GPT-who: An Information Density-based Machine-Generated Text Detector

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Abstract

 The *Uniform Information Density* (UID) prin- ciple posits that humans prefer to spread information evenly during language produc- tion. We examine if this UID principle can help capture differences between Large Lan- guage Models (LLMs)-generated and human- generated texts. We propose GPT-who, the first psycholinguistically-aware multi-class domain-agnostic statistical detector. This de- tector employs UID-based features to model the unique statistical signature of each LLM and human author for accurate authorship at- tribution. We evaluate our method using 4 large-scale benchmark datasets and find that **GPT-who outperforms state-of-the-art detec-**016 tors (both statistical- & non-statistical) such as GLTR, GPTZero, DetectGPT, OpenAI de- tector, and ZeroGPT by over 20% across do- mains. In addition to superior performance, it is computationally inexpensive and utilizes an interpretable representation of text arti- cles. We find that GPT-who can distinguish texts generated by very sophisticated LLMs, even when the overlying text is indiscernible. UID-based measures for all datasets and code **are available at [https://anonymous.4open.](https://anonymous.4open.science/r/gpt-who-03F8/)** [science/r/gpt-who-03F8/](https://anonymous.4open.science/r/gpt-who-03F8/).

028 1 Introduction

 The recent ubiquity of Large Language Models (LLMs) has led to more assessments of their po- tential risks. These risks include its capability to generate misinformation [\(Zellers et al.,](#page-10-0) [2019;](#page-10-0) [Uchendu et al.,](#page-9-0) [2020\)](#page-9-0), memorized content [\(Car-](#page-8-0) [lini et al.,](#page-8-0) [2021\)](#page-8-0), plagiarized content [\(Lee et al.,](#page-9-1) [2023\)](#page-9-1), toxic speech [\(Deshpande et al.,](#page-8-1) [2023\)](#page-8-1), and hallucinated content [\(Ji et al.,](#page-8-2) [2023;](#page-8-2) [Shevlane et al.,](#page-9-2) [2023\)](#page-9-2). To mitigate these issues, researchers have proposed automatic and human-based approaches to distinguish LLM-generated texts (i.e., machine- generated) from human-written texts [\(Zellers et al.,](#page-10-0) [2019;](#page-10-0) [Pu et al.,](#page-9-3) [2022;](#page-9-3) [Uchendu et al.,](#page-9-4) [2023;](#page-9-4) [Mitchell et al.,](#page-9-5) [2023\)](#page-9-5).

Figure 1: GPT-who leverages psycholinguistically motivated representations that capture authors' information signatures distinctly, even when the corresponding text is indiscernible.

Automatically detecting machine-generated **043** texts occurs in two settings- *Turing Test* (TT) which **044** is the binary detection of human vs. machine; and **045** *Authorship Attribution* (AA) which is the multi- **046** class detection of human vs. several machines (e.g., **047** GPT-3.5 vs. LLaMA vs. Falcon) [\(Uchendu et al.,](#page-10-1) **048** [2021\)](#page-10-1). While the TT problem is more rigorously **049** studied, due to the wide usage of different LLMs, **050** in the future, it will be imperative to build models **051** for the AA tasks to determine which LLMs are **052** more likely to be misused. This knowledge will **053** be needed by policymakers when they inevitably **054** institute laws to guard the usage of LLMs. **055**

To that end, we propose GPT-who, the first **056** psycholinguistically-aware supervised domain- **057** agnostic task-independent multi-class statistical- **058** based detector. GPT-who calculates interpretable **059** Uniform Information Density (UID) based features **060** from the statistical distribution of a piece of text **061** and automatically learns the threshold (using Lo- **062** gistic Regression) between different authors. **063**

To showcase the detection capabilities of GPT- **064** who, we use 4 large LLM benchmark datasets: Tur- **065** ingBench [\(Uchendu et al.,](#page-10-1) [2021\)](#page-10-1), GPABenchmark **066** [\(Liu et al.,](#page-9-6) [2023b\)](#page-9-6), ArguGPT [\(Liu et al.,](#page-9-7) [2023a\)](#page-9-7), **067** and Deepfake Text in-the-wild [\(Li et al.,](#page-9-8) [2023\)](#page-9-8). We **068**

 find that GPT-who remarkably outperforms state- of-the-art statistical detectors and is at par with task and domain-specific fine-tuned LMs for authorship attribution. This performative gain is consistent across benchmark datasets, types of LLMs, writing tasks, and domains.

 It is even more remarkable that this performa-076 tive gain is accompanied by two essential factors: First, GPT-who is computationally inexpensive as it eliminates the need for any LLM fine-tuning. It utilizes a freely available off-the-shelf LM to compute token probabilities, followed by logistic regression using a small set of carefully crafted and theoretically motivated UID features. Second, GPT-who provides a means to interpret and un- derstand its prediction behaviors due to the rich feature space it learns from. UID-based features en- able observable distinctions in the surprisal patterns of texts, which help in understanding GPT-who's decision-making on authorship (Figure [1\)](#page-0-0).

 We also analyze the UID distributions of dif- ferent LLMs and human-generated texts across all datasets and find that humans distribute infor- mation more unevenly and diversely than mod- els. In addition, UID features are reflective of differences in LLM architectures or families such that models that share architectures have similar UID distributions within but not outside their cat- egory. We find that UID-based features are a con- sistent predictor of authorship. Even when there aren't glaring differences between uniform and non-uniform text, the differences in UID distribu- tions are easily detectable and a powerful predic- tor of authorship, since they successfully capture patterns that go beyond the lexical, semantic, or syntactic properties of text. Our work indicates that psycholinguistically-inspired tools can hold their ground in the age of LLMs and a simpler theoretically-motivated approach can outperform complex and expensive uninterpretable black-box approaches for machine text detection.

¹¹⁰ 2 Related Work

111 2.1 Uniform Information Density (UID)

 Shannon's Information Theory states that informa- tion exchange is optimized when information trav- els across the (noisy) channel at a uniform rate [\(Shannon,](#page-9-9) [1948\)](#page-9-9). For language production, this uniform rate of information content is the basis of the UID hypothesis that posits that humans prefer to spread information evenly, avoiding sharp and

sudden peaks and troughs in the amount of informa- **119** tion conveyed per linguistic unit. The information **120** content or "surprisal" of a word is inversely pro- **121** portional to its probability in a given context. Less **122** predictable words have more surprisal while highly **123** predictable words convey lower information. **124**

UID in human language production has been **125** studied by measuring the amount of information **126** content per linguistic unit (sentence length/number **127** of words) or by studying any sudden changes in sur- **128** prisal at the onset of a word or sentential element **129** [\(Xu and Reitter,](#page-10-2) [2016;](#page-10-2) [Jaeger and Levy,](#page-8-3) [2007\)](#page-8-3). A **130** rich body of work in psycholinguistics has led to **131** the finding that, in language production, humans try **132** to spread information content or surprisal evenly **133** and maintain UID through their lexical, syntac- **134** [t](#page-8-4)ic, phonological, and semantic choices [\(Frank and](#page-8-4) **135** [Jaeger,](#page-8-4) [2008;](#page-8-4) [Xu and Reitter,](#page-10-3) [2018;](#page-10-3) [Jaeger,](#page-8-5) [2010;](#page-8-5) **136** [Mahowald et al.,](#page-9-10) [2013;](#page-9-10) [Tily and Piantadosi,](#page-9-11) [2009\)](#page-9-11). **137**

2.2 Machine-Generated Text Detection **138**

Large Language Models (LLMs) such as GPT-3.5, **139** GPT-4 [\(OpenAI,](#page-9-12) [2023\)](#page-9-12), LLaMA [\(Touvron et al.,](#page-9-13) **140** [2023\)](#page-9-13), Falcon [\(Penedo et al.,](#page-9-14) [2023\)](#page-9-14), have the capac- **141** ity to generate human-like-quality texts, which can **142** [b](#page-9-15)e easily construed as human-written [\(Sadasivan](#page-9-15) **143** [et al.,](#page-9-15) [2023;](#page-9-15) [Chakraborty et al.,](#page-8-6) [2023;](#page-8-6) [Zhao et al.,](#page-10-4) **144** [2023\)](#page-10-4). However, while such LLMs are remarkable, **145** it, therefore, makes them susceptible to malicious **146** use. These include the generation of toxic and **147** harmful content, like misinformation and terrorism **148** recruitment [\(Shevlane et al.,](#page-9-2) [2023;](#page-9-2) [Zellers et al.,](#page-10-0) **149** [2019;](#page-10-0) [Uchendu et al.,](#page-10-1) [2021\)](#page-10-1). Due to such potential **150** for misuse, we must develop techniques to distin- **151** guish human-written texts from LLM-generated **152** ones to mitigate these risks. **153**

To mitigate this potential for misuse of LLMs, **154** researchers have developed several types of au- **155** tomatic detectors. These techniques include su- **156** pervised [\(Uchendu et al.,](#page-10-1) [2021;](#page-10-1) [Zellers et al.,](#page-10-0) **157** [2019;](#page-10-0) [Uchendu et al.,](#page-9-0) [2020;](#page-9-0) [Zhong et al.,](#page-10-5) [2020;](#page-10-5) **158** [Kushnareva et al.,](#page-9-16) [2021;](#page-9-16) [Liu et al.,](#page-9-17) [2022\)](#page-9-17) and un- **159** supervised approaches [\(Gehrmann et al.,](#page-8-7) [2019;](#page-8-7) [Mitchell et al.,](#page-9-5) [2023;](#page-9-5) [Gallé et al.,](#page-8-8) [2021;](#page-8-8) [He et al.,](#page-8-9) **161** [2023;](#page-8-9) [Su et al.,](#page-9-18) [2023\)](#page-9-18). These supervised ap- **162** proaches tend to be stylometric-, deep learning- **163** and ensemble-based models while most unsuper- **164** vised approaches are statistical-based detectors **165** [\(Uchendu et al.,](#page-9-4) [2023;](#page-9-4) [Yang et al.,](#page-10-6) [2023\)](#page-10-6). **166**

More recently, due to the increased ubiquity of 167 LLMs, we need more interpretable, and less deep **168** learning-based models. Deep learning models have **169**

 been shown to be the most susceptible to adversar- ial perturbations than others [\(Pu et al.,](#page-9-3) [2022\)](#page-9-3). To that end, we propose the first supervised statistical- based technique, that calculates UID-based features of a given text and uses a classical machine learning model to automatically decide thresholds.

¹⁷⁶ 3 Our Proposal: **GPT-who**

 We propose a psycholinguistically-motivated statistical-based machine-generated text detector GPT-who that uses a **GPT**-based language model to predict **who** the author of an article is. GPT- who works by exploiting a densely information- rich feature space motivated by the UID principle. UID-based representations are sensitive to intri- cate "fluctuations" as well as "smoothness" in the text. Specifically, operationalizations of UID are aimed at capturing the evenness or smoothness of the distribution of surprisal per linguistic unit (to- kens, words), as stated by the UID principle. For example, in Figure [2,](#page-2-0) we show sequences of to- kens that correspond to the highest and lowest UID score spans within an article. Here, the differences between the two segments of texts might not be obvious at the linguistic level to a reader, but when mapped to their surprisal distributions, the two seg- ments have noticeably distinct surprisal spreads as can be seen by the peaks and troughs i.e. variance of token surprisals along the y-axis about the mean (dotted line). Most approximations of this notion of "smoothness" of information spread and UID, thus, formulate it as the variance of surprisal or as a measure of the difference of surprisals between [c](#page-9-19)onsecutive linguistic units [\(Jain et al.,](#page-8-10) [2018;](#page-8-10) [Meis-](#page-9-19) [ter et al.,](#page-9-19) [2020;](#page-9-19) [Wei et al.,](#page-10-7) [2021;](#page-10-7) [Venkatraman et al.,](#page-10-8) **204** [2023\)](#page-10-8).

 In measuring the distribution of surprisal of to- kens, UID-based features can capture and amplify subtle information distribution patterns that consti- tute distinct information profiles of authors. Using just an off-the-shelf language model to calculate UID-based features, GPT-who learns to predict au- thorship by means of a simple classifier using UID representations. In addition, as these features can be directly mapped to their linguistic token equiva- lents, GPT-who offers a more interpretable repre- sentation of its detection behavior, unlike current black-box statistical detectors, as illustrated in Fig- ure [2.](#page-2-0) The use of a psycholinguistically motivated representation also enables us to better interpret the resulting representation space. It can capture

Figure 2: An example of UID span feature extraction that selects the most uniform and non-uniform segments from the token surprisal sequence. As can be seen in this example, two texts that read well can have very different underlying information density distributions in a given context. UID features capture these hidden statistical distinctions that are not apparent in their textual form.

surprisal distributions indicative of and commonly **220** occurring in human-written or machine-generated **221** text. GPT-who is one of the first text detectors **222** that focus on informing a simple classifier with **223** theoretically motivated and intuitive features, as it **224** only requires a fixed-length UID-based representa- **225** tion of length 44 and learns to predict authorship **226** based on just these features, without the need for **227** the full text or any LM fine-tuning in the process **228** (See GPT-who's complete pipeline in Figure [3\)](#page-3-0). **229**

3.1 UID-based features **230**

We use the 3 most widely used measures of UID 231 scores as defined in previous works [\(Jain et al.,](#page-8-10) **232** [2018;](#page-8-10) [Meister et al.,](#page-9-19) [2020;](#page-9-19) [Wei et al.,](#page-10-7) [2021;](#page-10-7) [Venka-](#page-10-8) **233** [traman et al.,](#page-10-8) [2023\)](#page-10-8) as follows: We first obtain the **234** conditional probability p of each token (y_t) in an 235 article using a pre-trained LM (GPT2-XL). The **236** surprisal (u) of a token y_t is, is, **237**

$$
u(y_t) = -\log(p(y|y < t)), \t(1) \t(238)
$$

for $t \ge 1$ where $y_0 = \langle BOS \rangle$, and $t =$ time step. 239

The lower the probability of a token, the higher **240** its surprisal and vice-versa. Thus, surprisal indi- **241** cates how unexpected a token is in a given context. **242**

1. **Mean Surprisal** (μ) of an article (y) defined 243

Figure 3: GPT-who uses token probabilities of articles to extract UID-based features. A classifier then learns to map UID features to different authors, and identify the author of a new unseen article.

244 as follow:

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245
$$
\mu(y) = \frac{1}{|y|} \sum_{t} (u(y_t))
$$
 (2)

246 2. UID (Variance) score or global UID score **247** of an article (*y*) is calculated as the normalized **248** variance of the surprisal:

249
$$
\text{UID}(y) = \frac{1}{|y|} \sum_{t} (u(y_t) - \mu)^2 \qquad (3)
$$

250 From this formulation, a perfectly uniform **251** article would have the same surprisal at every **252** token and hence 0 UID (variance) score.

 3. UID (Difference) score or local UID score of an article (*y*) is calculated as the average of the difference in surprisals of every two 256 consecutive tokens $\mu(y_{t-1})$ and $\mu(y_t)$:

$$
UID(y) = \frac{1}{|y| - 1} \sum_{t=2}^{|y|} |\mu(y_t) - \mu(y_{t-1})|
$$
\n(4)

258 4. **UID** $(Difference²)$ score is defined as the average of the squared difference in surprisals **of every two consecutive tokens** $\mu(y_{t-1})$ and $\mu(y_t)$:

$$
UID(y) = \frac{1}{|y| - 1} \sum_{n=2}^{|y|} (\mu(y_t) - \mu(y_{t-1}))^2
$$
\n(5)

 From this formulation, both local measures of UID capture any sudden bursts of unevenness in how information is dispersed in consecutive tokens of the articles.

Maximum and minimum UID spans In addi- **267** tion to previously used approximations of UID, we **268** also craft a new set of features using the most and **269** least uniform segments of an article. Our intuition **270** for this feature is to focus on the extremities of **271** the UID distribution in an article, as the most and **272** least uniform spans would be the most expressive **273** and distinct sequences from a UID perspective. All **274** other spans or segments in an article necessarily **275** lie in between these two extremities. Thus taking **276** account of these two spans would ensure coverage **277** of the whole range of surprisal fluctuations within **278** an article. Thus, for each article, we calculate UID **279** (variance) scores for all spans of consecutive tokens **280** of a fixed length using a sliding window approach. **281** We tuned this window size and found that a window **282** size of 20 tokens per span sufficiently represented **283** an article's UID range. We also experimented with **284** randomly drawn and re-ordered spans and found **285** that random features did not contribute to task per- **286** formance (see Table [1](#page-4-0) for ablation study results). **287** We use the surprisal values corresponding to the **288** highest and lowest UID scoring span as additional **289** features and obtain fixed length UID features of **290** length 44 for each article. **291**

4 Empirical Validation **²⁹²**

We use [Meister et al.](#page-9-20) [\(2021\)](#page-9-20)'s implementation **293** of UID-based scores^{[1](#page-3-1)} and use the publicly avail-
294 able off-the-shelf pre-trained GPT2-XL language **295** model^{[2](#page-3-2)} to obtain conditional probabilities. For all 296 our experiments, we calculate the UID features **297** for the publically released train and test splits of **298**

¹ [https://github.com/rycolab/revisiting-uid/](https://github.com/rycolab/revisiting-uid/tree/main) [tree/main](https://github.com/rycolab/revisiting-uid/tree/main)

² <https://huggingface.co/gpt2-xl>

	Random	No Spans	$Min + Max UID spans$				
Span Length (N)	UID spans		$N=4$	$N=10$	$N = 15$	$N=20$	$N=30$
$GPT-1$	0.75	0.76	0.99	0.99	0.98	1.00	0.99
GPT-2 small	0.62	0.64	0.75	0.82	0.88	0.88	0.85
GPT-2 medium	0.63	0.63	0.73	0.80	0.88	0.87	0.84
GPT-2_large	0.65	0.62	0.73	0.79	0.88	0.88	0.83
GPT-2 xl	0.65	0.61	0.72	0.80	0.88	0.89	0.85
GPT-2 PyTorch	0.55	0.64	0.83	0.84	0.87	0.85	0.86
GPT-3	0.63	0.69	0.71	0.73	0.77	0.84	0.74
GROVER base	0.63	0.65	0.76	0.77	0.79	0.81	0.78
GROVER_large	0.59	0.60	0.71	0.71	0.73	0.75	0.72
GROVER mega	0.55	0.56	0.67	0.67	0.68	0.72	0.67
CTRL	0.79	0.83	0.99	0.98	0.98	0.99	0.98
XLM	0.62	0.69	0.96	0.96	0.96	0.99	0.96
XLNET base	0.62	0.71	0.95	0.97	0.98	0.98	0.99
XLNET_large	0.49	0.70	0.99	0.99	0.99	1.00	0.99
FAIR wmt19	0.54	0.57	0.74	0.75	0.78	0.74	0.76
Fair_wmt20	0.62	0.63	0.72	0.75	0.88	1.00	0.89
TRANSFO XL	0.70	0.70	0.79	0.80	0.83	0.79	0.84
PPLM distil	0.57	0.62	0.92	0.91	0.93	0.95	0.93
PPLM_gpt2	0.54	0.58	0.88	0.88	0.90	0.89	0.88
TuringBench (Avg F1)	0.62	0.65	0.82	0.84	0.87	0.88	0.86
InTheWild (Avg F1)	0.72	0.75	0.79	0.83	0.86	0.88	0.87

Table 1: Max. & Min. UID spans ablation study: Setting a span length of N=20 tokens maximized performance across large-scale datasets (N>30 leads to subsequently lower and eventually consistent performance). It can be seen that our min/max features tremendously impact performance against randomly sampled or no span features at all.

all datasets. We train a logistic regression model^{[3](#page-4-1)} using these features on the train splits and report performance on the test splits. We replicate all the original evaluation settings and metrics for each of the datasets (except one setting from the ArguGPT [\(Liu et al.,](#page-9-7) [2023a\)](#page-9-7) dataset that required access to unreleased human evaluation data). We do this to be able to directly compare the performance of GPT-who with current state-of-the-art detection methods reported so far.

309 4.1 Datasets

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 To test the applicability of GPT-who across text detection tasks, we run all experiments across 4 large-scale and very recent datasets that span over 15 domains and 35 recent LMs.

 TuringBench Benchmark [\(Uchendu et al.,](#page-10-1) [2021\)](#page-10-1) dataset is the largest multi-class authorship attribu- tion dataset that contains over 168k news articles generated by 19 neural text generators using 10K prompts from CNN and the Washington Post.

ArguGPT [\(Liu et al.,](#page-9-7) [2023a\)](#page-9-7) is a prompt- **327** balanced dataset of argumentative essays contain- **328** ing over 4k human-written essays and 4k articles **329** generated by 7 recent LLMs (including many vari- **330** ants of ChatGPT) using prompts from English **331** datasets such as TOEFL11 [\(Blanchard et al.,](#page-8-11) [2013\)](#page-8-11) **332** and WECCL [\(Wen et al.,](#page-10-9) [2005\)](#page-10-9) datasets. **333**

"InTheWild" Deepfake Text Detection in the **334** Wild [\(Li et al.,](#page-9-8) [2023\)](#page-9-8) dataset is, to our knowl- **335** edge, the largest text detection dataset consist- **336** ing of over 447k human-written and machine- **337** generated texts from 10 tasks such as story gen- **338** eration, news article writing, and academic writing. **339** They use 27 recent LLMs such as GPT-3.5, FLAN- **340**

GPABenchmark [\(Liu et al.,](#page-9-6) [2023b\)](#page-9-6) or GPT **319** Corpus for Academia is a multi-domain (Com- **320** puter Science (CS), Humanities and Social Sci- **321** ences (HSS) and Physics (PHX)) academic articles **322** dataset aimed at helping detection of LLM use or **323** misuse in academic writing. It contains 150k hu- **324** man and 450k ChatGPT-generated articles for 3 **325** task settings (completion, writing, and polishing). **326**

³ <https://scikit-learn.org/stable/>

Figure 4: Distribution of UID Scores of 20 authors from the TuringBench dataset grouped (dotted line) by architecture type. LMs that share architectures tend to distribute UID scores similarly.

341 T5, and LLaMA. We refer to this dataset as the **342** "InTheWild" dataset going forward for brevity.

343 4.2 Baselines & Detectors

 We compare our proposed method against the [4](#page-5-0)5 **following:** DetectGPT ⁴ [\(Mitchell et al.,](#page-9-5) [2023\)](#page-9-5), GLTR[5](#page-5-1) **346** [\(Gehrmann et al.,](#page-8-7) [2019\)](#page-8-7), an open-source **implementation^{[6](#page-5-2)} of GPTZero [\(Tian and Cui,](#page-9-21) [2023\)](#page-9-21),** [Z](#page-9-22)eroGPT [\(zer,](#page-8-12) [2023\)](#page-8-12), OpenAI's detector [\(Solaiman](#page-9-22) [et al.,](#page-9-22) [2019\)](#page-9-22), [Li et al.](#page-9-8) [\(2023\)](#page-9-8)'s LongFormer-based **detector^{[7](#page-5-3)}** tuned for the InTheWild benchmark (we refer to this method as "ITW"), a stylometric detector[8](#page-5-4) **352** [\(Abbasi and Chen,](#page-8-13) [2008\)](#page-8-13) and fine-tuned **BERT^{[9](#page-5-5)}** [\(Kenton and Toutanova,](#page-8-14) [2019\)](#page-8-14). We are un- able to report results for exhaustively all methods across all datasets due to inherent inapplicability in certain task settings. For example, most SOTA text detectors cannot be applied to the ArguGPT dataset as it only contains text written by multiple machines, while most text detectors are designed to differentiate between human-written and machine- generated texts. Beyond such limitations, we have utilized all applicable methods for 4 benchmark datasets.

364 4.3 UID Signatures of Authors

365 Given that humans tend to optimize UID, we study **366** if different models spread surprisal in ways that are **367** distinguishable from each other and human-written

[detecting-fake-text](https://github.com/HendrikStrobelt/detecting-fake-text)

8 <https://github.com/shaoormunir/writeprints>

text and if we can observe unique UID signatures **368** of different LM families. To this end, we plot the **369** UID score distributions of different text generators **370** across (see Figures [4,](#page-5-6) [5a,](#page-11-0) and [5b\)](#page-11-0). We observe that, **371** generally, the UID scores of human-written text **372** have a higher mean and larger standard deviation **373** than most machine-written text across writing task **374** types, domains, and datasets. This implies that **375** human-written text tends to be more non-uniform **376** and diverse in comparison to machine-generated **377** text. Hence, machines seem to be spreading in- **378** formation more evenly or smoothly than humans **379** who are more likely to have fluctuations in their **380** surprisal distributions. Going a step further, if we **381** compare models to other models, we see that mod- **382** els that belong to the same LM family by architec- **383** ture tend to follow similar UID distribution. For **384** example, in Figure [4,](#page-5-6) the dotted lines separate LMs **385** by their architecture type and it can be seen, for **386** example, that all GPT-2 based models have similar **387** UID distributions, all Grover-based models have **388** similarities, but these groups are distinct from each 389 other. This indicates that UID-based features can **390** capture differences in text generated by not only **391** humans and models but also one step further to cap- **392** ture differences between individual and multiple **393** models and LM families. To our knowledge, this **394** is the first large-scale UID-based analysis of recent **395** machine and human-generated text across writing **396** tasks and domains. **397**

4.4 Machine Text Detection Performance **398**

Overall, GPT-who outperforms other statistical- **399** based detectors and is at par with transformers- **400** based fine-tuned methods for 2 out of 4 bench- **401** marks. For GPABenchmark (Table [2\)](#page-6-0), across all **402**

⁴ <https://github.com/eric-mitchell/detect-gpt> 5 [https://github.com/HendrikStrobelt/](https://github.com/HendrikStrobelt/detecting-fake-text)

⁶ <https://github.com/BurhanUlTayyab/GPTZero> 7 <https://github.com/yafuly/DeepfakeTextDetect>

⁹ [https://huggingface.co/docs/transformers/](https://huggingface.co/docs/transformers/training) [training](https://huggingface.co/docs/transformers/training)

Task Type	Domain	GPTZero	ZeroGPT	OpenAI Detector	DetectGPT	BERT	ITW	GPT-who
Task 1	CS	0.30	0.67	0.81	0.58	0.99	0.98	0.99
	PHX	0.25	0.68	0.70	0.54	0.99	0.98	0.98
	HSS	0.72	0.92	0.63	0.57	0.99	0.96	0.98
Task 2	CS	0.17	0.25	0.64	0.16	0.99	0.81	0.84
	PHX	0.06	0.10	0.24	0.17	0.96	0.76	0.90
	HSS	0.44	0.62	0.27	0.20	0.97	0.29	0.80
Task 3	CS	0.02	0.03	0.06	0.03	0.97	0.38	0.63
	PHX	0.02	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.97	0.31	0.75
	HSS	0.20	0.25	0.06	0.06	0.99	0.08	0.62
Average F1		0.24	0.40	0.38	0.26	0.98	0.62	0.83

Table 2: Test Set Performance (F1 Scores) of different machine text detectors on the GPA Benchmark. Best performance are in bold, and second best underlined.

Table 3: Test Set Performance (F1 score) for TuringBench dataset. Overall, GPT-who outperforms both statistical and supervised detectors, and is at part with BERT.

Table 4: Test Set Performance (F1 score) for InTheWild dataset. ITW refers to the LongFormer-based detector trained by Li et al. (2023) specifically for this benchmark.

Author	$Experts*$	Stylometry BERT GPT-who		
text-babbage-001	0.47	0.45	0.84	0.85
text-curie-001	0.47	0.45	0.83	0.84
text-davinci-003	0.66	0.59	0.95	0.77
$gpt-3.5$ -turbo	0.63	0.69	0.96	0.84
$gpt2-xl$	0.37	0.49	0.95	0.91
Average F1	0.52	0.53	0.91	0.84

Table 5: Test Set Performance (F1 score) for ArguGPT dataset.* denotes results reported in [Liu et al.](#page-9-7) [\(2023a\)](#page-9-7).

 task types and domains, GPT-who outperforms GPTZero, ZeroGPT, DetectGPT and, OpenAI's detector by over 40%. The machine-generated texts for this task are from 7 very recent and highly sophisticated LLMs (including GPT3.5, GPT3 vari- ants), making the detection of machine-generated text a much more challenging task on which GPT-who outperforms other detectors exceedingly.

 For TuringBench (Table [3\)](#page-6-1), GPT-who signifi- cantly outperforms GLTR by 0.32 F1 points, and at par with BERT fine-tuned for the task. The InTheWild dataset contains 6 testbeds with vary- ing levels of detection difficulties, such as out- of-domain, out-of-distribution, and unseen-task test sets. We used all 6 testbeds to analyze the performance of GPT-who in detecting machine- generated texts across increasing levels of 'wild- ness' and find that overall, GPT-who outperforms all other methods except the one specifically tuned to the task (ITW) across all testbeds. More impor- tantly, GPT-who performs tremendously even for the most challenging or 'wildest' testbed settings of unseen model and unseen domain distributions (see Table [4\)](#page-6-2). For the ArguGPT dataset (Table [5\)](#page-7-0), we find that GPT-who outperforms human experts and stylometry in predicting authorship by 0.31 F1 points, but is outperformed by fine-tuned BERT. Although unable to perform as well as BERT, GPT- who is one of the only statistical-based detectors that can handle distinctions between machine-only texts. We were unable to evaluate other detectors as their human-generated texts were not publicly released, and they only work in human v/s machine settings.

⁴³⁷ 5 Discussion

 We turn to the UID principle, which states that *humans prefer to spread information evenly in lan- guage*, to automatically extract features that mea-sure the spread and flow of information content

or surprisal in texts. Our UID-based features are **442** formulated to capture how surprisal is distributed **443** in an article as they measure the local and global **444** variance, mean, and most uniform and non-uniform **445** segments of a text. This rich and succinct represen- **446** tation space drives the predictive capability of our **447** proposed detector and the interpretability of its rep- **448** resentations. Analysis of this feature space reveals **449** that human-written text tends to be more non- **450** uniform in comparison to machine-generated **451** text. Hence, machines seem to be spreading in- **452** formation more evenly or smoothly than humans **453** who are more likely to have fluctuations in their **454** surprisal distributions. We also find that UID-based **455** features can capture differences between text gen- **456** erated by not only humans and models but also **457** capture differences between multiple models and **458** LM families. Our main contribution is a novel **459** psycholinguistically-aware domain-agnostic multi- **460** class statistical-based machine-generated text de- **461** tector, GPT-who, that: **462**

- Outperforms statistical approaches across 4 **463** large-scale benchmark datasets that include 464 texts from over 35 LLMs across more than 10 **465** domains. **466**
- Generalizes better to out-of-distribution **467** datasets than SOTA detectors. **468**
- Computationally more efficient than other su- **469** pervised detectors as it does not require the **470** fine-tuning or training of any LLMs. **471**
- Intuitively interpretable due to its psy- **472** cholinguistically motivated UID-based feature **473 space. 474**

While our detector may not significantly outper- **475** form fine-tuned transformers-based models, it is **476** essential to highlight its independence from fine- **477** tuning, offering nearly comparable performance **478** at significantly lower computational costs and re- **479** mains one of the only statistical-based detectors **480** that can operate in multi-author settings beyond **481** the Turing Test. These findings indicate that ap- **482** proaches rooted in psycholinguistic theories that **483** delineate indicators of "human-like" language use **484** hold enormous and untapped potential in tackling **485** the fast catapulting and ever-changing LLM land- **486** scape. This work has implications for cognitively **487** plausible and explainable solutions to complex **488** challenges arising from ever-growing automated **489** text generators. **490**

⁴⁹¹ Limitations

 In our pursuit of a comprehensive examination of texts produced by recent large language models, we encountered limitations arising from resource con- straints and the availability of publicly accessible datasets. These factors constrained our ability to en- compass a more diverse array of models and tasks, including summarization and question-answering. Furthermore, our study did not delve into whether UID-based methods extend their utility beyond de- tecting machine-generated text to identify potential issues such as misinformation and plagiarism. We acknowledge these constraints as part of our on- going commitment to refining and expanding our efforts in future research endeavors.

⁵⁰⁶ Ethical Statement

 It is important to note that there are inherent limi- tations of AI-based tools and automated machine text detectors such as in this work. Acknowledg- ing the fallibility of these detectors, particularly in generating false positives, we note that there is still a crucial need for human oversight and discre- tion in the usage of such detectors in real-world settings. For example, ethical concerns surround- ing over-vigilance in scrutinizing student-written text are an important consideration for striking a balance between the convenience of automated de- tection and the preservation of academic integrity. By advocating for responsible development and im- plementation, we hope to contribute to a landscape where ethical considerations guide the integration of automatic text detection systems in educational settings, safeguarding against undue reliance and promoting fairness, equity, and respect for individ-ual expression.

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⁷⁵⁰ A Appendix

751 A.1 UID Score distributions of authors

 We see that for most cases, humans have a higher UID (variance) score than machines, as can be seen by the higher means of their scores in the box plots. This holds when comparing human-written texts with multiple machine-generated texts over shared tasks (Figure [5a\)](#page-11-0), and also when comparing their differences between tasks (Figure [5b\)](#page-11-0).

(a) Pairwise comparisons of human and different machine-generated texts for shared tasks: Distribution of UID Scores of 8 authors (7 models + human) from the InTheWild dataset. (m) indicates machine and (h) indicates human written texts. This is followed by the model name along the x-axis labels to indicate the different authors.

(b) Pairwise comparisons of human and different machine-generated texts for different tasks: Distribution of UID Scores of humans v.s. machines per task type. (m) indicates machine and (h) indicates human written texts. This is followed by the writing task type along the x-axis labels to indicate the different tasks.