt against an adversary that aims to access or infer private information about the demonstrations. Since ICL tasks may encounter an unlimited number of queries, to protect the privacy of the dataset $\mathcal{D}_{\text{priv}}$, we adopt a differentially private data synthesis approach to generate synthetic few-shot examples $\mathcal{C} = \{\tilde{z}_1, \dots, \tilde{z}_{n_{\text{shos}}}\}\$, where $\tilde{z}_i = (\tilde{x}_i, \tilde{y}_i)$, from the underlying distribution of $\mathcal{D}_{\text{priv}}$ while satisfying (ε, δ) -differential privacy on the private dataset $\mathcal{D}_{\text{priv}}$. For each ICL task, we generate task-specific synthetic examples C with the help of an LLM and a private dataset $\mathcal{D}_{\text{priv}}$. Then ICL can be performed using demonstrations from $\mathcal C$ in a prompt tailored to each task. By default, we incorporate all demonstrations from $\mathcal C$ in a prompt for each task.

We formally define (ε, δ) -differential privacy $((\varepsilon, \delta)$ -DP) as follows.

Definition 1 ((ε , δ)-Differential Privacy [\(Dwork et al., 2006a\)](#page-11-15)). A randomized algorithm A is (ε , δ)differentially private if for any two neighboring inputs D and D' that differ by a single entry and any set S of possible outputs: $\mathbb{P}[A(\mathcal{D}) \in \mathcal{S}] \leq e^{\varepsilon} \mathbb{P}[A(\mathcal{D}') \in \mathcal{S}] + \delta.$

4 PROPOSED METHOD

We use a two-stage framework to perform differentially private ICL, as illustrated in Figure [1.](#page-1-0) Generally speaking, in **Stage 1**, we generate DP synthetic few-shot demonstrations $C = \{\tilde{z}_1, \dots, \tilde{z}_{n_{\text{shots}}}\}\$ based on the private dataset $\mathcal{D}_{\text{priv}}$; and in **Stage 2**, we use these synthetic demonstrations for ICL.

The main challenge of this framework lies in the DP synthetic data generation (Stage 1). To maintain DP, a PATE-like framework is utilized, similar to [Tang et al.](#page-12-0) [\(2023\)](#page-12-0). Take the generation of a synthetic demonstration $\tilde{z} = (\tilde{x}, \tilde{y}) \in \mathcal{C}$ as an example. First, label $\tilde{y} \in \mathcal{Y}$ is randomly selected independently of private dataset $\mathcal{D}_{\text{priv}}$, and its corresponding demonstration \tilde{x} is generated token by token, starting from an empty string $\tilde{x} =$ ". The next token for \tilde{x} is generated by aggregating probability vectors $p_{\text{priv}}^1, \ldots, p_{\text{priv}}^M$, each of which is calculated by an LLM taking some prompt as input. Each prompt is a concatenation of a subset of examples (in a reverse order (y_i, x_i)) from the private dataset $\mathcal{D}_{\text{priv}} = \{(x_i, y_i)\}\$, the synthetic label \tilde{y} and the currently generated string \tilde{x} . Due to the dependence of the probability vectors on private dataset $\mathcal{D}_{\text{priv}}$, DP aggregation is required, and a classic way to achieve this is by adding noise (e.g., Gaussian mechanism) as in [Tang et al.](#page-12-0) [\(2023\)](#page-12-0).

Our approach is motivated by a hypothesis that the next-token predictions by different examples approximately reach a consensus. Once this hypothesis holds, the key innovation of our approach is to leverage this feature and reduce noise levels during aggregation in a data-adaptive manner. We verify the hypothesis quantitatively and tackle the key challenge in the following two sections, respectively.

4.1 CONSENSUS BEHAVIOR MEASURED BY CLUSTERING

We quantitatively measure the degree of consensus among the next-token generation probability vectors $p_{\text{priv}}^1, \ldots, p_{\text{priv}}^M$. Specifically, we approach this by visualizing consensus through the geometric concept of enclosing these vectors within a minimal enclosing ball, defined as an (r, c, ρ) -ball, where r is the radius, c is the center and $\rho \in (0,1]$ represents the required portion of vectors covered in the ball. For a given coverage requirement ρ , a smaller r indicates a tighter grouping, reflecting a high consensus among the model outputs. We hypothesize that *these next-token generation probability vectors are typically highly clustered in a ball with a small radius* r.

To verify the hypothesis, we conduct experiments using the DP fewshot generation algorithm [\(Tang et al., 2023\)](#page-12-0), and report the radius r of the minimal ball that encloses at least 80% ($\rho = 0.8$) of the next-token probability vectors generated by using different private examples in Table [1.](#page-4-0) For determining a small radius r that contains at least 80% of the input points, we adopt the GoodRadius algorithm in [Nissim et al.](#page-12-16) [\(2016\)](#page-12-16). We conduct experiments on three classification tasks: AGNews [\(Zhang et al., 2015\)](#page-13-14), DBPedia [\(Zhang et al.,](#page-13-14) [2015\)](#page-13-14) and TREC [\(Voorhees and Tice, 2000\)](#page-13-15), as well as two information extraction tasks, MIT-G and MIT-D [\(Liu et al., 2012\)](#page-11-16), using

Table 1: The mean and standard deviation of r over 5 runs with different random seeds.

the Llama-2-7b-hf model (Touvron et al., 2023)^{[1](#page-4-1)}. Details of the DP few-shot generation algorithm parameters can be found in Table [12.](#page-19-0)

As shown in Table [1,](#page-4-0) the measured radius r, ranging from 0.05 to 0.15, is much smaller than $\sqrt{2}/2$, the radius of the minimal ball that contains the probability simplex. These results confirm a high degree of clustering among the model outputs. Intuitively, if we can access such a ball of small radius r differentially privately, we can perform a differentially private projected mean aggregation that projects the probability vectors to the ball and calculates the projected mean with additive Gaussian noise. The noise level is determined by the sensitivity $2r$. Note that in [Tang et al.](#page-12-0) [\(2023\)](#page-12-0), without leveraging the clustering behavior of the data, a much higher noise level corresponding to sensitivity √ $\sqrt{2}$ is employed. Comparing these two cases, the sensitivity 2r is approximately $5\times$ to $14\times$ smaller $\sqrt{2}$ is employed. Comparing these two cases, the sensitivity 2r is approximately 5×10^4 smaller than $\sqrt{2}$, thus leading to more accurate aggregation due to lower noises. The key challenge is then how to differentially privately access a small ball that contains a majority number of probability vectors and perform the differentially private aggregation correspondingly. To tackle this challenge, we propose a novel Precision-Focused Iterative Radius Reduction technique.

4.2 PRECISION-FOCUSED ITERATIVE RADIUS REDUCTION

Building on the observation that next-token generation probability vectors from the LLM are highly clustered, we utilize an intuitive approach to adaptively adjust the noise level during aggregation: we first locate the minimal ball covering most vectors under DP and then project all points to this ball in ℓ_2 -norm to bound the influence of each point, thereby minimizing noise addition. This method, which adaptively leverages the inherent structure of the probability vectors, is essential to the success of our proposed method.

The task of finding a minimal enclosing ball under DP is known as the DP 1-clustering problem in the literature [\(Nissim et al., 2016\)](#page-12-16). However, existing methods [\(Nissim et al., 2016;](#page-12-16) [Nissim and](#page-12-17) [Stemmer, 2018;](#page-12-17) [Ghazi et al., 2020\)](#page-11-17) are hard to implement and computationally expensive.

To this end, we propose a novel technique called Precision-Focused Iterative Radius Reduction. We start with a large radius R and judiciously reduce it towards a small target radius r through iterative refinement. The target radius r is obtained under DP constraints using a tractable subroutine

¹<https://huggingface.co/meta-llama/Llama-2-7b-hf>.

GoodRadius from DP 1-clustering [\(Nissim et al., 2016\)](#page-12-16), which provides a threshold such that the designed radius should never go below. The reduction of radius R is carefully monitored by coverage checks, which ensure the majority of the probability vectors are covered by a ball with that radius. The center of the ball is efficiently obtained by private projected mean estimation. This dynamic adjustment of the ball ensures it is minimized effectively according to the distribution of the points along the adjustments. The amount of noise required for private projected mean estimation can be reduced, thus improving the quality of the synthetic demonstrations and the performance of ICL. We elaborate this Precision-Focused Iterative Radius Reduction technique in Section [4.3.](#page-5-0)

4.3 ADADPSYN ALGORITHM

We now introduce the proposed AdaDPSyn algorithm (Algorithm [1\)](#page-7-0), which generates DP synthetic few-shot examples from the private dataset \mathcal{D}_{priv} . For a given label \tilde{y} randomly selected from the label set without replacement, AdaDPSyn sequentially generates one token at a time, starting from an empty list. Each token generation begins with the Next Token Generation subroutine (Line [4\)](#page-7-1). Roughly speaking, the Next Token Generation process [\(Tang et al., 2023\)](#page-12-0) involves sampling MN examples with label \tilde{y} from the private dataset $\mathcal{D}_{\text{priv}}$, dividing them into M disjoint subsets, and then using these subsets as demonstrations to predict the next token's distribution $p_{\text{priv}}^1, \ldots, p_{\text{priv}}^M$ using an LLM. The vocabulary is restricted to S containing the top- K most probable tokens, which are determined from next-token probabilities generated only from instructions without using any private data. Details of Next Token Generation can be found in Appendix [A.1.](#page-14-0) Then we privately aggregate $p_{\text{priv}}^1, \ldots, p_{\text{priv}}^M$ using our *Precision-Focused Iterative Radius Reduction* technique (Lines [5-](#page-7-2) [21\)](#page-7-3), which consists of four critical steps:

Step 1: Establish Target Radius Differentially Privately. The process begins by setting a target radius r using the GoodRadius subroutine [\(Nissim et al., 2016\)](#page-12-16) in Line [5.](#page-7-2) GoodRadius is a subroutine used in DP 1-clustering methods [\(Nissim et al., 2016;](#page-12-16) [Nissim and Stemmer, 2018\)](#page-12-17), which identifies a radius that can encompass at least a fraction ρ of the data points under (α, τ_0) -RDP constraints. In this work, we set $\rho = 80\%$. Details are provided in Appendix [A.2.](#page-14-1)

Step 2: Projected Mean Estimation Using Gaussian DP Mechanism. For a probability simplex in \mathcal{R}^d , its radius^{[2](#page-5-1)} is $\frac{\sqrt{2}}{2}$. Thus, we set $R \leftarrow$ √ 2/2 (Line [6\)](#page-7-4) initially. We initialize projected points $\tilde{p}_{\text{priv}}^i \leftarrow p_{\text{priv}}^i, i = 1, \dots, M$ (Line [7\)](#page-7-5), and estimate mean of $\{\tilde{p}_{\text{priv}}^1, \dots, \tilde{p}_{\text{priv}}^M\}$ using Gaussian DP mechanism (Line [8\)](#page-7-6), i.e., $\tilde{p}_{\text{priv}} \leftarrow \frac{1}{M} \left(\sum_{i=1}^{M} \tilde{p}_{\text{priv}}^{i} + \mathcal{N}(0, 4R^{2} \sigma_{1}^{2} I) \right)$, where σ_{1} is the noise multiplier. Then we map \tilde{p}_{priv} back onto the probability simplex, i.e., $\tilde{p}_{priv} \leftarrow \frac{\max(\tilde{p}_{priv},0)}{\|\max(\tilde{p}_{priv},0)\|}$ $\frac{\max(p_{\text{priv}},0)}{\|\max(\tilde{p}_{\text{priv}},0)\|_1}$ (Line [9\)](#page-7-7).

Next, we reduce R towards the target radius r iteratively, ensuring that it covers a sufficient amount of probability vectors while satisfying DP (Lines [11](#page-7-8)[-21\)](#page-7-3). During the iterative process, which takes at most T iterations, each step starts with a radius coverage check detailed in the following paragraph.

Step 3: Radius Coverage Check Using Gaussian DP Mechanism. We use Gaussian DP mechanism to check whether a sufficient number of the original probability vectors $p_{\text{priv}}^1, \ldots, p_{\text{priv}}^M$ remain within a small radius from \tilde{p}_{priv} (Line [12\)](#page-7-9). Specifically, the check evaluates whether the ℓ_2 -ball with center \tilde{p}_{priv} and radius $r + \frac{2\lambda R\sigma_1\sqrt{K}}{M}$ can cover at least μM of the points $p_{\text{priv}}^1, \ldots, p_{\text{priv}}^M$, where λ is a hyperparameter, σ_1 scales the Gaussian noise introduced to \tilde{p}_{priv} in Line [8](#page-7-6) or Line [20,](#page-7-10) K is the dimensionality of the probability vectors, and $\mu \in (0, 1]$. We set $\mu = 0.55$ in this work. The term $\frac{2\lambda R\sigma_1\sqrt{K}}{M}$ represents an additional margin on the radius to accommodate the spread introduced by Gaussian noise added to \tilde{p}_{priv} in Line [8](#page-7-6) or Line [20,](#page-7-10) ensuring data coverage despite the distortion caused by the noise.

Step 4: Update Radius towards Target Radius. If the radius coverage check in Line [12](#page-7-9) reveals that fewer than μ M vectors are within the defined radius, the algorithm will stop reducing the cur-rent radius R. Otherwise, the algorithm proceeds to adjust R downward (Line [15](#page-7-11)[-18\)](#page-7-12), i.e., $R \leftarrow r +$

² For a bounded region $\mathcal{R} \subset \mathbb{R}^d$, we define its diameter as diam $(\mathcal{R}) = \sup_{x,y \in \mathcal{R}} \|x - y\|$, and its radius as half of the diameter, i.e., $Rad(\mathcal{R}) = \frac{1}{2} diam(\mathcal{R})$. The definition of diameter coincides with the definition of sensitivity for the aggregation (summation) of a utility function, thus the radius can be interpreted as half of the sensitivity factor.

 $\frac{2\lambda R\sigma_1\sqrt{K}}{M}$. Then we project next-token probability vectors $\{p^1_{\text{priv}},\ldots,p^M_{\text{priv}}\}$ to a ℓ_2 -ball defined by ra- ${\rm dius}\ R$ and centered at $\tilde{p}_{\rm priv}$ (Line [19\)](#page-7-13), i.e., $\tilde{p}_{\rm priv}^i=\tilde{p}_{\rm priv}+(p_{\rm priv}^i-\tilde{p}_{\rm priv})\Big/{\rm max}\left(1,\frac{\|p_{\rm priv}^i-\tilde{p}_{\rm priv}\|_2}{R}\right)$ $\Big), i =$ 1, ..., M. This operation ensures that the ℓ_2 -sensitivity of the term $\sum_{i=1}^M \tilde{p}_{\text{priv}}^i$ is at most 2R. Finally, we estimate the mean of the projected points $\{\tilde{p}^1_{\text{priv}}, \ldots, \tilde{p}^M_{\text{priv}}\}$ using Gaussian DP mechanism (Line [20\)](#page-7-10), i.e., $\tilde{p}_{\text{priv}} \leftarrow \frac{1}{M} \left(\sum_{i=1}^{M} \tilde{p}_{\text{priv}}^{i} + \mathcal{N}(0, 4R^{2} \sigma_{1}^{2} I) \right)$. As R decreases, the amount of noise added to \tilde{p}_{priv} is reduced accordingly. We then map \tilde{p}_{priv} back onto the probability simplex, i.e., $\tilde{p}_{\text{priv}} \leftarrow \frac{\max(\tilde{p}_{\text{priv}},0)}{\|\max(\tilde{p}_{\text{priv}},0)\|}$ $\frac{\max(p_{\text{priv}},0)}{\|\max(\tilde{p}_{\text{priv}},0)\|_1}$ (Line [21\)](#page-7-3).

The process of radius refinement concludes under any of the following conditions: (1) the maximum allowed number of iterations, \hat{T} , is reached; (2) further reduction in radius fails to cover the mini-mum required proportion of vectors (Line [12\)](#page-7-9); (3) the current radius R is smaller than $r + \frac{2\lambda_1 R \sigma_1 \sqrt{K}}{M}$ (Line [15\)](#page-7-11). Once the radius refinement process concludes, we select the next token for the synthetic sequence as $\arg \max_{j \in S} \tilde{p}_{priv}[j]$ where S is the vocabulary of size K, and this token is appended to what is generated so far. This continues until the sequence reaches the predefined maximum limit, T_{max} , of tokens we would like to generate.

Remark 1 (Comparison with [Tang et al.](#page-12-0) [\(2023\)](#page-12-0))*.* The main difference between our method and that of [Tang et al.](#page-12-0) [\(2023\)](#page-12-0) lies in the innovative approach we take toward the private aggregation of the next-token generation probabilities $p_{\text{priv}}^1, \ldots, p_{\text{priv}}^M$. Instead of directly using the Gaussian DP mechanism for aggregation as in [Tang et al.](#page-12-0) [\(2023\)](#page-12-0), our approach introduces an advancement through the Precision-Focused Iterative Radius Reduction technique (Lines [5-](#page-7-2)[21\)](#page-7-3). This technique allows noise to be added in a data-adaptive manner, effectively adapting the noise level to the degree of agreement among the models. Empirically, we evaluate the performance of our algorithm against [Tang et al.](#page-12-0) [\(2023\)](#page-12-0) in Section [5.1](#page-8-0) to demonstrate the effectiveness of our method.

4.4 PRIVACY ANALYSIS

Theorem [1](#page-7-0). *Algorithm 1 is* (ε, δ) -differentially private.

Proof Overview. We adopt the commonly used Rényi differential privacy (RDP) [\(Mironov, 2017\)](#page-12-9) to track the privacy cost in our algorithm, as it allows us to tightly quantify the privacy guarantees from the composition of multiple mechanisms. Our proof mainly consists of three steps. First, we show that each iteration of the algorithm is (α, τ) -RDP. In each iteration, our algorithm consists of 3 components: one instance of (α, τ_0) -RDP algorithm GoodRadius (Line [5\)](#page-7-2), at most $(\dot{T}+1)$ instances of (α, τ_1) -RDP projected mean estimation using Gaussian DP Mechanism (Line [8](#page-7-6) and Line [20\)](#page-7-10) and at most \ddot{T} instances of (α, τ_2) -RDP radius coverage check using Gaussian DP Mechanism (Line [12\)](#page-7-9). We apply the composition property of RDP to ensure the privacy guarantee in each iteration, that is, we ensure that $\tau = \tau_0 + (\tilde{T} + 1)\tau_1 + \tilde{T}\tau_2$. Next, since the Next Token Generation subroutine (Line [4\)](#page-7-1) involves drawing \dot{MN} samples from the dataset \mathcal{D}_{priv} , there is a privacy amplification by subsampling at each iteration. Finally, we compose privacy loss across all the T_{max} iterations of our algorithm using composition theorems. We rely on the conversion lemma [\(Balle et al., 2020\)](#page-10-13) to convert the RDP guarantee back to DP notions. We provide a full proof in Appendix [B.](#page-15-0) □

5 EXPERIMENTS

Datasets. We study text classification on three datasets: 4-way news classification AGNews [\(Zhang](#page-13-14) [et al., 2015\)](#page-13-14), 6-way question classification TREC [\(Voorhees and Tice, 2000\)](#page-13-15), and 14-way topic classification DBPedia [\(Zhang et al., 2015\)](#page-13-14). For information extraction, we study the MIT Movies trivia10k13 slot-filling dataset [\(Liu et al., 2012\)](#page-11-16), which includes movie genre (MIT-G) and director name (MIT-D) as slots. Additional dataset details are available in Appendix [C.2.](#page-17-0)

Setups. We use the synthetic few-shot demonstrations $\{\tilde{z}_1, \dots, \tilde{z}_{n_{\text{shots}}}\}\$ from Algorithm [1](#page-7-0) as input demonstrations in ICL for the aforementioned downstream tasks. We fix $n_{\text{shots}} = 4$ by default, generating 4-shot demonstrations (randomly without replacement from the label set) for ICL. We use Llama-2-7b-hf model [\(Touvron et al., 2023\)](#page-13-16) as our pre-trained LLM to generate synthetic

Algorithm 1 AdaDPSyn

1: **Input:** Private dataset: $\mathcal{D}_{\text{priv}}$, label: \tilde{y} , maximum token count: T_{max} , an LLM: LLM(·), noise multiplier: σ_0 , σ_1 , σ_2 , number of disjoint subsets: M, samples per subset: N, reduced vocabulary size: K, hyperparameters: λ and T. 2: **Initialize:** Set $\tilde{x} \leftarrow$ []. 3: for $t = 1$ to T_{max} do 4: $p_{\text{priv}}^1, \ldots, p_{\text{priv}}^M \leftarrow \text{NextTokenGeneration}(\mathcal{D}_{\text{priv}}, \tilde{y}, \text{LLM}(\cdot), M, N, K, \tilde{x})$ 5: $r \leftarrow \text{GoodRadius}(\{p_{\text{priv}}^1, \ldots, p_{\text{priv}}^M\}, \rho M, \sigma_0)$ \triangleright Establish Target Radius 6: $R \leftarrow \sqrt{2}/2$ 7: $\tilde{p}_{\text{priv}}^i \leftarrow p_{\text{priv}}^i, i = 1, \dots, M$ 8: $\tilde{p}_{\text{priv}} \leftarrow \frac{1}{M} \left(\sum_{i=1}^{M} \tilde{p}_{\text{priv}}^{i} + \mathcal{N}(0, 4R^{2} \sigma_{1}^{2} I) \right)$ 9: $\tilde{p}_{\text{priv}} \leftarrow \frac{\max(\tilde{p}_{\text{priv}},0)}{\|\max(\tilde{p}_{\text{priv}},0)\|}$ $\|\max(\tilde{p}_{\text{priv}},0)\|_1$ 10: **for** $j = 1$ to \overline{T} **do** 11: $t \leftarrow$ the count of $p_{\text{priv}}^1, \ldots, p_{\text{priv}}^M$ within a ℓ_2 -ball centered at \tilde{p}_{priv} with radius $r + \frac{2\lambda R\sigma_1\sqrt{K}}{M}$ 12: **if** $t + \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma_2^2) < \mu M$ then 13: break ▷ DP Radius Coverage Check 14: end if 14: **if** $R < r + \frac{2\lambda R \sigma_1 \sqrt{K}}{M}$ then 16: break 17: end if 18: **end if**
18: $R \leftarrow r + \frac{2\lambda R \sigma_1 \sqrt{K}}{M}$ ^M ▷ Update Radius towards Target Radius $19:$ $\tilde{p}_{\rm priv} \leftarrow \tilde{p}_{\rm priv} + (p_{\rm priv}^i - \tilde{p}_{\rm priv}) \Big/ \text{max}\left(1, \frac{\|p_{\rm priv}^i - \tilde{p}_{\rm priv}\|_2}{R}\right)$ $\bigg), i = 1, \ldots, M$ $20: \qquad \tilde{p}_{\rm priv} \leftarrow \frac{1}{M}\left(\sum_{i=1}^M \tilde{p}_{\rm priv}^i + \mathcal{N}(0, 4R^2\sigma_1^2I)\right) \quad \text{\r{DPP} Projected Mean Estimation}$ 21: $\tilde{p}_{\text{priv}} \leftarrow \frac{\max(\tilde{p}_{\text{priv}},0)}{\|\max(\tilde{p}_{\text{priv}},0)\|}$ $\|\max(\tilde{p}_{\text{priv}},0)\|_1$ 22: end for 23: $w \leftarrow \arg \max_{i \in S} \tilde{p}_{\text{priv}}[j]$ 24: $\tilde{x} \leftarrow \tilde{x} + [w]$ 25: end for 26: return \tilde{x} .

demonstrations^{[3](#page-7-14)}. We use the same prompt format during ICL following [Tang et al.](#page-12-0) [\(2023\)](#page-12-0) (see Appendix [C.11\)](#page-22-0). For ICL downstream tasks, we use Llama-2-7b-hf for AGNews, DBPedia, MIT-G, and MIT-D, and GPT-[4](#page-7-15)0 mini for $TREC^4$. For DP algorithms, we follow the common practice to set the privacy budget $\delta = 1/|\mathcal{D}_{\text{priv}}|$ [\(Tang et al., 2023;](#page-12-0) [Hong et al., 2023\)](#page-11-1).

Baselines. We compare our AdaDPSyn algorithm with DP few-shot generation in [Tang et al.](#page-12-0) [\(2023\)](#page-12-0), which uses a data-independent approach of adding the same level of Gaussian noise during aggregation. Hypermarameters in DP few-shot generation are detailed in Table [12,](#page-19-0) including the number of subsets M , the number of data samples per subset N , the number of tokens T_{max} , and the reduced vocabulary size K . To ensure a fair comparison, we select these parameters for DP few-shot generation based on the guidance in [Tang et al.](#page-12-0) [\(2023\)](#page-12-0), as detailed in Appendix [C.5.](#page-19-1) We then use the same values of M , N , T_{max} and K for our AdaDPSyn without any additional hyperparameter tuning.

As a fully private baseline $\varepsilon = 0$, we follow [Tang et al.](#page-12-0) [\(2023\)](#page-12-0) to generate synthetic 4-shot demon-strations using purely instructions without any private data^{[5](#page-7-16)}. We consider two non-private baselines

³Next Token Generation [\(Tang et al., 2023\)](#page-12-0) uses OpenAI's API logprobs parameters with a value of 100, which currently supports a maximum value of 5. To overcome this, we use the Llama-2-7b-hf model via vLLM platform (<https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm>), which offers a compatible API, as suggested in [Tang et al.](#page-12-0) [\(2023\)](#page-12-0).

⁴When using Llama-2-7b-hf for TREC, we observe high standard deviation in the results (around 10), likely due to the complexity of the task. GPT-4o mini reduces the standard deviation to around 5.

 5 [Tang et al.](#page-12-0) [\(2023\)](#page-12-0) demonstrate that in some applications, LLMs can generate relevant few-shot demonstrations using only instructions and perform competitively with DP few-shot generation algorithm.

Table 2: 4-shot ICL performance on the test set of downstream tasks with baselines. Results show the mean and standard deviation of accuracy over 5 runs. Our private solution with various privacy levels $\varepsilon = 1, 2, 4, 8$ uses AdaDPSyn to generate DP synthetic few-shot demonstrations for ICL, in comparison with the DP few-shot generation algorithm [\(Tang et al., 2023\)](#page-12-0). $\varepsilon = 0$ represents a fully private solution. $\varepsilon = \infty$ serves as the non-private baseline.

Dataset	Method	$\varepsilon = 0$	$\varepsilon = 1$	$\varepsilon=2$	$\varepsilon = 4$	$\varepsilon = 8$	$\varepsilon = \infty$
AGNews	DP few-shot generation	$61.38_{7.10}$	$60.74_{3.09}$	$62.64_{1.82}$	$62.70_{1.30}$	$63.18_{1.26}$	$65.92_{1.13}$
	AdaDPSyn		$65.42_{1.08}$	$65.52_{0.81}$	$65.84_{1.03}$	$65.92_{1.02}$	
DBPedia	DP few-shot generation	$63.92_{3.07}$	$64.68_{1.42}$	$64.78_{1.29}$	$64.92_{1.99}$	$65.26_{2.12}$	$69.06_{1.40}$
	AdaDPSyn		$66.76_{1.45}$	$67.48_{1.54}$	$67.12_{1.09}$	$67.70_{1.68}$	
TREC	DP few-shot generation	$59.40_{2.62}$	$62.48_{9.38}$	$65.28_{5.67}$	$66.12_{5.46}$	$66.52_{5.57}$	72.322.76
	AdaDPSyn		$69.32_{7.19}$	69.80 4.57	$71.48_{2.93}$	$72.08_{2.24}$	
MIT-G	DP few-shot generation	$13.62_{6.51}$	$31.15_{4.04}$	$34.00_{5.13}$	$35.85_{3.63}$	$36.10_{5.52}$	$43.23_{7.00}$
	AdaDPSyn		$37.59_{5.40}$	$37.41_{4.36}$	$37.85_{4.25}$	$38.31_{5.03}$	
MIT-D	DP few-shot generation	$52.29_{9.43}$	$72.87_{3.48}$	$73.11_{1.86}$	$74.60_{2.29}$	$75.18_{3.74}$	$79.33_{1.48}$
	AdaDPSvn		$73.35_{2.13}$	$74.41_{2.55}$	$75.08_{1.30}$	$75.28_{1.93}$	

for $\varepsilon = \infty$: (i) DP few-shot generation algorithm operates without any added noise; (ii) 4-shot demonstrations randomly selected from the private dataset. We present the best of two accuracies between the two baselines. Specifically, (i) performs better for AGNews, TREC, and MIT-G, while (ii) performs better for DBPedia and MIT-D, as detailed in Table [5.](#page-18-0)

It is noteworthy that, on the AGNews task, the fully private baseline $\varepsilon = 0$ outperforms baseline DP few-shot generation with higher ε values. This aligns with findings from [Tang et al.](#page-12-0) [\(2023\)](#page-12-0) (Table 1 in [Tang et al.](#page-12-0) $(2023)^6$ $(2023)^6$ $(2023)^6$), which highlights that LLMs are capable of generating meaningful demonstrations purely from instructions in some applications, performing well even without private data. Meanwhile, AdaDPSyn outperforms the $\varepsilon = 0$ baseline at $\varepsilon = 1, 2, 4, 8$, showing the advantage of our data-adaptive design.

5.1 MAIN RESULTS

We present our main results in Table [2.](#page-8-2) We provide the mean and standard deviation of the accuracy on the test data with ICL over 5 runs with different random seeds. In general, our results demonstrate that AdaDPSyn outperforms DP few-shot generation [\(Tang et al., 2023\)](#page-12-0) across various privacy settings, while also closely approximating the performance of the non-private baseline.

We observe that, compared with DP few-shot generation, AdaDPSyn provides gains at privacy levels $\varepsilon = 1, 2, 4, 8$. For instance, in the AGNews news classification task at $\varepsilon = 1$, our method achieves an accuracy of 65.42% compared to 60.74% under DP few-shot generation. In the DBPedia topic classification, we reach 66.76%, surpassing the previous 64.68%. Moreover, in the information extraction tasks, our performance improvements are also evident with MIT-G achieving 37.59% over 31.15% at $\varepsilon = 1$. This highlights our method's efficiency in adapting noise addition to the degree of consensus among model outputs, improving accuracy for ICL.

Additionally, our method closely approaches the performance of the non-private baseline $\varepsilon = \infty$ on several tasks. Specifically, for news classification AGNews with a strict privacy level as small as $\varepsilon = 1$, our method achieves an accuracy of 65.42%, just slightly below the non-private baseline's accuracy of 65.92%. For topic classification DBPedia at $\varepsilon = 1$, we record an accuracy of 66.76%, near the baseline's 69.06%. In the question classification task TREC at $\varepsilon = 1$, our approach reaches 69.32%, closely following the baseline's 72.32%.

We conduct a hyperparameter search for AdaDPSyn on λ and \hat{T} in Appendix [C.4.](#page-17-1) We observe that ICL accuracy remains stable across different λ and \overline{T} settings. For example, on AGNews, AdaDP-Syn achieves accuracy between 64.28% and 65.92% for $\hat{T} \in \{1, 2\}$ and $\lambda \in \{0.15, 0.2, 0.25\}$, compared to 63.18% for DP few-shot generation when $\varepsilon = 8$. This highlights the stability of Algorithm [1.](#page-7-0) We provide the parameters used for our main results in Appendix [C.5.](#page-19-1)

⁶In [Tang et al.](#page-12-0) [\(2023\)](#page-12-0), Table 1 shows that for AGNews using GPT-3 Babbage, the $\varepsilon = 0$ result outperforms DP few-shot generation at $\varepsilon = 1, 2$.

5.2 ABLATION STUDIES

Varying number of shots. Using the DBPedia dataset and setting $\varepsilon = 4$, we test the number of shots for ICL with $n_{\text{shots}} = 1, 2, 4, 8$. The results are presented in Table [3.](#page-9-0) $\varepsilon = 4$ (AdaDPSyn) presents the performance of our private solution and $\varepsilon = 4$ (DP few-shot generation) is based on the solution in [Tang et al.](#page-12-0) [\(2023\)](#page-12-0). We present two non-private performances: (i) DP few-shot generation algorithm operates without any added noise; (ii) few-shot demonstrations randomly selected from the private dataset.

We observe that AdaDPSyn consistently outperforms DP few-shot generation across all n-shot settings. Additionally, increasing the number of shots can improve the performance of AdaDPSyn. This suggests that AdaDPSyn can benefit from larger *n*-shot scenarios.

Table 3: ICL performance on the test set of the DBPedia dataset with various number of shots. $\varepsilon = 4$ (AdaDPSyn) uses AdaDPSyn to generate DP synthetic few-shot demonstrations for ICL. $\varepsilon = 4$ (DP few-shot generation) is based on the solution in [\(Tang et al., 2023\)](#page-12-0). $\varepsilon = \infty$ (Algorithm [2](#page-14-2) with $\sigma = 0$) represents DP fewshot generation algorithm operating without any added noise. $\varepsilon = \infty$ (rand) represents using demonstrations randomly selected from private dataset. Results show the mean and standard deviation of accuracy over 5 runs.

Varying LLMs. We evaluate ICL performance across different LLMs and present the results in Table [4.](#page-9-1) Specifically, we use the generated examples from Section [5.1](#page-8-0) as demonstrations with GPT-3.5 Turbo and GPT-4o mini, available through OpenAI's service, for downstream ICL tasks. The experiments are conducted on the DBPedia dataset.

We observe that AdaDPSyn consistently outperforms DP few-shot generation and performs comparably to non-private baselines. Performance improves with both GPT-4o mini and GPT-3.5 Turbo for all models, with GPT-4o mini showing the highest overall results. Our method remains open to further improvements with more advanced LLMs.

Table 4: ICL performance on test set of DBPedia dataset with various LLMs. $\varepsilon = 4$ (AdaDPSyn) uses AdaDPSyn to generate DP synthetic few-shot demonstrations for ICL. $\varepsilon = 4$ (DP few-shot generation) is based on the solution in [\(Tang et al., 2023\)](#page-12-0). $\varepsilon = \infty$ (Alg [2,](#page-14-2) $\sigma = 0$) represents DP few-shot generation algorithm operating without any added noise. $\varepsilon = \infty$ (rand) represents using demonstrations randomly selected from private dataset.

Performance against membership inference attacks (MIAs). Additionally, we conduct an empirical privacy evaluation in Appendix [C.6](#page-20-0) using membership inference attacks (MIA) [\(Shokri et al.,](#page-12-18) [2017;](#page-12-18) [Duan et al., 2023\)](#page-10-1). Our results show that, in contrast to non-private ICL, which suffers from significant membership privacy leakage, our AdaDPSyn algorithm effectively reduces the MIA success rate to the level of random guessing.

6 CONCLUSION

In this work, we introduced the AdaDPSyn algorithm, a novel approach to ICL that incorporates DP to safeguard sensitive data used in LLM prompts. By leveraging a data-adaptive noise addition strategy through our Precision-Focused Iterative Radius Reduction technique, we effectively reduced noise levels without compromising DP guarantees, thus maintaining higher accuracy for ICL. Our empirical results demonstrate the superior performance of AdaDPSyn, which nearly matches the non-private baseline's performance on several benchmarks. One limitation of this work is the lack of theoretical guarantees for utility, as it is difficult to find an appropriate closed-form expression of ICL accuracy. We leave this exploration to future work.

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A DP ALGORITHMS

In this section, we list all the differentially private mechanisms that are used in Algorithm [1](#page-7-0) and provide their guarantees.

A.1 DP FEW-SHOT GENERATION

The DP few-shot generation algorithm [\(Tang et al., 2023\)](#page-12-0) is detailed in Algorithm [2.](#page-14-2) The Next Token Generation subroutine [\(Tang et al., 2023\)](#page-12-0) is presented in Algorithm [3.](#page-14-3)

Algorithm 2 DP few-shot generation [\(Tang et al., 2023\)](#page-12-0)

1: **Input:** Private dataset: \mathcal{D}_{priv} , label: \tilde{y} , max number of tokens to generate: T_{max} , a pre-trained LLM: LLM (\cdot) , number of disjoint subsets of private data: M, number of data samples in each subset: N, reduce vocab publicly with top-K, noise multiplier: σ . 2: Algorithm used: Algorithm [3](#page-14-3) for generating next token probilities from LLM. 3: Initialize: Set $\tilde{x} \leftarrow$ []. 4: for $t = 1$ to T_{max} do 5: $p_{\text{priv}}^1, \ldots, p_{\text{priv}}^M \leftarrow \text{NextTokenGeneration}(\mathcal{D}_{\text{priv}}, \tilde{y}, \text{LLM}(\cdot), M, N, K, \tilde{x})$ 6: $p_{\text{priv}} \leftarrow \frac{1}{M} \left(\sum_{i=1}^{M} p_{\text{priv}}^{i} + \mathcal{N}(0, 2\sigma^{2}I) \right)$ 7: $w \leftarrow \arg \max_{j \in S} p_{\text{priv}}[j]$ 8: $\tilde{x} \leftarrow \tilde{x} + [w]$ 9: end for 10: return \tilde{x}

Algorithm 3 Next Token Generation [\(Tang et al., 2023\)](#page-12-0)

- 1: **Input:** Private dataset: $\mathcal{D}_{\text{priv}}$, label: \tilde{y} , a pre-trained LLM: LLM(·), number of disjoint subsets of private data: M , number of data samples in each subset: N , reduce vocab publicly with top-K, generated tokens \tilde{x} . 2: $\mathcal{D}_{\text{priv}}^{\gamma}$ ← randomly draw MN samples from $\mathcal{D}_{\text{priv}}$ with label \tilde{y}
- 3: $p \leftarrow \text{LLM}(\cdot | PB(instruction, \tilde{y}, \tilde{x}))$ where $PB(\cdot)$ is defined in Appendix [C.11](#page-22-0)
- 4: for $i = 1$ to M do
- 5: $\mathcal{D}_{\text{priv}}^{(i)} \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\text{priv}}'[(i-1)N : iN]$
- 6: $p_{\text{priv}}^i \leftarrow \text{LLM}(\cdot|PB(instruction, \mathcal{D}_{\text{priv}}^{(i)}, \tilde{y}, \tilde{x}))$
- 7: $\dot{S} \leftarrow$ top-K indices of p
- 8: $p_{\text{priv}}^i[\mathcal{V} \setminus S] \leftarrow 0$ and re-scale p_{priv}^i s.t. $\sum p_{\text{priv}}^i[S] = 1$
- 9: end for
- 10: **return** $p_{\text{priv}}^1, \ldots, p_{\text{priv}}^M$

A.2 GOODRADIUS

[Nissim et al.](#page-12-16) [\(2016\)](#page-12-16) propose the GoodRadius algorithm (Algorithm [4\)](#page-15-1) and provide its DP analysis. We adapt this with some modifications to provide an RDP guarantee. For readability, we include the RDP analysis here.

Theorem 2 [\(Nissim et al.](#page-12-16) [\(2016\)](#page-12-16)). *GoodRadius (Algorithm [4\)](#page-15-1) is* (α, τ_0) -*RDP.*

Proof. From [Nissim et al.](#page-12-16) [\(2016\)](#page-12-16), the sensitivity of L defined in Line [3](#page-15-2) of Algorithm [4](#page-15-1) is 2. Then in Line [4,](#page-15-3) we search for an r such that $L(r) \geq t$ and $L(r/2) < t$ while maintaining differential privacy. This is achieved by using binary search with noisy estimates of L for the comparisons. Specifically, we introduce a tolerance parameter θ , which determines the precision of the binary search. The number of iterations for the binary search is at most $\lceil \log_2 \left(\frac{\sqrt{2}}{2\theta} \right) \rceil$. In each iteration, we apply Gaussian mechanism to estimate $L(r)$ and $L(r/2)$, i.e., $\tilde{L}(r_{mid}) \leftarrow L(r_{mid}) + \mathcal{N}(0, 4\sigma_0^2)$ and $\tilde{L}(r_{\text{mid}}/2) \leftarrow L(r_{\text{mid}}/2) + \mathcal{N}(0, 4\sigma_0^2)$. By setting $\sigma_0 \leftarrow \sqrt{\alpha \lceil \log_2 \left(\frac{\sqrt{2}}{2\theta}\right) \rceil / \tau_0}$, we guarantee that each estimation satisfies $(\alpha, \tau_0/2 \lceil \log_2(\frac{\sqrt{2}}{2\theta}) \rceil)$ -RDP. By composition, the output r satisfies (α, τ_0) -RDP. \Box

Algorithm 4 GoodRadius [\(Nissim et al., 2016\)](#page-12-16)

- 1: **Input:** Database $\mathcal{P} \in (\mathcal{X}^d)^n$, desired ball volume t, noise multiplier σ_0 , tolerance θ . (We set $\theta = 0.1$ in our experiments.)
- 2: **Notation:** For a radius $r \geq 0$ and a point $p \in \mathcal{X}^d$, let $\mathcal{B}_r(p)$ denote the number of input points contained in a ℓ_2 -ball of radius r around p. That is, $\mathcal{B}_r(p) = \{i : ||x_i - p||_2 \le r\}$. Denote $\bar{\mathcal{B}}_r(p) = \min\{\tilde{\mathcal{B}_r}(p), t\}.$
- 3: For $r \ge 0$, define L as $L(r) = \frac{1}{t} \max_{distinct \ i_1, ..., i_t \in [n]} \left\{ \bar{\mathcal{B}}_r(x_{i_1}) + ... + \bar{\mathcal{B}}_r(x_{i_t}) \right\}$
- 4: $r \leftarrow \text{DPBinarySearch}(L, t, \sigma_0, \theta)$ \triangleright *Search for an r s.t. (i)* $L(r) \geq t$, *(ii)* $L(r/2) < t$, *(iii) satisfies* (α, τ_0) *-RDP* 5: return r

Algorithm 5 DP Binary Search

1: **Input:** Function L, desired ball volume t, noise multiplier σ_0 , tolerance θ .

 $_{0}^{2}$)

2: **Initialize:**
$$
r_{low} \leftarrow 0
$$
 and $r_{high} \leftarrow \sqrt{2/2}$.
\n3: $\sigma_0 \leftarrow \sqrt{\alpha \left[\log_2\left(\frac{\sqrt{2}}{2\theta}\right)\right] / \tau_0}$
\n4: **while** $r_{high} - r_{low} > \theta$ **do**
\n5: $r_{mid} \leftarrow (r_{low} + r_{high})/2$
\n6: $\tilde{L}(r_{mid}) \leftarrow L(r_{mid}) + \mathcal{N}(0, 4\sigma_0^2)$
\n7: $\tilde{L}(r_{mid}/2) \leftarrow L(r_{mid}/2) + \mathcal{N}(0, 4\sigma_0^2)$
\n8: **if** $\tilde{L}(r_{mid}/2) \geq t$ **then**
\n9: $r_{high} \leftarrow r_{mid}$
\n10: **else if** $\tilde{L}(r_{mid}) \geq t$ **then**
\n11: $r_{high} \leftarrow r_{mid}$
\n12: **else**
\n13: $r_{low} \leftarrow r_{mid}$
\n14: **end if**
\n15: **end while**
\n16: **return** $(r_{low} + r_{high})/2$

B PRIVACY ANALYSIS

In this section, we provide the privacy analysis for Algorithm [1.](#page-7-0)

Theorem 3 (Restatement of Theorem [1\)](#page-6-0). *Algorithm [1](#page-7-0) is* (ε, δ) -differentially private.

We introduce some concepts and relevant theorems from the literature required for our analysis first. While (ε, δ) -DP is a useful definition of privacy, it does not allow us to tightly quantify the privacy guarantees from the composition of multiple mechanisms. Instead, the notion of Renyi ´ Differential Privacy (RDP) [\(Mironov, 2017\)](#page-12-9) provides a succinct way to monitor the privacy costs from the composition of multiple mechanisms.

Definition 2 (Rényi Divergence [\(Mironov, 2017\)](#page-12-9)). For two probability distributions P and Q defined over $\mathbb R$, the Rényi divergence of order $\alpha > 1$ is

$$
D_{\alpha}(P\|Q) = \frac{1}{\alpha - 1} \log \mathbb{E}_{x \sim Q} \left(\frac{P(x)}{Q(x)}\right)^{\alpha}.
$$

Definition 3 (Rényi Differential Privacy [\(Mironov, 2017\)](#page-12-9)). A randomized algorithm $\mathcal A$ is τ -Rényi differentially private of order α ((α , τ)-RDP) if for any two neighboring inputs X and X', which differ in only a single record, we have

$$
D_{\alpha}(\mathcal{A}(\mathcal{X})\|\mathcal{A}(\mathcal{X}'))\leq \tau.
$$

τ

Theorem 4 (RDP Sequential Composition [\(Mironov, 2017\)](#page-12-9)). *If* A_1 *and* A_2 *are* (α, τ_1) *-RDP and* (α, τ_2) -RDP respectively then the mechanism combining the two $g(\mathcal{A}_1(\mathcal{X}), \mathcal{A}_2(\mathcal{X}))$ is $(\alpha, \tau_1 + \tau_2)$ -*RDP.*

Theorem 5 (RDP to DP conversion [\(Balle et al., 2020\)](#page-10-13)). *If a mechanism M is* (α, τ) *-RDP then it is* $(\tau + \log((\alpha - 1)/\alpha) - (\log \delta + \log \alpha)/(\alpha - 1), \delta)$ *-DP for any* $0 < \delta < 1$ *.*

One of the most widely used mechanisms to guarantee RDP is the Gaussian mechanism. **Theorem 6** (Gaussian Mechanism). *The Gaussian mechanism* $M : \mathcal{X} \to \mathbb{R}^m$ of the form

$$
M(x) = q(x) + \mathcal{N}\left(0, \frac{\Delta_2(q)^2 \alpha \mathbf{I}_m}{2\tau}\right)
$$

satisfies (α, τ) -RDP, where $\Delta_2(q) = \max_{x,x'} ||q(x) - q(x')||_2$ *is the* ℓ_2 -sensitivity of the query q.

We also need the following privacy amplification theorem by subsampling.

Theorem 7 (Amplification by subsampling [\(Wang et al., 2019\)](#page-13-17)). *Given a dataset of* n *points drawn from a domain* $\hat{\mathcal{X}}$ *and a mechanism* $\hat{\mathcal{M}}$ *that takes an input from* \mathcal{X}^m *for* $m\leq n$ *, let the randomized algorithm* M ◦ *subsample be defined as: i) subsample without replacement* m *datapoints of the dataset (sampling parameter* $\gamma = m/n$ *), and ii) apply M to the subsampled dataset. For all integers* $\alpha \geq 2$, *if* M *obeys* $(\alpha, \tau(\alpha))$ *-RDP, then the subsampled mechanism* M \circ *subsample obeys* $(\alpha, \tau'(\alpha))$ *RDP* where,

$$
J'(\alpha) \leq \frac{1}{\alpha - 1} \log \left(1 + \gamma^2 {\alpha \choose 2} \min \left\{ 4 \left(e^{\tau(2)} - 1 \right), \right.\right.
$$

$$
e^{\tau(2)} \min \left\{ 2, \left(e^{\tau(\infty)} - 1 \right)^2 \right\} + \sum_{j=3}^{\alpha} \gamma^j {\alpha \choose j} e^{(j-1)\tau(j)} \min \left\{ 2, \left(e^{\tau(\infty)} - 1 \right)^j \right\}.
$$

We are ready to do the privacy analysis of our algorithm (Theorem [1\)](#page-6-0).

Proof. Fix one iteration of the algorithm and let us bound the privacy loss. Our algorithm consists of 3 components: a DP algorithm GoodRadius (Line [5\)](#page-7-2), DP projected mean estimation using Gaussian DP Mechanism (Line [20\)](#page-7-10) and DP radius coverage check using Gaussian DP Mechanism (Line [12\)](#page-7-9). The output of GoodRadius algorithm r on Line [5](#page-7-2) satisfies (α, τ_0) -RDP by Theorem [2.](#page-14-4) Consider projected mean estimation using Gaussian Mechanism. The projection operation in Line [19](#page-7-13) ensures that the ℓ_2 -sensitivity of the term $\sum_{i=1}^{M} \tilde{p}_{\text{priv}}^i$ in Line [20](#page-7-10) is at most 2R. As we are adding Gaussian noise sampled from $\mathcal{N}(0, 4R^2 \sigma_1^2 I)$, we can ensure \tilde{p}_{priv} in Line [20](#page-7-10) satisfies (α, τ_1) -RDP by setting $\sigma_1 = \sqrt{\alpha/2\tau_1}$ (Theorem [6\)](#page-16-0). For the radius coverage check using Gaussian Mechanism, in Line [11,](#page-7-8) t counts the number of points of p_{priv}^1 , ..., p_{priv}^M covered in a ball with center \tilde{p}_{priv} and radius $r +$ $\frac{2\lambda R\sigma_1\sqrt{K}}{M}$. The sensitivity of the term t is 1. Then in Lin[e12](#page-7-9) we add Gaussian noise sampled from $\mathcal{N}(0, \sigma_2^2 I)$ to t. By setting $\sigma_2 = \sqrt{\alpha/2\tau_2}$, we can show the radius coverage check satisfies (α, τ_2) -RDP (Theorem [6\)](#page-16-0). Our algorithm consists of one instance of (α, τ_0) -RDP algorithm GoodRadius (Line [5\)](#page-7-2), at most $(T + 1)$ instances of (α, τ) -RDP projected mean estimation using Gaussian DP Mechanism (Line [8](#page-7-6) and Line [20\)](#page-7-10) and at most \hat{T} instances of (α, τ_2) -RDP radius coverage check using Gaussian DP Mechanism (Line [12\)](#page-7-9). We apply the composition property of RDP (Theorem [4\)](#page-15-4) to ensure each iteration of the algorithm is (α, τ) -RDP, that is, we ensure that $\tau = \tau_0 + (T + 1)\tau_1 +$ $\hat T \tau_2.$

Further, note that in each iteration, the Next Token Generation subroutine [\(Tang et al., 2023\)](#page-12-0) involves drawing MN samples from the dataset $\mathcal{D}_{\text{priv}}$, there is a privacy amplification by subsampling at each iteration. We apply Theorem [7](#page-16-1) to show that the effective privacy loss per iteration of our algorithm is (α, τ') -RDP for the full dataset.

Finally, we compose privacy loss across all the T_{max} iterations of our algorithm using composition theorems (Theorem [4\)](#page-15-4). We conclude that Algorithm [1](#page-7-0) satisfies $(\alpha, T_{max}\tau')$ -RDP and convert the privacy guarantee back into the standard DP definition (Theorem [5\)](#page-16-2). □ We then provide intuition on how the privacy budget is allocated below.

The GoodRadius step initializes a reference radius for the projected ball. Since it is not the final radius, this step can tolerate higher noise levels. Therefore, we typically set σ_0 to a large value (e.g., 10) to save privacy budget for the more sensitive projected mean estimation step.

The radius coverage check verifies whether a sufficient number of the original probability vectors $p_{\text{priv}}^1, \ldots, p_{\text{priv}}^M$ lie within a small radius from \tilde{p}_{priv} . This involves counting the number of covered vectors, adding Gaussian noise with standard deviation σ_2 , and comparing the noisy count to the total number of vectors M . When M is large, the relative impact of the noise added to the count diminishes because the noise becomes negligible compared to M . Therefore, as M increases, we can set σ_2 to a larger value. For example, when $M = 40$, σ_2 can be set to around 5 without significant loss of accuracy.

In conclusion, our privacy budget allocation prioritizes the projected mean estimation step for high accuracy, while allowing other steps to tolerate higher noise.

C EXPERIMENTAL SUPPLEMENTARY

C.1 EXPERIMENTS COMPUTE RESOURCES

The experiments use 4 NVIDIA RTX A5000 GPUs, each equipped with 24,564 MiB of memory. Approximately 24 hours are required to reproduce the main results in Section [5.1.](#page-8-0)

C.2 DATASETS

In this section, we describe the datasets used in our experiments.

- AGNews. The AG News (AG's News Corpus) dataset [\(Zhang et al., 2015\)](#page-13-14) comprises news articles categorized into four labels: World, Sports, Business, and Sci/Tech. It includes 30,000 training samples and 1,900 test samples per class. For our experiments, we randomly select 1,000 samples from the test set.
- **DBPedia.** The DBPedia ontology classification dataset [\(Zhang et al., 2015\)](#page-13-14) includes contents categorized into one of 14 topics: Company, School, Artist, Athlete, Politician, Transportation, Building, Nature, Village, Animal, Plant, Album, Film, and Book. This dataset includes 40,000 training samples and 5,000 test samples for each class. For our experiments, we randomly select 49,999 samples from the training set and 1,000 samples from the test set.
- TREC. The Text REtrieval Conference (TREC) question classification dataset [\(Voorhees and Tice,](#page-13-15) [2000\)](#page-13-15) contains questions categorized into one of 6 answer types: Number, Location, Person, Description, Entity, and Abbreviation. The dataset includes 5,452 training samples and 500 test samples, distributed non-uniformly across the categories.
- MIT Movies. MIT Movies trivia10k13 dataset [\(Liu et al., 2012\)](#page-11-16) comprises movie reviews designed for information extraction tasks, with specific slots for movie genre (MIT-G) and director name (MIT-D). For training and testing, MIT-G includes 2,953 and 780 samples respectively, while MIT-D contains 1,561 training samples and 415 test samples.

C.3 NON-PRIVATE BASELINES

In this section, we present the performance of non-private baselines for $\varepsilon = \infty$ in Table [5:](#page-18-0) (i) DP few-shot generation algorithm operates without any added noise; (ii) 4-shot demonstrations randomly selected from the private dataset.

C.4 HYPERPARAMETER SEARCH

In this section, we conduct ablation studies on key hyperparameters in Algorithm [1.](#page-7-0) We present results for datasets with varying λ and \hat{T} values in Table [6-](#page-18-1)Table [10.](#page-19-2) Specifically, we consider $\hat{T} \in \{1, 2\}$ and $\lambda \in \{0.15, 0.2, 0.25\}$ and present ICL accuracy for all these hyperparameter choices. We observe that ICL accuracy remains stable across the different hyperparameter settings. For

Table 5: Performance of non-private baselines on test datasets. We report mean and standard deviation of accuracy over 5 runs with different random seeds. $\varepsilon = \infty$ (Algorithm [2](#page-14-2) with $\sigma = 0$) column represents DP few-shot generation algorithm operating without any added noise. $\varepsilon = \infty$ (rand) column represents using 4-shot demonstrations randomly selected from the private dataset.

Task	$\varepsilon = \infty$ (Algorithm 2 with $\sigma = 0$)	$\varepsilon = \infty$ (rand)
AGNews	$\overline{6}5.92_{1.13}$	$\overline{65.28}_{2.65}$
DBPedia	$67.88_{1.75}$	$69.06_{1.40}$
TREC	$72.32_{2.76}$	$53.12_{3.72}$
MIT-G	$43.23_{7.00}$	$42.08_{6.35}$
MIT-D	$78.36_{3.33}$	$79.33_{1.48}$

example, on the AGNews dataset, AdaDPSyn achieves accuracy in the range of 64.28%–65.92% for $\hat{T} \in \{1, 2\}$ and $\lambda \in \{0.15, 0.2, 0.25\}$, compared to 63.18% for DP few-shot generation when $\varepsilon = 8$. This is good in terms of the stability of Algorithm [1.](#page-7-0)

Table 6: ICL performance on the test dataset of AGNews across varying λ and T values, showing mean and standard deviation of accuracy over 5 runs with different random seeds. We set $\varepsilon = 8$, $\sigma_0 = 10$, $\sigma_2 = 3$. For specific \hat{T} values, we set $\sigma_1 = 0.58$ when $\hat{T} = 1$, and 0.72 when $\hat{T} = 2$.

	$\lambda = 0.15$ $\lambda = 0.2$ $\lambda = 0.25$	
	$\dot{T} = 1$ 64.28 _{1.48} 65.92 _{1.02} 64.90 _{0.97}	
	$\hat{T} = 2$ 64.38 _{3.16} 65.76 _{1.13} 65.18 _{1.76}	

Table 7: ICL performance on the test dataset of DBPedia across varying λ and \ddot{T} values, showing mean and standard deviation of accuracy over 5 runs with different random seeds. We set $\varepsilon = 8$, $\sigma_0 = 10$, $\sigma_2 = 3$. For specific \hat{T} values, we set $\sigma_1 = 0.73$ when $\hat{T} = 1$, and 0.90 when $\hat{T} = 2$.

	$\lambda = 0.15$	$\lambda = 0.2$	$\lambda = 0.25$
$T=1$		$66.14_{2.91}$ $67.70_{1.68}$	$66.90_{1.25}$
$\hat{T}=2$	$66.02_{3.22}$	$66.30_{2.09}$	$65.28_{3.13}$

Table 8: ICL performance on the test dataset of TREC across varying λ and \hat{T} values, showing mean and standard deviation of accuracy over 5 runs with different random seeds. We set $\varepsilon = 8$, $\sigma_2 = 5$. For specific \hat{T} values, we set $\sigma_0 = 10$ and $\sigma_1 = 0.89$ when $\hat{T} = 1$, and $\sigma_0 = 15$ and $\sigma_1 = 1.09$ when $\hat{T} = 2$.

	$\lambda = 0.15$	$\lambda = 0.2$	$\lambda = 0.25$
$T=1$	$70.08_{2.53}$	$70.28_{2.63}$	$70.52_{3.62}$
$\hat{T}=2$	$71.24_{2.96}$	$72.08_{2,24}$	$71.08_{4,31}$

Table 9: ICL performance on the test dataset of MIT-G across varying λ and \hat{T} values, showing mean and standard deviation of accuracy over 5 runs with different random seeds. We set $\varepsilon = 8$, $\sigma_0 = 10$, $\sigma_2 = 5$. For specific \hat{T} values, we set $\sigma_1 = 0.73$ when $\hat{T} = 1$, and 0.90 when $\hat{T} = 2$.

	$\lambda = 0.15$ $\lambda = 0.2$ $\lambda = 0.25$	
$\overline{T} = 1$ 37.10 _{3.48} 36.33 _{7.28} 36.51 _{5.03}		
$\hat{T} = 2 \quad 36.95_{3.90}$	$38.31_{5.03}$ $37.56_{5.47}$	

We also perform ablation studies on σ_0 and σ_2 . To evaluate their impact, we conduct experiments on the MIT-G dataset with $\varepsilon = 8$, varying $\sigma_0 \in \{10, 15, 20\}$ and $\sigma_2 \in \{3, 4, 5\}$. The results are presented in Table [11.](#page-19-3)

Table 10: ICL performance on the test dataset of MIT-D across varying λ and \hat{T} values, showing mean and standard deviation of accuracy over 5 runs with different random seeds. We set $\varepsilon = 8$, $\sigma_0 = 15$, $\sigma_2 = 5$. For specific \hat{T} values, we set $\sigma_1 = 0.83$ when $\hat{T} = 1$, and 1.03 when $\hat{T} = 2$.

	$\lambda = 0.15$	$\lambda = 0.2$ $\lambda = 0.25$	
$T=1$	$75.28_{1.93}$	$74.94_{2.88}$	$73.30_{2.47}$
$\hat{T}=2$	$74.31_{2,32}$	74.17 _{1.47}	$73.11_{2.04}$

We observe that ICL accuracy remains stable across different σ_0 and σ_2 , ranging from 37.08% to 38.41%, showing an improvement over the 36.10% achieved by DP few-shot generation. This stability arises because, despite varying σ_0 and σ_2 , the resulting change in σ_1 (noise multiplier of projected mean estimation) is very small (0.90–0.92).

Table 11: ICL performance on the test dataset of MIT-G across varying σ_0 and σ_2 values, showing mean and standard deviation of accuracy over 5 runs with different random seeds. We set $\varepsilon = 8$, $\hat{T} = 2, \lambda = 0.2.$

	$\sigma_0 = 10$	$\sigma_0=15$	$\sigma_0 = 20$
$\sigma_2=3$	$37.08_{3.92}$	$37.87_{4.92}$	$38.26_{4.55}$
$\sigma_2=4$	$37.15_{3.85}$	$38.28_{4.30}$	$38.41_{4.71}$
$\sigma_2=5$	$38.31_{5.03}$	$37.56_{4.62}$	$38.18_{4.72}$

C.5 HYPERPARAMETERS

To ensure a fair comparison, we follow the guidance from [Tang et al.](#page-12-0) [\(2023\)](#page-12-0) to select parameters for the DP few-shot generation algorithm. Specifically, K is held constant at 100, and a grid search is performed to determine the optimal values for M and N ($N \in \{1, 2, 4\}$, $MN \in \{20, 40, 80\}$). We also use the same values of T_{max} as in [Tang et al.](#page-12-0) [\(2023\)](#page-12-0) for each task. Hyperparameters for the DP few-shot generation algorithm presented in Table [1](#page-4-0) are provided in Table [12.](#page-19-0) We then use the same values of M , N , T_{max} and K for our AdaDPSyn without any additional hyperparameter tuning.

Hyperparameters and privacy parameters for the results presented in Table [2](#page-8-2) are provided in Table [13-](#page-19-4)Table [17.](#page-20-1)

Table 12: Hyperparameters for DP few-shot generation [\(Tang et al., 2023\)](#page-12-0) presented in Table [1](#page-4-0) and Table [2.](#page-8-2) We choose $n_{\text{shot}} = 4$ and $K = 100$ for all tasks.

Task			max	D _P
AGNews	10		100	Gaussian
DBPedia	10	2	100	Gaussian
TREC	20	$\mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{A}}$	15	Gaussian
MIT-G	40		20	Gaussian
MIT-D	40		20	Gaussian

Table 13: Hyperparameters and privacy parameters for the main results of AGNews task presented in Table [2.](#page-8-2) We choose $M = 10$, $N = 2$, $T_{\text{max}} = 100$, $n_{\text{shot}} = 4$ and $K = 100$.

Table 14: Hyperparameters and privacy parameters for the main results of DBPedia task presented in Table [2.](#page-8-2) We choose $M = 10$, $N = 2$, $T_{\text{max}} = 100$, $n_{\text{shot}} = 4$ and $K = 100$.

		σ_0	σ_2	σ_1
$\varepsilon = 1$	0.1	10	3	1.54
$\varepsilon = 2$	0.1	10	3	1.14
$\varepsilon = 4$	0.2	10	3	0.89
$\varepsilon = 8$	02	10	3	0.73

Table 15: Hyperparameters and privacy parameters for the main results of TREC task presented in Table [2.](#page-8-2) We choose $M = 20$, $N = 2$, $T_{\text{max}} = 15$, $n_{\text{shot}} = 4$ and $K = 100$.

		σ_0	σο	σ_1
$\varepsilon=1$	0 1	17.5		2.52
$\varepsilon = 2$	0.2	15		1.95
$\varepsilon = 4$	0.15	10		1.15
$\varepsilon = 8$	0.25	15		1 09

Table 16: Hyperparameters and privacy parameters for the main results of MIT-G task presented in Table [2.](#page-8-2) We choose $M = 40$, $N = 1$, $T_{\text{max}} = 20$, $n_{\text{shot}} = 4$ and $K = 100$.

	ㅅ		σ_0	σο	σ_1
$\varepsilon = 1$		0.3	15	6.	1.59
$\varepsilon=2$		0.35	10	6.	1.17
$\varepsilon = 4$		0.25	10	h	1.12.
$\varepsilon = 8$		02	10		09O

Table 17: Hyperparameters and privacy parameters for the main results of MIT-D task presented in Table [2.](#page-8-2) We choose $M = 40$, $N = 1$, $T_{\text{max}} = 20$, $n_{\text{shot}} = 4$ and $K = 100$.

C.6 EMPIRICAL PRIVACY EVALUATION BY MEMBERSHIP INFERENCE ATTACK

While DP guarantee inherently provides a theoretical guarantee against privacy leakage, it is also important to assess empirical privacy risks. In this section, we evaluate the empirical privacy of AdaDPSyn against membership inference attack (MIA) [\(Shokri et al., 2017\)](#page-12-18).

We follow the prior work [\(Duan et al., 2023\)](#page-10-1), where the authors instantiate a membership inference attack (MIA) in the ICL framework. The goal is to determine whether a given private example was used within the prompt. Following [Duan et al.](#page-10-1) [\(2023\)](#page-10-1), we consider 1-shot ICL. We use the DBPedia dataset and apply the MIA for our AdaDPSyn algorithm. Specifically, we split the dataset into two parts for member and non-member samples. We use member samples to generate 1-shot synthetic demonstration with AdaDPSyn, repeated over 5 trials. Then we attempt MIA for the samples from members and non-members during ICL. For each synthetic demonstration, we run 20 trials for MIA and average across the 100 trials to calculate the AUC. Following [Duan et al.](#page-10-1) [\(2023\)](#page-10-1), we also consider a non-private baseline $\varepsilon = \infty$ of using actual samples from the private dataset in the prompt. For this baseline, we also average across 100 trials for AUC. The results are presented in Table [18.](#page-21-0)

We observe that using actual samples from the private dataset leads to successful MIA results (77.37) in the $\varepsilon = \infty$ case). AdaDPSyn reduces MIA AUC to almost random guesses, showing the effectiveness of our method against MIAs.

Table 18: Empirical privacy evaluation for 1-shot ICL by MIA on DBPedia dataset.

C.7 INSTRUCTION-TUNED LLAMA-2-7B RESULTS

In this section, we perform experiments on the instruction fine-tuned Llama-2-7b model. We present the results on DBPedia with $\varepsilon = 4$ using the Llama-2-7b-chat model in Table [19.](#page-21-1)

We observe that AdaDPSyn outperforms DP few-shot generation and performs close to non-private baselines on the instruction fine-tuned Llama-2-7B-chat model. Additionally, Llama-2-7B-chat achieves better overall performance compared to Llama-2-7B, showing the benefits of instruction fine-tuning.

Table 19: ICL performance on DBPedia with $\varepsilon = 4$ using Llama-2-7b-chat and Llama-2-7b.

C.8 VARYING LLMS OF SIMILAR SCALE

We perform experiments to compare Llama-2-7b and Gemma-7b on DBPedia with $\varepsilon = 4$. The results are presented in Table [20.](#page-21-2)

We observe that AdaDPSyn outperforms DP few-shot generation and performs close to non-private baselines on both models. Additionally, Gemma-7B achieves better overall performance compared to Llama-2-7B.

Table 20: ICL performance on DBPedia with $\varepsilon = 4$ using Llama-2-7b and Gemma-7b.

C.9 VARYING MODEL SIZE

We conduct experiments comparing Llama-2-7b and Llama-2-13b on DBPedia with $\varepsilon = 4$. The results are presented in Table [21.](#page-21-3) We observe that Llama-2-13B shows better overall performance compared to Llama-2-7B, reflecting the advantages of increased model size.

Table 21: ICL performance on DBPedia with $\varepsilon = 4$ using Llama-2-7b and Llama-2-13b.

C.10 TIME COST ANALYSIS

In this section, we present the time cost for generating one DP synthetic ICL sample with $\varepsilon = 4$ in Table [22.](#page-22-1)

We observe that the time cost of AdaDPSyn is very close to that of DP few-shot generation. Although AdaDPSyn includes additional steps that contribute to improved ICL accuracy, they do not introduce significant computational overhead.

Method (seconds)	AGNews DBPedia	TREC	MIT-G	MIT-D
AdaDPSyn	173.2608 182.9686 43.9833 116.7168 117.1299			
DP few-shot generation 173.2583 182.9660 43.9735 116.6792 117.0923				

Table 22: Time cost evaluation for generating one DP synthetic ICL sample with $\varepsilon = 4$.

C.11 PROMPT FORMATS

In this section, we present prompt formats during ICL and the prompt construction functions $PB(\cdot)$ for Next Token Generation (Algorithm [3\)](#page-14-3). While we use the same prompt format during ICL following [Tang et al.](#page-12-0) [\(2023\)](#page-12-0), we present them here in Table [23](#page-22-2) and Table [24](#page-23-0) for the convenience of the reader. We also present the prompt construction functions $PB(\cdot)$ used in Next Token Generation (Algorithm [3\)](#page-14-3) in Table [25](#page-23-1) and Table [26.](#page-24-0)

Table 23: The prompts used during ICL for text classification tasks, taken from Table 7 of [Tang et al.](#page-12-0) [\(2023\)](#page-12-0).

C.12 DEMONSTRATIONS

In this section, we present generated samples using AdaDPSyn at $\varepsilon = 4$ for the DBPedia dataset, as shown in Table [27.](#page-25-0) These results are compared to those obtained using DP few-shot generation, displayed in Table [28.](#page-26-0) Both methods use the LLama-2-7B-hf model.

We observe that samples generated by AdaDPSyn show good coherence and clarity. For example, the first sample in Table [27,](#page-25-0) which describes "John P. Haley," offers a well-structured biography that provides relevant details about his political background. Although there are some factual inaccuracies, these errors do not affect the sample's ability to perform well in the classification task. The generated text includes sufficient context and key information to ensure correct classification while maintaining the required privacy guarantees. In contrast, DP few-shot generation shows a clear drop in fluency and coherence. For example, the second sample in Table [28](#page-26-0) contains fragmented senTable 24: The prompts used during ICL for information extraction tasks, taken from Table 8 of [Tang](#page-12-0) [et al.](#page-12-0) [\(2023\)](#page-12-0).

Table 25: Prompt construction function PB (instruction, D, y) used in Algorithm [3](#page-14-3) for text classification tasks, taken from Table 5 of [Tang et al.](#page-12-0) [\(2023\)](#page-12-0).

tences and disjointed phrases, making it difficult to follow. These results show the effectiveness of our adaptive method, which maintains strong privacy guarantees while producing more coherent and usable text compared to DP few-shot generation.

C.13 COMPARISON OF DP AND REAL SAMPLES

In this section, we compare the DP samples generated by AdaDPSyn with the real private samples. We use the MIT-G dataset for this analysis because this task shows a relatively large performance gap between private and non-private methods. We present the private samples in Table [29,](#page-27-0) and the DP samples generated using AdaDPSyn with $\varepsilon = 1, 2, 4, 8$ in Table [30.](#page-28-0)

In the original private samples, the labels (movie genres) are explicitly included in the text, as the task is to extract the genre from the text. Similarly, in the DP samples generated by AdaDPSyn (ε = 1, 2, 4, 8), the labels are included most of the time, highlighted in blue in Table [30.](#page-28-0) Occasionally, the generated samples use related words instead of the exact label (e.g., "boxer" instead of "boxing"

Table 26: Prompt construction function PB (instruction, D, y) used in Algorithm [3](#page-14-3) for information extraction tasks, taken from Table 6 of [Tang et al.](#page-12-0) [\(2023\)](#page-12-0).

or "basketball" instead of "sports"), highlighted in red in Table [30.](#page-28-0) Despite these substitutions, the DP samples maintain semantic relevance to the task. However, compared to the private samples, the DP samples are more general and less detailed, sometimes introducing noise or repetition. These differences reflect the trade-offs for ensuring DP. With different ε values ($\varepsilon = 1, 2, 4, 8$), we do not observe significant differences in the quality of the DP samples. This aligns with our experimental results, where the ICL accuracy shows only small differences across $\varepsilon = 1, 2, 4, 8$ (between 37.41%) and 38.31%).

We also conduct experiments with smaller ε (0.2, 0.3, 0.5) on the MIT-G dataset. The DP samples generated using AdaDPSyn with these ε values are included in Table [30,](#page-28-0) and we present the performance results in Table [31.](#page-28-1)

For $\varepsilon = 1, 2, 4, 8$, the ICL performance shows only small differences (between 37.41% and 38.31%). However, when ε decreases to 0.5, ICL accuracy drops to 30.56%, and further decreases to 23.75% for $\varepsilon = 0.3$. At $\varepsilon = 0.2$, the ICL accuracy is 13.77%, which is nearly identical to the fully private baseline ($\varepsilon = 0$).

In Table 30, we observe that, for $\varepsilon = 1, 2, 4, 8$, the DP samples maintain similar quality, with labels (movie genres) included in the text most of the time. At $\varepsilon = 0.5$, quality decreases with occasional noise, and labels are included less frequently. At $\varepsilon = 0.3$, labels are only occasionally included, and at $\varepsilon = 0.2$, labels are entirely absent, with the samples containing more noise.

Table 28: Examples of generated samples using DP few-shot generation at $\varepsilon = 4$ for DBPedia.

Table 29: Real private samples from MIT-G.

Real Private Sample: Text (Label)

what 2011 dennis dugan romantic comedy starred adam sandler jennifer aniston nicole kidman and brooklyn decker (romantic comedy)

name the 1993 epic movie starring liam neeson as a german businessman that saved over a thousand polish jewish refugees during the holocost (epic)

what is the classic boxing film that starred and was written by superstar sylvester stallone (boxing) what 2001 fantasy film based on a novel by j r r tolkien tells the story frodo baggins (fantasy film)

name the disney live action film based upon a classic mickey cartoon where mickey becomes a magician (live action)

in 2011 what raunchy comedy was released with four friends attempting to have a bachelor party in thailand where nothing seems to go right i m thinking of a movie where star character stu ed helms wakes up with a tattoo on his face made popular by mike tyson (raunchy comedy)

what 1998 steven spielberg war film starred tom hanks matt damon edward burns and tom sizemore (war)

what is the animated family movie about a man who has to look after three orphaned girls (animated family)

name the sports movie about a high school basketball team that starred gene hackman as the coach (sports)

in which animated movie did steve carell play a thief who is trying to steal the moon (animated)

what 1956 science fiction film concerns aliens in a small california town who inhabit citizens bodies (science fiction)

what 2007 biopic is about the story of jean dominique bauby and his trouble with locked in syndrome (biopic)

in a decrepit south american village men are hired to transport an urgent nitroglycerine shipment without the equipment that would make it safe is the plot of this 1953 action thriller (action thriller)

young traveler allan gray discovers evidence of the supernatural in this black and white 1932 horror film (horror)

this computer animated film stars johnny depp as a timid chameleon who finds courage in the desert (computer animated)

what was the name of the cg movie with johnny depp as a lizard in the desert (cg)

name the 1990 american romantic fantasy film starring patrick swayze demi moore tony goldwyn and whoopi goldberg (american romantic fantasy)

what 2002 brazilian movie had a television show spin off called city of men in 2003 (brazilian)

do you know the name of the comedy film starring an actor named michael that s based off of a video game (comedy)

what is the 1989 comedy drama crime film starring tom hanks and beasley the dog (comedy drama crime)

a classic childrens tale of a bear who enjoys his honey and his animal friends (childrens)

superhero movie where team of superheros get together to defeat threats too big for just one hero (superhero movie)

what is the superhero movie about a powerful but arrogant warrior who is cast out of asgard (superhero)

tim burton used stop motion animation to tell the story of jack skellington in what 1993 disney movie (stop motion animation) what s the animated film made up of several stories which are set to classical music (animated)

this movie musical features two rival gangs the sharks and the jets and lots of prancing and snapping and wailing for maria (musical)

what is the 1992 american horror film starring tony todd as the titular character who has a hook for a hand (american horror) this one of the first classic horror movies thats been remade multiple times about zombies (classic horror)

ε	DP Sample: Text (Label)
	For Mary Baratani—smart, snay beautiful Miamity born who lost six sizes (romantic comedy)
	Sentence after my changes."Here some timemore >," in London "before (epic)
	Vancouver $Wow < 0xE5 >$ feild! For long now Tito Tararanilla may give (boxing)
	$\langle 0xED \rangle$ He picked up rocks (but failed [intonation key! R8)) & 1 (live action)
$\varepsilon = 0.2$	When Harry becomes Dr. Audi McAr's room guest but isn't expected again (raunchy comedy)
	With bombs clancing wildly an man a a few fell foming. man cming together (war)
	(for that in its purpose from something makes necessary have such ability will like must (an inter, (alien film)
	$\langle 0xEB \rangle$ Anything where she wins has better movie written. One fine episode & everyone clapend (animated family)
	(Example above replaced bengaleafcricket match nether on hrs: match win/ (sports)
	he started exploring areas forbidden throughout each human group except there ended up being definitely less area (animated)
$\varepsilon = 0.3$	For Mary, the path to true love romantic comedy took a weird turn when she unw (romantic comedy)
	199BCE, the Persian Empire attack the Greek city-states. Epic cinemat (epic)
	1976 sports drama film boxing, directed by Tariq Nashe (boxing)
	199 movies called Rocky because rocky is a boxer and uh they (live action)
	90s raunchy comedy remake of the 1980s classic comedic (raunchy comedy) 1917 is a war film film filled with action and also intrigue. WW1 (war)
	1996 teen disaster film is about a group of teenagers who are dealing (alien film)
	$\langle 0xEB \rangle$ is a 201 in the direction of Lanipekun, according to the (animated family)
	(Example) in the 1990s, the man who trained the wrestler " (sports)
	he started to find its way into the pivotal role of the bromantic comedy. (animated)
	2006 romantic comedy about a single boy meeting a girl while they are both visiting (romantic comedy)
	2006 epic movie about a legendary samurai's fight against Lord K (epic)
	2010 is a biographical drama film about the life of boxer james j. (boxing)
	$200 \le$ strong $>0 \le$ /strong $>$ and 2001 a space odys (fantasy film)
$\varepsilon = 0.5$	201 Action and Adventure Films Sentence 4 (live action)
	2011s Crazy, Stupid, Love is a raunchy comedy which (raunchy comedy)
	1998 war film Trenchcoat 22037 is not your average (war)
	201 mins. 201x201x201x2 (animated family)
	2014 sports movie with shia labeouf and an old-school baseball style (sports)
	2014 animated film about a cute girl trying to escape a mysterious castle while the (animated) 2004 romantic comedy about a woman who loses her job and goes to a resort (romantic comedy)
$\varepsilon=1$	1959 epic film about the battle of waterloo starring charlton h (epic)
	2006 boxing film starring 2006 boxing film starring (boxing)
	2017 fantasy film about a young boy who discovers a magical world in his (fantasy film)
	1990s live action film about a young boy who wants to be a firefigh (live action)
	2011 raunchy comedy about a man who wakes up with a hangover and (raunchy comedy)
	1998 war film directed by and starring Clint Eastwood. The film is based (war)
	1998 animated family film about a young boy who finds a magical board game that trans (animated family)
	1994 sports movie about a football player who loses his eye in a car accident and (sports)
	1998 animated film about a boy who dreams of becoming a rock star and the road (animated)
	2004 romantic comedy starring jennifer aniston and adam sandler (romantic comedy)
	1959 epic film about the battle of waterloo starring charlton h (epic)
	2005 film about a boxer who is the son of a boxer who was killed (boxing) 2017 fantasy film about a young boy who is transported to a magical world (fantasy film)
$\varepsilon=2$	1990s live action film about a young boy who is taken to a magical land (live action)
	2011 raunchy comedy about a man who wakes up in a hotel room with (raunchy comedy)
	1998 war film directed by and starring Clint Eastwood. The film is based (war)
	2016 animated family film about a young boy who wants to be a hero and his journey (animated family)
	2014 film about a high school basketball team in the 1950s that (sports)
	2010 animated film about a boy who gets a magic crayon that can draw anything (animated)
$\varepsilon = 4$	2005 romantic comedy starring jennifer aniston and vince vaug (romantic comedy)
	1999 epic film about a young boy who is the son of a king and is (epic)
	1976 film about a boxer who is trying to make it to the top of the (boxing)
	2017 fantasy film directed by 2017 fantasy film directed by (fantasy film)
	1999 live action film about a young boy who is transported to a magical world (live action)
	2011 raunchy comedy about a man who is trying to get his life back on (raunchy comedy)
	1942 war film directed by howard hawks and starring humphrey bog (war) 2010 animated family film about a young boy who befriends a dragon and helps (animated family)
	2010 was a great year for sports movies, with the release of the 2 (sports)
	2016 animated film about a boy who is a wizard and his pet dragon. (animated)
	2009 romantic comedy starring jennifer aniston and jason bateman (romantic comedy)
	1999 epic film about a young man who goes on a journey to find his father (epic)
$\varepsilon = 8$	1976 film about a boxer who is trying to make it to the top of the (boxing)
	2017 fantasy film about a young boy who is transported to a magical world (fantasy film)
	1999 live action film about a young boy who is transported to a magical world (live action)
	2011 raunchy comedy about a man who is trying to get his life back on (raunchy comedy)
	1917 is a war film about two soldiers who are sent on a mission to deliver a (war)
	2010 animated family film about a young boy who is transported to a magical world (animated family) 2010 was a great year for sports movies, with the release of the 2 (sports)
	2016 animated film about a boy who is transported to a magical world of g (animated)

Table 31: ICL performance on MIT-G using AdaDPSyn.

