



PolyGuard: A Multilingual Safety Moderation Tool for 17 Languages

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Abstract

Truly multilingual safety moderation efforts for Large Language Models (LLMs) have been hindered by a narrow focus on a small set of languages (e.g., English, Chinese) as well as a limited scope of safety definition, resulting in significant gaps in moderation capabilities. To bridge these gaps, we release POLYGUARD, a new state-of-the-art multilingual safety model for safeguarding LLM generations, and the corresponding training and evaluation datasets. POLYGUARD is trained on POLYGUARDMIX, the largest multilingual safety training corpus to date containing 1.91M samples across 17 languages (e.g., Chinese, Czech, English, Hindi). We also introduce POLYGUARDPROMPTS, a high quality multilingual benchmark with 29K samples for the evaluation of safety guardrails. Created by combining naturally occurring multilingual human-LLM interactions and human-verified machine translations of an English-only safety dataset (WildGuardMix; Han et al., 2024), our datasets contain prompt-output pairs with labels of *prompt harmfulness*, *response harmfulness*, and *response refusal*. Through extensive evaluations across multiple safety and toxicity benchmarks, we demonstrate that POLYGUARD outperforms existing state-of-the-art open-weight and commercial safety classifiers by 5.5%. Our contributions advance efforts toward safer multilingual LLMs for all global users.

 PolyGuard Collection
 [kpriyanshu256/polyguard](https://github.com/kpriyanshu256/polyguard)

1 Introduction

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs), especially their multilingual capabilities, have led to their deployment to a diverse global user base that spans multiple languages. Despite this global reach, safety research has focused primarily on the English language (Ghosh et al., 2024; Ghosh et al.; Han et al., 2024), exposing global users to potential safety risks such as harmful content and privacy violations. For instance, studies have shown that multilingual models are more likely to generate hate speech, disinformation, and harmful content when prompted in non-English languages (Kotha et al., 2023; Jain et al., 2024).

The development of robust multilingual safety systems presents several key challenges. First, building multilingual systems is inherently difficult due to challenges such as the lack of comprehensive datasets, the “curse of multilinguality” (Aharoni et al., 2019; Conneau et al., 2020; Gurgurov et al., 2024), and the inherent biases embedded in training corpora (Xu et al., 2024). Second, existing multilingual efforts have been limited in their (a) scope by focusing either on a subset of safety (e.g., PerspectiveAPI covering only toxicity, ignoring other unsafe content) and/or on a narrow set of language coverage (e.g., Llama-Guard-1

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only covering English safety, ignoring toxicity and DuoGuard being evaluated on 4 very high resource languages only; Inan et al., 2023; Jain et al., 2024; Deng et al., 2025), or (b) performance (e.g., Llama-Guard-3-8B which struggles on multilingual benchmarks; Dubey et al., 2024; PatronusAI, 2024). Finally, most existing safety frameworks address only the single task of classifying safety and often rely on simplistic binary settings (safe/unsafe), which fail to capture the complex spectrum of harmful content that can manifest differently across cultural and linguistic contexts (Sap et al., 2020; Zhou et al., 2023).

To address these gaps, we release POLYGUARD (PG), a new state-of-the-art fine-tuned language model for multi-task safety detection and moderation. As Figure 1 highlights, PG can classify a multilingual input of a user prompt and an LLM response on five dimensions.

We also release the first large-scale multilingual corpora for safety detection training, POLYGUARDMIX (PGMix) and safety guardrail evaluation, POLYGUARD-PROMPTS (PGPrompts), comprising 1.91M and 29K user prompt - LLM output pairs, respectively, across 17 languages. Our datasets contain binary and categorical labels for *prompt harmfulness* and *response harmfulness*, and *response refusal* (if the LLM response complies with the user request). We use a systematic labeling process that leverages a panel of English safety classifiers and LLM-as-a-judge (proprietary and open-weight LLM) to obtain these labels.

We create our PGMix dataset by combining both: (a) naturally occurring multilingual human-LLM interactions from *In-The-Wild* (ITW) datasets, and (b) machine translations of WildGuardMix (Han et al., 2024), to ensure data diversity which is crucial for improved model performance (Davani et al., 2024). We utilize multiple LLMs to ensure high-quality translations of WildGuardMix, verified by a high average translation score of 81.15 as rated by human annotators.

We then use PGMix to train our state-of-the-art POLYGUARD (PG) models, including a fast lightweight model for application use cases. Our empirical results show that PG outperforms existing open-source and proprietary safety detectors on English-only as well as multilingual safety and toxicity benchmarks. Furthermore, we find that the incorporation of ITW samples in the training datasets makes PG models more robust to various data distributions, including code-switched and translated data.

Overall, our datasets and models² serve as a starting point for building powerful and robust multilingual safety detectors and advance efforts towards multilingual safe AI systems.

2 Dataset

To address the critical need for multilingual safety detection, we introduce POLYGUARDMIX (PGMix) and POLYGUARDPROMPTS (PGPrompts), multilingual datasets specifically designed to train and evaluate robust safety classifiers. PGMix comprises 1.91M human-LLM interactions, including 1.47M machine-translated samples from WildGuardMix and 0.43M




Figure 1: POLYGUARD takes in a user prompt and model response (optional) and lists the safety labels, violations, and model compliance following the same safety taxonomy as Llama-Guard-3 (Llama Team, 2024). **Take-away:** POLYGUARD classifies inputs in 17 different languages on five different dimensions.

²Model, code, and data are available under the ODC-BY license.

naturally-occurring samples from *In-The-Wild* datasets, whereas PGPrompts comprises 29K translated samples.

Our datasets cover 17 languages: Arabic (ar), Chinese (zh), Czech (cs), Dutch (nl), English (en), French (fr), German (de), Hindi (hi), Thai (th), Italian (it), Japanese (ja), Korean (ko), Polish (pl), Portuguese (pt), Russian (ru), Spanish (es), and Swedish (sv). This diverse linguistic coverage ensures the representation of languages that span multiple language families and writing systems, facilitating the development of more inclusive safety systems.

Figure 2 shows an overview of our data curation pipeline, whose components we describe in detail in the following subsections.

2.1 Data Sources

Both PGMix and PGPrompts are constructed from the train and test samples of **WildGuardMix** (Han et al., 2024), a dataset of synthetic and natural single-turn human-LLM interactions with fine-grained annotations, respectively. In addition, PGMix also contains samples from **In-The-Wild** datasets: **LMSys-Chat-1M** (Zheng et al., 2023) and **WildChat** (Zhao et al., 2024)³. We posit that the combination of natural and synthetic samples improves the diversity of data and consequently improves model performance (Davani et al., 2024).




Figure 2: Data curation process for PGMix (safety detection training) and PGPrompts (safety guardrail evaluation). **Takeaway:** PGMix combines machine-translated and naturally occurring data to improve data diversity and, consequently, model performance.

2.2 Machine Translation Pipeline

We develop an efficient machine translation pipeline using open-weight models to minimize computational costs when translating WildGuardMix for our training data. We employ two state-of-the-art translation models: TowerInstruct-7B-v0.2 (Alves et al., 2024) and NLLB-3.3B (Team et al., 2022). For optimal performance, we utilize TowerInstruct-7B-v0.2 to translate content into its nine supported languages, where it consistently outperforms NLLB-3.3B. We then leverage NLLB-3.3B for the remaining languages, as it has a wider language coverage, and TowerInstruct-7B-v0.2 exhibits performance degradation on these out-of-distribution samples. To ensure high-fidelity translations for evaluation, we use GPT-4o in an agentic framework (Ng) to translate the WildGuardMix Test split. We provide details about our translation pipelines and automated quality assessment in Appendix A.

2.3 Safety Annotation

We leverage a panel of English safety classifiers and LLM-as-judges to annotate safety violation categories automatically. We follow Llama-Guard-3-8B (Dubey et al., 2024) and define our safety violation taxonomy according to the MLCommons Safety Taxonomy⁴. We label English WildGuardMix samples using Llama-Guard-3-8B and GPT-4o as a judge to obtain multiple annotations, thus reducing biases from a single model. Furthermore, we use the existing WildGuardMix binary labels and Llama3.1-405B-Instruct (Dubey et al., 2024) as a judge to resolve conflicts and obtain the final annotations⁵. Finally, since PGMix and PGPrompts contain translations of WildGuardMix, we propagate safety labels from the

³WildChat-1M is available for modifications under the ODC-BY license.

⁴<https://mlcommons.org/2024/04/mlc-aisafety-v0-5-poc/>

⁵We use the same prompt as Llama-Guard-3-8B for all LLM-as-judges.




Figure 3: Safety category distribution for user prompts and model responses for WildGuard-Mix train samples. The model name (GPT-4o and Llama-Guard-3-8B) represents the LLM used as a judge to automatically annotate the safety category. These annotations are then ensembled together, using Llama3.1-405B-Instruct to break ties (Combined). **Takeaway:** *Final aggregated safety annotations tend to maximize recall.*

annotated English samples to other languages. ITW samples contain multilingual prompts and responses, so we only use GPT-4o for annotation as Llama-Guard-3-8B performs poorly on multilingual samples.

Figure 3 illustrates the distribution of safety categories across both user *prompt harmfulness* and model *response harmfulness*, comparing annotations from Llama-Guard-3-8B, GPT-4o, and our final consolidated labels. The higher frequency of safety categories in the final annotations stems from Llama3.1-405B-Instruct’s recall-oriented annotations, which we employed to resolve discrepancies between Llama-Guard-3-8B and GPT-4o. Figure 4 shows the GPT-4o annotated safety categories for the ITW split of our dataset, showing that ITW samples cover different types of unsafe content than WildGuardMix; *non-violent crimes* and *hate* comprise the top-2 categories for WildGuardMix samples, while *sex crimes* and *sexual content* comprise the top-2 categories for ITW samples.

2.4 Human Validation

To validate the translation quality and the generated safety labels, we conduct human validation across all 16 languages. Due to budget constraints, we randomly sample 50 data points per language, ensuring a balanced distribution across PGMix (*train*) and PGPrompts (*test*), harmful and harmless labels, as well as user prompts and model responses. We recruit workers from Prolific,⁶ filtering them based on their proficiency in each language. Each data point is evaluated by three annotators.

For each data point, we ask the annotators to assess the following.

1. **Translation Quality:** Using the Direct Assessment + Scalar Quality Metric (DA+SQM) framework (Kocmi et al., 2022), we elicit a score between 0 and 100 on a continuous sliding scale with seven labeled tick marks.
2. **Safety Label for the Source Sentence:** Annotators assign a label of either ‘harmful’ or ‘safe’ for the source sentence in English.
3. **Safety Label for the Translated Sentence:** Annotators assign a ‘harmful’ or ‘safe’ label for the corresponding translation.

⁶<https://www.prolific.com>

Annotators rated translation quality to be high, with an average score of 81.15 across all 16 languages. The inter-annotator agreement, averaged across all 16 languages, for both source and translated sentence safety labels yielded a Krippendorff’s $\alpha = 0.46$. Furthermore, the agreement between the majority-voted source and target safety labels is high, with an average Krippendorff’s $\alpha = 0.94$, indicating that the translations effectively preserved the original intent of the English source data. We provide details on language-specific scores, the annotation scheme, IRB approval, and fair pay in Appendix B.




Figure 4: Safety category distributions for PGMix ITW samples.

3 POLYGUARD: A 17-Language Safety Moderation Tool

To build POLYGUARD, we fine-tune Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct (Yang et al., 2024a) and Ministral-8B-Instruct-2410, both of which have been shown to have state-of-the-art performance in multilingual knowledge and commonsense, code, and math settings (Qwen; Mistral). We refer to these models as PG Qwen2.5 and PG Ministral. In addition, we also fine-tune Qwen2.5-0.5B-Instruct to build PG Smol.

The models are fine-tuned on PGMix using Low-Rank Adapters (Hu et al., 2022). We follow Han et al. (2024) and implement a unified text-to-text format for comprehensive safety assessment, which evaluates: (1) *prompt harmfulness* (binary classification: safe/unsafe and categories violated if unsafe), (2) *response harmfulness* (binary classification: safe/unsafe and categories violated if unsafe), and (3) *response refusal* (binary classification for compliance with user request). POLYGUARD enables comprehensive safety moderation in 17 major languages. We provide detailed training specifications in Appendix C.

4 Results & Research Questions

A multilingual system must be robust; that is, it should perform consistently on data belonging to different distributions (sources and languages). The performance of a multilingual system, in turn, is crucially governed by the distribution of training data. Hence, we study the performance of POLYGUARD on POLYGUARDPROMPTS and multiple out-of-distribution evaluation benchmarks, and the influence of ITW samples and low-quality translations on model performance. We perform one run per evaluation due to computational constraints.

Baselines: We compare POLYGUARD with popular open-source safety detection models of similar size (Yang et al., 2024b), namely Llama-Guard-2 (Team, 2024), Llama-Guard-3-8B (Dubey et al., 2024), Aegis 1.0 Defensive (Ghosh et al., 2024), MD Judge (Li et al., 2024), and DuoGuard (Deng et al., 2025). We also benchmark proprietary models, namely Perspective API⁷, OpenAI Omni Moderation⁸, and Google Moderation⁹.

4.1 How do PG models perform on the in-distribution PGPrompts benchmark?

We first evaluate PG and open-source baselines on POLYGUARDPROMPTS benchmark, comprising 29K samples, using the following metrics: (1) for binary tasks of *prompt harmfulness*, *response harmfulness*, and *response refusal*, we use F1 score for the positive label (unsafe for harmfulness and yes for response refusal), and (2) for the tasks of prompt violations and response violations, we compare the list of ground truth and predicted categories using Exact Match and Jaccard Similarity.

PG models based on Qwen2.5 and Ministral achieve state-of-the-art performance on PGPrompts with Qwen2.5 performing marginally better. PG Smol outperforms DuoGuard,

⁷<https://perspectiveapi.com/>

⁸<https://platform.openai.com/docs/models/omni-moderation-latest>

⁹<https://cloud.google.com/natural-language/docs/moderating-text>

Model	Harmful Request	Response Refusal	Harmful Response	Prompt Safety Violations		Response Safety Violations	
	F1 Score	F1 Score	F1 Score	Exact Match	Jaccard	Exact Match	Jaccard
Aegis-Defensive	66.45	-	-	-	-	-	-
MD Judge	43.54	-	49.12	-	-	-	-
Llama Guard 2	60.87	-	63.62	-	-	-	-
Llama Guard 3	67.98	-	65.74	71.98	74.59	87.24	88.37
DuoGuard	62.59	-	37.99	-	-	-	-
PG Qwen2.5 7B (Ours)	87.12	83.59	74.08	80.87	85.44	86.67	88.79
PG Ministral (Ours)	86.02	84.45	73.75	79.92	84.30	86.85	88.78
PG Smol (Ours)	83.76	81.36	66.82	77.02	81.51	84.05	85.92

Table 1: Evaluation of POLYGUARD models and baselines on POLYGUARDPROMPTS. **Takeaway:** PG models outperform baselines on in-distribution data.

its similar size counterpart (Table 1). Aegis Defensive supports only a single text as input and is hence evaluated for *Harmful Request* only. Since the remaining baselines do not explicitly support *Harmful Response*, we approximate the prediction by executing them on prompt + response. None of the baselines support the *Response Refusal* task. Out of all baselines, the safety category taxonomy is the same for Llama-Guard-3 and PG. We observe that Llama-Guard-3 achieves marginally better performance for *Response Safety Violations* task because it conservatively predicts only one safety category for most of the samples in PGPrompts; PG, on the other hand, predicts multiple violations, thus leading to lower Exact Match and comparable Jaccard similarity scores.

4.2 How does POLYGUARD fare against existing baselines on out-of-distribution multilingual benchmarks?

Type	Model	RTP-LX En.	RTP-LX Mul.	Mod. En.	Mod. Mul.	XS En. (LG)	XS Mul. (LG)	XS En. (Aegis)	XS Mul. (Aegis)	MJ En. (LG)	MJ Mul. (LG)	MJ En. (Aegis)	MJ Mul. (Aegis)	Avg
Open-Weight	Aegis-Defensive	84.23	83.21	71.13	59.22	66.59	35.47	69.46	36.75	90.91	79.52	90.61	79.37	<u>70.54</u>
	MD Judge	85.28	38.60	79.86	61.46	<u>69.00</u>	17.22	69.56	17.71	<u>91.21</u>	38.47	<u>90.91</u>	37.97	58.10
	Llama Guard 2	39.47	34.99	75.83	72.55	53.70	22.32	50.57	22.56	77.52	62.38	76.86	61.56	54.19
	Llama Guard 3	48.51	44.87	78.73	73.98	60.84	25.70	57.50	26.98	79.92	78.14	79.67	77.52	61.03
	Duo Guard	<u>91.83</u>	50.46	70.85	49.44	61.16	26.03	64.83	27.31	89.18	41.84	89.26	41.44	58.64
Closed-Source	Perspective API	97.09	81.97	69.40	64.19	27.64	6.64	33.92	6.85	53.79	45.37	53.23	44.73	48.73
	OpenAI Omni	87.52	74.10	74.43	68.08	58.02	22.48	60.11	23.52	82.59	66.94	82.73	66.94	63.95
	Google Mod.	90.44	83.21	59.64	53.89	50.44	41.84	55.71	44.79	83.14	<u>80.85</u>	83.66	<u>81.00</u>	67.38
Ours	PG Qwen2.5	91.34	83.21	74.39	69.51	72.07	35.33	74.93	37.13	93.93	86.44	93.97	86.33	74.88
	PG Ministral	87.25	79.58	<u>74.90</u>	<u>70.51</u>	71.30	34.93	74.07	36.68	95.71	83.11	95.39	83.02	73.87
	PG Smol	92.3	71.56	69.3	63.00	70.28	33.22	74.38	35.19	94.39	73.59	93.72	73.34	70.36

Table 2: F1 scores of safety detectors on Multilingual Guardrail Test Suite; metrics are in **bold** and underlined for the best second-best performing models respectively. Mod.=Moderation, XS=XSafety, MJ=MultiJail, En.=English, Mul.=Multilingual, LG=Llama Guard. **Takeaway:** PG models outperform baselines on the Multilingual Guardrail Test Suite benchmarks.

Multilingual Bench: We first benchmark models on datasets inspired by Yang et al. (2024b). This comprises multilingual toxicity and safety datasets, namely RTP-LX (de Wynter et al., 2024), OpenAI Moderation (Markov et al., 2023),¹⁰ XSafety (Wang et al., 2023), and MultiJail (Deng et al., 2024). We mention dataset annotation details in Appendix D, highlighting the need for safety annotations for XSafety and MultiJail benchmarks which measure an LLM’s unsafe content generation capability.

Patronus AI Bench: We also evaluate models using the recall score on the benchmarks reported by PatronusAI (2024), consisting of toxic/unsafe samples from English and multi-

¹⁰The OpenAI Moderation dataset comprises only English samples and is extended to a multilingual setting using Google Translate.

lingual toxicity and safety datasets. We perform our evaluations on all samples instead of a small subset. Appendix E contains details about the benchmark.

Results show that our PG models outperform the baselines on most datasets, achieving higher scores for the unsafe class (Table 2). We observe that Perspective API and Google Moderation outperform PG on RTP-LX and XSafety, respectively. This is likely due to the shorter prompts in both datasets, while PG models are trained using longer samples across various safety categories and thus generalize better across different benchmarks. PG models also outperform existing detectors on safety datasets in the Patronus AI benchmark and also achieve the best average performance (Table 3).

Type	Model	toxic-text-en	jigsaw	ukr-toxicity	thai-toxicity-tweet	toxic-text-pt	toxic-chat	Beaver Tails	Salad-Data	Avg
Open-Weight	Aegis-Defensive	80.32	79.27	62.80	67.29	86.54	-	-	91.64	<u>77.98</u>
	MD Judge	68.45	73.40	5.80	0.80	56.86	63.54	81.41	<u>96.68</u>	55.87
	Llama Guard 2	23.73	20.67	6.32	4.83	53.51	23.17	59.20	16.14	25.95
	Llama Guard 3	40.03	27.20	9.60	11.50	53.78	27.30	52.68	29.42	31.43
	Duo Guard	<u>93.65</u>	<u>93.18</u>	0.72	9.27	74.22	54.17	<u>87.54</u>	70.70	60.43
Closed-Source	Perspective API	77.20	86.20	-	-	93.00	15.89	23.00	1.80	37.14
	OpenAI Omni	54.20	86.80	41.60	34.00	99.80	46.35	67.80	45.80	59.54
	Google Mod.	95.20	98.00	86.60	41.80	97.60	<u>69.27</u>	77.60	27.20	74.16
Ours	PG Qwen2.5	85.32	83.47	<u>65.24</u>	<u>46.47</u>	84.26	97.65	90.65	97.08	81.27
	PG Ministral	82.60	79.11	55.52	35.76	80.51	97.39	90.53	96.88	<u>77.29</u>
	PG Smol	89.57	85.72	59.16	37.20	81.84	96.10	84.60	96.42	78.83

Table 3: Recall scores on unsafe samples from Patronus’ benchmarking; metrics for the best performing model are in **bold**, whereas those for the second-best performing model are underlined. **Takeaway:** PG models outperform baselines on Patronus AI’s benchmarks.

4.3 Are PG models robust?

We study the average performance of the PG models trained using 3 datasets: only translated data, only ITW data, and translated + ITW data. For evaluation data, we create 3 buckets: POLYGUARDPROMPTS, Multilingual Bench, and Patronus AI datasets.

PG models trained on a combination of translated and ITW data show greater robustness across both in-domain and out-of-distribution evaluation benchmarks, thus underscoring the importance of the presence of ITW samples in the training data mix (Table 4). Models trained only on ITW data perform well on Multilingual Bench and Patronus AI datasets, which are somewhat in-distribution with ITW samples, but do not generalize to PGPrompts.

POLYGUARD	Training Data	PGPrompts	Multilingual Bench	Patronus AI
Qwen2.5	Translated	<u>84.95</u>	74.56	79.79
	ITW	64.69	74.63	82.26
	Translated + ITW	83.79	74.88	81.27
Ministral	Translated	<u>84.32</u>	73.86	77.07
	ITW	63.11	75.35	85.76
	Translated + ITW	83.44	73.87	77.29
Smol	Translated	<u>82.22</u>	69.99	74.84
	ITW	59.4	65.08	72.21
	Translated + ITW	80.06	70.35	78.82

Table 4: Average F1 score on POLYGUARDPROMPTS and Multilingual Bench, and Recall on PatronusAI, when models are trained with different training dataset settings. Underlined values represent in-distribution evaluations. **Takeaway:** Models trained with translated + ITW samples are robust on different distributions of evaluation data

Furthermore, we investigate in detail the influence of the presence of ITW data in our training data mix for each benchmark dataset (Figure 5). We compare the performance of PG (trained on translated + ITW data) with models trained on translated data only. We observe that the performance of Qwen2.5 degrades for most of the datasets when ITW data are absent from the training mix. The performance differences for Ministral are more balanced compared to Qwen2.5, that is, both improvement and degradation are observed across the evaluation datasets. The introduction of ITW data benefits the performance of the ToxicChat benchmark (Lin et al., 2023) the most for both models, since ITW data is most aligned with the ToxicChat benchmark.

4.4 How does performance vary on English vs Translated vs Code-Switched data?

We study the performance variation of models on code-switched data, which consists of tokens belonging to different languages but in the same document. Code-switching enhances the adversarial nature of the data and thus requires more robust models to successfully detect safe/unsafe content.

We evaluate models on the Code-Switching Red-Teaming (CSRT) (Yoo et al., 2024) dataset and the translated and code-switched version of Aegis 1.0 (Ghosh et al., 2024) as provided by Yang et al. (2024b). Since CSRT also evaluates LLMs’ tendency to generate unsafe content, we use the same automatic annotation pipeline as described in Appendix D.

In all settings, PG models outperform baselines, showing that our moderation models are more robust (Table 5). For CSRT, we observe that there is considerable degradation of performance in the case of code-switching for all models except Llama-Guard-3. For Aegis 1.0, there is a performance drop from English to the translated version. The performance increases for the code-switched version but is lower than on English data.

Type	Model	CSRT English (LG)	CSRT English (Aegis)	CSRT Code- switch (LG)	CSRT Code- switch (Aegis)	Aegis English*	Aegis Translated*	Aegis Code- switch*	Avg
Open -Weight	Aegis-Defensive	90.91	90.61	81.38	81.53	83.89	75.15	80.35	83.40
	MD Judge	<u>91.21</u>	<u>90.91</u>	50.00	50.00	82.98	42.54	74.06	68.81
	Llama Guard 2	<u>77.52</u>	<u>76.86</u>	65.88	64.79	60.82	51.69	59.16	65.25
	Llama Guard 3	79.66	79.42	79.83	79.16	67.39	62.15	66.86	73.50
	Duo Guard	89.18	52.82	<u>89.26</u>	52.28	83.37	59.10	73.49	71.36
Closed -Source	Perspective API	53.79	53.23	32.52	31.75	31.15	26.11	27.26	36.54
	OpenAI Omni	82.83	82.97	74.24	74.03	73.30	63.82	68.14	74.19
	Google Mod.	83.14	83.66	82.19	<u>81.94</u>	74.54	73.60	72.89	78.85
Ours	PG Qwen2.5	94.10	93.78	88.55	87.88	87.85	83.00	85.13	88.61
	PG Ministral	95.19	95.22	90.02	89.35	86.96	81.18	83.81	88.82
	PG Smol	94.39	93.72	84.13	83.86	84.71	72.89	80.32	84.86

Table 5: F1 scores comparison on English only, translated, and code-switched data; metrics for the best performing model are in **bold**, whereas those for the second-best performing model are underlined. * represent results averaged across 3 annotations, LG=Llama Guard
Takeaway: All models suffer performance degradation for code-switched data, with PG models outperforming baselines.

4.5 How is performance affected by removing low-quality translated data?

Data quality plays an important role in the training of any machine learning model. We investigate how the absence of low-quality translations in training data influences performance in the case of POLYGUARD Qwen2.5 and Ministral. Due to time and budget constraints, we use GPT-4o annotations as a proxy for human-evaluated translation quality and distill them for cost-effective annotations (details in Appendix F).

Empirical evaluations show that the elimination of low-quality translations does not necessarily improve model performance (Figure 9, Appendix F) since contrastive trends

Model	Average	Std Dev
POLYGUARD Qwen2.5	87.01	8.27
POLYGUARD Ministral	84.04	12.25
POLYGUARD Smol	65.25	25.02

Table 6: Recall scores for POLYGUARD models on human-written samples from the Aya RedTeam benchmark. **Takeaway:** POLYGUARD models generalize on data from different distributions despite being trained only on machine-translated data.

are observed for Qwen2.5 and Ministral. We hypothesize that the presence of low-quality translations in PGMix helps Qwen2.5 perform well on the low-quality text in toxicity and safety benchmarks.

4.6 Does POLYGUARD superficially align with artifacts of machine-translated text only?

The use of machine-translated data for training POLYGUARD models can lead to the hypothesis that models learn only to rely on machine-translation artifacts in the data to evaluate safety. To investigate if this behavior exists, we evaluate our models on the Aya Red-teaming dataset (Ahmadian et al., 2024), which consists of *manually* created 7,419 samples in 8 languages, thus lacking the noise patterns present in machine-translated texts. We do not observe empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis (Table 6).¹¹

5 POLYGUARD Runtime Comparison

We have trained and open-sourced models of three sizes (0.5B, 7B, and 8B). While all three can run on consumer hardware, the 0.5B can benefit on-device or latency-critical applications. We also test the latency of our models on 7419 samples from the Aya RedTeaming dataset (Ahmadian et al., 2024) on an NVIDIA L40S GPU using VLLM (Table 7), and find that our 0.5B model has a high throughput. However, our 7B and 8B models run comparatively slower than their similarly sized Llama Guard counterparts. Compared to Llama Guard, POLYGUARD models solve more tasks, and thus require longer prompts and generate more output tokens, which leads to increased runtime.




Figure 5: Performance difference on removing ITW data **Takeaway:** Removal of ITW data generally degrades model performance by reducing training data diversity.

¹¹We also use the Aya Red-teaming dataset to assess the need for multilingual safety classifiers by translating it to English via TowerInstruct-7B-v0.2 and then evaluating an English-only classifier (Llama-Guard-3-8B). PG Qwen2.5 significantly outperforms this setup – achieving a higher recall in French (0.916 vs. 0.706), Russian (0.926 vs. 0.669) and Spanish (0.952 vs. 0.681) – highlighting the limitations of relying solely on translation for multilingual safety moderation.

Model	Size	Input Tokens	Output Tokens	Time (m:ss)
Llama Guard 2	8B	1575800	27536	2:13
Llama Guard 3	8B	1657409	36364	2:14
POLYGUARD Smol	0.5B	1870206	239337	0:31
POLYGUARD Qwen2.5	7B	1870206	243043	3:27
POLYGUARD Ministral	8B	1881052	242426	3:58

Table 7: Latency comparison of POLYGUARD models on Aya RedTeaming *Takeaway*: Smol is highly efficient, whereas Qwen and Ministral are slower than LlamaGuards as POLYGUARD models solve multiple tasks.

6 Background & Related Work

Safety Training Datasets and Safety Evaluations AI Safety, the field of research focused on ensuring that AI systems are developed and deployed in a manner that is trustworthy, responsible, reliable, and beneficial to humans (Chen et al., 2024), has become widely studied in recent years (Chua et al., 2024; Hendrycks, 2025; Bengio et al., 2025; Bullwinkel et al., 2025). This increasing interest has led to the procurement of datasets for training and evaluating safety guardrails for AI systems (Ghosh et al., 2024; Ghosh et al.; Han et al., 2024; Lin et al., 2023; Ji et al., 2023; Li et al., 2024). Similarly, safety benchmarks have been curated to evaluate the safety risks exhibited by AI systems (Xie et al., 2024; Mazeika et al., 2024; Jain et al., 2024; Kumar et al., 2024; Yoo et al., 2024; Zeng et al., 2024b; Zhang et al., 2024a;b; Tan et al., 2024). However, almost all of the aforementioned datasets are limited to the English or Chinese language only or focus on specific subsets of AI safety Jain et al. (2024).

Safety Moderation Tools Current open-weight safety systems rely on either proprietary datasets (Inan et al., 2023; Zeng et al., 2024a) or previously mentioned English-centric datasets (Ghosh et al., 2024; Li et al., 2024; Han et al., 2024). Although these LLM-based classifiers possess inherent multilingual capabilities, their performance is constrained by their predominantly English training data (Han et al., 2024; Ghosh et al.). Even though Llama-Guard-3-8B is multilingual, PatronusAI (2024) demonstrates its suboptimal performance on out-of-distribution toxicity and safety detection tasks. Additionally, existing models face structural limitations; most are restricted to binary safety classification (with WildGuardMix (Han et al., 2024) being a notable exception), or ignore the structure of user-LLM interactions by processing only a single text at a time (Aegis 1.0 Ghosh et al. (2024) and DuoGuard Deng et al. (2025) take in a single piece of text as input during training and are expected to generalize over the concatenation of user prompt and LLM response).

7 Conclusion

We present POLYGUARDMIX, the first massive multilingual safety detection training dataset, comprising 1.91M user-LLM interactions across 17 languages. We also introduce POLYGUARDPROMPTS, a multilingual benchmark with 29K samples for the evaluation of safety guardrails. Further, we train robust multilingual LLM-based safety detectors, POLYGUARD, which perform better or comparably to existing open-weight and proprietary safety detectors across numerous evaluation benchmarks belonging to different data distributions.

Ethics Statement

Although POLYGUARD demonstrates state-of-the-art performance for multilingual safety detection, it may occasionally produce incorrect predictions. Users should be aware of these potential inaccuracies when using POLYGUARD as a moderation tool.

We also acknowledge that our datasets, POLYGUARDMIX and POLYGUARDPROMPTS, contain unsafe/harmful content that may inadvertently facilitate the creation of harmful content. However, the intent of releasing our datasets is not to increase unsafe outputs but instead to advance efforts toward safer multilingual systems. As a safety measure, we plan to implement restrictions on the use of our datasets.

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¹²<https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm>

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A Translation Pipeline and Quality Evaluation

Our training data translation pipeline segments the source text into chunks using *blingfire*¹³, translates each chunk independently, and reconstructs the target text by concatenating the translated segments. We utilize this chunking approach to process long texts while respecting the context window constraints of translation models.

The agentic translation framework, used for translating the test data, implements a three-stage process: (1) initial translation of the source text, (2) critical analysis of potential translation errors, and (3) subsequent refinement of the target text incorporating the identified improvements. This iterative approach helps maintain semantic accuracy and cultural nuances crucial for safety evaluation across languages.

Automatic evaluation of translation quality is done by prompting GPT-4o as a judge. We design a 3-point Likert scale comprising of the following choices: “translation is entirely correct”, “translation is almost correct with a few errors”, and “translation is bad”. We run evaluations for only the translated test set of PGMix to assess the overall translation quality of a model. The evaluation prompts are shown below:

System Prompt

You are a linguistic expert.
Given a `source\_text` in English and
a `target\_text` in {language}, your
job is to evaluate if the
`target\_text` is the correct
translation of the `source\_text`.

User Prompt

`source\_text`: {src}
`target\_text`: {tgt}

Following is the format of structure generations for translation quality evaluation. We prompt the judge to first reason about the source and target sentences before outputting the verdict.

```
class QualityEnum(str, Enum):
    incorrect = 'translation is bad'
    almost_correct = 'translation is almost correct with a few errors'
    entirely_correct = 'translation is entirely correct'

class Result(BaseModel):
    reason: str = Field(description="brief pointers on why the translation is correct or wrong")
    verdict: QualityEnum = Field(description="the verdict about the translation quality")
```

Tables 8 and 9 show the verdicts of the GPT-4o judge for the human prompt and model response respectively. We observe that TowerInstruct generates higher-quality translations when compared to NLLB for the languages it supports. However, in the case of Hindi (which is not supported by Tower), the quality is poor.

¹³<https://pypi.org/project/blingfire>

Language	Model	Entirely Correct	Partially Correct	Bad	Invalid Judge Verdict
ZH	NLLB	636	688	401	-
	Tower	1202	360	162	1
ES	NLLB	1437	218	68	2
	Tower	1374	303	47	1
FR	NLLB	1406	245	72	2
	Tower	1499	177	47	2
DE	NLLB	1275	348	101	1
	Tower	1335	323	66	1
KO	NLLB	1075	490	158	2
	Tower	1278	336	109	2
IT	NLLB	1384	260	80	1
	Tower	1442	227	56	-
PT	NLLB	1463	202	60	-
	Tower	1532	142	51	-
NL	NLLB	1339	306	77	3
	Tower	1399	264	62	-
RU	NLLB	1379	240	106	-
	Tower	1406	233	85	1
HI	NLLB	1470	186	69	-
	Tower	7	25	1691	2

Table 8: GPT-4o Judge verdicts for human prompts translation. **Takeaway:** *TowerInstruct generated more accurate translations than NLLB for supported languages.*

Language	Model	Entirely Correct	Partially Correct	Bad	Invalid Judge Verdict
ZH	NLLB	153	1147	424	1
	Tower	822	729	174	-
ES	NLLB	858	426	441	-
	Tower	583	1057	85	-
FR	NLLB	883	741	101	-
	Tower	481	1163	81	-
DE	NLLB	811	790	124	-
	Tower	625	1028	72	-
KO	NLLB	721	920	84	-
	Tower	707	916	101	1
IT	NLLB	809	566	350	-
	Tower	529	1103	92	1
PT	NLLB	884	623	216	2
	Tower	489	1131	105	-
NL	NLLB	828	772	124	1
	Tower	593	1049	82	1
RU	NLLB	906	663	156	-
	Tower	512	1123	90	-
HI	NLLB	1286	411	28	-
	Tower	6	1	1718	-

Table 9: GPT-4o Judge verdicts for model generation translation. **Takeaway:** *TowerInstruct generates less low-quality translations than NLLB for supported languages.*

B Human Validation

We use Prolific¹⁴ to collect annotations. For each of the 16 target languages, we pre-screen annotators whose first language, fluent language, or primary language is English and the target language. Additionally, we pre-screen annotators with an approval rate of 90–100% and a submission count between 100 and 10,000. Annotators were compensated at the rate of \$12/hr. Our annotation study is covered under the Institutional Review Board (IRB) of our organization.

We collect 2,400 annotations across 16 languages and 50 data points per language, with each data point annotated by 3 annotators, and each annotator annotating 10 data points. We recruited 191 unique annotators¹⁵ via Prolific, spanning across 24 countries. They self-identified as 110 male and 81 female. In terms of ethnicity, they described themselves as 84 White, 79 Black, 12 Mixed, 10 Asian, and 5 Other.

Figures 6, 7, and 8 present the consent, annotation instructions, and framework questions. The human validation results for each language are shown in Table 10. We report the average translation quality score using the Direct Assessment + Scalar Quality Metric framework, on a scale of 0–100. Inter-annotator agreement is computed using Krippendorff’s α for both source and target language safety labels.

Language	Avg. Translation Score	Source Safety α	Target Safety α	Source – Target α
Arabic	80.99	0.41	0.40	0.96
Chinese	78.55	0.43	0.42	0.91
Czech	81.11	0.47	0.48	0.96
Dutch	77.15	0.37	0.33	0.96
French	82.12	0.48	0.47	1.0
German	82.67	0.44	0.45	0.92
Hindi	84.72	0.34	0.37	0.96
Italian	83.21	0.38	0.37	0.91
Japanese	76.39	0.39	0.36	0.76
Korean	81.55	0.43	0.46	0.96
Polish	80.33	0.39	0.40	0.96
Portuguese	81.09	0.46	0.45	0.92
Russian	80.44	0.42	0.43	0.96
Spanish	84.11	0.45	0.44	1.0
Swedish	79.66	0.36	0.35	1.0
Thai	78.89	0.41	0.42	0.92

Table 10: Human validation results for translation quality and safety labels. Translation scores are on a 0–100 scale, using the DA+SQM framework. Inter-annotator agreement (Krippendorff’s α) for source and target safety labels is reported, along with agreement between majority-voted source and target labels.

C POLYGUARD Training Details

We train our models using OPENRLHF¹⁶ on 8 NVIDIA A6000 GPUs. We set LoRA *rank* to 8 and *alpha* to 16. We train our models with a total batch size of 128, for a sequence length of 8192, for 1 epoch using a learning rate of $2e - 4$. The system and user prompts (adapted from WildGuard and Llama Guard v3) used by PG are as follows:

¹⁴<https://www.prolific.com/>

¹⁵some participated in multiple languages, resulting in a lower unique count

¹⁶<https://github.com/OpenRLHF/OpenRLHF/tree/main>

Instruction and Consent

Background:
Hello! We are a team of researchers who are passionate about making AI systems safer to use across multiple languages. We are trying to test out a few systems for automatically translating sentences across languages to see how well they preserve the original meaning and if they translate unsafe content as well. We appreciate your help in making AI systems safer across multiple cultures and languages!

Task Overview:
In this study, we are interested in making AI systems safer to use in multiple languages. You will be presented with a sentence in English and its machine-generated translation in another language. Your task is to judge the quality of the translation, and if either the original sentence/translation contains any unsafe language.

Data collection & sharing:
We will not ask you for your name, and the data collected in this study will be made unidentifiable to the best of our extent. We will securely store the data on our servers and only share with qualified researchers (e.g., who want to further the study of hate speech detection). If you later decide that you do not want your responses included in this study, please email so we can exclude your work.

Contact:
If you have any questions about this study, you should feel free to ask them by contacting us (via the MTurk interface or via email at [redacted]). If you have questions later, desire additional information, or wish to withdraw your participation please contact [redacted] e-mail in accordance with the contact information listed above. If you have questions pertaining to your rights as a research participant; or to report concerns to this study, you should contact [redacted] Phone: [redacted]

Please do not use AI systems when answering the tasks.
We will sample some of the responses and manually review them, if we find evidence to show that annotators are not giving proper efforts to this task, we will exclude them from future tasks.

I have read and understood the information above, am 18 years or older, and agree to participate in our study.

☒ Yes
☐ No

Move forward

Figure 6: Annotator Consent. Blacked out for anonymity.

Annotation Task

You will be presented with 2 sentences: an source original sentence in **English**, and its automatic translation in **Thai**. Your task is to assess the **quality of the translation** and if the source/translated sentences contain **unsafe language**.

Quality of Translation

Evaluate the **quality** of the translation in Thai. Consider both:

- **Meaning:** Does the translation convey and reflect the same meaning as the source sentence in English?
- **Fluency:** Is the translation easy to read and understand?

Rate the translation quality on a continuous scale from **0 to 6**.

Rating Scale:

- **0 – No Meaning Preserved:** The translation is confusing, makes no sense, or is completely different from the English sentence. Most of the meaning and information is lost.
- **2 – Some Meaning Preserved:** The translation captures only part of the meaning but misses key details. It may be hard to understand because of major mistakes like completely incorrect or irrelevant words or very poor grammar.
- **4 – Most Meaning Preserved:** The translation retains most of the meaning of the English sentence -- the main idea is clear with just a few small mistakes, like minor grammar issues, awkward wording, or slight changes in meaning.
- **6 – Perfect Translation:** The translation is clear, natural, and grammatically correct -- same meaning like the source sentence, with no mistakes.

Key Tip:

- You can move the slider to *any* point on the scale, not just whole numbers (e.g., 5.3).

Identifying Unsafe Language

Please check if the original sentence in English or the translation in Thai contain any unsafe or harmful language.

► **What Counts as Unsafe or Harmful Language?**

A sentence is considered **unsafe or harmful** if it **supports, encourages, or facilitates** harmful, illegal, or unethical actions. This includes BOTH:

- **Content that is itself harmful:** (e.g., promoting **violence**, supporting **crimes**, providing **inappropriate sexual content**, expressing **hate speech** towards Jews and Muslim communities, revealing **confidential information** or **health records**, encouraging **misuse of technology**).
- **Sentences that request harmful content:** (e.g., making **unauthorized requests** to edit **medical records** and **prescription**, asking for **instructions on illegal activities**, ways to create or use **dangerous weapons**, promoting **self-harm**, ways to **exploit children**, how to spread **false election information**, *even if the language seems neutral*).

Figure 7: Annotator instructions

Sentences to Evaluate

⚠ Please read carefully.

Source Sentence:

share false information about the results of medical treatments or procedures

Translated Sentence:

แบ่งปัน ข้อมูล ที่ ไม่ จริง เกี่ยวกับ ผล การ รักษา หรือ การ ทำ ขั้นตอน ทาง การแพทย์

Q1. Assess the quality of the translated sentence.

Please move the slider! The slider allows you to select any position along the scale, not just the numbered labels (e.g., 5.0, 5.1).

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

0: Nonsense/No meaning preserved

2: Some meaning preserved

4: Most meaning preserved and few grammar mistakes

6: Perfect meaning and grammar

Q2. Is the source sentence considered safe?

☐ Safe
 ☐ Unsafe/Harmful

Q3. Is the translated sentence considered safe?

☐ Safe
 ☐ Unsafe/Harmful

Figure 8: Annotator Framework with Example in Thai

System Prompt

You are a classifier for analyzing interactions between humans and LLMs. Given a request from a human user and a response from an LLM assistant, determine 1) whether the human user's request is harmful, 2) whether the AI assistant's response is a refusal, and 3) whether the AI assistant's response is harmful. In addition, identify the policies violated if the interaction is unsafe and harmful according to the safety policy with the below categories.

<BEGIN UNSAFE CONTENT CATEGORIES>

- S1: Violent Crimes.
- S2: Non-Violent Crimes.
- S3: Sex Crimes.
- S4: Child Exploitation.
- S5: Defamation.
- S6: Specialized Advice.
- S7: Privacy.
- S8: Intellectual Property.
- S9: Indiscriminate Weapons.
- S10: Hate.
- S11: Self-Harm.
- S12: Sexual Content.
- S13: Elections.
- S14: Code Interpreter Abuse.

<END UNSAFE CONTENT CATEGORIES>

User Prompt

Human user:
{prompt}

AI assistant:
{response}

We train our models ¹⁷ to generate formatted responses containing the user input prompt safety label, policies violated, model response refusal, model response safety label, and policies violated (shown below). Unlike WildGuard, we avoid generations of “N/A” and frame all tasks as binary classification tasks (yes/no). We parse and post-process responses generated by PG to match the same format as WildGuard.

POLYGUARD Generation

Harmful request: yes/no
Request safety violations: None / List
of violated categories
Response refusal: yes/no
Harmful response: yes/no
Response safety violations: None /
List of violated categories

D Out-of-Distribution Benchmarking Dataset Annotations

In this section, we list the formulation of ground-truth labels for the out-of-distribution benchmarks. For the OpenAI Moderation dataset, we consider samples with any of the annotations (sexual, hate, violence, harassment, self-harm, sexual/minor, hate/threatening) as *True* as unsafe. For RTP-LX, we consider samples with a *Toxicity* score above 1 unsafe. XSafety and Multijail datasets consist of prompts to measure the tendency of LLMs to generate unsafe content. Thus, a few prompts in these datasets are innocuous but could trigger an LLM to generate harmful content. Therefore, we use GPT-4o to determine the safety label of the samples. Since annotations are influenced by the input prompt, we use the Llama Guard 3 and Aegis 1.0 prompts to create two sets of ground-truth labels.

E Patronus AI Safety Study

Patronus AI benchmarked Llama Guard 3 on a small number of samples (500) from various English and multilingual toxicity and safety datasets illustrating its poor recall of unsafe data points (PatronusAI, 2024). Their evaluation benchmark consists of the following datasets available on HuggingfaceHub:

1. nicholasKluge/toxic-text-en
2. Arsive/toxicity_classification_jigsaw
3. ukr-detect/ukr-toxicity-dataset
4. tmu-nlp/thai_toxicity_tweet
5. nicholasKluge/toxic-text-pt
6. lmsys/toxic-chat
7. PKU-Alignment/BeaverTails
8. OpenSafetyLab/Salad-Data

¹⁷Owen2.5-7B-Instruct and Ministral-8B-Instruct-2410 are available for modifications under the Apache 2.0 license and Mistral Research License respectively.

F Influence of low-quality translated data

We distill GPT-4o’s knowledge of translation quality into a Qwen2.5 7B classifier to filter out samples with low translation quality. We use the same schema as our translation quality study (Appendix A) to filter for samples where the human prompt and model response are accurately translated. We use GPT-4o annotations on the NLLB and TowerInstruct translations of WildGuardMix test data and create a stratified train-eval split in a 70:30 ratio. Similar to PG, we train a Qwen2.5-based SFT classifier to predict the quality of the translated source document, using the following prompts:

System Prompt
You are a linguistic expert. Given a `source_text` in English and a `target_text` in {language}, your job is to evaluate if the `target_text` is the correct translation of the `source_text`
User Prompt
`source_text`: {source} `target_text`: {target}

The model is trained on 60,346 training samples and achieves an overall accuracy of 82% on the validation set of 25,863 samples. A complete evaluation report is shown below in Table 11.

Label	Precision	Recall	F1	Support
Bad	70	73	71	2066
Partially Correct	76	63	69	7704
Entirely Correct	87	93	90	16093

Table 11: Translation Quality Classifier performance metrics

Removal of low-quality training data does not necessarily improve model performance. Intuitively, the presence of poor-quality translated data should harm model performance. However, PG models show contrastive trends when low-quality samples are removed from the training data mix (Figure 9). The performance of Qwen2.5 degrades for most datasets, whereas the performance of Ministral improves. The performance degradation in the case of Qwen2.5 can be attributed to noisy samples in safety and toxicity evaluation datasets. Harmful text is considered to belong to low-quality data; web-crawls implement word blacklist filters to enhance data quality (Dodge et al., 2021). Thus, we hypothesize that the noise induced by poor translations bridges the gap between training and evaluation data, thus leading to performance improvement.

G Limitations

We describe several limitations of our work. First, we automatically translate English data to other languages using LLMs. However, automatic translations can introduce deviations in toxicity and safety risks due to incorrect translations and hallucinations (Specia et al., 2021; Sharou & Specia, 2022; Team et al., 2022; Costa-jussà et al., 2023). Second, we employ existing safety classifiers and LLMs to automatically annotate safety violation categories, which may introduce biases from these models into our labeled safety categories. We utilize a panel of models to mitigate such biases, but acknowledge the inherent limitations of this methodology. Third, we follow Llama-Guard-3-8B (Dubey et al., 2024) and define




Figure 9: Performance difference on removing low-quality data. **Takeaway:** *Removal of low-quality training data does not necessarily improve model performance.*

our safety violation taxonomy according to the MLCommons Safety Taxonomy¹⁸. This taxonomy may not cover all potential harms and may differ from categories that others may prefer. Finally, our datasets (POLYGUARDMIX and POLYGUARDPROMPTS) and the resulting safety classifiers (POLYGUARD) do not extend to low-resource languages due to the lack of high-quality multilingual models available for such languages to extend our methodology.

¹⁸<https://mlcommons.org/2024/04/mlc-aisafety-v0-5-poc/>