GUARD: Guiding Unbiased Alignment through Reward Debiasing

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Abstract

Reward misspecification in RLHF threatens the reliability of large language models by amplifying spurious correlations and producing unstable or unsafe behavior Christiano et al. [2017], Skalse et al. [2022], Gao et al. [2023]. Expert-defined harm categories provide a stable signal for post-training evaluation Mitchell et al. [2019], but reward models often encode categorical biases that undermine trustworthiness. We address this challenge through an information-theoretic reliability objective: minimizing mutual information Belghazi et al. [2018] between reward scores and sensitive categories. Our approach enforces invariance via adversarial training Edwards and Storkey [2016], Zhao et al. [2018] while integrating curiosity-driven intrinsic rewards Pathak et al. [2017] into PPO Schulman et al. [2017] to preserve diversity. Framing debiasing as a minimax game yields reward models that are both robust and verifiably category-independent. Empirically, our Fair-RM achieves near-neutral bias on CrowS-Pairs Nangia et al. [2020] and StereoSet Nadeem et al. [2020], reduces post-PPO disparity on HH-RLHF, and scales to 19-category fairness in PKU-SafeRLHF Ji et al. [2024]. These results demonstrate improved calibration and stability under distribution shift, establishing our method as a practical reliability control for safety-critical RLHF deployment.

1 Introduction

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Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) has become essential for aligning large language models with human intent Christiano et al. [2017], Ouyang et al. [2022], yet reward 20 misspecification poses significant risks for reliability in safety-critical applications Amodei et al. 21 [2016], Pan et al. [2022]. When reward models inherit biases from pretraining or exploit spurious 22 correlations Skalse et al. [2022], downstream policies can display unstable or unsafe behaviors 23 across demographic groups or safety categories—a major barrier to deployment in domains such 24 as healthcare, finance, and criminal justice. These failures undermine not only fairness but also 25 calibration, robustness, and the broader trustworthiness of RLHF systems across the full LLM 26 lifecycle. 27

Existing approaches to mitigating bias typically rely on penalty-based regularization Shen et al. [2023], Dai et al. [2023] that augments the training loss, or resource reallocation across groups Ouyang et al. [2025] and ensemble-based multi-objective methods Zhou et al. [2024]. While such techniques reduce observed disparities, they lack theoretical guarantees of reliability, often collapse under distribution shift, and may sacrifice response diversity. As a result, these strategies leave open important failure modes—including reward hacking and instability—that limit confidence in their use for safety-critical AI deployment.

Our key insight is that reliability can be formalized as statistical independence between reward outputs and sensitive categories Belghazi et al. [2018], Zhao et al. [2018]. We implement this by introducing an adversarial minimax game Edwards and Storkey [2016] that enforces invariance in the reward model while preserving preference learning performance. To counteract the reduction in

generative diversity that such constraints can impose, we further integrate a curiosity-driven intrinsic reward during PPO training Pathak et al. [2017], Schulman et al. [2017]. Together, these components provide both a mitigation strategy and an evaluation protocol, embedding reliability requirements directly into reward modeling while enabling verifiable improvements in calibration, robustness, and fairness across diverse categories.

2 Related Work

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Reward Misspecification and Reliability in RLHF. Prior work has identified reward misspecification as a fundamental threat to RLHF reliability, including reward hacking and over-optimization Skalse et al. [2022], Gao et al. [2023]. Existing mitigation strategies—penalty-based regularization Shen et al. [2023], Dai et al. [2023], resource reallocation Ouyang et al. [2025], and multi-objective methods Zhou et al. [2024], Wu et al. [2023]—lack theoretical guarantees and often collapse under distribution shift. Our work formalizes reliability as statistical independence with verifiable adversarial constraints.

Information-Theoretic Fairness and Adversarial Training. Mutual information has been used to enforce fairness through adversarial training that minimizes dependence on sensitive attributes Edwards and Storkey [2016], Zhao et al. [2018], Belghazi et al. [2018]. Parallel work explores adversarial and self-play approaches to better represent heterogeneous preferences and bypass reward models Cheng et al. [2024], Wu et al. [2024], Chen et al. [2024], Bukharin et al. [2025], Wang et al. [2025, 2024]. We combine adversarial debiasing with curiosity-driven rewards Pathak et al. [2017] to enforce category independence while preserving diversity during PPO training.

3 Problem Setup and Method

Reward Modeling in RLHF. An RLHF reward model (RM) assigns a scalar score $r_{\theta}(x,y)$ to a prompt-response pair and is trained from human pairwise preferences Christiano et al. [2017], Ouyang et al. [2022]. We use the Bradley-Terry formulation Bradley and Terry [1952]

$$P(y_A \succ y_B) = \sigma(r_\theta(x, y_A) - r_\theta(x, y_B)),$$

with training objective (averaged over pairs)

$$L_{\rm BT}(\theta) = -\log \sigma (r_{\theta}(x, y_A) - r_{\theta}(x, y_B)),$$

so minimizing $L_{\rm BT}$ drives $r_{\theta}(x,y_A) > r_{\theta}(x,y_B)$ when y_A is preferred. The BT objective represents an MLE of the preference dataset onto the space of scalar-valued reward models Swamy et al. [2025].

Reliability Constraint via Mutual Information. Following Ouyang et al. [2025], we treat reliability of an RM across categories $c \in C$ (e.g., helpfulness/harmlessness or broader safety tags) as invariance of the reward scale with respect to these categories (see Appx. A.1 for how non-invariant RMs can induce undesirable downstream behavior). Formally, we target identical reward distributions $r_{\theta}(x,y \mid c)$ for all c, i.e.,

$$I(r_{\theta}(x,y);c) = 0,$$

zero mutual information between reward and category Belghazi et al. [2018], Zhao et al. [2018]. Directly minimizing this dependence is intractable, so we adopt an adversarial surrogate: a classifier $q_{\phi}(c \mid r)$ attempts to predict c from rewards. This casts reliable (category-invariant) reward learning as a minimax game between the reward model and a discriminator solved via no-regret dynamics; our analysis (Appendix A.3) shows that such training drives the empirical MI toward zero.

Adversarial Implementation. We impose the constraint during RM training on preference pairs, where each comparison (x, y_A, y_B) carries a category label. We optimize $L_{\rm BT}$ for preference prediction while training an adversary q_{ϕ} on scored examples (x, y); a lightweight MLP consumes scalar rewards $r_{\theta}(x, y_A)$ and $r_{\theta}(x, y_B)$ to predict c. In practice, the adversarial weight $\lambda_{\rm adv}$ trades off invariance against stability and fit. To preserve output diversity while enforcing invariance, we add a small intrinsic reward via Random Network Distillation (RND) Pathak et al. [2017], Burda et al. [2019] during PPO, following recent introductions of intrinsic reward into RLHF Sun et al. [2025].

4 Experiments and Results

We evaluate our framework on a binary Helpful/Harmless (HH-RLHF) task Bai et al. [2022] and a 19-class safety classification task Ji et al. [2024]. We fine-tune TinyLlama-1.1B TinyLlama Team [2024] policies with PPO Schulman et al. [2017], Hugging Face [2023], comparing a baseline reward model against our Fair and Fair+Curiosity variants. Full training and evaluation details are provided in Appendix A.4–B.

Reward Distribution Analysis. In our main experiment, we compare reward model scores for Helpful versus Harmless completions. The baseline RM exhibits a systematic skew, consistently 90 inflating Helpful rewards and allowing weak completions to outrank stronger ones from the other 91 category, violating the assumption of a shared reward scale. 92 With $\lambda_{\rm adv} = 0.2$, the fairness-constrained model yields a substantially more balanced distribution 93 (Figures 5, 6). The KS distance drops from 0.43 to 0.10 (p < 0.001) and the Wasserstein-1 distance 94 from 13.38 to 0.53 (p<0.001), indicating a significant reduction in categorical bias. This improves 95 comparability across behavior types and enables more reliable evaluation; a post-hoc predictability test (Appx. A.7) further confirms that category membership is nearly unrecoverable from debiased 97 rewards. 98

Hyperparameter settings are in Appendix A.6, with MI estimator details in Section A.8.






Figure 1: Reward distribution before applying fairness constraint

Figure 2: Reward distribution after applying fairness constraint

4.1 Post-PPO Fairness

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After PPO fine-tuning on HH-RLHF, we evaluate all policies on 100 Helpful and 100 Harmless prompts, scoring with an HH-RLHF-trained safety RM Bai et al. [2022]. The baseline policy exhibits a parity gap of 0.4814, reduced to 0.4001 (-16.9%) under the fairness constraint and 0.4126(-14.3%) with Fair+Curiosity. Curiosity slightly widens the gap relative to fairness alone but still markedly improves over baseline while recovering most variance and response diversity. We frame this parity-gap analysis as an *evaluation metric* for reward reliability, complementing diversity audits. See Sec. 4.1 and Appx. B.1 for more details.

Policy	Parity Gap	Relative Drop
Baseline	0.4814	_
Fair	0.4001	-16.9%
Fair + Curiosity	0.4126	-14.3%

Table 1: Parity gap between Helpful and Harmless mean rewards on HH-RLHF prompts post-PPO.

Diversity. We measure semantic diversity via average pairwise cosine distance of 108 all-mpnet-base-v2 embeddings Reimers and Gurevych [2019], Song et al. [2020]; 109 see Appx. B.2. Fairness reduces diversity from 0.9638 to 0.9584 (p < 0.001), while curiosity restores 110 it to 0.9616 (p=0.002), nearly matching baseline. This shows curiosity offsets the diversity loss from 111 fairness; longer PPO runs may further amplify these effects. 112

4.2 Generalization to Unseen Biases

114 **Setup** We train two HH-RLHF reward models Bai et al. [2022]: a baseline ($\lambda_{adv} = 0$, Bradley– Terry) and a fairness-constrained model ($\lambda_{adv} = 0.2$, MI penalty). Bias is assessed on CrowS-Pairs 115 Nangia et al. [2020] and StereoSet Nadeem et al. [2020] as the proportion of stereotypical predictions 116 (neutral = 50%).117

Results Introducing the MI constraint shifts bias rates toward neutrality compared to the baseline RM, with statistically significant improvements (CrowS-Pairs: McNemar p < 0.001; StereoSet: p < 0.01). Notably, the fairness objective is trained without access to CrowS-Pairs or StereoSet, yet reduces stereotype bias across domains. This

Model	CrowS-Pairs	StereoSet
Baseline RM	$42.84\% \pm 1.27\%$	$46.58\% \pm 1.09\%$
Fair RM	$51.46\% \pm 1.29\%$	$49.95\% \pm 1.09\%$

Table 2: Bias rates (50% = neutral).

demonstrates generalization beyond training categories and highlights a scalable path to mitigating unseen RLHF biases.

4.3 Fairness Across Multiple Harm Categories

Setup We train two Llama-127 3.2-1B reward models on the 128 19-category PKU-SafeRLHF 129 dataset Ji et al. [2024]: a 130 Baseline $(\lambda_{adv} = 0)$ and 131 a Fair model with an MI 132 adversary ($\lambda_{adv} =$ 0.2).133 While the baseline displays 134 large reward disparities across 135 harm categories, the fairness-136

constrained RM produces dis-

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


Figure 3: Before fairness.

Figure 4: After fairness.

tributions that are far more uniform. Crucially, the distributions do not collapse; the RM preserves its 138 Bradley-Terry predictive performance, showing that a single model can be made fair across many 139 categories simultaneously—scaling fairness beyond binary setups. 140

4.4 Backward Compatibility and Temporal Shift Robustness

We evaluate whether fairness regularization preserves prior alignment while improving robustness 142 to distribution shift. The fairness-constrained reward model retains 70.38% of strong baseline 143 preferences, maintaining backward compatibility with only a 2.2\% drop in overall preference quality. 144 At the same time, it improves temporal robustness, outperforming the baseline by 2.09 accuracy 145 points on RewardBench-2. These results suggest that fairness constraints alter a non-trivial fraction 146 of legacy preferences in a targeted manner, yielding stable backward compatibility together with 147 measurable out-of-distribution gains. 148

4.5 Ablation: Adversarial Weight

We analyze the effect of the adversarial weight λ_{adv} on our MI objective by sweeping this 150 parameter (full results in Appx. A.9). For each setting, we report both mutual information (MI) and 151 Bradley-Terry (BT) loss. Table 3 shows a steep drop in MI as λ_{adv} increases, alongside improvements in BT loss. This suggests that the fairness constraint doubles as a regularizer, enhancing preference 153 learning while suppressing categorical dependence.

$\lambda_{ m adv}$	BT loss	MI
0.0	2.8712	0.2282
0.2	2.2307	0.0163
0.8	1.1879	0.0073
1.5	0.7432	0.0136

Table 3: Representative λ_{adv} settings; full sweep in Appx. A.9.

5 Conclusion

We introduce an adversarial MI constraint that reduces bias in reward models while keeping alignment 156 with human preferences intact. Across tasks like CrowS-Pairs, StereoSet, and SafeRLHF's 19 157 categories, our method improves fairness without sacrificing performance. By pairing this with an intrinsic reward in PPO, we position fairness as a built-in reliability goal rather than an add-on. 159 160 This frames our metrics as part of the broader evaluation protocol for RLHF systems across the LLM lifecycle. Looking ahead, we plan to test larger models and study how fairness interacts with 161 emergent risks such as reward hacking and scaling-related behaviors. 162

Ethics and Limitations

Our adversarial training method is motivated by zero-information strategies, but practical noisiness makes it hard to tune Edwards and Storkey [2016], Belghazi et al. [2018]. Its effectiveness depends 165 on well-defined, discrete categories, suggesting future work should extend to non-discrete attributes 166 Mitchell et al. [2019], Bolukbasi et al. [2016]. The approach also increases time and memory costs Ouyang et al. [2022], requiring larger batch sizes for distribution-level statistics, and our experiments remain limited in characterizing the reward hacking dynamics introduced by this constraint.

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290 A Appendix

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A.1 Why enforce fairness on Reward Models?

In this section, we offer an intuitive thought experiment on why fairness defined as categorical 292 independence of the reward model distribution mitigates undesired reward hacking scenarios in PPO. Consider the example given in the main text 4 and suppose $y_{i,c}, y_{i,r}$ are chosen and rejected samples 294 from the ith datapoint in our preference dataset respectively. We observe cases where $\exists i, j$ such 295 that $y_{i,c} > y_{i,r} > y_{j,c} > y_{j,r}$. That is, because datapoint i and datapoint j are independent of one 296 another, we can have a good model in the Bradley-Terry definition prioritize chosen over rejected 297 within the pair, but then across pairs end up rewarding a rejected sample of one pair over the chosen 298 sample of another. In practice, we notice a systemic shift towards higher rewards for $i \in D_{helpful}$ 299 (the subset of preference exemplars portraying helpful behaviors) over $j \in D_{harmless}$ (the subset of 300 preference exemplars portraying harmless behaviors). Then, for cases where $y_{i,c} > y_{i,r} > y_{j,c}$, we 301 will observe behavior in the post-trained LM where it prioritizes both helpful and unhelpful behavior 302 over harmless behavior given a potentially harmful prompt. 303

A.2 Theoretical Justification

We ground our approach in adversarial training theory, considering a reward model $r_{\theta}: \mathcal{X} \to \mathbb{R}$ and a discriminator $q_{\phi}(c \mid \cdot)$ Edwards and Storkey [2016].

Setting. We observe i.i.d. triples (X_t^+, X_t^-, C_t) with labels $Y_t \in \{0, 1\}$ indicating whether X_t^+ is preferred to X_t^- from some unknown preference distribution. Let $R_\theta = r_\theta(X)$. The (population) Bradley–Terry loss is

$$\mathcal{L}_{BT}(\theta) = \mathbb{E}\left[-\log\sigma(r_{\theta}(X^{+}) - r_{\theta}(X^{-}))\right]. \tag{1}$$

Our discriminator $q_\phi(c\mid\cdot)$ tries to infer C from rewards. We thus have the zero-sum game

$$\min_{\theta} \max_{\phi} \mathcal{J}(\theta, \phi) = \mathcal{L}_{BT}(\theta) + \lambda \mathbb{E}[\log q_{\phi}(C \mid R_{\theta})]. \tag{2}$$

where our target is independence: $R_{\theta} \perp C$ (i.e., $I_{\theta}(C; R_{\theta}) = 0$).

Our main theoretical result connects the adversarial training scheme to our original fairness objective:

Theorem 1 (No-regret reaches mutual information target). Assume Lemma 1, feasible invariance (7), and no-regret play with $\operatorname{Reg}_G(T), \operatorname{Reg}_D(T) = o(T)$. Then

$$\frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^{T} I_{\theta_t}(C; R_{\theta_t}) \le \frac{\text{Reg}_G(T) + \text{Reg}_D(T)}{\lambda T} \xrightarrow[T \to \infty]{} 0.$$
 (3)

315 A.3 Proof of Theoretical Results

In this section we provide a proof for our main convergence theorem, starting with supporting lemmas to demonstrate the equivalence of our adversarial game to mutual information minimization.

Lemma 1 (Best response is a mutual-information penalty). If we take a fixed θ ,

$$\sup_{\phi} \mathbb{E} \big[\log q_{\phi}(C \mid R_{\theta}) \big] = \mathbb{E} \big[\log p_{\theta}(C \mid R_{\theta}) \big] = -H_{\theta}(C \mid R_{\theta}).$$

This implies that the inner game's value is nothing more than $-H_{\theta}(C \mid R_{\theta})$, the negative conditional entropy of categories given the reward model distribution (for a slight abuse of notation), and so the reward model's objective becomes

$$\overline{\mathcal{J}}(\theta) := \sup_{\phi} \mathcal{J}(\theta, \phi) = \mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{BT}}(\theta) + \lambda I_{\theta}(C; R_{\theta}). \tag{4}$$

We drop the additive constant $-\lambda H(C)$ since it does not depend on θ .

Moreover, any best-response discriminator satisfies $q_{\phi^*}(\cdot | r) = p_{\theta}(\cdot | r)$ a.s.

We turn to the literature of no-regret algorithms as solvers for two-player zero-sum (2p0s) games to show the convergence of this adversarial training procedure, defining the regret for the reward model

and discriminator respectively.

Repeated play and regrets. At round t = 1, ..., T, the reward model chooses θ_t , the discriminator chooses ϕ_t , and both observe payoff $\mathcal{J}(\theta_t, \phi_t)$. Define external regrets

$$\operatorname{Reg}_G(T) := \sum_{t=1}^T \mathcal{J}(\theta_t, \phi_t) - \min_{\theta} \sum_{t=1}^T \mathcal{J}(\theta, \phi_t), \qquad \operatorname{Reg}_D(T) := \max_{\phi} \sum_{t=1}^T \mathcal{J}(\theta_t, \phi) - \sum_{t=1}^T \mathcal{J}(\theta_t, \phi_t).$$

We assume no-regret algorithms for both: $\mathrm{Reg}_G(T) = o(T)$ and $\mathrm{Reg}_D(T) = o(T)$. Let $\bar{\mathcal{J}}_T = o(T)$

 $\frac{1}{T}\sum_{t=1}^{T}\mathcal{J}(heta_t,\phi_t)$ denote the average payoff, and let the *game value* be

$$V := \min_{\theta} \max_{\phi} \mathcal{J}(\theta, \phi) = \min_{\theta} \overline{\mathcal{J}}(\theta) = \min_{\theta} \{ \mathcal{L}_{BT}(\theta) + \lambda I_{\theta}(C; R_{\theta}) \}.$$

- Our next lemma bounds our defined objective \mathcal{J} in terms of the value of the game, with a deviation equal to the average regret of our generator/discriminator algorithms.
- Lemma 2 (No-regret bound for zero-sum play). Let $\mathcal{J}(\theta,\phi)$ be zero-sum and let a play $(\theta_t,\phi_t)_{t=1}^T$

334 induce

$$\bar{\mathcal{J}}_T \coloneqq \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T \mathcal{J}(\theta_t, \phi_t),$$

$$\operatorname{Reg}_G(T) \coloneqq \sum_{t=1}^T \mathcal{J}(\theta_t, \phi_t) - \min_{\theta} \sum_{t=1}^T \mathcal{J}(\theta, \phi_t),$$

$$\operatorname{Reg}_D(T) \coloneqq \max_{\phi} \sum_{t=1}^T \mathcal{J}(\theta_t, \phi) - \sum_{t=1}^T \mathcal{J}(\theta_t, \phi_t).$$

335 Let $V_{\mathrm{up}} \coloneqq \min_{\theta} \max_{\phi} \mathcal{J}(\theta, \phi)$ and $V_{\mathrm{low}} \coloneqq \max_{\phi} \min_{\theta} \mathcal{J}(\theta, \phi)$. Then

$$V_{\text{low}} - \frac{\text{Reg}_D(T)}{T} \le \bar{\mathcal{J}}_T \le V_{\text{up}} + \frac{\text{Reg}_G(T)}{T}. \tag{5}$$

336 In particular, if the game has value V (i.e., $V_{
m up} = V_{
m low} = V$),

$$\left|\bar{\mathcal{J}}_T - V\right| \le \frac{\operatorname{Reg}_G(T) + \operatorname{Reg}_D(T)}{T}.$$
 (6)

237 *Proof.* We start with the upper bound. By the generator's regret definition,

$$\sum_{t=1}^{T} \mathcal{J}(\theta_t, \phi_t) \leq \min_{\theta} \sum_{t=1}^{T} \mathcal{J}(\theta, \phi_t) + \operatorname{Reg}_G(T).$$

Let $\theta^{\star} \in \arg\min_{\theta} \max_{\phi} \mathcal{J}(\theta, \phi)$ (a minimax optimizer). Evaluating the RHS at θ^{\star} and using $\max_{\phi} \mathcal{J}(\theta^{\star}, \phi) = V_{\mathrm{up}}$ yields

$$\min_{\theta} \sum_{t=1}^{T} \mathcal{J}(\theta, \phi_t) \leq \sum_{t=1}^{T} \mathcal{J}(\theta^*, \phi_t) \leq \sum_{t=1}^{T} \max_{\phi} \mathcal{J}(\theta^*, \phi) = T V_{\text{up}}.$$

- Combining gives $\sum_{t=1}^{T} \mathcal{J}(\theta_t, \phi_t) \leq T V_{\rm up} + \mathrm{Reg}_G(T)$, hence $\bar{\mathcal{J}}_T \leq V_{\rm up} + \mathrm{Reg}_G(T)/T$., which completes this part of the inequality.
- Next, we demonstrate the lower bound. By the discriminator's regret definition,

$$\sum_{t=1}^{T} \mathcal{J}(\theta_t, \phi_t) \geq \max_{\phi} \sum_{t=1}^{T} \mathcal{J}(\theta_t, \phi) - \operatorname{Reg}_D(T).$$

Let $\phi^{\star} \in \arg \max_{\phi} \min_{\theta} \mathcal{J}(\theta, \phi)$ (a maxmin optimizer), so $\min_{\theta} \mathcal{J}(\theta, \phi^{\star}) = V_{\text{low}}$. Then for every θ , $\mathcal{J}(\theta, \phi^{\star}) \geq V_{\text{low}}$. In particular,

$$\max_{\phi} \sum_{t=1}^{T} \mathcal{J}(\theta_t, \phi) \geq \sum_{t=1}^{T} \mathcal{J}(\theta_t, \phi^*) \geq \sum_{t=1}^{T} V_{\text{low}} = T V_{\text{low}}.$$

345 Thus $\sum_{t=1}^T \mathcal{J}(\theta_t,\phi_t) \geq T \, V_{\mathrm{low}} - \mathrm{Reg}_D(T),$ i.e., $\bar{\mathcal{J}}_T \geq V_{\mathrm{low}} - \mathrm{Reg}_D(T)/T.$

Combining both sides finishes the proof – in particular, if $V_{\rm up}=V_{\rm low}=V$ (minimax theorem of zero-sum games), then

$$V - \frac{\operatorname{Reg}_D(T)}{T} \le \bar{\mathcal{J}}_T \le V + \frac{\operatorname{Reg}_G(T)}{T},$$

and, since $\max\{a,b\} \le a+b$ for $a,b \ge 0$, the symmetric bound (6) follows.

Another technicality is we require the optimal reward model— the one that satisfies our mutual

information constraint while minimizing BT-loss, to lie in our function class. We frame this as the

351 **feasible invariance** condition:

Feasible invariance. Let $\mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{BT}}^{\star} = \inf_{\theta} \mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{BT}}(\theta)$. We say *feasible invariance* holds if there exists θ^{\dagger} with

$$\mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{BT}}(\theta^{\dagger}) = \mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{BT}}^{\star} \quad \text{and} \quad I_{\theta^{\dagger}}(C; R_{\theta^{\dagger}}) = 0.$$
 (7)

In that case, the minimax value satisfies $V=\mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{BT}}^{\star}$ by (4).

With these results, we can then prove our main theorem that in no-regret, our reward model converges

356 to zero mutual-information.

Proof of Theorem 1 (No Regret Convergence)

Proof. For each t, let $V(\theta) = \max_{\phi} \mathcal{J}(\theta, \phi) = \mathcal{L}_{BT}(\theta) + \lambda I_{\theta}(C; R_{\theta})$ by Lemma 1. By the discriminator's regret definition,

$$\frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^{T} V(\theta_t) = \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^{T} \max_{\phi} \mathcal{J}(\theta_t, \phi) \leq \bar{\mathcal{J}}_T + \frac{\text{Reg}_D(T)}{T}.$$

Feasible invariance implies $V = \mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{BT}}^{\star}$, and Lemma 2 gives $\bar{\mathcal{J}}_T \leq V + \frac{\mathrm{Reg}_G(T)}{T} = \mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{BT}}^{\star} + \frac{\mathrm{Reg}_G(T)}{T}$.

361 Hence

$$\frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^{T} \left[\mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{BT}}(\theta_t) + \lambda I_{\theta_t}(C; R_{\theta_t}) \right] \leq \mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{BT}}^{\star} + \frac{\mathrm{Reg}_G(T) + \mathrm{Reg}_D(T)}{T}.$$

Since $\mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{BT}}(\theta_t) \geq \mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{BT}}^{\star}$ for all t, canceling $\mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{BT}}^{\star}$ yields

$$\lambda \cdot \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^{T} I_{\theta_t}(C; R_{\theta_t}) \leq \frac{\operatorname{Reg}_G(T) + \operatorname{Reg}_D(T)}{T},$$

which proves the claim. Note that if the average of these terms converges to 0, then we also have that $\inf_t I_{\theta_t} \to 0$, and so we can select the minimum running iterate that is bounded by this average to have a direct convergent subsequence.

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We view training the discriminator using CELoss on each batch as an approximate "best-response." More formally, we can think of it as an ϵ_t -Nash equilibrium for each round – that is, if q_{ϕ_t} is trained to near-optimality per round so that $\max_{\phi} \mathcal{J}(\theta_t, \phi) - \mathcal{J}(\theta_t, \phi_t) \leq \epsilon_t$ with $\frac{1}{T} \sum_t \epsilon_t \to 0$, then the proof above holds with $\mathrm{Reg}_D(T)$ replaced by $\sum_t \epsilon_t$. What if exact invariance is infeasible? That is, what if the Bradley-Terry-optimal reward model

What if exact invariance is infeasible? That is, what if the Bradley-Terry-optimal reward model invariant to category does not lie in our function class? If no θ attains both $\mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{BT}}^{\star}$ and I=0, then $V>\mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{BT}}^{\star}$ and our theorem instead yields the following bound:

$$\frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^{T} I_{\theta_t}(C; R_{\theta_t}) \leq \frac{V - \mathcal{L}_{\mathrm{BT}}^{\star}}{\lambda} + \frac{\mathrm{Reg}_G(T) + \mathrm{Reg}_D(T)}{\lambda T},$$

where we cannot ignore the $V-\mathcal{L}_{BT}^*$ term, which we can think of approximation error-esque term in the learning theory language.

A.4 Datasets and Preprocessing

HH-RLHF (Helpful/Harmless): We construct (chosen, rejected) preference pairs and assign each

pair a category label of either helpful or harmless. Prompts and responses are concatenated, and sequences are truncated to a maximum of 1,024 tokens.

PKU-SafeRLHF (19 categories): We retain the official harm category labels from the dataset release.

Samples with missing category annotations are removed to ensure label integrity.

Deduplication: Exact duplicate (prompt, response) pairs are removed to avoid information leakage

Deduplication: Exact duplicate (prompt, response) pairs are removed to avoid information leakage and inflated results.

Tokenization and padding: All data is tokenized with padding=longest and truncation=true. Each prompt-response sequence is capped at 1,024 tokens in all reported experiments.

A.5 Model and Training Details

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We use Llama-3.2-1B adapted into a scalar reward model for our RM backbone, with the Bradley-Terry pairwise log-likelihood on (chosen, rejected) pairs as our baseline training objective. We train

for a single epoch on a balanced sample of helpful and harmless data from the Anthropic HH-RLHF

dataset and evaluate on a held-out set of HH-RLHF dataset as well as RewardBench.

391 A.6 Adversary and Fairness Optimization

The fairness constraint uses a lightweight MLP adversary q_{ϕ} that receives summary statistics of rewards, computed separately for each category. For each batch, we calculate the mean, variance, skewness, and kurtosis of the chosen and rejected rewards, grouped by category, to form the adversary's input features.

Our training implementation follows the given alternating update schedule:

- 1. Compute Bradley-Terry loss $L_{\rm BT} = -\log \sigma (r_{\rm chosen} r_{\rm rejected})$.
- 2. Adversary step: update q_{ϕ} by minimizing cross-entropy loss to predict the category from the moment features.
- 3. Fairness step: update the reward model to maximize adversary uncertainty, i.e., minimize

$$L_{\text{BT}} - \lambda_{\text{adv}} \cdot CELoss(q_{\phi}(\cdot \mid \text{moments}), y),$$

Ablation: For ablation studies, we sweep $\lambda_{adv} \in \{0.0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1.0, 1.5, 2.0\}$. The default setting for main experiments is $\lambda_{adv} = 0.2$.

setting for main experiments is $\lambda_{\rm adv} = 0.2$. **Post-training Category Predictability.** As a post-training test, we train a fresh discriminator on frozen rewards from the above regularized model, which yields near-chance performance—AUC $0.78 \pm 0.03 \rightarrow 0.53 \pm 0.06$, BA $0.70 \pm 0.02 \rightarrow 0.52 \pm 0.05$ (5-fold; see Appx. A.7)—indicating little recoverable category signal from the fair reward model.

407 A.7 Post-hoc Category Predictability Audit

To test whether category information remains after training, we *freeze* the reward model and train a new discriminator $\hat{q}(c \mid r)$ on its scalar outputs (no weights shared with the in-training adversary). We use stratified 5-fold cross-validation and report mean \pm sd over folds. The discriminator is a 2-layer MLP trained with cross-entropy and early stopping on validation AUC. Chance performance is 0.5 for both AUC and balanced accuracy (BA).

Model	AUC	Balanced Acc.
Baseline RM	0.78 ± 0.03	0.70 ± 0.02
Fair RM (ours)	0.53 ± 0.06	0.52 ± 0.05

Table 4: Post-hoc predictability from frozen rewards; lower is better (chance ≈ 0.5).

413 A.8 Mutual Information Estimation (Ablation)

We measure the dependence between reward scores and category labels during the λ_{adv} sweep.

Mutual information (MI) is computed with sklearn.metrics.mutual_info_score between category

labels $C \in \{\text{helpful}, \text{harmless}\}\$ and a discretized reward variable, obtained by binning rewards into

417 50 equal-width bins.

Lower MI indicates that the rewards are more category-independent. As an additional check, we mon-

itor the adversary's balanced accuracy; values close to chance imply minimal category dependence.


In this section we provide the complete data for our full sweep over adversarial loss parameters.

$\lambda_{ m adv}$	BT loss	MI
0.0	2.8712	0.2282
0.2	2.2307	0.0163
0.4	1.5607	0.0088
0.6	1.7104	0.0059
0.8	1.1879	0.0073
1.0	0.8694	0.0141
1.5	0.7432	0.0136
2.0	0.8151	0.0076

Table 5: Complete sweep of λ_{adv} values.

A.10 Scaling Experiments

To evaluate the scalability of our method, we conducted preliminary experiments on Meta's Llama3-8B-Instruct model on an 8xH100 node. The reward distributions for our Fair-RM variant, shown below, exhibit a more complex, multimodal structure compared to the 1.1B model, which we hypothesize is due to the larger model's capacity to capture finer-grained nuances in the preference data. Despite this, the results confirm that our approach remains effective at scale. There is clear separation between chosen and rejected rewards, indicating preference alignment is maintained. Crucially, the distributions for helpful and harmless categories remain tightly aligned, demonstrating that the fairness constraint successfully generalizes and prevents reward disparities even in larger models. However, both our base model and fair-RM variant achieve around 50% accuracy on a subset of RewardBench after our training, for a variety of reasons but mainly in part due to the small bandwidth we had to only run smaller training runs. Our Fair-RM had on-par performance with the baseline BT model, however, but to achieve SOTA-level eval results on both models, full-scale post-training of RewardBench-competitive models derived from the 8B models is part of our future intended work.



Reward Distribution: Helpful vs Harmless

0.5

Helpful (chosen+rejected)
Harmless (chosen+rejected)
0.4

0.0

0.1

0.0

0.1

Figure 5: Reward distributions for chosen vs. rejected

Figure 6: Reward distributions for helpful vs. harmless

B PPO Training Setup

In this section we detail our setup for PPO training of downstream language models using our fair reward models.

Base Actor. We initialize all policy variants from TinyLlama/TinyLlama-1.1B-Chat-v1.0 to enable rapid convergence and reduce compute cost while still maintaining competitive generation quality for our evaluation tasks. Policies are adapted using LoRA with rank r=16 and $\alpha=32$, targeting the query/key/value and output projection matrices in the attention layers.

PPO Configuration. We use HuggingFace TRL's PPOTrainer with minibatch size =64, batch size =512, and 2 PPO epochs per update. The KL control coefficient is set to $\beta=0.05$ (adaptive control enabled), targeting the reference model (TinyLlama/TinyLlama-1.1B-Chat-v1.0). We set target kl=0.1 to limit divergence from the reference.

Reward Models. All reward models are Llama-3.2-1B sequence classifiers trained on preference data with the Bradley–Terry objective. The **Fair** variant applies a mutual information (MI) penalty

with $\lambda_{\text{adv}} = 0.2$ between protected-category predictions and reward scores. Fair + Curiosity adds an

intrinsic curiosity bonus from a Random Network Distillation (RND) module trained online during

452 PPO.

453 **Curiosity Bonus.** The RND network uses a 2-layer MLP with ReLU activations, hidden size 512.

The predictor network is optimized with Adam ($\eta = 1 \times 10^{-4}$) on the cosine similarity loss between

target and predictor features. Intrinsic reward is scaled by $\eta_{\rm cur}=0.05$ and added to the scalar RM

score before PPO optimization.

Generation Settings. For PPO rollouts, we generate with temperature = 0.7, top-p = 0.9, and max length = 256 tokens. KL penalties are computed against the reference log-probabilities.

Training Duration. Each run is trained for $N = 5{,}000$ PPO steps (≈ 1.5 M tokens processed),

which we found sufficient for convergence in both reward and policy loss metrics given the small

461 model size.

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B.1 Parity Gap: Definition and Estimation

In this section we detail a parity gap (effectively mean matching evaluation) for how fair a reward model is, for simplicity across only two categories.

Definition. Let r(x,y) denote the scalar reward assigned by a (fixed) safety RM to a prompt-response pair (x,y). We consider two behavior categories $c \in \{\text{Helpful}, \text{Harmless}\}$ and define the parity gap as the absolute difference in expected rewards:

ParityGap =
$$|\mathbb{E}[r(x,y) \mid c = \text{Helpful}] - \mathbb{E}[r(x,y) \mid c = \text{Harmless}]|$$
.

We define the parity gap as effectively a mean-matching surrogate evaluation – intuitively, a smaller parity gap indicates the RM (and the downstream policy it shapes) treats categories on a comparable reward scale, reducing category-dependent inflation/deflation.

Estimator. Given disjoint evaluation sets \mathcal{D}_H and \mathcal{D}_A (Helpful vs. Harmless) with sizes n_H and n_A and rewards $\{r_i^H\}_{i=1}^{n_H}, \{r_i^A\}_{i=1}^{n_A}$, we compute

$$ar{r}_{\mathrm{H}} = rac{1}{n_{\mathrm{H}}} \sum_{i=1}^{n_{\mathrm{H}}} r_{i}^{\mathrm{H}}, \qquad ar{r}_{\mathrm{A}} = rac{1}{n_{\mathrm{A}}} \sum_{i=1}^{n_{\mathrm{A}}} r_{j}^{\mathrm{A}}, \qquad \widehat{\Delta} = ar{r}_{\mathrm{H}} - ar{r}_{\mathrm{A}}, \qquad \widehat{\mathrm{ParityGap}} = |\widehat{\Delta}|.$$

When $n_{\rm H} \neq n_{\rm A}$, the above remains unbiased under i.i.d. sampling within each group. In our main runs we use balanced sets $(n_{\rm H} = n_{\rm A})$.

Relative change (vs. a baseline). When comparing a model M to a baseline B, we also report the relative drop:

$$\operatorname{RelDrop}(M; B) = \frac{\widehat{\operatorname{ParityGap}(M)} - \widehat{\operatorname{ParityGap}(B)}}{\widehat{\operatorname{ParityGap}(B)}} \times 100\%.$$

Practical notes. (i) We score responses with the same fixed RM across all policies. (ii) Generation settings and seeds are identical across policies (Appendix B).

B.2 Semantic Diversity Calculation

480 In this section we detail our metric for diversity of LLM sampling to benchmark our intrinsic reward.

Prompts and generation. For diversity evaluation we sample 1,030 LIMA prompts (seed 42) and generate one response per prompt with identical sampling across models. Prompts are drawn from GAIR/lima. Generation parameters: temperature = 0.9, top-p = 0.95, max_new_tokens = 100, max_length = 512, batch size = 8. All models use the same seed and generation parameters.

Semantic diversity (primary metric). Let $f(\cdot)$ be all-mpnet-base-v2 with mean-pooling; embeddings are ℓ_2 -normalized. For the set of responses $\{y_i\}_{i=1}^n$ with embeddings $e_i = f(y_i)$, we report

SemDiv =
$$\frac{2}{n(n-1)} \sum_{i < j} (1 - \cos(e_i, e_j)).$$

88 Higher is better (more meaning-level variety).

- 489 **Statistics.** To compare a fair model against the baseline, we use a paired bootstrap (1,000 resamples;
- two-sided) over aligned prompt sets, reporting the mean difference, 95% CI, and p-value. In the main
- text, we report semantic-diversity differences: Fair (no curiosity) vs. Baseline: -0.0054 (p<0.001);
- Fair + Curiosity vs. Baseline: -0.0022 (p=0.002).

493 B.3 Compute and Runtime

494 Hardware: For initial experiments of both reward model training and PPO, we used dual A100

clusters, and currently are using a 8xH100 node for results on Llama3-8B.