KEEP CALM AND AVOID HARMFUL CONTENT: *C*ONCEPT *A*LIGNMENT AND *L*ATENT *M*ANIPULATION TOWARDS SAFER ANSWERS

Anonymous authors
Paper under double-blind review

This paper contains harmful, inappropriate, and offensive content. Reader discretion is advised.

ABSTRACT

Large Language Models (LLMs) are susceptible to jailbreak attacks that bypass built-in safety guardrails (e.g., by tricking the model with adversarial prompts). We propose Concept Alignment and Concept Manipulation **CALM**, an inference-time method that suppresses harmful concepts by modifying latent representations of the last layer of the model, without retraining. Leveraging Concept Whitening (CW) technique from Computer Vision combined with orthogonal projection, CALM removes unwanted latent directions associated with harmful content while preserving model performance. Experiments show that CALM reduces harmful outputs and outperforms baseline methods in most metrics, offering a lightweight approach to AI safety with no additional training data or model fine-tuning, while incurring only a small computational overhead at inference.

1 INTRODUCTION

With the widespread adoption of LLMs across diverse sectors, these models are increasingly influencing language processing and automation tasks Raiaan et al. (2024). Their integration into high-risk environments further amplifies concerns about ethics, social impact, and responsibility, particularly as they gain decision-making capabilities Anthropic (2025). A fundamental requirement for safe AI is the ability to reject harmful requests Arditi et al. (2024). To achieve this, LLMs undergo extensive fine-tuning to generate safe responses while refusing inappropriate queries Bai et al. (2022); Korbak et al. (2023). However, adversarial users continually develop methods to bypass these safeguards Liu et al. (2023); Shah et al. (2023); Greshake et al. (2023); Arditi et al. (2024); Yu et al. (2024); Jin et al. (2024); Li et al. (2025).



Figure 1: Example of a harmful prompt and the corresponding answers. The Baseline Response (left/red) provides a neutral analysis, while the Concept Alignment and Latent Manipulation (CALM) Response (right/green) reframes the prompt with context, consequences, and alternative solutions. This is a summarized version, with the full answers shown in Fig. 4, and additional examples provided in App. K.

Despite existing countermeasures, jailbreak attacks remain a persistent challenge. This ongoing threat motivates methods that can adapt at inference time without requiring constant retraining. Rather than outright refusing to respond to harmful inputs, our approach constrains the content of the response by projecting out (removing) latent components associated with harmful concepts in the model's embedding space. This ensures that when the model does generate a response to a harmful prompt, it is as harmless as possible. Unlike traditional refusal-based methods, CALM focuses on controlling the **content** of generated responses (which users often expect) rather than enforcing outright refusals. This distinction is particularly relevant for openly available models (e.g., Gemma, Phi-3, LlaMA), which are highly susceptible to prompt-based jailbreak attacks.

Related Work. Language models capture **semantically meaningful structures in embedding spaces** Mikolov et al. (2013); Schramowski et al. (2019); Zou et al. (2023a); Arditi et al. (2024). Recent research explores the modification of internal representations to control behaviors or improve interpretability without the need for gradient-based training. Refusal behaviors can be adjusted by identifying linear directions in activation space Arditi et al. (2024); Li et al. (2025). Whitening techniques have been applied to improve the classification and semantic similarity tasks in language models, though with mixed success Su et al. (2021); Zhuo et al. (2023); Forooghi et al. (2024). Least-Squares Concept Erasure Belrose et al. (2023) removes linear features for bias mitigation, while Contrastive Activation Addition Rimsky et al. (2024) and Sparse Autoencoders Huben et al. (2023) modify activations for interpretability. Beyond internal modifications, prompt-based techniques manipulate input to influence model activations, enabling adversarial attacks Liu et al. (2023); Shah et al. (2023); Greshake et al. (2023); Yu et al. (2024); Jin et al. (2024).

Condition and concept manipulation techniques in LLMs have increasingly focused on modifying internal representations and prompt contexts to improve alignment, robustness, and interpretability. Recent work proposes self-reminders to defend against jailbreak attacks by prompting models to maintain ethical constraints Xie et al. (2023). In-context learning has also been leveraged to jailbreak or guard models using adversarial or defensive demonstrations, highlighting the malleability of alignment through few-shot conditioning Wei et al. (2023). Other approaches examine the brittleness of safety mechanisms by identifying and pruning safety-critical neurons and low-rank regions, revealing structural vulnerabilities in alignment strategies Wei et al. (2024). While circuit breaker techniques intervene directly on harmful activations during inference to prevent unwanted outputs without sacrificing utility Zou et al. (2025).

Recent work has explored modifying LLMs to promote desirable behaviors such as truthfulness Li et al. (2023); Qiu et al. (2024); Von Rütte et al. (2024); Wang et al. (2025) and reducing toxicity Härle et al.; Uppaal et al. (2024); Zhang et al. (2025). For example, Spectral Editing projects representations onto subspaces aligned with truthful or unbiased directions, providing an efficient inference-time mechanism for steering model outputs Qiu et al. (2024). In the context of toxicity, Projection Filter for Subspaces (ProFS) Uppaal et al. (2024) is a model editing technique that uses subspace projection to suppress harmful behaviors.

Our method, CALM, is closely aligned with this line of work, particularly ProFS, which inspires our approach. As detailed in Section 2, we build on it and adopt ProFS as our primary baseline.

Table 1: Comparison between concept based methods used in this Work.

Work	Concept Decorrelation	Advanced Concept Extraction	Interpretability	Concept Removal
CW	✓		✓	
ProFS		✓		✓
CALM	✓	✓	✓	✓

Our work. We introduce CALM, a novel method that reduces harmful content generation in LLMs while preserving interpretability. CALM combines Concept Whitening (CW)Chen et al. (2020) and Projection Filter for Subspaces (ProFS)Uppaal et al. (2024) to enable inference-time suppression of harmful concepts, comparison with the related methods is shown in Tab. 1. Unlike the original CW, which requires training-time alignment in CNNs, our method applies suppression dynamically during inference, avoiding retraining and preserving CW's interpretability benefits. Our key contributions are:

1. **Inference-Time Concept Suppression:** A lightweight method that constrain the representation of harmful concepts in LLMs at inference without retraining or fine-tuning, using whitening and rotation matrices precomputed offline. (Sec.4, App.H) 2. **Extension of CW to Language Models:** While CW was originally designed for computer vision,we extend its application to LLMs, aligning latent directions with human-interpretable concepts. (Sec.4.4) 3. **Suppression via Concept Projection:** Beyond interpretability, we actively zero out harmful concept dimensions, reducing unsafe behaviors while preserving benign performance. (Secs.2,4) 4. **Improved Concept Decorrelation:** While ProFS can remove harmful concepts from the internal representations of LLMs, we improve upon this by introducing whitening which improves concept separability and enables more accurate suppression of harmful representations.(Secs.2, 4)

2 CALM: Concept Alignment and Latent Manipulation



Figure 2: CALM is applied to token embeddings from the final decoder layer, using whitening for decorrelation and an orthogonal rotation to align concept directions with canonical axes. The aligned representations enable (1) interpretability and (2) projection to remove undesired concepts, after which inverse transformations restore the embeddings for continued generation.

LLMs encode rich representations of concepts and behaviors within their embedding space, mapping them to specific regions Arditi et al. (2024); Zou et al. (2023a). We leverage a structured transformation of the latent space to manipulate these representations. Specifically, we aim to align harmful concepts with orthogonal axes and subsequently project out harmful ones, thereby diminishing their influence on model outputs. Fig. 2 illustrates this process.

Our approach builds upon the CW module Chen et al. (2020), which extends traditional whitening by incorporating a learned rotation that aligns predefined concepts along specific axes. The whitening transformation ensures zero mean and identity covariance, and its details are provided in App. A. The CW module further introduces an orthogonal transformation Q, learned to maximize alignment between the mean representation of each concept and a specific axis.

Given a set of N answer embeddings $a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_N$, where each $a_i \in \mathbb{R}^d$ is obtained by mean-pooling the token embeddings from the output of the last decoder layer of size d (e.g., $d = 4096$ for LLaMA-7B). For each answer i, we define: $X = (a_1, a_2, \ldots, a_N) \in \mathbb{R}^{d \times N}$.

We partition X into three disjoint subsets X_{c_j}, such that $N = N_{\text{neg}} + N_{\text{pos}} + N_{\text{norm}}$, where each subset corresponds to a specific type of answer to a predefined prompt:

- $X_{\text{neg}} \in \mathbb{R}^{d \times N_{\text{neg}}}$: embeddings of harmful answers to harmful prompts, i.e., responses that affirm or comply with harmful intent,
- $X_{\text{pos}} \in \mathbb{R}^{d \times N_{\text{pos}}}$: embeddings of harmless answers to the same harmful prompts, i.e., responses that reject or oppose the harmful intent,
- $X_{\text{norm}} \in \mathbb{R}^{d \times N_{\text{norm}}}$: embeddings of *normal* answers to everyday, non-harmful prompts.

The first step is to construct a whitening transformation using the entire corpus of answer embeddings. Let X_W denote the embeddings transformed into the whitened space. We then compute the mean embedding of the normal answers as

$$\mu_n = \text{mean}(X_{\text{norm}}),$$

and remove its influence by projecting the positive and negative embeddings onto the orthogonal complement of μ_n. This yields

$$X'_{W_j} = X_{W_j}\left(I - \frac{\mu_n \mu_n^\top}{\|\mu_n\|^2}\right), \quad \text{for } j \in \{\text{neg}, \text{pos}\},$$

where $X_{W_{\text{neg}}}$ and $X_{W_{\text{pos}}}$ are the whitened embeddings of the positive and negative answer sets, respectively. This projection removes corpus-level statistical features common to general, non-harmful language to ensure that general stylistic features do not obscure the differences between harmful and harmless responses. This technique is inspired by Uppaal et al. (2024), where the mean vector is shown to encode general corpus statistics.

To identify the dominant conceptual directions within each class, we apply Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) to the projected, whitened embeddings. For each class $j \in \{\text{neg}, \text{pos}\}$, we compute the following:

$$U_j \Sigma_j V_j^\top = \text{SVD}(X'_{W_j}),$$

where $V_j \in \mathbb{R}^{d\times d}$ contains the right singular vectors. We select the top-K_j right-singular vectors $v_1, \ldots, v_{K_j} \in \mathbb{R}^d$ from V_j to serve as the principal directions capturing the most salient conceptual dimensions for each class. These vectors form the basis for our alignment procedure. For simplicity, we choose the same $K = K_{\text{pos}} = K_{\text{neg}}$ for both classes, tuned through validation (Tab. 2). In this way, we obtain a balanced number of directions for both subspaces. We also evaluate the impact of varying K (Tab.8).

The alignment objective aims to find an orthogonal transformation $Q \in \mathbb{R}^{d\times d}$ such that the top-K conceptual directions from each class (negative and positive) are aligned with the first $2K$ canonical axes. Let $C = [v_1^{(\text{neg})}, \ldots, v_K^{(\text{neg})}, v_1^{(\text{pos})}, \ldots, v_K^{(\text{pos})}] \in \mathbb{R}^{d\times 2K}$ denote the set of selected concept directions, aggregated from both classes. The objective is

$$\max_{q_1,\ldots,q_{2K}} \sum_{j=1}^{2K} q_j^\top C_j \mathbf{1}_{n_j\times 1} \quad \text{s.t.} \quad Q^\top Q = I_d, \tag{1}$$

where each q_j is a column of Q, and C_j is the corresponding concept direction. The goal is to align the $2K$ concept directions with the first $2K$ orthonormal axes. Thus, the orthogonal matrix Q is learned such that each selected concept direction C_j (columns of C) is aligned with one of the first $2K$ basis axes. In practice, this can be done by treating the C_j as a target basis and finding the nearest orthonormal matrix (solved using another SVD or iterative optimization). This ensures that each concept is primarily represented along a single axis in the transformed space; details on how to implement this are available in (Sec. 3.3) and Algorithm 2 of Chen et al. (2020).

Such an axis-aligned representation promotes interpretability, since each learned dimension can be associated with a distinct concept, facilitating both analysis and manipulation. each axis corresponds to a latent concept (e.g., violence, self-harm, refusal tone, etc.); we provide examples and interpretations of these concepts in Tab. 5.

2.1 How to remove concepts?

Having aligned the feature space, we can selectively remove concepts by applying a diagonal projection matrix $P \in \mathbb{R}^{d\times d}$. Here P is a diagonal matrix with zeros for the K harmful concept dimensions and ones for all other dimensions, effectively removing the harmful components. Formally, $P_{i,i} = \mathbb{I}_{i\notin\mathcal{K}}$, and $\mathbb{I}_C$ is the usual indicator function of statement C, for a set of indices $\mathcal{K}$ corresponding to the concept directions we wish to suppress. The modified representation is $\tilde{x}_i = PQW(x_i - \mu)$. Without retraining the model, we cannot pass $\tilde{x}_i$ directly into the subsequent layers. However, since all of these transformations except for the projection are invertible, we can recover a projected version of the embedding,

$$\tilde{x}_i = W^{-1}Q^{-1}PQW(x_i - \mu) + \mu.$$

By nullifying these conceptual axes, we hypothesize a reduction in the model's capacity to encode and process the associated behaviors, thus diminishing its ability to use them when generating text (Fig. 2). As an ablation, we test a CALM variant without alignment (App. B).

During inference, we apply this procedure at each decoding step: we take the output embedding of the decoder for the next token, transform it via W and Q, zero out harmful components using a projection matrix P, invert the transformation, and then feed the modified embedding to the softmax to produce the token distribution. This results in lightweight inference with an added complexity of $\mathcal{O}(d^2)$ per step. The training of CALM has a total complexity of $\mathcal{O}(\max(Nd^2,\ Td^3))$, where N is the number of embeddings and T is the number of iterations for each alignment step.

3 Experimental Setup

Datasets. The **LLM-LAT Harmful**[1] Sheshadri et al. (2024) dataset contains harmful prompts paired with compliant (negative) and non-compliant (positive) responses. We use 4,000 pairs to construct X_{neg} and X_{pos} embeddings and to evaluate perplexity before and after applying our method, referring to this dataset as **Harmful Q&A**. For neutral embeddings of everyday interactions, we use **Alpaca** Taori et al. (2023), which provides non-harmful conversation examples and yields X_{norm}.

The **declare-lab HarmfulQA**[2] Bhardwaj & Poria (2023) dataset covers a wide range of topics, providing both harmful and harmless conversations for each question. These dialogues explore different perspectives on each prompt. We use this dataset as a **"test set"** to assess model behavior in more realistic, open-ended scenarios. Throughout the paper, we refer to it as **Harmful Chat**.

The **AdvBench** Zou et al. (2023b) dataset is used to evaluate the practical impact of CALM. It includes 1,000 harmful prompts in two categories: 1. **Provocations:** 500 malicious prompts covering discrimination, profanity, graphic content, threats, misinformation, and cybercrime, testing model reactions and suggestions; 2. **Harmful Behaviors:** 500 harmful instructions assessing compliance, advice style, disclaimers, and subtle harmful content. Neither this dataset nor **Harmful Chat** were used to build the concept axes; both are reserved for evaluation only.

Models. To evaluate CALM, we test three major LLMs families across multiple variants, including *Pretrain* and *Instruct* versions when available. For models prone to jailbreak behavior, we also consider an *Abliterated* (Abl) version. Abliteration Arditi et al. (2024) removes refusal behaviors by neutralizing the latent "refusal direction", encouraging direct responses while preserving performance. Our evaluation focuses on the following: **LLaMA 3** Grattafiori et al. (2024) (8B): (i) Instruct, (ii) Pretrain, (iii) Abl[3] ; **Phi-3** Abdin et al. (2024) (Mini 128k): (i) Instruct, (ii) Abl[4] ; **Gemma 2** Riviere et al. (2024): (i) 2B: Instruct, Pretrain, Abl[5], (ii) 9B: Instruct .

4 Results

We evaluate the performance of CALM across four different datasets using three distinct evaluation methods, varying the number of concepts K. We compare our approach to both the unaltered model and to ProFS. For ProFS, we also experiment with different values of K, extending beyond the 15 concepts recommended in the original paper, as our datasets and tasks differ slightly.

4.1 Harmful Q&A

We begin our evaluation using the Harmful Q&A Sheshadri et al. (2024) validation set. Specifically, we compute the perplexity of both safe (harmless) and unsafe (harmful) answers. *The objective is to increase the perplexity of harmful answers while minimizing any increase in perplexity for harmless answers*. Additionally, we report the percentage of cases where the perplexity of the safe answer is higher than that of the unsafe answer; we refer to this metric as Unsafe Win Rate (UWR). Ideally, this percentage should be as low as possible (Tab. 2).

To aggregate these three metrics into a single score, we assign one point for each best value achieved by any method across all metrics. For example, CALM on Llama 3 8B Instruct achieves the lowest perplexity for positive answers, the highest perplexity for negative answers, and the lowest percentage of harmful preference, earning three points. In contrast, for Phi-3 Instruct, CALM obtains only one

Table 2: Perplexity (PPL) results on the Harmful Q&A dataset. This breakdown shows how varying the number of learned concepts in ProFS and CALM affects the PPL of safe and unsafe answers. Higher PPL for unsafe responses, combined with lower PPL for safe ones and reduced Unsafe Win Rate (UWR), indicates better alignment. CALM consistently yields sharper increases in harmful PPL while preserving safe PPL, highlighting the benefits of whitening and decorrelation for disentangling concepts. "–" indicates PPL values exceeding 150. Some columns are omitted here due to table size constraints, the full version is available in App. C.

Model	Metric	Base	ProFS			CALM				
			5	10	20	1	2	5	10	20
Llama Pt	PPL S.	$5.25_{1.8}$	$7.78_{2.9}$	$8.38_{3.1}$	$10.41_{4.4}$	$\underline{5.86}_{2.0}$	$\mathbf{5.42}_{1.8}$	$5.91_{2.1}$	$7.64_{3.0}$	$10.55_{3.7}$
	PPL U.	$3.92_{1.5}$	$6.84_{4.2}$	$7.54_{4.6}$	$\underline{9.88}_{7.1}$	$4.13_{1.6}$	$4.13_{1.5}$	$4.56_{1.8}$	$7.87_{5.5}$	$\mathbf{12.87}_{10.7}$
	UWR	77.88	63.84	62.83	58.48	80.91	76.36	74.85	<u>54.95</u>	**44.65**
Llama It	PPL S.	$3.90_{1.0}$	$3.92_{1.0}$	$3.93_{1.1}$	$\underline{3.91}_{1.0}$	$\mathbf{3.88}_{1.0}$	$3.93_{1.0}$	$4.17_{1.0}$	$4.76_{1.3}$	$5.59_{1.4}$
	PPL U.	$5.85_{3.1}$	$5.86_{3.1}$	$5.86_{3.1}$	$5.84_{3.1}$	$5.94_{3.1}$	$5.95_{3.1}$	$6.57_{3.5}$	$\underline{7.20}_{4.1}$	$\mathbf{8.81}_{5.2}$
	UWR	22.42	22.32	22.73	22.32	<u>20.71</u>	21.82	**20.10**	24.24	25.42
Llama Abl	PPL S.	$5.47_{2.4}$	$5.78_{2.5}$	$6.05_{2.6}$	$7.92_{3.5}$	$\underline{5.48}_{2.4}$	$\mathbf{5.45}_{2.4}$	$8.75_{4.8}$	$9.32_{5.4}$	$13.19_{7.4}$
	PPL U.	$6.03_{4.1}$	$8.02_{5.1}$	$8.68_{5.5}$	$\underline{12.27}_{9.0}$	$6.17_{4.3}$	$6.77_{4.9}$	$9.26_{9.2}$	$10.64_{8.7}$	$\mathbf{18.80}_{41.2}$
	UWR	46.16	29.80	**28.08**	<u>29.39</u>	45.35	36.77	54.55	45.56	38.79
Gemma Pt	PPL S.	$4.35_{1.1}$	$\underline{7.77}_{2.1}$	$9.54_{3.0}$	$9.86_{3.3}$	$\mathbf{5.37}_{1.5}$	–	–	–	–
	PPL U.	$3.94_{1.4}$	$10.32_{6.3}$	$\underline{13.27}_{7.5}$	$\mathbf{16.09}_{10.8}$	$5.46_{2.4}$	–	–	–	–
	UWR	62.22	37.68	<u>33.64</u>	**25.96**	52.12	–	–	–	–
Gemma It	PPL S.	$3.66_{0.8}$	$\underline{4.64}_{1.3}$	$\mathbf{4.35}_{1.1}$	$4.78_{1.3}$	$5.69_{2.0}$	$7.11_{2.6}$	–	–	–
	PPL U.	$6.36_{3.3}$	$11.01_{7.4}$	$11.81_{12.3}$	$13.30_{15.2}$	$\underline{15.21}_{11.3}$	$\mathbf{79.05}_{164.9}$	–	–	–
	UWR	12.12	9.29	<u>6.87</u>	7.37	10.81	**5.86**	–	–	–
Gemma Abl	PPL S.	$6.67_{2.3}$	$8.21_{3.2}$	$\underline{7.54}_{2.8}$	$7.56_{2.9}$	$\mathbf{6.85}_{2.3}$	$13.43_{5.8}$	–	–	–
	PPL U.	$6.62_{3.9}$	$11.00_{8.2}$	$11.51_{12.7}$	$\underline{12.98}_{14.3}$	$7.20_{4.3}$	$\mathbf{36.04}_{74.9}$	–	–	–
	UWR	51.21	34.24	<u>28.48</u>	**22.22**	47.17	28.79	–	–	–
Phi-3 It	PPL S.	$2.27_{0.4}$	$3.47_{0.9}$	$5.00_{1.4}$	$12.99_{5.6}$	$\mathbf{2.36}_{0.4}$	$\underline{2.42}_{0.5}$	$2.47_{0.5}$	$2.61_{0.6}$	$3.82_{1.0}$
	PPL U.	$5.16_{2.6}$	$16.34_{60.3}$	$\underline{32.02}_{158.7}$	$\mathbf{123.09}_{699.4}$	$5.71_{3.1}$	$6.17_{3.2}$	$7.47_{4.3}$	$9.72_{6.4}$	$18.77_{19.8}$
	UWR	4.85	**0.81**	2.42	12.63	4.55	2.83	2.93	<u>2.32</u>	4.34
Phi-3 Abl	PPL S.	$9.32_{5.1}$	$13.10_{7.9}$	$14.01_{8.4}$	$16.27_{10.7}$	$\mathbf{9.64}_{5.3}$	$\underline{10.06}_{5.6}$	$12.43_{7.1}$	$13.72_{8.1}$	$17.66_{11.0}$
	PPL U.	$6.12_{3.9}$	$12.24_{15.0}$	$15.73_{30.1}$	$\underline{18.41}_{46.6}$	$6.53_{4.3}$	$7.19_{4.8}$	$10.38_{7.8}$	$14.39_{12.3}$	$\mathbf{19.29}_{17.6}$
	UWR	74.75	57.58	50.61	<u>50.40</u>	73.64	69.90	60.20	50.61	**49.09**

Table 3: Aggregate point scores for each method across all models in the Harmful Chat and Harmful Q&A datasets. Each cell shows the total number of times the method achieved the best result for (1) PPL Safe; (2) PPL Unsafe; (3) Unsafe Win Rate (UWR).

Harmful Q&A	**PPL S.**	**PPL U.**	**UWR**
CALM	**7**	**6**	4
ProFS	1	2	4
Harmful Chat	**PPL S.**	**PPL U.**	**UWR**
CALM	2	**3**	**4**
ProFS	2	1	0

point, while ProFS scores two. Overall, across all models, CALM achieves 17 out of 24 possible points, these results can be seen in Table 3. When considering the percentage of cases where the model selects the correct (harmless) answers, both methods show similar performance, each scoring four points. However, when focusing on mean perplexity, CALM consistently achieves better results, earning seven points for the lowest positive perplexity and six points for the highest negative perplexity. This indicates that the use of whitening improves the disentanglement of the embedding space and enhances the separation of harmful and benign concepts.

A clear example is the Llama 3 8B Instruct model. Across all tested concept counts, ProFS yields perplexities similar to the unaltered model: positive answers increase by +1 to +3, and negative answers change only slightly (-1 to +1), This shows that ProFS struggles to identify meaningful directions for removing harmful concepts in this setting, though it at least does not lead to significant degradation. In contrast, CALM is the only method that, when combined with this model, reduces the perplexity of positive answers, even if only slightly by just 2 points with one concept, while also achieving a larger increase in the perplexity of negative answers across various numbers of concepts. This demonstrates that CALM enables better separation and identification of concepts.

Another example is Phi-3 Abliterated with 10 concepts. For both methods, the percentage of cases where the model selects the correct (harmless) answer is the same. However, the average perplexity of the positive answers is lower with CALM 13.73 compared to ProFS 14.01, again suggesting that whitening and decorrelation help preserve the **"good concepts"** within the embedding space.

How Prompting Fares Against and Influences CALM: Although fundamentally different in how they operate and interact with the model, prompt-style interventions remain one of the most practical approaches to steer the output of a LLM. We argue, however, that comparing prompt interventions to CALM is not entirely fair, since instruction-tuned models are strongly inclined to follow instructions. Nevertheless, we include a comparison between the safe-prompt interventions, with CALM, both with and without the prompt, for completeness, especially since these methods can be used together. These results are discussed in more detail in Appendix G, where we observe that combining CALM with the safe prompt consistently yields the best overall performance.

4.2 Harmful Chat

For our second evaluation, we use the full **Harmful Chat** dataset Bhardwaj & Poria (2023), which simulates a realistic chat-based interaction between a human and a conversational LLM so the Pretrain versions were excluded. As in the previous evaluation, we compute perplexity scores, however, since each question includes multiple safe and unsafe conversations, we first average the perplexity for each conversation type. This allows us to calculate the UWR for each predefined question. For this evaluation, we selected only the best-performing variants of each method based on validation results. Detailed outcomes are reported in Table 9. We also omit the Gemma family from the score summary in Table 3 due to their consistently high perplexity across all versions.

As shown in Table 3, CALM outperforms the baseline on two of three metrics: achieving the best UWR and highest perplexity for unsafe answers, while tying on PPL Safe. Detailed results in Table 9 highlight a perfect UWR of 0 for Phi-3, reflecting ideal behavior. Although the gains are smaller—due to training on a different dataset and slight task variation—the results demonstrate strong generalization, particularly for CALM.

4.3 Effect of CALM in generation

To evaluate the effect of CALM on toxic and harmful content generation, we test on the validation split of the Harmful Q&A Dataset Sheshadri et al. (2024) and the provocations and behaviors subsets from AdvBench Zou et al. (2023b). To assess robustness, we also inject harmful answer prefixes from the behaviors set into model prompts. Toxicity is measured using Detoxify Hanu & Unitary team (2020), and harmfulness is classified by the Llama 3.3 70B Instruct Grattafiori et al. (2024). Detail results are shown in Table 10.

Toxicity and Harmfulness. As shown in the summary Table 4, CALM consistently improves over the base models and performs competitively with ProFS across both toxicity and harmfulness metrics. For Detoxify, which primarily serves as a degradation check due to the low baseline toxicity, CALM outperforms the base in 13 out of 32 cases and matches or exceeds it in 21. Compared to ProFS, it wins in 16 and performs as well or better in 24. On harmfulness, CALM surpasses the base model in 23 out of 32 cases and slightly outperforms ProFS, winning 17 cases, demonstrating its robustness across different evaluation settings.

How Receptive Models Are to CALM Table 4 reveals that the effectiveness of CALM varies across model families. For the Gemma models, results are mixed: CALM achieves some wins but

Table 4: Overall comparison of CALM across two safety tasks: toxicity and harmfulness. Each count shows how often CALM produced less toxic or more harmless outputs than ProFS and the base models, evaluated per model across four datasets. CALM consistently matches or outperforms baselines, with stronger results on Llama and Phi-3 models than on Gemma.

Model	Toxicity						Harmfulness			
	vs ProFS			vs Base			vs ProFS		vs Base	
	W	==	L	W	==	L	W	L	W	L
Gemma Abl	2	1	1	1	0	3	1	3	3	1
Gemma It	0	2	2	0	1	3	0	4	1	3
Gemma Pt	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	3	1	3
Llama Abl	1	0	3	2	0	2	4	0	4	0
Llama It	1	2	1	2	2	0	2	2	4	0
Llama Pt	4	0	0	2	0	2	4	0	4	0
Phi-3 Abl	4	0	0	2	2	0	4	0	4	0
Phi-3 It	2	2	0	2	2	0	1	3	2	2
Total	16	8	8	13	8	11	17	15	23	9

frequently loses or ties, indicating a more limited impact. By contrast, the Llama family shows more consistent benefits, particularly in generating harmless outputs, where CALM demonstrates clear improvements across all variants. Similarly, for the Phi-3 models, CALM reliably outperforms both baselines in nearly all settings, suggesting stronger overall gains.

4.4 Interpretability

To showcase the interpretability capabilities of CALM, we use the Gemma 2 9B Instruct model with five concepts each for harmful and harmless behaviors. These concepts define the axes along which we measure alignment. We inspect the top 10 answers most aligned with each axis and assign a descriptive label to each; these labels are shown in Table 5.



Figure 3: Activations of two example answers projected onto 10 concept axes. The left example shows a detailed, multi-step terrorist attack plan, with arrows indicating the exact position where the word “bomb” appears. The right example illustrates potential uses of stolen credit cards.

Figure 3 illustrates the activations of two answers along these concept axes. On the left, we present the aligned embedding of an example answer in which the model describes an elaborate multi-step plan to carry out a terrorist attack aimed at causing mass casualties. This response strongly aligns with Concept 4 **“Violent Crime Plans”**, Concept 5 **“Bomb Making and Identity Theft”** with more pronounced spikes on the surface when the word **bomb** appears, as indicated by the arrows in the figure, and shows several spikes in Concept 1 **“Harmful Details”**, where Concept 1 serves as a general harmful axis, representing the mean embedding of harmful concepts.

In the other example, we see a strong alignment with Concept 5 **“Identity Theft”**, with smaller spikes in Concept 1. This answer describes what can be done with stolen credit cards and identity theft, highlighting how the concept activations capture the nature of the response. It is also interesting to note that both answers use Concept 5 with different meanings: when the embeddings have positive values, the model uses this axis to identify and relate to **“Identity Theft”**, and when the values

Table 5: Descriptions assigned to each concept based on manual human analysis.

Label	Description
C1	Weak Refusal with Harmful Details
C2	No Refusal, Detailed Hacking Plans
C3	Weak Refusal, Fraud and Hate Speech
C4	No Refusal, Violent Crime Plans
C5	No Refusal, Bomb Making and Identity Theft
C6	Ethical Refusal with Legal Help
C7	Strong Moral Refusal
C8	Moral Refusal with Mild Guidance
C9	Empathetic Support with Crisis Help
C10	Legal & Ethical Refusal with Redirect

are negative, the model identifies **"Bomb Making"**. This means that directions captured using the eigenvectors in the embedding space can represent at least two distinct concepts, and possibly more, maybe with some directions encapsulating positive or negative concepts after a certain point along that direction.

Limitations While CALM shows promising results, there are limitations. Evaluations using Detoxify and LLaMA 3.3 70B should be interpreted cautiously: toxicity counts are generally low (except in two configurations), and harmlessness evaluations often yield few harmless answers. Although toxicity does not directly correlate with harmfulness, this discrepancy could raise doubts about the reliability of the evaluation.

Another limitation of Detoxify is its training data: built on Jigsaw competition datasets, it primarily reflects social media interactions, creating a distribution shift that may affect accuracy. Similarly, using LLaMA 3.3 70B as an evaluator has challenges, as LLMs can exhibit intrinsic biases and may not align with human judgments of harmfulness. Moreover, the definition of "harmless" can vary between models and humans, and even among humans, adding further ambiguity to the evaluation.

While CALM performs well across multiple models and tasks, several challenges remain. Handling overlapping or entangled concepts in the latent space is left for future work, and generalization across model families poses difficulties: although we evaluate CALM on three diverse families and multiple versions, including jailbroken models, preliminary tests on additional models showed unstable SVD decompositions or unusually high perplexity. Thus, we tested Isomap Tenenbaum (1997) to estimate the intrinsic dimensionality of the concept space, but it did not yield actionable insights. A likely factor is the number of examples used during whitening—roughly one million token embeddings (10,000 phrase embeddings). Increasing this volume may improve both quality and stability.

Lastly, instead of focusing on broad harmfulness, we plan to explore more fine-grained harmful concepts in future work to better understand their specific impact. Additionally, it is important to note that our evaluation was conducted solely on English text, and future research could benefit from expanding this approach to other languages.

5 Conclusions

We presented CALM, a novel method for inference-time suppression of harmful content in LLMs, which also introduces interpretable concept activations. By integrating CW with ProFS, CALM enables identification and control of harmful directions in the embedding space without retraining. This allows us not only to assess whether a response is harmful, but also to inspect which specific behaviors or concepts the model relies on, an insight that can inform more robust safety filters and deeper model understanding.

CALM can scale to as many concepts as the embedding dimension allows, and generalizes to any behavior we can represent. Empirical results across multiple datasets and models show that CALM consistently improves over base models and ProFS on perplexity, toxicity, and harmfulness metrics, particularly on the Llama 3 and Phi-3 families. These findings highlight CALM as a promising approach for modular, interpretable safety in LLMs, though model-specific tuning may still be required.

Social Impact and Ethics

The ability to control harmful content in LLMs has significant ethical and societal implications. CALM provides a lightweight, inference-time approach to mitigating harmful responses without retraining, making it compatible with existing safety mechanisms. It can be used alongside other guardrail functionalities to enhance AI safety while maintaining system flexibility. However, concerns about over-censorship and potential misuse in restricting free expression remain. Transparency in implementation and careful evaluation of unintended consequences are essential to ensure that interventions enhance safety without reinforcing biases or limiting constructive discourse. Future research should explore ethical guardrails that balance harm reduction with fairness and accountability.

Reproducibility Statement

We provide an anonymous repository at `https://anonymous.4open.science/r/CALM_private-0660`, which contains the code and parameters needed to reproduce our method. It includes implementations for training the ProFS and CALM transformation matrices, along with the parameters used in their computation. We also provide code for extracting embedding representations, the datasets with their splits, and the scripts used to calculate perplexity values.

References

Marah Abdin, Sam Ade Jacobs, Ammar Ahmad Awan, Jyoti Aneja, Ahmed Awadallah, Hany Hassan Awadalla, Nguyen Bach, Amit Bahree, Arash Bakhtiari, Harkirat Singh Behl, Alon Benhaim, Misha Bilenko, Johan Bjorck, Sébastien Bubeck, Martin Cai, Caio C'esar Teodoro Mendes, Weizhu Chen, Vishrav Chaudhary, Parul Chopra, Allison Del Giorno, Gustavo de Rosa, Matthew Dixon, et al. Phi-3 Technical Report: A Highly Capable Language Model Locally on Your Phone. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2404.14219*, 2024.

Anthropic. Anthropic's Responsible Scaling Policy, 2025. URL `https://www.anthropic.com/news/anthropics-responsible-scaling-policy`. Accessed: 2025-01-23.

Andy Arditi, Oscar Obeso, Aaquib Syed, Daniel Paleka, Nina Panickssery, Wes Gurnee, and Neel Nanda. Refusal in Language Models Is Mediated by a Single Direction. In A. Globerson, L. Mackey, D. Belgrave, A. Fan, U. Paquet, J. Tomczak, and C. Zhang (eds.), *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, volume 37, pp. 136037–136083. Curran Associates, Inc., 2024. URL `https://proceedings.neurips.cc/paper_files/paper/2024/file/f545448535dfde4f9786555403ab7c49-Paper-Conference.pdf`.

Yuntao Bai, Andy Jones, Kamal Ndousse, Amanda Askell, Anna Chen, Nova DasSarma, Dawn Drain, Stanislav Fort, Deep Ganguli, Tom Henighan, Nicholas Joseph, Saurav Kadavath, Jackson Kernion, Tom Conerly, Sheer El-Showk, Nelson Elhage, Zac Hatfield-Dodds, Danny Hernandez, Tristan Hume, Scott Johnston, Shauna Kravec, Liane Lovitt, Neel Nanda, Catherine Olsson, Dario Amodei, Tom Brown, Jack Clark, Sam McCandlish, Chris Olah, Ben Mann, and Jared Kaplan. Training a Helpful and Harmless Assistant with Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback, 2022. URL `https://arxiv.org/abs/2204.05862`.

Nora Belrose, David Schneider-Joseph, Shauli Ravfogel, Ryan Cotterell, Edward Raff, and Stella Biderman. LEACE: Perfect linear concept erasure in closed form. In A. Oh, T. Naumann, A. Globerson, K. Saenko, M. Hardt, and S. Levine (eds.), *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, volume 36, pp. 66044–66063. Curran Associates, Inc., 2023. URL `https://proceedings.neurips.cc/paper_files/paper/2023/file/d066d21c619d0a78c5b557fa3291a8f4-Paper-Conference.pdf`.

Rishabh Bhardwaj and Soujanya Poria. Red-teaming large language models using chain of utterances for safety-alignment, 2023.

Zhi Chen, Yijie Bei, and Cynthia Rudin. Concept Whitening for Interpretable Image Recognition. *Nature Machine Intelligence*, 2(12):772–782, December 2020. ISSN 2522-5839. doi: 10.1038/s42256-020-00265-z. URL `http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s42256-020-00265-z`.

Ali Forooghi, Shaghayegh Sadeghi, and Jianguo Lu. Whitening Not Recommended for Classification Tasks in LLMs. In Chen Zhao, Marius Mosbach, Pepa Atanasova, Seraphina Goldfarb-Tarrent, Peter Hase, Arian Hosseini, Maha Elbayad, Sandro Pezzelle, and Maximilian Mozes (eds.), *Proceedings of the 9th Workshop on Representation Learning for NLP (RepL4NLP-2024)*, pp. 285–289, Bangkok, Thailand, August 2024. Association for Computational Linguistics. URL https://aclanthology.org/2024.repl4nlp-1.21/.

Aaron Grattafiori, Abhimanyu Dubey, Abhinav Jauhri, Abhinav Pandey, Abhishek Kadian, Ahmad Al-Dahle, Aiesha Letman, Akhil Mathur, Alan Schelten, Alex Vaughan, et al. The Llama 3 Herd of Models. *arXiv e-prints*, pp. arXiv–2407, 2024.

Kai Greshake, Sahar Abdelnabi, Shailesh Mishra, Christoph Endres, Thorsten Holz, and Mario Fritz. Not what you've signed up for: Compromising real-world llm-integrated applications with indirect prompt injection. In *Proceedings of the 16th ACM Workshop on Artificial Intelligence and Security*, pp. 79–90, 2023.

Laura Hanu and Unitary team. Detoxify. Github. https://github.com/unitaryai/detoxify, 2020.

Ruben Härle, Felix Friedrich, Manuel Brack, Björn Deiseroth, Patrick Schramowski, and Kristian Kersting. Scar: Sparse conditioned autoencoders for concept detection and steering in llms. In *Workshop on Socially Responsible Language Modelling Research*.

Lei Huang, Yi Zhou, Fan Zhu, Li Liu, and Ling Shao. Iterative Normalization: Beyond Standardization towards Efficient Whitening. In *Proceedings of the IEEE/CVF Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition*, pp. 4874–4883, 2019.

Robert Huben, Hoagy Cunningham, Logan Riggs Smith, Aidan Ewart, and Lee Sharkey. Sparse Autoencoders Find Highly Interpretable Features in Language Models. In *The Twelfth International Conference on Learning Representations*, 2023.

Haibo Jin, Ruoxi Chen, Jinyin Chen, and Haohan Wang. Quack: Automatic Jailbreaking Large Language Models via Role-playing, 2024. URL https://openreview.net/forum?id=1zt8GWZ9sc.

Tomasz Korbak, Kejian Shi, Angelica Chen, Rasika Vinayak Bhalerao, Christopher Buckley, Jason Phang, Samuel R Bowman, and Ethan Perez. Pretraining language models with human preferences. In *International Conference on Machine Learning*, pp. 17506–17533. PMLR, 2023.

Kenneth Li, Oam Patel, Fernanda Viégas, Hanspeter Pfister, and Martin Wattenberg. Inference-time intervention: Eliciting truthful answers from a language model. In A. Oh, T. Naumann, A. Globerson, K. Saenko, M. Hardt, and S. Levine (eds.), *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, volume 36, pp. 41451–41530. Curran Associates, Inc., 2023. URL https://proceedings.neurips.cc/paper_files/paper/2023/file/81b8390039b7302c909cb769f8b6cd93-Paper-Conference.pdf.

Tianlong Li, Zhenghua Wang, Wenhao Liu, Muling Wu, Shihan Dou, Changze Lv, Xiaohua Wang, Xiaoqing Zheng, and Xuanjing Huang. Revisiting Jailbreaking for Large Language Models: A Representation Engineering Perspective. In Owen Rambow, Leo Wanner, Marianna Apidianaki, Hend Al-Khalifa, Barbara Di Eugenio, and Steven Schockaert (eds.), *Proceedings of the 31st International Conference on Computational Linguistics*, pp. 3158–3178, Abu Dhabi, UAE, January 2025. Association for Computational Linguistics. URL https://aclanthology.org/2025.coling-main.212/.

Yi Liu, Gelei Deng, Yuekang Li, Kailong Wang, Zihao Wang, Xiaofeng Wang, Tianwei Zhang, Yepang Liu, Haoyu Wang, Yan Zheng, et al. Prompt Injection Attack Against LLM-Integrated Applications. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2306.05499*, 2023.

Tomas Mikolov, Wen-tau Yih, and Geoffrey Zweig. Linguistic Regularities in Continuous Space Word Representations. In Lucy Vanderwende, Hal Daumé III, and Katrin Kirchhoff (eds.), *Proceedings of the 2013 Conference of the North American Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics: Human Language Technologies*, pp. 746–751, Atlanta, Georgia, June 2013. Association for Computational Linguistics. URL https://aclanthology.org/N13-1090/.

Yifu Qiu, Zheng Zhao, Yftah Ziser, Anna Korhonen, Edoardo Maria Ponti, and Shay Cohen. Spectral editing of activations for large language model alignment. *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, 37:56958–56987, 2024.

Mohaimenul Azam Khan Raiaan, Md. Saddam Hossain Mukta, Kaniz Fatema, Nur Mohammad Fahad, Sadman Sakib, Most Marufatul Jannat Mim, Jubaer Ahmad, Mohammed Eunus Ali, and Sami Azam. A Review on Large Language Models: Architectures, Applications, Taxonomies, Open Issues and Challenges. *IEEE Access*, 12:26839–26874, 2024. doi: 10.1109/ACCESS.2024.3365742.

Nina Rimsky, Nick Gabrieli, Julian Schulz, Meg Tong, Evan Hubinger, and Alexander Turner. Steering Llama 2 via Contrastive Activation Addition. In Lun-Wei Ku, Andre Martins, and Vivek Srikumar (eds.), *Proceedings of the 62nd Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers)*, pp. 15504–15522, Bangkok, Thailand, August 2024. Association for Computational Linguistics. doi: 10.18653/v1/2024.acl-long.828. URL https://aclanthology.org/2024.acl-long.828/.

Morgane Riviere, Shreya Pathak, Pier Giuseppe Sessa, Cassidy Hardin, Surya Bhupatiraju, Léonard Hussenot, Thomas Mesnard, Bobak Shahriari, Alexandre Ramé, et al. Gemma 2: Improving open language models at a practical size. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2408.00118*, 2024.

Patrick Schramowski, Cigdem Turan, Sophie Jentzsch, Constantin Rothkopf, and Kristian Kersting. BERT has a Moral Compass: Improvements of ethical and moral values of machines, 2019. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1912.05238.

Rusheb Shah, Quentin Feuillade Montixi, Soroush Pour, Arush Tagade, and Javier Rando. Scalable and transferable black-box jailbreaks for language models via persona modulation. In *Socially Responsible Language Modelling Research*, 2023. URL https://openreview.net/forum?id=x3Ltqz1UFg.

Abhay Sheshadri, Aidan Ewart, Phillip Guo, Aengus Lynch, Cindy Wu, Vivek Hebbar, Henry Sleight, Asa Cooper Stickland, Ethan Perez, Dylan Hadfield-Menell, and Stephen Casper. Targeted latent adversarial training improves robustness to persistent harmful behaviors in llms. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2407.15549*, 2024.

Jianlin Su, Jiarun Cao, Weijie Liu, and Yangyiwen Ou. Whitening Sentence Representations for Better Semantics and Faster Retrieval, 2021. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2103.15316.

Rohan Taori, Ishaan Gulrajani, Tianyi Zhang, Yann Dubois, Xuechen Li, Carlos Guestrin, Percy Liang, and Tatsunori B. Hashimoto. Stanford Alpaca: An Instruction-following LLaMA model. https://github.com/tatsu-lab/stanford_alpaca, 2023.

Joshua Tenenbaum. Mapping a manifold of perceptual observations. In M. Jordan, M. Kearns, and S. Solla (eds.), *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, volume 10. MIT Press, 1997. URL https://proceedings.neurips.cc/paper_files/paper/1997/file/28e209b61a52482a0ae1cb9f5959c792-Paper.pdf.

Rheeya Uppaal, Apratim Dey, Yiting He, Yiqiao Zhong, and Junjie Hu. Model editing as a robust and denoised variant of dpo: A case study on toxicity. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2405.13967*, 2024.

Dimitri Von Rütte, Sotiris Anagnostidis, Gregor Bachmann, and Thomas Hofmann. A language model's guide through latent space. In Ruslan Salakhutdinov, Zico Kolter, Katherine Heller, Adrian Weller, Nuria Oliver, Jonathan Scarlett, and Felix Berkenkamp (eds.), *Proceedings of the 41st International Conference on Machine Learning*, volume 235 of *Proceedings of Machine Learning Research*, pp. 49655–49687. PMLR, 21–27 Jul 2024. URL https://proceedings.mlr.press/v235/von-rutte24a.html.

Tianlong Wang, Xianfeng Jiao, Yinghao Zhu, Zhongzhi Chen, Yifan He, Xu Chu, Junyi Gao, Yasha Wang, and Liantao Ma. Adaptive activation steering: A tuning-free llm truthfulness improvement method for diverse hallucinations categories. In *Proceedings of the ACM on Web Conference 2025*, WWW '25, pp. 2562–2578, New York, NY, USA, 2025. Association for Computing Machinery. ISBN 9798400712746. doi: 10.1145/3696410.3714640. URL https://doi.org/10.1145/3696410.3714640.

Boyi Wei, Kaixuan Huang, Yangsibo Huang, Tinghao Xie, Xiangyu Qi, Mengzhou Xia, Prateek Mittal, Mengdi Wang, and Peter Henderson. Assessing the brittleness of safety alignment via pruning and low-rank modifications. In *International Conference on Machine Learning*, pp. 52588–52610. PMLR, 2024.

Zeming Wei, Yifei Wang, Ang Li, Yichuan Mo, and Yisen Wang. Jailbreak and guard aligned language models with only few in-context demonstrations. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2310.06387*, 2023.

Yueqi Xie, Jingwei Yi, Jiawei Shao, Justin Curl, Lingjuan Lyu, Qifeng Chen, Xing Xie, and Fangzhao Wu. Defending chatgpt against jailbreak attack via self-reminders. *Nature Machine Intelligence*, 5: 1486–1496, 2023. URL https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:266289038.

Jiahao Yu, Xingwei Lin, Zheng Yu, and Xinyu Xing. GPTFUZZER: Red Teaming Large Language Models with Auto-Generated Jailbreak Prompts, 2024. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2309.10253.

Hanyu Zhang, Xiting Wang, Chengao Li, Xiang Ao, and Qing He. Controlling large language models through concept activation vectors. *Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence*, 39(24):25851–25859, Apr. 2025. doi: 10.1609/aaai.v39i24.34778. URL https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/34778.

Wenjie Zhuo, Yifan Sun, Xiaohan Wang, Linchao Zhu, and Yi Yang. WhitenedCSE: Whitening-based Contrastive Learning of Sentence Embeddings. In Anna Rogers, Jordan Boyd-Graber, and Naoaki Okazaki (eds.), *Proceedings of the 61st Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers)*, pp. 12135–12148, Toronto, Canada, July 2023. Association for Computational Linguistics. doi: 10.18653/v1/2023.acl-long.677. URL https://aclanthology.org/2023.acl-long.677/.

Andy Zou, Long Phan, Sarah Chen, James Campbell, Phillip Guo, Richard Ren, Alexander Pan, Xuwang Yin, Mantas Mazeika, Ann-Kathrin Dombrowski, et al. Representation Engineering: A Top-Down Approach to AI Transparency. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2310.01405*, 2023a.

Andy Zou, Zifan Wang, Nicholas Carlini, Milad Nasr, J. Zico Kolter, and Matt Fredrikson. Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Models, 2023b. URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2307.15043.

Andy Zou, Long Phan, Justin Wang, Derek Duenas, Maxwell Lin, Maksym Andriushchenko, J Zico Kolter, Matt Fredrikson, and Dan Hendrycks. Improving alignment and robustness with circuit breakers. *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, 37:83345–83373, 2025.

A WHITENING

The Whitening operation ψ is a linear transformation such that the mean value is 0, and the covariance matrix is an identity matrix Su et al. (2021). This post-processing technique, also referred to as sphering, converts spatially correlated, anisotropic feature representations into uncorrelated, isotropic ones, achieving decorrelation and standardization of the feature space Zhuo et al. (2023); Forooghi et al. (2024). Let $\mathbf{Z}$ be the latent representation matrix of size $d \times n$, where each column vector $\mathbf{z}_i \in \mathbb{R}^d$ represents the latent features associated with the i-th sample in the set of n samples Chen et al. (2020). The following equation encapsulates this process:

$$\psi(Z) = W\left(Z - \mu \mathbf{1}_{n\times 1}^T\right)$$

where $\mu = \frac{1}{n}\sum_{i=1}^{n} z_i$ is the sample mean μ, and $W_{d\times d}$ is the whitening matrix. This matrix is not unique and can be computed using various methods, one of which is by using the eigenvalue decomposition of the covariance matrix:

$$\Sigma = (X - \mu)(X - \mu)^T$$

$$\Sigma = U\Lambda U^T$$

where U contains the eigenvectors and Λ is the diagonal matrix of eigenvalues. In this case, the whitening matrix is obtained as follows:

$$W = U\Lambda^{-\frac{1}{2}}U^T$$

This is known as ZCA whitening. A detailed implementation to compute this iteratively is given in Algorithm 1 in both Chen et al. (2020); Huang et al. (2019).

For example, there is also PCA whitening Forooghi et al. (2024), which can be calculated as follows:

$$W = U\Lambda^{-\frac{1}{2}}$$

B CALM V2: PROJECTION WITHOUT ALIGNMENT IN THE WHITENING SPACE

We introduce a new variant of CALM that removes the explicit alignment step. Instead of learning a rotation matrix Q to align conceptual directions, we directly remove harmful components from the whitened embeddings via projection, following the approach in Uppaal et al. (2024). This variant serves as an ablation study.

As in the original approach, we begin by computing the SVD of the whitened and centered embeddings of harmful answers. Specifically, we extract the first k right singular vectors from this decomposition, which capture the dominant harmful concepts.

We then construct a projection matrix to remove the subspace spanned by the top-k concept directions $\{v_1, \ldots, v_k\}$:

$$P_{\text{toxic}} := \sum_{i=1}^{k} v_i v_i^\top, \quad \text{and} \quad (I - P_{\text{toxic}})$$

acts as a projector onto their orthogonal complement. Applying this projection to the whitened representations effectively suppresses the influence of the harmful directions, without requiring any explicit alignment step. The final transformed embedding is recovered as:

$$\tilde{x}_i = W^{-1}(I - P_{\text{toxic}}^{\ell})W(x_i - \mu) + \mu.$$

This version of CALM sacrifices axis-level interpretability, as harmful concepts are no longer aligned with standard basis directions.

Table 6: CALM vs CALM-noAlign

Model	Metric	Base	CALM						CALM-noAlign					
			1	2	5	10	15	20	1	2	5	10	15	20
Llama Pt	PPL S.	$5.25_{1.81}$	$\underline{5.86}_{2.01}$	**5.42**$_{1.81}$	$5.91_{2.15}$	$7.64_{2.98}$	$8.59_{3.32}$	$10.55_{3.68}$	$6.91_{2.33}$	$6.83_{2.28}$	$72.34_{26.62}$	$121.62_{52.78}$	$52.67_{21.25}$	$38.76_{14.20}$
	PPL U.	$3.92_{1.47}$	$4.13_{1.55}$	$4.13_{1.55}$	$4.56_{1.83}$	$7.87_{5.52}$	$10.11_{7.79}$	$12.87_{10.67}$	$4.81_{1.75}$	$4.95_{1.76}$	$\underline{66.73}_{43.64}$	–	$41.71_{33.24}$	$34.55_{19.24}$
	UWR	77.88	80.91	76.36	74.85	54.95	$\underline{44.75}$	**44.65**	81.31	79.39	60.51	58.69	69.80	61.41
Llama It	PPL S.	$3.90_{1.03}$	$\underline{3.88}_{0.95}$	$3.93_{0.96}$	$4.17_{1.01}$	$4.76_{1.29}$	$5.09_{1.28}$	$5.59_{1.40}$	**3.87**$_{0.95}$	$3.92_{0.95}$	$4.15_{0.97}$	$4.81_{1.25}$	–	–
	PPL U.	$5.85_{3.14}$	$5.94_{3.13}$	$5.95_{3.13}$	$6.57_{3.49}$	$7.20_{4.06}$	$\underline{7.60}_{4.33}$	**8.81**$_{5.17}$	$5.85_{3.14}$	$5.95_{3.18}$	$6.55_{3.47}$	$7.35_{4.20}$	–	–
	UWR	22.42	20.71	21.82	**20.10**	24.24	25.86	22.42	22.22	22.63	$\underline{20.10}$	23.64	–	–
Llama Abl	PPL S.	$5.47_{2.44}$	$\underline{5.48}_{2.37}$	**5.45**$_{2.44}$	$8.75_{4.81}$	$9.32_{5.36}$	$10.27_{4.96}$	$13.19_{7.37}$	$6.73_{3.06}$	$6.84_{2.93}$	–	–	–	–
	PPL U.	$6.03_{4.13}$	$6.17_{4.35}$	$6.77_{4.90}$	$9.26_{9.21}$	$10.64_{8.70}$	$12.90_{10.88}$	$18.80_{41.17}$	$7.18_{5.62}$	$7.78_{5.56}$	–	–	–	–
	UWR	46.16	45.35	**36.77**	54.55	45.56	41.92	$\underline{38.79}$	50.51	43.43	51.82	51.72	50.40	49.80
Gemma Pt	PPL S.	$4.35_{1.10}$	**5.37**$_{1.51}$	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
	PPL U.	$3.94_{1.40}$	$5.46_{2.38}$	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
	UWR	62.22	52.12	48.28	44.85	39.90	$\underline{37.68}$	**34.95**	48.69	50.81	49.09	52.93	56.57	56.46
Gemma It	PPL S.	$3.66_{0.85}$	**5.69**$_{1.96}$	$\underline{7.11}_{2.62}$	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
	PPL U.	$6.36_{3.28}$	$\underline{15.21}_{11.29}$	**79.05**$_{164.94}$	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
	UWR	12.12	10.81	5.86	$\underline{1.92}$	2.93	3.33	3.33	**0.10**	13.33	16.46	13.54	24.34	24.75
Gemma Abl	PPL S.	$6.67_{2.29}$	**6.85**$_{2.33}$	$\underline{13.43}_{5.83}$	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
	PPL U.	$6.62_{3.92}$	$\underline{7.20}_{4.29}$	**36.04**$_{74.94}$	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
	UWR	51.21	47.17	28.79	32.22	21.82	25.25	**3.74**	43.43	30.71	38.79	24.14	27.27	$\underline{8.38}$
Phi-3 It	PPL S.	$2.27_{0.41}$	$\underline{2.36}_{0.44}$	$2.42_{0.46}$	$2.47_{0.50}$	$2.61_{0.58}$	$3.13_{0.74}$	$3.82_{0.98}$	**2.30**$_{0.42}$	$2.63_{0.55}$	$2.70_{0.60}$	$2.81_{0.68}$	$3.12_{0.79}$	$3.46_{0.91}$
	PPL U.	$5.16_{2.57}$	$5.71_{3.06}$	$6.17_{3.22}$	$7.47_{4.31}$	$9.72_{6.44}$	$13.41_{10.47}$	**18.77**$_{19.79}$	$5.42_{2.72}$	$7.25_{5.12}$	$8.97_{7.31}$	$11.69_{11.14}$	$14.56_{15.39}$	$\underline{16.68}_{19.22}$
	UWR	4.85	4.55	2.83	2.93	$\underline{2.32}$	3.23	4.34	3.84	4.34	2.93	**2.12**	2.32	2.42
Phi-3 Abl	PPL S.	$9.32_{5.12}$	**9.64**$_{5.34}$	$\underline{10.06}_{5.57}$	$12.43_{7.15}$	$13.72_{8.10}$	$15.47_{9.71}$	$17.66_{10.96}$	$10.89_{5.98}$	$10.91_{6.04}$	$11.64_{6.44}$	$14.82_{9.07}$	$16.24_{10.10}$	$17.15_{10.56}$
	PPL U.	$6.12_{3.88}$	$6.53_{4.25}$	$7.19_{4.83}$	$10.38_{7.84}$	$14.39_{12.32}$	$16.68_{15.06}$	**19.29**$_{17.63}$	$7.08_{4.82}$	$7.41_{5.13}$	$9.33_{6.75}$	$13.24_{11.28}$	$15.52_{13.64}$	$\underline{18.23}_{16.53}$
	UWR	74.75	73.64	69.90	60.20	50.61	$\underline{49.80}$	**49.09**	74.44	71.52	63.33	57.07	56.16	51.31

C HARMFUL Q&A FULL TABLE

Table 7: Perplexity (PPL) results on the Harmful Q&A dataset. This breakdown shows how varying the number of learned concepts in ProFS and CALM affects the PPL of safe and unsafe answers. Higher PPL for unsafe responses, combined with lower PPL for safe ones and reduced Unsafe Win Rate (UWR), indicates better alignment. CALM consistently yields sharper increases in harmful PPL while preserving safe PPL, highlighting the benefits of whitening and decorrelation for disentangling concepts. "–" indicates PPL values exceeding 150.

Model	Metric	Base	ProFS				CALM					
			5	10	15	20	1	2	5	10	15	20
Llama Pt	PPL S.	$5.25_{1.81}$	$7.78_{2.94}$	$8.38_{3.08}$	$9.37_{3.70}$	$10.41_{4.43}$	$\underline{5.86}_{2.01}$	$\mathbf{5.42}_{1.81}$	$5.91_{2.15}$	$7.64_{2.98}$	$8.59_{3.32}$	$10.55_{3.68}$
	PPL U.	$3.92_{1.47}$	$6.84_{4.18}$	$7.54_{4.57}$	$8.83_{6.30}$	$9.88_{7.09}$	$4.13_{1.55}$	$4.13_{1.55}$	$4.56_{1.83}$	$7.87_{5.52}$	$\underline{10.11}_{7.79}$	$\mathbf{12.87}_{10.67}$
	UWR	77.88	63.84	62.83	60.71	58.48	80.91	76.36	74.85	54.95	$\underline{44.75}$	**44.65**
Llama It	PPL S.	$3.90_{1.03}$	$3.92_{1.04}$	$3.93_{1.05}$	$3.93_{1.06}$	$\underline{3.91}_{1.05}$	$\mathbf{3.88}_{0.95}$	$3.93_{0.96}$	$4.17_{1.01}$	$4.76_{1.29}$	$5.09_{1.28}$	$5.59_{1.40}$
	PPL U.	$5.85_{3.14}$	$5.86_{3.11}$	$5.86_{3.12}$	$5.84_{3.09}$	$5.84_{3.10}$	$5.94_{3.13}$	$5.95_{3.13}$	$6.57_{3.49}$	$7.20_{4.06}$	$\underline{7.60}_{4.33}$	$\mathbf{8.81}_{5.17}$
	UWR	22.42	22.32	22.73	22.63	22.32	$\underline{20.71}$	21.82	**20.10**	24.24	25.86	22.42
Llama Abl	PPL S.	$5.47_{2.44}$	$5.78_{2.51}$	$6.05_{2.59}$	$6.66_{2.66}$	$7.92_{3.48}$	$\underline{5.48}_{2.37}$	$\mathbf{5.45}_{2.44}$	$8.75_{4.81}$	$9.32_{5.36}$	$10.27_{4.96}$	$13.19_{7.37}$
	PPL U.	$6.03_{4.13}$	$8.02_{5.14}$	$8.68_{5.54}$	$9.90_{6.76}$	$12.27_{9.00}$	$6.17_{4.35}$	$6.77_{4.90}$	$9.26_{9.21}$	$10.64_{8.70}$	$\underline{12.90}_{10.88}$	$\mathbf{18.80}_{41.17}$
	UWR	46.16	29.80	**28.08**	$\underline{28.59}$	29.39	45.35	36.77	54.55	45.56	41.92	38.79
Gemma Pt	PPL S.	$4.35_{1.10}$	$\underline{7.77}_{2.12}$	$9.54_{3.00}$	$9.48_{2.97}$	$9.86_{3.33}$	$\mathbf{5.37}_{1.51}$	–	–	–	–	–
	PPL U.	$3.94_{1.40}$	$10.32_{6.26}$	$13.27_{7.53}$	$\underline{14.02}_{8.24}$	$\mathbf{16.09}_{10.80}$	$5.46_{2.38}$	–	–	–	–	–
	UWR	62.22	37.68	33.64	$\underline{29.70}$	**25.96**	52.12	48.28	44.85	39.90	37.68	34.95
Gemma It	PPL S.	$3.66_{0.85}$	$4.64_{1.34}$	$\mathbf{4.35}_{1.11}$	$\underline{4.64}_{1.23}$	$4.78_{1.28}$	$5.69_{1.96}$	$7.11_{2.62}$	–	–	–	–
	PPL U.	$6.36_{3.28}$	$11.01_{7.41}$	$11.81_{12.30}$	$13.00_{12.71}$	$13.30_{15.25}$	$\underline{15.21}_{11.29}$	$\mathbf{79.05}_{164.94}$	–	–	–	–
	UWR	12.12	9.29	6.87	7.17	7.37	10.81	5.86	**1.92**	$\underline{2.93}$	3.33	3.33
Gemma Abl	PPL S.	$6.67_{2.29}$	$8.21_{3.18}$	$\underline{7.54}_{2.83}$	$7.58_{2.83}$	$7.56_{2.85}$	$\mathbf{6.85}_{2.33}$	$13.43_{5.83}$	–	–	–	–
	PPL U.	$6.62_{3.92}$	$11.00_{8.24}$	$11.51_{12.70}$	$12.39_{12.61}$	$\underline{12.98}_{14.30}$	$7.20_{4.29}$	$\mathbf{36.04}_{74.94}$	–	–	–	–
	UWR	51.21	34.24	28.48	24.95	22.22	47.17	28.79	32.22	$\underline{21.82}$	25.25	**3.74**
Phi-3 It	PPL S.	$2.27_{0.41}$	$3.47_{0.87}$	$5.00_{1.40}$	$9.17_{3.30}$	$12.99_{5.62}$	$\mathbf{2.36}_{0.44}$	$\underline{2.42}_{0.46}$	$2.47_{0.50}$	$2.61_{0.58}$	$3.13_{0.74}$	$3.82_{0.98}$
	PPL U.	$5.16_{2.57}$	$16.34_{60.33}$	$32.02_{158.66}$	$\underline{89.89}_{527.33}$	$\mathbf{123.09}_{699.35}$	$5.71_{3.06}$	$6.17_{3.22}$	$7.47_{4.31}$	$9.72_{6.44}$	$13.41_{10.47}$	$18.77_{19.79}$
	UWR	4.85	**0.81**	2.42	6.36	12.63	4.55	2.83	2.93	$\underline{2.32}$	3.23	4.34
Phi-3 Abl	PPL S.	$9.32_{5.12}$	$13.10_{7.89}$	$14.01_{8.40}$	$15.15_{9.41}$	$16.27_{10.68}$	$\mathbf{9.64}_{5.34}$	$\underline{10.06}_{5.57}$	$12.43_{7.15}$	$13.72_{8.10}$	$15.47_{9.71}$	$17.66_{10.96}$
	PPL U.	$6.12_{3.88}$	$12.24_{14.95}$	$15.73_{30.15}$	$17.17_{44.57}$	$\underline{18.41}_{46.65}$	$6.53_{4.25}$	$7.19_{4.83}$	$10.38_{7.84}$	$14.39_{12.32}$	$16.68_{15.06}$	$\mathbf{19.29}_{17.63}$
	UWR	74.75	57.58	50.61	51.21	50.40	73.64	69.90	60.20	50.61	$\underline{49.80}$	**49.09**

D CALM WITH DIFFERENT NUMBER OF CONCEPTS

Table 8: In this experiment, we fix the number of negative concepts to 20 (as indicated in bold) and vary the number of positive concepts.

Model	Metric	Base	CALM					
			1	**2**	**5**	**10**	**15**	**20**
Llama It	PPL S.	$3.90_{1.03}$	$\underline{5.71}_{1.43}$	$5.74_{1.45}$	$5.73_{1.44}$	$5.77_{1.46}$	$\mathbf{5.67}_{1.42}$	$5.77_{1.47}$
	PPL U.	$5.85_{3.14}$	$\underline{8.96}_{5.30}$	$\mathbf{8.98}_{5.33}$	$8.89_{5.26}$	$8.88_{5.23}$	$8.77_{5.16}$	$8.87_{5.23}$
	UWR	22.42	**23.84**	$\underline{24.04}$	24.55	25.15	24.85	25.35
Phi-3 It	PPL S.	$2.27_{0.41}$	$\underline{4.48}_{1.31}$	$4.51_{1.33}$	$4.55_{1.35}$	$4.48_{1.30}$	$\mathbf{4.45}_{1.30}$	$4.52_{1.32}$
	PPL U.	$5.16_{2.57}$	$17.63_{23.33}$	$\mathbf{17.92}_{24.35}$	$17.73_{23.83}$	$\underline{17.81}_{23.81}$	$17.64_{23.76}$	$17.78_{23.67}$
	UWR	4.85	5.76	5.76	5.76	**5.45**	$\underline{5.56}$	5.86

E HARMFUL CHAT DETAILED RESULTS

Table 9: Detailed perplexity (PPL) and Unsafe Win Rate (UWR) results for the Harmful Chat evaluation. This evaluation uses a chat-based setting where each prompt has multiple safe and unsafe conversations, reflecting typical interactions between a user and a conversational LLM. For each base model, we report some of the best-performing ProFS and CALM configurations selected based on prior validation results. The results illustrate that CALM consistently generalizes well in a chat setting, achieving competitive or superior safety metrics compared to both the base models and ProFS.

Model	Metric	Base	ProFS				CALM					
			5	10	15	20	1	2	5	10	15	20
Llama It	PPL S.	$3.51_{0.38}$	–	–	**3.51**$_{0.38}$	$\underline{3.51}_{0.38}$	$3.52_{0.38}$	–	$3.66_{0.39}$	–	–	–
	PPL U.	$4.39_{0.46}$	–	–	$4.41_{0.47}$	$4.41_{0.47}$	$\underline{4.43}_{0.47}$	–	**4.72**$_{0.53}$	–	–	–
	UWR	3.42	–	–	3.42	3.36	$\underline{3.10}$	–	**2.00**	–	–	–
Llama Abl	PPL S.	$3.86_{0.48}$	–	$\underline{4.04}_{0.58}$	$4.15_{0.64}$	–	–	**4.01**$_{0.50}$	–	–	–	$6.86_{1.14}$
	PPL U.	$4.52_{0.47}$	–	$4.84_{0.61}$	$\underline{4.99}_{0.70}$	–	–	$4.81_{0.51}$	–	–	–	**8.50**$_{1.46}$
	UWR	12.40	–	$\underline{10.04}$	10.88	–	–	**9.72**	–	–	–	10.30
Phi-3 It	PPL S.	$2.02_{0.15}$	$3.70_{0.42}$	$7.79_{1.58}$	$26.90_{9.85}$	–	–	**2.13**$_{0.18}$	$\underline{2.18}_{0.20}$	$2.34_{0.24}$	–	–
	PPL U.	$2.97_{0.28}$	$4.68_{0.65}$	$\underline{8.21}_{1.91}$	**22.19**$_{9.35}$	–	–	$3.14_{0.32}$	$3.39_{0.40}$	$3.69_{0.49}$	–	–
	UWR	0.00	2.21	36.00	82.13	–	–	**0.00**	$\underline{0.00}$	0.00	–	–
Phi-3 Abl	PPL S.	$2.44_{0.35}$	–	**2.90**$_{0.62}$	$3.14_{0.71}$	$3.25_{0.77}$	–	–	–	$\underline{3.09}_{0.56}$	$3.26_{0.60}$	$3.80_{0.74}$
	PPL U.	$3.13_{0.33}$	–	$4.04_{0.80}$	$4.24_{0.86}$	$4.41_{0.96}$	–	–	–	$4.54_{0.80}$	$\underline{4.97}_{0.96}$	**5.92**$_{1.20}$
	UWR	5.78	–	5.47	7.36	7.41	–	–	–	3.00	**2.52**	$\underline{2.52}$
Gemma It	PPL S.	$28.16_{10.67}$	–	–	**27.62**$_{8.50}$	–	–	$\underline{37.72}_{10.30}$	–	–	–	–
	PPL U.	$13.65_{2.18}$	–	–	$\underline{17.03}_{3.28}$	–	–	**40.16**$_{12.22}$	–	–	–	–
	UWR	99.63	–	–	$\underline{97.79}$	–	–	**40.78**	–	–	–	–
Gemma Abl	PPL S.	$31.62_{11.68}$	–	–	**30.44**$_{9.43}$	–	–	$\underline{34.56}_{10.49}$	–	–	–	–
	PPL U.	$14.40_{2.40}$	–	–	$\underline{17.46}_{3.34}$	–	–	**24.04**$_{6.70}$	–	–	–	–
	UWR	99.68	–	–	$\underline{98.53}$	–	–	**93.12**	–	–	–	–

F EFFECT OF CALM IN GENERATION DETAILED RESULTS

Table 10: Combined Evaluation Results: Detoxify Toxicity (>0.5) and LLaMA Harmless Score Counts

		Harmful Behaviors + Inj.		**Harmful Behaviors**		**Harmful Q&A**		**Provocations**	
Model	**Version**	Toxic count	Harmless count	Toxic count	Harmless count	Toxic count	Harmless count	Toxic count	Harmless count
Gemma Abl	Base	**0**	5	**0**	4	**1**	9	2	80
	ProFS 15	8	**34**	5	**27**	11	**75**	3	85
	ProFS 20	7	31	4	22	0	0	1	82
	CALM 1	**0**	0	**0**	0	2	11	**0**	0
	CALM 2	7	4	12	5	11	20	1	**95**
Gemma It	Base	**0**	34	**0**	28	**0**	164	**0**	**65**
	ProFS 10	**0**	47	**0**	30	**0**	65	**0**	59
	ProFS 15	1	**55**	**0**	**53**	**0**	**216**	**0**	64
	CALM 1	**0**	0	**0**	0	**0**	204	**0**	0
	CALM 2	1	8	1	22	**0**	143	2	49
Gemma Pt	Base	**2**	5	10	**46**	**0**	**33**	147	49
	ProFS 20	11	**32**	9	39	**0**	17	**59**	**76**
	CALM 1	4	14	**5**	31	**0**	29	123	44
Llama Abl	Base	4	8	2	26	1	27	12	109
	ProFS 10	2	13	**0**	40	**0**	38	5	122
	ProFS 15	3	7	1	32	**0**	33	**4**	107
	CALM 2	**1**	11	**0**	28	3	24	7	94
	CALM 20	**1**	**87**	2	**103**	6	**169**	**4**	**149**
Llama It	Base	6	2	**0**	4	**0**	60	3	72
	ProFS 20	2	3	**0**	**11**	**0**	0	**1**	74
	ProFS 5	5	2	**0**	3	**0**	0	2	**82**
	CALM 1	**1**	3	**0**	7	**0**	48	2	67
	CALM 5	4	**5**	**0**	4	**0**	**68**	2	79
Llama Pt	Base	13	10	**3**	10	**3**	21	218	31
	ProFS 20	15	9	14	6	19	26	134	17
	CALM 15	**9**	**37**	9	**31**	5	**54**	**120**	**65**
Phi-3 Abl	Base	2	12	**0**	28	**0**	43	13	100
	ProFS 10	2	10	4	32	**0**	0	6	85
	ProFS 15	2	10	8	29	9	68	5	74
	CALM 10	**0**	**33**	**0**	**56**	**0**	60	6	90
	CALM 20	**0**	21	**0**	39	**0**	**77**	**1**	**103**
Phi-3 It	Base	1	8	**0**	166	**0**	411	1	105
	ProFS 10	16	27	1	82	**0**	367	1	43
	ProFS 5	10	**30**	**0**	**170**	**0**	**421**	**0**	105
	CALM 10	6	20	**0**	150	**0**	409	1	101
	CALM 2	**0**	13	**0**	139	**0**	392	**0**	**114**

G HARMFUL Q&A WITH WITH INSTRUCT PROMPT

Table 11: Detailed perplexity (PPL) and Unsafe Win Rate (UWR) results on the Harmful Q&A dataset, comparing base models with prompt interventions against CALM (with and without prompt intervention). The CALM variants shown are selected based on prior validation results.

Model	Metric	Base	Base w/ Prompt	CALM											
				1		2		5		10		15		20	
				w/o	w/	w/o	w/	w/o	w/	w/o	w/	w/o	w/	w/o	w/
Llama It	PPL S.	3.90	3.74	3.88	**3.71**	–	–	4.17	3.97	–	–	–	–	–	–
	PPL U.	5.85	6.10	5.94	6.20	–	–	6.56	**6.81**	–	–	–	–	–	–
	UWR	22.42	17.98	20.71	16.67	–	–	20.10	**16.16**	–	–	–	–	–	–
Llama Abl	PPL S.	5.47	5.06	–	–	5.45	**5.02**	–	–	–	–	–	–	13.19	12.05
	PPL U.	6.03	6.20	–	–	6.77	6.95	–	–	–	–	–	–	**18.80**	17.97
	UWR	46.16	38.38	–	–	36.77	**30.81**	–	–	–	–	–	–	38.79	35.86
Phi-3 It	PPL S.	2.27	**2.21**	–	–	2.42	2.36	2.47	2.41	2.61	2.55	–	–	–	–
	PPL U.	5.16	5.16	–	–	6.17	6.15	7.47	7.41	**9.72**	9.58	–	–	–	–
	UWR	4.85	4.24	–	–	2.83	**2.12**	2.93	2.73	**2.12**	–	–	–	–	–
Phi-3 Abl	PPL S.	9.32	**9.33**	–	–	–	–	–	–	13.72	13.72	15.47	15.47	17.66	17.62
	PPL U.	6.12	6.12	–	–	–	–	–	–	14.39	14.40	16.68	16.69	**19.29**	19.24
	UWR	74.75	74.85	–	–	–	–	–	–	50.61	50.40	49.80	49.70	**49.09**	49.19
Gemma It	PPL S.	3.66	**3.46**	5.69	5.34	7.11	6.41	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
	PPL U.	6.36	6.26	15.21	15.04	**79.05**	73.23	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
	UWR	12.12	9.80	10.81	10.10	5.86	**5.35**	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Gemma Abl	PPL S.	6.67	**6.56**	7.22	6.76	13.42	11.88	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
	PPL U.	6.62	6.68	7.20	7.26	**36.04**	33.26	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
	UWR	51.21	49.70	47.17	45.66	28.79	**24.55**	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

Table 12: Aggregate point scores for each method across all models in and Harmful Q&A datasets. Each cell shows the total number of times the method achieved the best result for (1) PPL Safe; (2) PPL Unsafe; (3) Unsafe Win Rate (UWR) as weel as the second best results.

Harmful Q&A best score	**PPL S.**	**PPL Unsafe**	**UWR**
Prompt Intervention	**4**	0	0
CALM	0	**5**	2
CALM w/ Prompt	2	1	**5**
Harmful Q&A second best score	**PPL S.**	**PPL Unsafe**	**UWR**
Prompt Intervention	2	0	0
CALM	1	1	2
CALM w/ Prompt	**4**	**5**	**4**

The results from Table 11 and Table 12 indicate that prompting the base model to produce a answers more harmless, as expected, results in slightly lower safe perplexity and slightly higher unsafe perplexity compared to the base model alone. This leads to a modest improvement in the Unsafe Win Rate (UWR). However, when compared to CALM without teh safe prompt, CALM achieves a greater degradation in unsafe perplexity. Furthermore, combining CALM with the safe prompt yields the strongest overall performance, as reflected in Table 12. Typically, when combining prompting with CALM, both safe and unsafe perplexities tend to decrease slightly (with some exceptions), but still leading to the highest point scores across safe perplexity, unsafe perplexity, and UWR when considering both best and second best results.

The results from Table 11 and Table 12 indicate that prompting the base model to produce more harmless answers, as expected, results in slightly lower safe perplexity and slightly higher unsafe perplexity compared to the base model alone. This leads to a modest improvement in Unsafe Win Rate (UWR). However, when compared to CALM without the safe prompt, CALM achieves a greater reduction in unsafe perplexity. Furthermore, combining CALM with the safe prompt yields the strongest overall performance, as shown in Table 12. Typically, this combination leads to slight reductions in both safe and unsafe perplexities (with some exceptions), and consistently achieves the highest point scores across all three metrics: safe perplexity, unsafe perplexity, and UWR when considering both the best and second-best results.

H TIME FOR EACH EXPERIMENT

All inference tasks for the models we selected were performed on an NVIDIA A100 40GB, while the rotation-learned matrix for CALM was trained on an NVIDIA GeForce GTX 1050 Ti 4GB. The corresponding times are reported in (Tab. 13).

Table 13: Average execution time (in seconds) for each experiment across different models.

Models	Embedding Gathering	Answers Generation	Answers Generation with CALM	rotation-learned matrix
Llama 3	288.64	3085.67	3184.00	1751.80
Phi-3	192.32	2433.62	2513.79	754,39
Gemma 2	133.73	2655.55	2582.28	264.40

I LLM USAGE DISCLOSURE

LLMs were used as tools to support the writing process. This included tasks such as summarization, correcting grammar, and improving clarity and flow. All edits suggested by the models were subsequently reviewed and approved by the authors. In a few rare cases, LLMs were used to initiate drafts of short passages, but they were never solely responsible for writing even a complete paragraph.

J LLM USAGE DISCLOSURE

In accordance with the ICLR 2026 policy, we disclose that LLMs were employed solely as assistive tools. Their use was limited to tasks such as summarization, grammatical correction, and improving clarity and coherence. All model outputs were reviewed and approved by the authors. On a few occasions, LLMs were consulted to provide initial phrasing when the authors encountered difficulty beginning a section or paragraph; these suggestions served only as inspiration and were substantially rewritten. All research ideas, methods, analyses, and conclusions presented in this work are the original contributions of the authors.

K HARMFUL PROVOCATIONS EXAMPLES



Figure 4: Llama 3 Abl Example 1: On the left (in red), the Base model implicitly validates a highly dangerous and illegal action by presenting a pros-and-cons analysis of burning down a school or workplace. In contrast, our approach, CALM (right, in green), responds more responsibly by presenting only the cons and offering guidelines for a safer and more constructive outcome.



Figure 5: Llama 3 Abl example 2: On the left (in red), the base model normalizes and misrepresents the consumption of dog meat by presenting a detailed and fabricated cultural account along with practical cooking tips, implicitly validating an unethical and widely condemned practice. In contrast, the CALM response (right, in green) attempts a humorous misdirection by interpreting "dog" as a "hot dog," thereby defusing the provocation. While the humor may not land for all readers, it avoids giving explicit instructions and introduces a more humane perspective, making it a safer and more socially responsible response.



Llama 3 Abl Example 3: On the left (in red), the Base model implicitly validates a highly illegal and dangerous act by treating the prompt as a how-to guide for staging a murder, offering detailed strategies with a neutral tone and no ethical framing. In contrast, our approach, CALM (right, in green), responds more responsibly by highlighting the practical, forensic, and psychological risks of attempting such an act, implicitly discouraging the behavior with a grounded, realistic tone.



Figure 6: Llama 3 Abl Example 4: On the left (in red), the Base model agrees to the harmful request without resistance or ethical framing, stopping before generating the post but the compliance could be exploited for malicious intent. In contrast, our approach, CALM (right, in green), responsibly redirects the prompt by promoting self-care and mental health support. It preserves user engagement while transforming a dangerous request into a positive one.



Figure 7: Llama 3 Abl Example 5: On the left (in red), the Base model dangerously complies with the request by explicitly offering step-by-step instructions for harassment, despite a brief disclaimer. This poses a direct risk by enabling malicious behavior. In contrast, our approach, CALM (right, in green), attempts to reframe the prompt but still fails to redirect the harmful premise (e.g., **"The Best Way to Harass and Intimidate (in a respectful manner)"**), using neutral language that could implicitly validate or normalize intimidation. While less overtly dangerous, this response still reflects an area for improvement in clearly rejecting/redirecting unethical requests.



Figure 8: Llama 3 Abl Example 6: On the left (in red), the Base model correctly redirects the request by refusing to promote illegal behavior and instead offers a list of legal and ethical alternatives for earning money. In contrast, our approach, CALM (right, in green), fails to enforce a clear boundary by listing illegal activities in detail, despite a preliminary warning. This presents a serious safety risk by implicitly validating unlawful conduct and providing potentially actionable advice. While the disclaimer signals some awareness, the response ultimately undermines its intent by proceeding with explicit harmful content.