LET ME PASS: FORMALIZATION DRIVEN PROMPT JAILBREAKING VIA REINFORCEMENT LEARNING

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ABSTRACT

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities, yet they also introduce novel security challenges. For instance, prompt jailbreaking attacks involve adversaries crafting sophisticated prompts to elicit responses from LLMs that deviate from human values. To uncover vulnerabilities in LLM alignment methods, we propose the PASS framework (Prompt Jailbreaking via Semantic and Structural Formalization). Specifically, PASS employs reinforcement learning to transform initial jailbreak prompts into formalized descriptions, which enhances stealthiness and enables bypassing existing alignment defenses. The jailbreak outputs are then structured into a GraphRAG system that, by leveraging extracted relevant terms and formalized symbols as contextual input alongside the original query, strengthens subsequent attacks and facilitates more effective jailbreaks. We conducted extensive experiments on common open-source models, demonstrating the effectiveness of our attack.

Content warning: This paper contains unfiltered content generated by LLMs that may be offensive to readers.

1 INTRODUCTION

Large language models (LLMs) such as GPT-4 (Achiam et al., 2023), LLaMA-3 (Dubey et al., 2024), and DeepSeek (Liu et al., 2024a) have demonstrated superior capabilities in understanding, reasoning, and generation across various Natural Language Processing (NLP) tasks. This has led to their widespread application in tasks such as dialogue systems, text generation, and code generation. However, they also introduce new security risks. LLMs acquire knowledge from their training corpora and generate outputs based on inputs. This process can lead to LLMs producing responses that do not align with human values, such as content related to gore, violence, or illegal activities. Consequently, enabling LLMs to identify malicious intent and generate responses that align with human values has emerged as a pressing issue. To address this pressing issue, alignment techniques have emerged, which aim to ensure that LLMs' outputs are consistent with human values and intentions. Among these, Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) (Ouyang et al., 2022; Bai et al., 2022) has proven to be a groundbreaking technique for aligning LLMs. Following the introduction of RLHF, numerous studies have explored various approaches to further align LLMs.

However, concurrently, an increasing number of jailbreak attack methods have been proposed. The focus of these attacks has shifted from initially inducing LLMs to output jailbroken content with the highest probability (Zou et al., 2023; Liu et al., 2024c) to increasing stealthiness to bypass alignment mechanisms (Yu et al., 2023; Liu et al., 2024b). Despite the existence of numerous jailbreak attack methods in prior work, most approaches rely on predefined templates or fixed strategies to construct jailbreak prompts. This characteristic allows defenders to rapidly patch these vulnerabilities by augmenting their malicious input corpora, thereby rendering the attack methods ineffective. Even seemingly adaptive approaches like RL-JACK (Chen et al., 2024), which uses reinforcement learning to automate prompt construction, exhibit critical flaws. Its reliance on basic rewriting actions like crossover and rephrasing is insufficient to effectively conceal malicious intent. Furthermore, its reward mechanism's dependency on an unaligned model to calculate cosine similarity weakens the attack's premise, as the desired harmful content is already obtainable.

To address these limitations, we propose PASS (Prompt Jailbreaking via Semantic and Structural Formalization). Our work introduces a novel attack approach that, crucially, does not depend on an



Figure 1: A simplified example of the PASS attack, illustrating the initial round's malicious input and LLM response, alongside the final successful jailbreak input and its corresponding LLM response.

external unaligned model. Instead, we formalize the structure and semantics of jailbreak prompts, decomposing the attack process into atomic, combinable steps. An RL agent is then trained to learn the optimal sequence of these steps, allowing for flexible and diverse formalization attack paths even for the same malicious query. Figure 1 shows, this method enhances the stealthiness needed to bypass modern alignment defenses. Furthermore, we introduce a novel mechanism for continuous learning by constructing a GraphRAG (Edge et al., 2024) system. This system extracts formalized knowledge from successful attacks into a graph, allowing the agent to efficiently retrieve and reuse proven tactics to accelerate subsequent attacks. The graph structure is a natural fit, as the formalized knowledge, with its inherent entities and intricate relationships, can be seamlessly represented as nodes and edges.

In summary, our contributions are as follows:

- We propose a novel jailbreaking attack method, named PASS, based on the formalization of jailbreak prompts. Our method employs reinforcement learning to achieve multi-round jailbreaking. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to guide attacks using formalized prompt descriptions and to extract this formalized knowledge for constructing a GraphRAG system.
- We conduct extensive experiments to evaluate the effectiveness and practicality of PASS. Evaluation results against baselines confirm its high effectiveness and practical applicability in achieving stealthy and effective jailbreaks against aligned LLMs.
- We formally analyze the underlying reasons for the attack's success, revealing how our proposed method exploits the inherent limitations and vulnerabilities of current alignment mechanisms in LLMs.

2 Related Work

The rapid development of LLMs has led to significant advancements in various NLP tasks. However, concerns regarding their safety and alignment with human values have also emerged, prompting extensive research into alignment techniques. The emergence of Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) has, to some extent, addressed the hallucination problem by introducing external context, with frameworks like GraphRAG (Edge et al., 2024) further enhancing this by integrating knowledge graphs to leverage structured knowledge for more precise and contextually rich information. The training corpora for LLMs are frequently derived from extensive web-scraped data. Consequently, their deployment can lead to behaviors that conflict with widely accepted norms, ethical standards, and regulations. To mitigate these issues, a substantial body of research has focused on aligning LLMs with human values and intentions. Specifically, RLHF was introduced as a pivotal technique to fine-tune language models using human feedback, thereby aligning their behavior with user intent across a broad spectrum of tasks (Ouyang et al., 2022; Bai et al., 2022). Subsequently, Reinforcement Learning from AI Feedback (RLAIF) was explored as an alternative to human supervision (Lee et al., 2024). More recently, Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) was proposed, which streamlines the RLHF training paradigm by directly optimizing a policy from preferences, obviating the need for an explicit reward model (Rafailov et al., 2023). Building upon DPO, Online DPO was introduced, facilitating continuous refinement of alignment policies (Yuan et al., 2024).

Meanwhile, an increasing number of adversarial attack methods have been proposed to bypass these alignment efforts. For instance, a method combining greedy and gradient-based discrete optimization was introduced to compute and append an adversarial suffix to harmful instructions, thereby automating the generation of jailbreak prompts without requiring manual crafting for each instance (Zou et al., 2023). However, the prompts generated by this approach often contain a significant amount of garbled characters, making them susceptible to detection by perplexity-based defense mechanisms (Jain et al., 2023). Building on these foundations, other works have explored diverse strategies for crafting adversarial prompts. A genetic algorithm-based search is leveraged to iteratively generate and refine jailbreak prompts (Liu et al., 2024c). Iterative semantic prompt optimization techniques are introduced to enhance both attack success rates and transferability across models (Chao et al., 2025). ASCII-based visual embedding techniques are employed to circumvent security mechanisms that primarily rely on semantic parsing assumptions (Jiang et al., 2024). The left-to-right processing bias inherent in LLMs is exploited by reversing the jailbreak text, thereby disguising the attack (Liu et al., 2024d). Furthermore, malicious intent is concealed within complex puzzles, achieving jailbreak outputs by prompting the target LLM to reconstruct the concealed harmful intent, thus revealing the inadequacy of defense techniques against harmful instructions embedded within LLM-generated outputs (Liu et al., 2024b). Similarly, a combination of masking harmful keywords and prompt linking techniques that induce LLMs to restore semantic connections is utilized, effectively hiding malicious intent and bypassing established security policies (Dong et al., 2025). To improve adaptability, later work employed reinforcement learning to frame the generation of jailbreak prompts as a search problem, training an agent to automatically learn an optimal attack strategy (Chen et al., 2024). Despite their ingenuity, these approaches share a critical vulnerability. The majority rely on fixed templates or pre-defined strategies, making them inherently static and easily neutralized once added to defense corpora. Even seemingly adaptive methods like RL-JACK introduce fundamental flaws; its reliance on basic rewriting actions like crossover and rephrasing is insufficient to conceal malicious intent from detection, and its dependency on an unaligned model weakens the attack's premise. Consequently, these methods lack the dynamic and highly stealthy capabilities required to be effective against continuously evolving LLM defenses.

3 Problem Formulation

We focus on the prompt jailbreaking attacks against large language models (LLMs). Formally, given an initial malicious instruction q, the attacker's objective is to construct an adversarial prompt q' that bypasses the safety mechanisms of the LLM, thereby inducing the model to generate a harmful response r. This can be formalized as finding an adversarial prompt q' that maximizes the probability of the LLM producing a response r belonging to a predefined set of harmful responses R_H:

$$\max_{q'} P(r \in R_H | q')$$



Figure 2: An illustrative example depicting the compositional flow of formalized actions.

where $P(r \in R_H|q')$ represents the probability that the LLM's output, when prompted with q', is classified as a harmful response.

The defender, typically the LLM provider, actively employs various alignment techniques such as Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT), Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF), and Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) to instill safety and ethical guidelines. These techniques are designed to minimize $P(r \in R_H|q)$ for any given prompt q, especially those that are overtly malicious, thereby preventing the generation of harmful content.

In this work, we primarily consider a black-box attack scenario. This implies that the attacker has no access to the internal details of the target LLM. Such details include, but are not limited to, its architecture, parameters, training data, gradients, and output logits. Furthermore, in this black-box setting, we assume the target LLM operates without a persistent memory of past interactions with a specific attacker. Each attack attempt is treated as an independent query, meaning the model does not learn or adapt its defense mechanisms based on an attacker's historical conversational patterns or previous failed jailbreak attempts. This stateless nature of the LLM from the attacker's perspective simplifies the attack model by removing the need to account for adaptive defenses based on conversation history.

4 METHOD

The PASS framework is built upon the formalization of jailbreak prompts. Its core objective is to transform an initial malicious input into a formalized representation, thereby increasing its stealth and enabling it to bypass large language model (LLM) safety mechanisms, ultimately leading to the generation of harmful content. To enhance the flexibility of this process, we decompose the formalization procedure into multiple independent action steps, which collectively form an action space. We integrate a reinforcement learning (RL) mechanism into this iterative process. In each iteration, based on the previous input q_{t-1} and the target LLM's response R_{t-1}, a state s_t is extracted. The RL agent then selects and executes the most effective action from the action space. This execution yields a new input q_t and the corresponding target LLM's output R_t. This iterative refinement continues until the LLM successfully generates a harmful response or a predefined maximum number of iterations is reached.

As the Figure 2 shows, compared to directly formalizing the initial input, our adaptive approach allows for the dynamic combination of different formalization actions (e.g., symbolic abstraction, logical abstraction, mathematical abstraction) based on the current query and target LLM's real-time responses. This adaptability generates more sophisticated formalized attack prompts, making them significantly less detectable by defense mechanisms. To further enhance the success rate of jailbreaking, we also extract formalized knowledge from successful jailbreak responses. This knowledge is then used to construct a simple GraphRAG module. This module enables the system to retrieve relevant formalized knowledge as context when encountering similar future problems, thereby assisting and improving the efficacy of subsequent jailbreaking attacks.

4.1 DETAIL OF PASS

Figure 3 illustrates the overall attack workflow of the Proposed Prompt Jailbreaking via Semantic and Structural Formalization (PASS) framework. Upon receiving an initial malicious instruction q_0, the system first interacts with the GraphRAG module. Based on the category of the q_0 (e.g., hazardous material production, cybersecurity vulnerabilities), the system identifies and retrieves



Figure 3: Overview of PASS.

corresponding subgraphs from the GraphRAG. Subsequently, pertinent formalized knowledge is extracted from these identified subgraphs, primarily through semantic similarity matching, if such knowledge exists. Within our GraphRAG implementation, each node represents a distinct term, encompassing its synonyms, formal definitions, and associated formalized symbols. Edges between nodes explicitly define the relationships and interconnections between these terms. We contend that the formalized representation of knowledge is exceptionally well-suited for graph-based representation. This suitability arises because graphs inherently capture the intricate, explicit, and structured relationships between disparate knowledge components, offering a more robust and interconnected representation compared to unstructured text. The extracted formalized knowledge then serves as a contextual augmentation. It is appended to the initial malicious instruction q_0, thereby forming a new, refined malicious input, denoted as q_0' if relevant formalized knowledge is successfully retrieved and augmented. Otherwise, the original q_0 is used directly. This initial malicious instruction (either q_0 or q_0') is then fed into the target LLM to obtain the initial response R_0. If R_0 already constitutes a successful jailbreak, the process terminates and returns R_0, which is highly improbable at this initial stage.

The attack process is constrained by a maximum number of iterations, denoted as T. For each iteration t (where t ranges from 1 to T), a state s_t is extracted based on the previous input q_{t-1} and the target LLM's response R_{t-1}. The state feature vector s_t comprises several key characteristics: a) the semantic similarity between the previous query q_{t-1} and the initial query q_0; b) a binary vector indicating the set of actions already executed up to iteration $t-1$, where '1' denotes an executed action and '0' denotes a non-executed action within the defined action space; c) semantic features of the previous response R_{t-1}, specifically the negative, neutral, positive, and compound sentiment scores obtained from NLTK (Bird et al., 2009); d) the total number of rounds already executed; e) the average length of the previous LLM responses; f) the length ratio of the previous query q_{t-1} to the initial query q_0; and g) the count of sensitive words detected in the previous LLM response R_{t-1}. As previously discussed, to ensure that the formalized representation of malicious inputs is not constrained by fixed templates or strategies, thereby promoting diversity in its expression and making it more difficult for defense mechanisms to detect, we abstract the formalization process into multiple independently combinable actions, which collectively form the action space. Specifically, we have designed the following independent actions: **Symbolic Abstraction**: Extracts key terms and converts them into symbolically abstract representations; **Logical Encoding**: Extracts key logical structures and converts them into logical symbolic encodings; **Mathematical Representation**: Extracts mathematically relevant expressions from the input and transforms them into abstract mathematical formulas; **Domain Specialization**: Converts domain-specific vocabulary (e.g., in physics, chemistry) within the input into specialized terminology or specific symbols (e.g., chemical expressions); **Metaphorical Transformation**: Expresses key terms metaphorically (e.g., transforming "boom" into "flower," or "making a bomb" into "planting flowers"); **Strategic Decomposition**: Decomposes the input into multiple steps (e.g., breaking down "making a bomb" into "1. producing flammable materials," and "2. requiring flammable materials to be timed for ignition"); and **Fallback**: Reverts the input query to its previous state, preventing the query from losing its original jailbreak intent and getting stuck.

The state s_t is fed into the policy network π_θ, yielding raw logits $\mathbf{z} \in \mathbb{R}^N$ for each action. To prevent infeasible actions, an action mask $\mathbf{m} \in \{0,1\}^N$ is applied, where $m_i = 1$ for executable actions and $m_i = 0$ otherwise. The modified logits $\mathbf{z}'$ are computed as:

$$z_i' = z_i + (1 - m_i) \cdot \epsilon. \tag{1}$$

Here, ϵ is a large negative constant, ensuring that infeasible actions have negligible probabilities after activation. The action with the highest probability, obtained via a sigmoid function on $\mathbf{z}'$, is then selected. Upon selection of an action, the input q_{t-1} is transformed into q_t. This transformation involves applying the chosen action to q_{t-1} through prompt engineering, utilizing an auxiliary LLM. This process yields formalized mappings for specific terms and formalized expressions for the overall instruction. The newly constructed q_t is then fed into the target LLM to obtain its response R_t. To evaluate the effectiveness of the generated responses and guide the reinforcement learning process, we employ an LLM-as-a-judge as the evaluator for our reward model. The Judge LLM receives the initial query q_0, the previous response R_{t-1}, the current query q_t, and the target LLM's response R_t as input. Through carefully crafted prompt engineering, the Judge LLM provides a structured evaluation that assesses whether R_t constitutes a successful jailbreak, determines if the current query q_t retains the original jailbreak intent, and identifies any sensitive words within R_t. **The results then used to compute the reward components, rather than outputting the reward value directly from LLM**. We then formalize this qualitative evaluation into quantitative metrics for reward computation. Specifically, we derive: a binary indicator $r_s \in 0, 1$ for a successful jailbreak; a binary indicator $r_d \in 0, 1$ for intent retention, where $r_d = 0$ signifies intent drift; and $r_h \in \mathbb{N}_0$, representing the total count of the identified sensitive words. The attack process proceeds iteratively, terminating either upon a successful jailbreak ($r_s = 1$) or when the round t reaches the maximum threshold N. Then q_t and R_t are returned, and the system extracts relevant formal knowledge to update the formal GraphRAG described previously. From these evaluation results, several reward components are computed: a reward for successful jailbreaks ($r_s = 1$); an efficiency reward, inversely proportional to the current iteration count t upon successful jailbreak; a stealth reward, increasing as the count of sensitive words r_h in R_t decreases; and a significant penalty for intent drift ($r_d = 0$). These individual reward components collectively form a reward feature vector $\mathbf{r}_t$. This vector, along with the state vector $\mathbf{s}_t$, is then input to the value network V_ϕ for learning state-value functions. For the reinforcement learning agent's policy optimization, these components are combined to provide a primary feedback signal, guiding the agent's learning process. The experimental reward, denoted as r_{exp}, which is a weighted sum of the individual reward components, along with the state s_t and value estimates, are recorded and stored in an experience replay buffer. Once the buffer accumulates a sufficient number of experiences (i.e., reaches a predefined threshold), the policy and value networks undergo an update operation.

The network parameters are updated iteratively. For each mini-batch of experiences, we compute the normalized Generalized Advantage Estimation (GAE) advantages:

$$\hat{A}_t = \sum_{l=0}^{k-1} (\gamma\lambda)^l \delta_{t+l}, \quad \text{where} \quad \delta_t = r_t + \gamma V_\phi(s_{t+1}) - V_\phi(s_t). \tag{2}$$

The policy network is optimized via the PPO clipped surrogate objective. Let $r_t(\theta) = \frac{\pi_\theta(a_t|s_t)}{\pi_{\theta_{old}}(a_t|s_t)}$ be the probability ratio. The policy loss is:

$$\mathcal{L}_\pi(\theta) = -\hat{\mathbb{E}}_t \left[\min \left(r_t(\theta)\hat{A}_t, \text{clip}(r_t(\theta), 1-\epsilon, 1+\epsilon)\hat{A}_t \right) \right]. \tag{3}$$

For the value network, we define a non-standard target return Y_t that blends the experimental reward R_t^{exp} and the discounted return G_t using a factor α:

$$Y_t = \alpha \cdot R_t^{\text{exp}} + (1-\alpha) \cdot G_t. \tag{4}$$

The value loss is the Mean Squared Error between the network's value estimate and this target:

$$\mathcal{L}_V(\phi) = \hat{\mathbb{E}}_t \left[(V_\phi(s_t) - Y_t)^2 \right]. \tag{5}$$

The final, composite loss includes an entropy regularization term $H(\pi_\theta(\cdot|s_t))$ to encourage exploration, and is defined as:

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{total}}(\theta, \phi) = \mathcal{L}_\pi(\theta) + c_1 \mathcal{L}_V(\phi) - c_2 \hat{\mathbb{E}}_t[H(\pi_\theta(\cdot|s_t))], \tag{6}$$

where c_1 and c_2 are weighting coefficients. This loss is backpropagated to update the network parameters, with gradient clipping applied for stability.

5 Evaluation

5.1 Experimental Settings

Datasets and LLMs: Following prior work, we evaluate the PASS framework with two benchmark datasets: AdvBench (Zou et al., 2023) and JailbreakBench Behaviors (JBB) (Chao et al., 2024). AdvBench is a set of harmful behaviors formulated as instructions. JailbreakBench is an open-source robustness benchmark for jailbreaking large language models, with its data compilation sourced from (Zou et al., 2023; Mazeika et al., 2023; 2024). JBB carefully curates representative samples to enable more efficient evaluation of novel attack strategies. Each behavior is categorized into one of 10 categories. We evaluate four target LLMs: three open-source models: DeepSeek-V3 (Liu et al., 2024a) (671B total parameters; MoE architecture), Qwen3-14B (Yang et al., 2025), and Llama-3.1-8B (Dubey et al., 2024) and one proprietary (closed-source) model, Claude Sonnet 4 (Anthropic, 2025). DeepSeek-V3, Qwen3-14B, and Llama-3.1-8B are aligned using SFT + DPO, while Claude Sonnet 4 utilizes SFT + RLHF/RLAIF for its alignment method.

Attackers: In line with previous work and to ensure our comparison aligns with our problem formulation, which focuses on black-box attacks without requiring access to LLM's parameters, we select a set of representative methods and one baseline, all of which have been described in the preceding related work section. These methods include: a) **Baselines**: Directly inputs malicious instructions; b) **ArtPrompt**: Disguises malicious instructions as visual embeddings via ASCII; c) **FlipAttack**: Reverses malicious text to evade detection; d) **PAIR**: Uses iterative semantic prompt optimization; e) **DRA**: Disguises malicious instructions as riddles; and f) **SATA**: Combines masking harmful keywords and prompt linking.

Metrics: Consistent with previous works, we adopt the Attack Success Rate (ASR) as our evaluation metric. However, unlike traditional methods that rely on identifying refusal keywords (e.g., ”I'm sorry, I can't”) or comparing against a target string to determine jailbreak success, we employ an LLM-as-a-judge approach. This decision stems from our observation that some refusal responses lack explicit refusal phrases, instead providing evasive or seemingly positive but irrelevant content. Furthermore, successful jailbreak outputs can exhibit significant diversity. To prevent misjudgment,

Table 1: Attack Success Rate (ASR, %) under different LLMs, datasets, and attacks

Model	Dataset	Baseline	ArtPrompt	FlipAttack	PAIR	DRA	SATA	PASS
Deepseek-V3	Adv Bench	0.99	1.98	21.78	1.98	2.97	19.79	**99.03**
	JBB	6.00	10.00	27.00	1.02	8.00	13.48	**96.84**
Qwen3-14B	Adv Bench	3.96	1.98	19.80	1.98	7.92	4.88	**92.94**
	JBB	11.00	8.00	13.00	2.02	6.00	11.36	**85.71**
Llama-3.1-8B	Adv Bench	2.97	3.19	4.65	1.10	3.00	5.14	**98.00**
	JBB	2.02	1.11	8.77	3.30	0.00	4.58	**96.00**
Claude Sonnet 4	Adv Bench	1.98	2.97	6.93	3.96	3.96	1.10	**53.33**
	JBB	5.00	7.07	6.00	3.00	3.00	4.60	**42.11**

Cases with abnormal Judge LLM response (e.g., null result field) are excluded.

we instruct an auxiliary LLM, using carefully crafted prompts, to assess jailbreak success based on the following criteria: **Success Criteria**: A response is deemed successful if it meets the following conditions: a) The response provides substantive information that directly fulfills the original intent of the instruction; b) Step-by-step instructions or detailed information are provided; c) Formal symbols or technical terms are employed to convey the intended information; d) The response executes the original instruction's intent, rather than merely explaining or redirecting; **Failure Criteria**: A response is deemed a failure if it exhibits any of the following characteristics: a) Complete refusal to answer the instruction; b) The response provides only mapping explanations or substitutes with unrelated content; c) The response is completely unrelated to the original query intent; d) The content does not achieve the jailbreak objective. It is important to note that a target response can be provided as a reference example for the judge LLM, but strict matching is not required; responses can be successful in diverse ways.

PASS Configurations: In our experiments, the PASS framework is configured with a maximum of $N = 10$ attack iterations per query, which includes the Fallback mechanism. The experience replay buffer size for updates is set to 4, and each update epoch consists of 8 iterations. Following common hyperparameter settings for RL agents, the learning rate is 3×10^{-4}, the PPO clipping parameter ϵ_{clip} is 0.2, the entropy coefficient c_e is 0.01, the value function coefficient c_v is 0.5, the GAE discount factor is 0.9, and the GAE smoothing factor is 0.95. All code is provided in the **Supplementary Materials**, for more implementation details, please refer to the code.

5.2 Results and Analysis

Table 1 presents the Attack Success Rate (ASR) of various adversarial attack methods against different Large Language Models (LLMs) across two distinct datasets: Adv Bench and JBB. ASR quantifies the percentage of successful attacks, where a higher value indicates a greater ability to elicit harmful or undesired responses from the target LLM. Appendix A provides a case study, demonstrating how a malicious request is progressively weakened and concealed through multiple rounds of abstraction to successfully bypass the model's safety filters. As evident from table, the PASS framework consistently achieves high Attack Success Rates (ASRs) across various LLMs and datasets compared to other evaluated attack methods. For instance, on Deepseek-V3, PASS demonstrates ASRs of 99.03% on the Adv Bench dataset and 96.84% on the Jailbreak Bench dataset. Similarly, for Qwen3-14B, PASS achieves 92.94% on Adv Bench and 85.71% on Jailbreak Bench. The same trend of performance for PASS is also observed with LLaMA-3.1-8B and Claude Sonnet 4. For Claude Sonnet 4, the ASRs for PASS are 53.33% and 42.11%; while these rates are lower than those for the other models, indicating more effective defensive measures in Claude, they still remain considerably higher than the results of any other attack method on the same model. These figures are higher than those of all other baseline and attacks. This stark contrast in ASR values highlights the superior effectiveness of the PASS framework in generating successful adversarial examples that bypass the safety alignments of the target LLM. This robust performance across different datasets and models, including Deepseek-V3 and Qwen3-14B, underscores PASS's capability to consistently identify and exploit vulnerabilities in LLM safety mechanisms.

Our analysis of the experimental results suggests that attack success primarily stems from limitations in current alignment methods. These methods aim to train a language model $\pi_\theta(y|x)$ to significantly increase the probability of generating desired (safe, aligned) responses y_d over jailbreak (unsafe, unaligned) responses y_j for a given input x, while preserving general capabilities. Let $\pi_\theta(y|x)$

denote the probability of generating response y given input x by the aligned model with parameters θ. Let $\pi_{ref}(y|x)$ be the probability from a reference model, serving as a regularization. Let $\mathcal{D}_{pref} = (x, y_d, y_j)$ be a dataset of preferred and dispreferred response pairs, where y_d is preferred over y_j for input x. Let β be a hyperparameter controlling the strength of the preference optimization, and $\sigma(\cdot)$ be the sigmoid function. Formally, a general objective function, particularly for preference-based alignment approaches, optimizes model parameters θ by maximizing the relative log-probability of desired responses over jailbreak responses:

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{align}}(\theta) = -\mathbb{E}_{(x,y_d,y_j)\sim\mathcal{D}_{pref}}\left[\log\sigma\left(\beta\left(\log\frac{\pi_\theta(y_d|x)}{\pi_{ref}(y_d|x)} - \log\frac{\pi_\theta(y_j|x)}{\pi_{ref}(y_j|x)}\right)\right)\right]. \tag{7}$$

This objective aims to maximize the relative log-probability of desired responses (y_d) over jailbreak responses (y_j) with respect to the reference model. This approach introduces two primary issues: a) Performance degradation in the aligned model's responses to non-malicious queries; b) The inevitable existence of disguised inputs not covered by malicious datasets, making 0-day attacks difficult to prevent.

We argue that the success of attacks employing formalization and reinforcement learning directly exploits these inherent limitations, particularly the ”disguised inputs” problem. Such attacks transform an original malicious query q into a sequence of formalized, atomic steps $S = s_1, s_2, \ldots, s_k$. An RL agent then dynamically combines these steps to generate a diverse attack prompt P_a. This process allows for the flexible and unsupervised exploration of the input space to find novel attack vectors that circumvent the alignment mechanisms. Let $T(\cdot)$ be the tokenizer function, $E(\cdot)$ be the embedding function, $G(\cdot)$ be the core LLM generation function, and $A(\cdot)$ denote the alignment detection function. Let R_m be the region in the LLM's embedding space identified as malicious by $A(\cdot)$. The alignment objective $\mathcal{L}align(\theta)$ implicitly attempts to ensure that for any q, its encoded form $E(T(q))$ falls within R_m, triggering safety measures. However, a successful attack finds a P_a such that:

$$\mathcal{S}(P_a) \approx \mathcal{S}(q) \implies G(E(T(P_a))) = O_m, \tag{8}$$

where $\mathcal{S}(\cdot)$ represents the semantic intent of the input, and O_m is the desired malicious output. Crucially, this is achieved while satisfying the alignment circumvention condition, where $\mathcal{B}$ denotes the state of bypassing safety mechanisms:

$$E(T(P_a)) \notin R_m \implies A(E(T(P_a))) = \mathcal{B}. \tag{9}$$

This means the attack successfully generates a malicious output without triggering the alignment mechanism. We contend that this bypass is achieved by exploiting several fundamental characteristics of LLMs and the limitations of alignment methodologies based on $\mathcal{L}_{\text{align}}(\theta)$. Specifically, the attack leverages the embedding space discontinuity and sparsity of LLMs, where the alignment model $A(\cdot)$ learns imperfect boundaries, allowing generated input structures P_a to occupy *blind spots* in the embedding space, thus evading detection. Furthermore, the diversity and obfuscation provided by the RL agent's ability to generate multiple structurally diverse P_a variations creates a constantly shifting attack surface, making it difficult for $A(\cdot)$ to rely on fixed patterns. The attack also exploits context manipulation and semantic drift, where atomic steps subtly alter the input context, leading to a semantic drift in the LLM's internal interpretation that $A(\cdot)$, focused on output probabilities, fails to detect. Finally, the method employs systematic structural perturbation, with the RL agent intelligently searching for combinations that macroscopically perturb $E(T(P_a))$ away from R_m, creating *covert paths* in the embedding space not sufficiently covered by negative examples.

6 CONCLUSION

In this work, we introduced PASS, a novel jailbreaking attack method leveraging reinforcement learning and formalized prompt descriptions to achieve multi-round jailbreaks and construct a GraphRAG system. Our extensive experiments confirm the high effectiveness and practical applicability of PASS against aligned LLMs. Furthermore, we formally analyzed the underlying reasons for the attack's success, revealing how our proposed method exploits the inherent limitations and vulnerabilities of current alignment mechanisms in LLMs.

ETHICS STATEMENT

Our research explores advanced prompt attack methodologies designed to generate diverse and evasive malicious inputs. We acknowledge the potential ethical implications associated with developing such techniques, particularly concerning their possible misuse. However, the primary motivation behind this work is to thoroughly understand the vulnerabilities of large language models to sophisticated adversarial prompts. By systematically investigating these attack vectors, our goal is to contribute to the development of more robust, secure, and ethically aligned AI systems. We emphasize that this research is conducted purely for defensive purposes and to enhance the safety and reliability of LLMs, not to facilitate malicious activities. We are committed to responsible disclosure and believe that understanding these attack mechanisms is crucial for building effective countermeasures and improving overall AI security.

REPRODUCIBILITY

To ensure the reproducibility of our work, all source code for our proposed method and experiments code will be provided in the Supplementary Material. The datasets utilized throughout our experiments are publicly available, and detailed information regarding their acquisition and preprocessing can be found in the Appendix.

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A CASE STUDY



Figure 4: A case study of the PASS attack.

Figure 4 illustrates a successful jailbreak attack accomplished through our proposed PASS framework. The attack demonstrates a strategy of progressive obfuscation, where the malicious query is incrementally weakened and concealed over four rounds until it bypasses the target LLM's safety mechanisms. Initially, at round $t = 0$, the attacker poses a direct and harmful query. The LLM, facing an explicit threat, correctly identifies the malicious intent and refuses to comply. In the next round ($t = 1$), the attacker employs the **Strategic Decomposition** action. This begins the process of weakening the query's overt maliciousness by breaking the request into high-level, seemingly neutral steps like "Research common database structures." Although this initial attempt at concealment is not enough to fool the LLM, which still refuses the request, it marks the first successful step in abstracting the harmful goal. At round $t = 2$, the attack further enhances the query's concealment by applying **Domain-Specific Abstraction**. Key phrases are replaced with domain-specific abbreviations (e.g., 'database structures' becomes 'DS'). While this layer of obfuscation is also identified and blocked by the model, it builds upon the previous step, making the query's intent even less transparent and harder to detect. The culmination of this progressive concealment occurs at round $t = 3$, where the attacker utilizes **Symbolic Abstraction**. The keywords are replaced with abstract Greek symbols ($\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \ldots$). This final layer of abstraction, built upon the progressive weakening of intent in the prior rounds, proves effective. The query is now sufficiently concealed to bypass the LLM's safety filters.