MIA: A FRAMEWORK FOR CERTIFIABLY ROBUST TIME-Series Classification and Forecasting Against Temporally-Localized Perturbations

Anonymous authors

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Abstract

Recent literature demonstrates that times-series forecasting/classification are sensitive to input perturbations. However, the defenses for time-series models are relatively under-explored. In this paper, we propose Masking Imputing Aggregation (MIA), a plug-and-play framework to provide an arbitrary deterministic time-series model with certified robustness against temporally-localized perturbations (also known as ℓ_0 -norm localized perturbations), which is to our knowledge the first ℓ_0 -norm defense for time-series models. Our main insight is to let an occluding mask move across the input series, guaranteeing that, for an arbitrary localized perturbation there must exist at least one mask that completely occlude the perturbed area, so that the prediction on this masked series is certifiably unaffected. MIA is flexible as it still works even if we only have the query access to the pretrained model. To further validate the superior effectiveness of MIA, we specifically compare MIA to two baselines extended from prior randomized smoothing approaches. Extensive experiments show that MIA yields stronger robustness.

1 INTRODUCTION

Time series forecasting/classification (TSF/TSC) have been widely applied to help businesses make informed decisions and plans (Miyato et al., 2017; Zhou et al., 2019; Schlegl et al., 2019; Park et al., 2018). However, a wide range of literature demonstrate that time-series models are vulnerable to adversarial input perturbations (Connor et al., 1994; Gelper et al., 2010; Ding et al., 2022; Yang et al., 2020; Dang-Nhu et al., 2020; Oregi et al., 2018; Han et al., 2020), e.g., an elaborately designed imperceptible perturbation could control the prediction (Karim et al., 2020; Fawaz et al., 2019). So far related literature is mainly focusing on detecting the outliers (Ruff et al., 2018; Yairi et al., 2017), the adversarial robustness of time-series models is relatively under-explored, especially ℓ_0 -norm robustness, e.g., (Yoon et al., 2022) only explore the ℓ_2 -norm adversarial robustness for probabilistic forecasting models. In the present work, we focus on the robustness against temporally-localized perturbations, as we notice there already exists corresponding powerful attacks (Yang et al., 2022).

Generally, defenses can be divided into two types, heuristic defenses and certified defenses. Heuristic defense can yield better empirical robustness but lack robustness guarantees. From the experience on image classification (Athalye et al., 2018; Carlini & Wagner, 2017; Athalye & Carlini, 2018), the heuristic defenses would be useless when confronted with the newly designed adaptive attacks, e.g., Athalye et al. (2018) leverage Backward Pass Differentiable Approximation technique to successfully circumvent almost all the heuristic defenses at that time. To end such a "cat and mouse" game between the adaptive attacks and the heuristic defenses, the concept of certified defense is proposed, with unbreakable robustness certificates.

Current certified defenses can produce robustness certificates but often require the user to retrain the base model from scratch, e.g., Yoon et al. (2022); Li et al. (2020); Cohen et al. (2019) retrain the base model as these defenses do perform poorly on naturally-trained models. The requirement for retraining could bring additional challenges when it comes to the real-world deployments. In addition, the certified defenses on sequence-based data are quite under-explored, since almost all the certified defenses are focusing on matrix-based data (e.g. image).



Figure 1: Overview of MIA pipeline. Inputted a series $\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0}$, MIA first masks different periods of $\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0}$ to construct the masked series $\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0} \odot \mathbf{M}^{(k)}$, $k = 0, \ldots, M$. Then MIA imputes the masked series with the imputation model $G(\cdot)$. We classify the imputed series with the pretrained model. If the predictions of all the imputed series are *Class 0*, MIA will return *Class 0* with the robustness guarantee that the output is clean, otherwise MIA will return **Abstain**.

To address these issues, in this paper, we propose Masking Imputing Aggregation (MIA), a flexible framework to arm an arbitrary TSF/TSC deterministic model with robustness certificates against temporally-localized perturbations. Different from the requirement for retraining in prior defenses, MIA only an imputation model for recovering the masked areas, which can be easily learned in an unsupervised setting. Specifically, MIA works as follows: 1) **masking:** MIA first masked series via sliding a mask through the input series; 2) **imputing:** MIA imputes the masked series with the imputation model; 3) **aggregation (checking agreement):** MIA only returns the the class if the pretrained model outputs the same for all the imputed series, otherwise returns Abstain. With the above three steps, we can guarantee that all the predictions from MIA is clean. Furthermore, we compare MIA to two baselines extended from randomized smoothing, as we notice that randomized smoothing has achieved a widespread success in defending different adversarial attacks. **The contributions are:**

1) We propose MIA, a plug-and-play framework to arm an arbitrary TSF/TSC model with certified robustness against temporally-localized perturbations, which is to our knowledge the first ℓ_0 -norm certified defense in time series domain.

2) We propose randomized masked training, a specialized training algorithm for training the imputation model of MIA, to further boost the performance of MIA.

3) We compare MIA to two baseline methods comprehensively on three aspects. 1) robustness: extensive experiments on different datasets validate that superior robustness of MIA. 2) Practicality: MIA is stronger as it is plug-and-play and do not require retraining. 3) Inference cost: the inference time of MIA is comparable to the time cost of two baselines.

2 Related Work

Heuristic defenses for time-series models. Prior works on robust TSF/TSC can be divided into two general categories: outlier detection and deep learning. The former is to filter the outliers in a statistical way, including k-Means clustering (Yang et al., 2017), one-class SVM clustering (Schölkopf et al., 2001), Kalman filters (de Bézenac et al., 2020) and support vector data description (Tax & Duin, 2004). The latter leverages the strong representation ability of neural networks to recover the perturbed series, including robust feature-based approaches (Guo et al., 2016; Yang & Fan, 2022), reconstruction-based methods (Li et al., 2021; 2019; Xu et al., 2018; Schlegl et al., 2019), GNN-based methods (Zhao et al., 2020; Deng & Hooi, 2021), association discrepancy (Xu et al., 2022), LSTM-based methods (Hundman et al., 2018; Tariq et al., 2019). However, these empirical methods lack robustness guarantees, hinting that they would be meaningless once a new adaptive attack is found. For that reason, certified defenses are crucial because their mathematical robustness certificates are permanently unbreakable.

Certified adversarial defenses. In the field of image classification, there has been much work on the certified defenses, including randomized smoothing (Cohen et al., 2019; Salman et al., 2020), convex polytope (Wong & Kolter, 2018), CROWN-IBP (Zhang et al., 2019) and Lipschitz bounding (Cisse et al., 2017). Among them, the ℓ_0 -norm defenses include derandomized smoothing (Levine & Feizi, 2020a), randomized ablation (Levine & Feizi, 2020b; Zhang et al., 2020) and a series of mask-based

defenses (Xiang & Mittal, 2021; McCoyd et al., 2020; Han et al., 2021; Xiang et al., 2021; 2022). *In stark contrast, the certified defenses for time-series data are rarely explored.* To our knowledge, (Yoon et al., 2022) and (Li et al., 2020) are the only two defenses that produce ℓ_2 -norm robustness certificates, but a common downside is that they both additionally require retraining the base model over Gaussian augmented samples, which imposes a large amount of additional training costs.

3 Preliminaries

Time series classification (TSC). The time series classification is modeled as: inputted a t_0 -length series (denoted by $\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0} = [x_1, x_2, \dots, x_{t_0}]$), TSC model returns a class $f(\cdot) : \mathbf{x}_{1:t_0} \to y$.

Time series forecasting (TSF). Given the "past observations" $\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0}$, the forecasting model returns the "future values" $f(\cdot) : \mathbf{x}_{1:t_0} \to \mathbf{x}_{t_0+1,t_0+\tau}$. In this paper we mainly focus on the classic and commonly studied short-term forecasting setting (Ke et al., 2017), which is to forecast a single time point $f(\cdot) : \mathbf{x}_{1:t_0} \to \mathbb{R}$ (not necessarily the next point x_{t_0+1}). The short-term forecasting problem is sufficiently representative as the problem of long-term forecasting $f(\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0}) \to \mathbf{x}_{t_0+1:t_0+\tau}$ can be decomposed into τ short-term forecasting subproblems, in which the *i*-th ($i = 1, \ldots, \tau$) forecaster predicts the ($t_0 + i$)-th time point. We discuss the multivariate tasks later in this paper.

Definition 1 (Temporally-localized perturbation $\delta_{[t_{adv}+1:t_{adv}+L_{adv}]}$). In a temporally-localized perturbation attack, the adversary is allowed to *perturb an arbitrary subseries w.r.t. the given* ℓ_0 -norm constraint. Let L_{adv} be the ℓ_0 -norm constraint on the localized perturbation. We can formulate all the perturbed series w.r.t. the ℓ_0 -norm constraint as follows:

$$\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0} + \boldsymbol{\delta}_{[t_{adv}+1:t_{adv}+L_{adv}]} = \mathbf{x}_{1:t_0} + [0, \dots, 0, \delta_{t_{adv}+1}, \dots, \delta_{t_{adv}+L_{adv}}, 0, \dots, 0] = [x_1, \dots, \underbrace{x_{t_{adv}+1} + \delta_{t_{adv}+1}, \dots, x_{t_{adv}+L_{adv}} + \delta_{t_{adv}+L_{adv}}}_{\text{Perturbed subseries}}, \dots, x_{t_0}]$$

$$(1)$$

where unbold δ_t refers to the single perturbation value added to the t-th time point. $t_{adv} + 1$ and $t_{\rm adv} + L_{\rm adv}$ refer to the starting point and the ending point of the perturbation respectively, which explicitly restricts its ℓ_0 norm as $\|\boldsymbol{\delta}_{[t_{adv}+1:t_{adv}+L_{adv}]}\|_{\ell_0} = (t_{adv}+L_{adv}) - (t_{adv}+1) + 1 = L_{adv}$. Significance of temporally-localized perturbation. Temporally-localized perturbation is especially representative in real-world scenarios. Temporally-localized perturbation can represent shortterm volatility and local anomaly, both of which can be regarded as the normal data added with temporally-localized perturbation. The resistance to short-term volatility is important in long-term forecasting/prediction, in which the long-term value is considered unaffected by the short-term volatility. A typical example is the well-known investment philosophy, "Value Investing" (Piotroski, 2000), where the "intrinsic value" of a business is considered to be robust against short-term volatility. Moreover, the detection of local anomaly is practically useful in real-world scenarios. For instance, detecting a subsequent time interval of abnormal heart rate in electronic health records is a problem of local anomaly detection. We can also adopt the method of detecting temporally-localized perturbation for detecting the abnormal network traffic for IoT Time-Series Data. Furthermore, to highlight the risk of temporally-localized perturbations, we empirically show how much a ℓ_0 -norm perturbation can change the output of an undefended forecaster in Appendix. We also compare the attacking performance of ℓ_0 -norm perturbation to ℓ_0 -norm perturbation, and the empirical results suggest that forecasting models might be more sensitive to ℓ_0 -norm perturbations.

4 PROPOSED FRAMEWORK: MASKING IMPUTING AGGREGATION

4.1 PIPELINE OVERVIEW

MIA includes three steps: 1) masking; 2) imputing; 3) aggregation (checking agreement).

1. Masking. We denote a mask by $M_{[u:v]}$, where $\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0} \odot M_{[u:v]}$ is replacing the values of $\mathbf{x}_{u:v}$ among $\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0}$ with zeros. Let L_{mask} be the size of the mask. Inputted a series $\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0}$ and the ℓ_0 norm of the temporally-localized perturbation L_{adv} , we slide the mask thorough the input series with the step size $\alpha = L_{\text{mask}} - L_{\text{adv}} + 1$, and then obtain the following masked series¹:

$$\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0} \odot \mathbf{M}_{[1+k\alpha:\min(L_{\max}+k\alpha,t_0)]}, \ k = 0, \dots, \left\lceil (t_0 - L_{\max})/\alpha \right\rceil$$

where $\alpha = L_{\max} - L_{\operatorname{adv}} + 1$ (2)

^{1[}c] returns the smallest integer larger than or equal to c

Algorithm 1: Algorithm of Masking Imputing Aggregation.

- **Input:** The pretrained TSF/TSC model $f(\cdot)$, the imputation model $G(\cdot)$, the input series $\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0}$, the mask size L_{mask} , the length of temporally-localized perturbation L_{adv} , the discretization parameter Δ for TSF task.
- 1 Compute the step size of masking $\alpha \leftarrow L_{\text{mask}} L_{\text{adv}} + 1$;
- ² Generate the masked series via sliding the L_{mask} -size mask $\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0} \odot \mathbf{M}_{[1+k\alpha:\min(t_0, L_{\max}+k\alpha)]}, \ k = 0, \dots, \lceil (t_0 - L_{\max})/\alpha \rceil;$
- 3 Utilize the imputation model to impute the masked series

 $\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0}^{(k)} = G(\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0} \odot \mathbf{M}_{[1+k\alpha:\min(t_0, L_{\max}+k\alpha)]});$ 4 Compute the output (denoted by $y^{(k)}$) for each imputed series, as follows:

$$y^{(k)} = \begin{cases} f(\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0}^{(k)}) & \text{for TSC task} \\ f_{\text{dis}}(\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0}^{(k)}) & f_{\text{dis}}(\cdot) \text{for TSF task} \end{cases}$$

$f_{dis}(\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0}^{(k)})$ is computed as Eq. (5); **5** if $y^{(0)} = y^{(1)} = \ldots = y^{(k)}$ then **Output:** $y^{(0)}$. 6 else Output: Abstain.

We set the step size to $L_{\text{mask}} - L_{\text{adv}} + 1$ for guaranteeing all the temporally-localized perturbations of L_{adv} can be covered. $\min(L_{mask} + k\alpha, t_0)$ is to prevent the mask from exceeding t_0 .

2. Imputing. Our second step is to recover the masked values with the imputation model $G(\cdot)$:

 $\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0}^{(k)} = G(\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0} \odot \mathbf{M}_{[1+k\alpha:\min(t_0, L_{\max k}+k\alpha)]}) \quad k = 0, 1, \dots, \lceil (t_0 - L_{\max k})/\alpha \rceil$ (3) This step is to make $\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0}^{(k)}$ approximate the normal time series, so that the pretrained model could perform similarly on these imputed series. We discuss $G(\cdot)$ later this section.

3. Aggregation (Checking Agreement). We input the imputed series $\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0}^{(k)}$ into the pretrained model $f(\cdot)$. If the pretrained model's ouputs on all $\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0}^{(k)}$ reach agreement unanimously, MIA classifier $f_{\text{MIA}}(\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0})$ will output this unanimously approved label/prediction, otherwise output Abstain to alert that the input series might have been attacked by the temporally-localized perturbations.

$$f_{\text{MIA}}(\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0}) = \begin{cases} f(\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0}^{(0)}) & f(\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0}^{(0)}) = f(\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0}^{(1)}) = \dots = f(\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0}^{(|(t_0 - L_{\text{mask}})/\alpha|)}) \\ \text{Abstain} & \text{Otherwise} \end{cases}$$
(4)

Discretization technique for MIA on TSF. We note that TSF models are impossible to forecast exactly the identical value on different series, so that MIA would output Abstain all the time on TSF. To address this, we substitute the original pretrained forecaster $f(\cdot)$ with its discretized version $f_{\rm dis}$

s(·) in Eq. (4), where
$$f_{\text{dis}}(\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0}^{(n)}), k = 0, \dots, |(t_0 - L_{\text{mask}})/\alpha|$$
 compute as follow:

$$f_{\text{dis}}(\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0}^{(k)}) = \Delta \cdot \lfloor f(\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0}^{(k)})/\Delta \rfloor$$
(5)

where Δ is a discretization parameter that controls the trade-off between the discretization error and the success rate of achieving agreement. As Δ decreases, the discretized forecasts retain more information from the original forecasts while the agreement rate decreases. If we take $\Delta = 0.5$, $f_{\text{dis}}(\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0}^{(k)})$ is to round up the value of $f_{\text{dis}}(\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0}^{(k)})$ to the nearest integer.

4.2 Discussion on the mask size L_{mask} .

The only requirement of Masking (Step 1) is to ensure for an arbitrary temporally-localized perturbation of L_{adv} , there always exists a mask to occlude that perturbation. Thus a prerequisite is $L_{\text{mask}} \geq L_{\text{ady}}$. We can control the trade-off between the the imputation quality and the inference cost with L_{mask} . As we increase L_{mask} , the imputation quality will decrease since the number of missing values increases. Meanwhile, the number of masked series decreases subsequently, so the inference cost is reduced. In the extreme case where $L_{mask} = t_0$ where the masked series are all equal $\mathbf{0}_{1:t_0}$, MIA always outputs $f(G(\mathbf{0}_{1:t_0}))$ regardless of the input series. The imputation quality is extremely poor and the inference cost is the smallest. The practical implementation of MIA is showed in Algorithm 1.

Remark 1 (MIA on Probabilistic Models). We notice a line of time-series forecasting models are probabilistic (e.g., DeepAR (Salinas et al., 2020)), which models the forecasted value $f(\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0})$ as a random distribution $q[y | \mathbf{x}_{1:t_0}]$ rather than a single value, as follows:

$$f(\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0}) = \mathbb{E}_{q[x_{t_0+1}|\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0}]} [x_{t_0+1}]$$
(6)

The exact forecasting value of probabilistic models is inaccessible (prior works perform Monte-Carlo inference for approximation). which makes applying MIA to probabilistic models challenging. Although we can utilize Clopper-Pearson method (Clopper & Pearson, 1934) to estimate the discretized forecasts $f_{dis}(\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0})$ with a confidence level, the inference cost would be expensive for confidence interval estimation.²

4.3 ROBUSTNESS CERTIFICATE OF MIA

Proposition 1 (Robustness Certificate of MIA). The forecast/label (not **Abstain**) returned by Algorithm 1 cannot be changed by any temporally-localized perturbation whose ℓ_0 norm is no larger than L_{adv} (see proof in Appendix).

Remark 2 (Robustness Certificate). The robustness certificate is for $f_{\text{MIA}}(\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0})$ rather than $f(\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0})$ because it is almost impossible to derive the certificate for a pretrained model without any requirement. Our aggregation does not allow any tolerance because the certificate would not hold once a disagreement is allowed. Note that, with **Masking (Step 1)**, we can guarantee there exists a masked series that is unaffected, and all other masked series retain the perturbed area. If we allow a disagreer, the ensemble prediction would be totally under the adversary's control, because all except one masked series are perturbed (the only one not affected would become the disagreer). We point out that the certificate also holds for multivariable TSC/TSF. We can easily apply MIA to multivariable tasks through repeating **Masking (Step 1)** and **Imputing (Step 2)** on each variable.

4.4 Training Imputation Model $G(\cdot)$

The performance of MIA highly depends on the imputation model $G(\cdot)$. We notice that there already exists much work on time series imputation (Cao et al., 2018; Du et al., 2022; Moritz & Bartz-Beielstein, 2017; Fortuin et al., 2020; Cao et al., 2018; Luo et al., 2019; Yozgatligil et al., 2013). However, all these imputation models aim to recover the discrete missing values, which is not we want. To train an imputation model to recover consecutive missing values, we propose *randomized masked training algorithm*, which minimizes the MSE loss over the masked noisy series, as follows:

$$\mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{\delta}_{[1:t_0]} \sim \mathcal{N}(0,\sigma^2)} \quad \frac{1}{C+1} \sum_{k=0}^{C} \|G\left((\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0} + \boldsymbol{\delta}_{[1:t_0]}\right) \odot M_{[1+k\alpha:\min(L_{mask}+k\alpha,t_0)]}\right) - \mathbf{x}_{1:t_0}\|_2^2 \tag{7}$$

where $C = \lceil (t_0 - L_{mask})/\alpha \rceil$ and $\delta_{[1:t_0]} \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2)$ is a Gaussian noise series, of which each entry is *i.i.d.* sampled from Gaussian distribution. We specifically add Gaussian noise is to make the imputation model robust to the random noise and avoid overfitting, since prior works (Foster et al., 1992; Passalis et al., 2021; Hwang et al., 1998) show the time series data is generally noisy. We emphasize that we do not add any noise in inference stage.

4.5 Comparison to Randomized Smoothing Defenses

Randomized smoothing (Cohen et al., 2019) is a well-know model-agnostic method in the field of certified defenses, which has been applied to defend various types of attacks and achieves superior certified robustness in their respective fields. Comparing MIA to randomized smoothing can better demonstrate the advance of our method. We extend two image-specific randomized smoothing defenses, Derandomized Smoothing (Levine & Feizi, 2020a) and Randomized Ablation (Levine & Feizi, 2020b) to the time series domain, as the baselines.

Derandomized smoothing for time-series models. In the time-series version of DS, given a time series $\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0}$ and the base classifier $f(\cdot)$, DS (denoted by f_{DS}) classifies as follows³:

$$f_{\rm DS}(\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0}) = \operatorname*{arg\,max}_{y \in \mathcal{Y}} \left[\sum_{\mathbf{x}_{\rm sub} \in \operatorname{Sub}(\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0}, \eta)} \mathbb{I}\{f(\mathbf{x}_{\rm sub}) = y\} \right]$$
(8)

²We notice that a recent work (Yoon et al., 2022) derives robustness certificate for probabilistic forecasters, but our definitions of robustness are different. Yoon et al. (2022) bounds the local Lipschitz constant, while our objective is much stricter, aiming to guarantee the forecast is invariant under the perturbation.

 $^{{}^{3}\}mathbb{I}{}$ is the indicator function.

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Defense	1 %	2 %	3 %	4 %	5 %	6 %	7 %	8 %	9 %	10 %
$MIA \left(L_{\text{mask}} = 10\% \right)$	67.3%	66.3%	67.3%	67.3%	66.3%	64.4%	66.3%	64.4%	64.4%	63.4%
DS ($\eta = 10\%$)	28.1%	28.1%	28.1%	28.1%	28.1%	28.1%	28.1%	28.1%	28.1%	28.1%
RA ($\eta = 10\%$)	5.8%	5.8%	5.8%	5.8%	5.8%	5.8%	5.8%	5.8%	5.8%	5.8%
$MIA \left(L_{mask} = 15\% \right)$	62.4%	65.3%	65.3%	64.4%	64.4%	62.4%	63.4%	65.3%	63.4%	64.4%
DS ($\eta = 15\%$)	30.2%	30.2%	30.2%	30.2%	30.2%	30.2%	30.2%	30.2%	30.2%	30.2%
RA ($\eta = 15\%$)	9.4%	9.4%	9.4%	9.4%	9.4%	9.4%	9.4%	9.4%	9.4%	9.4%

Table 1: (DistalPhalanxTW) Comparison among three defenses on a TSC dataset.

where $\text{Sub}(\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0}, \eta)$ consists of the subsequences $\mathbf{x}_{1:\eta}, \mathbf{x}_{\eta+1:2\eta}, \mathbf{x}_{2\eta+1:3\eta}, \dots, \mathbf{x}_{t_0-\eta+1,t_0}$. We first let the base classifier make predictions on these subsequences, and then $f_{\text{DS}}(\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0})$ outputs the majority label. The prediction is robust if

$$\sum_{\mathbf{x}_{\mathrm{sub}}\in\mathrm{Sub}(\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0},\eta)} \mathbb{I}\{f(\mathbf{x}_{\mathrm{sub}}) = \hat{y}\} - \max_{y\neq\hat{y}} \sum_{\mathbf{x}_{\mathrm{sub}}\in\mathrm{Sub}(\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0},\eta)} \mathbb{I}\{f(\mathbf{x}_{\mathrm{sub}}) = y\} > 2(\eta + L_{\mathrm{adv}} - 1) \quad (9)$$

Randomized ablation for time-series models. RA (denoted by $f_{RA}(\cdot)$) classifies as follows:

$$f_{\mathrm{RA}}(\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0}) = \underset{y \in \mathcal{Y}}{\mathrm{arg\,max}} \left[\Pr_{\mathbf{x}_{\mathrm{sub}} \sim \mathrm{Sample}(\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0}, \eta)} [f(\mathbf{x}_{\mathrm{sub}}) = y] \right]$$
(10)

where $\mathbf{x}_{sub} \sim RA(\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0}, \eta)$ is to randomly sample η time points without replacement to construct the subseries \mathbf{x}_{sub} , and ablate all other points. $f_{RA}(\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0})$ returns the label that $f(\cdot)$ is most likely to classify \mathbf{x}_{sub} as. $\hat{y} = f_{RA}(\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0})$ is robust if

$$\Pr_{\mathbf{x}_{\text{sub}} \sim \text{Sample}(\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0}, \eta)} \left[f(\mathbf{x}_{\text{sub}}) = \hat{y} \right] > \frac{3}{2} - \frac{\binom{t_0 - L_{\text{adv}}}{\eta}}{\binom{t_0}{\eta}}$$
(11)

Comparison to DS and RA. We note that the pretrained models of DS and RA make predictions on subseries $f(\mathbf{x}_{sub})$ instead of normal series. Since the data distribution of the subseries are fundamentally different from the normal data, we can expect that these two defenses would perform poorly on the naturally-trained models. Therefore, we need to train the base classifiers from scratch on the subseries. In stark contrast, MIA is a plug-and-play framework that can be directly applied to TSF/TSC pretrained models. In MIA, the main cost of training stage is preparing the imputation model. We point out that the imputation model of MIA can be trained in an unsupervised manner, saving us from labeling the data. Furthermore, we empirically show that MIA attains a significantly better robustness than DS and RA in Section 5.

5 Experiments

Experimental setup. We evaluate MIA on both TSC and TSF datasets. TSF includes Exchange Rate, Traffic and UCI Electricity (Alexandrov et al., 2019), and TSC datasets include DistalPhalanxTW, MiddlePhalanxTW and ProximalPhalanx (Ismail Fawaz et al., 2019a). We use MLP-Mixer (Tolstikhin et al., 2021), MLP and LSTM (Hochreiter & Schmidhuber, 1997) as the pretrained model. Our experiments are conducted on the clean trainsets, following the common setting of certified adversarial defenses (Yoon et al., 2022; Li et al., 2020; Cohen et al., 2019; Chiang et al., 2020; Zhang et al., 2019). Unless otherwise specified, We use MLP-Mixer as the base model for MIA, DS and RA, and $\Delta = 1.5$. The experiments are conducted on CPU (16 Intel(R) Xeon(R) Gold 5222 CPU @ 3.80GHz) and GPU (one NVIDIA RTX 2080 Ti). More details are omitted to Appendix.

Evaluation metrics. For TSC, we evaluate the defense by *certified accuracy* (CA) under the temporally-localized perturbation, which is defined by the fraction of the test samples that are correctly classified and certifiably robust to the perturbation. For TSC, we evaluate the defense by: *forecasting rate* (FR), *mean square error* (MSE) and *mean absolute error* (MAE)⁴. FR is the fraction of the test samples on which MIA outputs the forecast instead of **Abstain**. MSE/MAE measures the mean square error/mean absolute error between MIA forecasts (**Abstain** are excluded) and groundtruth. We omit the evaluation on multivariate tasks to Appendix due to space limitations.⁵

5.1 Comparison to Peer Methods

Comparison on TSC. Table 1 reports the certified accuracy of three methods in defending temporally-localized perturbations. The pretrained/base model architectures of three defenses are all

⁴We omit the evaluation of MAE to Appendix.

⁵In our experiments, $L_{\text{mask}} = c\%$ or $L_{\text{adv}} = c\%$ or $\eta = c\%$ refer to $c\% \cdot t_0$.

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Metric	Defense	1 %	2 %	3 %	4 %	5 %	6 %	7 %	8 %	9 %	10 %
	MIA ($L_{\rm mask} = 10\%$)	82.2	82.2	83.2	82.2	82.2	81.2	81.2	81.2	80.2	79.2
	DS ($\eta = 10\%$)	24.8	24.8	24.8	24.8	24.8	24.8	24.8	24.8	24.8	24.8
FR (%)	RA ($\eta = 10\%$)	16.8	16.8	16.8	16.8	16.8	16.8	16.8	16.8	16.8	16.8
11(()0)	$MIA \left(L_{\text{mask}} = 15\% \right)$	64.4	71.3	69.3	69.3	71.3	68.3	69.3	71.3	62.4	65.3
	DS ($\eta = 15\%$)	20.8	20.8	20.8	14.9	14.9	11.9	11.9	11.9	11.9	10.9
	RA ($\eta = 15\%$)	23.8	23.8	23.8	23.8	23.8	23.8	23.8	23.8	23.8	23.8
	MIA ($L_{\rm mask} = 10\%$)	0.143	0.141	0.145	0.141	0.141	0.139	0.137	0.137	0.135	0.134
	DS ($\eta = 10\%$)	0.192	0.192	0.192	0.192	0.192	0.192	0.192	0.192	0.192	0.192
MSE	RA ($\eta = 10\%$)	0.202	0.202	0.202	0.202	0.202	0.202	0.202	0.202	0.202	0.202
	$MIA \left(L_{\text{mask}} = 15\% \right)$	0.126	0.134	0.130	0.132	0.137	0.132	0.129	0.130	0.123	0.125
	DS ($\eta = 15\%$)	0.144	0.144	0.144	0.065	0.065	0.069	0.069	0.069	0.069	0.060
	RA ($\eta = 15\%$)	0.248	0.248	0.248	0.248	0.248	0.248	0.248	0.248	0.248	0.248

Table 2: (Exchange) Comparison among three certified defenses on TSF dataset.

Table 3: Comparison of the inference time (millisecond) of three defenses on TSC datasets.

Model Defense		FCN		Ν	ILP-Mix	er		MLP		F	ResNet-1	8
	2%	5%	10%	2%	5%	10%	2%	5%	10%	2%	5%	10%
$eq:mass_mass_mass_mass_mass_mass_mass_mass$	2.0	2.0	3.0	2.7	2.7	4.6	1.7	1.7	2.7	3.8	3.8	5.3
	0.6	0.6	0.6	2.0	2.0	2.0	0.3	0.3	0.3	2.6	2.6	2.6
	25.2	25.2	25.2	259.7	259.7	259.7	0.8	0.8	0.8	130.3	130.3	130.3
$eq:mass_mass_mass_mass_mass_mass_mass_mass$	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.7	2.7	2.7	1.7	1.7	1.7	3.8	3.8	3.8
	0.6	0.6	0.6	1.9	1.9	1.9	0.3	0.3	0.3	2.6	2.6	2.6
	25.3	25.3	25.3	260.6	260.6	260.6	0.8	0.8	0.8	130.4	130.4	130.4

Table 4: (Traffic) The performance of MIA on different pretrained models. $(c_1 c_2\%)$ reports (MSE, FR%) of MIA. **Baseline** is MSE of the pretrained model without MIA. The lowest MSE and the highest FR for each pretrained model is shown in bold-face.

Model	Baseline	Lmask	267	$\Delta = 1.0$	100	261	$\Delta = 1.2$	100	26	$\Delta = 1.5$	100
			2%	5%	10%	2%	5%	10%	2%	5%	10%
MLP-Mixer	0.224	2% 5% 10%	0.065 72.3% 0.067 75.2% 0.068 77.2%	0.068 73.3% 0.069 76.2%	0.066 69.3%	0.072 77.2% 0.079 80.2% 0.079 80.2%	0.075 78.2% 0.079 80.2%	0.075 76.2%	0.144 89.1% 0.141 90.1% 0.143 91.1%	0.143 89.1% 0.141 90.1%	0.139 88.1%
GRU	0.243	2% 5% 10%	0.067 66.3% 0.072 72.3% 0.070 74.3%	0.070 68.3% 0.071 72.3 %	0.069 63.4%	0.070 73.3% 0.075 76.2% 0.074 77.2%	0.073 74.3% 0.074 77.2%	0.066 70.3%	0.143 89.1% 0.145 91.1 % 0.145 91.1 %	0.141 88.1% 0.143 90.1%	0.137 86.1%
LSTM	0.229	2% 5% 10%	0.068 66.3% 0.069 66.3% 0.070 65.3%	0.070 65.3% 0.071 66.3 %	0.066 61.4%	0.071 76.2% 0.073 77.2% 0.073 77.2%	0.071 76.2% 0.073 77.2%	0.064 72.3%	0.152 91.1% 0.149 89.1% 0.150 89.1%	0.147 88.1% 0.153 90.1%	0.149 87.1%
MLP	0.222	2% 5% 10%	0.064 67.3% 0.067 71.3% 0.067 70.3%	0.064 68.3% 0.067 70.3 %	0.063 66.3%	0.064 72.3% 0.064 72.3% 0.064 72.3%	0.064 72.3% 0.064 72.3%	0.063 70.3%	0.148 90.1% 0.148 92.1% 0.146 91.1%	0.148 90.1% 0.146 91.1%	0.144 89.1%
ResNet18	0.248	2% 5% 10%	0.074 64.4% 0.077 68.3% 0.077 67.3%	0.077 65.3% 0.078 67.3%	0.076 60.4%	0.087 75.2% 0.088 79.2% 0.086 76.2%	0.089 76.2% 0.086 76.2%	0.083 73.3%	0.149 88.1% 0.150 89.1% 0.150 88.1%	0.146 87.1% 0.149 86.1%	0.145 83.2%

MLP-Mixer. An interesting observation is that the certified accuracy of DS and RA keeps constant to different L_{adv} . The reason is that, the probability score of DS/RA models often concentrates on a single class, causing most classifications (including both (correct and wrong classifications) of DS and RA are of high robustness. The results show that the certified accuracy of MIA is more than twice of DR and RA across different L_{adv} . The reason is that the pretrained model of MIA classifies the masked series, while the base model in RS/DS classifies the subseries. MIA can attain a higher certified accuracy because the masked series contains much more information ($t_0 - L_{mask}$ unmasked time points) than the subseries (η sampled time points).

Comparison on TSF. Table 2 reports FR and MSE of three defenses on Exchange, where the model predicts the next 30 values. Here we utilize discretization technique to make the TSF task feasible to DS and RA. The table shows that MIA offers a significantly higher FR than DS and RA, implying that MIA return the forecasting results much more frequently than other two defenses. The reason for the superior FR is same as TSC. We also observe that DS ($\eta = 15\%$) achieves a lower MSE than MIA at $L_{adv} \ge 4\%$, which partially owing to its low FR. Since a low FR implies that the aggregation step of MIA filters a large portion of distrustful forecasts, reducing the difficulty of achieving lower MSE for the remained forecasts. Based on the results, MIA is better than other two defenses when we jointly consider FR and MSE.

	D L'	7		$\Delta = 1.0$			$\Delta = 1.2$			$\Delta = 1.5$	
Model	вазение	L_{mask}	2%	5%	10%	2%	5%	10%	2%	5%	10%
MLP-Mixer	0.388	2% 5% 10%	0.093 66.3% 0.095 69.3% 0.095 67.3%	0.093 68.3% 0.095 67.3%	0.089 55.4%	0.094 64.4% 0.096 67.3% 0.091 64.4%	0.094 66.3% 0.091 64.4%	0.089 59.4%	0.136 77.2% 0.134 78.2% 0.134 77.2%	0.134 78.2% 0.134 77.2%	0.116 66.3%
GRU	0.420	2% 5% 10%	0.099 62.4% 0.100 64.4% 0.102 65.3%	0.101 63.4% 0.099 62.4%	0.103 49.5%	0.086 60.4% 0.087 62.4% 0.085 61.4%	0.087 62.4% 0.087 61.4%	0.086 53.5%	0.135 68.3% 0.139 69.3% 0.139 69.3%	0.139 69.3% 0.139 69.3%	0.120 64.4%
LSTM	0.438	2% 5% 10%	0.100 64.4% 0.100 66.3% 0.100 66.3%	0.101 65.3% 0.100 64.4%	0.110 51.5%	0.082 52.5% 0.092 55.4% 0.091 56.4%	0.092 55.4% 0.092 55.4%	0.094 48.5%	0.142 70.3% 0.140 71.3% 0.140 71.3%	0.142 70.3% 0.142 70.3%	0.119 59.4%
MLP	0.402	2% 5% 10%	0.106 73.3% 0.108 77.2% 0.105 75.2%	0.105 75.2% 0.105 75.2%	0.098 60.4%	0.082 61.4% 0.087 65.3% 0.087 61.4%	0.085 63.4% 0.087 61.4%	0.084 55.4%	0.136 74.3% 0.131 77.2% 0.131 77.2%	0.132 76.2% 0.126 76.2%	0.108 66.3%
ResNet18	0.554	2% 5% 10%	0.093 51.5% 0.089 51.5% 0.094 52.5%	0.089 50.5% 0.093 51.5%	0.092 43.6%	0.080 59.4% 0.080 60.4% 0.079 56.4%	0.080 60.4% 0.081 58.4%	0.076 54.5%	0.136 66.3% 0.140 68.3% 0.141 67.3%	0.140 68.3% 0.136 66.3%	0.121 61.4%

Table 5: (Electricity) $(c_1 c_2 \%)$ report (MSE FR%) of MIA on different pretrained models.

Table 6: Comparison of different training algorithms on 3 TSC datasets.

Madal	Tuiture	T	Dis	stalPhalanx	TW	Mic	idlePhalan	άTW	Prox	imalPhalan	xTW
Model	Training	L_{mask}	5%	10%	15%	5%	10%	15%	5%	10%	15%
MI P-Mixer	Random	5% 10% 15%	62.4% 61.4% 59.4%	58.4% 59.4%	58.4%	52.5% 53.5% 59.4%	50.5% 54.5%	49.5%	65.3% 73.3% 68.3%	71.3% 67.3%	61.4%
WEI WIXE	Masked	5% 10% 15%	65.3% 66.3% 64.4%	63.4% 64.4%	60.4%	64.4% 67.3% 66.3%	60.4% 62.4%	59.4%	72.3% 76.2% 76.2%	74.3% 75.2%	74.3%
FCN	Random	5% 10% 15%	63.4% 66.3% 66.3%	63.4% 65.3%	65.3%	53.5% 52.5% 57.4%	52.5% 57.4%	56.4%	68.3% 70.3% 66.3%	67.3% 66.3%	65.3%
Masked	Masked	5% 10% 15%	70.3% 70.3% 70.3%	69.3% 67.3%	66.3%	64.4% 66.3% 65.3%	65.3% 63.4%	63.4%	75.2% 73.3% 75.2%	71.3% 73.3%	73.3%
MLP	Random	5% 10% 15%	62.4% 62.4% 63.4%	60.4% 61.4%	61.4%	65.3% 59.4% 61.4%	54.5% 55.4%	55.4%	72.3% 76.2% 71.3%	73.3% 71.3%	68.3%
WILL	Masked	5% 10% 15%	64.4% 65.3% 66.3%	64.4% 63.4%	63.4%	69.3% 70.3% 69.3%	67.3% 66.3%	66.3%	79.2% 79.2% 78.2%	78.2% 78.2%	77.2%
ResNet-18	Random	5% 10% 15%	61.4% 59.4% 58.4%	57.4% 56.4%	55.4%	57.4% 57.4% 58.4%	56.4% 58.4%	58.4%	65.3% 74.3% 74.3%	67.3% 73.3%	66.3%
Resinel-18	Masked	5% 10% 15%	65.3% 66.3% 64.4%	64.4% 61.4%	59.4%	67.3% 63.4% 65.3%	63.4% 62.4%	62.4%	78.2% 78.2% 78.2%	76.2% 78.2%	78.2%

Comparison on inference time. Table 3 compares the inference time of three defenses, which is averaged among three TSC datasets. We observe that the inference time of MIA is larger than DS, but significantly smaller than RA. Specifically, MIA's larger inference time than DS is owing to the cost in running the imputation model. RA's large inference time is for the confidence interval estimation⁶. We also observe that the inference time of MIA increases with L_{adv} , and decreases with L_{mask} , because the number of masked series is $\lceil (t_0 - L_{mask})/(L_{mask} - L_{adv} + 1) \rceil + 1$. We omit the inference time analysis on TSF datasets to Appendix.

5.2 Analysis of MIA on Different Pretrained Models

Table 4 and Table 5 report the performance of MIA on different pretrained models, where the model forecasts the next 24 points. We observe that MIA ($\Delta = 1.0, 1.5$) consistently lowers MSE as compared to that of the original pretrained models, suggesting MIA could also be an effective plugin for performance improvement. Specifically, MIA improves the forecasting performance in the way of filtering these distrustful forecasts, sacrificing the availability (the decrease of FR) for lower MSE as well as certified robustness, which is a common trade-off in the field of certified defenses (Cohen et al., 2019; Levine & Feizi, 2020a;b; Liu et al., 2021; Han et al., 2021). We can control the trade-off between MSE and FR by Δ , as the decrease of Δ can reduce MSE and FR.

5.3 Analysis on Imputation Model of MIA and Ablation Study

Impact of training algorithm. Table 6 compares our masked training to random training, which trains the imputation model on the randomly masked series. Through extensive comparisons on different imputation model architectures and datasets, we convince that masked training consistently

⁶Following the official implementation of RA (Levine & Feizi, 2020b), we take 100,000 samples for the confidence interval estimation.



Figure 2: Top: impact of L_{mask} on TSC dataset ProximalPhalanxTW. Bottom: impact of Δ on TSF dataset Traffic ($L_{\text{adv}} = 3\%$).

Table 7: Comparison of four imputation models. The best results are shown in bold-face.

Madal	т	1	Electricity			Exchange			Traffic	
Wodel	L_{mask}	2%	5%	10%	2%	5%	10%	2%	5%	10%
	2%	0.136 77.2%			0.158 87.1%			0.144 89.1%		
MLP-Mixer	5%	0.134 78.2%	0.134 78.2%		0.144 83.2%	0.138 81.2%		0.141 90.1%	0.143 89.1%	
	10%	0.134 77 .2%	0.134 77.2%	0.116 66.3 %	0.141 82.2%	0.141 82.2%	0.134 79.2%	0.143 91.1%	0.141 90.1%	0.139 88.1%
	2%	0.118 65.3%			0.118 40.6%			0.142 87.1%		
BRITS	5%	0.110 71.3%	0.099~59.4%		0.118 49.5%	$0.098\ 15.8\%$		0.136 84.2%	0.130 75.2%	
	10%	$0.099\;61.4\%$	0.100~60.4%	0.094 45.5%	$0.207 \ 10.9\%$	$0.277 \ 1.0\%$	$0.000 \ 0.0\%$	0.128 79.2%	0.129 77.2%	0.123 73.3%
	2%	0.101 58.4%			0.095 25.7%			0.120 67.3%		
SAITS	5%	0.091 53.5%	0.090 52.5%		0.137 43.6%	0.101 27.7%		0.128 73.3%	0.121 68.3%	
	10%	$0.104\ 56.4\%$	0.103 54.5%	0.094 44.6%	0.070 7.9%	0.048~6.9%	0.001 4.0%	0.125 67.3%	0.132 69.3%	0.124 59.4%
	2%	0.085 52.5%			0.145 23.8%			0.130 68.3%		
Transformer	5%	0.110 52.5%	0.113 42.6%		0.072 6.9%	0.001 2.0%		0.127 74.3%	0.123 65.3%	
	10%	$\textbf{0.096} \ 60.4\%$	0.093~58.4%	$0.093 \; 34.7\%$	0.029 8.9%	0.036 7.9%	$0.001 \ 5.0\%$	0.124~75.2%	0.127 74.3%	0.123~61.4%

outperforms random training for MIA by a non-trivial gap. The gap becomes even larger at larger L_{adv} . The results suggest that masked training is suitable for MIA imputation model.

Impact of architecture of imputation models. Table 7 reports the performances of different imputation model architectures on MIA. Our results show that MLP-Mixer can offer higher FR and lower MSE simultaneously, suggesting MLP-Mixer is intrinsically more robust than other models.

Impact of L_{mask} . Fig. 2a, 2b show: 1) MSE roughly keeps constant w.r.t. L_{mask} , because the discretization technique can diminish the difference between the forecasts that are close to each other. 2) FR decreases with the increase of L_{mask} , because our imputation quality decreases with L_{mask} , making it harder to reach agreement unanimously. Fig. 2c show that the impact of L_{mask} on CA is not significant. Although the increase of L_{mask} reduces our imputation quality, it reduces the number of masked series simultaneously.

Impact of Δ **.** Fig. 2d, 2e report the impact of Δ . As Δ increases, we observe that MSE and FR increase, validating our statement about Δ in Section 4.1.

6 CONCLUSION

In this paper, we propose the first framework for time-series models to certifiably defend against ℓ_0 -norm perturbations. Notably, MIA is a plug-and-play defense, which can be easily applied to any TSF/TSC pretrained model. The only requirement of deploying MIA is to train an imputation model, which has been extensively explored in this work. Moreover, our extensive experiments validate the effectiveness of MIA. We expect our work can inspire more studies on the ℓ_0 -norm robustness for time-series models. Interesting future works include applying MIA to probabilistic models.

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A **Proof for Proposition 1**

Proposition 2 (Robustness Certificate of MIA). The forecast/label (not **Abstain**) returned by Algorithm 1 cannot be changed by any temporally-localized perturbation whose ℓ_0 norm is no larger than L_{adv} (see proof in Appendix).

Proof. Here we prove the robustness certificate for MIA (TSC). The proof for MIA (TSF) is analogous to this proof. Assume that the adversary has changed the classification result of MIA from y_1 to y_2 via the temporally-localized perturbation δ (ℓ_0 norm is L_{adv}). For notational simplicity we denote $M_{[1+k\alpha:min(L_{mask}+k\alpha,t_0)]}$ by $M^{(k)}$, $k = 0, \ldots, \lceil (t_0 - L_{mask})/\alpha \rceil$ and denote $\delta_{[t_{adv}+1:t_{adv}+L_{adv}]}$ by $\delta^{(t_{adv})}$, $t_{adv} = 0, \ldots, t_0 - L_{adv}$. Then, we have:

$$f(\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0} \odot \mathbf{M}^{(0)}) = f(\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0} \odot \mathbf{M}^{(1)}) = \dots = y_1$$
(12)

$$f((\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0} + \boldsymbol{\delta}^{(t_{\text{adv}})}) \odot \mathbf{M}^{(0)}) = f((\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0} + \boldsymbol{\delta}^{(t_{\text{adv}})}) \odot \mathbf{M}^{(1)}) = \dots = y_2$$
(13)

Then our next step is to prove that *there exists a mask* $M^{(\hat{m})}, \hat{m} \in \{0, \dots, \lceil t_0 - L_{\text{mask}})/\alpha \rceil\}$ *that can occlude the perturbation.* Specifically, we show that the mask $M^{(\lfloor \frac{t_{\text{adv}}}{\alpha} \rfloor)}$ can cover the perturbation. First, we show the presence of the mask $M^{(\lfloor \frac{t_{\text{adv}}}{\alpha} \rfloor)}$ by proving $\lfloor \frac{t_{\text{adv}}}{\alpha} \rfloor \leq \lceil (t_0 - L_{\text{mask}})/\alpha \rceil$, as follow:

$$\frac{t_{\rm adv}}{\alpha} - \frac{t_0 - L_{\rm mask}}{\alpha} \le \frac{t_0 - L_{\rm adv} - t_0 + L_{\rm mask}}{L_{\rm mask} - L_{\rm adv} + 1} = \frac{L_{\rm mask} - L_{\rm adv}}{L_{\rm mask} - L_{\rm adv} + 1} < 1$$
(14)

Second, we show that $M^{(\lfloor \frac{t_{adv}}{\alpha} \rfloor)}$ covers the perturbation by comparing the starting/end point of the mask $M^{(\frac{t_{adv}}{\alpha})}$ and the perturbation δ . For the starting point, we have:

$$\underbrace{(\alpha \lfloor \frac{t_{\text{adv}}}{\alpha} \rfloor + 1)}_{\text{Mask}} - \underbrace{(t_{\text{adv}} + 1)}_{\text{Perturbation}} \le 0$$
(15)

In terms of the end points, we have:

$$\underbrace{\left(\alpha \lfloor \frac{t_{adv}}{\alpha} \rfloor + 1 + L_{mask}\right)}_{Mask} - \underbrace{\left(t_{adv} + L_{adv}\right)}_{Perturbation}$$
(16)

$$= \alpha \lfloor \frac{t_{\text{adv}}}{\alpha} \rfloor + (L_{\text{mask}} - L_{\text{adv}} + 1) - t_{\text{adv}}$$
(17)

$$=\alpha(\lfloor \frac{t_{\text{adv}}}{\alpha} \rfloor + 1) - t_{\text{adv}} \ge 0$$
(18)

As $M^{(\hat{m})}$ occludes the perturbation, thus $(\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0}) \odot M^{(\hat{m})} = (\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0} + \boldsymbol{\delta}^{(t_{adv})}) \odot M^{(\hat{m})} \Rightarrow y_1 = y_2$. Our proof is completed.

B EMPIRICAL EVALUATION ON RISK OF TEMPORALLY-LOCALIZED PERTURBATIONS

To support our statement about the risk of temporally-localized perturbations, we specifically propose an algorithm for generating the temporally-localized perturbations. We then evaluate the attack performance visually.

B.1 RESTATE DEFINITION OF TEMPORALLY-LOCALIZED PERTURBATION

Definition 2 (Temporally-localized perturbation). Temporally-localized perturbation is to *perturb* consecutive time points of $\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0}$ w.r.t. ℓ_0 -norm constraint. The perturbed series is:

$$\mathbf{x}_{1:t_{0}} + \boldsymbol{\delta}_{[t_{adv}+1:t_{adv}+L_{adv}]} \quad \text{subject to} \quad \|\boldsymbol{\delta}_{[t_{adv}+1:t_{adv}+L_{adv}]}\|_{0} \leq L_{adv}$$

$$= \mathbf{x}_{1:t_{0}} + [0, \dots, \delta_{t_{adv}+1}, \dots, \delta_{t_{adv}+L_{adv}}, 0, \dots, 0]$$

$$= [x_{1}, \dots, \underbrace{x_{t_{adv}+1} + \delta_{t_{adv}+1}, \dots, x_{t_{adv}+L_{adv}} + \delta_{t_{adv}+L_{adv}}}_{\text{Perturbed subsequence}}, \dots, x_{t_{0}}] \quad (19)$$

where $t_{adv} + 1$ and L_{adv} are the starting point and the ℓ_0 -norm of the temporally-localized perturbation $\delta_{[t_{adv}+1:t_{adv}+L_{adv}]}$.

Model	$L_{\rm adv}$	1.0	1.5	2.0	2.5	3.0	3.5
MLP	$2\% \\ 5\% \\ 10\%$	1.614 1.437 1.318	1.675 1.375 1.204	1.731 1.295 1.137	1.547 1.288 1.418	1.482 1.472 1.686	1.469 1.590 1.865
MLP-Mixer	$2\% \\ 5\% \\ 10\%$	0.156 0.154 0.071	0.156 0.502 0.321	0.188 0.322 0.282	0.283 0.148 0.201	0.400 0.148 0.220	0.425 0.148 0.150
LSTM	$2\% \\ 5\% \\ 10\%$	0.059 0.323 0.166	0.132 0.503 0.290	0.152 0.646 0.652	0.422 0.630 0.803	0.212 0.852 1.301	0.176 0.929 1.753

Table 8: (Traffic) Evaluate MSE between the clean forecasts and the perturbed forecasts. The temporally-localized perturbations is generated subject to different ℓ_0 -norm constraints ($L_{adv} = 2\%, 5\%, 10\%$) and ℓ_2 -norm constraints (1.0, 1.5, 2.0, 2.5, 3.0, 3.5).

B.2 Algorithm of Generating Temporally-Localized Perturbations.

The objective of our algorithm is to maximize MSE between the original forecasts and the perturbed forecasts, with respect to the ℓ_0 -norm constraint. Specifically, given the forecasting model $f(\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0}) \rightarrow \mathbf{x}_{t_0+1,t_0+\tau}$, our objective can be formulated as follows:

$$\underset{\boldsymbol{\delta}}{\arg\max} |f(\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0} + \boldsymbol{\delta}) - f(\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0})|_2^2$$
(20)

where δ corresponds to the perturbation defined in Eq.(19). Actually, the problem of computing the temporally-localized perturbation can be decomposed into two sub-problems: **P1**) Search for the period $[t_{adv}+1, t_{adv}+L_{adv}]$ to perturb. **P2**) Fix the period $[t_{adv}+1, t_{adv}+L_{adv}]$, compute the value of the perturbation $\delta_{t_{adv}+1}, \ldots, \delta_{t_{adv}+L_{adv}}$. Here solving **P2** is not hard. If we have determined $\delta_{t_{adv}+1}, \ldots, \delta_{t_{adv}+L_{adv}}$, we can maximize the following loss to compute the perturbation values via projected gradient descent (PGD).

$$\max_{\delta_{t_{\mathrm{adv}}+1},\ldots,\delta_{t_{\mathrm{adv}}+L_{\mathrm{adv}}}} |f(\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0} + \boldsymbol{\delta}) - f(\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0})|_2^2$$
(21)

Then the main challenge is to determined which period to perturb. Here we solve **P1** by enumerating all the possible perturbing positions $[t_{adv} + 1 : t_{adv} + L_{adv}]$, $t_{adv} = 0, \ldots, t_0 - L_{adv}$ and compute the corresponding attacks. Finally, we return the one with the largest MSE loss among $t_0 - L_{adv} + 1$ perturbations. However, in practice we found that computing the values of perturbation (**P2**) w.r.t. to the fixed period is hard to converge, as the ℓ_2 norm of the temporally-localized perturbation will approach ∞ . We believe that a perturbation attack with $\infty \ell_2$ norm is meaningless in practice. In the sake of practicality, we additionally consider ℓ_2 norm for the temporally-localized perturbations besides ℓ_0 -norm constraint for the sub-problem **P2**, as follows:

$$\max_{\delta_{t_{\text{adv}}+1},\dots,\delta_{t_{\text{adv}}+L_{\text{adv}}}} |f(\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0} + \boldsymbol{\delta}) - f(\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0})|_2^2 \text{subject to} \|\boldsymbol{\delta}\|_2^2 \le \epsilon$$
(22)

where ϵ is the preset upper bound of the perturbation ℓ_2 norm.

B.3 Empirical Evaluation of Temporally-localized Perturbations.

B.4 QUANTIFY THE RISK OF TEMPORALLY-LOCALIZED PERTURBATIONS.

Table 8 quantifies the risk of temporally-localized perturbations via computing MSE between the clean forecasts and the perturbed forecasts w.r.t. the ℓ_0 -norm (L_{adv}) and the ℓ_2 -norm (ϵ) constraints. We observe that MLP-Mixer model provides the highest empirical robustness among three models, which partially explains why MLP-Mixer outperforms other models on MIA. In particular, we further compare MLP to MLP+MIA ($\delta = 1.5$) in Table 4 of the main paper. Specifically, MSE of MLP under temporally-localized perturbations ($\epsilon = 3.0$) is 5% : 1.472, 10% : 0.1.686 while MLP+MIA is 5% : 0.146, 10% : 0.144. MIA reduces the MSE to roughly one tenth of the original, which indicates that MIA can effectively prevent our forecasting results from being influenced by the temporally-localized perturbations.

Dataset	Context length	Forecasting length	Number of classes
Electricity	96	24	N/A
Exchange	120	30	N/A
Traffic	96	24	N/A
DistalPhalanxTW	80	N/A	6
MiddlePhalanxTW	80	N/A	6
ProximalPhalanxTW	80	N/A	6

Table 9: Dataset information for TSF and TSC.

B.5 Compare Attacking Performance of ℓ_0 Attack to ℓ_2 Attack

We compare the ℓ_0 attack and ℓ_2 attack under under norm constraints β (attack rate) on time series forecasting task. Results are shown in Table 30, 31 and 32. The values in tables are calculated as $\frac{\text{MSE}_{\ell_0} - \text{MSE}_{\ell_2}}{\text{MSE}_{\ell_2}} \times 100\%.$

B.6 VISUALIZE THE RISK OF TEMPORALLY-LOCALIZED PERTURBATIONS.

Fig. 3 illustratively shows the effect of temporally-localized perturbations on our forecasting results. We observe that temporally-localized perturbations of $L_{\rm atk} = 10\%$ can significantly change our forecasts.

C EXPERIMENTAL SETUPS

C.1 DATASET INFORMATION

Table 9 shows the details of each dataset, including context length, forecasting length (for TSF datasets) and number of classes.

Traffic Hourly occupancy rate, between 0 and 1, of 963 San Francisco car lanes (Salinas et al., 2019).

Electricity Hourly time series of the electricity consumption of 370 customers (Salinas et al., 2019).

Exchange Daily exchange rate between 8 currencies (Salinas et al., 2019).

DistalPhalanxTW, MiddlePhalanxTW, ProximalPhalanxTw⁷ This series of 11 classification problems were created as part of Luke Davis's PhD titled "Predictive Modelling of Bone Ageing". They are designed to test the efficacy of hand and bone outline detection and whether these outlines could be helpful in bone age prediction. Note that these problems are aligned by subject, and hence can be treated as a multi-dimensional TSC problem. The final three bone classification problems, DistalPhalanxTW, MiddlePhalanxTW and ProximalPhalanxTW, involve predicting the Tanner-Whitehouse score (as labelled by a human expert) from the outline.

Data Pre-Processing We pre-process the input series with *scipy.signal.savgol_filter* with window length 15 and polyorder 5 on both training and testing datasets. Besides, we normalize each input series with its mean value and standard deviation. Mean value and standard deviation will be 0 and 1 respectively for each normalized input series. We use the instance normalization method on both trainsets and testsets.

⁷https://timeseriesclassification.com/description.php



Figure 3: The effect of temporally-localized perturbations ($L_{atk} = 10\%$ and $\epsilon = 3.0$) on different datasets. Clean and Perturbed refer to the normal input series and the temporally-localized perturbations respectively. Row 1, 2, 3: Traffic. Row 4, 5: Electricity. Row 6, 7: Exchange rate. The red background denotes the position of the location of the perturbation. The blue background denotes the output series.

Input dim	Output dim	Activation
Length of sequence	96	LeakyReLU($\alpha = 0.2$)
96	96	LeakyReLU($\alpha = 0.2$)
96	96	LeakyReLU($\alpha = 0.2$)
96	96	LeakyReLU($\alpha = 0.2$)
96	Length of sequence	LeakyReLU($\alpha = 0.2$)

Table 10: MLP structure

Table 11: LSTM/GRU structure

_

Number of layers	Hidden dim
4	32

Table 12: The structure of MLP-Mixer Block, and we stack 4 MLP-Mixer blocks to construct MLP-Mixer for forecasting and imputation.

Туре	Input dim	Output dim	Activation
LayerNorm	96	96	/
Linear	128	128	GELU Hendrycks & Gimpel (2016)
Linear	128	128	GELU
LayerNorm	96	96	/
Linear	Length of sequence	Length of sequence	GELU
Linear	Length of sequence	Length of sequence	GELU

Table 13: The structure of Fully Convolutional Network (FCN) for TSC.

Layer	Input channel	Output channel	Kernel size
Conv1d	1	96	3
BatchNorm1d	96	96	N/A
ReLU	96	96	N/A
Conv1d	96	96	3
BatchNorm1d	96	96	N/A
ReLU	96	96	N/A
Conv1d	96	96	3
BatchNorm1d	96	96	N/A
ReLU	96	96	N/A
Conv1d	96	96	3
BatchNorm1d	96	96	N/A
ReLU	96	96	N/A
GlobalPooling	96	96	N/A
Linear	96	6	N/A

D INTRODUCTION TO PRETRAINED MODELS

Model architecture. We use the classical forecasting and classification models, MLP, MLP-Mixer (Tolstikhin et al., 2021), GRU (Cho et al., 2014), LSTM (Hochreiter & Schmidhuber, 1997), FCN (Ismail Fawaz et al., 2019b) and ResNet-18 (He et al., 2016) as the pretrained models. We show the architecture of these models in Table 10, 11, 12, 13.

Training. we uniformly adapt Adam optimizer (Kingma & Ba, 2014) with $lr = 0.0001, \beta = (0.9, 0.999), \epsilon = 10^{-8}$, weight_decay = 0, epochs = 20 for all the pretrained models.

E MORE EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

Comparison to peer methods on Mean Absolute Error (MAE). Table 15 compares MAE and FR of three defenses on Traffic. Analogous to the comparison (Table 2 in main paper) on MSE, MIA achieves both the lowest MAE and highest FR on $L_{adv} = 1\%, 2\%, 3\%$. DS outperforms MIA at $L_{adv} = 4\%, \ldots, 10\%$ for the great sacrifice on its FR.

Table 14: Comparison of imputation quality (MSE between the imputed series and the original series) of different imputation models on imputing the masked series of different mask length $L_{\text{mask}} = 5\%, 10\%, 15\%, 20\%$. Fixing L_{mask} , we first construct $t_0 - L_{\text{mask}} + 1$ masked series of L_{mask} and compute the average imputation MSE over imputing these $t_0 - L_{\text{mask}} + 1$ masked series. Bold indicates the best among four generators.

Generator		Tra	ffic			Elect	ricity			Exch	ange	
oundration	5%	10%	15%	20%	5%	10%	15%	20%	5%	10%	15%	20%
MLP-Mixer	0.0007	0.0082	0.0170	0.0240	0.0033	0.0320	0.0458	0.0631	0.0002	0.0028	0.0104	0.0212
SAITS	0.0652	0.1110	0.1786	0.2476	0.0878	0.1654	0.2687	0.3586	0.0191	0.0410	0.0631	0.0824
Transformer	0.0642	0.1183	0.1854	0.2629	0.0821	0.1836	0.2404	0.3271	0.0210	0.0389	0.0595	0.0787
BRITS	0.0159	0.0419	0.0656	0.0927	0.0410	0.1192	0.1613	0.2109	0.0099	0.0252	0.0516	0.0705

Table 15: (Exchange) Comparison among three certified defenses on TSF dataset.

Metric	Defense	1 %	2 %	3 %	4 %	5 %	6 %	7 %	8 %	9 %	10 %
	$MIA \left(L_{\text{mask}} = 10\% \right)$	82.2	82.2	83.2	82.2	82.2	81.2	81.2	81.2	80.2	79.2
	DS ($\eta = 10\%$)	24.8	24.8	24.8	24.8	24.8	24.8	24.8	24.8	24.8	24.8
FR (%)	RA ($\eta = 10\%$)	16.8	16.8	16.8	16.8	16.8	16.8	16.8	16.8	16.8	16.8
IR(70)	$MIA (L_{mask} = 15\%)$	64.4	71.3	69.3	69.3	71.3	68.3	69.3	71.3	62.4	65.3
	DS ($\eta = 15\%$)	20.8	20.8	20.8	14.9	14.9	11.9	11.9	11.9	11.9	10.9
	RA ($\eta = 15\%$)	23.8	23.8	23.8	23.8	23.8	23.8	23.8	23.8	23.8	23.8
	$MIA (L_{mask} = 10\%)$	0.332	0.330	0.334	0.330	0.330	0.327	0.326	0.326	0.323	0.320
	DS ($\eta = 10\%$)	0.408	0.408	0.408	0.408	0.408	0.408	0.408	0.408	0.408	0.408
MAE	RA ($\eta = 10\%$)	0.413	0.413	0.413	0.413	0.413	0.413	0.413	0.413	0.413	0.413
MAE	$MIA (L_{mask} = 15\%)$	0.307	0.320	0.313	0.316	0.322	0.317	0.311	0.314	0.301	0.306
	DS ($\eta = 15\%$)	0.320	0.320	0.320	0.215	0.215	0.222	0.222	0.222	0.222	0.204
	RA ($\eta = 15\%$)	0.446	0.446	0.446	0.446	0.446	0.446	0.446	0.446	0.446	0.446

Table 16: (Traffic) The performance of MIA on different pretrained models. ($c_1 c_2\%$) reports (MAE, FR%) of MIA. **Baseline** is MAE of the pretrained model without MIA. The lowest MAE and the highest FR for each pretrained model is shown in bold-face.

Model	Baseline	Lmack		$\Delta = 1.0$			$\Delta = 1.2$			$\Delta = 1.5$	
		mask	2%	5%	10%	2%	5%	10%	2%	5%	10%
		2%	0.227 72.3%			0.213 77.2%			0.340 89.1%		
MLP-Mixer	0.265	5%	0.231 75.2%	0.233 73.3%		0.225 80.2%	0.218 78.2%		0.336 90.1%	$0.340\ 89.1\%$	
		10%	0.233 77.2%	0.233 76.2%	0.227 69.3%	0.225 80.2%	0.225 80.2%	0.216 76.2%	0.338 91.1%	0.336 90.1%	0.333 88.1%
		2%	0.234 66.3%			0.210 73.3%			0.339 89.1%		
GRU	0.283	5%	0.242 72.3%	0.239 68.3%		0.219 76.2%	0.214 74.3%		0.340 91.1%	0.337 88.1%	
		10%	0.237 74.3%	0.239 72.3%	0.236 63.4%	0.217 77 .2%	0.217 77 .2%	0.203 70.3%	0.340 91.1%	0.338 90.1%	0.329 86.1%
		2%	0.235 66.3%			0.212 76.2%			0.350 91.1%		
LSTM	0.274	5%	0.237 66.3%	0.237 65.3%		0.215 77.2%	0.213 76.2%		0.345 89.1%	0.343 88.1%	
		10%	0.237 65.3%	0.239 66.3 %	0.231 61.4%	0.215 77.2%	0.215 77 .2%	0.201 72.3%	0.347 89.1%	0.349 90.1%	0.344 87.1%
		2%	0.226 67.3%			0.201 72.3%			0.344 90.1%		
MLP	0.268	5%	0.231 71.3%	0.226 68.3%		0.201 72.3%	0.201 72.3%		0.343 92.1%	0.344 90.1%	
		10%	0.230 70.3%	0.230 70.3%	0.225 66.3%	0.201 72.3%	0.201 72.3%	0.199 70.3%	0.341 91.1%	0.341 91.1%	0.338 89.1%
		2%	0.244 64.4%			0.238 75.2%			0.343 88.1%		
ResNet18	0.290	5%	0.249 68.3%	0.249 65.3%		0.239 79.2%	0.241 76.2%		0.345 89.1%	0.340 87.1%	
		10%	0.249 67.3%	0.251 67.3%	0.246 60.4%	0.235 76.2%	0.235 76.2%	0.231 73.3%	0.345 88.1%	$0.343\ 86.1\%$	0.337 83.2%

Table 17: (Electricity) ($c_1 c_2$ %) report (MAE FR%) of MIA on different pretrained models.

Model Baseline L _{mask}				$\Delta = 1.0$			$\Delta = 1.2$			$\Delta = 1.5$	
		mask	2%	5%	10%	2%	5%	10%	2%	5%	10%
		2%	0.260 66.3%			0.262 64.4%			0.312 77.2%		
MLP-Mixer	0.430	5%	0.264 69.3%	0.262 68.3%		0.266 67.3%	0.263 66.3%		0.308 78.2%	0.308 78.2%	
		10%	0.264 67.3%	0.264 67.3%	0.257 55.4%	0.259 64.4%	0.259 64.4%	0.255 59.4%	0.308 77.2%	0.308 77.2%	0.287 66.3%
		2%	0.269 62.4%			0.247 60.4%			0.312 68.3%		
GRU	0.441	5%	0.273 64.4%	0.274 63.4%		0.250 62.4%	0.250 62.4%		0.317 69.3%	0.317 69.3%	
		10%	0.275 65.3%	0.270 62.4%	0.282 49.5%	$0.247\;61.4\%$	$0.251\ 61.4\%$	0.250 53.5%	0.317 69.3%	0.317 69.3%	0.295 64.4%
		2%	0.273 64.4%			0.243 52.5%			0.319 70.3%		
LSTM	0.447	5%	0.273 66.3%	0.275 65.3%		0.257 55.4%	0.257 55.4%		0.316 71.3%	0.319 70.3%	
		10%	0.273 66.3%	$0.272 \ 64.4\%$	0.298 51.5%	0.257 56.4%	0.257 55.4%	0.262 48.5%	0.316 71.3%	0.320 70.3%	0.294 59.4%
		2%	0.283 73.3%			0.242 61.4%			0.313 74.3%		
MLP	0.421	5%	0.287 77.2%	0.283 75.2%		0.249 65.3%	0.245 63.4%		0.304 77.2%	0.306 76.2%	
		10%	0.283 75.2%	0.283 75.2%	0.273 60.4%	$0.250\ 61.4\%$	$0.250\ 61.4\%$	0.246 55.4%	0.304 77.2%	0.299 76.2%	0.280 66.3%
		2%	0.256 51.5%			0.243 59.4%			0.318 66.3%		
ResNet18	0.569	5%	0.248 51.5%	0.248 50.5%		0.242 60.4%	0.242 60.4%		0.324 68.3%	0.324 68.3%	
		10%	0.257 52.5%	0.256 51.5%	0.255 43.6%	$0.240\ 56.4\%$	$0.244\ 58.4\%$	0.237 54.5%	0.323 67.3%	0.318 66.3%	0.302 61.4%

Evaluation of MAE on Traffic and Electricity. Table 16, Table 17 report MAE and FR of MIA on Traffic, Electricity and Exchange respectively, as a supplement to Table 4 and Table 5 in the main paper. We observe that MIA consistently reduces MAE of the pretrained models, similar to

M- I-I	Develiere	T		$\Delta = 1.0$			$\Delta = 1.2$			$\Delta = 1.5$	
Model	Baseline	L_{mask}	2%	5%	10%	2%	5%	10%	2%	5%	10%
MLP-Mixer	0.030	2% 5% 10%	0.060 88.1% 0.055 83.2% 0.056 83.2%	0.053 80.2% 0.053 81.2%	0.051 78.2%	0.100 87.1% 0.096 84.2% 0.095 84.2%	0.096 84.2% 0.095 84.2%	0.088 80.2%	0.158 87.1% 0.144 83.2% 0.141 82.2%	0.138 81.2% 0.141 82.2%	0.134 79.2%
GRU	0.040	2% 5% 10%	0.062 83.2% 0.060 79.2% 0.061 82.2%	0.058 75.2% 0.060 80.2%	0.058 68.3%	0.104 83.2% 0.105 85.1% 0.103 86.1%	0.099 80.2% 0.100 84.2%	0.098 75.2%	0.152 84.2% 0.150 83.2% 0.152 84.2%	0.140 77.2% 0.152 84.2%	0.142 78.2%
LSTM	0.042	2% 5% 10%	0.061 83.2% 0.062 82.2% 0.063 82.2%	0.058 78.2% 0.062 80.2%	0.055 75.2%	0.098 87.1% 0.099 86.1% 0.099 86.1%	0.098 83.2% 0.099 85.1%	0.098 82.2%	0.162 85.1% 0.159 83.2% 0.160 84.2%	0.152 79.2% 0.160 84.2%	0.155 82.2%
MLP	0.658	2% 5% 10%	0.065 27.7% 0.057 26.7% 0.057 26.7%	0.072 19.8% 0.057 26.7%	0.069 18.8%	0.110 41.6% 0.105 44.6% 0.107 44.6%	0.094 27.7% 0.106 43.6%	0.105 35.6%	0.210 56.4% 0.209 53.5% 0.213 51.5%	0.231 40.6% 0.216 52.5%	0.240 39.6%
ResNet18	0.053	2% 5% 10%	0.060 78.2% 0.058 79.2% 0.058 78.2%	0.058 77.2% 0.060 78.2%	0.059 72.3%	0.096 83.2% 0.093 81.2% 0.091 78.2%	0.093 80.2% 0.092 78.2%	0.090 76.2%	0.163 88.1% 0.163 87.1% 0.163 87.1%	0.157 85.1% 0.163 87.1%	0.159 85.1%

Table 18: (Exchange) $c_1 c_2 \%$ report MSE FR% of MIA at different L_{atk} and L_{def} .

Table 19: (Exchange) $c_1 c_2 \%$ report MAE FR% of MIA at different L_{adv} and L_{mask} .

Model	Baseline	L_{mask}	29	$\Delta = 1.0$	100	201	$\Delta = 1.2$	100	20	$\Delta = 1.5$	100
			2%	5%	10%	2%	5%	10%	2%	5%	10%
		2%	0.209 88.1%			0.270 87.1%			0.349 87.1%		
MLP-Mixer	0.133	5%	0.199 83.2%	0.194 80.2%		0.264 84.2%	0.264 84.2%		0.333 83.2%	0.326 81.2%	
		10%	0 200 83 2%	0 195 81 2%	0.190 78.2%	0.263 84 2%	0.263 84.2%	0.252.80.2%	0.330.82.2%	0 330 82 2%	0.320 79.2%
		10 /0	0.200 00.270	0.175 0112 /c	01290 7012 70	01200 0 11270	01200 0 112 / 0	01202 0012 /0	0.000 02.270	0.000 0212 10	01010 7712 70
		2%	0.211 83.2%			0.274 83.2%			0.342 84.2%		
GRU	0.152	5%	0.206 79.2%	0.203 75.2%		$0.276\ 85.1\%$	0.267 80.2%		0.339 83.2%	0.325 77.2%	
		10%	0.210 82.2%	0.209 80.2%	0.203 68.3%	0.274 86.1%	0.270 84.2%	0.263 75.2%	0.342 84.2%	0.342 84.2%	0.330 78.2%
		2%	0.209 83.2%			0.266 87.1%			0.352 85.1%		
LSTM	0.159	5%	0.210 82.2%	0.203 78.2%		0.266 86.1%	0.264 83.2%		0.348 83.2%	0.340 79.2%	
		10%	0.213 82.2%	0.211 80.2%	0.199 75.2%	0.266 86.1%	0.266 85.1%	0.263 82.2%	0.350 84.2%	0.350 84.2%	0.344 82.2%
		2%	0.213 27.7%			0.284 41.6%			0.409 56.4%		
MLP	0.639	5%	0.196 26.7%	0.229 19.8%		0.274 44.6%	0.260 27.7%		0.405 53.5%	0.447 40.6%	
		10%	0.196 26.7%	0.196 26.7%	0.227 18.8%	0.277 44.6%	0.274 43.6%	0.275 35.6%	0.412 51.5%	0.416 52.5%	0.458 39.6%
		2%	0.205 78.2%			0.263 83.2%			0.355 88.1%		
ResNet18	0.181	5%	0.201 79.2%	0.201 77.2%		0.257 81.2%	0.257 80.2%		0.354 87.1%	0.347 85.1%	
		10%	0.202 78.2%	0.205 78.2%	0.201 72.3%	0.254 78.2%	0.256 78.2%	0.253 76.2%	0.354 87.1%	0.354 87.1%	0.349 85.1%

the results on MSE. Our comprehensive experiments suggest that MIA can effectively improve our forecasting quality in the way of filtering the unconfident forecasts.

Evaluation of MSE and MAE for MIA on Exchange. Table 18 and Table 19 evaluate MSE/MAE of MIA on exchange. We observe that, MIA moderately increase MSE/MAE of the pretrained models because of the information loss for the discretization technique. Specifically, we can see that MSE/MAE of the pretrained models are commonly much smaller than that of Traffic and Electricity because Exchange dataset is much simpler. The better forecasting performance implies that we might lose more information for the discretization technique. On Exchange, information loss plays a more conspicuous role than the filtering function of MIA, causing the increase of MSE/MAE. This suggests that discretization technique might lower the forecasting performance when the pretrained models are precise enough.

Analysis of training algorithm of imputation models. Table 20 reportS MSE and FR of masked training and random training on the TSF dataset Traffic. Similar to the comparison on TSC datasets (Table 6 in the main paper), our masked training consistently achieves lower MSE than random training on different imputation models.

Analysis of Different Pretrained Models on MIA. Table 21 reports the MAE of MIA with different pretrained models, as a supplement to Table 7 in the main paper. The results demonstrate that MLP-Mixer outperforms all the other defenses.

F MIA ON MULTIVARIATE TIME SERIES FORECASTING (MTSF)

Apply MIA to Multivariate. Suppose the input series is a d_0 -dimension t_0 -length matrix $\mathcal{X} \in \mathbb{R}^{t_0 \times d_0}$. We can represent the multivariate series uniquely by d_0 univariate series $\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0}^{(d)}, d = 1, 2, \dots, d_0$.

$$\mathcal{X} = [\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0}^{(1)}, \, \mathbf{x}_{2:t_0}^{(2)}, \, \dots, \, \mathbf{x}_{1:t_0}^{(d_0)}]^T$$
(23)

Model	Mask Method	Lmask	257	$\Delta = 1.0$	100	277	$\Delta = 1.2$	100	27	$\Delta = 1.5$	10/7
			2%	5%	10%	2%	5%	10%	2%	5%	10%
		2%	0.068 53.5%			0.071 63.4%			0.144 76.2%		
	random	5%	0.071 42.6%	0.075 28.7%		0.063 50.5%	0.057 43.6%		0.145 73.3%	0.135 62.4%	
CPU		10%	0.073 30.7%	0.069 26.7%	0.075 23.8%	0.052 49.5%	0.048 45.5%	0.051 40.6%	0.140 66.3%	0.138 64.4%	0.132 59.4%
GRU		2%	0.074 64.4%			0.073 66.3%			0.148 84.2%		
	block	5%	0.073 66.3%	0.075 61.4%		0.073 66.3%	0.073 65.3%		0.148 83.2%	0.145 80.2%	
		10%	0.073 64.4%	0.074 63.4%	0.070 57.4%	0.074 65.3%	0.074 64.4%	0.065 59.4%	0.148 84.2%	0.148 84.2%	0.145 79.2%
		2%	0.064 55.4%			0.073 62.4%			0.144 81.2%		
	random	5%	0.063 37.6%	0.050 25.7%		0.051 49.5%	0.055 38.6%		0.129 67.3%	0.130 58.4%	
LOTM		10%	0.065 37.6%	0.053 27.7%	0.049 14.9%	0.050 48.5%	0.053 45.5%	0.046 30.7%	0.134 68.3%	0.128 64.4%	0.120 53.5%
LSIM		2%	0.071 61.4%			0.069 68.3%			0.144 85.1%		
	block	5%	0.067 59.4%	0.067 56.4%		0.069 68.3%	0.068 66.3%		0.144 85.1%	0.141 82.2%	
		10%	0.068 60.4%	0.067 58.4%	0.067 56.4%	0.069 67.3%	0.069 66.3%	0.067 65.3%	0.144 85.1%	0.144 85.1%	0.142 83.2%
		2%	0.073 54 5%			0.085.66.3%			0.147 75 2%		
	random	5%	0.074 44.6%	0.067 27.7%		0.072 59.4%	0.061 47.5%		0.137 74.3%	0.142 63.4%	
		10%	0.072 42.6%	0.073 40.6%	0.059 26.7%	0.065 57.4%	0.067 53.5%	0.061 43.6%	0.134 74.3%	0.130 70.3%	0.130 61.4%
MLP-Mixer		2%	0.079 67.3%			0.085 74.3%			0.151 86.1%		
	block	5%	0.076 67.3%	0.078 61.4%		0.083 76.2%	0.079 72.3%		0.151 86.1%	0.149 83.2%	
		10%	0.079 63.4%	0.077 61.4%	0.076 55.4%	0.081 72.3%	0.077 71.3%	0.078 69.3 %	0.151 86.1%	0.150 85.1%	0.145 82.2%
		2%	0.069 53.5%			0.074 61.4%			0.145 75.2%		
	random	5%	0.072 44.6%	0.071 37.6%		0.059 58.4%	0.044 47.5%		0.138 78.2%	0.138 67.3%	
MD		10%	0.072 42.6%	0.073 40.6%	0.077 34.7%	0.061 53.5%	0.062 52.5%	0.055 48.5%	0.140 78.2%	0.140 75.2%	0.133 67.3%
MLP		2%	0.072 60.4%			0.068 68.3%			0.146 84.2%		
	block	5%	0.071 61.4%	0.071 58.4%		0.070 66.3%	0.070 66.3%		0.145 86.1%	0.147 85.1%	
		10%	0.073 58.4%	0.072 59.4%	0.069 52.5%	0.065 66.3%	0.065 66.3%	0.065 62.4%	0.146 84.2%	0.147 85.1%	0.144 82.2%
		2%	0.071 57.4%			0.083 66.3%			0.143 82.2%		
	random	5%	0.073 33.7%	0.072 29.7%		0.063 54.5%	0.057 46.5%		0.136 62.4%	0.139 55.4%	
DecNot19		10%	0.067 32.7%	0.070 27.7%	0.076 17.8%	0.059 49.5%	0.061 49.5%	0.047 37.6%	0.143 61.4%	0.130 53.5%	0.117 45.5%
Residents		2%	0.073 63.4%			0.089 71.3%			0.146 86.1%		
	block	5%	0.074 62.4%	0.074 62.4%		0.085 68.3%	0.084 67.3%		0.147 87.1%	0.146 86.1%	
		10%	0.075 60.4%	0.072 59.4%	0.070 57.4%	0.087 68.3%	0.084 69.3%	0.076 62.4%	0.143 84.2%	0.143 84.2%	0.140 82.2%

Table 20: (Traffic) Comparison between mask methods. $c_1 c_2\%$ report MSE TPR% of MIA across $L_{\text{def}} = 2\%, 5\%, 10\%, L_{\text{atk}} = 2\%, 5\%, 10\%, \Delta = 1.0, 1.2, 1.5.$ c_1 . MSE(c_1) reports the forecasting performance.

Tat	ole	2	1:	C	omparisoi	n of	four	imp	utation	mode	els.	T	he	best	resul	ts a	re s	hown	in	bol	d-	face
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Generator	Matric	τ.		Electricity			Exchange			Traffic	
Ocherator	wictric	Lmask	2%	5%	10%	2%	5%	10%	2%	5%	10%
		2%	0.312 77.2%			0.349 87.1%			0.340 89.1%		
MLP-Mixer	MAE	5%	0.308 78.2%	0.308 78.2%		0.333 83.2%	0.326 81.2%		0.336 90.1%	0.340 89.1%	
		10%	0.308 77 .2%	0.308 77 .2%	0.287 66.3%	0.330 82.2%	0.330 82.2%	0.320 79.2%	0.338 91.1%	0.336 90.1%	0.333 88.1%
		2%	0.290 65.3%			0.299 40.6%			0.338 87.1%		
BRITS	MAE	5%	0.283 71.3%	0.264 59.4%		$0.288 \ 49.5\%$	0.246 15.8%		0.327 84.2%	0.320 75.2%	
		10%	0.271 61.4%	$0.272\ 60.4\%$	0.265 45.5%	0.381 10.9%	0.526 1.0%	Inf 0.0%	0.315 79.2%	0.319 77.2%	0.312 73.3%
		2%	0.269 58.4%			0.258 25.7%			0.307 67.3%		
SAITS	MAE	5%	0.261 53.5%	0.256 52.5%		0.317 43.6%	0.264 27.7%		0.321 73.3%	0.308 68.3%	
		10%	0.274 56.4%	0.278 54.5%	0.263 44.6%	0.179 7.9%	0.123 6.9%	0.035 4.0%	0.316 67.3%	0.325 69.3%	0.315 59.4%
		2%	0.253 52.5%			0.329 23.8%			0.322 68.3%		
Transformer	MAE	5%	0.288 52.5%	0.291 42.6%		0.164 6.9%	0.030 2.0%		0.318 74.3%	0.312 65.3%	
		10%	0.266 60.4%	0.263 58.4%	0.274 34.7%	0.112 8.9%	0.135 7.9%	$0.037 \ 5.0\%$	0.313 75.2%	0.317 74.3%	0.312 61.4%

1. We generate the masks in the same way as **Masking** (Step 1). The main difference is the way we mask the multivariate series with the univariate mask. Masking multivariate series \mathcal{X} with the mask $M_{[u:v]}$ is computed as follow:

$$\mathcal{X} \odot \mathbf{M}_{[u:v]} = \left[\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0}^{(1)} \odot \mathbf{M}_{[u:v]}, \ \mathbf{x}_{2:t_0}^{(2)} \odot \mathbf{M}_{[u:v]}, \ \dots, \mathbf{x}_{1:t_0}^{(d_0)} \odot \mathbf{M}_{[u:v]} \right]^T$$
(24)

2. With the imputation model $G(\cdot)$, **Imputing (Step 2)** for multivariate series \mathcal{X} is computed as follow:

$$G(\mathcal{X} \odot \mathbf{M}_{[u:v]}) = \left[G\left(\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0}^{(1)} \odot \mathbf{M}_{[u:v]} \right), \ G\left(\mathbf{x}_{2:t_0}^{(2)} \odot \mathbf{M}_{[u:v]} \right), \ \dots, \ G\left(\mathbf{x}_{1:t_0}^{(d_0)} \odot \mathbf{M}_{[u:v]} \right) \right]^T$$
(25)

3. We aggregate all the predictions of the imputed multivariate series in the same way as Aggregation (Step 3) for univariate series.

Evaluation of MIA on multivariate tasks. In terms of the multivariate time series forecasting (MTSF) task, we follow the work (Wu et al., 2021) and evaluate our MIA framework on four datasets (ETTh2 (Zhou et al., 2021), ETTm2 (Zhou et al., 2021), weather ⁸ and illness ⁹. Corresponding results are presented in Table 22 to 29. Extensive experiments demonstrate that MIA behaves similarly to that of univariate forecasting tasks.

⁸https://www.bgc-jena.mpg.de/wetter/

⁹https://gis.cdc.gov/grasp/fluview/fluportaldashboard.html

Model	Baseline	L_{mask}	2 %	$\Delta = 1.0 \\ 5 \%$	10 %	2 %	$\Delta = 1.2 \\ 5 \%$	10 %	2 %	$\Delta = 1.5 \\ 5 \%$	10 %
MLP-Mixer	0.712	2 % 5 % 10 %	0.363 74.9% 0.363 75.8% 0.360 75.0%	0.360 73.8% 0.356 74.2%	0.346 70.1%	0.434 82.4% 0.435 83.6% 0.431 82.6%	0.432 81.8% 0.427 82.2%	0.415 77.5%	0.550 90.3% 0.552 90.8% 0.548 90.5%	0.547 89.8% 0.542 90.1%	0.528 86.9%
MLP	0.815	2 % 5 % 10 %	0.368 68.4% 0.371 69.0% 0.368 67.0%	0.365 66.7% 0.365 66.5%	0.356 64.4%	0.436 76.5% 0.438 76.6% 0.438 76.1%	0.434 75.5% 0.435 75.9%	0.424 73.3%	0.542 85.5% 0.547 86.6% 0.545 86.3%	0.541 85.1% 0.541 85.8%	0.527 83.5%
LSTM	0.802	2 % 5 % 10 %	0.374 69.1% 0.375 68.7% 0.373 68.4%	0.372 67.9% 0.373 68.0%	0.370 66.7%	0.444 76.6% 0.447 77.1% 0.445 76.7%	0.443 76.0% 0.443 76.0%	0.436 74.0%	0.556 85.7% 0.558 85.9% 0.556 85.9%	0.552 84.7% 0.551 85.2%	0.542 83.6%
GRU	0.782	2 % 5 % 10 %	0.373 71.6% 0.374 72.4% 0.372 72.0%	0.371 70.0% 0.372 71.6%	0.369 68.1%	0.441 78.1% 0.442 78.3% 0.440 78.0%	0.440 77.2% 0.439 77.6%	0.435 75.4%	0.563 87.1% 0.565 87.6% 0.562 87.3%	0.560 85.9% 0.556 86.9%	0.545 84.2%
RNN	0.809	2 % 5 % 10 %	0.384 69.9% 0.383 70.2% 0.381 69.3%	0.382 68.8% 0.380 68.4%	0.378 67.1%	0.454 79.0% 0.454 79.2% 0.452 78.7%	0.453 78.4% 0.451 78.3%	0.448 76.9%	0.560 87.6% 0.560 87.6% 0.559 87.5%	0.559 87.0% 0.556 87.0%	0.551 86.1%
TransformerNormal	0.852	2 % 5 % 10 %	0.405 67.0% 0.404 66.6% 0.400 65.1%	0.403 66.1% 0.397 64.6%	0.393 63.1%	0.481 75.2% 0.480 75.1% 0.478 74.5%	0.480 74.8% 0.477 74.3%	0.473 73.4%	0.593 83.8% 0.592 83.4% 0.589 83.1%	0.591 83.3 % 0.587 82.4%	0.583 81.9%
TransformerPadding	0.981	2 % 5 % 10 %	0.346 57.9% 0.346 57.8% 0.344 57.8%	0.346 57.8% 0.344 57.8%	0.344 57.8%	0.427 65.3% 0.426 65.3% 0.425 65.4%	0.426 65.3% 0.425 65.4%	0.424 65.3%	0.553 76.7% 0.552 76.5% 0.550 76.5%	0.552 76.5% 0.550 76.5%	0.550 76.5%
TransformerConv	0.934	2 % 5 % 10 %	0.353 61.1% 0.352 61.0% 0.350 60.2%	0.351 60.6% 0.349 60.1%	0.348 59.7%	0.427 70.2% 0.426 70.3% 0.423 69.7%	0.424 69.7% 0.423 69.6%	0.419 68.7%	0.538 79.4% 0.537 79.4% 0.535 79.3%	0.536 79.4% 0.534 79.3%	0.531 79.1%

Table 22: (ETTh2) Evaluate MAE of MIA with pretrained models on multi-variate time series forecasting (MTSF).

Table 23: (ETTh2) Evaluate MSE of MIA with different pretrained models on multi-variate time series forecasting (MTSF).

Model	Deceline	т		$\Delta = 1.0$			$\Delta = 1.2$			$\Delta = 1.5$	
Model	Dasenne	L_{mask}	2 %	5 %	10 %	2 %	5 %	10 %	2 %	5 %	10 %
MLP-Mixer	0.930	2 % 5 % 10 %	0.159 74.9% 0.159 75.8% 0.157 75.0%	0.157 73.8% 0.155 74.2%	0.149 70.1%	0.230 82.4% 0.231 83.6% 0.228 82.6%	0.228 81.8% 0.225 82.2%	0.215 77.5%	0.367 90.3% 0.370 90.8% 0.366 90.5%	0.365 89.8% 0.360 90.1%	0.347 86.9%
MLP	1.143	2 % 5 % 10 %	0.162 68.4% 0.163 69.0% 0.162 67.0%	0.160 66.7% 0.159 66.5%	0.153 64.4%	0.230 76.5% 0.231 76.6% 0.230 76.1%	0.228 75.5% 0.228 75.9%	0.219 73.3%	0.357 85.5% 0.362 86.6% 0.360 86.3%	0.356 85.1% 0.357 85.8%	0.342 83.5%
LSTM	1.072	2 % 5 % 10 %	0.165 69.1% 0.165 68.7% 0.164 68.4%	0.164 67.9% 0.164 68.0 %	0.162 66.7%	0.235 76.6% 0.237 77.1% 0.236 76.7%	0.234 76.0% 0.233 76.0%	0.228 74.0%	0.370 85.7% 0.371 85.9% 0.369 85.9%	0.366 84.7% 0.365 85.2%	0.357 83.6%
GRU	1.042	2 % 5 % 10 %	0.166 71.6% 0.167 72.4% 0.166 72.0%	0.165 70.0% 0.165 71.6%	0.161 68.1%	0.236 78.1% 0.237 78.3% 0.235 78.0%	0.235 77.2% 0.233 77.6%	0.229 75.4%	0.378 87.1% 0.380 87.6% 0.377 87.3%	0.376 85.9% 0.373 86.9%	0.364 84.2%
RNN	1.074	2 % 5 % 10 %	0.171 69.9% 0.171 70.2% 0.170 69.3%	0.170 68.8% 0.169 68.4%	0.166 67.1%	0.244 79.0% 0.243 79.2% 0.242 78.7%	0.243 78.4% 0.241 78.3%	0.238 76.9%	0.375 87.6% 0.375 87.6% 0.373 87.5%	0.373 87.0% 0.370 87.0%	0.366 86.1%
TransformerNormal	1.241	2 % 5 % 10 %	0.186 67.0% 0.185 66.6% 0.182 65.1%	0.184 66.1% 0.180 64.6%	0.177 63.1%	0.264 75.2% 0.263 75.1% 0.261 74.5%	0.262 74.8% 0.259 74.3%	0.256 73.4%	0.406 83.8% 0.404 83.4% 0.401 83.1%	0.403 83.3% 0.398 82.4%	0.394 81.9%
TransformerPadding	1.576	2 % 5 % 10 %	0.149 57.9% 0.149 57.8% 0.148 57.8%	0.149 57.8% 0.148 57.8%	0.148 57.8%	0.222 65.3% 0.222 65.3% 0.221 65.4%	0.222 65.3% 0.221 65.4%	0.221 65.3%	0.362 76.7% 0.361 76.5% 0.359 76.5%	0.361 76.5% 0.359 76.5%	0.359 76.5%
TransformerConv	1.424	2 % 5 % 10 %	0.154 61.1% 0.154 61.0% 0.153 60.2%	0.153 60.6% 0.152 60.1%	0.151 59.7%	0.224 70.2% 0.224 70.3% 0.222 69.7%	0.222 69.7% 0.221 69.6%	0.219 68.7%	0.353 79.4% 0.352 79.4% 0.350 79.3%	0.351 79.4% 0.349 79.3%	0.347 79.1%

G IMPUTATION MODELS.

For the imputation model architectures, we take SAITS, Transformer and BRITS and MLP-Mixer. Specifically, for SAITS, we use the code from ¹⁰. For SAITS (Du et al., 2022), we set $d_{\text{model}} = 32$, $n_{\text{layers}} = 2$, $d_{\text{inner}} = 16$, $n_{\text{head}} = 4$, $d_{\text{k}} = 8$, $d_{\text{v}} = 8$. For Transformer (Vaswani et al., 2017), we set $d_{\text{model}} = 32$, $n_{\text{layers}} = 2$, $d_{\text{inner}} = 16$, $n_{\text{head}} = 4$, $d_{\text{k}} = 8$, $d_{\text{v}} = 8$. For BRITS (Cao et al., 2018), we set $h_{\text{hidden}} = 32$. For MLP-Mixer (Tolstikhin et al., 2021), we use the same structure as Table 12. In terms of training, we use optimizer Adam with lr = 0.0001, $\beta = (0.9, 0.999)$, $\epsilon = 10^{-8}$, weight_decay = 0 and train the model for 30 epochs.

G.1 Choice of Imputation Model Architecture.

Table 14 compares the imputation quality of different imputation models on Traffic. The imputation quality is quantified by the mean square error (MSE) between the imputed series and the original series. We observe that MLP-Mixer consistently outperforms other three models across different datasets and L_{adv} , indicating the superior imputation ability of MLP-Mixer architecture.

¹⁰https://github.com/WenjieDu/PyPOTS

Model	Baseline	$L_{\rm mask}$	2 %	$\Delta = 1.0$ 5 %	10 %	2 %	$\Delta = 1.2$ 5 %	10 %	2 %	$\Delta = 1.5$ 5 %	10 %
MLP-Mixer	0.858	2 % 5 % 10 %	0.329 67.6% 0.340 68.2% 0.337 67.2%	0.312 62.3% 0.336 66.7%	0.299 56.4%	0.404 75.5% 0.421 76.1% 0.414 75.3%	0.385 70.7% 0.411 75.0%	0.361 65.0%	0.526 83.7% 0.548 84.3% 0.538 82.9%	0.504 80.1% 0.533 82.8%	0.467 75.6%
MLP	0.755	2 % 5 % 10 %	0.350 74.2% 0.366 76.3% 0.357 74.6%	0.325 70.2% 0.351 72.0%	0.324 61.9%	0.427 82.0% 0.453 85.1% 0.445 83.8%	0.408 80.7% 0.440 82.4%	0.411 72.5%	0.546 86.5% 0.577 87.4% 0.569 86.8%	0.527 86.0% 0.567 87.0%	0.529 80.8%
LSTM	1.034	2 % 5 % 10 %	0.364 64.6% 0.363 64.2% 0.359 63.8%	0.357 63.9% 0.355 63.2%	0.347 62.1%	0.462 72.9% 0.460 72.1% 0.456 71.3%	0.454 71.3 % 0.452 70.6%	0.444 69.2%	0.594 82.4% 0.594 81.9% 0.591 81.7%	0.589 81.6% 0.589 81.8%	0.583 81.4%
GRU	1.065	2 % 5 % 10 %	0.388 62.4% 0.388 61.8% 0.382 59.9%	0.371 60.2% 0.375 59.0%	0.353 54.7%	0.479 69.9% 0.479 69.6% 0.476 67.5%	0.463 67.6% 0.468 66.5%	0.445 62.3%	0.619 78.9% 0.620 78.3% 0.616 77.2%	0.604 76.8% 0.610 77.1%	0.589 74.2%
RNN	1.024	2 % 5 % 10 %	0.299 61.7% 0.310 64.2% 0.308 64.6%	0.273 56.9% 0.299 60.5%	0.260 49.7%	0.363 70.1% 0.375 71.6% 0.372 71.6%	0.338 65.6% 0.358 68.0%	0.310 59.9%	0.462 77.4% 0.481 78.2% 0.478 77.6%	0.448 73.3% 0.465 75.2 %	0.410 69.5%
TransformerNormal	0.989	2 % 5 % 10 %	0.322 57.7% 0.318 56.5% 0.311 53.4%	0.309 51.2% 0.305 51.4%	0.283 41.0%	0.382 67.5% 0.382 66.8% 0.377 64.5%	0.369 61.8% 0.369 62.4%	0.353 54.6%	0.468 77.6% 0.473 76.4% 0.466 75.7%	0.455 73.8% 0.457 74.1%	0.435 68.7%
TransformerPadding	1.096	2 % 5 % 10 %	0.376 51.8% 0.392 48.5% 0.374 38.2%	0.393 44.0% 0.377 34.8%	0.373 27.0%	0.445 60.7% 0.459 59.5% 0.447 48.5%	0.459 54.0% 0.445 46.1%	0.434 37.3%	0.559 73.3% 0.552 71.4% 0.556 63.0%	0.551 68.3% 0.553 61.6%	0.543 54.6%
TransformerConv	0.869	2 % 5 % 10 %	0.331 67.5% 0.314 66.7% 0.312 61.7%	0.294 58.9% 0.308 60.0%	0.298 50.4%	0.401 72.3% 0.390 72.8% 0.384 68.8%	0.362 66.4% 0.375 66.5%	0.362 58.7%	0.519 78.8% 0.511 79.2% 0.504 77.5%	0.478 75.3% 0.488 75.1%	0.467 68.4%

Table 24: (ETTm2) Evaluate MAE of MIA with different pretrained models on multi-variate time series forecasting (MTSF).

Table 25: (ETTm2) Evaluate MSE of MIA with different pretrained models on multi-variate time series forecasting (MTSF).

Model	Baseline	Lunask		$\Delta = 1.0$			$\Delta = 1.2$			$\Delta = 1.5$	
		mask	2 %	5 %	10 %	2%	5 %	10 %	2 %	5 %	10 %
MLP-Mixer	1.750	2 % 5 % 10 %	0.139 67.6% 0.145 68.2% 0.143 67.2%	0.128 62.3% 0.142 66.7%	0.121 56.4%	0.206 75.5% 0.219 76.1% 0.214 75.3%	0.192 70.7% 0.212 75.0%	0.176 65.0%	0.339 83.7% 0.362 84.3 % 0.352 82.9%	0.319 80.1% 0.348 82.8%	0.287 75.6%
MLP	1.508	2 % 5 % 10 %	0.149 74.2% 0.161 76.3% 0.156 74.6%	0.134 70.2% 0.152 72.0%	0.134 61.9%	0.222 82.0% 0.243 85.1% 0.237 83.8%	0.208 80.7% 0.233 82.4%	0.211 72.5%	0.358 86.5% 0.385 87.4% 0.377 86.8%	0.337 86.0% 0.376 87.0%	0.336 80.8%
LSTM	2.858	2 % 5 % 10 %	0.158 64.6% 0.157 64.2% 0.155 63.8%	0.154 63.9% 0.152 63.2%	0.149 62.1%	0.242 72.9% 0.241 72.1% 0.238 71.3%	0.236 71.3% 0.235 70.6%	0.229 69.2%	0.391 82.4% 0.391 81.9% 0.387 81.7%	0.386 81.6% 0.386 81.8%	0.381 81.4%
GRU	2.685	2 % 5 % 10 %	0.174 62.4% 0.174 61.8% 0.171 59.9%	0.163 60.2% 0.168 59.0%	0.154 54.7%	0.260 69.9% 0.261 69.6% 0.260 67.5%	0.247 67.6% 0.254 66.5%	0.236 62.3%	0.426 78.9% 0.426 78.3% 0.422 77.2%	0.410 76.8% 0.417 77.1%	0.395 74.2%
RNN	2.598	2 % 5 % 10 %	0.121 61.7% 0.127 64.2% 0.125 64.6%	0.104 56.9% 0.120 60.5%	0.096 49.7%	0.177 70.1% 0.185 71.6% 0.183 71.6%	0.159 65.6% 0.173 68.0%	0.138 59.9%	0.280 77.4% 0.297 78.2% 0.295 77.6%	0.266 73.3% 0.285 75.2 %	0.233 69.5%
TransformerNormal	2.150	2 % 5 % 10 %	0.131 57.7% 0.128 56.5% 0.124 53.4%	0.121 51.2% 0.120 51.4%	0.108 41.0%	0.186 67.5% 0.187 66.8% 0.181 64.5%	0.174 61.8% 0.173 62.4%	0.163 54.6 %	0.286 77.6% 0.288 76.4% 0.279 75.7%	0.269 73.8% 0.268 74.1%	0.249 68.7%
TransformerPadding	2.828	2 % 5 % 10 %	0.168 51.8% 0.175 48.5% 0.166 38.2%	0.174 44.0% 0.168 34.8%	0.164 27.0%	0.238 60.7% 0.245 59.5% 0.236 48.5%	0.243 54.0% 0.235 46.1%	0.226 37.3%	0.375 73.3% 0.369 71.4% 0.367 63.0%	0.367 68.3% 0.365 61.6%	0.353 54.6%
TransformerConv	1.918	2 % 5 % 10 %	0.139 67.5% 0.129 66.7% 0.128 61.7%	0.118 58.9% 0.124 60.0%	0.117 50.4%	0.203 72.3% 0.195 72.8% 0.192 68.8%	0.175 66.4% 0.184 66.5%	0.174 58.7%	0.332 78.8% 0.323 79.2% 0.318 77.5%	0.291 75.3% 0.304 75.1%	0.283 68.4%

G.2 IMPACT OF GAUSSIAN AUGMENTATION

Table 33, Table 34, Table 35, Table 36 and Table 37 report the impact of Gaussian augmentation at $\sigma = 0.01, 0.02, 0.03, 0.04, 0.05$ on time series classification dataset DistalPhalanxTW ($L_{mask} = 15\%$) respectively. We compare the MIA with Gaussian augmentation to MIA without Gaussian augmentation (baseline) on **Certified Accuracy** at $L_{atk} = 5\%, 10\%, 15\%$. The table reports the relative improvement (abs %) on certified accuracy.

$G.3 \quad V isualize \ {\rm the \ imputation \ quality.}$

Fig. 4 intuitively shows the imputation performance of different imputation models on dataset Traffic.

Model	Baseline	$L_{\rm mask}$	2 %	$\Delta = 1.0 \\ 5 \%$	10 %	2 %	$\Delta = 1.2 \\ 5 \%$	10 %	2 %	$\Delta = 1.5 \\ 5 \%$	10 %
MLP-Mixer	0.712	2 % 5 % 10 %	0.232 81.3% 0.217 77.2% 0.216 77.2%	0.238 76.6% 0.220 77.2%	0.230 73.1%	0.251 86.5% 0.236 81.3% 0.254 84.8%	0.227 80.7% 0.252 84.2%	0.247 82.5%	0.314 90.6% 0.309 88.3% 0.315 88.9%	0.263 87.7% 0.313 88.9%	0.286 88.9%
MLP	0.930	2 % 5 % 10 %	0.287 54.4% 0.258 51.5% 0.268 50.9%	0.255 50.9% 0.263 50.3%	0.256 50.3%	0.333 66.1% 0.306 62.6% 0.328 65.5%	0.301 61.4% 0.325 65.5%	0.311 63.7%	0.394 82.5% 0.377 80.1% 0.388 81.9%	0.376 79.5% 0.389 81.9%	0.373 79.5%
LSTM	1.079	2 % 5 % 10 %	0.239 45.6% 0.244 45.6% 0.244 45.6%	0.243 45.6% 0.243 45.6%	0.239 45.6%	0.291 59.6% 0.297 59.6% 0.296 59.6%	0.290 59.6% 0.296 59.6%	0.292 59.6%	0.356 77.8% 0.355 77.2% 0.358 77.2%	0.348 77.2% 0.355 76.6%	0.351 76.6%
GRU	0.987	2 % 5 % 10 %	0.300 54.4% 0.296 54.4% 0.294 54.4%	0.299 52.0% 0.294 54.4%	0.296 54.4%	0.336 67.3% 0.334 67.3% 0.332 67.3%	0.343 66.7% 0.331 67.3%	0.333 67.3%	0.373 80.1% 0.368 78.9% 0.374 80.1%	0.373 78.9% 0.373 80.1%	0.368 79.5%
RNN	1.150	2 % 5 % 10 %	0.296 38.6% 0.300 38.0% 0.297 38.0%	0.288 38.0% 0.297 38.0%	0.293 38.0%	0.365 55.0% 0.361 52.6% 0.360 52.6%	0.353 52.6% 0.357 52.0%	0.354 52.0%	0.390 63.7% 0.394 63.2% 0.394 63.2%	0.388 63.2% 0.390 62.6%	0.387 62.6%
TransformerNormal	0.877	2 % 5 % 10 %	0.244 58.5% 0.253 55.0% 0.242 56.7%	0.255 55.0% 0.231 55.6%	0.232 54.4%	0.301 70.2% 0.289 67.8% 0.280 67.8%	0.285 66.7% 0.277 67.8%	0.272 66.1%	0.376 82.5% 0.337 79.5% 0.336 80.1%	0.327 78.4% 0.330 79.5%	0.326 79.5%
TransformerPadding	0.945	2 % 5 % 10 %	0.290 54.4% 0.307 52.6% 0.297 50.9%	0.305 50.3% 0.298 49.7%	0.296 48.0%	0.326 69.0% 0.328 66.1% 0.341 67.3%	0.326 64.3% 0.348 66.7%	0.351 65.5%	0.362 84.2% 0.353 81.3% 0.372 83.6%	0.358 81.3% 0.374 82.5%	0.381 81.9%
TransformerConv	0.820	2 % 5 % 10 %	0.272 66.1% 0.266 63.2% 0.258 63.2%	0.276 60.8% 0.263 61.4%	0.263 56.7%	0.316 73.7% 0.317 74.9% 0.303 70.8%	0.315 72.5% 0.302 70.2%	0.309 67.8%	0.395 80.1% 0.385 79.5% 0.392 78.9%	0.372 78.9% 0.385 78.9%	0.380 77.8%

Table 26: (Illness) Evaluate MAE of MIA with different pretrained models on multi-variate time series forecasting (MTSF).

Table 27: (Illness) Evaluate MSE of MIA with different pretrained models on multi-variate time series forecasting (MTSF).

Model	Pocalina	τ.		$\Delta = 1.0$			$\Delta = 1.2$			$\Delta = 1.5$	
Woder	Dasenne	Lmask	2 %	5 %	10 %	2 %	5 %	10 %	2 %	5 %	10 %
MLP-Mixer	0.970	2 % 5 % 10 %	0.075 81.3% 0.067 77.2% 0.069 77.2%	0.076 76.6% 0.071 77.2%	0.075 73.1%	0.095 86.5% 0.084 81.3% 0.095 84.8%	0.078 80.7% 0.093 84.2%	0.090 82.5%	0.156 90.6% 0.148 88.3% 0.148 88.9%	0.120 87.7% 0.146 88.9%	0.130 88.9%
MLP	1.265	2 % 5 % 10 %	0.104 54.4% 0.085 51.5% 0.092 50.9%	0.084 50.9% 0.089 50.3%	0.086 50.3%	0.137 66.1% 0.116 62.6% 0.132 65.5%	0.112 61.4% 0.131 65.5%	0.121 63.7%	0.203 82.5% 0.186 80.1% 0.195 81.9%	0.186 79.5% 0.195 81.9%	0.181 79.5%
LSTM	1.536	2 % 5 % 10 %	0.074 45.6% 0.077 45.6% 0.076 45.6%	0.076 45.6% 0.076 45.6%	0.074 45.6%	0.120 59.6% 0.122 59.6% 0.123 59.6%	0.120 59.6% 0.123 59.6%	0.121 59.6%	0.178 77.8% 0.176 77.2% 0.179 77.2%	0.172 77.2% 0.176 76.6%	0.173 76.6%
GRU	1.407	2 % 5 % 10 %	0.114 54.4% 0.110 54.4% 0.109 54.4%	0.112 52.0% 0.109 54.4%	0.110 54.4%	0.143 67.3% 0.141 67.3% 0.140 67.3%	0.145 66.7% 0.140 67.3%	0.139 67.3%	0.195 80.1% 0.190 78.9% 0.195 80.1%	0.191 78.9% 0.195 80.1%	0.190 79.5%
RNN	1.727	2 % 5 % 10 %	0.111 38.6% 0.114 38.0% 0.113 38.0%	0.106 38.0% 0.113 38.0%	0.110 38.0%	0.165 55.0% 0.161 52.6% 0.160 52.6%	0.154 52.6% 0.158 52.0%	0.155 52.0%	0.201 63.7% 0.203 63.2% 0.202 63.2%	0.194 63.2% 0.198 62.6%	0.194 62.6%
TransformerNormal	1.126	2 % 5 % 10 %	0.086 58.5% 0.087 55.0% 0.084 56.7%	0.089 55.0% 0.078 55.6%	0.078 54.4%	0.126 70.2% 0.122 67.8% 0.116 67.8%	0.118 66.7% 0.114 67.8%	0.110 66.1%	0.197 82.5% 0.171 79.5% 0.165 80.1%	0.163 78.4% 0.159 79.5%	0.157 79.5%
TransformerPadding	1.236	2 % 5 % 10 %	0.115 54.4% 0.122 52.6% 0.119 50.9%	0.121 50.3% 0.121 49.7%	0.120 48.0%	0.144 69.0% 0.143 66.1% 0.153 67.3%	0.142 64.3% 0.157 66.7%	0.160 65.5%	0.187 84.2% 0.183 81.3% 0.191 83.6%	0.188 81.3% 0.190 82.5 %	0.194 81.9%
TransformerConv	1.175	2 % 5 % 10 %	0.105 66.1% 0.099 63.2% 0.095 63.2%	0.103 60.8% 0.097 61.4%	0.095 56.7%	0.144 73.7% 0.146 74.9% 0.137 70.8%	0.143 72.5% 0.137 70.2%	0.137 67.8%	0.219 80.1% 0.210 79.5% 0.215 78.9%	0.202 78.9% 0.210 78.9%	0.206 77.8%

Table 28: (Weather) Evaluate MAE of MIA with different pretrained models on multi-variate time series forecasting (MTSF).

Model	Deceline	T		$\Delta = 1.0$			$\Delta = 1.2$			$\Delta = 1.5$	
Model	Dasenne	L_{mask}	2 %	5 %	10 %	2 %	5 %	10 %	2 %	5 %	10 %
MLP-Mixer	0.793	2 % 5 % 10 %	0.362 71.1% 0.367 71.5% 0.362 70.2%	0.359 68.7% 0.361 70.0%	0.347 66.1%	0.440 78.0% 0.445 78.0% 0.439 77.3%	0.436 76.5% 0.438 77.3 %	0.425 74.5%	0.566 84.6% 0.571 84.5% 0.563 84.0%	0.560 83.3% 0.561 83.9 %	0.545 82.0%
MLP	0.831	2 % 5 % 10 %	0.405 70.0% 0.406 71.9% 0.405 71.3%	0.396 66.6% 0.402 70.4%	0.389 63.0%	0.476 78.1% 0.478 79.6% 0.478 79.8%	0.468 75.1% 0.475 79.2%	0.461 73.3%	0.586 85.9% 0.587 86.6% 0.586 86.2%	0.578 84.1% 0.584 86.2%	0.572 84.1%
LSTM	0.898	2 % 5 % 10 %	0.432 72.3% 0.432 72.3% 0.432 72.6%	0.431 71.8% 0.432 72.3%	0.428 71.4%	0.516 77.2% 0.517 77.2% 0.516 77.0%	0.516 76.7% 0.516 77.1%	0.511 76.5%	0.645 83.6% 0.646 83.5% 0.646 83.6%	0.644 83.0% 0.646 83.6 %	0.640 83.2%
GRU	1.135	2 % 5 % 10 %	0.417 51.7% 0.419 52.3% 0.419 52.4%	0.414 49.8% 0.417 52.1%	0.410 49.4%	0.514 63.3% 0.516 63.8% 0.515 63.7%	0.512 61.8% 0.513 63.3 %	0.506 59.6%	0.654 73.8% 0.655 74.3% 0.654 74.1%	0.652 72.8% 0.652 73.7%	0.646 70.9%
RNN	0.777	2 % 5 % 10 %	0.385 73.1% 0.388 74.8% 0.391 74.7%	0.367 71.2% 0.389 73.6%	0.363 65.4%	0.465 77.6% 0.471 79.3% 0.475 79.6%	0.447 75.3% 0.473 78.7%	0.446 72.0%	0.587 82.8% 0.593 83.7% 0.598 83.7%	0.568 79.6% 0.595 83.1 %	0.567 77.7%
TransformerNormal	0.891	2 % 5 % 10 %	0.412 68.4% 0.412 68.2% 0.406 66.6%	0.409 66.9% 0.407 66.4%	0.399 65.2%	0.491 73.1% 0.491 73.1% 0.485 72.8%	0.489 72.6% 0.486 72.5%	0.479 71.9%	0.619 80.0% 0.616 79.2% 0.609 78.8%	0.614 78.6% 0.609 78.5%	0.601 77.7%
TransformerPadding	0.844	2 % 5 % 10 %	0.392 70.1% 0.392 70.0% 0.387 69.5%	0.387 69.3% 0.385 69.0%	0.382 68.2%	0.480 76.9% 0.479 76.5% 0.474 76.3%	0.474 76.1% 0.473 76.0%	0.469 75.5%	0.611 83.5% 0.611 83.4% 0.604 82.8%	0.606 83.2% 0.603 82.7%	0.600 82.6%
TransformerConv	0.886	2 % 5 % 10 %	0.394 66.9% 0.393 66.6% 0.389 65.6%	0.391 66.1% 0.388 65.5%	0.384 63.9%	0.475 74.5% 0.475 74.3% 0.468 72.4%	0.472 73.7% 0.466 72.0%	0.459 70.5%	0.598 82.3% 0.598 82.2% 0.592 81.4%	0.596 81.6% 0.592 81.1%	0.582 79.9%

Model	Baseline	$L_{\rm mask}$	2 %	$\Delta = 1.0 \\ 5 \%$	10 %	2 %	$\Delta = 1.2 \\ 5 \%$	10 %	2 %	$\Delta = 1.5 \\ 5 \%$	10 %
MLP-Mixer	1.227	2 % 5 % 10 %	0.159 71.1% 0.162 71.5% 0.159 70.2%	0.157 68.7% 0.158 70.0%	0.149 66.1%	0.235 78.0% 0.238 78.0% 0.234 77.3%	0.232 76.5% 0.233 77.3%	0.222 74.5%	0.378 84.6% 0.383 84.5% 0.376 84.0%	0.373 83.3% 0.375 83.9%	0.359 82.0%
MLP	1.485	2 % 5 % 10 %	0.187 70.0% 0.187 71.9% 0.187 71.3%	0.180 66.6% 0.184 70.4 %	0.176 63.0%	0.262 78.1% 0.263 79.6% 0.263 79.8%	0.255 75.1% 0.261 79.2%	0.250 73.3%	0.403 85.9% 0.405 86.6% 0.404 86.2%	0.395 84.1% 0.402 86.2 %	0.390 84.1%
LSTM	1.900	2 % 5 % 10 %	0.204 72.3% 0.204 72.3% 0.205 72.6%	0.204 71.8% 0.204 72.3 %	0.202 71.4%	0.293 77.2% 0.293 77.2% 0.293 77.0%	0.292 76.7% 0.293 77.1%	0.289 76.5%	0.455 83.6% 0.456 83.5% 0.456 83.6 %	0.455 83.0% 0.456 83.6 %	0.451 83.2%
GRU	2.167	2 % 5 % 10 %	0.194 51.7% 0.195 52.3% 0.195 52.4%	0.192 49.8% 0.194 52.1%	0.189 49.4 %	0.290 63.3% 0.292 63.8% 0.291 63.7%	0.289 61.8% 0.290 63.3%	0.283 59.6%	0.465 73.8% 0.467 74.3% 0.466 74.1%	0.464 72.8% 0.464 73.7%	0.457 70.9%
RNN	1.591	2 % 5 % 10 %	0.171 73.1% 0.173 74.8% 0.176 74.7%	0.160 71.2% 0.174 73.6%	0.158 65.4%	0.249 77.6% 0.252 79.3% 0.256 79.6%	0.234 75.3% 0.253 78.7%	0.234 72.0%	0.392 82.8% 0.397 83.7% 0.402 83.7%	0.371 79.6% 0.399 83.1 %	0.371 77.7%
TransformerNormal	1.457	2 % 5 % 10 %	0.190 68.4% 0.190 68.2% 0.187 66.6%	0.189 66.9% 0.187 66.4%	0.182 65.2%	0.272 73.1% 0.272 73.1% 0.268 72.8%	0.271 72.6% 0.268 72.5%	0.262 71.9%	0.432 80.0% 0.430 79.2% 0.423 78.8%	0.427 78.6% 0.422 78.5%	0.414 77.7%
TransformerPadding	1.502	2 % 5 % 10 %	0.178 70.1% 0.178 70.0% 0.175 69.5%	0.175 69.3% 0.174 69.0%	0.171 68.2%	0.263 76.9% 0.262 76.5% 0.258 76.3%	0.258 76.1% 0.257 76.0%	0.255 75.5%	0.418 83.5% 0.418 83.4% 0.411 82.8%	0.413 83.2% 0.410 82.7%	0.407 82.6%
TransformerConv	1.599	2 % 5 % 10 %	0.179 66.9% 0.179 66.6% 0.176 65.6%	0.178 66.1% 0.175 65.5%	0.171 63.9%	0.261 74.5% 0.261 74.3% 0.256 72.4%	0.259 73.7% 0.254 72.0%	0.248 70.5%	0.410 82.3% 0.410 82.2% 0.405 81.4%	0.407 81.6% 0.404 81.1%	0.395 79.9%

Table 29: (Weather) Evaluate MSE of MIA with different pretrained models on multi-variate time series forecasting (MTSF).

Table 30: Compare ℓ_0 -norm localized perturbation to ℓ_2 -norm perturbation (computed by the algorithm [2]) on the MSE between the original forecast and the perturbed forecast. The table reports the relative improvement of the ℓ_0 -norm perturbation over the ℓ_2 -norm perturbation (averaging among 128 randomly selected samples). The positive value indicates that our ℓ_0 -norm perturbation outperforms ℓ_0 -norm perturbation. For fairness, the ℓ_0 or ℓ_2 norm of the perturbation is restricted to be no larger than $\beta \times$ the average value among the ℓ_0 or ℓ_2 norm of all the testing samples. Values in tables are calculated as $(MSE_{\ell_0} - MSE_{\ell_2})/MSE_{\ell_2}$.

Madal		A	ttack Rate (β)	
Model	10 %	20 %	30 %	40 %	50 %
MLP-Mixer	+769.9 %	+89.5 %	+73.3 %	+12.3 %	+53.1 %
GRU	+2.5 %	-1.6 %	-8.3 %	-3.3 %	-6.5 %
LSTM	+23.1 %	+15.1 %	-33.5 %	-14.8 %	+2.0 %
MLP	+265.0 %	+376.3 %	+211.6 %	+114.1 %	+58.3 %

Table 31: (Exchange) Time series attack. Difference of MSE between ℓ_0 and ℓ_2 attack.

Madal		At	tack Rate (β)		
Model	10 %	20 %	30 %	40 %	50 %
MLP-Mixer	+1000.1 %	+332.2 %	+114.7 %	+131.7 %	+84.6 %
GRU	-48.6 %	-45.1 %	-39.7 %	-31.7 %	-20.9 %
LSTM	-8.8 %	-28.3 %	-24.9 %	-16.2 %	-6.6 %
MLP	+528.9 %	+101.8 %	+36.9 %	+8.8 %	+6.2 %

Table 32: (Traffic) Time series attack. Difference of MSE between ℓ_0 and ℓ_2 attack.

Madal		A	ttack Rate (β)	
Model	10 %	20 %	30 %	40 %	50 %
MLP-Mixer	+3310.1 %	+841.8 %	+328.5 %	+317.7 %	+205.5 %
GRU	+147.0 %	+28.2 %	+7.3 %	-4.7 %	+21.6 %
LSTM	+239.0 %	+66.8 %	+14.9 %	+2.5 %	-2.8 %
MLP	+1760.4 %	+145.7 %	+38.4 %	+7.5 %	-7.6 %

	N	r	Dist	alPhalanxT	ſW	Mide	llePhalanx	TW	ProximalPhalanxTW		
Model	Metric, $\sigma = 0.010$	L _{mask}	5 %	10 %	15 %	5 %	10 %	15 %	5 %	10 %	15 %
FCN	ACC	5 % 10 % 15 %	1.0 % -1.0 % 1.0 %	0.0 % 3.0 %	0.0 %	-3.0 % 0.0 % -4.0 %	-1.0 % -3.0 %	-4.0 %	0.0 % -1.0 % -1.0 %	-3.0 % 1.0 %	3.0 %
MLP-Mixer	ACC	5 % 10 % 15 %	0.0 % -2.0 % -2.0 %	-2.0 % 0.0 %	-2.0 %	0.0 % 0.0 % -1.0 %	-1.0 % 1.0 %	-2.0 %	1.0 % -1.0 % 1.0 %	-1.0 % 0.0 %	2.0 %
MLP	ACC	5 % 10 % 15 %	-1.0 % -1.0 % 1.0 %	-1.0 % 1.0 %	3.0 %	2.0 % -1.0 % 2.0 %	0.0 % 4.0 %	2.0 %	0.0 % 0.0 % 1.0 %	0.0 % 0.0 %	0.0 %
ResNet-18	ACC	5 % 10 % 15 %	-2.0 % 3.0 % -1.0 %	0.0 % -3.0 %	-1.0 %	-1.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 %	0.0 % 1.0 %	1.0 %	0.0 % 0.0 % -1.0 %	1.0 % -2.0 %	-1.0 %

Table 33: (DistalPhalanxTW $L_{mask} = 15\%)~\sigma = 0.01$

Table 34: (DistalPhalanxTW $L_{mask} = 15\%)~\sigma = 0.02$

M - 1-1	Matria 0.000	τ	Dista	alPhalanxT	W	Mide	ilePhalanx'	ГW	Proxi	malPhalan	хТW
Model	Metric, $\sigma = 0.020$	L _{mask}	5 %	10 %	15 %	5 %	10 %	15 %	5 %	10 %	15 %
FCN	ACC	5 % 10 % 15 %	-1.0 % 0.0 % 5.0 %	1.0 % 6.9 %	3.0 %	$\begin{array}{c} 0.0 \ \% \\ 0.0 \ \% \\ 0.0 \ \% \end{array}$	0.0 % -1.0 %	-2.0 %	0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 %	0.0 % 1.0 %	2.0 %
MLP-Mixer	ACC	5 % 10 % 15 %	0.0 % 1.0 % -1.0 %	0.0 % 3.0 %	5.0 %	1.0 % 0.0 % 2.0 %	2.0 % 0.0 %	0.0 %	1.0 % 1.0 % 0.0 %	-1.0 % 0.0 %	0.0 %
MLP	ACC	5 % 10 % 15 %	0.0 % 3.0 % 0.0 %	0.0 % 2.0 %	3.0 %	2.0 % 1.0 % 2.0 %	2.0 % 3.0 %	3.0 %	0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 %	1.0 % 0.0 %	0.0 %
ResNet-18	ACC	5 % 10 % 15 %	-3.0 % 5.0 % 0.0 %	1.0 % 1.0 %	1.0 %	0.0 % -1.0 % 1.0 %	1.0 % 2.0 %	2.0 %	0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 %	0.0 % -1.0 %	-1.0 %

Table 35: (DistalPhalanxTW $L_{mask} = 15\%)~\sigma = 0.03$

Madal	Matria - 0.020	r	Dist	alPhalanxT	W	Mide	ilePhalanx	TW	Proxi	malPhalan	хTW
Woder	Metric, $\sigma = 0.050$	Lmask	5 %	10 %	15 %	5 %	10 %	15 %	5 %	10 %	15 %
		5 %	-2.0 %			0.0 %			1.0 %		
FCN	ACC	10 %	-2.0 %	0.0 %		-1.0 %	-3.0 %		-3.0 %	-2.0 %	
		15 %	2.0 %	3.0 %	2.0 %	-2.0 %	-3.0 %	-2.0 %	-1.0 %	2.0 %	2.0 %
		5 %	0.0 %			1.0 %			2.0 %		
MLP-Mixer	ACC	10 %	0.0 %	1.0 %		-1.0 %	1.0 %		1.0 %	0.0 %	
		15 %	-1.0 %	3.0 %	3.0 %	1.0 %	0.0 %	0.0 %	1.0 %	1.0 %	0.0 %
		5 %	0.0 %			2.0 %			0.0 %		
MLP	ACC	10 %	1.0 %	1.0 %		0.0 %	1.0 %		0.0 %	1.0 %	
		15 %	1.0 %	3.0 %	4.0 %	0.0 %	1.0 %	1.0 %	-1.0 %	0.0 %	-1.0 %
		5 %	-4.0 %			2.0 %			0.0 %		
ResNet-18	ACC	10 %	0.0 %	-1.0 %		0.0 %	1.0 %		0.0 %	1.0 %	
		15 %	-1.0 %	-1.0 %	0.0 %	0.0 %	1.0 %	1.0 %	0.0 %	0.0 %	0.0 %

Table 36: (DistalPhalanxTW $L_{mask} = 15\%) \, \sigma = 0.04$

Model	Metric, $\sigma = 0.040$	$L_{\rm mask}$	DistalPhalanxTW			MiddlePhalanxTW			ProximalPhalanxTW		
			5 %	10 %	15 %	5 %	10 %	15 %	5 %	10 %	15 %
FCN	ACC	5 %	2.0 %			-1.0 %			0.0 %		
		10 %	2.0 %	3.0 %		-2.0 %	-2.0 %		-2.0 %	-2.0 %	
		15 %	2.0 %	1.0 %	0.0 %	-1.0 %	-2.0 %	-2.0 %	-3.0 %	1.0 %	1.0 %
MLP-Mixer		5 %	-1.0 %			1.0 %			0.0 %		
	ACC	10 %	0.0 %	1.0 %		0.0 %	-1.0 %		0.0 %	0.0 %	
		15 %	0.0 %	2.0 %	0.0 %	0.0 %	1.0 %	-2.0 %	-1.0 %	2.0 %	0.0 %
MLP		5 %	1.0 %			1.0 %			1.0 %		
	ACC	10 %	1.0 %	0.0 %		0.0 %	1.0 %		1.0 %	1.0 %	
		15 %	1.0 %	3.0 %	4.0 %	1.0 %	3.0 %	3.0 %	-1.0 %	0.0 %	0.0 %
ResNet-18		5 %	-1.0 %			1.0 %			-1.0 %		
	ACC	10 %	0.0 %	0.0 %		0.0 %	1.0 %		1.0 %	1.0 %	
		15 %	2.0 %	2.0 %	0.0 %	1.0 %	1.0 %	2.0 %	0.0 %	0.0 %	-1.0 %

Table 37: (DistalPhalanxTW $L_{mask} = 15\%$) $\sigma = 0.05$

Model	Metric, $\sigma = 0.050$	$L_{\rm mask}$	DistalPhalanxTW			MiddlePhalanxTW			ProximalPhalanxTW		
			5 %	10 %	15 %	5 %	10 %	15 %	5 %	10 %	15 %
FCN	ACC	5 % 10 % 15 %	1.0 % 0.0 % 5.0 %	1.0 % 4.0 %	2.0 %	0.0 % -1.0 % 0.0 %	-4.0 % -1.0 %	-2.0 %	1.0 % -1.0 % 0.0 %	0.0 % 2.0 %	1.0 %
MLP-Mixer	ACC	5 % 10 % 15 %	-1.0 % 1.0 % 2.0 %	1.0 % 5.0 %	0.0 %	-2.0 % -2.0 % 3.0 %	-1.0 % 1.0 %	0.0 %	1.0 % -1.0 % 0.0 %	-2.0 % -1.0 %	2.0 %
MLP	ACC	5 % 10 % 15 %	1.0 % 4.0 % 2.0 %	1.0 % 3.0 %	3.0 %	2.0 % -1.0 % 2.0 %	1.0 % 4.0 %	1.0 %	0.0 % 0.0 % -1.0 %	0.0 % 0.0 %	0.0 %
ResNet-18	ACC	5 % 10 % 15 %	-2.0 % 3.0 % 1.0 %	-1.0 % 1.0 %	0.0 %	0.0 % -1.0 % 1.0 %	-1.0 % 1.0 %	1.0 %	-1.0 % 0.0 % -1.0 %	-1.0 % 0.0 %	-1.0 %



Figure 4: (Traffic) Imputation quality with different imputation models. We set $L_{\text{mask}} = 10\%$. Original and imputed refer to the original time series and the imputed time series respectively.