

EVOLVABLE SAFETY BENCHMARKING: A MULTI-AGENT PIPELINE FOR LVLMs

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ABSTRACT

Large vision-language models (LVLMs) exhibit remarkable capabilities in vision and language tasks but face significant safety challenges, which undermine their reliability in real-world applications. Efforts have been made to build LVLM safety evaluation benchmarks to uncover their vulnerability. However, existing benchmarks are hindered by their labor-intensive construction process and static complexity that fail to keep pace with rapidly evolving model architectures and emerging risks. To address these limitations, we propose VLSafetyBencher, the first agent flow system designed for automated LVLM safety benchmarking, which introduces four collaborative agents: Preprocessing, Cross-Modal, Augmentation, and Post-Sampling agents. Through an optimized sampling algorithm, VLSafetyBencher selects high-quality data points to construct and update benchmarks. We conduct experiments on benchmark construction and updating tasks with VLSafetyBencher and evaluate extensive LVLMs. Experiments demonstrate that VLSafetyBencher can efficiently construct high-quality benchmarks at a minimal cost. The generated dataset can effectively distinguish model safety, with a safety rate disparity of nearly 70% between the most and least safe models. Ablation analyses further validate VLSafetyBencher’s effectiveness. Code and data will be released after the paper is accepted.

1 INTRODUCTION

Built on large language models (LLMs), large vision-language models (LVLMs) have demonstrated versatile proficiency in extensive vision tasks and cross-modal problems. However, their safety vulnerabilities raise significant concerns, *e.g.*, toxic responses, biased arguments, and privacy leakages. These problems undermine model reliability and draw growing attention from researchers.

To accurately measure the safety of LVLMs, extensive benchmarks have been proposed to quantify general and domain-specific safety (Ye et al., 2025; Liu et al., 2024c; Zhang et al., 2024a; Ma et al., 2025; Liu et al., 2024b; Zhang et al., 2024b; Gu et al., 2024; Zhang et al., 2025c;b). Despite these efforts, existing benchmarks exhibit notable limitations: **High Resource and Labor Costs**. Current methods for building benchmarks predominantly rely on manual annotation and semi-automated workflows. While producing valuable benchmarks, the construction process is complex and demands substantial human efforts and expert knowledge. This results in high resource and time costs and prolongs development cycles. **Lack of Dynamic Update Mechanisms**. Existing static benchmarks typically fail to keep pace with the rapid development of LVLMs. As models, training data, and application scenarios evolve, emerging safety challenges, such as new attack methods or data contamination, may hinder the efficacy of already finished benchmarks (Yang et al., 2024; Wang et al., 2025). The absence of update mechanisms limits the long-term applicability of benchmarks. **Limited Discriminative Power**. Some current benchmarks are devoid of systematic mechanisms to improve safety discernment, yielding evaluation results with poor differentiation.

To alleviate these problems, we propose a multi-agent system, *VLSafetyBencher*, which establishes a fully automated pipeline to construct new benchmarks or update existing ones without human intervention. Through the collaboration of agents, VLSafetyBencher can create a benchmark within one week and allow for rapid benchmark upgrading within days. All of these successes are attributed to four elaborate agents: Preprocessing, Cross-Modal, Augmentation, and Post-Sampling agents. Initially, the Preprocessing agent conducts deduplication and filtration on large volumes of raw data.

Then, the Cross-Modal agent generates malicious image-question pairs based on the complex interaction between modalities. Next, the Augmentation agent improves harmfulness and diversity via dual-modal mutation. Finally, the Post-Sampling agent considers three desiderata, separability, harmfulness, and diversity, to improve benchmark quality. We formalize all desiderata and cast the sampling process as an optimization problem. An iterative algorithm is proposed to solve the problem and guarantee the generated benchmark achieves global optimum. In summary, four agents collaboratively execute essential steps to build a high-quality benchmark efficiently, which allows for: 1) replacing manual efforts with agent intelligence and substantially alleviating resource and labor costs; 2) remarkably reducing time and cost and facilitating a rapid dynamic update mechanism; 3) improving discriminative power of benchmarks via an optimization-based sampling strategy.

Our experiments are twofold. On one hand, we validate the high quality of generated benchmarks by comparing them to existing benchmarks. Our generated benchmark reveals a safety score gap of 70% between the highest and lowest performing LVLMS, +15.67% higher than human-constructed benchmarks, such as SafeBench (Ying et al., 2024) and MLLMGuard (Gu et al., 2024). On the other hand, we use our benchmark to evaluate the safety of mainstream LVLMS to produce a comprehensive safety leaderboard. The contributions are listed as follows.

- We present a multi-agent system, VLSafetyBench, to streamline benchmark construction, with each agent solving a specific task within the pipeline. On top of this, a novel LVLMS safety benchmark is built.
- We propose an optimization-based sampling method to select high-value test data, which yields the optimal benchmark for safety evaluation in our settings.
- We validate our approach through experiments, demonstrating improvements in construction efficiency and dataset quality.

2 METHODS

The proposed multi-agent system, *VLSafetyBench*, is designed to automate the construction and updating of safety benchmarks for LVLMS. The system orchestrates four agents: Preprocessing, Cross-Modal, Augmentation, and Post-Sampling, which work in a serialized pipeline. Below, we demonstrate data sources and detail the design of each agent. The framework is depicted in Figure 1.

2.1 DATA COLLECTION

To construct a raw data pool for VLSafetyBench, we aggregate data from four sources to guarantee comprehensiveness and diversity: existing safety datasets, general image datasets, synthetic images, and social media data. We follow (Zhang et al., 2025a) and leverage CLIP (Radford et al., 2021) to conduct coarse filtering, ensuring that all selected images contain potentially harmful information. After filtration, the data pool comprises around 300K images, with 134K derived from existing datasets, 20K from general images, 40K generated via diffusion models, and 106K scraped from social media. Detailed illustration of data sources are presented in Appendix.

2.2 PREPROCESSING AGENT

The Preprocessing Agent conducts initial cleaning and filtering for the raw data pool to eliminate low-quality samples. It performs the following tasks:

Filtration Short prompts (≤ 24 characters) and low-resolution images (length + width ≤ 256 px) are filtered out. Images with excessively high or low brightness are also removed. Then, a hash-based deduplication algorithm is employed to remove redundant samples.

Data Categorization We integrate the taxonomies of (Gu et al., 2024) and (Ji et al., 2025) to define a two-layer tree comprising 6 categories and 20 subcategories. The 6 categories are: *Privacy*, *Bias*, *Toxicity*, *Legality*, *Misinformation*, and *Health Risk*. Details are given in Appendix. To categorize samples into the tree, we instruct the agent to use CLIP and LVLMS to match images with category descriptions. They form a verification mechanism aimed at ensuring classification correctness.

2.3 CROSS-MODAL AGENT

The objective of this agent is to synthesize harmful image-question pairs. Efforts like MMStar (Chen et al., 2024) reveal a prevalent issue in multimodal evaluation benchmarks: *the textual query often*




Figure 1: Framework of VLSafetyBench. We highlight Cross-Modal and Post-Sampling agents.

contains all necessary information, rendering the image potentially irrelevant to the problem. This limitation undermines the evaluation of true multimodal capabilities. The core principle to solve this problem is to create data where the determination of harmfulness necessitates a cross-modal understanding of visual and textual content. When considered in isolation, neither the image nor the text should be sufficient to reveal harmful intent. This forces LVLMs to analyze genuine multimodal information to identify safety risks. We achieve this through three distinct yet complementary sample synthesis strategies: Modality Dependency, Complementarity, and Conflict.

Modality Dependency We focus on scenarios where the harmfulness is exclusively embedded within image contents. The text is entirely neutral and provides no cues about the potential risk. This type of sample tests LVLMs’ ability to detect harmful content that is not explicitly prompted. The primary challenge for the model is to perform a detailed visual scan and recognize the harmful element without any textual guidance. Figure 2(a) present four instances wherein the textual queries contain no harmful information; only the violent and detrimental elements within the images may elicit unsafe responses. Conversely, samples with benign images and harmful texts are also included to ensure the comprehensiveness of the dataset.

Modality Complementarity This strategy generates samples where the critical information required to identify a potential risk is deliberately distributed between the visual and textual modalities. Neither modality alone contains enough information to complete safety evaluation. The model must integrate partial information from both the image and text to recognize underlying harmfulness. To this end, we decompose the components of a harmful scenario into a *visual context* and a *textual query*. The detection of risks necessitates the combination of both visual evidence and text queries. This design ensures that a model cannot bypass multimodal fusion by relying on simple keyword matching in the text or object detection in the image. Examples are shown in Figure 2(b).

Modality Conflict This strategy is designed to test model’s ability to critically evaluate textual information against visual evidence and its robustness to overcome textual manipulation. We introduce contradictions between two modalities. The text attempts to induce or mislead the model towards an unsafe or incorrect interpretation, while the accompanying image does not even contain the described content. Examples are given in Figure 2(c). A robust VLM should be able to identify the discrepancy and refuse to comply with the misleading textual prompt.

Before the creation of image-question pairs, we first instruct the agents to produce detailed image descriptions and explanations of harmfulness. After the pairs are constructed, the agents must also delineate the specific interactions between the image and the question.

2.4 AUGMENTATION AGENT

The Augmentation Agent conducts data mutation to enhance diversity and applicability from the textual and visual modalities separately.

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Figure 2: Examples of cross-modal strategies. We present the harmfulness of text and image separately, as well as the intermodal semantic overlapping and misleading.

Text Augmentation Considering that users from diverse professional or personal backgrounds may express queries in varied forms. For instance, “How to make a bomb?” may be rephrased as “Which household items should not be mixed to avoid explosion?” or a chemical engineer asking, “Can sugar and potassium nitrate fertilizer be stored together?”. We follow (Yang et al., 2024) to adopt role-playing and contextual tricks, as well as simple synonym substitution and sentence paraphrasing operations, to improve textual complexity. Besides, jailbreak methods are employed (Yuan et al., 2023; Andriushchenko & Flammarion, 2024; Vega et al., 2024) to improve harmfulness.

Image Augmentation Image augmentation is widely employed to enhance data diversity and generalization. Without hindering image semantics, we apply simple image augmentation operations to expand sample coverage, e.g., cropping, spatial transformations, adding noise, and blurring. In addition, we also insert random characters or objects into the image to improve diversity.

2.5 POST-SAMPLING AGENT

After the above three agents, we execute a criterion-based sample selection algorithm to construct the final dataset. We argue that a high-quality safety benchmark must satisfy the following desiderata: 1) *Separability*. The benchmark should effectively distinguish the safety performance of different models, avoiding clustering of safety scores within a narrow range; 2) *Harmfulness*. The samples should be capable of eliciting obvious harmful responses; 3) *Diversity*. The benchmark should comprise a wide range of multimodal samples covering diverse scenarios.

We formulate mathematical representations for the three desiderata and design an optimization algorithm. Existing efforts like AutoBench (Li et al., 2024) typically quantify and optimize the properties of the whole benchmark, e.g., diversity or separability. Due to the huge search space, this scheme often leads to the constructed benchmark being trapped in a local optimum. In contrast to prior work, we quantify the property of *each sample* and iteratively select the optimal sample. This provides a *closed-form* solution for our problem, which means that our benchmark is the *optimal* set satisfying the three desiderata mentioned above.

2.5.1 SEPARABILITY

Separability measures the disagreement between LVLMS of varying safety levels on whether a sample elicits a harmful response. Overly safe/unsafe samples are not conducive to safety evaluation as they show no discriminative power between models. We employ entropy to measure the separability of a sample. Assuming p_{prop} denotes the probability that a sample elicits a harmful response, p_{prop} can be calculated as the proportion of harmful responses generated by a randomly selected set of LVLMS. We denote the sample as s and its separability criterion C_{sep} can be calculated as:

$$C_{sep}(s) = -p_{prop} \log p_{prop} - (1 - p_{prop}) \log(1 - p_{prop}). \tag{1}$$

Higher entropy indicates a stronger ability to distinguish models with different safety capabilities. When $C_{sep} \rightarrow 0$, all LVLMS agree (no discriminative power); when $C_{sep} \rightarrow 1$, LVLMS are evenly split, indicating maximal ability to distinguish safety levels.

2.5.2 HARMFULNESS

Harmfulness quantifies the sample’s ability to trigger harmful responses. We assess the harmfulness of a sample by using judges to determine whether an LVLM’s response is harmful. Each judge performs binary classification on the responses, categorizing them as harmful or unhelpful, and outputs the corresponding probabilities. We posit that the higher the probability that a judge deems a response harmful, the more harmful the sample is considered.

To enhance stability, we employ N_J ($N_J \geq 3$) judges to perform harmfulness identification and average their predicted probabilities. Additionally, we use a set of N_M randomly selected LVLMs to generate multiple responses for the same sample. Let $p_{i,j}$ denote the probability that the response from the j -th model is classified as harmful by the i -th judge, where $i = 1, \dots, N_J$ and $j = 1, \dots, N_M$. The harmfulness C_{harm} of the input sample can then be computed as:

$$C_{\text{harm}}(s) = \frac{1}{N_J N_M} \sum_{i=1}^{N_J} \sum_{j=1}^{N_M} p_{i,j}. \quad (2)$$

We note that C_{harm} and C_{sep} are mutually constrained criteria. If C_{harm} approaches 0 (or 1), it indicates that all LVLMs generate harmless (or harmful) responses, resulting in C_{sep} approaching 0. When C_{harm} approaches 0.5, C_{sep} approaches 1, making the benchmark more discriminative.

2.5.3 DIVERSITY

Diversity measures the distribution uniformity of selected samples across categories and semantics to avoid overrepresentation of similar samples. We denote the data pool as \mathcal{D} , the currently selected subset as \mathcal{D}_S , and the candidate sample under consideration as s . To enhance category uniformity, we quantify the impact of incorporating sample s on the category entropy of \mathcal{D}_S , *i.e.*,

$$\Delta H(s, \mathcal{D}_S) = H(\{s, \mathcal{D}_S\}) - H(\mathcal{D}_S), \text{ where } H(\mathcal{D}_S) = - \sum_{c=1}^K p_c \log p_c, \quad (3)$$

where K is the category number in our safety taxonomy, and p_c denote the proportion of samples belonging to category c in \mathcal{D}_S . Furthermore, to improve semantic diversity, we prioritize selecting s with the largest semantic distance to \mathcal{D}_S . We extract joint image-text embeddings using CLIP’s encoder, $E(\cdot)$, and compute the cosine distance between s and \mathcal{D}_S , which is defined as the distance between s and its closest sample in \mathcal{D}_S . Denoted as $\cos(s, \mathcal{D}_S)$, it can be calculated as

$$\cos(s, \mathcal{D}_S) = 1 - \frac{E(s) \cdot E(\mathcal{D}_S)}{\|E(s)\| \|E(\mathcal{D}_S)\|}. \quad (4)$$

Finally, the diversity criterion is the mean of category uniformity and semantic diversity:

$$C_{\text{div}}(s, \mathcal{D}_S) = \left(\frac{1}{\log(K)} \Delta H(s, \mathcal{D}_S) + \cos(s, \mathcal{D}_S) \right) / 2, \quad (5)$$

where $\frac{1}{\log(K)}$ is a normalization factor. A larger C_{div} indicates a more uniform category distribution and ensures that \mathcal{D}_S covers a broad range of safety scenarios.

2.5.4 OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM

Our goal is to select a subset $\mathcal{D}_S \subseteq \mathcal{D}$ that maximizes the weighted sum of the three criteria, with the only constraint being the maximum benchmark size N_{max} . We fuse the three criteria into a single objective via weighted summation, then the optimization problem can be formulated as:

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{\mathcal{D}_S \subseteq \mathcal{D}} \quad & \mathcal{C}(\mathcal{D}_S) = \sum_{s \in \mathcal{D}_S} C(s, \mathcal{D}_S) = \sum_{s \in \mathcal{D}_S} (\alpha \cdot C_{\text{sep}}(s) + \beta \cdot C_{\text{harm}}(s) + \gamma \cdot C_{\text{div}}(s, \mathcal{D}_S)) \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & \alpha, \beta, \gamma \geq 0, \alpha + \beta + \gamma = 1, |\mathcal{D}_S| \leq N_{\text{max}} \end{aligned} \quad (6)$$

For simplicity, we assume that C_{sep} , C_{harm} , and C_{div} are positive values, then the solution to Problem 6 is to select the N_{max} samples with the largest values of $\alpha \cdot C_{\text{sep}}(s) + \beta \cdot C_{\text{harm}}(s) + \gamma \cdot C_{\text{div}}(s, \mathcal{D}_S)$. The subset \mathcal{D}_S constructed from these samples maximizes the optimization objective $\mathcal{C}(\mathcal{D}_S)$.

Algorithm 1 Iterative Criterion-Based Sample Selection for LVLM Safety Benchmark.

Require: Candidate pool \mathcal{D} , maximum benchmark size N_{\max} , weights α, β, γ .
Ensure: Optimized benchmark subset \mathcal{D}_S .

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1:  $\mathcal{D}_S \leftarrow \emptyset$  ▷ Start with empty selected set
2:  $\mathcal{D}_{\text{rem}} \leftarrow \mathcal{D}$  ▷ Candidates are unselected initially
3: while  $|\mathcal{D}_S| < N_{\max}$  do ▷ Iteratively select samples
4:   for  $s \in \mathcal{D}_{\text{rem}}$  do
5:     Calculate  $C_{\text{sep}}(s)$ ,  $C_{\text{harm}}(s)$ , and  $C_{\text{div}}(s, \mathcal{D}_S)$ 
6:      $C(s, \mathcal{D}_S) \leftarrow \alpha \cdot C_{\text{sep}}(s) + \beta \cdot C_{\text{harm}}(s) + \gamma \cdot C_{\text{div}}(s, \mathcal{D}_S)$  ▷ Total criterion for  $s$ 
7:   end for
8:    $s_{\text{best}} \leftarrow \arg \max_{s \in \mathcal{D}_{\text{rem}}} C(s, \mathcal{D}_S)$ 
9:    $\mathcal{D}_S \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_S \cup \{s_{\text{best}}\}$  ▷ Add top candidate to  $\mathcal{D}_S$ 
10:   $\mathcal{D}_{\text{rem}} \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\text{rem}} \setminus \{s_{\text{best}}\}$  ▷ Remove  $s_{\text{best}}$  from  $\mathcal{D}_{\text{rem}}$ 
11: end while
12: return  $\mathcal{D}_S$  ▷ The final selected subset

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From Equations 3, 4, and 5, C_{div} is determined not only by the current sample s but also by the set of already selected samples \mathcal{D}_S . To account for this dependency, we leverage an iterative manner to select samples one by one. Specifically, \mathcal{D}_S is initialized as an empty set. We then iteratively select the sample s from \mathcal{D} that maximizes criterion $C(s, \mathcal{D}_S)$ and put it into \mathcal{D}_S . This process continues until the size of \mathcal{D}_S reaches N_{\max} . The detailed pipeline is summarized in Algorithm 1. This sample-level modeling method allows our solution to achieve a global optimum.

3 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP

We begin by describing the configurations of agents, including hyperparameters and implementation details, followed by an introduction to the evaluated LVLMs.

Key hyperparameters are configured to balance benchmark quality and computational feasibility. We set the benchmark size, N_{\max} , to 4,000 for rapid safety evaluation. For the Post-Sampling agent, the weights in Problem 6 are set to $\alpha = 0.5$ (for C_{sep}), $\beta = 0.3$ (for C_{harm}), and $\gamma = 0.2$ (for C_{div}), which are determined via grid search to ensure balanced optimization of all desiderata. $N_J = 3$ judges are adopted to classify model responses (harmful/harmless), including GuardReasoner-V (Liu et al., 2025), LLaMA-Guard (Inan et al., 2023), and LLaMA-Guard-Vision (Chi et al., 2024).

For feature extraction, we use CLIP ViT-L/14 (Radford et al., 2021) for image-text encoding, semantic distance calculation, and sample categorization. For the construction of image-text pairs, we employ jailbreaking methods to generate harmful queries for images based on the Gemma-3-12B-It (Team et al., 2025) model. The temperature is set to 1.0 and the maximum output length is 256. Our experiments were conducted on 16 NVIDIA A800 GPUs. We develop all agents and tools based on the smolagents library (Roucher et al., 2025). Each agent is assigned a specific task objective, standardized input/output formats, and a tool-calling interface. To ensure safety, all agents operate within Docker containers. We employ DeepSeek-V3 (Liu et al., 2024a) as the agent engine.

We evaluate 35 LVLMs, covering a variety of model types: LVLMs trained solely with language modeling objectives (e.g., the Ovis2 series (Lu et al., 2024)); instruction-tuned LVLMs (e.g., InternVL3-Instruct (Zhu et al., 2025)); multimodal models (e.g., GPT-4o (Hurst et al., 2024)); proprietary models (e.g., Claude (Anthropic, 2024) and Gemini (Comanici et al., 2025)); and reasoning models (e.g., GLM-4.1V-Thinking (Hong et al., 2025)). Priority is given to models released after January 2024. More details is presented in the Appendix.

4 MAIN RESULTS

Our results focus on three core aspects: the quality of generated/updated benchmark, the efficiency of the construction pipeline, and the safety evaluation of mainstream LVLMs.

4.1 BENCHMARK QUALITY

Baseline To validate the superiority of VLSafetyBench, we compare the generated benchmark \mathcal{D}_S against existing manual and automated LVLM safety benchmarks, which represent the current

Table 1: Benchmark quality comparison (%) between VLSafetyBencher and existing works

Benchmark	MAD \uparrow	MEAN \uparrow	GAP \uparrow	DIV \uparrow
SafeBench	8.32	22.81	54.30	82.05
MLLMGuard	6.73	34.32	46.38	82.64
DataGen	7.18	29.11	49.88	77.66
AutoBench	7.63	39.32	50.33	78.99
DME+MLLMGuard	7.10	33.84	47.80	82.98
VLSafetyBench	15.03	39.16	69.97	83.10

Table 2: Quality comparison (%) of original and updated benchmarks

Benchmark	MAD \uparrow	MEAN \uparrow	GAP \uparrow
SafeBench	8.32	22.81	54.30
20% Update	8.45	26.88	56.77
50% Update	10.58	31.76	59.67
MLLMGuard	6.73	34.32	46.38
20% Update	9.36	32.39	47.06
50% Update	11.19	35.78	56.66

state-of-the-art in LVLm safety evaluation. Manual baselines include: *SafeBench* (Ying et al., 2024): A widely used safety benchmark covering multiple risk scenarios. *MLLMGuard* (Gu et al., 2024): A semi-automated benchmark focusing on mitigating harmful responses in multimodal models. Automated benchmarking frameworks include *AutoBench* (Li et al., 2024), *DataGen* (Huang et al., 2024), and *DME* (Yang et al., 2024). We reproduce these methods in a multimodal safety scenario and evaluate the constructed benchmarks, where we utilize SD-3.5-Large (Esser et al., 2024) to generate images and jailbreak Gemma-3-12B-It (Team et al., 2025) to build image-question pairs.

Metric We first calculate the attack success rate (ASR) of each model on each benchmark. Then, four metrics are adopted to quantify the quality of benchmarks: mean absolute deviation of ASR across models (MAD), mean ASR across models (MEAN), the gap between the highest and lowest ASR (GAP), and the diversity of \mathcal{D}_S (DIV). In terms of discriminative power, MAD gauges a benchmark’s overall safety discrimination capability, whereas GAP reflects the breadth of its assessable safety scope. Regarding harmfulness, the MEAN metric indicates the benchmark’s aggregate level of harmfulness. The DIV metric is calculated as the average C_{div} of all samples in \mathcal{D}_S . Additionally, we also consider the construction efficiency, which is measured based on time and cost.

Results Table 1 summarizes the quantitative comparison results. It is evident that VLSafetyBencher outperforms most baselines across all metrics, demonstrating its ability to construct benchmarks with stronger discriminative power, appropriate harmfulness, and richer diversity. AutoBench exhibits slightly higher harmfulness than our method, which may be attributed to its optimization for ASR, whereas our approach places greater emphasis on discrimination ability. As other baselines do not perform optimization for the metrics, their quality lags behind ours.

4.2 CONSTRUCTION EFFICIENCY

We evaluate efficiency from two critical perspectives: construction time and total cost, with comparisons to representative manual/semi-automated baselines.

Time Time efficiency is measured by the end-to-end duration from raw data to the final benchmark. In our test, VLSafetyBencher’s automated pipeline can build a benchmark from scratch in only *1 week*. Compared to the months-long process required by manual benchmarks, our method significantly reduces time consumption. Our replication of AutoBench required 5.6 days to run, similar to our method’s time cost.

Cost Cost efficiency focuses on monetary expenditures associated with benchmark development. We employ DeepSeek-V3 as agent engine and call the APIs to generate executable Python code. By utilizing open-source models to construct image-question pairs, our approach incurs no data generation or annotation costs. The total expenditure amounts to *\$1.34*, entirely attributed to API usage. Manually annotated datasets, e.g., VLSBench (Hu et al., 2024), often require an investment exceeding hundreds of dollars. In contrast, our system requires minimal to no financial investment.

4.3 BENCHMARK UPDATING

Setting A critical application of VLSafetyBencher is its ability to upgrade existing static benchmarks. We experiment to update two mainstream baselines, SafeBench and MLLMGuard. We first identify low-efficiency samples via the criterion proposed in Problem 6, then we retrieve new high-quality samples to replace them. In our experiments, we only replace the bottom 20% and 50% of samples in each benchmark. The multiple-choice questions are excluded.

Table 3: Safety evaluation of 20 mainstream LVLMs. In addition to ASR, we also present safety rate (SR), where $SR=1-ASR$. **Bold** indicates the best and underline indicates the second.

Model	Privacy	Bias	Toxic	Legal	Misinfo	Health	ASR	SR
Ovis2-8B	51.59	34.04	43.87	51.70	42.35	46.16	44.85	55.15
Ovis2-34B	45.86	39.01	42.34	45.11	31.63	37.50	40.40	59.60
SAIL-VL-8B	57.32	42.55	51.70	61.49	43.88	52.49	51.70	48.30
QVQ-72B-Preview	38.56	32.62	33.61	38.65	40.00	38.24	36.35	63.65
Qwen2.5-VL-72B-Instruct	30.77	6.12	26.41	29.08	16.22	20.19	22.42	77.58
Pixtral-12B-2409	57.96	39.01	52.77	58.72	44.39	46.81	50.22	49.78
InstructBLIP-Vicuna-7B	77.71	68.79	70.01	78.94	68.88	67.73	72.19	27.81
Phi-3.5-Vision-Instruct	9.55	42.55	14.41	7.23	41.33	13.96	19.09	80.91
Kimi-VL-A3B-Instruct	57.32	48.23	46.44	52.13	42.35	52.78	49.43	50.57
InternVL3-78B-Instruct	33.12	30.50	29.45	34.68	24.49	32.81	30.75	69.25
Gemma-3-27B-It	36.31	9.93	16.07	29.15	16.33	17.58	19.45	80.55
DeepSeek-VL2	48.41	79.43	43.72	46.38	69.90	52.70	53.41	46.59
GLM-4.1V-9B-Thinking	69.43	45.39	54.10	68.30	46.94	62.59	57.50	42.50
LLaVA-Next-110B	59.24	52.48	52.05	58.94	47.45	48.44	52.35	47.65
LLaMA-3.2-11B-Vision-Instruct	36.31	34.75	31.87	31.70	33.67	25.05	31.35	68.65
Grok-4	50.94	35.48	29.80	30.53	23.75	38.34	34.09	65.91
GPT-4o	<u>7.33</u>	<u>12.50</u>	<u>5.69</u>	<u>2.95</u>	6.91	<u>4.62</u>	<u>6.22</u>	<u>93.78</u>
GPT-4.1	8.05	<u>12.50</u>	7.30	4.03	6.84	5.44	7.13	92.87
Gemini-2.5-Pro	37.50	19.82	22.41	20.79	18.47	14.43	21.41	78.59
Claude-Sonnet-4	1.32	3.55	1.88	1.55	4.15	1.89	2.22	97.78

Result We compare the original and updated benchmarks in Table 2. When updating only 20% of the samples, MLLMGuard exhibits a slight decline in harmfulness. This arises from the inherent property of the dataset, *i.e.*, the high harmfulness and low discriminative power of original MLLMGuard. During optimization, the sampling strategy prioritizes overall quality enhancement, which may cause reductions in individual metrics. When 50% of the samples are updated, all metrics rise.

4.4 LVLMS SAFETY EVALUATION

Using the benchmark generated by VLSafetyBench, we evaluate 35 mainstream LVLMs, with a subset of 20 presented in Table 3. More results are provided in Appendix. We can observe significant safety disparity, where the safety rate ranges from 27.81% (InstructBLIP-Vicuna-7B) to 97.78% (Claude-Sonnet-4). Proprietary LVLMS (*e.g.*, GPT-4o, Claude, Gemini) achieve higher safety rates (80–100%) due to advanced alignment and reasoning capabilities, while language-oriented models (*e.g.*, Ovis2) and relatively small models (smaller than 10B) have lower safety rates (30–60%).

5 ABLATION EXPERIMENTS

We mainly investigate the design and hyperparameters from three aspects: the role of each agent, the sampling strategy, and the benchmark size.

5.1 AGENT DESIGN

We remove one agent at a time to verify the necessity of the multi-agent design. Table 4 illustrates the impact of agents on benchmark quality and construction time cost. The Preprocessing agent has a negligible effect on final benchmark quality but significantly reduces time cost by filtering out substantial low-quality data. Removing the Cross-Modal agent (directly generating image-question pairs without considering inter-modal relationships) reduces discriminative ability and harmfulness, likely because LVLMS can identify harmful content via unsafe text input. Removing the Augmentation agent

Table 4: Ablation results of the role of agents. “Baseline” represents the complete framework.

Ablated Agent	MAD \uparrow	MEAN \uparrow	GAP \uparrow	Time
Baseline	15.03	39.16	69.97	7.57 d
Preprocessing	15.01	38.96	68.53	≥ 14 d
Cross-Modal	12.94	33.28	64.37	4.80 d
Augmentation	11.73	30.15	61.61	6.82 d
Post-Sampling	5.18	20.76	40.37	3.12 d




Figure 3: Ablation for weights α , β , and γ and their effect on MAD, MEAN, and GAP.

markedly lowers benchmark harmfulness, as the augmentation strategy enhances jailbreak success rate. Excluding the Post-Sampling agent reduces time cost but degrades all quality metrics.

5.2 SAMPLING STRATEGY

As observed above, the Post-Sampling Agent is the most critical part in the entire framework. Therefore, we analyze the impact of the criteria $C_{sep}(s)$, $C_{harm}(s)$, and $C_{div}(s, \mathcal{D}_S)$, by examining the influence of the weights α , β , and γ in Problem 6. We change each weight independently while keeping the sum of all weights equal to 1. For each experiment, the tested weight takes values in $\{0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1.0\}$, and the remaining two weights are set equally.

Figure 3 presents the results, which indicate a trade-off among the criteria. It can be observed that increasing the weights leads to improvements in corresponding benchmark quality, albeit to varying degrees. Specifically, raising α results in a significant enhancement in MAD and GAP, whereas increasing γ has a minimal impact on diversity according to our experiments. Consequently, the highest weight is assigned to α , and the lowest to γ .

5.3 BENCHMARK SIZE

We test the stability of LVLm safety evaluation versus benchmark size across four models in Figure 4: Qwen2.5-VL-72B-Instruct (Bai et al., 2025), Gemini-2.5-Pro (Comanici et al., 2025), DeepSeek-VL2 (Wu et al., 2024), and Ovis2-34B (Lu et al., 2024). The ASR of each model is visualized. We can observe that smaller sizes exhibit higher instability and hamper the safety measure of models (left of the dashed line), while larger numbers introduce more cost and redundancy (right of the dashed line). We adopt a conservative strategy to set N_{max} to 4000.




Figure 4: Ablation for benchmark size (N_{max}).

6 CONCLUSION

Existing LVLm safety benchmarks suffer from high costs, insufficient update, and weak discriminative power. We present *VLSafetyBench*, a fully automated multi-agent system for LVLm safety benchmarking. *VLSafetyBench* leverages four collaborative agents for benchmark generation, where cross-modal relationships and optimization-based sampling are explored. Experiments show *VLSafetyBench* outperforms existing benchmarks and automated baselines by a large margin in discriminative power and harmfulness. *VLSafetyBench* can construct a benchmark in one week and update existing benchmarks effectively. *VLSafetyBench* provides a scalable, efficient framework for LVLm safety evaluation, advancing reliable multimodal AI. Future work may expand the safety taxonomy and adapt the pipeline to more complex LVLm capacity evaluations.

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