

# 000 001 002 003 004 005 006 007 008 009 010 011 012 013 014 015 016 017 018 019 020 021 022 023 024 025 026 027 028 029 030 031 032 033 034 035 036 037 038 039 040 041 042 043 044 045 046 047 048 049 050 051 052 053 SafeMVD**Drive**: MULTI-VIEW SAFETY-CRITICAL DRIVING VIDEO GENERATION IN THE REAL-WORLD DOMAIN

005  
006  
007  
008  
009  
010  
011  
012  
013  
014  
015  
016  
017  
018  
019  
020  
021  
022  
023  
024  
025  
026  
027  
028  
029  
030  
031  
032  
033  
034  
035  
036  
037  
038  
039  
040  
041  
042  
043  
044  
045  
046  
047  
048  
049  
050  
051  
052  
053  
Anonymous authors  
Paper under double-blind review

## ABSTRACT

005  
006  
007  
008  
009  
010  
011  
012  
013  
014  
015  
016  
017  
018  
019  
020  
021  
022  
023  
024  
025  
026  
027  
028  
029  
030  
031  
032  
033  
034  
035  
036  
037  
038  
039  
040  
041  
042  
043  
044  
045  
046  
047  
048  
049  
050  
051  
052  
053  
Safety-critical scenarios are essential for evaluating autonomous driving (AD) systems, yet they are rare in practice. Existing generators produce trajectories, simulations, or single-view videos—but they don’t meet what modern AD systems actually consume: realistic multi-view video. We present SafeMVD**Drive**, the first framework for generating multi-view safety-critical driving videos in the real-world domain. SafeMVD**Drive** couples a safety-critical trajectory engine with a diffusion-based multi-view video generator through three design choices. First, we pick the right adversary: a GRPO-fine-tuned vision-language model (VLM) that understands multi-camera context and selects vehicles most likely to induce hazards. Second, we generate the right motion: a two-stage trajectory process that (i) produces collisions, then (ii) transforms them into natural evasion trajectories—preserving risk while staying within what current video generators can faithfully render. Third, we synthesize the right data: a diffusion model that turns these trajectories into multi-view videos suitable for end-to-end planners. On a strong end-to-end planner, our videos substantially increase collision rate, exposing brittle behavior and providing targeted stress tests for planning modules. Our code and video examples are available at: <https://iclr-1.github.io/SMD/>.



005  
006  
007  
008  
009  
010  
011  
012  
013  
014  
015  
016  
017  
018  
019  
020  
021  
022  
023  
024  
025  
026  
027  
028  
029  
030  
031  
032  
033  
034  
035  
036  
037  
038  
039  
040  
041  
042  
043  
044  
045  
046  
047  
048  
049  
050  
051  
052  
053  
Figure 1: Keyframes from videos generated by **SafeMVD**Drive****. Red boxes mark safety-critical vehicles: cut-ins (top-left), rapid rear approaches (top-right, bottom-left), and sudden braking (bottom-right). SafeMVD**Drive** generates high-quality multi-view safety-critical videos, providing a critical tool for developing and stress-testing autonomous driving systems. <sup>1</sup>

## 1 INTRODUCTION

005  
006  
007  
008  
009  
010  
011  
012  
013  
014  
015  
016  
017  
018  
019  
020  
021  
022  
023  
024  
025  
026  
027  
028  
029  
030  
031  
032  
033  
034  
035  
036  
037  
038  
039  
040  
041  
042  
043  
044  
045  
046  
047  
048  
049  
050  
051  
052  
053  
Vision-based end-to-end (E2E) autonomous driving (AD) systems map visual inputs directly to driving decisions. They are rapidly advancing and beginning to see deployment in the real world (Zheng et al., 2024a; Hu et al., 2023; Li et al., 2024a; Liao et al., 2025; Jiang et al., 2024). But making

<sup>1</sup>Video examples are available at: <https://iclr-1.github.io/SMD/#Video Gallery>.

them safe remains difficult. What they most need—large-scale, diverse, safety-critical data—is nearly impossible to collect at scale: rare events are rare for a reason, and capturing them in the wild is both costly and dangerous.

Synthetic generation offers a scalable alternative, but existing approaches fall short. Prior work has mostly focused on producing adversarial trajectories with diffusion models (Xu et al., 2025; Zhong et al., 2023b;a; Chang et al., 2024), which can stress-test standalone AD planners but are not directly applicable to E2E AD systems that require video, not trajectories. Simulator-based video generation (Zhang et al., 2024; Abeysirigoonawardena et al., 2019) avoids this mismatch but suffers from a large domain gap between simulation and reality. Deep video generators like Open-Sora (Zheng et al., 2024c) can render accident videos in the real-world domain, yet the results are single-view, low-quality, and unsuitable for multi-view E2E pipelines (Li et al., 2025).

We introduce *SafeMVD*rive, the first framework to generate multi-view safety-critical driving videos in the real-world domain. A straightforward way would be to generate adversarial trajectories and then convert them into control signals for existing multi-view video generators (Wen et al., 2024; Sima et al., 2024; Chen et al., 2024b). This, however, fails for two reasons. First, conventional trajectory generators ignore visual context, relying only on non-visual data like vehicle kinematics and maps, and often select adversarial vehicles that are physically infeasible (see Section 3.2). We instead assist trajectory generation with the visual scene information, using a VLM-based selector to identify the critical vehicle. Second, existing video generators (Chen et al., 2024b; Gao et al., 2024a; Wen et al., 2024) cannot realistically render collisions due to the scarcity of multi-view collision data (Feng et al., 2025). To address this, we design a two-stage trajectory generator: it first produces collisions, then refines them into natural evasions – preserving safety-critical characteristics without requiring explicit crash rendering. Combined with a state-of-the-art multi-view video generator, SafeMVDrive produces high-quality, safety-critical videos in the real-world domain (Figure 1).

The main contributions of our work are summarized as follows:

- In this paper, we introduce **SafeMVDrive, the first framework capable of generating multi-view safety-critical videos in the real-world domain. The key idea is to couple a safety-critical trajectory simulator with a multi-view driving video generator, and to solve the integration bottlenecks with a VLM-based adversarial vehicle selector and a two-stage evasion trajectory generator.**
- We incorporate visual context into the selection of safety-critical vehicles through a fine-tuned vision–language model (VLM). The model is adapted for multi-view driving scene understanding using supervision from an automated annotation pipeline that pairs scenes with their corresponding safety-critical vehicles. This adaptation allows the VLM to reliably identify adversarial vehicles most likely to induce safety-critical scenarios.
- We propose a two-stage trajectory generator that produces collision–evasion trajectories within the capability of existing multi-view video generation models. In stage one, a collision trajectory is generated; in stage two, it is refined into a natural evasion trajectory—preserving safety-critical characteristics while remaining compatible with video generation models.

SafeMVDrive produces high-quality multi-view safety-critical videos in the real-world domain. On the representative E2E autonomous planner UniAD (Hu et al., 2023), our videos induce 30% more collisions than those from original NuScenes data (Caesar et al., 2020), exposing brittle planner behavior. Despite their adversarial nature, the generated videos remain realistic: in user studies, they are rated as natural as videos produced by state-of-the-art models on original benign trajectories.

## 2 RELATED WORK

Safety-critical data generation is essential to enhance end-to-end AD systems’ robustness in the real world. The existing work can be categorized into trajectory-based and video-based approaches in terms of their output formats. Trajectory-based approaches generate adversarial trajectories (non-visual), while video-based approaches produce safety-critical driving videos. **We note that safety-critical scenarios in autonomous driving are diverse and difficult to enumerate exhaustively.** In this paper, the term safety-critical vehicle specifically refers to one scenario type: a safety-critical

108 situation arising from the interaction between an adversarial vehicle and the ego vehicle due to their  
 109 trajectory relationship.

110 **Safety-critical Trajectory generation:** Given an initial traffic context, trajectory-based approaches  
 111 typically first select an adversarial vehicle and then optimize trajectories that lead to safety-critical  
 112 situations. Recent works often leverage diffusion models, which excel at capturing highly complex  
 113 and multimodal trajectory distributions. At test time, loss-gradient guidance (Janner et al., 2022;  
 114 Zhong et al., 2023b) can be introduced to enable controllable trajectory generation, steering sampled  
 115 trajectories toward the trajectory data manifold while simultaneously minimizing task-specific loss  
 116 functions. Methods such as Safe-Sim (Chang et al., 2024) and CTG++ (Zhong et al., 2023a) further  
 117 incorporate collision-related losses to generate safety-critical trajectories. While these methods show  
 118 progress, they are incompatible with E2E AD systems, which require video input. Besides, they  
 119 rely on non-visual data (e.g., vehicle kinematics, maps) to select adversarial vehicles, which often  
 120 neglects critical visual cues and may result in physically infeasible selections (shown in Figure 3).

121 **Safety-critical Video generation:** Another research direction is to directly generate safety-critical  
 122 video data. Some works (Zhang et al., 2024; Xu et al., 2025; Wang et al., 2024) use simulators like  
 123 Carla (Dosovitskiy et al., 2017) to generate adversarial driving videos. However, these methods’  
 124 effectiveness is limited by the domain gap between simulation and reality. To generate realistic  
 125 videos, ADV2 (Li et al., 2025) employs generative models like open-sora (Zheng et al., 2024c),  
 126 finetuned on real traffic accident data with text captions, to produce adversarial videos from user  
 127 prompts. However, the videos are low-quality and single-view, limiting their use in E2E AD systems  
 128 that require high-quality, multi-view inputs.

129 Unlike existing works, our framework can generate multi-view safety-critical videos in the real-world  
 130 domain that are compatible with E2E AD systems. This is enabled by strategically integrating a  
 131 safety-critical trajectory simulator with a multi-view driving video generator, and overcoming key  
 132 integration challenges through a VLM-based adversarial vehicle selector and a two-stage evasion  
 133 trajectory generator.

### 135 3 METHODS

#### 137 3.1 OVERVIEW

139 Figure 2 shows our framework for generating multi-view safety-critical videos, comprising three  
 140 parts: (1) a VLM-based adversarial vehicle selector; (2) a two-stage evasion trajectory generator; and  
 141 (3) a trajectory-to-video generator. The input is single-frame holistic information of an initial scene,  
 142 combining visual data (multi-view images) and non-visual data (camera parameters, vehicle states,  
 143 and road maps)—all available in datasets like NuScenes (Caesar et al., 2020), Waymo (Sun et al.,  
 144 2020), and Argoverse2 (Wilson et al., 2023). First, we mark vehicles within distance  $D$  from the  
 145 ego vehicle with ID-labeled 2D boxes in the multi-view images. The images are then fed into the  
 146 VLM-based selector to identify the adversarial vehicle  $V_{adv}$ . With  $V_{adv}$ ’s ID, the two-stage evasion  
 147 trajectory generator can produce safety-critical trajectories: the first stage generates a collision  
 148 trajectory where  $V_{adv}$  collides with the ego vehicle  $V_{ego}$ ; the second converts it into a realistic evasion  
 149 trajectory using our proposed method. The generated trajectories are then converted to control signals  
 150 that guide a diffusion-based video generator to synthesize realistic safety-critical multi-view videos.

#### 151 3.2 VLM-BASED ADVERSARIAL VEHICLE SELECTOR

153 The first step in generating safety-critical data is selecting the adversarial vehicle  $V_{adv}$  from the  
 154 initial scene. Prior methods rely on simple heuristic methods using non-visual data like vehicle  
 155 kinematics and maps, such as choosing the nearest neighbor vehicle, applying fixed distance-velocity  
 156 rules (Zhong et al., 2023a), or selecting a random nearby lane vehicle (Chang et al., 2024). However,  
 157 these heuristic methods lack crucial visual cues and fail to capture complex driving scenarios, often  
 158 resulting in physically infeasible selections (shown in Figure 3).

159 To address the aforementioned problems, we propose incorporating visual information into adversarial  
 160 vehicle selection by leveraging the scene understanding capabilities of Vision-Language Models  
 161 (VLMs) (Chen et al., 2024a). Specifically, we introduce a VLM-based selector that selects the  
 critical adversarial vehicle using the multi-view images in the initial scene. To aid comprehension




Figure 2: The SafeMVDdrive framework for generating realism, multi-view safety-critical videos.



Figure 3: Comparison between the initial scene's BEV-rendered annotations (left) and its camera images (right). Previous selection methods rely on non-visual annotations, which would select vehicle 1. However, in the real scene, an obstacle exists between the ego vehicle and vehicle 1, preventing a physically feasible collision.

and accurate vehicle ID output, we annotate safety-critical vehicle candidates with ID-labeled 2D bounding boxes (as shown in the right part of Figure 3) and exclude distant vehicles (beyond distance  $D$  from the ego vehicle). Our first attempt is to guide the VLM with task-specific prompts (see Appendix A.4). However, due to VLMs' limited exposure to multi-view data during training, prompting alone proves insufficient for effective multi-view understanding.

To address the above problem, we propose a VLM fine-tuning pipeline to improve its adaptation to our task. A key challenge in constructing a suitable fine-tuning dataset is determining the correct VLM

216 output for each multi-view image—specifically, identifying which vehicles could realistically collide  
 217 with the ego vehicle via dynamically plausible trajectories. To this end, we propose an automated  
 218 method that simulates each safety-critical vehicle candidate using a dynamically plausible traffic  
 219 simulator (Zhong et al., 2023b) to examine whether it can collide with the ego vehicle. Specifically,  
 220 for each candidate, we apply a loss-guidance encouraging collision with the ego vehicle based on  
 221 their distance (see Section 3.3). We select vehicles that successfully collide and filter out unrealistic  
 222 cases, such as those entering non-drivable areas or colliding with other vehicles first. This yields  
 223 annotated data defining the set of effective safety-critical vehicles  $S_{coll}$  for each scene. Because  
 224 repeated simulation is computationally expensive, the method is used only during training to construct  
 225 reliable fine-tuning labels, while at inference, the VLM performs fast selection without exhaustive  
 226 simulation.

227 After obtaining the fine-tuning dataset, we apply the GRPO algorithm (Shao et al., 2024), a recent RL  
 228 method proven to effectively enhance the reasoning of VLMs (Shen et al., 2025). GRPO enhances  
 229 the model’s reasoning capabilities through a self-improving RL process, which makes it well-suited  
 230 for helping the model better understand complex multi-view physical scenarios (Wei et al., 2022;  
 231 Ho et al., 2022). Following (Shen et al., 2025), we augment the prompt with: ‘Output the thinking  
 232 process in <think> </think> and final answer (number) in <answer> </answer> tags.’ and  
 233 use the following format reward:

$$R_{form} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } O \sim <\text{think}> \dots </\text{think}> <\text{answer}> \dots </\text{answer}> \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (1)$$

237 where  $O$  refers to the output from the VLM. The format reward is designed to enforce the model to  
 238 place its reasoning process between ‘<think>’, and outputs the final answer within the ‘<answer>’  
 239 tags. To promote accurate outputs, we add the following accuracy reward,

$$R_{Acc} = \begin{cases} \text{similarity}(\text{extract\_answer}(O), \text{“no vehicle is appropriate”}) & \text{if } S_{coll} = \emptyset \\ 1 & \text{if } S_{coll} \neq \emptyset \wedge \text{extract\_answer}(O) \in S_{coll} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (2)$$

240 where *extracted\_answer()* extracts the content between the tags <answer>...</answer> from  
 241 the VLM output.  $S_{coll}$  denotes the set of vehicles that can collide with the ego vehicle in our automated  
 242 annotation process. If  $S_{coll} = \emptyset$ , it indicates that no vehicle in the scene can collide with the ego  
 243 vehicle, in which case we expect the model to output “no vehicle is appropriate”. If  $S_{coll} \neq \emptyset$ , at least  
 244 one adversarial vehicle exists, and the model should output an ID belonging to this set.

### 250 3.3 TWO-STAGE EVASION TRAJECTORY GENERATOR

251 After selecting the adversarial vehicles as described above, current safety-critical trajectory simulators  
 252 (Xu et al., 2025; Zhong et al., 2023a; Chang et al., 2024) can be used to generate collision trajectories.  
 253 However, current multi-view video generators struggle to realistically generate such collision events,  
 254 resulting in degraded visual quality when control signals cause collisions. To address this, we  
 255 propose a two-stage evasion trajectory generator. It produces safety-critical yet non-colliding evasion  
 256 trajectories compatible with current video generators while retaining safety-critical features.

257 Our generator builds upon a popular diffusion-based controllable trajectory generation framework  
 258 (Zhong et al., 2023b). The model is first trained on real-world driving data to learn realistic trajectories.  
 259 Since our framework takes a single-frame initial scene as input, we retrain the trajectory generation  
 260 model to align with this setup. At test time, a loss-gradient guidance (Janner et al., 2022; Liang  
 261 et al., 2023; Chang et al., 2024; Zhong et al., 2023b) is introduced to enable controllable trajectory  
 262 generation. This guidance pushes the sampled trajectories toward the data manifold of realistic  
 263 trajectories while simultaneously minimizing the loss function. We adopt the closed-loop simulation  
 264 strategy described in (Zhong et al., 2023b). At each step  $n$ , the model predicts future trajectories  
 265 from the current scene, applying only the first few to update the scene. This iterates to form the full  
 266 trajectory sequence.

267 Once the VLM-based selector identifies the adversarial vehicle  $V_{adv}$ , our trajectory generator performs  
 268 a two-stage simulation. In the first stage,  $V_{adv}$  is guided to collide with  $V_{ego}$ . If the collision occurs  
 269 before  $V_{adv}$  entering non-drivable areas or hitting others, the collision trajectory is considered valid.

270  
 271 Table 1: Comparison of baseline effectiveness by evaluating video realism and planner’s safety-related  
 272 metrics on the videos. Sample-level  $CR$  measures the average collision rate per valid sample, while  
 273 scene-level  $CR$  counts the average number of colliding valid samples per scene. SafeMVDdrive has a  
 274 natural score comparable to Origin (0.9x), with a 15x  $CR$  increase and 30% reductions in TTC and  
 275 NC.

Methods	Natural score $\uparrow$	Subject Consistency $\uparrow$	FID $\downarrow$	Sample-level $CR$ (%) $\uparrow$				Scene-level $CR$ $\uparrow$				NC $\downarrow$	TTC $\downarrow$
				1s	2s	3s	Avg.	1s	2s	3s	Avg.		
Origin	0.63 $\pm$ 0.13	0.88	16.25	0.57	0.90	1.64	1.04	0.07	0.12	0.21	0.13	0.98	0.96
Naive	0.21 $\pm$ 0.18	0.66	23.35	18.65	34.04	46.40	33.03	1.46	2.66	3.62	2.58	0.37	0.28
SafeMVDdrive	0.56 $\pm$ 0.12	0.86	20.63	6.77	15.25	23.67	15.23	0.86	1.94	3.02	1.94	0.77	0.69

280  
 281  
 282 In the second stage, we introduce a trajectory update mechanism with an evasion-targeted loss, which  
 283 guides  $V_{ego}$  in evading  $V_{adv}$ . Finally, a collision-evasion trajectory sequence is generated.  
 284

285 During the collision-stage trajectory simulation, we employ three loss functions for test-time guidance:  
 286 an adversarial loss, a no-collision loss, and an on-road loss. The adversarial loss is necessary to  
 287 encourage  $V_{adv}$  to collide with  $V_{ego}$ , typically based on their distance (Zhong et al., 2023a; Chang  
 288 et al., 2024). However, this often causes  $V_{adv}$  to remain stuck to  $V_{ego}$  after collision, resulting in  
 289 unnatural dynamics—shifting of  $V_{adv}$  from aggressive (e.g., rapid acceleration) to passive, ego-like  
 290 behaviors (e.g., slow driving). To solve this, we propose the following adversarial loss formulation:  
 291

$$L_{adv} = \begin{cases} \sum_{t=1}^T w_t \cdot d_t \cdot \mathbb{I}(d_t > d_{penalty}) & \text{Before } V_{adv} \text{ collides with } V_{ego} \\ 0 & \text{After } V_{adv} \text{ collides with } V_{ego} \end{cases} \quad (3)$$

292 where  $T$  denotes predicted future steps,  $d_t$  is the distance between  $V_{adv}$  and  $V_{ego}$  at time step  $t$ , and  
 293  $d_{penalty}$  is the non-collision distance threshold. Gradients are detached with respect to  $V_{ego}$  to ensure  
 294 only  $V_{adv}$  has the adversarial behavior. A time-decay weight  $w_t = \frac{\lambda^t}{\sum_{k=0}^{T-1} \lambda^k}$ , controlled by a decay  
 295 factor  $\lambda$ , emphasizes earlier trajectory predictions and is shared across all losses. Moreover, to avoid  
 296 unnatural sticking post-collision, we explicitly set the adversarial loss  $L_{adv}$  to zero once the collision  
 297 between  $V_{adv}$  and  $V_{ego}$  has occurred in the updated trajectories during closed-loop simulation. This  
 298 leads to more natural post-collision behavior of the adversarial vehicle.  
 299

300 To prevent undesired collisions (except between the ego and adversarial vehicles), we utilize a  
 301 no-collision loss  $L_{no\_coll}$ , which penalizes inter-vehicle collisions in denoised trajectories, excluding  
 302 the ego–adversarial pair. To keep vehicles in drivable areas, an on-road loss  $L_{on\_road}$  penalizes  
 303 trajectories entering non-drivable zones and guides them back. Full definitions are in Appendix A.3.  
 304

305 Overall, the loss function of the collision stage trajectory simulation can be summarized as  
 306

$$L_{coll} = \alpha L_{adv} + \beta L_{no\_coll} + \gamma L_{on\_road} \quad (4)$$

307 where  $\alpha, \beta, \gamma$  are the hyperparameters to control the contribution of each loss function. Through  
 308 closed-loop simulation, we obtain a trajectory sequence. To ensure safety-criticality and physical  
 309 feasibility, we filter out trajectories that either do not result in a collision with the ego vehicle or  
 310 that collide with other vehicles or go off-road before reaching the ego vehicle. Subsequently, the  
 311 physically feasible and safety-critical trajectories are fed into the second stage for evasion trajectory  
 312 simulation.  
 313

314 During the evasion stage trajectory simulation, we only use  $L_{no\_coll}$  and  $L_{on\_road}$  as follow,  
 315

$$L_{eva} = \beta L_{no\_coll} + \gamma L_{on\_road} \quad (5)$$

316 where the  $L_{no\_coll}$  is applied to all vehicles in the scene (include ego–adversarial pair) to guide  $V_{ego}$  to  
 317 evade  $V_{adv}$ . The evasion-stage simulation starts from the same initial scene as the collision stage.  
 318 During closed-loop rollout, only the ego vehicle’s trajectory is updated via the diffusion model; other  
 319 vehicles retain their collision-stage trajectories to preserve adversarial behavior. This converts a  
 320 collision scenario to a safety-critical evasion one, staying within the video generator’s capability.  
 321 Finally, we select successful evasive trajectories for video generation.  
 322



Figure 4: Comparison of videos generated by different methods, only showing the front view. It can be seen that the video generated by the origin method is quite ordinary, the video generated by the naive method loses realism towards the end (highlighted by the red-boxed frames), while only ours exhibits both realism and safety-criticality.

### 3.4 TRAJECTORY-TO-VIDEO GENERATOR

To convert simulated collision-evasion trajectories into multi-view driving videos, we adopt UniMLVG (Chen et al., 2024b), a diffusion-based video generation model tailored for autonomous driving. [UniMLVG is trained on 1,498 hours of diverse driving data \(including OpenDV-Youtube, NuScenes, Waymo, and Argoverse2\)](#), providing strong out-of-distribution generalization that enables it to accurately represent our safety-critical collision-avoidance scenarios. This model supports motion control signals such as 3D bounding boxes, HD maps, and camera conditions, enabling trajectories to be translated into realistic multi-view videos. Moreover, UniMLVG can produce high-quality and sufficiently long videos, [which is essential since safety-critical events typically unfold over longer time spans](#), by mitigating autoregressive errors through its multi-task training scheme. Detailed generation settings are provided in Appendix A.9.

## 4 EXPERIMENTS

### 4.1 EXPERIMENTAL SETTINGS

**Datasets:** We use the large-scale real-world driving dataset NuScenes (Caesar et al., 2020), which provides 5.5 hours of annotated trajectories collected across two cities, featuring diverse scenarios and traffic conditions. To train the VLM for our adversarial vehicle selector, we randomly select 1,500 samples from the training split and generate the safety-critical annotations within each scene with the automated annotation method (see Section 3.2). The trajectory generation diffusion model is trained on the full training split. For evaluation, 250 samples are randomly selected from the validation split.

**Baseline:** As the first to generate multi-view, realistic, safety-critical videos, we design two intuitive baselines for comparison. **Naive** generates safety-critical videos by converting collision trajectories into control signals for the video generator. These trajectories are produced with the vehicle selection method and loss function from (Zhong et al., 2023a), combined with our retrained trajectory diffusion model. **Origin** uses original NuScenes trajectories to benchmark video quality under natural trajectories. All baselines generate videos via UniMLVG with identical settings (see Appendix A.9).

**Metrics:** To evaluate the realism of generated videos, existing automatic metrics such as FVD (Unterthiner et al., 2018) are widely recognized as insufficient for accurately reflecting perceptual quality and real-world dynamics (Gao et al., 2024b; Bar-Tal et al., 2024; Girdhar et al., 2024; Wu et al., 2024). Consequently, we rely on human evaluation for a more reliable assessment. In line with recent studies (Gao et al., 2024b; Bar-Tal et al., 2024; Blattmann et al., 2023b;a; Chen et al., 2023; Wang et al., 2025), we employ the Two-Alternative Forced Choice (2AFC) protocol to evaluate the videos (see Appendix A.2 for details) and refer to the resulting preference rate as the **natural score** in our experiments. In addition, we also compute FID, an auxiliary metric for evaluating image quality.




Figure 5: Adversarial vehicle selection examples with GRPO-finetuned VLM. Images are inputs; texts are responses. The VLM correctly analyzes the vehicle’s position and the visual information fence.

To evaluate physical consistency, we introduce Subject Consistency. Intuitively, stable tracking reflects physical plausibility, as tracking often fails when an object deforms unrealistically. Since our scenarios focus on collision avoidance between the ego vehicle and an adversarial vehicle, the adversarial vehicle is most likely to exhibit such inconsistencies. We therefore use StreamPETR (Wang et al., 2023) to track the adversarial vehicle in the generated videos and define Subject Consistency as the ratio between its tracked frame length and its actual frame length in the scene. For Origin, we use the same adversarial (AD) vehicle ID as in SafeMVD.

To demonstrate videos generated by our framework present significant challenges to end-to-end planners and are likely to induce collisions, we evaluate three end-to-end planners, UniAD (Hu et al., 2023), SparseDrive (Sun et al., 2025), and DiffusionDrive (Liao et al., 2025) on our generated data. Following the method proposed by Li et al. (Li et al., 2024b), we compute the collision rate for each video sample. Specifically, the collision rate is defined as:

$$cr(t) = \left( \sum_{i=0}^N \mathbb{I}_i \right) > 0, \quad N = \frac{t}{0.5}. \quad (6)$$

where  $N$  denotes the number of the trajectory points in the planning before  $t$  seconds, and  $\mathbb{I}_i$  indicates whether the ego vehicle collides at step  $i$ . The final collision rate  $CR(t)$  is averaged over all samples. We follow this method with one adaptation: if a collision already occurs at the initial step ( $\mathbb{I}_0 = 1$ ), the collision ratio  $cr(t)$  for this sample is always 1, making it unsuitable for evaluating planner performance. Therefore, we consider such samples as invalid initializations and exclude them from our evaluation. We report both sample-level and scene-level averaged  $CR(t)$ : the former represents the averaged  $cr(t)$  before time  $t$  for each valid sample; the latter reflects the average number of valid samples in which the planner collides before time  $t$  within each scene. For a more comprehensive evaluation, we follow NAVSIM (Dauner et al., 2024), which benchmarks planning using non-reactive simulations and closed-loop metrics. We focus on two collision-related measures, no collisions (NC) and time-to-collision (TTC), re-implemented under our datasets (see Appendix A.11).

**Implement Details:** We use Qwen2.5VL-7B-Instruct (Team, 2025) as the base VLM for its strong vision-language understanding capabilities (fine-tuning details in Appendix A.8). For safety-critical candidate selection, we set the distance threshold  $D = 25$  m. Moreover, we retrain the trajectory generation model to align with our single-frame input setup (details in Appendix A.8). In the two-stage simulation process, we set  $\alpha = 1$ ,  $\beta = 50$ ,  $\gamma = 1$  in the collision stage,  $\beta = 1$ ,  $\gamma = 1$  in the evasion stage, and use  $\lambda = 0.9$  for all loss terms. Ablation studies on these hyperparameters can be found in Appendix A.14 and A.15. Our video generator produces 19 frames per iteration, using the last frame of the previous rollout as the reference frame for the next. This results in a final 9-second video at 12Hz. Efficiency and cost analysis of our framework can be found in Appendix A.10.

432  
433  
434  
Table 2: Comparison of different methods for  
adversarial vehicle selection.

Methods	Precision	Recall	F1-score
Random-neighbor rule	0.606	0.437	0.507
Precision-first rule	0.758	0.497	0.600
Nearest-vehicle rule	0.528	0.861	0.654
VLM-based selector	0.750	0.675	<b>0.710</b>

435  
436  
437  
438  
439  
440  
441  
442  
Table 3: Comparison of the performance of dif-  
ferent models on adversarial vehicle selection.

Model	Precision	Recall	F1-score
Base 3B	0.360	0.596	0.449
Base 7B	0.455	0.530	0.489
Base 72B	0.433	0.602	0.504
SFT-finetuned Model 7B	0.582	0.748	0.655
GRPO-fine-tuned Model 7B	0.750	0.675	<b>0.710</b>

443  
444  
445  
446  
447  
448  
449  
450  
451  
452  
453  
454  
455  
456  
457  
458  
459  
460  
461  
462  
Table 4: Evaluation of the effectiveness of the two-stage simulation.

Methods	Natural score $\uparrow$	Subject Consistency $\uparrow$	FID $\downarrow$	Sample-level CR (%) $\uparrow$				Scene-level CR $\uparrow$				NC $\downarrow$	TTC $\downarrow$
				1s	2s	3s	Avg.	1s	2s	3s	Avg.		
Origin	$0.60 \pm 0.13$	0.88	16.25	0.57	0.90	1.64	1.04	0.07	0.12	0.21	0.13	0.98	0.96
Collision stage only	$0.33 \pm 0.13$	0.58	22.20	17.53	31.15	38.98	29.22	1.46	2.59	3.24	2.43	0.67	0.63
Two-stage simulation	$0.57 \pm 0.08$	0.86	20.63	6.77	15.25	23.67	15.23	0.86	1.94	3.02	1.94	0.77	0.69

443  
444  
445  
446  
447  
448  
449  
450  
451  
452  
453  
454  
455  
456  
457  
458  
459  
460  
461  
462  
4.2 EVALUATION OF SAFEMVDRIVE

This section compares the realism of videos generated by different baselines, as well as the averaged safety-critical-related metric scores (CR, NC, and TTC) of UniAD, SparseDrive, and DiffusionDrive on these videos (respective detailed results presented in the Appendix). Each method generates videos from 250 samples randomly selected from the NuScenes validation split (details in Appendix A.13); the results are shown in Table 1. For video generation, naturalness is the foundation of usability. SafeMVDdrive achieves both higher naturalness and FID scores than the Naive baseline. In particular, its naturalness score is nearly three times higher than that of Naive and remains comparable to Origin. The extremely low naturalness score of Naive is mainly attributed to excessive collision events exceeding the generator’s capacity and leading to severe vehicle deformations (as shown in red-boxed frames in Fig. 4; video examples are provided here). Moreover, while preserving naturalness and image quality, SafeMVDdrive introduces more realistic safety-critical events, which in turn challenge the planner, resulting in a substantial increase in CR and significant decreases in TTC and NC compared to Origin.

463  
464  
465  
466  
467  
468  
469  
470  
471  
472  
473  
474  
4.3 EVALUATION OF THE VLM-BASED ADVERSARIAL VEHICLE SELECTOR

In this section, we evaluate the effectiveness of our VLM-based adversarial vehicle selector. On 250 validation scenes, we identify all vehicles in the simulated scenes that may collide with the ego vehicle by exhaustively checking every vehicle in the environment (unlike in VLM fine-tuning label generation, where distant vehicles are filtered out). We compare the precision, recall, and F1-score of our VLM-based selector against three heuristic methods: Random-neighbor rule (Chang et al., 2024), Precision-first rule (Zhong et al., 2023a), and Nearest-vehicle rule (details in Appendix A.12). As shown in Table 2, our method achieves the highest F1-score, demonstrating its effectiveness in accurately identifying safety-critical vehicles. Figure 5 shows examples of adversarial vehicle selections, where our VLM correctly analyzes positional relationships and driving directions to make appropriate selections.

We further evaluate the effectiveness of our GRPO fine-tuning. As shown in Table 3, the GRPO-fine-tuned model significantly outperforms the untuned baseline, achieving an F1-score improvement of 0.21 over the strongest 72B base model. We also evaluate supervised fine-tuning (SFT) for comparison (see Appendix A.8 for configurations), but it performs worse than GRPO, with an F1-score reduction of more than 0.05. These findings highlight both the necessity and effectiveness of adopting GRPO for our adversarial vehicle selection task.

481  
482  
483  
484  
485  
4.4 EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE TWO-STAGE SIMULATION

We propose a two-stage trajectory simulator to generate collision-evasion scenarios that are both safety-critical and within the capability of current multi-view video generators. In this section, we assess the necessity of the two-stage simulation by comparing videos from collision-stage-only

Table 5: Effectiveness of SafeMVDrive in improving the performance of the End-to-end planner.

Evaluation Set	Model	Sample-level $CR\ (\%) \downarrow$				Scene-level $CR \downarrow$				NC $\uparrow$	TTC $\uparrow$
		1s	2s	3s	Avg.	1s	2s	3s	Avg.		
NuScenes Val	Base	0.11	0.15	0.28	0.18	0.04	0.05	0.09	0.06	0.992	0.976
	Finetuned	0.06	0.11	0.21	0.13	0.02	0.04	0.07	0.04	0.993	0.979
SafeMVDdrive Val	Base	6.63	17.60	25.68	16.64	0.81	2.16	3.15	2.04	0.743	0.684
	Finetuned	3.06	7.40	12.59	7.68	0.37	0.91	1.54	0.94	0.822	0.763

trajectories with those from the full two-stage process. Additionally, to assess the naturalness of the generated videos, we include the Origin baseline for comparison. Each method generates videos based on 250 samples randomly selected from the NuScenes validation split. Detailed generation procedures can be found in Appendix A.13. As shown in Table 4, our two-stage simulation leads to both higher collision rates for planners and significantly improved realism.

## 4.5 ENHANCEMENT FOR END-TO-END PLANNER

In this section, we verify the usefulness of the videos generated by SafeMVDdrive for improving an end-to-end autonomous driving planner in terms of collision avoidance. We split the generated data into training and validation sets with a 4:1 ratio, and mix the training portion with the original NuScenes training set to fine-tune the lightweight DiffusionDrive (Liao et al., 2025) model for 10 epochs. We then evaluate the model on both the NuScenes validation set and our generated SafeMVDdrive validation set. As shown in Table 5, after training the end-to-end planner on a combination of our generated data and the real NuScenes data, the collision-related metrics decrease significantly on the SafeMVDdrive validation dataset, and also decrease on NuScenes validation dataset.

Building on these results, we note that the two-stage avoidance scenario simulation allows our generated data to contain active collision-avoidance behaviors, which provides a richer supervisory signal for planning. As a result, the end-to-end planner can effectively learn these behaviors and reduce collision rates. This further demonstrates the value of our framework.

## 5 CONCLUSION

We present **SafeMVD**, the first framework for generating multi-view safety-critical driving videos in the real-world domain. By strategically combining a safety-critical trajectory simulator with a realistic multi-view video generator, we build a bridge from safety-critical trajectory simulation to multi-view video generation. To address the integration challenge, we introduce a VLM-based adversarial vehicle selector and a two-stage collision-evasion trajectory generation strategy. Experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach in producing realistic and multi-view safety-critical videos, which lead to a high collision rate for end-to-end planners. The generated video data can serve as valuable resources for evaluating and enhancing autonomous driving systems.

## 6 REPRODUCIBILITY STATEMENT

We have made extensive efforts to ensure the reproducibility of our work. The source code of our framework is available at [https://anonymous.4open.science/r/SafeMVDrive\\_anonymous\\_code-D70E](https://anonymous.4open.science/r/SafeMVDrive_anonymous_code-D70E). The overall design and methodology of our framework are described in Section 3 of the main text, while detailed training and evaluation settings are provided in the Appendix. In addition, we will release our test dataset to the public upon acceptance of the paper.

540      **7 ETHICS STATEMENT**  
 541

542      This work aims to improve the safety and robustness of autonomous driving systems by generating  
 543      realistic, safety-critical driving scenarios for testing and training. The potential for misuse is limited,  
 544      as the primary application—autonomous driving—rarely involves malicious intent.  
 545

546      **REFERENCES**  
 547

548      Yasasa Abeysirigoonawardena, Florian Shkurti, and Gregory Dudek. Generating adversarial driving  
 549      scenarios in high-fidelity simulators. In *2019 International Conference on Robotics and Automation*  
 550      (*ICRA*), pp. 8271–8277. IEEE, 2019.

551      Omer Bar-Tal, Hila Chefer, Omer Tov, Charles Herrmann, Roni Paiss, Shiran Zada, Ariel Ephrat,  
 552      Junhwa Hur, Guanghui Liu, Amit Raj, et al. Lumiere: A space-time diffusion model for video  
 553      generation. In *SIGGRAPH Asia 2024 Conference Papers*, pp. 1–11, 2024.

554      Andreas Blattmann, Tim Dockhorn, Sumith Kulal, Daniel Mendelevitch, Maciej Kilian, Dominik  
 555      Lorenz, Yam Levi, Zion English, Vikram Voleti, Adam Letts, et al. Stable video diffusion: Scaling  
 556      latent video diffusion models to large datasets. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2311.15127*, 2023a.

557      Andreas Blattmann, Robin Rombach, Huan Ling, Tim Dockhorn, Seung Wook Kim, Sanja Fidler,  
 558      and Karsten Kreis. Align your latents: High-resolution video synthesis with latent diffusion  
 559      models. In *Proceedings of the IEEE/CVF conference on computer vision and pattern recognition*,  
 560      pp. 22563–22575, 2023b.

561      Holger Caesar, Varun Bankiti, Alex H Lang, Sourabh Vora, Venice Erin Liong, Qiang Xu, Anush  
 562      Krishnan, Yu Pan, Giancarlo Baldan, and Oscar Beijbom. nuscenes: A multimodal dataset for  
 563      autonomous driving. In *Proceedings of the IEEE/CVF conference on computer vision and pattern*  
 564      *recognition*, pp. 11621–11631, 2020.

565      Wei-Jer Chang, Francesco Pittaluga, Masayoshi Tomizuka, Wei Zhan, and Manmohan Chandraker.  
 566      Safe-sim: Safety-critical closed-loop traffic simulation with diffusion-controllable adversaries. In  
 567      *Computer Vision – ECCV 2024: 18th European Conference, Milan, Italy, September 29–October 4,*  
 568      *2024, Proceedings, Part XXI*, pp. 242–258, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2024. Springer-Verlag. ISBN 978-  
 569      3-031-72663-7. doi: 10.1007/978-3-031-72664-4\_14. URL [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-72664-4\\_14](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-72664-4_14).

570      Boyuan Chen, Zhuo Xu, Sean Kirmani, Brain Ichter, Dorsa Sadigh, Leonidas Guibas, and Fei Xia.  
 571      Spatialvlm: Endowing vision-language models with spatial reasoning capabilities. In *Proceedings*  
 572      *of the IEEE/CVF Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition*, pp. 14455–14465,  
 573      2024a.

574      Haoxin Chen, Menghan Xia, Yingqing He, Yong Zhang, Xiaodong Cun, Shaoshu Yang, Jinbo  
 575      Xing, Yaofang Liu, Qifeng Chen, Xintao Wang, et al. Videocrafter1: Open diffusion models for  
 576      high-quality video generation. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2310.19512*, 2023.

577      Rui Chen, Zehuan Wu, Yichen Liu, Yuxin Guo, Jingcheng Ni, Haifeng Xia, and Siyu Xia. Unimlvg:  
 578      Unified framework for multi-view long video generation with comprehensive control capabilities  
 579      for autonomous driving, 2024b.

580      Daniel Dauner, Marcel Hallgarten, Tianyu Li, Xinshuo Weng, Zhiyu Huang, Zetong Yang, Hongyang  
 581      Li, Igor Gilitschenski, Boris Ivanovic, Marco Pavone, et al. Navsim: Data-driven non-reactive  
 582      autonomous vehicle simulation and benchmarking. *Advances in Neural Information Processing*  
 583      *Systems*, 37:28706–28719, 2024.

584      Alexey Dosovitskiy, German Ros, Felipe Codevilla, Antonio Lopez, and Vladlen Koltun. CARLA:  
 585      An open urban driving simulator. In *Proceedings of the 1st Annual Conference on Robot Learning*,  
 586      pp. 1–16, 2017.

587      Tuo Feng, Wenguan Wang, and Yi Yang. A survey of world models for autonomous driving. *arXiv*  
 588      *preprint arXiv:2501.11260*, 2025.

594 Ruiyuan Gao, Kai Chen, Bo Xiao, Lanqing Hong, Zhenguo Li, and Qiang Xu. Magicdrive-v2: High-  
 595 resolution long video generation for autonomous driving with adaptive control. *arXiv preprint*  
 596 *arXiv:2411.13807*, 2024a.

597 Shenyuan Gao, Jiazhi Yang, Li Chen, Kashyap Chitta, Yihang Qiu, Andreas Geiger, Jun Zhang,  
 598 and Hongyang Li. Vista: A generalizable driving world model with high fidelity and versatile  
 599 controllability. In *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS)*, 2024b.

600 Rohit Girdhar, Mannat Singh, Andrew Brown, Quentin Duval, Samaneh Azadi, Sai Saketh Rambhatla,  
 601 Akbar Shah, Xi Yin, Devi Parikh, and Ishan Misra. Factorizing text-to-video generation by explicit  
 602 image conditioning. In *European Conference on Computer Vision*, pp. 205–224. Springer, 2024.

603 Namgyu Ho, Laura Schmid, and Se-Young Yun. Large language models are reasoning teachers.  
 604 *arXiv preprint arXiv:2212.10071*, 2022.

605 Yihan Hu, Jiazhi Yang, Li Chen, Keyu Li, Chonghao Sima, Xizhou Zhu, Siqi Chai, Senyao Du,  
 606 Tianwei Lin, Wenhui Wang, Lewei Lu, Xiaosong Jia, Qiang Liu, Jifeng Dai, Yu Qiao, and  
 607 Hongyang Li. Planning-oriented autonomous driving. In *Proceedings of the IEEE/CVF Conference*  
 608 *on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition*, 2023.

609 Michael Janner, Yilun Du, Joshua B Tenenbaum, and Sergey Levine. Planning with diffusion for  
 610 flexible behavior synthesis. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2205.09991*, 2022.

611 Bo Jiang, Shaoyu Chen, Bencheng Liao, Xingyu Zhang, Wei Yin, Qian Zhang, Chang Huang,  
 612 Wenyu Liu, and Xinggang Wang. Senna: Bridging large vision-language models and end-to-end  
 613 autonomous driving. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2410.22313*, 2024.

614 Cheng Li, Keyuan Zhou, Tong Liu, Yu Wang, Mingqiao Zhuang, Huan-ang Gao, Bu Jin, and  
 615 Hao Zhao. Avd2: Accident video diffusion for accident video description. *arXiv preprint*  
 616 *arXiv:2502.14801*, 2025.

617 Zhenxin Li, Kailin Li, Shihao Wang, Shiyi Lan, Zhiding Yu, Yishen Ji, Zhiqi Li, Ziyue Zhu, Jan Kautz,  
 618 Zuxuan Wu, et al. Hydra-mdp: End-to-end multimodal planning with multi-target hydra-distillation.  
 619 *arXiv preprint arXiv:2406.06978*, 2024a.

620 Zhiqi Li, Zhiding Yu, Shiyi Lan, Jiahua Li, Jan Kautz, Tong Lu, and Jose M Alvarez. Is ego status  
 621 all you need for open-loop end-to-end autonomous driving? In *Proceedings of the IEEE/CVF*  
 622 *Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition*, pp. 14864–14873, 2024b.

623 Zhixuan Liang, Yao Mu, Mingyu Ding, Fei Ni, Masayoshi Tomizuka, and Ping Luo. Adaptdiffuser:  
 624 Diffusion models as adaptive self-evolving planners. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2302.01877*, 2023.

625 Bencheng Liao, Shaoyu Chen, Haoran Yin, Bo Jiang, Cheng Wang, Sixu Yan, Xinbang Zhang,  
 626 Xiangyu Li, Ying Zhang, Qian Zhang, et al. Diffusiondrive: Truncated diffusion model for  
 627 end-to-end autonomous driving. In *Proceedings of the Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition*  
 628 *Conference*, pp. 12037–12047, 2025.

629 Alexander Naumann, Xunjiang Gu, Tolga Dimlioglu, Mariusz Bojarski, Alperen Degirmenci, Alexan-  
 630 der Popov, Devansh Bisla, Marco Pavone, Urs Muller, and Boris Ivanovic. Data scaling laws for  
 631 end-to-end autonomous driving. In *Proceedings of the Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition*  
 632 *Conference*, pp. 2571–2582, 2025.

633 Zhihong Shao, Peiyi Wang, Qihao Zhu, Runxin Xu, Junxiao Song, Xiao Bi, Haowei Zhang,  
 634 Mingchuan Zhang, YK Li, Y Wu, et al. Deepseekmath: Pushing the limits of mathematical  
 635 reasoning in open language models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2402.03300*, 2024.

636 Haozhan Shen, Peng Liu, Jingcheng Li, Chunxin Fang, Yibo Ma, Jiajia Liao, Qiaoli Shen, Zilun  
 637 Zhang, Kangjia Zhao, Qianqian Zhang, Ruochen Xu, and Tiancheng Zhao. Vlm-r1: A stable and  
 638 generalizable r1-style large vision-language model. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2504.07615*, 2025.

639 Chonghao Sima, Katrin Renz, Kashyap Chitta, Li Chen, Hanxue Zhang, Chengen Xie, Jens  
 640 Beßwenger, Ping Luo, Andreas Geiger, and Hongyang Li. Drivelm: Driving with graph vi-  
 641 sual question answering. In *European Conference on Computer Vision*, pp. 256–274. Springer,  
 642 2024.

648 Pei Sun, Henrik Kretzschmar, Xerxes Dotiwalla, Aurelien Chouard, Vijaysai Patnaik, Paul Tsui, James  
 649 Guo, Yin Zhou, Yuning Chai, Benjamin Caine, et al. Scalability in perception for autonomous  
 650 driving: Waymo open dataset. In *Proceedings of the IEEE/CVF conference on computer vision*  
 651 *and pattern recognition*, pp. 2446–2454, 2020.

652 Wenchao Sun, Xuewu Lin, Yining Shi, Chuang Zhang, Haoran Wu, and Sifa Zheng. Sparsedrive:  
 653 End-to-end autonomous driving via sparse scene representation. In *2025 IEEE International*  
 654 *Conference on Robotics and Automation (ICRA)*, pp. 8795–8801. IEEE, 2025.

655 Qwen Team. Qwen2.5-vl, January 2025. URL <https://qwenlm.github.io/blog/qwen2.5-vl/>.

656 Thomas Unterthiner, Sjoerd Van Steenkiste, Karol Kurach, Raphael Marinier, Marcin Michalski, and  
 657 Sylvain Gelly. Towards accurate generative models of video: A new metric & challenges. *arXiv*  
 658 *preprint arXiv:1812.01717*, 2018.

659 Jingkang Wang, Ava Pun, James Tu, Sivabalan Manivasagam, Abbas Sadat, Sergio Casas, Mengye  
 660 Ren, and Raquel Urtasun. Advsim: Generating safety-critical scenarios for self-driving vehicles.  
 661 In *Proceedings of the IEEE/CVF Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition*, pp.  
 662 9909–9918, 2021.

663 Shihao Wang, Yingfei Liu, Tiancai Wang, Ying Li, and Xiangyu Zhang. Exploring object-centric  
 664 temporal modeling for efficient multi-view 3d object detection. In *Proceedings of the IEEE/CVF*  
 665 *international conference on computer vision*, pp. 3621–3631, 2023.

666 Tianqi Wang, Sukmin Kim, Ji Wenxuan, Enze Xie, Chongjian Ge, Junsong Chen, Zhenguo Li, and  
 667 Ping Luo. Deepaccident: A motion and accident prediction benchmark for v2x autonomous driving.  
 668 In *Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence*, volume 38, pp. 5599–5606, 2024.

669 Xiaofeng Wang, Zheng Zhu, Yunpeng Zhang, Guan Huang, Yun Ye, Wenbo Xu, Ziwei Chen, and  
 670 Xingang Wang. Are we ready for vision-centric driving streaming perception? the asap benchmark.  
 671 *arXiv preprint arXiv:2212.08914*, 2022.

672 Yaohui Wang, Xinyuan Chen, Xin Ma, Shangchen Zhou, Ziqi Huang, Yi Wang, Ceyuan Yang, Yinan  
 673 He, Jiashuo Yu, Peiqing Yang, et al. Lavie: High-quality video generation with cascaded latent  
 674 diffusion models. *International Journal of Computer Vision*, 133(5):3059–3078, 2025.

675 Jason Wei, Xuezhi Wang, Dale Schuurmans, Maarten Bosma, Fei Xia, Ed Chi, Quoc V Le, Denny  
 676 Zhou, et al. Chain-of-thought prompting elicits reasoning in large language models. *Advances in*  
 677 *neural information processing systems*, 35:24824–24837, 2022.

678 Yuqing Wen, Yucheng Zhao, Yingfei Liu, Fan Jia, Yanhui Wang, Chong Luo, Chi Zhang, Tiancai  
 679 Wang, Xiaoyan Sun, and Xiangyu Zhang. Panacea: Panoramic and controllable video generation  
 680 for autonomous driving. In *Proceedings of the IEEE/CVF Conference on Computer Vision and*  
 681 *Pattern Recognition*, pp. 6902–6912, 2024.

682 Benjamin Wilson, William Qi, Tanmay Agarwal, John Lambert, Jagjeet Singh, Siddhesh Khandelwal,  
 683 Bowen Pan, Ratnesh Kumar, Andrew Hartnett, Jhony Kaesemel Pontes, et al. Argoverse 2: Next  
 684 generation datasets for self-driving perception and forecasting. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2301.00493*,  
 685 2023.

686 Jay Zhangjie Wu, Guian Fang, Haoning Wu, Xintao Wang, Yixiao Ge, Xiaodong Cun, David Junhao  
 687 Zhang, Jia-Wei Liu, Yuchao Gu, Rui Zhao, et al. Towards a better metric for text-to-video  
 688 generation. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2401.07781*, 2024.

689 Chejian Xu, Aleksandr Petushko, Ding Zhao, and Bo Li. Diffscene: Diffusion-based safety-critical  
 690 scenario generation for autonomous vehicles. In *Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial*  
 691 *Intelligence*, volume 39, pp. 8797–8805, 2025.

692 Jiawei Zhang, Chejian Xu, and Bo Li. Chatscene: Knowledge-enabled safety-critical scenario  
 693 generation for autonomous vehicles. In *Proceedings of the IEEE/CVF Conference on Computer*  
 694 *Vision and Pattern Recognition*, pp. 15459–15469, 2024.

702 Wenzhao Zheng, Ruiqi Song, Xianda Guo, Chenming Zhang, and Long Chen. Genad: Generative end-  
 703 to-end autonomous driving. In *European Conference on Computer Vision*, pp. 87–104. Springer,  
 704 2024a.

705 Yaowei Zheng, Richong Zhang, Junhao Zhang, Yanhan Ye, Zheyuan Luo, Zhangchi Feng, and  
 706 Yongqiang Ma. Llamafactory: Unified efficient fine-tuning of 100+ language models. In *Pro-  
 707 ceedings of the 62nd Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 3:  
 708 System Demonstrations)*, Bangkok, Thailand, 2024b. Association for Computational Linguistics.  
 709 URL <http://arxiv.org/abs/2403.13372>.

710 Zangwei Zheng, Xiangyu Peng, Tianji Yang, Chenhui Shen, Shenggui Li, Hongxin Liu, Yukun Zhou,  
 711 Tianyi Li, and Yang You. Open-sora: Democratizing efficient video production for all. *arXiv  
 712 preprint arXiv:2412.20404*, 2024c.

713 Ziyuan Zhong, Davis Rempe, Yuxiao Chen, Boris Ivanovic, Yulong Cao, Danfei Xu, Marco Pavone,  
 714 and Baishakhi Ray. Language-guided traffic simulation via scene-level diffusion. In *7th Annual  
 715 Conference on Robot Learning*, 2023a. URL <https://openreview.net/forum?id=nKWQnYkkwX>.

716 Ziyuan Zhong, Davis Rempe, Danfei Xu, Yuxiao Chen, Sushant Veer, Tong Che, Baishakhi Ray,  
 717 and Marco Pavone. Guided conditional diffusion for controllable traffic simulation. In *2023  
 718 IEEE International Conference on Robotics and Automation (ICRA)*, pp. 3560–3566, 2023b. doi:  
 10.1109/ICRA48891.2023.10161463.

719  
 720  
 721  
 722  
 723  
 724  
 725  
 726  
 727  
 728  
 729  
 730  
 731  
 732  
 733  
 734  
 735  
 736  
 737  
 738  
 739  
 740  
 741  
 742  
 743  
 744  
 745  
 746  
 747  
 748  
 749  
 750  
 751  
 752  
 753  
 754  
 755

756 **A APPENDIX**  
757758 **A.1 DISCUSSION ABOUT DIFFERENT TYPES OF SAFETY-CRITICAL SCENARIOS**  
759760 In autonomous driving scenarios, the most severe type of incident is vehicle-to-vehicle collisions,  
761 which can lead to serious threats to human safety. In the past, constructing datasets of inter-vehicle  
762 collision scenarios has been an important research topic (Wang et al., 2024; Chang et al., 2024; Wang  
763 et al., 2021). However, it remains difficult to obtain multi-view collision scenes in the real world  
764 domain. Therefore, the main goal of this work is to generate multi-view, safety-critical scenarios  
765 involving vehicle-to-vehicle collision avoidance in real-world domains.766 Generating a broader variety of safety-critical scenarios would be even more beneficial for autonomous  
767 driving. Our current framework focuses on safety-critical collision-avoidance scenarios between the  
768 ego vehicle and an adversarial vehicle. Since safety-critical situations are highly diverse, we next  
769 discuss how our approach could be extended to two additional common types of scenarios. (1): for  
770 collisions avoidance between two non-ego vehicles, one only need to replace the loss-guidance target  
771 for the adversarial vehicle with the other vehicle in the collision stage simulation. (2): for safety-  
772 critical interactions between pedestrians and vehicles, one need to train a diffusion-based trajectory  
773 generator specifically for pedestrians and control their motion using a test-time loss-guidance strategy  
774 similar to that proposed in our paper. Furthermore, existing autonomous driving video generators  
775 still exhibit inadequate performance when conditioned on out-of-distribution pedestrian trajectories,  
776 indicating that stronger modeling of pedestrians is required to ensure high-quality generation in such  
777 scenarios.778 **A.2 USER STUDY SETTING**  
779780 In our experiments, participants are presented with two videos displayed side-by-side and are asked  
781 to choose the one they perceive to be of higher visual quality. In addition to choosing one of the two  
782 videos, an 'uncertain' option is also provided. A selected video receives 1 point; in the case of an  
783 "uncertain" response, both videos receive 0.5 points each. The final realism score is computed as the  
784 total number of points received divided by the total number of comparisons. The questionnaire we  
785 used is shown in Figure 6. The user studies in Section 4.2 and Section 4.4 are conducted separately.  
786 In the experiment of Section 4.2, we randomly select ten initial scenes that are present across all three  
787 video sets—Origin, Naive, and SafeMVD. For each selected scene, we retrieve the corresponding  
788 video from each set, forming ten matched triplets for pairwise comparison. Similarly, in Section  
789 4.4, we randomly select ten initial scenes that exist in all three sets—Origin, Collision Stage Only,  
790 and Two-Stage Simulation—and obtain the corresponding video per method for each scene, again  
791 resulting in ten matched triplets for evaluation. For each user study, we collect 660 answers from 22  
792 participants.793 **A.3 NO-COLLISION LOSS AND ON-ROAD LOSS**  
794795 To prevent collisions between the vehicles in the scene, we use the following no-collision loss,  
796

797 
$$L_{no\_coll} = \sum_{t=1}^T \sum_{i,j \in \mathcal{A}} w_t \cdot \left( 1 - \frac{d_t^{i,j}}{d_{penalty}^{i,j}} \right) \cdot M_{i,j} \cdot \mathbb{I}((d_t^{i,j} < d_{penalty}^{i,j}) \wedge (v_i > v_{th})) \quad (7)$$
  
800

801 where  $\mathcal{A}$  is the set of all vehicles in the scene, and  $d_t^{i,j}$  and  $d_{penalty}^{i,j}$  represent the distance at time step  
802  $t$  and minimum non-collision threshold distance while detach the gradient of  $V_j$ .  $v_i$  is the velocity  
803 of the vehicle  $V_i$ , and  $v_{th}$  is a very small velocity threshold. When the vehicle's velocity exceeds  
804  $v_{th}$ , it indicates that the vehicle is not in a completely stationary state. This condition ensures that  
805 when a moving vehicle is about to collide with a stationary vehicle, the moving vehicle will adjust its  
806 trajectory, rather than causing the stationary vehicle to evade the collision, which is a more natural  
807 way to prevent collisions.  $M_{i,j}$  is a mask indicating which pairs of agents should evade collisions.  
808 In the collision-stage simulation, we configure that all agents, except for the ego and adversarial  
809 vehicles, are required to evade collisions. In the evasion-stage simulation, this mask includes all  
agents.

810

## Realism Evaluation of Autonomous Driving Videos

811

812


Evaluate the realism of multi-view videos from the ego-vehicle perspective. Please select the option that appears more realistic in each video comparison.

815

816

817

\* 1. A:



820

821


822

823

824

825

B:



828

829

830

831

832

833

834

A

B

Uncertain

835

The more realistic video is



836

837

838

839

Figure 6: The questionnaire used to evaluate the realism of videos generated by different baselines in the user study.

840

841

842

843

To ensure that the vehicles stay within the driving area, we utilize the following on-road loss,

844

845

$$L_{on\_road} = \sum_{t=1}^T \sum_{p \in P_{offroad}} w_t \cdot \left( 1 - \frac{\min_{q \in P_{onroad}} dist(p, q)}{l_{diag}} \right) \cdot \mathbb{I}(v_i > v_{th}) \quad (8)$$

846

847

848

849

where  $P_{offroad}$  and  $P_{onroad}$  are the set of sampled points located off-road and on-road, respectively, within the agent vehicle’s bounding box,  $dist(p, q)$  is the Euclidean distance between points  $p$  and  $q$  while detach the gradients of  $q$ , and  $l_{diag}$  is the diagonal length of the agent vehicle’s bounding box. The gradient of this loss pulls the ego vehicle’s off-road points toward the nearest on-road points, thereby encouraging the denoised trajectory to remain within drivable areas.

850

851

852

853

854

855

856

### A.4 PROMPT

857

858

859

860

861

862

863

In this section, we present the prompt used in our VLM-based selection of adversarial vehicles in Figure 10. In the prompt,  $v$  is substituted with the ego vehicle’s velocity in the given scene. For the non-finetuned VLM, we append “Output final answer (number) in `<answer> </answer>` tags.” at the end to ensure it outputs the vehicle ID for evaluation. For the GRPO-fine-tuned VLM, we append “Output the thinking process in `<think> </think>` and final answer (number) in `<answer> </answer>` tags.” at the end. For the SFT-finetuned VLM, we use the original prompt without any modifications.

Table 6: Performance of UniAD in Section 4.2

Methods	Sample-level $CR$ (%) $\uparrow$				Scene-level $CR$ $\uparrow$				$NC \downarrow$	$TTC \downarrow$
	1s	2s	3s	Avg.	1s	2s	3s	Avg.		
Origin	1.14	2.09	3.98	2.40	0.146	0.27	0.51	0.31	0.99	0.97
Naive	19.04	43.59	61.57	41.40	1.49	3.40	4.81	3.23	0.33	0.26
SafeMVdrive	2.10	11.85	23.52	12.49	0.27	1.51	3.00	1.59	0.83	0.75

Table 7: Performance of SparseDrive in Section 4.2

Methods	Sample-level $CR$ (%) $\uparrow$				Scene-level $CR$ $\uparrow$				$NC \downarrow$	$TTC \downarrow$
	1s	2s	3s	Avg.	1s	2s	3s	Avg.		
Origin	0.38	0.38	0.50	0.42	0.05	0.05	0.07	0.05	0.98	0.96
Naive	17.26	28.07	38.14	27.82	1.35	2.19	2.98	2.17	0.38	0.29
SafeMVdrive	7.57	15.23	22.32	15.04	0.96	1.94	2.84	1.91	0.74	0.67

## A.5 EVALUATION RESULTS OF DIFFERENT END-TO-END PLANNERS

In this section, we present the detailed open-loop performance of the different planners evaluated in Sections 4.2 and 4.4 of the main paper. Tables 6, 7, and 8 report the detailed results of UniAD (Hu et al., 2023), SparseDrive (Sun et al., 2025), and DiffusionDrive (Liao et al., 2025) for the experiments in Section 4.2. Tables 9, 10, and 11 show the corresponding results for the experiments in Section 4.4.

## A.6 EXAMPLES OF VLM SELECTING PHYSICALLY FEASIBLE AND SAFETY-CRITICAL VEHICLES

In this section, we present several examples in which the VLM makes selections that adhere to physical feasibility, as shown in Figures 7, 8, and 9. In these examples, the vehicles selected by the most representative rule based method, nearest-vehicle rule method, are in fact physically infeasible, whereas our VLM makes physically feasible choices.




Figure 7: In this example, the nearest-vehicle rule method would choose Vehicle 1, which is blocked by an obstacle and therefore cannot produce a physically feasible scenario, whereas the VLM would select Vehicle 3.

## A.7 RUNNING TIME COMPARISON BETWEEN EXHAUSTIVE SIMULATION AND VLM INFERENCE.

In this section, we compare the computational efficiency of our VLM-based selector against exhaustive simulation. Since trajectory simulation incurs a non-trivial computational cost—approximately 2 minutes per simulation—simulating every vehicle in a scene to identify safety-critical ones is time-

918 Table 8: Performance of DiffusionDrive in Section 4.2  
919  
920

Methods	Sample-level $CR$ (%) $\uparrow$				Scene-level $CR$ $\uparrow$				NC $\downarrow$	TTC $\downarrow$
	1s	2s	3s	Avg.	1s	2s	3s	Avg.		
Origin	0.19	0.24	0.44	0.29	0.02	0.03	0.06	0.04	0.98	0.97
Naive	19.66	30.47	39.50	29.88	1.54	2.39	3.09	2.34	0.41	0.30
SafeMVdrive	10.63	18.68	25.17	18.16	1.35	2.38	3.21	2.31	0.74	0.66

927 Table 9: Performance of UniAD in Section 4.4  
928  
929

Methods	Sample-level $CR$ (%) $\uparrow$				Scene-level $CR$ $\uparrow$				NC $\downarrow$	TTC $\downarrow$
	1s	2s	3s	Avg.	1s	2s	3s	Avg.		
Origin	1.14	2.09	3.98	3.98	0.15	0.27	0.51	0.31	0.99	0.97
Collision stage only	20.35	40.12	48.26	48.26	1.71	3.37	4.05	3.04	0.67	0.64
Two-stage simulation	2.10	11.85	23.52	23.52	0.27	1.51	3.00	1.59	0.83	0.75

938 consuming, typically averaging around 28 minutes and exceeding 98 minutes in scenes with many  
939 vehicles. Even when used purely as part of a data engine, such simulation time introduces significant  
940 overhead. In contrast, once trained, the VLM requires only about 22 seconds per scene to accurately  
941 identify safety-critical adversarial vehicles, yielding roughly an 80x speed-up. Moreover, according  
942 to the scale laws of autonomous driving (Naumann et al., 2025), training a commercial planner  
943 generally requires massive datasets, often amounting to tens of thousands of hours of driving data. At  
944 such a scale, the speed of data generation becomes crucial, as it can directly influence the overall  
945 time-to-market.

946 A.8 FINETUNING SETTING  
947948 A.8.1 VLM FINETUNING  
949

950 **GRPO-finetuning details:** We set the learning rate to 0.00002 with a cosine scheduler, enable  
951 DeepSpeed Zero3, set the number of generations in GRPO to 6, do not freeze any modules, and  
952 follow other settings from the LoRA fine-tuning configuration in (Shen et al., 2025). We fine-tune  
953 Qwen-VL 2.5 Instruct (Team, 2025) using the GRPO algorithm within the framework of (Shen et al.,  
954 2025) for 2600 steps on 4 A800 GPUs.

955 **SFT-finetuning details:** We set the learning rate to 0.00002 with a cosine scheduler, use a gradient  
956 accumulation step size of 2, do not freeze any modules, and follow other settings from the LoRA  
957 fine-tuning configuration of Qwen-VL 2.5 Instruct in (Zheng et al., 2024b). We fine-tune Qwen-VL  
958 2.5 Instruct (Team, 2025) using the SFT algorithm within the framework of (Zheng et al., 2024b) for  
959 2600 steps on a single A800 GPU.

960 A.8.2 TRAJECTORY DIFFUSION MODEL FINETUNING  
961

962 Originally, the context length of the trajectory generation model (Zhong et al., 2023b) is set to 6.  
963 Since our framework takes a single-frame initial scene as input, we retrain the model to align with  
964 this setup. Following the configuration of (Zhong et al., 2023b), we introduce two key modifications:  
965 (1) the context length is set to 1, and (2) the motion restriction mask for static vehicles is removed to  
966 allow more vehicles to collide with the ego vehicle. The trajectory generation model is trained for  
967 80,000 steps.

968 A.9 VIDEO GENERATION SETTINGS  
969

970 In UniMLVG (Chen et al., 2024b), textual descriptions derived from ground truth frames are used  
971 as text conditions for video generation. However, this limits the diversity of generated videos, as

972  
973  
974  
975 Table 10: Performance of SparseDrive in Section 4.4  
976  
977  
978  
979

Methods	Sample-level $CR$ (%) $\uparrow$				Scene-level $CR$ $\uparrow$				NC $\downarrow$	TTC $\downarrow$
	1s	2s	3s	Avg.	1s	2s	3s	Avg.		
Origin	0.38	0.38	0.50	0.42	0.05	0.05	0.07	0.05	0.98	0.96
Collision stage only	16.42	26.63	34.17	25.74	1.35	2.20	2.82	2.12	0.67	0.62
Two-stage simulation	7.57	15.23	22.32	15.04	0.96	1.94	2.84	1.91	0.74	0.67

980  
981 Table 11: Performance of DiffusionDrive in Section 4.4  
982  
983

Methods	Sample-level $CR$ (%) $\uparrow$				Scene-level $CR$ $\uparrow$				NC $\downarrow$	TTC $\downarrow$
	1s	2s	3s	Avg.	1s	2s	3s	Avg.		
Origin	0.19	0.24	0.44	0.29	0.02	0.03	0.06	0.04	0.98	0.97
Collision stage only	15.83	26.70	34.52	25.68	1.30	2.20	2.85	2.12	0.67	0.62
Two-stage simulation	10.63	18.68	25.17	18.16	1.35	2.38	3.21	2.31	0.74	0.66

991 discrepancies between the vehicle trajectories in the generated video and those in the ground truth can  
992 lead to inaccuracies in object and background descriptions. Therefore, we only use time and weather  
993 descriptions in text condition, preserving the controllability of modifying temporal and weather  
994 attributes while evading textual inconsistencies when vehicle trajectories are altered. Subsequently,  
995 multi-view images from the initial scene are used as reference frames for the first roll-out. We convert  
996 the full-scene trajectory information into 3D bounding boxes and map lanes in the camera coordinate  
997 system and explicit viewpoint modeling, which are used as conditioning information to generate  
998 views that accurately follow the specified trajectories. Each roll-out produces 19 frames at 12 Hz. The  
999 last generated frame for each generation is then used as the reference frame for the next roll-out, and  
1000 through autoregressive generation, the entire safety-critical trajectory is rendered into a multi-view  
1001 video from the ego-vehicle’s perspective.

1002  
1003 A.10 EFFICIENCY AND COST ANALYSIS

1004  
1005 **Training:** We use GRPO to train the VLM, which consumes 80 GB of GPU memory. The training  
1006 runs on four GPUs for 88 hours, resulting in 352 GPU hours. To align with our trajectory simulation  
1007 from single-image initial scenes, we also train a one-step context trajectory diffusion model, which  
1008 uses 8 GB of memory and trains for 15 hours on a single GPU.

1009  
1010 **Inference:** The VLM infers in  $\sim$ 22 seconds with 28 GB memory. Each trajectory simulation  
1011 stage takes  $\sim$ 2 minutes ( $<3$  GB), totaling  $\sim$ 4 minutes. Video generation requires  $\sim$ 21 minutes  
1012 (9-second video) and uses 40 GB, making it the main bottleneck. In total, generating one video  
1013 without failure takes approximately 25 minutes. Considering the time overhead resulting from  
1014 selecting inappropriate adversarial vehicles and failures in the evasion stage, the average time to  
1015 generate a complete video increases to approximately 36 minutes, which is comparable with current  
1016 driving video generators. We plan to accelerate the video synthesis process using techniques such as  
1017 distillation or by incorporating a 3D VAE in future work.

1018  
1019 A.11 CLOSED-LOOP METRICS SETTINGS

1020  
1021 The NAVSIM (Dauner et al., 2024) benchmark evaluation uses non-reactive simulations and closed-  
1022 loop metrics for a comprehensive assessment. We focus on two collision-related metrics: no collisions  
1023 (NC) and time-to-collision (TTC). We make some adjustments to better evaluate safety-critical data  
1024 generation and to align with our dataset. Since our dataset annotations use 12 Hz interpolation (Wang  
1025 et al., 2022), we set the closed-loop frequency to 12 Hz to ensure consistency with the annotations.  
1026 By default, UniAD predicts future trajectories at 2 Hz over a 3-second horizon, so we also evaluate  
1027 TTC and NC on 3-second trajectory horizon. Both NC and TTC are set to the default value of 1. If  
1028 the ego vehicle collides with another vehicle within 3 seconds, NC is set to 0. TTC is set to 0 if, for



1036 Figure 8: In this example, the nearest-vehicle rule would select Vehicle 2, which is blocked by an  
1037 obstacle and therefore cannot produce a physically feasible scenario, whereas the VLM determines  
1038 that there is no suitable vehicle in the scene.



1049 Figure 9: In this example, the nearest-vehicle rule would select Vehicle 2, which is blocked by an  
1050 obstacle and therefore cannot produce a physically feasible scenario, whereas the VLM determines  
1051 that there is no suitable vehicle in the scene.

1052  
1053  
1054 any simulation step within the 4s horizon, the ego-vehicle’s time-to-collision, when projected forward  
1055 with a constant velocity and heading, is less than 1 second. Similarly to the collision rate, we make  
1056 one adaptation: if a collision already occurs at the initial step, we consider such samples as invalid  
1057 initializations and exclude them from our evaluation.

#### 1058 A.12 BASELINE SELECTOR SETTINGS

1059  
1060 **Random-neighbor rule:** Candidate vehicles are selected as adversaries based on their lane positions  
1061 relative to the ego vehicle. Specifically, vehicles located within a predefined lane proximity (we select  
1062 one lane) as the ego are identified, and one of them is randomly chosen as the adversary.

1063  
1064 **Nearest-neighbor rule:** The adversarial vehicle is chosen as the one that is spatially closest to the  
1065 ego vehicle in the initial frame (at 0 s). This rule emphasizes simplicity by selecting the nearest  
1066 neighbor at the start of the scenario, regardless of subsequent speed, orientation, or lane constraints.

1067  
1068 **Precision-first rule:** Candidate vehicles are first identified based on the following criteria; among  
1069 them, the nearest one is selected.

- 1070 • Both the ego vehicle and the candidate have current speeds greater than 2 m/s.
- 1071 • At both 0 s and 2 s, the distance between the ego vehicle and the candidate is within the  
1072 range of 10–30 m.
- 1073 • At both 0 s and 2 s, the orientation difference between the ego vehicle and the candidate is  
1074 less than 108 degrees.

#### 1075 A.13 GENERATED VIDEOS USED FOR EVALUATION.

1076  
1077 The videos used in our evaluation are generated under a fixed set of 250 samples, randomly selected  
1078 from the val split, hereafter referred to as the base dataset. The following sections provide the video  
1079 generation process in each experiment.

1080

1081

1082

1083

1084

1085

1086

1087

1088

1089

1090

1091

1092

1093

1094

1095

1096

1097

1098

1099

1100

1101

1102

1103

1104

1105

1106

1107

1108

1109

1110

1111

1112

1113

Prompt: You are a collision scenario analysis expert. Based on the traffic scenario described in the input images, your task is to identify the vehicle most likely to generate collision with the ego vehicle. The scene consists of six camera views surrounding the ego vehicle, arranged as follows: The first row includes three images: FRONT LEFT, FRONT, and FRONT RIGHT. The second row includes three images: BACK RIGHT, BACK, and BACK LEFT. Potential Dangerous Vehicles are highlighted with red boxes, and each vehicle's ID is labeled in the top-left corner of the respective box. Select the one most likely to have its future trajectory modified (through manual intervention) to produce the collision with the ego vehicle. The speed of any car other than ego vehicle can be adjusted, as long as it is in accordance with the laws of physics, so there is no need to analyze the speed of other cars. If no vehicle is suitable for this task, please respond that 'no vehicle is appropriate'. In the current scenario, the initial speed of the ego vehicle is  $v$  m/s.

Figure 10: Original Prompt used in our VLM-based selection.

1100

1101

1102

1103

1104

1105

1106

1107

1108

1109

1110

1111

1112

1113

1114

1115

1116

1117

1118

1119

1120

1121

1122

1123

1124

1125

**Videos used in Section 4.2:** In this section, we compare the generated videos under three baselines: Origin, Naive, and our proposed SafeMVD. For the SafeMVD set, we apply our full framework to the base dataset and ultimately obtain 41 collision-evasion videos. For the Origin set, we start from the same 41 initial scenarios used in the SafeMVD set and convert their original NuScenes trajectories into videos. For the Naive set, we apply the naive baseline to all 250 initial scenarios in the base dataset and obtain 72 valid collision trajectories, which are then converted into videos. We evaluate the collision rates of the planner using videos on these three sets. Since FID scores are empirically affected by the number of images used in evaluation—more images generally lead to lower FID values—for fairness, we randomly sample 41 videos from the Naive set to compute FID. The videos used in the user study are described in Section A.2.

1126

1127

1128

1129

1130

1131

1132

1133

Table 12: Ablation Study on Loss Functions in the Two-Stage Evasion Trajectory Generator.

CONFIGURATION	CSR $\uparrow$	ESR $\uparrow$	COLLISION RATE $\downarrow$	OFF-ROAD RATE $\downarrow$	REALISM $\downarrow$	CLOSEST DISTANCE $\downarrow$
WHOLE LOSSES	0.750	0.402	0.042	0.002	0.312	5.37
$-L_{adv}$ IN COLLISION STAGE	0.471	0.703	0.034	0.000	0.308	9.11
$-L_{no\_coll}$ IN COLLISION STAGE	0.735	0.410	0.141	0.004	0.312	6.07
$-L_{on\_road}$ IN COLLISION STAGE	0.765	0.490	0.053	0.065	0.314	5.37
$-L_{no\_coll}$ IN EVASION STAGE	0.770	0.127	0.024	0.000	0.313	6.32
$-L_{on\_road}$ IN EVASION STAGE	0.770	0.304	0.057	0.007	0.310	5.23

1134  
1135 A.14 ABLATION STUDY ON LOSS FUNCTIONS IN THE TWO-STAGE EVASION TRAJECTORY  
1136 GENERATOR1137 We conduct ablation studies on the loss functions used in our two-stage evasion trajectory simulator.  
1138 On 250 validation scenes, we first use the VLM selector to identify safety-critical candidates. Then,  
1139 we remove one specific loss from the two-stage simulation while keeping the remaining loss terms  
1140 unchanged to simulate.1141 We report the following metrics:  
1142

- **Collision Success Rate (CSR):** the proportion of adversarial vehicles that successfully collide with the ego vehicle during collision simulation. A higher value is better.
- **Evasion Success Rate (ESR):** the proportion of adversarial vehicles that successfully evade during evasion simulation. A higher value is better.
- **Collision Rate:** in the final trajectories, the proportion of adversarial vehicles that collide with any vehicle. Since these trajectories are later used for multi-view video simulation, and collision cases cannot be rendered, a lower value is preferred. This metric follows the implementation in CTG (Zhong et al., 2023b).
- **Off-Road Rate:** in the final trajectories, the proportion of adversarial vehicles that enter non-drivable areas. A lower value is better. This metric follows the implementation in CTG (Zhong et al., 2023b).
- **Realism:** in the final trajectories, the degree to which the trajectories resemble real-world behavior. In accordance with (Zhong et al., 2023b), we compare the statistical distribution between simulated trajectories and real-world trajectories. A lower value indicates better realism. This metric follows the implementation in CTG (Zhong et al., 2023b).
- **Closest Distance:** in the final trajectories, the minimum distance between the adversarial vehicle and the ego vehicle, measured by the distance between their center points, which reflects the potential danger level. A lower value is better.

1162 The experimental results are shown in Table 12. The results demonstrate that each of our loss terms  
1163 plays a crucial role. Removing  $L_{adv}$  during the collision stage leads to a higher Closest Distance,  
1164 indicating a lower safety criticality of the scenes. Removing  $L_{no\_collision}$  results in a higher Collision  
1165 Rate in the final trajectories. Removing  $L_{on\_road}$  increases the Off-Road Rate in the final trajectories.  
1166 During the evasion stage, removing  $L_{no\_collision}$  decreases the Evasion Success Rate (ESR), resulting  
1167 in fewer generated scenarios, while removing  $L_{on\_road}$  similarly increases the Off-Road Rate in the  
1168 final trajectories. These results verify the rationality and necessity of our loss design.  
11691170 A.15 HYPERPARAMETERS STUDY OF THE LOSSES USED IN THE TWO-STAGE EVASION  
1171 TRAJECTORY GENERATOR1173 In this section, we investigate the hyperparameters that control the contributions of different loss terms  
1174 in the two-stage simulation. The positions of these hyperparameters can be found in Equations (4) and  
1175 (5) in the main text. In addition to these, we also conduct hyperparameter studies on the weight decay  
1176 rate factor  $\lambda$ . Similar to the previous section, we first use the VLM selector to identify safety-critical  
1177 candidates on the 250 validation scenes. After that, we vary the hyperparameter corresponding to a  
1178 specific loss term while keeping the other parameters fixed and then perform the two-stage simulation.  
1179 We adopt the same evaluation metrics as in the previous section.1180 The experimental results are shown in Table 13, 15, 14, 16, 17, and 18. We vary the hyperparameters  
1181 controlling the loss contributions with values  $\{0, 1, 50\}$ . Overall, setting the value to 0 generally  
1182 leads to worse performance across various metrics, indicating the necessity of each individual loss  
1183 term. On the other hand, when the value is within the range of 1 to 50, the differences among the  
1184 metrics are relatively small, suggesting that our framework is not highly sensitive to hyperparameter  
1185 selection.1186 For the weight decay factor  $\lambda$ , we evaluate settings of 0, 0.9, and 1. A value of 0 means that the loss  
1187 is computed using only the prediction at timestamp 1, while a value of 1 averages the loss across all  
1188 timestamps (i.e., no decay is applied). We observe that the best performance across all metrics is

1188  
1189  
1190 Table 13: Ablation Study on  $\alpha$  in Collision Stage.  
1191  
1192  
1193

CONFIGURATION	CSR $\uparrow$	ESR $\uparrow$	COLLISION RATE $\downarrow$	OFF-ROAD RATE $\downarrow$	REALISM $\downarrow$	CLOSEST DISTANCE $\downarrow$
$\alpha = 0$	0.471	0.703	0.034	0.000	0.308	9.11
$\alpha = 1$ (DEFAULT)	0.750	0.402	0.042	0.002	0.312	5.37
$\alpha = 50$	0.765	0.404	0.054	0.003	0.311	5.33

1194  
1195 Table 14: Ablation Study on  $\beta$  in Collision Stage.  
1196  
1197  
1198  
1199

CONFIGURATION	CSR $\uparrow$	ESR $\uparrow$	COLLISION RATE $\downarrow$	OFF-ROAD RATE $\downarrow$	REALISM $\downarrow$	CLOSEST DISTANCE $\downarrow$
$\beta = 0$	0.735	0.410	0.141	0.004	0.312	6.07
$\beta = 1$	0.735	0.440	0.083	0.005	0.311	5.63
$\beta = 50$ (DEFAULT)	0.750	0.402	0.042	0.002	0.312	5.37

1200  
1201 achieved when  $\lambda = 0.9$ , which demonstrates the importance of applying a temporal weight decay in  
1202 our loss design.  
12031204  
1205 A.16 PERFORMS ON DIFFERENT SENSOR CONFIGURATIONS1206  
1207 In this section, we perform experiments on the nuScenes dataset to assess how changes in camera  
1208 parameters impact the generated video quality. We randomly perturb the extrinsic parameters of all  
1209 cameras—up to 5 cm in translation and 2° in rotation along the x, y, and z axes. Since the initial  
1210 camera images are captured using the original configuration and become misaligned after perturbation,  
1211 we exclude them from the generation inputs. Other conditioning signals, such as bounding boxes and  
1212 map information, are retained, and their projected positions in the camera views change accordingly  
1213 as the extrinsic parameters vary. For comparison, we also generate videos under the original camera  
1214 configuration without using the initial camera images as conditioning input. The results in Figure 19  
1215 show that FID, sample-level CR, and scene-level CR remain similar before and after perturbation,  
1216 indicating that our framework demonstrates a degree of transferability to different camera parameters.  
1217

## 1218 A.17 LIMITATIONS

1219 Since this is the first work to generate multi-view safety-critical driving videos in the real-world  
1220 domain, we have several limitations. One is the reliance on the complete initial scene configuration,  
1221 which restricts its ability to generate scenarios directly from raw multi-view camera inputs. Additionally,  
1222 although our framework uses guidance signals to generate annotations, it lacks a mechanism to  
1223 discard outdated or irrelevant ones—e.g., vehicles that have exited the ego’s view. While this does  
1224 not affect the evaluation of planning-related metrics, it may have some impact on perception-related  
1225 evaluation metrics. Consequently, our dataset cannot be directly applied to tasks such as 3D detection  
1226 or BEV segmentation for training and evaluation. Future research could address these challenges by  
1227 reducing dependency on dense annotations and incorporating dynamic filtering strategies to maintain  
1228 temporal relevance in the guidance signals.  
1229

## 1230 A.18 THE USE OF LARGE LANGUAGE MODELS

1231 In this work, large language models (LLMs) are employed primarily for polishing purposes. Specifically,  
1232 they are used to improve the clarity, fluency, and readability of the manuscript without altering  
1233 the underlying technical content. The use of LLMs is restricted to language refinement, such as  
1234 correcting grammatical errors, enhancing sentence structure, and improving overall coherence. Import-  
1235 antly, no novel ideas, experimental results, or conceptual contributions are generated by the LLMs;  
1236 all scientific content and findings presented in this paper are entirely the work of the authors.  
1237  
1238  
1239  
1240  
1241

Table 15: Ablation Study on  $\gamma$  in Collision Stage.

CONFIGURATION	CSR $\uparrow$	ESR $\uparrow$	COLLISION RATE $\downarrow$	OFF-ROAD RATE $\downarrow$	REALISM $\downarrow$	CLOSEST DISTANCE $\downarrow$
$\gamma = 0$	0.765	0.490	0.053	0.065	0.314	5.37
$\gamma = 1$ (DEFAULT)	0.750	0.402	0.042	0.002	0.312	5.37
$\gamma = 50$	0.779	0.396	0.059	0.003	0.311	5.60

Table 16: Ablation Study on  $\beta$  in Evasion Stage.

CONFIGURATION	CSR $\uparrow$	ESR $\uparrow$	COLLISION RATE $\downarrow$	OFF-ROAD RATE $\downarrow$	REALISM $\downarrow$	CLOSEST DISTANCE $\downarrow$
$\beta = 0$	0.750	0.127	0.024	0.000	0.313	6.32
$\beta = 1$ (DEFAULT)	0.750	0.402	0.042	0.002	0.312	5.37
$\beta = 50$	0.750	0.422	0.041	0.003	0.311	4.92

Table 17: Ablation Study on  $\gamma$  in Evasion Stage.

CONFIGURATION	CSR $\uparrow$	ESR $\uparrow$	COLLISION RATE $\downarrow$	OFF-ROAD RATE $\downarrow$	REALISM $\downarrow$	CLOSEST DISTANCE $\downarrow$
$\gamma = 0$	0.750	0.304	0.057	0.007	0.310	5.23
$\gamma = 1$ (DEFAULT)	0.750	0.402	0.042	0.002	0.312	5.37
$\gamma = 50$	0.750	0.363	0.002	0.048	0.310	5.59

Table 18: Ablation Study on  $\lambda$ .

CONFIGURATION	CSR $\uparrow$	ESR $\uparrow$	COLLISION RATE $\downarrow$	OFF-ROAD RATE $\downarrow$	REALISM $\downarrow$	CLOSEST DISTANCE $\downarrow$
$\lambda = 0$	0.640	0.011	0.182	0.091	0.336	8.61
$\lambda = 0.9$ (DEFAULT)	0.750	0.402	0.042	0.002	0.312	5.37
$\lambda = 1$	0.765	0.433	0.060	0.004	0.317	5.85

Table 19: Performance under unseen camera configurations.

METHODS	SAMPLE-LEVEL CR (%) $\uparrow$				SCENE-LEVEL CR $\uparrow$				FID $\downarrow$
	1s	2s	3s	Avg.	1s	2s	3s	Avg.	
ORIGINAL CAMERA	7.58	18.96	28.09	18.21	1.32	3.32	4.90	3.18	31.70
MODIFIED CAMERA	7.58	19.24	28.51	18.44	1.34	3.39	4.98	3.24	35.85