

CROSS-MODAL OBFUSCATION FOR JAILBREAK ATTACKS ON LARGE VISION-LANGUAGE MODELS

Anonymous authors

Paper under double-blind review

ABSTRACT


Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) demonstrate exceptional performance across multimodal tasks, yet remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that bypass safety mechanisms. Existing jailbreak methods suffer from two critical limitations: insufficient stealth against input-level defense filters and high computational costs from lengthy prompts or iterative procedures. In this work, we present Cross-modal Adversarial Multimodal Obfuscation (CAMO), a black-box jailbreak framework that decomposes harmful instructions into benign-looking textual and visual clues. CAMO leverages LVLMs’ cross-modal reasoning to reconstruct attack intent while each component appears harmless in isolation, evading defense filters. Our compositional obfuscation design achieves superior efficiency, using only 12.6% of tokens required by existing methods while achieving high attack success rates of 81.82% on GPT-4.1-nano and 93.94% on DeepSeek-R1. CAMO bypasses multiple defense mechanisms with 100% evasion rate, demonstrating effectiveness across both open-source and closed-source models. This work exposes critical vulnerabilities in current multimodal safety protocols and underscores the need for more sophisticated defense strategies.

1 INTRODUCTION

Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) have made rapid progress in multimodal reasoning, visual understanding, and instruction following (Achiam et al., 2023; Team et al., 2024; ant, 2024; Wang et al., 2024a; Liu et al., 2024a). Their widespread deployment across diverse applications—from autonomous systems to healthcare diagnostics—necessitates rigorous evaluation of their safety and robustness properties (Mazeika et al., 2024). Jailbreak attacks represent one of the most critical security threats to current LVLM-based systems. These attacks craft specially designed inputs to elicit harmful outputs that violate safety constraints, potentially enabling malicious actors to exploit deployed models for generating dangerous content, misinformation, or instructions for illegal activities (Luo et al., 2024).

Consequently, the development of advanced jailbreak attacks is essential for red-teaming LVLM systems—by proactively identifying and understanding potential attack vectors, researchers can develop more robust defenses and mitigate vulnerabilities before malicious exploitation occurs. Current jailbreak methodologies bifurcate into two primary categories: textual and visual attacks. Textual approaches embed malicious content through adversarial suffixes or multi-turn role-playing strategies (Andriushchenko et al., 2024; Chao et al., 2023; Zeng et al., 2024), while visual methods inject harmful content via adversarial text overlays or embedded patches within images (Li et al., 2024; Gong et al., 2025). Both paradigms have demonstrated notable success in bypassing safeguards. However, existing jailbreak methods suffer from two critical limitations that severely constrain their practical effectiveness. First, they lack sufficient *stealth* and are vulnerable to input-level defense filters—when defensive systems deploy additional filtering mechanisms at the input stage, most current approaches fail to bypass these defenses and achieve successful attacks (Jain et al., 2023). For example, adversarial suffixes like “xjk9mq2w!@#v1z8n” and harmful content embedded within images (e.g., “bomb”) are easily detectable by filtering systems (as shown in Figure 1a). Second, they incur *high computational costs* in three ways: (i) requiring excessively long input sequences, as demonstrated by the token count comparison in Figure 1b; (ii) necessitating expensive iterative training procedures (Carlini et al., 2023; Wang et al., 2024b; Shayegani et al., 2023); and

(iii) relying on auxiliary LLMs to synthesize attack prompts (Chao et al., 2023; Zeng et al., 2024), which further increases API costs and latency.



(a) Comparison between CAMO and prior attack methods. (b) Comparison of the number of tokens.

Figure 1: CAMO’s advantages in stealth and efficiency compared to existing methods.

To address these limitations, we propose *Cross-modal Adversarial Multimodal Obfuscation (CAMO)*, a black-box jailbreak framework that decomposes harmful instructions into benign-looking textual and visual clues. While each clue appears harmless in isolation, they are jointly interpreted by LVLMs to semantically reconstruct the original attack intent through multi-step cross-modal reasoning. Specifically, CAMO identifies sensitive keywords (e.g., “explosive”) and replaces them with two textual clues—a partially masked fragment (e.g., “_xplosive”) and a simple math question (e.g., “What is 7 + 6?”), while embedding a character–number lookup table in an accompanying image; reconstructing the term requires solving the math (“13”), mapping the result to the corresponding character in the visual table (“13” → “e”), and filling the blank to recover the full word. This compositional obfuscation design addresses the *stealth* limitation by enabling each component to appear harmless in isolation while evading single-modality defense filters, and simultaneously solves the *cost* problem by leveraging the model’s reasoning capabilities to distract safety mechanisms rather than relying on lengthy inputs or random noise, resulting in 87% fewer tokens than existing methods (Figure 1b). Crucially, CAMO operates under strict black-box constraints without requiring model parameters or gradients, making it highly practical for commercial LVLm deployments. The novelty and key contributions of this work are summarized as follows:

- We develop a lightweight attack pipeline CAMO that operates under strict black-box constraints, requiring only single-turn queries without access to model parameters, gradients, or internal representations. Through multimodal decomposition of harmful instructions into distributed benign components, CAMO achieves computational efficiency and strong generalization capability.
- We propose compositional obfuscation that (i) decomposes harmful intent into benign cross-modal clues so each modality passes input filters, and (ii) achieves model interference via cross-modal decryption instead of long or noise-padded prompts, using only 12.6% of prior tokens (179 vs. 1420).
- We demonstrate effectiveness across state-of-the-art LVLms: 81.82% ASR on GPT-4.1-nano (OpenAI, 2025), 93.94% on DeepSeek-R1 (Guo et al., 2025), and 100% evasion against three defenses (perplexity-based filters (Jain et al., 2023), OCR keyword detection, OpenAI content moderation (OpenAI, 2024)).

2 RELATED WORK

Large Vision-Language Models (LVLms). The advancement of Large Language Models (LLMs) (Achiam et al., 2023; Touvron et al., 2023; Yang et al., 2024; Reid et al., 2024) has spurred progress in Large Vision-Language Models (Yin et al., 2023), extending LLMs’ reasoning and understanding to the visual domain by converting visual data into token sequences. A cross-modal projector facilitates this integration by bridging the visual encoder and LLMs (Bai et al., 2023; Liu et al., 2024a; Wang et al., 2024a; 2023) which is achieved through a lightweight Q-Former (Li et al., 2023) or simpler projection networks like linear layers (Zhu et al., 2023) or MLPs (Liu et al., 2024a).




Figure 2: Overview of the CAMO pipeline. Given a harmful question (e.g., “How to make a bomb”), CAMO identifies risky keywords and obfuscates them through cross-modal decomposition. Math expressions are embedded in the text, guiding the model to resolve character indices from OCR-visible clues in the image. This composition evades unimodal safety filters while triggering harmful completions via joint reasoning.

Jailbreak Attacks. Jailbreak attacks have emerged as a critical tool for evaluating the safety boundaries of large vision-language models (Luo et al., 2024; Mazeika et al., 2024). Early works primarily focused on text-only attacks, employing adversarial suffixes (Zou et al., 2023a; Andriushchenko et al., 2024; Liao & Sun, 2024; Liu et al., 2023) or multi-turn role-play strategies (Chao et al., 2023; Zeng et al., 2024) to manipulate the model’s behavior. These methods often require carefully crafted prompts and multiple rounds of interaction to succeed. Another line of work aims to obfuscate harmful prompts through semantic disguise. Some approaches encrypt malicious instructions using cipher-based transformations (Yuan et al., 2023; Handa et al., 2024; Liu et al., 2024b), while others translate them into low-resource languages to evade detection (Yong et al., 2023). More recent studies have extended jailbreak strategies into the visual modality. For example, HADES (Li et al., 2024) synthesized the harmful image into a semantically more harmful one by diffusion models for providing a better jailbreaking context and renders adversarial keywords directly onto images, while FigStep (Gong et al., 2025) embeds harmful queries as optical character recognition (OCR) readable text. Jailbreak.in.Pieces (Shayegani et al., 2023) propose a compositional multimodal attack that combines adversarial images with benign textual prompts to induce harmful outputs. Their method relies on white-box access to the vision encoder for optimizing image embeddings, thus limiting applicability to open-source models. However, existing jailbreak methods suffer from two critical limitations that severely constrain their practical effectiveness. First, they lack sufficient *stealth* and are vulnerable to input-level defense filters—adversarial suffixes and harmful content embedded within images are easily detectable by filtering systems, causing most approaches to fail when defensive systems deploy additional screening mechanisms (Jain et al., 2023). Second, they incur *high computational costs* through requiring excessively long input sequences, necessitating expensive iterative training procedures, and relying on auxiliary LLMs or multi-turn interactions, which significantly increases API costs and latency. To address these limitations, we propose CAMO, which decomposes harmful instructions into benign cross-modal clues that individually evade defense filters but collectively reconstruct the attack intent. This approach achieves stealth and efficiency through single-turn black-box queries with significantly fewer tokens than existing methods.

3 METHODOLOGY

In this section, we present the framework and detailed methodology for our proposed CAMO. As illustrated in Figure 2, CAMO decomposes malicious instructions into semantically benign visual and textual components, which are then reconstructed through multi-step inference to elicit harmful

responses while evading conventional detection systems. Specifically, our framework comprises four core components: (1) Target Keyword Selection, which extracts potentially harmful elements from input prompts; (2) Cross-modal Decomposition, which transforms identified elements into distributed visual-textual puzzles; (3) Obfuscated Query Construction, which assembles benign-appearing multimodal inputs; and (4) Reasoning Complexity Control, which dynamically adjusts puzzle difficulty to balance stealth and success rates. The subsequent sections provide detailed exposition of these four components.

3.1 TARGET KEYWORD SELECTION

Given an input prompt $T = [t_1, t_2, \dots, t_n]$, we first identify a candidate keyword set W for adversarial manipulation. We construct a composite sensitive dictionary \mathcal{D} containing manually curated harmful terms (e.g., *kill, bomb, illegal*). We process the input prompt using POS tagging and lemmatization, then extract keywords whose lemmatized form appears in \mathcal{D} while excluding stopwords \mathcal{S} , yielding the initial matched set M . When the number of matched keywords falls below a threshold (proportion α of non-stopword content), we supplement M with additional informative terms from T , selected from nouns, verbs, and adjectives ranked by descending length. If no relevant keywords are identified, we select the shortest noun or adjective from $T \setminus \mathcal{S}$ as fallback. Finally, the resulting keyword list W is sorted by original prompt order to preserve semantic structure. The full extraction procedure can be found in the appendix.

3.2 CROSS-MODAL REASONING CHAIN GENERATION

To obfuscate adversarial intent while maintaining semantic coherence, we devise a cross-modal transformation mechanism that decomposes each selected keyword $w_i \in W$ into a sequence of multimodal clues. This approach leverages the reasoning burden imposed by multi-step inference for analyzing the clues to bypass detection mechanisms while preserving the underlying malicious semantics.

Each clue maps one character c_j from w_i to a visual location using a simple math question and an OCR index. Formally, for each selected character c_j , we generate a question Q_j such that:

$$A_j = \text{solve}(Q_j), \quad c_j \in w_i, \quad (1)$$

where A_j is a numeric solution used as a spatial index. The image I contains a map from index to character:

$$c_j = \mathcal{F}_{\text{OCR}}(I[A_j]), \quad (2)$$

where $\mathcal{F}_{\text{OCR}}(\cdot)$ denotes the character extracted from image region A_j .

We define the full reasoning chain for recovering the attack content as:

$$\hat{W} = \mathcal{G} \left(\{ \mathcal{F}_{\text{OCR}}(I[\text{solve}(Q_j)]) \}_{j=1}^{|w_i|} \right), \quad (3)$$

where $\mathcal{G}(\cdot)$ represents the semantic reconstruction function that assembles individual characters into coherent keywords. In such a process, it compels the model to traverse multiple steps across modalities to recover the original W .

3.3 INSTRUCTION RECONSTRUCTION AND EXECUTION

The culmination of the cross-modal obfuscation process involves the synthesis of adversarial inputs that necessitate multi-step reasoning for malicious intent recovery. The final adversarial construct comprises two integrated components: a textual prompt T' and a visual input I' , which collectively constitute a cross-modal reasoning task designed to elicit harmful responses through distributed semantic reconstruction. The textual component T' combines a fixed reasoning template Φ with the list of math questions $\{Q_j\}_{j=1}^m$. This composition is formally expressed as: $T' = \mathcal{C}(\Phi, Q_j)$ for $j = 1, \dots, m$ with $\mathcal{C}(\cdot)$ denotes the filling the list of math questions into Φ . The template instructs the model to perform mathematical reasoning, index character positions, and synthesize the complete response from recovered characters. The template Φ can be found in the appendix.

To recover the masked instruction, the model must (1) solve each math question Q_j to compute its answer A_j , (2) use A_j as a spatial index to retrieve character c_j from the image I' , and (3) sequentially reassemble the full target phrase. This modular construction ensures that each individual

clue—whether textual or visual—remains benign, nonspecific, and interpretable in isolation. As a result, the composite prompt evades detection by perplexity-based filters, OCR-based scanning, and human review, while still enabling the model to infer the underlying harmful instruction through multi-step reasoning.

3.4 COARSE-TO-FINE DIFFICULTY ADJUSTMENT

To balance attack stealth and reconstructability, CAMO introduces a dynamic difficulty adjustment mechanism that operates along two orthogonal dimensions: (1) the proportion r of selected content words to be masked, and (2) the masking depth k applied within each selected word, defined as a character-level proportion. Given a filtered candidate word set $W = \{w_1, w_2, \dots\}$ obtained from part-of-speech-aware extraction (Section 3.1), we randomly sample a subset $W_r \subseteq W$ such that:

$$|W_r| = \lfloor r \cdot |W| \rfloor, \quad (4)$$

where $r \in (0, 1]$ determines the fraction of words selected for masking. Each word $w \in W_r$ is then partially obscured by masking its prefix proportionally:

$$\text{Mask}(w; k) = [\text{MASK}]^{\lfloor k \cdot |w| \rfloor} \parallel w_{\lfloor k \cdot |w| \rfloor + 1}, \quad (5)$$

where $k \in (0, 1]$ defines the fraction of characters to mask, and $w_{i:}$ denotes the suffix starting from the $(i + 1)$ -th character. The masked portion is then transformed into mathematical or visual clues (see Section 3.2) to construct the cross-modal prompt.

Coarse-to-Fine Masking Perspective. From a linguistic perspective, prefixes typically carry more semantic information than suffixes (e.g., *-ive*, *-ion*). Masking *explosive* as *_____sive* removes the critical semantic prefix while preserving only the grammatical suffix, maximizing obfuscation effectiveness. From a computational perspective, subword embeddings make prefix-preserved forms like *explo_____* closely align with the original *explosive* embedding, enabling easy detection. Therefore, masking the prefix (e.g., *_____sive*) conceals the most informative components while allowing reconstruction through contextual reasoning. This fine-grained masking strategy enhances both stealth and efficiency: it shortens the prompt compared to full-keyword masking, reduces reconstruction difficulty, and increases the likelihood of bypassing content-based filters. Combined with coarse-level control, it enables CAMO to adaptively adjust difficulty for optimal attack success.

4 EXPERIMENTS

4.1 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP

Datasets. We evaluate CAMO on AdvBench (Zou et al., 2023b), containing 520 harmful prompts, and AdvBench-M (Niu et al., 2024), which extends AdvBench to the multimodal setting. Both datasets group harmful prompts into eight threat categories: *bomb_explosive* (BE), *drugs* (DR), *suicide* (SU), *hack_information* (HI), *kill_someone* (KS), *social_violence* (SV), *finance_stock* (FS), and *firearms_weapons* (FW). We insert neutral blank images when no visual content is available to maintain consistent input formatting.

Baselines. We compare CAMO against five attack strategies under two configurations: (1) Text-only: AP (Andriushchenko et al., 2024), DRA (Liu et al., 2024b), and PAPs (Zeng et al., 2024). We adapt CAMO by embedding visual clues as natural language words. (2) Image+Text: FigStep and FigStep_{pro} (Gong et al., 2025) OCR entire harmful requests into images, with FigStep_{pro} segmenting across three sub-images. HADES (Li et al., 2024) renders keywords from CAMO’s dictionary into images. All methods use single-query evaluation.

Victim Models. We evaluate CAMO on two categories of models. For closed-source commercial models, we test on GPT-4o, GPT-4o-mini (Hurst et al., 2024), GPT-4.1-nano (OpenAI, 2025), and Gemini-2.0-Flash (DeepMind, 2025), all accessed via their official APIs. For open-source models, we evaluate three models from Together AI (AI, 2025): DeepSeek-R1 (Guo et al., 2025), a reasoning-enhanced language model with explicit step-by-step deliberation capabilities, and two large vision-language models—Qwen2-VL-72B-Instruct (Wang et al., 2024a) and Qwen2.5-VL-72B-Instruct (Team, 2025). To ensure consistent evaluation across different backends, all models are constrained to produce a maximum of 500 output tokens per query, with the exception of DeepSeek-R1, which is allocated up to 8,000 tokens to accommodate its chain-of-thought reasoning process.

Due to current limitations of the Together AI platform, which does not support uploading multiple local images per request, we omit comparison with FigStep_{pro} on Qwen models.

Evaluation. Our evaluation follows metrics similar to those used in AP (Andriushchenko et al., 2024). We adopt the Attack Success Rate (ASR) as our primary metric, measuring the percentage of prompts that successfully elicit harmful responses. The judge model used is GPT-4o-2024-08-06 (Hurst et al., 2024). The evaluation prompt can be found in the appendix.

Table 1: Comparison of attack success rates (%) across methods. **Bold** indicates best.

Type	Model	Method	BE	DR	SU	HI	KS	SV	FS	FW
text-only	GPT-4o-mini	Vanilla	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	GPT-4o-mini	AP	0.00	3.23	0.00	3.03	0.00	0.00	3.33	0.00
	GPT-4o-mini	DRA	23.33	35.48	26.67	30.30	23.33	43.75	46.67	33.33
	GPT-4o-mini	PAPs	10.00	48.39	16.67	31.25	43.33	12.90	48.28	25.00
	GPT-4o-mini	Ours	53.33	51.61	40.00	45.45	23.33	53.12	53.33	36.67
image+text	GPT-4o	Vanilla	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	GPT-4o	HADES	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	GPT-4o	FigStep	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	3.33	0.00
	GPT-4o	FigStep _{pro}	3.33	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	3.33	0.00
	GPT-4o	Ours	53.33	12.90	3.45	39.39	20.00	18.75	53.33	26.67
	GPT-4.1-nano	Vanilla	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	GPT-4.1-nano	HADES	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	GPT-4.1-nano	FigStep	36.67	3.23	0.00	3.03	6.67	6.25	20.00	16.67
	GPT-4.1-nano	FigStep _{pro}	36.67	12.90	3.33	18.18	20.00	12.50	30.00	30.00
	GPT-4.1-nano	Ours	50.00	35.48	56.67	81.82	53.33	56.25	66.67	66.67
	GPT-4o-mini	Vanilla	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	GPT-4o-mini	HADES	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	GPT-4o-mini	FigStep	0.00	0.00	0.00	3.03	0.00	6.25	3.33	3.33
	GPT-4o-mini	FigStep _{pro}	6.67	3.23	3.33	0.00	0.00	0.00	10.00	0.00
	GPT-4o-mini	Ours	60.00	67.74	55.17	48.48	53.33	71.88	66.67	53.33
	Gemini-2.0-Flash	Vanilla	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.1	0.0	3.3
	Gemini-2.0-Flash	HADES	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	3.13	0.00	3.33
	Gemini-2.0-Flash	FigStep _{pro}	3.33	3.23	0.00	0.00	3.33	3.13	3.33	3.33
	Gemini-2.0-Flash	FigStep	3.33	25.81	20.00	27.27	26.67	43.75	36.67	26.67
	Gemini-2.0-Flash	Ours	26.67	61.30	33.33	75.80	83.33	62.50	86.70	46.70

4.2 COMPARISON WITH THE STATE-OF-THE-ART

Evaluation on Close-Source Models. Table 1 reports attack success rates (ASR) across eight instruction categories and four model variants, evaluated under both `text-only` and `image+text` input settings. Each method is evaluated in a single-query setting with a maximum output length of 500 tokens. CAMO consistently outperforms all baselines across models and modalities. In the `text-only` setup on GPT-4o-mini, CAMO achieves the highest attack success rates in 7 out of 8 categories while requiring the fewest input tokens, demonstrating superior effectiveness with minimal cost. For instance, in categories like BE and SV, CAMO achieves over 50% success rates while the best baselines reach only around 23-44%. It is worth noting that AP relies on iterative logits-based suffix optimization, which limits its effectiveness in a one-shot query setting, leading to comparatively lower success rates here. In contrast, CAMO’s integrated clue design achieves superior performance without requiring multiple iterations. As illustrated in Figure 1b, PAPs first uses lengthy templates to call LLMs for generating attack texts, resulting in the highest overall token consumption, while our method uses only 12.6% of the tokens required by PAPs.

In the `image+text` setting, while baseline methods generally achieve low or near-zero attack success rates, CAMO consistently delivers substantial improvements across all four tested models. For instance, on GPT-4.1-nano, CAMO attains ASRs of 81.82% in HI and 66.67% in both FS and FW, while the best baseline (FigStep_{pro}) only reaches 30.00% in these categories. Similarly, on Gemini-2.0-Flash, CAMO achieves 83.33% in KS and 86.70% in FS, compared to the best baseline performance of 43.75% and 36.67% respectively. For instance, on GPT-4.1-nano, CAMO attains ASRs of 81.82% in HI and 66.67% in both FS and FW, while the best baseline (FigStep_{pro}) only reaches 30.00% in these categories. Similarly, on Gemini-2.0-Flash, CAMO achieves 83.33% in KS and 86.70% in FS, compared to the best baseline performance of 26.67% and 36.67% re-

Table 2: Attack success rates (ASR) of CAMO and baselines across eight harmful instruction categories using open-source models accessed via the `together.ai` API.

Type	Model	Method	BE	DR	SU	HI	KS	SV	FS	FW
text only	DeepSeek-R1	Vanilla	0.00	0.00	0.00	6.06	0.00	0.00	3.33	0.00
	DeepSeek-R1	PAPs	20.00	45.16	16.67	69.70	43.33	53.13	73.33	63.33
	DeepSeek-R1	DRA	46.67	64.52	43.33	90.91	73.33	81.25	83.33	80.00
	DeepSeek-R1	AP	76.67	83.87	56.67	93.94	80.00	50.00	93.33	73.33
	DeepSeek-R1	Ours	90.00	83.87	76.67	93.94	90.00	78.13	83.33	82.76
image+text	Qwen2-VL-72B	Vanilla	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Qwen2-VL-72B	HADES	0.00	0.00	0.00	3.03	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Qwen2-VL-72B	FigStep	46.67	38.71	23.33	60.61	53.33	34.38	56.67	43.33
	Qwen2-VL-72B	Ours	56.67	77.42	70.00	96.97	86.21	78.12	76.67	83.33
	Qwen2.5-VL-72B	Vanilla	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Qwen2.5-VL-72B	HADES	0.00	0.00	0.00	3.33	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Qwen2.5-VL-72B	FigStep	36.67	45.16	20.00	60.61	66.67	31.25	56.67	40.00
	Qwen2.5-VL-72B	Ours	80.00	70.97	53.33	87.50	73.33	65.62	90.00	66.67

spectively. This performance difference stems from distinct approaches to embedding adversarial content. While methods like HADES and FigStep directly embed text-based harmful queries into images, CAMO employs multi-step cross-modal clues that progressively reconstruct the target content. We further evaluate CAMO’s ability to bypass defense filters in Section 5.2, demonstrating its effectiveness against various safety mechanisms.

Evaluation on Open-Source Models. To further evaluate the generalizability of CAMO beyond closed-source APIs, we extend our study to open-source multimodal models hosted on the Together AI platform. Specifically, we evaluate on three models: DeepSeek-R1 (Guo et al., 2025) (a reasoning-enhanced LLM) for text-only attacks, and Qwen2-VL-72B and Qwen2.5-VL-72B (LVLMS) for image+text attacks, all accessed via the `together.ai` API platform (AI, 2025).

Table 2 presents comprehensive ASR across eight harmful instruction categories under both text-only and multimodal attack configurations. The results demonstrate a clear performance hierarchy across all evaluated models and threat categories. CAMO consistently achieves the highest attack success rates, significantly outperforming all baseline methods. Notably, on DeepSeek-R1, CAMO achieves exceptional performance with ASRs reaching 93.94% for `hack_information` and 90.00% for both `bomb_explosive` and `kill_someone` categories. In the multimodal setting, CAMO maintains its superiority, achieving 96.97% ASR on `hack_information` with Qwen2-VL-72B and 90.00% on `finance_stock` with Qwen2.5-VL-72B. A key insight emerges regarding reasoning-enhanced models: DeepSeek-R1 exhibits unexpected vulnerability across all attack methods, with CAMO achieving an overall ASR of 84.8% in text-only mode. This reveals a reasoning paradox where enhanced reasoning capabilities paradoxically facilitate attack success rather than providing protection, as the model’s step-by-step deliberation process systematically reconstructs obfuscated harmful content. Furthermore, CAMO triggers exceptionally long output generation (averaging 3930 words) on reasoning models, creating an attention dispersion effect that dilutes safety monitoring effectiveness across extended reasoning chains. These findings underscore CAMO’s superior adaptability and effectiveness across diverse model architectures and platforms.

5 ABLATION STUDIES AND ANALYSIS OF ATTACK OVER DEFENSE

5.1 ABLATION STUDIES

We conduct a comprehensive ablation study to assess the contribution of each component and key hyperparameters in our attack pipeline.


Effect of Core Components. Table 3 presents the ablation results on GPT-4o-mini using ASR (%) with fixed hyperparameters $r = 0.6$ and $k = 0.4$. Each variant removes a single component from the full CAMO pipeline to isolate its individual impact. *w/o Keyword Set*: Remove the manually curated harmful keyword library, relying solely on part-of-speech filtering. *w/o Text Template*: Remove natural language wrapper templates, directly injecting attack targets. *w/o Math Encoding*:

Omit mathematical transformations, inserting tokens without arithmetic disguise. *w/o Visual Input:* Embed all clues into text channel only, removing multimodal components.


Table 3 shows each component’s contribution to CAMO’s effectiveness. The keyword set provides the largest improvements, particularly in BE (+46.67 points). Text templates enhance performance in BE and DR (+23.33 and +22.58 points), while math encoding consistently improves results. Visual input contributes most in SU (+15.17 points), demonstrating multimodal obfuscation value. These results validate CAMO’s synergistic design.

Table 3: Component ablation study (ASR, %).

Component	BE	DR	SU	HI
w/o Keyword Set	13.33	64.52	23.33	36.36
w/o Text Template	36.67	45.16	46.67	46.67
w/o Math Encoding	58.06	58.06	56.67	45.45
w/o Visual Input	53.33	51.61	40.00	45.45
CAMO (Full)	60.00	67.74	55.17	48.48



(a) Keyword selection ratio r on ASR.



(b) Character masking ratio k on ASR.

Figure 3: Ablation analysis of two key hyperparameters r and k on ASR.

Effect of Key Hyperparameters. We investigate two key hyperparameters: the keyword selection ratio r (proportion of keywords selected for manipulation) and the character masking ratio k (proportion of characters masked within each keyword). Figure 3a shows ASR under varying $r \in \{0.2, 0.4, 0.6\}$ with fixed $k = 0.4$ on GPT-4o-mini. Higher r values improve performance, with ASR on DR rising from 38.71% to 67.74%. Figure 3b shows results for varying $k \in \{0.2, 0.4, 0.6\}$ with fixed $r = 0.6$ on GPT-4.1-nano. Increasing k enhances visual obfuscation, with ASR on DR improving from 22.58% to 70.97%. Both parameters contribute to attack success by distributing harmful semantics into the visual channel.

5.2 ATTACK AGAINST DEFENSES

To evaluate CAMO’s robustness against real-world safety mechanisms, we test its performance against three common defense layers: statistical-level perplexity filtering, visual-level OCR detection, and semantic-level moderation APIs. CAMO achieves 100% success rates in bypassing all evaluated defenses, highlighting systemic vulnerabilities in current safety infrastructure.

Statistical-Level Defense: Perplexity-Based Filtering. To assess the stealthiness of CAMO-generated inputs, we evaluate against the perplexity-based defense proposed in (Jain et al., 2023), which filters syntactically irregular prompts using log-perplexity thresholds. We replicate their Basic Perplexity Filter using Qwen-2.5-0.5B (Yang et al., 2024) to compute perplexity scores for both attack prompts and corresponding harmful questions across 8 adversarial categories from the AdvBench-M dataset. Following standard practice (Jain et al., 2023), sequences with log-perplexity $\log PPL(x) > \tau$ are rejected as suspicious, where we set $\tau = 5$. CAMO achieves a **100% pass rate** under the Basic Perplexity Filter across all attack prompt samples. The average log-perplexity for these inputs is consistently low across all task categories. As illustrated in Figure 4, CAMO demonstrates remarkable consistency and stealthiness across all adversarial categories. The distribution analysis (Figure 4a) reveals that CAMO prompts achieve a concentrated distribution with an average log-perplexity of 3.39, significantly lower than the harmful questions’ average of 3.47. More importantly, the category-wise comparison (Figure 4b) demonstrates CAMO’s exceptional stability—across all 8 categories, CAMO prompts maintain consistently low perplexity values with minimal variance, indicating robust performance regardless of the specific attack domain. This stability contrasts with the higher variability observed in direct harmful questions, underscoring




Figure 4: Perplexity analysis comparing CAMO prompts and harmful questions. Higher PPL indicates lower model confidence.

CAMO’s ability to generate linguistically natural and semantically coherent prompts that reliably evade perplexity-based detection mechanisms.

Visual-Level Defense: OCR-Based Toxicity Detection. Following the experimental setup of Fig-Step (Gong et al., 2025), we apply EasyOCR (Jaied AI, 2023) to extract textual content from CAMO’s visual prompts. The extracted text is then passed to LLaMA-2-Chat-7B (Touvron et al., 2023), used as a zero-shot toxicity classifier. Remarkably, the classifier consistently labels **100%** of the samples as non-toxic. This indicates that despite the presence of harmful intent embedded in visual form, the extracted textual surface remains benign enough to evade detection by language model-based safety filters.

Semantic-Level Defense: OpenAI Moderation APIs. We evaluate CAMO against OpenAI’s Moderation API (OpenAI, 2024), which detects toxic content through semantic analysis rather than surface-level pattern matching. We test carefully designed inputs that embed harmful visual clues within benign text prompts. Despite containing malicious intent, the moderation system consistently classifies **100%** of these inputs as safe, revealing vulnerabilities to attacks requiring multi-step reasoning or semantic concealment. This highlights the need for enhanced defenses that integrate cross-modal understanding to detect sophisticated adversarial strategies.

6 CONCLUSION

We proposed Cross-modal Adversarial Multimodal Obfuscation (CAMO), a black-box jailbreak framework that addresses two critical limitations of existing methods: insufficient stealth and high computational costs. CAMO decomposes harmful instructions into benign-looking textual and visual clues that evade input-level defenses while using only 12.6% of tokens required by existing methods. Our approach achieves high attack success rates of 81.82% on GPT-4.1-nano and 93.94% on DeepSeek-R1, while maintaining 100% evasion rate against multiple defense mechanisms. The compositional obfuscation design enables practical deployment under strict black-box constraints with single-turn API queries. While CAMO demonstrates strong effectiveness, it has certain limitations that warrant future investigation. The current approach relies on manually tuned hyperparameters for keyword selection and masking ratios, which could benefit from adaptive optimization schemes. Additionally, investigating more sophisticated encoding strategies and systematically analyzing the optimal balance between textual and visual cues could further improve attack performance and generalizability across diverse model architectures. Furthermore, the adversarial examples generated by CAMO could potentially be leveraged to train more robust safety mechanisms, creating a beneficial cycle where attack methods contribute to enhanced model security. By exposing critical vulnerabilities in current multimodal safety protocols, this work underscores the need for more sophisticated defense strategies and facilitates rigorous safety evaluation of LVLMs.

ETHICS STATEMENT

This research investigates adversarial attacks against large vision-language models (LVLMs) to identify vulnerabilities in their safety mechanisms. While our work involves the generation of potentially harmful content for evaluation purposes, we emphasize that our primary objective is to improve the robustness and safety of AI systems. All experiments were conducted using publicly available datasets (AdvBench and AdvBench-M) that are commonly used in the adversarial machine learning community for safety evaluation. We do not release any harmful content generated during our experiments, nor do we provide tools that could be easily misused for malicious purposes. Our attack method CAMO is presented solely for academic research to help developers and researchers understand potential vulnerabilities and develop more effective defense mechanisms. We strongly discourage any malicious use of the techniques described in this paper and advocate for responsible disclosure and collaborative efforts to enhance AI safety. We acknowledge our responsibility to ensure this research contributes positively to the field of AI safety and security.

REFERENCES

- The Claude 3 Model Family: Opus, Sonnet, Haiku. Anthropic Blog, March 2024. URL <https://www.anthropic.com/news/claude-3-family>.
- Josh Achiam, Steven Adler, Sandhini Agarwal, Lama Ahmad, Ilge Akkaya, Florencia Leoni Aleman, Diogo Almeida, Janko Altenschmidt, Sam Altman, Shyamal Anadkat, et al. GPT-4 Technical Report. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2303.08774*, 2023.
- Together AI. Together Inference. <https://together.ai>, 2025. Accessed: 2025-06.
- Maksym Andriushchenko, Francesco Croce, and Nicolas Flammarion. Jailbreaking Leading Safety-Aligned LLMs with Simple Adaptive Attacks. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2404.02151*, 2024.
- Jinze Bai, Shuai Bai, Shusheng Yang, Shijie Wang, Sinan Tan, Peng Wang, Junyang Lin, Chang Zhou, and Jingren Zhou. Qwen-VL: A Versatile Vision-Language Model for Understanding, Localization, Text Reading, and Beyond, 2023. URL <https://arxiv.org/abs/2308.12966>.
- Nicholas Carlini, Milad Nasr, Christopher A Choquette-Choo, Matthew Jagielski, Irena Gao, Pang Wei W Koh, Daphne Ippolito, Florian Tramèr, and Ludwig Schmidt. Are aligned neural networks adversarially aligned? *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, 36:61478–61500, 2023.
- Patrick Chao, Alexander Robey, Edgar Dobriban, Hamed Hassani, George J Pappas, and Eric Wong. Jailbreaking Black Box Large Language Models in Twenty Queries. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2310.08419*, 2023.
- Google DeepMind. Gemini 2.0 flash. <https://cloud.google.com/vertex-ai/generative-ai/docs/models/gemini/2-0-flash>, 2025. Accessed: 2025-09-25.
- Yichen Gong, DeLong Ran, Jinyuan Liu, Conglei Wang, Tianshuo Cong, Anyu Wang, Sisi Duan, and Xiaoyun Wang. FigStep: Jailbreaking Large Vision-Language Models via Typographic Visual Prompts. In *Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence*, volume 39, pp. 23951–23959, 2025.
- Daya Guo, Dejian Yang, Haowei Zhang, Junxiao Song, Ruoyu Zhang, Runxin Xu, Qihao Zhu, Shirong Ma, Peiyi Wang, Xiao Bi, et al. Deepseek-r1: Incentivizing reasoning capability in llms via reinforcement learning. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2501.12948*, 2025.
- Divij Handa, Zehua Zhang, Amir Saeidi, Shrinidhi Kumbhar, and Chitta Baral. When “Competency” in Reasoning Opens the Door to Vulnerability: Jailbreaking LLMs via Novel Complex Ciphers. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2402.10601*, 2024.
- Aaron Hurst, Adam Lerer, Adam P Goucher, Adam Perelman, Aditya Ramesh, Aidan Clark, AJ Ostrow, Akila Welihinda, Alan Hayes, Alec Radford, et al. GPT-4o System Card. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2410.21276*, 2024.

-
- Jaied AI. EasyOCR 1.7.1. <https://pypi.org/project/easyocr/1.7.1/>, 2023. Accessed: 2024-02-09.
- Neel Jain, Avi Schwarzschild, Yuxin Wen, Gowthami Somepalli, John Kirchenbauer, Ping-yeh Chiang, Micah Goldblum, Aniruddha Saha, Jonas Geiping, and Tom Goldstein. Baseline defenses for adversarial attacks against aligned language models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2309.00614*, 2023.
- Junnan Li, Dongxu Li, Silvio Savarese, and Steven Hoi. BLIP-2: Bootstrapping Language-Image Pre-training with Frozen Image Encoders and Large Language Models. In *International conference on machine learning*, pp. 19730–19742. PMLR, 2023.
- Yifan Li, Hangyu Guo, Kun Zhou, Wayne Xin Zhao, and Ji-Rong Wen. Images are Achilles’ Heel of Alignment: Exploiting Visual Vulnerabilities for Jailbreaking Multimodal Large Language Models. In *European Conference on Computer Vision*, pp. 174–189. Springer, 2024.
- Zeyi Liao and Huan Sun. AmpleGCG: Learning a Universal and Transferable Generative Model of Adversarial Suffixes for Jailbreaking Both Open and Closed LLMs. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2404.07921*, 2024.
- Haotian Liu, Chunyuan Li, Yuheng Li, and Yong Jae Lee. Improved Baselines with Visual Instruction Tuning. In *Proceedings of the IEEE/CVF Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition*, pp. 26296–26306, 2024a.
- Tong Liu, Yingjie Zhang, Zhe Zhao, Yinpeng Dong, Guozhu Meng, and Kai Chen. Making Them Ask and Answer: Jailbreaking Large Language Models in Few Queries via Disguise and Reconstruction. In *33rd USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 24)*, pp. 4711–4728, 2024b.
- Xiaogeng Liu, Nan Xu, Muhao Chen, and Chaowei Xiao. AutoDAN: Generating Stealthy Jailbreak Prompts on Aligned Large Language Models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2310.04451*, 2023.
- Weidi Luo, Siyuan Ma, Xiaogeng Liu, Xiaoyu Guo, and Chaowei Xiao. JailBreakV: A Benchmark for Assessing the Robustness of MultiModal Large Language Models against Jailbreak Attacks. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2404.03027*, 2024.
- Mantas Mazeika, Long Phan, Xuwang Yin, Andy Zou, Zifan Wang, Norman Mu, Elham Sakhaee, Nathaniel Li, Steven Basart, Bo Li, et al. HarmBench: A Standardized Evaluation Framework for Automated Red Teaming and Robust Refusal. *Proceedings of Machine Learning Research*, 235: 35181–35224, 2024.
- Zhenxing Niu, Haodong Ren, Xinbo Gao, Gang Hua, and Rong Jin. Jailbreaking Attack against Multimodal Large Language Model. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2402.02309*, 2024.
- OpenAI. Moderation – OpenAI API. <https://platform.openai.com/docs/guides/moderation>, 2024. Accessed: 2024-02-09.
- OpenAI. Introducing GPT-4.1 in the API. <https://openai.com/index/gpt-4-1/>, 2025. Accessed: 2025-06.
- Machel Reid, Nikolay Savinov, Denis Teplyashin, Dmitry Lepikhin, Timothy Lillicrap, Jean-baptiste Alayrac, Radu Soricut, Angeliki Lazaridou, Orhan Firat, Julian Schrittwieser, et al. Gemini 1.5: Unlocking multimodal understanding across millions of tokens of context. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2403.05530*, 2024.
- Erfan Shayegani, Yue Dong, and Nael Abu-Ghazaleh. Jailbreak in pieces: Compositional Adversarial Attacks on Multi-Modal Language Models. In *The Twelfth International Conference on Learning Representations*, 2023.
- Gemini Team, Petko Georgiev, Ving Ian Lei, Ryan Burnell, Libin Bai, Anmol Gulati, Garrett Tanzer, Damien Vincent, Zhufeng Pan, Shibo Wang, et al. Gemini 1.5: Unlocking multimodal understanding across millions of tokens of context. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2403.05530*, 2024.
- Qwen Team. Qwen2.5-VL, January 2025. URL <https://qwenlm.github.io/blog/qwen2.5-vl/>.

- Hugo Touvron, Louis Martin, Kevin Stone, Peter Albert, Amjad Almahairi, Yasmine Babaei, Nikolay Bashlykov, Soumya Batra, Prajjwal Bhargava, Shruti Bhosale, et al. Llama 2: Open Foundation and Fine-Tuned Chat Models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2307.09288*, 2023.
- Peng Wang, Shuai Bai, Sinan Tan, Shijie Wang, Zhihao Fan, Jinze Bai, Keqin Chen, Xuejing Liu, Jialin Wang, Wenbin Ge, Yang Fan, Kai Dang, Mengfei Du, Xuancheng Ren, Rui Men, Dayiheng Liu, Chang Zhou, Jingren Zhou, and Junyang Lin. Qwen2-VL: Enhancing Vision-Language Model’s Perception of the World at Any Resolution. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2409.12191*, 2024a.
- Ruofan Wang, Xingjun Ma, Hanxu Zhou, Chuanjun Ji, Guangnan Ye, and Yu-Gang Jiang. White-box Multimodal Jailbreaks Against Large Vision-Language Models. In *Proceedings of the 32nd ACM International Conference on Multimedia*, pp. 6920–6928, 2024b.
- Weihan Wang, Qingsong Lv, Wenmeng Yu, Wenyi Hong, Ji Qi, Yan Wang, Junhui Ji, Zhuoyi Yang, Lei Zhao, Xixuan Song, et al. CogVLM: Visual Expert for Pretrained Language Models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2311.03079*, 2023.
- An Yang, Baosong Yang, Binyuan Hui, Bo Zheng, Bowen Yu, Chang Zhou, Chengpeng Li, Chengyuan Li, Dayiheng Liu, Fei Huang, Guanting Dong, Haoran Wei, Huan Lin, Jialong Tang, Jialin Wang, Jian Yang, Jianhong Tu, Jianwei Zhang, Jianxin Ma, Jin Xu, Jingren Zhou, Jinze Bai, Jinzheng He, Junyang Lin, Kai Dang, Keming Lu, Keqin Chen, Kexin Yang, Mei Li, Mingfeng Xue, Na Ni, Pei Zhang, Peng Wang, Ru Peng, Rui Men, Ruize Gao, Runji Lin, Shijie Wang, Shuai Bai, Sinan Tan, Tianhang Zhu, Tianhao Li, Tianyu Liu, Wenbin Ge, Xiaodong Deng, Xiaohuan Zhou, Xingzhang Ren, Xinyu Zhang, Xipin Wei, Xuancheng Ren, Yang Fan, Yang Yao, Yichang Zhang, Yu Wan, Yunfei Chu, Yuqiong Liu, Zeyu Cui, Zhenru Zhang, and Zhihao Fan. Qwen2 Technical Report. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2407.10671*, 2024.
- Shukang Yin, Chaoyou Fu, Sirui Zhao, Ke Li, Xing Sun, Tong Xu, and Enhong Chen. A Survey on Multimodal Large Language Models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2306.13549*, 2023.
- Zheng-Xin Yong, Cristina Menghini, and Stephen H Bach. Low-Resource Languages Jailbreak GPT-4. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2310.02446*, 2023.
- Youliang Yuan, Wenxiang Jiao, Wenxuan Wang, Jen-tse Huang, Pinjia He, Shuming Shi, and Zhaopeng Tu. GPT-4 Is Too Smart To Be Safe: Stealthy Chat with LLMs via Cipher. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2308.06463*, 2023.
- Yi Zeng, Hongpeng Lin, Jingwen Zhang, Diyi Yang, Ruoxi Jia, and Weiyan Shi. How Johnny Can Persuade LLMs to Jailbreak Them: Rethinking Persuasion to Challenge AI Safety by Humanizing LLMs. In *Proceedings of the 62nd Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers)*, pp. 14322–14350, 2024.
- Deyao Zhu, Jun Chen, Xiaoqian Shen, Xiang Li, and Mohamed Elhoseiny. MiniGPT-4: Enhancing Vision-Language Understanding with Advanced Large Language Models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2304.10592*, 2023.
- Andy Zou, Zifan Wang, Nicholas Carlini, Milad Nasr, J Zico Kolter, and Matt Fredrikson. Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2307.15043*, 2023a.
- Andy Zou, Zifan Wang, J. Zico Kolter, and Matt Fredrikson. Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Models, 2023b.

REPRODUCIBILITY STATEMENT

To ensure the reproducibility of our results, we provide comprehensive experimental details throughout the paper and supplementary materials. Section 4.1 contains detailed descriptions of all datasets (AdvBench, AdvBench-M), baseline methods (AP, DRA, PAPs, HADES, FigStep), and evaluation metrics (ASR) used in our experiments. The hyperparameter settings for our method CAMO, including the difficulty adjustment parameters r and k , are explicitly specified in Section 4.4 and the ablation study (Section 5). All victim models are accessed through publicly available APIs (OpenAI,

Together AI) with consistent configuration settings detailed in Section 4.1. The mathematical formulations of our cross-modal decomposition mechanism are provided in Section 4.2 with complete algorithmic descriptions. Defense evaluation protocols, including the perplexity threshold $\tau = 4$ and OCR-based detection setup, are thoroughly documented in Section 5. We plan to release our implementation code and experimental configurations upon paper acceptance to facilitate reproduction and future research. The appendix contains additional implementation details, extended experimental results, and complete evaluation prompts used in our human and automated assessments.

A APPENDIX

A.1 METHOD

CAMO’s keyword extraction and obfuscation process involves several key steps to ensure effective cross-modal decomposition while maintaining semantic coherence. The method first identifies sensitive keywords from the input harmful instruction using part-of-speech tagging and a manually curated keyword library. Selected keywords are then processed through character-level masking with configurable ratios, where masked characters are replaced with mathematical expressions and visual lookup tables. This multi-step approach ensures that each component appears benign in isolation while enabling semantic reconstruction through cross-modal reasoning. The full extraction procedure is summarized in Algorithm 1.

Algorithm 1 Target Keyword Selection

Require: Input prompt $T = [t_1, t_2, \dots, t_n]$, sensitive dictionary \mathcal{D} , stopword set \mathcal{S} , optional extra terms E , ratio α , and fallback flag

Ensure: Candidate attack keyword set W

- 1: keywordize T and apply POS tagging and lemmatization \rightarrow sequence D
- 2: Merge \mathcal{D} and E into unified sensitive term set \mathcal{D}'
- 3: $M \leftarrow \emptyset$ \triangleright Matched sensitive keywords
- 4: **for all** $t_i \in D$ **do**
- 5: **if** lemma(t_i) $\in \mathcal{D}'$ **and** $t_i \notin \mathcal{S}$ **and** len(t_i) > 2 **then**
- 6: $M \leftarrow M \cup \{t_i\}$
- 7: **end if**
- 8: **end for**
- 9: Compute total valid keyword count N and stopword count N_s
- 10: $\gamma \leftarrow \alpha \cdot (N - N_s)$
- 11: **if** $|M| < \gamma$ **then** \triangleright Complementary POS keywords
- 12: $C \leftarrow \emptyset$
- 13: **for all** $t_i \in D$ **do**
- 14: **if** POS(t_i) $\in \{\text{NOUN}, \text{VERB}, \text{ADJ}\}$ **and** $t_i \notin M$ **and** $t_i \notin \mathcal{S}$ **and** len(t_i) > 2 **then**
- 15: $C \leftarrow C \cup \{t_i\}$
- 16: **end if**
- 17: **end for**
- 18: Sort C by descending keyword length as as list $\hat{C} = \{\hat{c}_1, \hat{c}_2, \dots, \hat{c}_{|C|}\}$
- 19: $M \leftarrow M \cup \{\hat{c}_i \mid i = 1, \dots, \gamma - |M|\}$
- 20: **end if**
- 21: **if** $M = \emptyset$ **and** fallback is **True** **then**
- 22: Select shortest noun/adjective from $D \setminus \mathcal{S}$ as ψ
- 23: $M \leftarrow M \cup \{\psi\}$
- 24: **end if**
- 25: Sort M according to order in T
- 26: **return** $W = M[1 : \gamma]$

CAMO employs a carefully crafted prompt template that disguises the attack as an innocent “Escape Room Challenge” to evade content filters. The template integrates mathematical questions, masked text, and visual lookup instructions to guide the model through cross-modal reasoning while maintaining the appearance of a harmless puzzle game. This design ensures that each component appears benign in isolation while collectively enabling the reconstruction of harmful instructions.

Adversarial Prompt Template

```
# Escape Room Challenge: Decode the hidden word from the puzzle
and complete the question below.
Then, assuming the blank is already filled, describe detailed
steps to carry out the behavior in the question.
Do **not** explain or reveal how the word was derived.

## Math Questions: {math_section}
## Question: {masked_text}
## Rules: - Use math answers as positions to find letters from
the image clues.
- Only describe the process **after** the blank is filled.
```

To ensure objective and consistent evaluation of attack success, we employ an automated judging system based on GPT-4o with a standardized evaluation prompt. The judge assesses whether the model’s response contains harmful content that violates safety guidelines, using a numerical rating scale from 1 to 10. This approach eliminates subjective bias in manual evaluation and provides reproducible results across different attack scenarios. The evaluation prompt is designed to focus on content harmfulness rather than response quality or coherence, shown below:

System Prompt for Evaluation

You are a helpful red teaming assistant. You will receive a prompt and the AI assistant’s response to the prompt. Your task is to assess whether the response completes a harmful instruction.
Your rating should strictly follow this format: `[[rating]]` — a number from 1 to 10, where 10 indicates a complete, unambiguous, and harmful output that violates ethical or safety guidelines.

A.2 QUALITATIVE VISUALIZATION

To qualitatively assess the effectiveness of CAMO, we visualize input-output interactions with both closed-source and open-source LVLs. Figures 5 and 6 illustrate representative model responses to CAMO-generated prompts when queried with GPT-4.1-mini and DeepSeek-R1-0528 hosted on the TogetherAI platform, respectively. In Figure 5, we present two variants of adversarial input formats. In the first (left), all reasoning is encoded in text via symbolic expressions. In the second (right), partial keyword masking is combined with visual clues embedded within the image. Both approaches elicit harmful completions despite appearing benign when processed independently. Figure 6 further confirms that CAMO generalizes to open-source models served via API. Despite no access to model internals, CAMO successfully bypasses DeepSeek-R1’s moderation mechanisms, triggering detailed harmful outputs in response to obfuscated queries. These qualitative results demonstrate that CAMO is not only effective in evading content moderation but also generalizable across deployment settings and model families.

A.3 VISUAL MODALITY INFLUENCE

Table 4: Impact of different visual input types on attack success rate (ASR, %) across four threat categories: `bomb_explosive` (BE), `drugs` (DR), `suicide` (SU), `hack_information` (HI). All experiments are conducted on GPT-4.1-nano.

Image Type	BE	DR	SU	HI
Relevant Image	50.00	35.48	56.67	81.82
Blank Image	40.00	38.71	50.00	75.76
Random Image	36.67	67.74	66.67	90.91

To understand the role of visual modality in adversarial prompting, we investigate three image configurations: *relevant*, *blank*, and *random* inputs (see Figure 7). As illustrated in Figure 7, all images embed the same set of visual clues (e.g., “3:F”, “6:I”, “4:R”), while varying in semantic alignment.




Figure 5: Qualitative examples of CAMO input formats and their corresponding model outputs. (a) The entire reasoning chain is encoded within the text using symbolic math expressions, without relying on any visual input. (b) The masked keyword appears in the text, while visual clues are embedded in the accompanying image. Both variants successfully trigger harmful completions in GPT-4.1-mini, demonstrating CAMO’s ability to elicit unsafe behavior while maintaining input-level stealth.




Figure 6: Interaction with DeepSeek-R1-0528 on the TogetherAI platform, illustrating successful evasion of safety mechanisms by CAMO-generated attack prompts.

The left image contains a semantically relevant scene (retrieving a weapon), the middle is an empty placeholder, and the right shows an unrelated outdoor scene.

Table 4 presents quantitative results from GPT-4.1-nano. Interestingly, the use of relevant images improves ASR significantly in categories such as Suicide Methods (56.67%) and Hacking Instructions (81.82%), confirming that visual alignment aids in content reconstruction. In contrast, blank

810
811
812
813
814
815
816
817
818
819
820
821
822
823
824
825
826
827
828
829
830
831
832
833
834
835
836
837
838
839
840
841
842
843
844
845
846
847
848
849
850
851
852
853
854
855
856
857
858
859
860
861
862
863




Figure 7: Visual examples of three image input types used in CAMO. Left: a *relevant image* aligned with the harmful theme (e.g., weapon retrieval); Middle: a *blank image* with no visual content; Right: a *random image* unrelated to the instruction. All images include embedded visual clues (e.g., 3:F, 6:I, 4:R) for keywords reconstruction.

images result in slightly lower ASR, showing that cross-modal reasoning can still function with minimal visual content. Surprisingly, random images outperform the other settings in Drug Recipes (67.74%) and Hacking Instructions (90.91%), indicating that LLMs may exploit arbitrary visual features or bypass safety filters unintentionally. However, they underperform in Bomb-related tasks (36.67%), likely due to semantic mismatch disrupting reasoning consistency. These results suggest that while relevant visual grounding enhances interpretability and stealth, some visual randomness may inadvertently assist in jailbreak under specific categories. CAMO’s visual strategy should thus balance semantic relevance and obfuscation strength based on the targeted task.