

CENSORING WITH PLAUSIBLE DENIABILITY: ASYMMETRIC LOCAL PRIVACY FOR MULTI-CATEGORY CDF ESTIMATION

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ABSTRACT

We introduce a new mechanism within the Utility-Optimized Local Differential Privacy (ULDP) framework that enables censoring with plausible deniability when collecting and analyzing sensitive data. Our approach addresses scenarios where certain values, such as large numerical responses, are more privacy-sensitive than others, while accompanying categorical information may not be private on its own but could still be identifying. The mechanism selectively withholds identifying details when a response might indicate sensitive content, offering asymmetric privacy protection. Unlike previous methods, it avoids the need to predefine which values are sensitive, making it more adaptable and practical. Although the mechanism is designed for ULDP, it can also be applied under symmetric LDP settings, where it still benefits from censoring and reduced privacy cost. We provide theoretical guarantees, including uniform consistency and pointwise weak convergence results. Extensive numerical experiments demonstrate the validity of developed methodologies.

1 INTRODUCTION

Although crowd-sourced data aggregation has led to impressive large-scale telemetry-driven services, such as Google Maps and Apple’s predictive keyboard, collecting statistics from personal data while preserving individual privacy remains a fundamental challenge in the age of big data. Differential Privacy (DP) (Dwork et al., 2006a), has become the prevailing standard for privacy-preserving analysis recognized by its notable deployments in the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2020 Census (Hotz & Salvo, 2022; Abowd & Hawes, 2023). Although DP (or central-DP for contrast), controls the leakage of privacy at publication, it is vulnerable towards curator side breaches (see Ayyagari (2012); Quach et al. (2022); Lee (2022); Khan et al. (2022); Hantke et al. (2024) for such incidents and studies). Such events call for protection that is closer to its source, the protocol of data collection. Local Differential Privacy (LDP) (Duchi et al., 2013) has emerged as a powerful alternative. By removing the need for a trusted curator, LDP allows users to locally randomize their responses, ensuring that even the data collector cannot infer sensitive information with high confidence. LDP protocols have been widely adopted for collecting privatized data, including major companies like Tiktok (TikTok Engineering, 2023), Google (Erlingsson et al., 2014) and Microsoft (Ding et al., 2017).

While LDP offers robust privacy guarantees, it inherently imposes a non-negligible utility loss, even under optimal conditions (Steinberger, 2024). This trade-off is already evident in the basic task of frequency estimation (Wang et al., 2017). The situation is exacerbated when multiple attributes are collected (Liu et al., 2023; Arcolezi et al., 2023): either by combining the attributes into a high-dimensional domain, which increases the complexity and potential error, or by splitting the privacy budget among attributes, leading to reduced accuracy for each. Both approaches have been shown to significantly degrade estimation accuracy in such settings. Considering this, it is natural to ask whether we must pay for all aspects of privacy equally—or whether we can instead choose what to protect. We begin by observing that sensitivity is often asymmetric in numerical attributes. For instance, high income may be considered sensitive due to tax or benefit implications, while low income is less concerning. Similarly, high debt or frequent insurance claims may reveal undesirable traits, whereas low values are relatively innocuous. In other domains, the opposite is true—such as GPA, where low values are more embarrassing or private. At the same time, many real-world surveys

054 also include categorical demographic attributes such as nationality, gender, or postal code to support
 055 fairness, subgroup analysis, or other stratified inference tasks. Naively applying LDP to such data
 056 requires protecting every attribute equally, effectively treating nonsensitive fields as if they are just as
 057 sensitive. [Related relaxations under LDP show that substantial utility gains are possible, as in the](#)
 058 [semi-feature LDP framework for nonparametric regression with public features](#) Ma et al. (2025), but
 059 [attributes that are not sensitive on their own can act as quasi-identifiers](#) (Borrero-Foncubierta et al.,
 060 2025; Wong et al., 2019). This is especially true for continuous nonsensitive variables (e.g., precise
 061 income or debt), which may be nearly unique and thus indirectly revealing. Adding noise uniformly
 062 wastes privacy budget or discourages truthful reporting when users are unwilling to disclose sensitive
 063 data with identifiers. One solution is defining a fixed sensitive region (Murakami & Kawamoto,
 064 2019): define a region of sensitivity and allow disclosure of values outside. But such regions can be
 065 arbitrary, vary across individuals, and shift over time. In contrast, the direction of sensitivity tends to
 066 be more stable—for example, it is much more likely that higher debt is sensitive than low.

067 1.1 RELATED WORKS

069 Without the constraint of DP, empirical cumulative distribution functions can already be close to
 070 the underlying truth; such studies may date back to Komlós et al. (1975). On the central model,
 071 where a trusted curator has access to raw data, various mechanisms have been proposed for accurate
 072 distribution estimation. Barber & Duchi (2014) demonstrated that histogram estimators are optimal
 073 for Lipschitz distributions under the L_2 risk in the presence of differential privacy constraints. Later,
 074 Lalanne et al. (2023) extended this work by analyzing the cost of central privacy in estimating the
 075 density of densities in the Lipschitz and Sobolev spaces. [Beyond distributional functionals, versatile](#)
 076 [central mechanisms based on data-level perturbations—such as the zero-inflated multivariate Laplace](#)
 077 [mechanism for general M-estimation proposed by Lu et al. \(2025\)](#), illustrating how carefully designed
 078 noise distributions can support a broad class of privacy guarantees.

079 In the context of LDP, the estimation of distributions over continuous domains presents unique
 080 challenges. For discrete domains, frequency oracle mechanisms such as RAPPOR (Erlingsson et al.,
 081 2014) and Hadamard Response (Acharya et al., 2019) have been developed. These methods can be
 082 extended to continuous data through discretizations, but this approach may compromise the inherent
 083 structure of the continuous domain. To better preserve the characteristics of continuous data, several
 084 LDP perturbation techniques have been proposed. These include the direct application of the Laplace
 085 mechanism (Dwork et al., 2006b), the piecewise mechanism (Wang et al., 2019), its refinement for
 086 improved utility (Li et al., 2020), and more recently, a binary response-based approach (Liu et al.,
 087 2024). These methods aim to balance the trade-off between privacy and accuracy, particularly under
 088 the constraints of limited information channels inherent to LDP.

089 The concept of Utility-Optimized Local Differential Privacy (ULDP) was introduced in Murakami &
 090 Kawamoto (2019), initially for frequency estimation via modified randomized response and RAPPOR-
 091 style mechanisms. This framework aims to enhance utility by allowing users to specify sensitive
 092 regions, thereby relaxing the privacy constraints on non-sensitive data. Subsequent work (Zhang et al.,
 093 2024) has extended ULDP to the (ϵ, δ) setting, with a refined control on privacy leakage, and Zhang
 094 et al. (2024) proposed mean estimation techniques for numerical data in the same framework, allowing
 095 robust private aggregation of continuous values. To the best of our knowledge, however, there has
 096 been no prior work addressing the estimation of distribution of a continuous variable—whether
 097 standalone or paired with a categorical demographic attribute—under utility-optimized LDP.

098 1.2 OUTLINE

099 We begin by reviewing the relevant definitions and background on CDF estimation and differential
 100 privacy frameworks. This is followed by a description of our data collection procedure, which
 101 employs a deterministic preprocessing step that maps the original secret information to a binary
 102 response—similar in spirit to Liu et al. (2024), but without introducing random perturbation at this
 103 stage. The resulting binary response is then processed through a randomized ULDP mechanism. This
 104 two-step design avoids the need to predefine a sensitive region and instead only specifies the direction
 105 of sensitivity (e.g., larger values are considered sensitive).
 106

107 Next, we construct an estimator based on the privatized binary data. A key observation is that the
 privacy mechanism and the statistical estimation procedure can be cleanly separated by adopting

an alternative interpretation of the randomized response: it can be viewed as a truthful response from a transformed variable, akin to techniques in Liu et al. (2024) and conceptually similar to data encountered in competing risks settings in medical statistics. Building on this insight, we develop a maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) by discretizing the data and solving a bound-constrained optimization problem, resulting in an estimator with a data-driven support.

We establish the L_2 - and L_∞ - uniform consistency of the ULDP CDF estimator under a general privacy mechanism, with convergence rates of $\mathcal{O}_p(n^{-1/3})$, $\mathcal{O}_p(n^{-1/3} \log n)$ respectively. Furthermore, we derive pointwise weak convergence results at interior points. These findings are consistent with the results obtained for the case $K = 1$ under the LDP mechanism studied in Liu et al. (2024), which rely on the Chernoff distribution properties described in Groeneboom (1989). Building on the ULDP CDF estimator, we also demonstrate how to construct consistent estimators for the predictive probabilities of categorical outcomes, conditioned on a given range of sensitive features. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to establish these asymptotic properties for ULDP CDF estimation and its application to multi-category prediction.

Finally, we discuss the implementation details of the algorithm and validate the effectiveness of our proposed protocol through numerical experiments, demonstrating its practical utility and accuracy in estimating the CDF under the ULDP framework.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the background on differential privacy frameworks. Section 3 describes the problem setting and methodology. Section 4 establishes the asymptotic properties of the proposed estimator, and Section 5 investigates its finite sample performance. Additional discussions, simulation results and all technical proofs are provided in the Appendix.

2 PRELIMINARIES

2.1 DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY: CENTRAL AND LOCAL MODELS

Differential Privacy (DP) provides a rigorous framework for protecting individual information in data analysis. At its core, DP ensures that the output of a computation remains statistically indistinguishable whether or not any one individual’s data is included. This protects against inference attacks, even by adversaries with substantial auxiliary knowledge.

Definition 1 (Dwork et al., 2006a) A randomized mechanism \mathcal{A} is (ϵ, δ) -differentially private if, for all datasets S, S' differing on a single individual’s data and all measurable subsets E of outputs,

$$\mathbb{P}[\mathcal{A}(S) \in E] \leq e^\epsilon \mathbb{P}[\mathcal{A}(S') \in E] + \delta.$$

In the central DP (CDP) model, this guarantee is enforced by a trusted data curator who aggregates the dataset and injects noise into the final output. While CDP typically yields high utility, it assumes users trust the curator with their raw data.

In contrast, the local models remove the need for trust: each user independently applies a randomization mechanism to their data before sharing it. The formal definition is as follows:

Definition 2 (Joseph et al., 2019) A randomized mechanism $R : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$ satisfies (ϵ, δ) -LDP if, for all inputs $x, x' \in \mathcal{X}$ and measurable subsets $S \subseteq \mathcal{Y}$,

$$\mathbb{P}[R(x) \in S] \leq e^\epsilon \mathbb{P}[R(x') \in S] + \delta.$$

In LDP, each user has full control over their privacy, and no trusted aggregator is required. However, the noise introduced at the individual level often imposes a high utility cost—particularly when estimating fine-grained statistics or when multiple attributes must be protected.

2.2 UTILITY-OPTIMIZED LOCAL DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY

To mitigate the utility degradation under LDP, utility-optimized local differential privacy (ULDP) was proposed, initially for categorical distribution estimation (Murakami & Kawamoto, 2019). ULDP

provides strong privacy guarantees only over a predefined sensitive region of the input domain while allowing exact outputs for the non-sensitive region when it does not risk user privacy. The formal definition is as follows:

Definition 3 (Murakami & Kawamoto, 2019) A randomized mechanism $\mathbf{Q} : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$ satisfies $(\mathcal{X}_S, \mathcal{Y}_P, \epsilon)$ -ULDP if:

1. For any $y \in \mathcal{Y}_I := \mathcal{Y} \setminus \mathcal{Y}_P$, there exists $x \in \mathcal{X}_N := \mathcal{X} \setminus \mathcal{X}_S$ such that

$$\mathbf{Q}(y | x) > 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \mathbf{Q}(y | x') = 0 \text{ for all } x' \neq x.$$

2. For any $x, x' \in \mathcal{X}$ and any $y \in \mathcal{Y}_P$, $\mathbf{Q}(y | x) \leq e^\epsilon \mathbf{Q}(y | x')$.

This definition is slightly generalized in Zhang et al. (2024) to allow a continuous output space \mathcal{Y} and relaxed probabilistic guarantees. However, we adopt the original discrete formulation, as these generalizations are not relevant to our setting.

In this definition, \mathcal{X}_S denotes the sensitive subset of the input domain, and \mathcal{Y}_P represents the subset of outputs over which DP-style indistinguishability is enforced. For convenience, we refer to \mathcal{X}_S , $\mathcal{X}_N = \mathcal{X} \setminus \mathcal{X}_S$, \mathcal{Y}_P , and $\mathcal{Y}_I = \mathcal{Y} \setminus \mathcal{Y}_P$ as sensitive inputs, safe inputs, sensitive outputs, and safe outputs, respectively.

Notably, sensitive inputs never produce safe outputs. This design choice not only simplifies analysis and improves utility but also adds a safety guarantee because mapping to a safe but rare output may reveal it was perturbed from a sensitive input. Therefore, sensitive inputs always map to sensitive outputs, and perturbation occurs entirely within the sensitive output space (except in the degenerate case where there is only one sensitive output, in which case no perturbation is needed). Meanwhile, safe inputs may be mapped either to sensitive or safe outputs to provide plausible deniability for sensitive inputs.

3 METHODOLOGY

3.1 PROBLEM FORMULATION

We consider a population of n users, each holding a data pair (X, Y) drawn i.i.d. from an unknown joint distribution over $[0, 1] \times \{1, \dots, K\}$. Here, X is a numerical variable that may be sensitive, Y is a categorical variable that typically represents demographic information and K is the number of categories. Without loss of generality, we assume $X \in [0, 1]$, with larger values of X corresponding to increasingly sensitive information. In the mean time, our privacy goal follows the ULDP framework: any output that reveals or suggests that a user holds a larger value of X must be protected by standard ϵ -indistinguishability. That is, for any two inputs differing in X their corresponding output distributions must remain within a multiplicative factor of e^ϵ for any sensitive output.

The utility goal is to estimate the joint distribution function $F_{0k}(t) = \mathbb{P}(X \leq t, Y = k)$ for each category $k = 1, \dots, K$, which describes the cumulative distribution of X conditioned on the categorical label. Estimation quality may be measured under various norms; in this work, we focus on the L_∞ norm as a canonical metric for evaluating the maximum estimation error across the domain.

3.2 ULDP DATA COLLECTION

Unlike the CDP setting where raw data is collected and perturbed by a trusted aggregator, the design of the data collection procedure is crucial in the local setting. This is particularly challenging for continuous variables, where existing LDP or ULDP mechanisms such as additive noise (e.g., Laplace mechanism) or square wave encoding introduce large variance and often produce values outside the support, making recovery difficult (Fan, 1992).

In addition, direct application of ULDP requires the predefined specification of a sensitive region in \mathcal{X} , as done in Zhang et al. (2024). This requirement is at odds with the practical observation that sensitivity boundaries are difficult to determine and may vary over time. Predefining such regions rigidly may lead to inconsistent protection.

Motivated by recent works (Liu et al., 2024; Nikita & Steinberger, 2025), we adopt a binary encoding that bypasses the need for specifying a sensitive subset of \mathcal{X} and improves estimation accuracy. In particular, each user is issued a threshold t_i , sampled from a random variable T with a predetermined distribution G over $[0, 1]$ (e.g., the uniform distribution). The user then compares their private value x_i with the threshold t_i and computes the binary indicator $\mathbf{1}_{x_i > t_i}$.

This comparison serves two purposes. First, the bit $\mathbf{1}_{x_i > t_i}$ is a function of x_i and thus not more sensitive than x_i itself—it can be computed from x_i but not vice versa. Second, it introduces an asymmetry in sensitivity: reporting $\mathbf{1}_{x_i > t_i} = 1$ suggests that x_i may be large and therefore sensitive, while $\mathbf{1}_{x_i > t_i} = 0$ does not indicate sensitive information and can be treated as non-sensitive while, eliminating the need to predefine a fixed sensitive zone in \mathcal{X} .

This structure also aligns well with the objectives of ULDP. Naively, after preprocessing with threshold comparison and combining with the categorical label Y , each user produces one of $2K$ possible outcomes—pairs $(\mathbf{1}_{x_i > t_i}, y_i)$, which we denote as $\mathcal{X} = \{0, 1\} \times \{1, \dots, K\}$. Among these, half—those $\mathcal{X}_S = \{(1, y) | y \in \{1, \dots, K\}\}$ —are considered sensitive.

A standard LDP random response mechanism $\mathcal{A} : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{X}$ would be costly in terms of utility. The probability of returning the true value is

$$P(\mathcal{A}(x) = x) = \frac{e^\epsilon}{e^\epsilon + 2K - 1}.$$

For example, when $K = 4$ and $\epsilon = 1$, this results in a truthful response probability of less than 28%, with the remaining probability spread uniformly across the other $2K - 1 = 7$ outputs.

A direct application of the utility-optimized randomized response mechanism under ULDP (Murakami & Kawamoto (2019), Definition 3) yields truthful reporting probabilities of approximately 47% for sensitive outputs and around 30% for safe outputs under the same parameters (see F for details).¹ While these rates represent an improvement over standard LDP, they remain suboptimal.

To serve the dual purposes of utility and privacy, we propose suppressing the report of Y for sensitive outputs entirely as follows:

Definition 4 (Asymmetrically Censored Randomized Response (ACRR):) *Given a privacy budget $\epsilon > 0$, define the output domain using one-hot encoding vectors as $\mathcal{E} = \{e_1, e_2, \dots, e_K, e_{K+1}\} \subset \{0, 1\}^{K+1}$, where each e_i is the one-hot vector with a 1 at the i -th position and 0 elsewhere.*

The ACRR mechanism $\mathcal{M} : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{E}$ is defined as follows:

$$\mathcal{M}((0, k)) = \begin{cases} e_k & \text{with probability } 1 - e^{-\epsilon}, \\ e_{K+1} & \text{with probability } e^{-\epsilon}, \end{cases} \quad \text{for } k = 1, \dots, K,$$

and $\mathcal{M}((1, k)) = e_{K+1}$, for $k = 1, \dots, K$.

As a special case of the utility-optimized randomized response mechanism (Murakami & Kawamoto, 2019), this approach provides $(\mathcal{X}_N, \{e_{K+1}\}, \epsilon)$ -ULDP. Numerically, for $\epsilon = 1$ and $K = 4$, the probability of truthful reporting is over 63% for safe inputs and exactly 100% for sensitive inputs. Notably, these probabilities remain independent of K due to censoring, which further improves utility by eliminating the need for perturbation in the degenerate case of a singleton sensitive output set. To better illustrate the ACRR mechanism, we present a schematic diagram in Figure 1, and the full mechanism is provided in Appendix B.

Remark 1 *An additional advantage of this approach is conditional censoring: if the output indicates that the numerical response is potentially sensitive ($x > t$), the mechanism suppresses disclosure of the accompanying categorical identifier Y . This conditional suppression reduces re-identification risks, enhancing privacy even further beyond the basic ULDP guarantees. See Appendix A for a real world example of a such survey.*

Remark 2 *The ULDP guarantee applies to the derived space of \mathcal{X} and \mathcal{E} . Due to the first condition in the original ULDP definition (Definition 1), a mapping from a continuous domain to a discrete*

¹Safe inputs are less likely to be truthfully reported because they must be perturbed to provide plausible deniability for sensitive inputs.




Figure 1: Schematic diagram for ACRR mechanism

domain is not compatible with this requirement. Instead, we protect a coarsened representation that is sufficient for estimation and inherently less informative as an image of the original data. As with any mechanism under a local DP framework, the guarantee is fully disclosed to users to support informed decision-making.

3.3 RECOVERING THE DISTRIBUTION FROM THE ULDP DATA VIEW

The ACRR provides an ULDP view of the data in the formation of one hot vectors of length $K + 1$. Next, we consider how to recover the original distribution from it.

To intuitively understand how recovery remains possible even under censoring mechanisms, let us temporarily remove randomness by setting $\epsilon = +\infty$. In this case, all indicator functions are true and all labels about Y are true or missing.

Observe that for any threshold $u < 1$, the joint cumulative distribution function $F_{0k}(u) = \mathbb{P}(X \leq u, Y = k)$ can be estimated without requiring any information from the part of $X > u$.

Precisely, suppose that before applying the LDP mechanism, the data collected from user i is summarized by

$$\Delta_i = (\Delta_{i,k}, 1 \leq k \leq K + 1) = (\mathbf{1}_{x_i \leq t_i, y_i=1}, \dots, \mathbf{1}_{x_i \leq t_i, y_i=K}, \mathbf{1}_{x_i > t_i}),$$

where x_i is the continuous variable and $y_i \in \{1, \dots, K\}$ is the categorical label.

Based on the observed data $\{\Delta_i\}_{i=1}^n$, we consider the following log-likelihood function for the distribution $\mathbf{F} = (F_{0k}, F_{1k}, \dots, F_{0K})$ and $F_+ = \sum_{k=1}^K F_{0k}$:

$$\ell(\mathbf{F}) = \sum_{i=1}^n \left(\sum_{k=1}^K \Delta_{i,k} \log F_{0k}(t_i) + \Delta_{i,K+1} \log(1 - F_+(t_i)) \right). \quad (1)$$

The estimation of each cumulative distribution function (CDF) F_{0k} is obtained simultaneously by maximizing the log-likelihood function equation 1, subject to monotonicity constraints. Notice that each distribution F_{0k} can be estimated individually using only the data $\{\Delta_{i,k}\}_{i=1}^n$, by maximizing the log-likelihood function

$$\ell(F_{0k}) = \sum_{i=1}^n (\Delta_{i,k} \log F_{0k}(t_i) + (1 - \Delta_{i,k}) \log(1 - F_{0k}(t_i))). \quad (2)$$

However, this approach neglects the dependence structures among the distributions F_{0k} . Additionally, it is less efficient due to ignoring information contained in $\Delta_{i,K+1}$ (Maathuis & Hudgens, 2011).

This form of shape-constrained minimization surprisingly coincides with survival-censored data. In Hudgens et al. (2001), an Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm was proposed that transforms the MLE for truncated competing-risks data into an EM problem on the unknown interval-and-type allocations. Later an Iterative Convex Minorant (ICM) algorithm (Groeneboom & Jongbloed, 2014) was derived with more computational efficiency, which we will later adopt for experiments.

Remark 3 *The idea of the ICM algorithm is to approximate the loss function using a weighted sum of squares and then perform iterative optimization by computing the left derivative of the convex minorant over a collection of points. Detailed descriptions of the algorithm can be found in Section 7.3 of Groeneboom & Jongbloed (2014) and we give a brief introduction in Appendix D. Notably, the minimization of (1) leads to a step function on t_i since the value elsewhere is irrelevant to the likelihood.*

Surprisingly, setting $\epsilon < \infty$ does not significantly complicate the recovery process.

After applying the LDP mechanism \mathcal{M} , we observe a perturbed indicator, which can be equivalently viewed as a sample from a new random variable (X^*, Y^*) drawn from a distribution distorted by the mechanism. Accordingly, we define the transformed indicator

$$\Delta_i^* = (\mathbf{1}_{x_i^* \leq t_i, y_i^* = 1}, \dots, \mathbf{1}_{x_i^* \leq t_i, y_i^* = K}, \mathbf{1}_{x_i^* > t_i}),$$

as if the perturbed data were generated truthfully from (X^*, Y^*) . Let

$$F_{0k}^*(t) = \mathbb{P}(X^* \leq t, Y^* = k), \quad \text{for } k = 1, \dots, K,$$

and define the CDF vector under this distorted distribution as

$$\mathbf{F}^*(t) = (F_{01}^*(t), \dots, F_{0K}^*(t)), \quad F_+^*(t) = \sum_{k=1}^K \mathbb{P}(X^* \leq t, Y^* = k)$$

In this formulation, the observed empirical estimates $\hat{\mathbf{F}}^*(t)$ can be computed from the data $\mathcal{E}(\Delta_i)$, and the original target CDF vector $\mathbf{F}(t)$ can be recovered by inverting the distortion introduced by the mechanism, which is where we pay the price of random perturbation, as the variance will be inflated in this procedure. We will quantify that in the next section. The complete procedure is summarized in the following algorithm.

Algorithm 1 Estimation (server-side recovery of F_{0k} from ACRR data)

Inputs: Collected reports $\{(t_i, a_i)\}_{i=1}^n$ with $a_i \in \{e_1, \dots, e_K, e_{K+1}\}$. Parameters K (categories) and $\epsilon > 0$ (privacy budget).

Outputs: Step-function estimators $\{\hat{F}_{0k}^*(t)\}_{k=1}^K; \hat{F}_+(t) = \sum_{k=1}^K \hat{F}_{0k}^*(t)$.

Procedure:

1. **Fit the distorted sub-CDFs.** Treat ACRR outputs as current-status competing risks; estimate nondecreasing step functions $\{\hat{F}_{0k}^*(t)\}_{k=1}^K$ on the thresholds using a monotone method (e.g., likelihood/ICM), and set $\hat{F}_+^*(t) = \sum_{k=1}^K \hat{F}_{0k}^*(t)$.
2. **Reverse DP.** Using $F_{0k}^*(t) = (1 - e^{-\epsilon})F_{0k}(t)$, set

$$\hat{F}_{0k}(t) \leftarrow \frac{\hat{F}_{0k}^*(t)}{1 - e^{-\epsilon}}, \quad \hat{F}_+(t) \leftarrow \sum_{k=1}^K \hat{F}_{0k}(t).$$

3. **Postprocess (total-CDF capping).** Cap the total CDF at 1 and freeze all sub-CDFs thereafter: $t^\dagger \leftarrow \inf\{t : \hat{F}_+(t) \geq 1\}$ (set $t^\dagger = +\infty$ if empty), and for all k ,

$$\hat{F}_{0k}(t) \leftarrow \hat{F}_{0k}(t)\mathbf{1}_{t \leq t^\dagger} + \hat{F}_{0k}(t^\dagger)\mathbf{1}_{t > t^\dagger}, \quad \hat{F}_+(t) \leftarrow \min\{\hat{F}_+(t), 1\}.$$

4 ASYMPTOTIC PROPERTIES

Beyond the ACRR mechanism, we prove the theoretical results on a broader family of censored perturbation mechanisms, including the mechanism in Liu et al. (2024), an LDP variant of ACRR (see Appendix F), which also benefits from the censoring. First, we define the censor map.

Definition 5 (Censor map) *The censor map $\mathcal{C} : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{E}$, where $(0, k)$ is mapped to e_k for $k = 1, \dots, K$, and all other values are mapped to e_{K+1} .*

Then, any randomized mapping from \mathcal{E} to \mathcal{E} can be represented by a $(K + 1) \times (K + 1)$ transition matrix \mathcal{L} , where $\mathcal{L}_{i,j}$ denotes the probability that e_i is mapped to e_j . Let $\mathcal{W}_{\mathcal{L}}$ denote the randomization mechanism induced by \mathcal{L} . Then, the ACRR mechanism can be expressed as the composition of $\mathcal{W}_{\mathcal{L}}$ and the censoring map \mathcal{C} , where \mathcal{L} is defined as follows:

$$\begin{bmatrix} (1 - e^{-\epsilon})I_K & e^{-\epsilon} \cdot \mathbf{1}_K \\ \mathbf{0}_{1 \times K} & 1 \end{bmatrix}.$$

Remark 4 *It is worth noting that the relationship between the true distribution $\mathbf{F}(t)$ and the observed distribution $\mathbf{F}^*(t)$ is $\mathbf{F}^*(t) = \mathcal{L} \cdot \mathbf{F}(t)$, and recovery amounts to computing $\mathbf{F}(t) = \mathcal{L}^{-1} \mathbf{F}^*(t)$, provided \mathcal{L} is invertible. This framework accommodates a broad class of mechanisms beyond simple randomized response and allows for principled estimation under LDP with finite ϵ .*

While it may appear natural to extend existing uniform consistency results for current-status data, this is nontrivial in our setting. The ULDP mechanism introduces additional non-differentiable points-privacy-induced artifacts that violate the smoothness assumptions underlying classical analyses. To handle this, we first establish key local properties of the estimator on neighborhoods that avoid these irregularities. We then use compactness, via the Heine–Borel theorem, to lift these local bounds to uniform control over the full interval. Thus, the consistency result for our ULDP estimator is not a direct corollary of existing current-status theory but requires a tailored argument.

Before we the main results, we introduce the $L_{p,G}$ consistency with the corresponding $L_{p,G}$ norm.

Definition 6 ($L_{p,G}$ consistency) *For a K -dimensional function $\mathbf{F}(t)$ and a distribution function G , the $L_{p,G}$ norm is $\|\mathbf{F}(t)\|_{p,G}^p = \sum_{k=1}^K \int |F_k(t)|^p dG(t)$. When the distribution G admits a density function g supported on $[0, 1]$, the consistency reduces to the standard L_p consistency with the L_p norm $\|\mathbf{F}(t)\|_p^p = \sum_{k=1}^K \int |F_k(t)|^p dt$.*

Theorem 1 *Recalling $T \sim G$ for distribution function G over $[0, 1]$ and when T is independent of (X, Y) , one has*

$$\|\mathbf{F}(t) - \hat{\mathbf{F}}(t)\|_{1,G} = \mathcal{O}_p(\|\mathcal{L}^{-1}\|_{\infty} n^{-1/3}), \|\mathbf{F}(t) - \hat{\mathbf{F}}(t)\|_{2,G} = \mathcal{O}_p(\lambda_{\min}^{-1}(\mathcal{L}) n^{-1/3}),$$

where $\lambda_{\min}(A)$ is the minimum eigenvalue of A .

Further, if G and F_{0k} , $k = 1, \dots, K$ have positive density function g and f_{0k} on $[0, 1]$, then,

$$\sup_{t \in [0,1]} \|\mathbf{F}(t) - \hat{\mathbf{F}}(t)\|_{\infty} = \mathcal{O}_p(\|\mathcal{L}^{-1}\|_{\infty} n^{-1/3} \log^{1/3} n).$$

The convergence rates for both L_p and uniform consistency are in line with those of typical shape-constrained estimators, and they also align with the special case when $K = 1$ studied in Liu et al. (2024). For the ACRR algorithm $\lambda_{\min}^{-1}(\mathcal{L}) = 1/(1 - e^{-\epsilon})$, which coincides with the reciprocal probability of truthful response of safe inputs.

Next, we establish the point-wise weak convergence result of $\hat{\mathbf{F}}(t)$, which cannot be improved to simultaneous results on $[0, 1]$ due to nontightness, as explained in Huang & Wellner (1997).

Theorem 2 *For $t_0 \in (0, 1)$, if $G(t_0)$ and $F_{0k}(t_0)$, $k = 1, \dots, K$, are continuously differentiable at t_0 with positive derivatives $g(t_0)$ and $f_{0k}(t_0)$, one has that*

$$n^{1/3}(\mathbf{F}(t_0) - \hat{\mathbf{F}}(t_0)) \xrightarrow{d} \mathcal{L}^{-1} \mathcal{F}_{t_0}(0),$$

where the random variable $\mathcal{F}_{t_0}(0)$ is defined in Appendix C.2 due to the space limitations.

Remark 5 *Notably, when $K = 1$ and one applies the privacy mechanism in Liu et al. (2024), the point-wise asymptotic distribution $\mathcal{L}^{-1}\mathcal{F}(0)$ will degenerate to*

$$\frac{\left\{4 \left(rF_+(t_0) + \frac{1-r}{2}\right) \left(\frac{1+r}{2} - rF_+(t_0)\right) f(t_0)\right\}^{1/3} \arg \max_{t \in \mathbb{R}} \{W(t) - t^2\}}{(r^2g(t_0))^{1/3}},$$

which is consistent with results in Liu et al. (2024). We establish the details in Appendix C.2.

For the prediction probability over a range of X , it is worth noting that for any $0 < t_0 < t_1 < 1$ and $k = 1, \dots, K$, the conditional probability is given by

$$h_k(t_0, t_1) := \mathbb{P}(Y = k \mid t_0 < X \leq t_1) = \frac{\mathbb{P}(Y = k, t_0 < X \leq t_1)}{\mathbb{P}(t_0 < X \leq t_1)} = \frac{F_{0k}(t_1) - F_{0k}(t_0)}{F_+(t_1) - F_+(t_0)}.$$

Therefore, the conditional probability $h_k(t_0, t_1)$ can be estimated via $\widehat{\mathbf{F}}(t_0)$ and $\widehat{\mathbf{F}}(t_1)$:

$$\widehat{h}_k(t_0, t_1) = \frac{\widehat{F}_{0k}(t_1) - \widehat{F}_{0k}(t_0)}{\widehat{F}_+(t_1) - \widehat{F}_+(t_0)}.$$

The asymptotic properties of $\widehat{h}_k(t_0, t_1)$ follow from Theorems 1 and 2.

Theorem 3 *Let $0 < t_0 < t_1 < 1$. Suppose that $G(t_0)$, $G(t_1)$, and $F_{0k}(t_0)$, $F_{0k}(t_1)$ for $k = 1, \dots, K$ are continuously differentiable at t_0 and t_1 with positive derivatives $g(t_0)$, $g(t_1)$, $f_{0k}(t_0)$, and $f_{0k}(t_1)$, respectively. Then,*

$$\begin{aligned} \|\mathbf{h}(t_0, t_1) - \widehat{\mathbf{h}}(t_0, t_1)\|_\infty &= \mathcal{O}_p\left(\|\mathcal{L}^{-1}\|_\infty n^{-1/3} \log^{1/3} n\right), \\ n^{1/3} \left(\mathbf{h}(t_0, t_1) - \widehat{\mathbf{h}}(t_0, t_1)\right) &\xrightarrow{d} \frac{\mathcal{L}^{-1}\mathcal{F}_{t_1}(0) - \mathcal{L}^{-1}\mathcal{F}_{t_0}(0)}{\|\mathcal{L}^{-1}\mathcal{F}_{t_1}(0) - \mathcal{L}^{-1}\mathcal{F}_{t_0}(0)\|_+}, \end{aligned}$$

where $\mathbf{h}(t_0, t_1) = \{h_k(t_0, t_1)\}_{k=1}^K$, $\widehat{\mathbf{h}}(t_0, t_1) = \{\widehat{h}_k(t_0, t_1)\}_{k=1}^K$, and $\|\mathbf{b}\|_+ := \sum_{k=1}^K b_k$ for a K -dimensional vector \mathbf{b} .

At the boundary $t_0 = 0$, we define $\widehat{\mathbf{F}}(t_0) = 0$, ensuring the estimator is well-defined on the full interval $[0, 1]$. The conclusions of Theorem 3 remain valid at $t_0 = 0$. However, at $t_1 = 1$, while consistency still holds, the weak convergence result no longer applies due to the non-differentiable behavior introduced by the ULDP mechanism at the boundary.

Remark 6 *These boundary cases enable estimation of both $\mathbb{P}(Y = k \mid X \leq u)$ and $\mathbb{P}(Y = k \mid X > u)$. The latter is particularly interesting for applications involving censored sensitive regions, as it allows us to estimate the demographic distribution within those zones. However, the estimation quality for $\mathbb{P}(Y = k \mid X > u)$ is generally worse than that for $\mathbb{P}(Y = k \mid X \leq u)$, due to reduced label information and the need to estimate $F_{0k}(1)$ (whereas $F_{0k}(0) = 0$ is known by definition).*

5 IMPLEMENTATION AND EXPERIMENTS

While theoretical guarantees for our estimator have been established, we introduce several practical implementation strategies that further improve empirical performance.

First, the multi-category case introduces significant computational overhead. Computing the estimator for $n = 10^5$ samples can take about one minute, with runtime growing superlinearly in n (see Appendix E.1). This is consistent with the trend observed in the single-category setting (Liu et al., 2024), but with substantially larger constants. To address this, we adopt a divide-and-conquer strategy: we partition the dataset into M equally sized subsets, compute the estimator on each subset, and average the results. Empirically, we find that setting $M = 4$ both reduces computation time and slightly improves estimation accuracy.

Second, although the estimated CDFs are guaranteed to be non-decreasing and start at zero under the mechanism, randomness and the corrective division by the truthful reporting rate $1 - e^{-\epsilon}$ can cause the total estimated CDF to slightly exceed 1. While prior work such as Liu et al. (2024) proposes

486 retroactively capping the total CDF at 1, it is not straightforward to apply this constraint to each
 487 sub-CDF F_{0k} individually, since the true values $F_{0k}(1)$ (i.e., the marginal category proportions)
 488 are unknown. Empirically, we find that capping the total CDF at 1 and stopping the growth of all
 489 sub-CDFs beyond that point yields performance very close to an oracle that knows the true marginal
 490 proportions. Alternative adjustment rules are compared in Appendix E.2.

491 For the numerical evaluation, we consider the case $K = 4$, with the true joint CDFs $F_{0k}(x)$ defined
 492 as $0.2x$, $0.3x^{1/4}$, $0.3x^4$, and $0.2 \max(0, 3x - 2)$, respectively.

493 We examine privacy budgets $\epsilon \in \{1, 2, 3\}$, corresponding to strong to moderate privacy regimes. For
 494 context, Apple reportedly used $\epsilon = 2$ for sensitive health statistics and $\epsilon = 4$ for emoji usage (Apple,
 495 2020). Sample sizes n range from 10^3 to 10^6 , with 100 independent replications per setting. To
 496 eliminate cross-run correlations, experiments with different sample sizes are conducted independently.
 497 As the maximum likelihood estimator is not unique and interpolation may introduce bias, we retain
 498 the staircase form of the estimated CDFs for fair comparison.

499 Performance is evaluated using two metrics: the L_∞ error over $[0, 1]$, and the ℓ_∞ error in estimating
 500 $\mathbb{P}(Y = k, X < 1/2)$. The means and standard deviations are reported in Table 1. Notably, we can
 501 also estimate $\mathbb{P}(Y = k, X > 1/2)$, which corresponds to the distribution within the censored region.
 502 The corresponding numerical results are provided in the Appendix E.3.

503 As shown in Table 2, Appendix E.3, both the uniform consistency and prediction error improve
 504 steadily with increasing sample size, confirming the consistency of the estimator. Higher values of ϵ
 505 (weaker privacy) also lead to improved accuracy, as expected. Notably, the prediction error remains
 506 reasonably low even under strong privacy constraints ($\epsilon = 1$). We further investigate the relative error
 507 in Section E.4 and illustrate our method on real-world data in Section E.5.

508 6 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS

509 In this paper, we proposed a flexible ULDP mechanism that adaptively censors potentially sensitive
 510 responses without requiring a predefined sensitive region. This is achieved through (i) transforming
 511 and privatizing binary sensitivity indicators and (ii) applying a randomized-response step. Our
 512 two-stage design decouples privacy preservation from statistical estimation: the privatized data can
 513 be interpreted as truthful samples from a transformed variable, and the CDF estimator is computed
 514 via a bound-constrained discretized maximum-likelihood procedure.

515 We establish that the proposed estimator achieves L^2 - and sup-norm consistency at rates $\mathcal{O}_p(n^{-1/3})$
 516 and $\mathcal{O}_p(n^{-1/3} \log n)$, respectively, with pointwise weak convergence in the interior following the
 517 classical Chernoff limit distribution. These theoretical guarantees extend naturally to multi-category
 518 prediction under ULDP. Simulations confirm both the practical accuracy and computational viability
 519 of the approach across a range of settings, marking the first rigorous treatment of ULDP-based CDF
 520 estimation and prediction with provable asymptotic properties.

521 Despite these contributions, several limitations remain. First, the reconstruction of the distribution is
 522 based on a capping mechanism, which enforces a fixed upper bound on the estimated CDF. While
 523 effective, this approach may obscure the true distributional structure near the boundary. A potentially
 524 more informative direction would involve jointly estimating the CDF under the constraint, possibly
 525 leading to richer theoretical insights.

526 Although the proposed method is computationally efficient for small to moderate numbers of cate-
 527 gories, the complexity increases substantially with K . In particular, the runtime grows significantly
 528 compared to the $K = 1$ case, making the approach less practical for applications involving very
 529 large datasets (e.g., $n > 10^8$). Developing scalable algorithms or approximation techniques for
 530 high-throughput scenarios is thus a valuable avenue for future research.

531 Finally, like other nonparametric estimators under privacy constraints, it does not achieve the para-
 532 metric $\mathcal{O}_p(n^{-1/2})$ rate of the non-private empirical CDF. [There are some potential approaches to
 533 improve the cube-root rate estimator, such as smoothed estimator \(Groeneboom et al., 2010\) and
 534 the federated estimator \(Shi et al., 2018\).](#) We observe similar improvement via the later approach in
 535 Section E.1. Addressing these statistical limitations, while preserving ULDP guarantees, remains an
 536 important and challenging open problem.

540 REPRODUCIBILITY STATEMENT

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542 All numerical experiments and real-data analyses are fully reproducible via the code included in the
543 submitted anonymized supplementary materials.

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689 A A SAMPLE SURVEY BASED ON ACRR

692 Assuming that researchers aim to estimate how outstanding credit-card debt (X) is distributed across
693 universities (Y) while safeguarding respondents with high debt.

694 Disclosing a *high* debt level together with an identifying attribute (alma mater) raises privacy concerns.
695 We therefore treat “high debt” as the sensitive direction and design a survey that never reveals both
696 high debt and university simultaneously.
697

698 Survey protocol for each participant

- 700 1. Sample a personal threshold $T \sim G$ (for example, G uniform on $[0, \$25\,000]$).
- 701 2. Ask the participant to follow the random procedure below.

702 **Credit-Card Debt and Alma Mater Questionnaire**

- 703
- 704 1. **Your threshold:** $T = \$18\,000$.
- 705
- 706 2. **Flip a fair coin.**
- 707 Heads: mark **Yes** in Step 4 and skip Step 3.
- 708 Tails: continue to Step 3.
- 709
- 710 3. Compare your own debt x with T .
- 711 If $x > T$: mark **Yes**.
- 712 If $x \leq T$: tick the university you graduated from.
- 713
- 714 4. **Select exactly one option**
- 715 **Yes**
- 716 University A University B University C

717 This protocol offers plausible deniability that some low-debt participants output “Yes” solely because
718 the coin landed heads, so high-debt participants who also answer “Yes” are ϵ indistinguishable from
719 them ($\epsilon \approx 0.7$). Conditional disclosure ensures that only low-debt respondents with a tails outcome
720 and $x \leq T$ reveal their university. There is no joint leakage because the final response space contains
721 either “Yes” or one university label—never both.

722 Despite the heavy censoring of individual responses, the underlying distribution can still be accurately
723 reconstructed by applying the recovery procedure described in Section 3.3.

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B FULL MECHANISM OF ACRR

Algorithm 2 Perturbation (client-side ACRR reporting)

Inputs:

- Privacy parameter $\epsilon > 0$.
- Threshold distribution G on $[0, 1]$ (public).
- User’s private pair $(x_i, y_i) \in [0, 1] \times \{1, \dots, K\}$.

Output: A one-hot report $a_i \in \{e_1, \dots, e_K, e_{K+1}\}$ and the issued threshold t_i .

Procedure:

1. Draw $t_i \sim G$ (issued to user i).
2. Compute $b_i \leftarrow \mathbf{1}\{x_i > t_i\}$.
3. Apply ACRR:
 - If $b_i = 1$, set $a_i \leftarrow e_{K+1}$.
 - If $b_i = 0$, set

$$a_i \leftarrow \begin{cases} e_{y_i}, & \text{with probability } 1 - e^{-\epsilon}, \\ e_{K+1}, & \text{with probability } e^{-\epsilon}. \end{cases}$$

4. Send (t_i, a_i) to the aggregator.
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C PROOF OF MAIN RESULTS

C.1 PROOF OF THEOREM 1

Since $\mathbb{P}(\Delta_i | X_i, Y_i, T_i) = P(\Delta^* | X_i, Y_i, T_i)$, one can transform the CDF \mathbf{F} estimation with data Δ_i under LDP into CDF \mathbf{F}^* estimation with data Δ_i^* under non-DP. Using Δ_i^* to recover \mathbf{F}^* is a typical current status problem. Applying Theorem 4.1 and Collary 4.2 in Groeneboom et al. (2008a), one obtains the $L_{1,G}$ and $L_{2,G}$ consistency with order $n^{-1/3}$, i.e.,

$$\|\mathbf{F}^*(t) - \widehat{\mathbf{F}}^*(t)\|_{1,G} = \mathcal{O}_p(n^{-1/3}), \|\mathbf{F}^*(t) - \widehat{\mathbf{F}}(t)\|_{2,G} = \mathcal{O}_p(n^{-1/3}).$$

Based on the linear mapping between $(\mathbf{F}^*, \widehat{\mathbf{F}}^*)$ and $(\mathbf{F}, \widehat{\mathbf{F}})$, one has that

$$\|\mathbf{F}(t) - \widehat{\mathbf{F}}(t)\|_{1,G} = \mathcal{O}_p(\|\mathcal{L}^{-1}\|_{\infty} n^{-1/3}), \|\mathbf{F}(t) - \widehat{\mathbf{F}}(t)\|_{2,G} = \mathcal{O}_p(\lambda_{\min}^{-1}(\mathcal{L}) n^{-1/3}).$$

For uniform consistency, due to the CDF function \mathbf{F}^* is not absolutely continuous, it is not trivial to apply the existing results of current status problem. We will derive the local consistency on some interval first, and then combines this intervals to establishes the uniform consistency.

In detail, for $t_0 \in [0, 1]$, one denotes the interval $\mathcal{I}_{\omega}(t_0) = (t_0 - \omega, t_0 + \omega)$, if $F_+^*(t_0) > 0$, $\mathcal{I}_r(t_0) = (t_0, t_0 + \omega)$ if $F_+^*(t_0) = 0$, and $\mathcal{I}_r(t_0) = (t_0 - \omega, t_0)$ if $F_+^*(t_0) = 1$, for some $\omega > 0$. Notices that if $F_{0k}, k = 1, \dots, K$ have positive density function g and f_{0k} on $[0, \gamma]$, then F_{0k}^* 's are continuously differentiable at t_0 with positive and bounded away from zero derivatives in interval $\mathcal{I}_r(t_0)$ for any $t_0 \in [0, 1]$ and some $\omega > 0$. Therefore, according to Lemmas 4.1 and 4.4 of Malow (2021), one has that

$$\sup_{t \in \mathcal{I}_{\omega}(t_0)} \|\mathbf{F}^*(t) - \widehat{\mathbf{F}}^*(t)\|_{\infty} = \mathcal{O}_p(n^{-1/3} \log^{1/3} n).$$

Recalling that $[0, 1]$ is a compact set, we select a finite cover $\{\mathcal{I}_{\omega_j}(t_j)\}_{j=1}^d$ of the interval. Then we find that

$$\sup_{t \in [0, 1]} \|\mathbf{F}^*(t) - \widehat{\mathbf{F}}^*(t)\|_{\infty} = \max_{j \in \{1, \dots, d\}} \sup_{t \in \mathcal{I}_{\omega_j}(t_j)} \|\mathbf{F}^*(t) - \widehat{\mathbf{F}}^*(t)\|_{\infty} = \mathcal{O}_p(n^{-1/3} \log^{1/3} n).$$

Finally, Based on the linear mapping between $(\mathbf{F}^*, \widehat{\mathbf{F}}^*)$ and $(\mathbf{F}, \widehat{\mathbf{F}})$, one has that

$$\sup_{t \in [0, 1]} \|\mathbf{F}(t) - \widehat{\mathbf{F}}(t)\|_{\infty} = \mathcal{O}_p(\|\mathcal{L}^{-1}\|_{\infty} n^{-1/3} \log^{1/3} n).$$

C.2 PROOF OF THEOREM 2

To introduce our pointwise asymptotic results, we first define the distribution \mathcal{F}_{t_0}

Let $\mathbf{W} = (W_1, \dots, W_K)$ be a K -tuple of two-sided Brownian motion processes originating from zero, with mean zero and covariances

$$E\{W_j(t)W_k(s)\} = (|s| \wedge |t|)1\{st > 0\}\Sigma_{jk}, \quad s, t \in \mathbb{R}, j, k \in \{1, \dots, K\},$$

where

$$\Sigma_{jk} = g(t_0)^{-1} \{1\{j = k\}F_{0k}^*(t_0) - F_{0j}^*(t_0)F_{0k}^*(t_0)\}.$$

Moreover, $\mathbf{V}_{t_0} = (V_{1,t_0}, \dots, V_{K,t_0})$ is a vector of drifted Brownian motions, defined by

$$V_{k,t_0}(t) = W_k(t) + \frac{1}{2}f_{0k}^*(t_0)t^2, \quad k = 1, \dots, K$$

Similarly, let $V_{+,t_0} = \sum_{k=1}^K V_{k,t_0}, W_+ = \sum_{k=1}^K W_k$. Following Theorem 1.7 in Groeneboom et al. (2008b), for some $t_0 \in (0, 1)$, there exists an almost surely unique K -tuple $\widehat{\mathbf{H}}_{t_0} = (\widehat{H}_{1,t_0}, \dots, \widehat{H}_{K,t_0})$ of convex functions with right-continuous derivatives $\mathcal{F}_{t_0}(t) = (\mathcal{F}_{1,t_0}(t), \dots, \mathcal{F}_{K,t_0}(t))$ satisfying the following three conditions, where $a_{k,t_0} = (F_{0k}(t_0))^{-1}$, and $a_{K+1,t_0} = (1 - F_+(t_0))^{-1}$,

- 864 • $a_{k,t_0} \widehat{H}_{k,t_0}(t) + a_{K+1,t_0} \widehat{H}_{+,t_0}(t) \leq a_{k,t_0} V_{k,t_0}(t) + a_{K+1,t_0} V_{+,t_0}(t)$, for $k = 1, \dots, K, t \in$
865 \mathbb{R} .
- 866 • $\int \left\{ a_{k,t_0} \widehat{H}_{k,t_0}(t) + a_{K+1,t_0} \widehat{H}_{+,t_0}(t) - a_{k,t_0} V_{k,t_0}(t) - a_{K+1,t_0} V_{+,t_0}(t) \right\} d\widehat{F}_k(t) = 0$, $k =$
867 $1, \dots, K$.
- 868 • For all $M > 0$ and $k = 1, \dots, K$, there are points $\tau_{1k} < -M$ and $\tau_{2k} > M$ so that
869 $a_k \widehat{H}_{k,t_0}(t) + a_{K+1,t_0} \widehat{H}_{+,t_0}(t) = a_{k,t_0} V_{k,t_0}(t) + a_{K+1,t_0} V_{+,t_0}(t)$ for $t = \tau_{1k}$ and $t = \tau_{2k}$.
870
871

872 Similarly, for $t_0 \in (0, 1)$, if $F_{0k}(t_0), k = 1, \dots, K$, are continuously differentiable at t_0 with positive
873 derivatives $f_{0k}(t_0)$, then $F_{0k}^*(t_0), k = 1, \dots, K$, are continuously differentiable at t_0 with positive
874 derivatives $f_{0k}^*(t_0)$. One applies Theorem 1.8 of Groeneboom et al. (2008b), and obtains

$$875 n^{1/3}(\mathbf{F}^*(t_0) - \widehat{\mathbf{F}}^*(t_0)) \xrightarrow{d} \mathcal{F}_{t_0}(0).$$

876 Combined with continuous mapping theorem, the proof is completed.
877

878 If $K = 1$ and one applies the privacy mechanism in Liu et al. (2024), then one only needs to
879 estimate $F_+(t)$. Then relationship $\mathbf{F}^*(t) = \mathcal{L}\mathbf{F}(t)\mathbf{1}_{0 < t < 1} + \mathbf{1}_{t=1}$ will degenerate to $F_+^*(t) =$
880 $\{rF_+(t) + (1-r)/2\}_{0 < t < 1} + \mathbf{1}_{t=1}$ and $f_+^*(t) = rf_+(t)$. Hence,, the variance term Σ_{jk} of two-sided
881 Brownian motion W will degenerate to

$$882 \frac{\{4(rF_+(t_0) + \frac{1-r}{2})(\frac{1+r}{2} - rF_+(t_0))\}}{(g(t_0)).$$

883 Based on the relationships between Brownian motion and Chernoff distribution, see Groeneboom
884 (1989),

$$885 \arg \max_{t \in \mathbb{R}} \{W(t) - ct^2\} \stackrel{d}{=} c^{-1/3} \mathcal{F}_{t_0}(0) \stackrel{d}{=} c^{-1/3} \arg \max_{t \in \mathbb{R}} \{W(t) - t^2\},$$

886 for some $c > 0$. Let $c = \frac{\{4(rF_+(t_0) + \frac{1-r}{2})(\frac{1+r}{2} - rF_+(t_0))f(t_0)\}}{(g(t_0))}$, the point-wise asymptotic distribution
887 $\mathcal{L}^{-1}\mathcal{F}(0)$ will degenerate to

$$888 \frac{\{4(rF_+(t_0) + \frac{1-r}{2})(\frac{1+r}{2} - rF_+(t_0))f(t_0)\}^{1/3} (\arg \max_{t \in \mathbb{R}} \{W(t) - t^2\},)}{(r^2g(t_0))^{1/3}}.$$

889 C.3 PROOF OF THEOREM 3

890 The consistent result is derived by Theorem 1 deriectly.

891 For second result, one notice that for any $0 < t_0 < t_1 < 1$, $\mathbf{F}(t_0) - \widehat{\mathbf{F}}(t_0)$ and $\mathbf{F}(t_1) - \widehat{\mathbf{F}}(t_1)$ are
892 asymptotically independent, see page 131 in Huang & Wellner (1997) for the local dependence
893 structure of this type of process in a closely related problem. Then, following Theorem 2,
894

$$895 n^{1/3} \left\{ \mathbf{F}(t_0) - \widehat{\mathbf{F}}(t_0), \mathbf{F}(t_1) - \widehat{\mathbf{F}}(t_1) \right\} \xrightarrow{d} \{ \mathcal{F}_{t_0}(0), \mathcal{F}_{t_1}(0) \}.$$

896 Apply the continuous mapping theorem, the theorem is proved.
897

898 D ICM ALGORITHM

899 In this section, we briefly introduce the ICM algorithm following Groeneboom & Jongbloed (2014).
900 The notation remains consistent with that used above.

901 Denote by e_k the k -th unit vector in \mathbb{R}^K , by $\#$ the counting measure on $D = \{e_k : k = 1, \dots, K+1\}$,
902 and by G the distribution of T . We define the measure $\mu = G \times \#$ on $\mathbb{R} \times D$. With respect to this
903 dominating measure, the density of a single observation (T, Δ) is
904

$$905 p_F(t, \delta) = \prod_{k=1}^K F_k(t)^{\delta_k} (1 - F_+(t))^{1 - \delta_+}, \quad (3)$$

where $\delta_+ = \sum_{k=1}^K \delta_k$. Given an independent sample of size n distributed as (T, Δ) ,

$$(t_i, \Delta_i) = (t_i, \Delta_{i,1}, \dots, \Delta_{i,K+1}), \quad i = 1, \dots, n,$$

the log-likelihood is

$$\begin{aligned} \ell(F) &= \int \log p_F(t, \delta) d\mathbb{P}_n(t, \delta) \\ &= \int \left\{ \sum_{k=1}^K \delta_k \log F_k(t) + (1 - \delta_+) \log(1 - F_+(t)) \right\} d\mathbb{P}_n(t, \delta), \end{aligned}$$

where \mathbb{P}_n is the empirical distribution of (t_i, Δ_i) . An MLE $\hat{F} = (\hat{F}_1, \dots, \hat{F}_K)$ is defined as

$$\ell(\hat{F}) = \max_{F \in \mathcal{F}_K} \ell(F),$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{F}_K &= \{F = (F_1, \dots, F_K) : F_1, \dots, F_K \text{ are subdistribution functions,} \\ &\text{and for all } x \geq 0, \sum_{k=1}^K F_k(x) \leq 1\}. \end{aligned}$$

The iterative convex minorant (ICM) algorithm is derived from Corollary 2.10 in Groeneboom et al. (2008a), restated below.

Lemma 1 (Corollary 2.10 in Groeneboom et al. (2008a)) *Let*

$$\lambda = 1 - \int \frac{\delta_{K+1}}{1 - \hat{F}_+(u)} d\mathbb{P}_n(u, \delta) \geq 0. \quad (4)$$

Then $\hat{F} = (\hat{F}_1, \dots, \hat{F}_K)$ is an MLE if, for all $k = 1, \dots, K$ and each point of jump τ_{ki} of \hat{F}_k ,

$$\int_{u \in [\tau_{ki}, s]} \left\{ \frac{\delta_k}{\hat{F}_k(u)} - \frac{\delta_{K+1}}{1 - \hat{F}_+(u)} \right\} d\mathbb{P}_n(u, \delta) \geq \lambda 1_{[\tau_{ki}, s]}(T_{(p)}), \quad s \in \mathbb{R}, \quad (5)$$

where equality holds if $s > \tau_{ki}$ is a point of increase of \hat{F}_k , or if $s > T_{(p)}$, the largest strictly ordered order statistic.

A cusum diagram is then constructed with points $(0, 0)$ and

$$\left(\sum_{i=1}^j w_{ki}, \sum_{i=1}^j (w_{ki} y_{ki} + v_{ki}) - \lambda 1_{\{j=n_k\}} \right), \quad j = 1, \dots, n_k, \quad (6)$$

where λ is defined in equation 4 using the current iterate F_+ ,

$$w_{ki} = \int_{u \in [T_i, T_j]} \left\{ \frac{\delta_k}{F_k(u)^2} + \frac{\delta_{K+1}}{(1 - F_+(u))^2} \right\} d\mathbb{P}_n(u, \delta),$$

with T_i and T_j successive points where $\delta_k = 1$,

$$v_{ki} = \int_{u \in [T_i, T_j]} \left\{ \frac{\delta_k}{F_k(u)} - \frac{\delta_{K+1}}{1 - F_+(u)} \right\} d\mathbb{P}_n(u, \delta),$$

and y_{ki} is the value of F_k at T_i in the current iteration. The quantity n_k denotes the number of points where $\delta_k = 1$. As described in Groeneboom & Jongbloed (2014), the w_{ki} correspond to the diagonal elements of the Hessian of the maximization problem.

The next step is to compute the greatest convex minorant of the cusum diagram equation 6 and use its left derivative to update F_k . The Lagrange multiplier λ is recomputed in each iteration using equation 4. We only need to update F_k at points where $\delta_k = 1$, since these are the only locations where the subdistribution can place mass. At any stationary point of the iteration, the conditions in equation 5 are satisfied, and hence an MLE is obtained. A golden section search is used to determine the step size for each iteration.

E ADDITIONAL NUMERICAL RESULTS

E.1 DIVIDE AND CONQUER IN THE ICM ALGORITHM

In this subsection, we are using the same setting as in Chapter 5, where we set $\epsilon = 1$. All experiments are run on a single core of an AMD 9950X CPU. The figure below illustrates the mean and median computational time when running the ICM algorithm:




Figure 2: Mean and median computational time for the ICM algorithm

The plot demonstrates that it takes approximately one second to process $n = 50000$ data points. Linear regression shows that computational time increases at a rate of approximately $n^{1.49}$.

Since this rate is superlinear, we consider a divide-and-conquer strategy, where the data is randomly split into four even-sized portions, and the final result is summarized by taking the average.




Figure 3: Computational time under the divide-and-conquer strategy

Under this strategy, the growth rate of computational time is significantly reduced. However, for smaller sample sizes, the overhead associated with splitting the data may result in slightly longer runtimes. However, the total computational time for small datasets remains under one second.

Importantly, improvement in computational efficiency does not come at the cost of accuracy of estimation. In contrast, all divide-and-conquer strategies we considered, namely splitting the data

into 2, 4, and 8 parts, consistently produce better results compared to the baseline (without division). We illustrate this below for the case of $\epsilon = 1$.




Figure 4: Error Under Different Divide-and-Conquer Settings

The observed improvement may be partly explained by Theorems 1 and 2, which show that the variance of the proposed ULDP estimator is of order $n^{1/3}$. When the data set is divided into subsets L , the variance of the resulting divide-and-conquer estimator is expected to scale heuristically as $L^{-1/6}n^{1/3}$. However, the impact of bias under this strategy remains unclear and is analytically difficult to characterize. In particular, in the extreme case of $L = n$, the estimator reduces to the empirical cumulative distribution function, which almost surely converges to an incorrect distribution. This suggests the existence of an optimal choice of L , although identifying it theoretically is a complex problem beyond the scope of this paper.

E.2 COMPARING TO ALTERNATIVE ORACLE CAPPING MECHANISM

Although having the estimated CDF exceed 1 does not violate the theoretical error bounds presented in our main results, it can be problematic in practical, real-world streaming applications. Formally, the aggregated estimated CDF $\hat{F}_0(t) = \sum_{k=1}^K \hat{F}_{0k}(t)$ can sometimes surpass 1 due to randomness and adjustments from the ULDP mechanism. To address this, we propose a method that ensures the estimates remain interpretable and potentially improve accuracy.

We introduce a correction based on the rule of stopping at 1, denoted as $\check{F}_{0k}^{stop_at_one}(t)$:

$$\check{F}_{0k}^{stop_at_one}(t) = \begin{cases} \hat{F}_{0k}(t), & \text{if } \hat{F}_0(t) \leq 1, \\ \lim_{s \rightarrow \inf\{u > 0: \hat{F}_0(u) > 1\}^-} \hat{F}_{0k}(s), & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

This method halts the growth of all sub-CDF estimates simultaneously at the earliest point where the aggregate estimate first exceeds unity, thereby maintaining monotonicity and interpretability without altering previous estimates.

To evaluate its performance, we compare against an oracle based method, denoted \check{F}_{0k}^{oracle} . This oracle assumes knowledge of the true marginal values $F_{0k}(1)$, and thus caps each sub-CDF estimate at the true marginal proportion:

$$\check{F}_{0k}^{oracle}(t) = \min(\hat{F}_{0k}(t), F_{0k}(1)),$$

Although practically unattainable, this oracle serves as an optimal performance benchmark. We find that by applying the stopping rule, the corrected estimates can reach results similar to the oracle, offering a practical solution that ensures both interpretability and accuracy in streaming applications.

The empirical results comparing these methods are presented below.

Table 1: Empirical results of uniform consistency (standard deviation) under the proposed capping mechanism and the oracle method

n	Stop at one			Oracle		
	$\epsilon = 1$	$\epsilon = 2$	$\epsilon = 3$	$\epsilon = 1$	$\epsilon = 2$	$\epsilon = 3$
1×10^3	0.098(0.024)	0.085(0.018)	0.086(0.019)	0.082(0.015)	0.075(0.016)	0.074(0.014)
2×10^3	0.082(0.020)	0.071(0.018)	0.066(0.016)	0.072(0.016)	0.063(0.013)	0.059(0.014)
5×10^3	0.062(0.013)	0.055(0.012)	0.054(0.010)	0.055(0.011)	0.051(0.011)	0.049(0.013)
1×10^4	0.051(0.012)	0.045(0.010)	0.044(0.010)	0.045(0.009)	0.042(0.008)	0.041(0.009)
2×10^4	0.041(0.010)	0.038(0.008)	0.037(0.009)	0.039(0.009)	0.037(0.008)	0.036(0.009)
5×10^4	0.034(0.008)	0.029(0.006)	0.028(0.006)	0.031(0.007)	0.030(0.007)	0.029(0.007)
1×10^5	0.029(0.006)	0.025(0.005)	0.024(0.006)	0.027(0.007)	0.025(0.006)	0.024(0.005)
2×10^5	0.024(0.005)	0.022(0.005)	0.021(0.005)	0.024(0.006)	0.021(0.005)	0.021(0.005)
5×10^5	0.019(0.005)	0.018(0.004)	0.017(0.005)	0.019(0.004)	0.017(0.003)	0.017(0.003)
1×10^6	0.017(0.004)	0.014(0.004)	0.013(0.003)	0.016(0.003)	0.014(0.003)	0.013(0.003)

Notably, the proposed capping mechanism achieves performance close to the oracle, particularly for large sample sizes; therefore, we recommend using this correction in conjunction with our method, and it is adopted in all empirical evaluations presented in this paper.

E.3 TABLES IN SECTION 5

Table 2: Empirical results of uniform consistency and prediction error (standard deviation)

n	Uniform Consistency			Prediction Error		
	$\epsilon = 1$	$\epsilon = 2$	$\epsilon = 3$	$\epsilon = 1$	$\epsilon = 2$	$\epsilon = 3$
1×10^3	0.098(0.024)	0.085(0.018)	0.086(0.019)	0.059(0.036)	0.053(0.029)	0.053(0.028)
2×10^3	0.082(0.020)	0.071(0.018)	0.066(0.016)	0.042(0.025)	0.041(0.020)	0.036(0.019)
5×10^3	0.062(0.013)	0.055(0.012)	0.054(0.010)	0.030(0.016)	0.028(0.014)	0.028(0.015)
1×10^4	0.051(0.012)	0.045(0.010)	0.044(0.010)	0.023(0.014)	0.020(0.013)	0.019(0.010)
2×10^4	0.041(0.010)	0.038(0.008)	0.037(0.009)	0.019(0.010)	0.018(0.010)	0.016(0.009)
5×10^4	0.034(0.008)	0.029(0.006)	0.028(0.006)	0.013(0.007)	0.011(0.005)	0.010(0.006)
1×10^5	0.029(0.006)	0.025(0.005)	0.024(0.006)	0.011(0.006)	0.009(0.005)	0.009(0.005)
2×10^5	0.024(0.005)	0.022(0.005)	0.021(0.005)	0.008(0.004)	0.007(0.004)	0.007(0.004)
5×10^5	0.019(0.005)	0.018(0.004)	0.017(0.005)	0.006(0.004)	0.005(0.003)	0.005(0.003)
1×10^6	0.017(0.004)	0.014(0.004)	0.013(0.003)	0.005(0.002)	0.004(0.002)	0.003(0.002)

Table 3: Prediction error: mean (standard deviation) of $\mathbb{P}(Y = k, X > 1/2)$.

n	Prediction Error		
	$\epsilon = 1$	$\epsilon = 2$	$\epsilon = 3$
1×10^3	0.138 (0.055)	0.108 (0.046)	0.107 (0.045)
2×10^3	0.114 (0.042)	0.090 (0.036)	0.087 (0.034)
5×10^3	0.080 (0.029)	0.073 (0.025)	0.064 (0.028)
1×10^4	0.067 (0.024)	0.058 (0.023)	0.054 (0.025)
2×10^4	0.054 (0.021)	0.046 (0.016)	0.041 (0.017)
5×10^4	0.037 (0.015)	0.034 (0.015)	0.034 (0.013)
1×10^5	0.031 (0.012)	0.028 (0.011)	0.024 (0.011)
2×10^5	0.025 (0.009)	0.020 (0.009)	0.019 (0.009)
5×10^5	0.017 (0.007)	0.015 (0.006)	0.014 (0.005)
1×10^6	0.013 (0.004)	0.011 (0.004)	0.009 (0.004)

1188 E.4 RELATIVE ERROR ANALYSIS
1189

1190 In addition to the uniform consistency in Section 5, we also consider relative uniform consistency,
1191 defined as

$$1192 \sup_{t \in (0,1)} \max_{k \in \{1,2,3,4\}} \frac{F_{0k}(t) - \widehat{F}_k(t)}{F_{0k}(1)}.$$

1193
1194
1195
1196 The numerical results are provided in the table at the end of this response. Since $F_{0k}(1) \in [0.2, 0.3]$,
1197 we expect the relative error to be inflated by a factor between $1/0.3 \approx 3.33$ and $1/0.2 = 5$. Empiri-
1198 cally, the observed inflation factor is about 3.74 on average with standard deviation 0.23, which lies
1199 within the theoretical range. This indicates that the maximum relative error is not concentrated only
1200 on the most frequent or the least frequent categories.

1201 Furthermore, we do not observe any significant differences in the relative error across different values
1202 of ϵ . For sufficiently large n , the relative errors remain reasonable, implying no notable increase in
1203 error for less common categories.
1204

1205
1206 Table 4: Relative Empirical results of uniform consistency and prediction error (standard deviation).

1207 n	1208 Uniform consistency		
	1209 $\epsilon = 1$	1210 $\epsilon = 2$	1211 $\epsilon = 3$
1212 1×10^3	0.416 (0.110)	0.348 (0.079)	0.337 (0.069)
1213 2×10^3	0.335 (0.075)	0.283 (0.060)	0.263 (0.056)
1214 5×10^3	0.233 (0.053)	0.210 (0.044)	0.207 (0.042)
1215 1×10^4	0.190 (0.037)	0.176 (0.040)	0.160 (0.035)
1216 2×10^4	0.161 (0.034)	0.144 (0.031)	0.132 (0.024)
1217 5×10^4	0.125 (0.025)	0.113 (0.025)	0.106 (0.020)
1218 1×10^5	0.102 (0.020)	0.088 (0.016)	0.084 (0.014)
1219 2×10^5	0.083 (0.017)	0.075 (0.017)	0.073 (0.016)
1220 5×10^5	0.068 (0.016)	0.061 (0.014)	0.060 (0.013)
1221 1×10^6	0.061 (0.015)	0.054 (0.013)	0.051 (0.013)

E.5 REAL DATA ANALYSIS

For validation of the proposed method on real-world data, we used the government salary dataset available in the R package `fairadapt`, which contains 204,309 salary records. In this dataset, salary is treated as the continuous response and race (7 categories) as the categorical variable. Although this dataset is not privacy-sensitive in the sense of containing ground-truth protected attributes for disclosure, it serves as a practical validation example.

We applied the following preprocessing steps. We removed outliers with salaries exceeding \$200,000, which account for less than 0.2% of the records. Following the same approach as for the synthetic data, we randomly sampled without replacement subsets of sizes 5,000, 10,000, 20,000, 50,000, 100,000, and 200,000 (nearly the full dataset). Smaller sample sizes (e.g., 1,000 and 2,000) were excluded because some race categories would be absent. For each sample size, we ran experiments with privacy budgets $\epsilon \in \{1, 2, 3\}$. Each setting was repeated for 100 independent repetitions. The reported quantities are the average L_∞ errors with standard deviations (in parentheses).

Table 5: Consistency on real data

n	ϵ		
	1	2	3
5×10^3	0.084 (0.019)	0.075 (0.017)	0.073 (0.016)
1×10^4	0.067 (0.013)	0.060 (0.012)	0.058 (0.011)
2×10^4	0.058 (0.012)	0.049 (0.009)	0.044 (0.008)
5×10^4	0.044 (0.008)	0.040 (0.007)	0.039 (0.007)
1×10^5	0.038 (0.006)	0.035 (0.007)	0.033 (0.006)
2×10^5	0.033 (0.005)	0.029 (0.005)	0.028 (0.004)

These results demonstrate performance comparable to the synthetic data, with a slightly higher error primarily attributable to class imbalance: approximately 90% of observations belong to the White group.

F THE VARIANTS OF ACRR

The ACRR mechanism can be modified to conform with the classical definition of local differential privacy. Consider the following randomized mechanism $\mathcal{M}_{\text{LDP1}} : X \rightarrow \mathcal{E}$, which satisfies ϵ -LDP:

$$\mathcal{M}_{\text{LDP1}}((0, k)) = \begin{cases} e_j & \text{with probability } \frac{1}{K+e^\epsilon} \text{ for } j \neq k, \\ e_k & \text{with probability } \frac{e^\epsilon}{K+e^\epsilon}. \end{cases}$$

$$\mathcal{M}_{\text{LDP1}}((1, k)) = \begin{cases} e_j & \text{with probability } \frac{1}{K+e^\epsilon} \text{ for } j = 1, \dots, K, \\ e_{K+1} & \text{with probability } \frac{e^\epsilon}{K+e^\epsilon}. \end{cases}$$

This guarantees ϵ -LDP, as the ratio of any two output probabilities is bounded by e^ϵ .

Although this mechanism introduces more noise compared to ACRR, it can still be analyzed using the framework using the mechanism developed in Chapter 4. In particular, the associated perturbation matrix $\mathcal{L} \in \mathbb{R}^{(K+1) \times (K+1)}$ has the following structure:

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{LDP1}} = \frac{1}{K+e^\epsilon} \begin{bmatrix} e^\epsilon & 1 & \dots & 1 \\ 1 & e^\epsilon & \dots & 1 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ 1 & 1 & \dots & e^\epsilon \end{bmatrix}.$$

Notice that according to Theorems 1, 2, and 3, the matrix $\mathcal{L}_{\text{LDP1}}^{-1}$ acts as a multiplicative factor in the error bound. A direct computation shows that:

$$\|\mathcal{L}_{\text{LDP1}}^{-1}\|_\infty = \frac{1 + e^{-\epsilon}(2K - 1)}{1 - e^{-\epsilon}},$$

whereas for the ACRR mechanism, we have:

$$\|\mathcal{L}^{-1}\|_\infty = \frac{1 + e^{-\epsilon}}{1 - e^{-\epsilon}}.$$

This indicates that *asymmetric privacy protection* eliminates the inflation dependent on K in the error bound.

Even though LDP1 performs poorly in other respects, it still benefits from the censoring mechanism. To see why, consider a standard LDP2 random response mechanism that perturbs X to \tilde{X} (rather than to \mathcal{E}). In this case, the perturbation matrix becomes a $2K \times 2K$ matrix:

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{LDP2}} = \frac{1}{2K + e^\epsilon - 1} \begin{bmatrix} e^\epsilon & 1 & \dots & 1 \\ 1 & e^\epsilon & \dots & 1 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ 1 & 1 & \dots & e^\epsilon \end{bmatrix}.$$

Its inverse has infinity norm:

$$\|\mathcal{L}_{\text{LDP2}}^{-1}\|_\infty = \frac{1 + e^{-\epsilon}(4K - 3)}{1 - e^{-\epsilon}},$$

which further inflates the error by nearly a factor of 2 compared to the censored mechanism.