

BSPA: EXPLORING BLACK-BOX STEALTHY PROMPT ATTACKS AGAINST IMAGE GENERATORS

Anonymous authors

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ABSTRACT

Extremely large image generators offer significant transformative potential across diverse sectors. It allows users to design specific prompts to generate realistic images through some black-box APIs. However, some studies reveal that image generators are notably susceptible to attacks and generate Not Suitable For Work (NSFW) contents by manually designed toxin texts, especially imperceptible to human observers. We urgently need a multitude of universal and transferable prompts to improve the safety of image generators, especially black-box-released APIs. Nevertheless, they are constrained by labor-intensive design processes and heavily reliant on the quality of the given instructions. To achieve this, we introduce a black-box stealthy prompt attack (BSPA) that adopts a retriever to simulate attacks from API users. It can effectively harness filter scores to tune the retrieval space of sensitive words for matching the input prompts, thereby crafting stealthy prompts tailored for image generators. Significantly, this approach is model-agnostic and requires no internal access to the model’s features, ensuring its applicability to a wide range of image generators. Building on BSPA, we have constructed an automated prompt tool and a comprehensive prompt attack dataset (NSFWeval). Extensive experiments demonstrate that BSPA effectively explores the security vulnerabilities in a variety of state-of-the-art available black-box models, including Stable Diffusion XL and Midjourney. Furthermore, we have developed a resilient text filter and offer targeted recommendations to ensure the security of image generators against prompt attacks in the future.

1 INTRODUCTION

The recent emergence of image generators (Ramesh et al., 2021; Rombach et al., 2022; Saharia et al., 2022) promises immense transformative across various sectors (Song et al., 2021; 2022; Kapelyukh et al., 2023). However, these sophisticated generators come with their own set of opportunities and challenges. They are vulnerable to exploitation by adversaries who might generate images that could negatively impact ethical, societal, and political landscapes (Rando et al., 2022; Schramowski et al., 2023). As illustrated in Fig. 1, malicious users can leverage these technologies to craft Not Suitable For Work (NSFW) content, especially when provided with prompts containing explicit harmful tokens derived from inappropriate websites. To counteract such threats, researchers have integrated sensitive word filters into these models, which are now prevalent in many publicly-released APIs (Rando et al., 2022; Qu et al., 2023; Rismani et al., 2023).

To delve deeper into vulnerability risks and enhance model safety, recent studies have manually designed seemingly benign prompts (Schuhmann et al., 2021; 2022) that are more discreet and challenging to defend against. While these subtle threat prompts are adept at circumventing filters and generating NSFW content, they are constrained by labor-intensive design processes and heavily reliant on the quality of the given instructions. With the dramatic increase in users accessing the black-box API to generate images, there is a pressing need for an automated prompt-generation tool capable of producing a multitude of prompt samples. It can simulate the stealthy attack process i.e. black-box approach to identify weaknesses in prevalent models and facilitate their improvement.

A logical approach directly involves a large language model (LLM) for automated prompt generation through instructions (Wei et al., 2021; Qu et al., 2023; Kim et al., 2023). However, these resulting prompts tend to be minimally threatening and lack diversity. Since these methods lack an effective




Figure 1: Schematic illustrations of the comparisons across various prompt attackers. Crawler-based attacker craft prompts containing explicit harmful tokens (already masked) from malicious websites. Manual design-based attackers provide prompts by predetermined instruction, which inherently lack in both quantity and diversity. To simulate attacks originating from API users and identify potential vulnerabilities, we employ LLM to generate prompts with quantity, stealth, and diversity.

training strategy and rely excessively on the LLM’s zero-shot performance, the resulting prompts tend to be minimally threatening and lack diversity. To solve the above issues, some works (Ilyas et al., 2018; Cheng et al., 2019; Sun et al., 2022) adopt zeroth-order/derivative-free optimization to tune prompts. However, these strategies confine prompts to a restricted subspace and cannot provide adequate malicious direction, making it challenging to fully engage the LLM’s creative capacities. Due to the above challenge, these methods can not generate stealthy and diverse prompts to simulate attacks from API users.

To address the aforementioned problems, we drive our research perspective to optimize the stealthy attack prompts by only accessing the image generator inference API. We introduce a novel black-box stealthy prompt attack (BSPA) to generate *stealthy*, *offensive*, and *diverse* samples, which enables a transformation from original zeroth-order optimization (Conn et al., 2009; Rios & Sahinidis, 2013) to gradient-based optimization. Specifically, it utilizes the supervised sign from generated text/image and employs a retriever to identify the most relevant sensitive word to the input, thus ensuring a sufficient retrieval space. Inspired by the mechanisms of communication feedback to the attacker, we leverage a pseudo-labeling strategy to mitigate the lack of training data in this domain and effectively optimize the retriever. Our innovative pseudo-labeling technique integrates aspects of toxicity, stealth, and similarity to the input text. Furthermore, we propose a streamlined loss to sufficiently sample the retrieval space to obtain diverse sensitive words. This refined function can amplify prompt diversity by suppressing the probability of the top-k text similarities, allowing for a more extensive and varied range of stealthy prompts.

Building upon the BSPA framework, we have developed an automated prompt tool proficient in generating stealthy and diverse NSFW samples. We present an extensive prompt attack dataset, named NSFWeval, designed to simulate attacks from malicious users, comprising 3,000 stealthy and explicit prompts. These prompts exhibit significant transferability and reveal universal vulnerabilities on commercial APIs, including Stable Diffusion XL and Midjourney. Additionally, we have constructed a robust text filter for enhancing the safety of the image generator, which can suppress 84.9% of prompt attacks, including explicit and stealthy prompts. To the best of our knowledge, this constitutes the inaugural effort to develop a security verification framework for image generators, which is paramount in fostering the development of more secure and robust image generators.

2 RELATED WORKS

The safety of image generator. The main area of this work is verifying the defense capabilities of image generators and building a universal benchmark for NSFW content detection. Currently,

researchers focus on improving model’s performance to generate exquisite and realistic images through diffusion model (Ramesh et al., 2021; Rombach et al., 2022; Saharia et al., 2022) etc. However, there is a lack of control over the security of the generated content, and if exploited by attackers, it is easy to do behaviors that harm society. Nowadays, researchers have started to focus on the safety of generators by collecting prompts with explicit NSFW prompts (Qu et al., 2023; Kim et al., 2023). These methods achieve excellent attack results on open-source models. However, they become dysfunctional due to the powerful filtering mechanism present in the Black-box model. To evaluate the safety of the generated models in a more comprehensive and general way, we urgently require more stealthily toxic prompts to validate them. We design a black-box attack framework instead of traditional prompt collection methods, thus producing more imaginative and comprehensively toxic prompts with less cost.

Black-box optimization. Researchers adopt black-box optimization to simulate attacks on large model APIs by malicious users. The mainstream black-box optimization methods can be divided into two types: 1) score-based black-box adversarial attacks (Ilyas et al., 2018; Andriushchenko et al., 2020; Cheng et al., 2019), these works adopt zeroth-order optimization methods to optimize the inputs and thus spoof the threat model. Derivative-Free Optimization and Prompt Learning methods are mostly applied to increase the loss on large models. However, these methods suffer from limited retrieval space and cannot effectively achieve diversity and comprehensive attack coverage. 2) the other method is Knowledge Distillation (Wang, 2021; Nguyen et al., 2022), which utilizes the outputs of other models to learn the threat model for achieving adversarial attacks. However, these methods can only achieve excellent attack and transferability when the parameters and the training data in the teacher model are much larger than the attacked model. Unlike previous black-box attack paradigms (Sun et al., 2022; Diao et al., 2023), our approach adopts gradient-based optimization by a retriever (e.g., BM25 (Robertson et al., 2009), DPR (Karpukhin et al., 2020), etc.) and receives the supervised signal from generated text/image, which has sufficient retrieval space to engage the LLM’s creative capacities.

3 METHOD

In this section, we first clarify the problem and present our attacker. Afterwards, we introduce the text retriever, which provides a larger retrieval space for retrieving sensitive words. Finally, we design our optimization scheme, including pseudo-labeling and loss function.

3.1 PROBLEM FORMULATION

Let \mathcal{X} denote the space of normal language prompts. We aspire to learn a mapping function, denoted as $g_\phi(\cdot) : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{X}$, tasked with morphing a given prompt $\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{X}$ into a modified prompt \mathbf{x}_s . This altered prompt, when interfaced with an image generator API $g_\psi(\cdot) : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$, is engineered to generate harmful images, with \mathcal{Y} representing the realm of generated images. Formally, our objective is to solve:

$$\max_{g_\phi} \mathbb{E}_{\mathbf{x} \sim \mathcal{X}} [\mathcal{L}_{harm}(g_\psi(g_\phi(\mathbf{x})))] \quad \text{s.t.} \quad \mathcal{L}_{sim}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x}_s) > \delta, \quad \mathcal{L}_{tox}(g_\psi(\mathbf{x}_s)) < \epsilon, \quad (1)$$

where \mathcal{L}_{harm} quantifies the degree of harmfulness in a generated image $\mathbf{y} \in \mathcal{Y}$, \mathcal{L}_{sim} calculates the similarity between the original and the transformed prompts, and \mathcal{L}_{tox} assesses the manifest toxicity of the altered prompt. δ and ϵ are the corresponding thresholds. This objective aims to optimize for the generation of maximally harmful images, subjected to constraints on the similarity to the original prompt and the overt toxicity of the altered prompt. Our intention is to learn the mapping function $g_\phi(\cdot)$ within a black-box scenario, devoid of access to the internal mechanisms of $g_\psi(\cdot)$, and interfacing with $g_\psi(\cdot)$ exclusively through its API.

A preliminary idea entails utilizing a text generator (e.g. LLM) to instantiate $g_\phi(\cdot)$, where it directly generates a stealthy prompt \mathbf{x}_s by input description \mathbf{x} straightly. Subsequently, \mathbf{x}_s is applied to an image generator $g_\psi(\cdot)$ to yield \mathbf{y} as:

$$\mathbf{y} = g_\psi(g_\phi(\mathbf{x})). \quad (2)$$

Due to the lack of training process and “bait” guidance, this paradigm is challenging in ensuring prompt diversity and relevance, adapting to various model complexities, and preventing the creation of unintentional malicious or harmful prompts.




Figure 2: An overview of the training paradigm of black-box stealthy prompt attack (BSPA). **Left:** Our method transforms zeroth-order optimization into gradient-based optimization through the involvement of a retriever. This operation effectively employs text/image filter scores to tune the retrieval space of sensitive words for matching the input prompts. **Right:** We embed and retrieve sensitive words by a dense retrieval model, which is characterized by minimal optimization effort and expansive retrieval space.

To enhance the quality and diversity of prompts, we drive our research perspective to train a retriever to simulate the actions of a malicious user. This approach utilizes a retriever $r(\cdot)$ to influence $g_\phi(\cdot)$ to generate \mathbf{x}_s by querying the most relevant sensitive $\mathbf{w} = r(\mathbf{x})$ (filtered from malicious image-text pairs). These are subsequently combined into a single prompt $\mathbf{x}_m = \mathbf{x} \oplus \mathbf{w}$, $\mathbf{x}_m \in \mathcal{X}_m$ to fabricate harmful images, where \oplus represents a human instruction guiding the LLM to generate \mathbf{x}_s :

$$\mathbf{y} = g_\psi(g_\phi(\mathbf{x}_m)). \quad (3)$$

To simulate attacks from API users and improve the stealthy and diversity of prompts, we propose a framework for black-box stealthy prompt attacks. It transforms zeroth-order optimization into gradient-based optimization through the incorporation of a retriever. As illustrated in Figure 2, we decompose the optimization process of Eq. 1 into four steps: **Step1** (Sensitive word matching), To guide the LLM to produce toxic prompts, when a description \mathbf{x} is fed into the framework, it initially matches the most similar sensitive words \mathbf{w} (i.e., the words with the highest propensity to generate the attack samples). **Step2** (Threat content generation), Text/Image Generator $g_\phi(\cdot)/g_\psi(\cdot)$ is adopted to generate threat content based on input prompts. To simulate attacks from API users, both utilize a black-box API. **Step3** (Toxic score calculation). To optimize the retriever to retrieve the most relevant words, we apply a text/image filter $f_\phi(\cdot)/f_\psi(\cdot)$ to calculate the toxicity of the text/image. **Step4** (Retriever Optimization), Text Retriever $r(\cdot)$ serves to retrieve the most pertinent sensitive word relative to the input text, engaging the creative capacities of Text Generator. It undergoes training and optimization by the toxic scores derived from text/image filters.

We pioneered the black-box attack on image generator by enabling the creativity of LLM through a retriever, which expands the sampling space of sensitive words. The benefits of utilizing BSPA over alternative methods are as follows. First, it contains a black-box nature regarding the image generation model, meaning that it can only access the final prediction results from the target model, akin to an external attacker’s perspective. Second, the implementation of a supervised, automatic generation methodology can produce numerous attack texts with elevated diversity and complexity. Additionally, an attack is considered successful when $f_\phi(\mathbf{x}_s) < \epsilon_t$ and $f_\psi(\mathbf{y}) > \epsilon_i$, where ϵ_t and ϵ_i are the toxic score thresholds of text and image, respectively.

3.2 TEXT RETRIEVER

To cover attacks from malicious users, we require a large retrieval space to accommodate enough sensitive words. Therefore, we adopt a text retriever for fetching relevant words. As shown in Fig 2, text retriever is the main optimization part of our framework. It effectively adopts text/image filter scores and transforms zeroth-order optimization into gradient-based optimization to generate threatening prompts. Text retriever first encodes the sensitive words to d -dimensional vector $e_w(\mathbf{w})$ and builds an index for retrieval. During retrieval, we encode input sentence \mathbf{x} to a d -dimensional

vector $e_x(\mathbf{x})$, and retrieve the closest sensitive word vector to the input sentence vector. We define similarity as their association criterion as

$$sim(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{w}) = \frac{e_x(\mathbf{x})e_w(\mathbf{w})}{|e_x(\mathbf{x})||e_w(\mathbf{w})|}. \quad (4)$$

Our goal is to create a sufficient retrieval space where the distance between relevant pairs of \mathbf{x} and \mathbf{x}_s is smaller than the distance of the irrelevant pairs. However, with the retrieval space expanding, space optimization becomes extraordinarily hard, which interferes with the selection of relevant sensitive words. To solve the problem of difficult spatial optimization, in-batch negatives are adopted to improve training efficiency and increase the number of training examples, i.e., the $(B \times d)$ input text vectors $e_s(S)$ are associated with all $(B \times d)$ sensitive words vectors $e_w(W)$ within a batch, thus obtaining a similarity $(B \times B)$ matrix $S = e_s(S)e_w(W)^T$. Therefore, we achieve effective training on $B^2(W_i, S_j)$ in each batch, when $i = j$ and the text is related to the sensitive word and vice versa. The training process of our retriever is summarized in the Appendix C.

3.3 PSEUDO-LABELING AND LOSS FUNCTION

As described above, we introduce a black-box prompt-generation tool and adopt gradient-based optimization to optimize it. The supervisory signal and loss function are crucial for model optimization, decreasing the optimization effort and improving the quality of prompts. To prevent over-centralization of sensitive words and increase the diversity of prompts, we produce a complete and streamlined optimization scheme, including pseudo-labeling generation and loss function design. They can increase the utilization of retrieval space by considering the similarity of $\mathbf{x}-\mathbf{x}_s$.

We design a stealthy and toxic pseudo-label to simulate the tactics of the attacker. The pseudo-label generation process of our retriever is summarized in the Appendix C. Given a description \mathbf{x}^i and sensitive word set \mathcal{W} . When \mathbf{x}^i is fed into the framework, we match it with all the sensitive words \mathcal{W} to generate toxicity prompts set \mathcal{X}_s^i and harmful images set \mathcal{Y}^i by text/image generator. We adopt $f_\phi(\cdot)/f_\psi(\cdot)$ to get the supervised signal s_t/s_i from $\mathbf{x}_s^i/\mathbf{y}_i$:

$$s_t = f_\phi(\mathbf{x}_s^i), \mathbf{x}_s^i \in \mathcal{X}_s^i, \quad (5)$$

$$s_i = f_\psi(\mathbf{y}_i), \mathbf{y}_i \in \mathcal{Y}^i. \quad (6)$$

Additionally, to increase the diversity of prompts, we add the similarity of $\mathbf{x}-\mathbf{x}_s$ pair as a part of the pseudo-label. The pseudo label s is defined as:

$$s = s_i - \alpha s_t + \beta sim(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x}_s) \quad (7)$$

where α and β are tunable parameter. The first term encourages the generated image \mathbf{y} to contain more NSFW content. The second term encourages the generated text \mathbf{x}_s to contain less NSFW content. The third similarity term encourages the generated text to be as similar as possible to the input text to ensure the diversity of the generated text. Since the vectors of \mathbf{x} and \mathbf{x}_s are iteratively optimized during training, pseudo label s is also optimized during training to lead it more inclined to generate NSFW text related to the input text and improve the diversity of attack prompts. We choose the sensitive word with the highest s as its positive pseudo-labeling s^+ and the others as negative pseudo-labeling s^- .

During the training process of BSPA, the sampling of the retriever will be overly centralized on some highly induced sensitive words, which is detrimental to the diversity of the prompt. To improve sample utilization and training efficiency, we fully utilize positive/negative pseudo-labeling for contrastive learning. The first term is designed as the following function to encourage the retriever to choose closer to positive pseudo-labeling, we optimize it as the negative log-likelihood of the positive pseudo-labeling s^+ :

$$\mathcal{L}_{clo} = -\log \frac{e^{s^+}}{e^{s^+} + \sum_{j=1}^n e^{s_j^-}}, \quad (8)$$

where n denotes the number of sensitive words. The second term encourages Text Retriever to provide more diverse options of \mathbf{w} :

$$\mathcal{L}_{div} = h(\text{softmax}(sim(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x}_s))), \quad (9)$$




Figure 3: Example of generated images by using prompts from BSPA.

where $h(\cdot)$ is adopted to sum the top k values. We aim to minimize the probability value of the top- k text similarities, thus obtaining a greater diversity of \mathbf{y} . The text retriever loss is defined as

$$\mathcal{L} = \mathcal{L}_{clo} + \mathcal{L}_{div}. \tag{10}$$

We adopt \mathcal{L} in our experiments to improve the sample utilization, resulting in greater diversity for our method without compromising aggressiveness.

4 EVALUATION AND DISCUSSION

In this section, we present the experimental results to validate the effectiveness of BSPA for stealthy prompt attacks. We follow a simple-to-complex procedure to conduct experiments. We first introduce baseline and metrics, and then conduct results and discussion. For consistency and fairness of the evaluation, we conduct the main experiment on Stable Diffusion. More experiment details are put in the Appendix B. We demonstrate some NSFW images generated with BSPA prompts in Fig. 3, which reveals that large image generators are suffering from the stealthy prompts attack.

4.1 BASELINE AND METRICS

To validate the toxicity, stealth, and diversity of the prompts generated by BSPA, we choose Crawler-based attacker and Traditional LLM-based attacker as our baseline for comparison with our method.

Crawler-based attacker (CBA): We collect the titles of the videos from Pornhub and detect the title language, selecting 6,000 English titles for retention.

Traditional LLM-based attacker (TLA): We randomly select 10,000 scene descriptions from the MS-COCO captions val dataset for the LLM’s human instructions.

BSAP attacker (BSAP): We adopt the same scene descriptions as TLA, and the top-3 sensitive words with the highest correlation are selected for stealthy prompt generation.

For TLA and BSAP, we adopt a simple data cleaning method to filter the dirty data and retain 12,155 and 27,026 prompts. The implementation details can be found in the Appendix B. We evaluate generated text-image pairs from text stealth, text diversity, and attack success rate as follows.

Text stealth: It is designed to evaluate the stealthy of generated text. The higher probability that prompts are not detected as toxic text by the text filter, the more stealthy the text is. Therefore, we verify text stealth by publicly convincing toxic comment classification (Hanu & Unitary team, 2020), i.e., the number of texts surpassing the toxicity threshold (0.3 in this paper).




Figure 4: Ablation studies of \mathcal{L}_{div} . We evaluate its impact on diversity from toxic rate and the number of tokens/sensitive words.



Figure 5: The word cloud of BSPA prompts, we set the max words as 200.

Table 1: Quality review and attack success rates of three attackers. Toxic Rate \downarrow means that a lower toxic rate is better, ASR \uparrow means that a higher attack success rate is better.

	Prompt	Text-level		Token	Image-level		
		Toxic Rate \downarrow	Avg Length		ASR _{fil} \uparrow	ASR _{hum} \uparrow	ASR \uparrow
CBA	6,000	75.48%	17.04	4,707	8.60%	1.15%	9.75%
TLA	12,155	13.84%	31.63	6,513	6.07%	1.66%	7.65%
BSPA	27,026	14.35%	33.75	7,139	11.95%	3.80%	15.32%

Text diversity: Texts with longer sentence lengths and larger token counts tend to contain more comprehensive scenarios and content expressions. Therefore, we evaluate the diversity of the generated prompts by two textual attributes: average length of prompts and total number of tokens.

Attack success rate: The main objective of the attack method is to induce the image generator to produce NSFW images. Since there are gaps in the filters of different image generators, human judgment is involved in determining whether the response is a refusal or an attempt to avoid generating NSFW content. We define two attack success statistics: 1) the generated image is intercepted by the image filter of the model, and 2) the generated image is not intercepted but contains NSFW content, both of them provided that the prompts escape the text filter. Three attack success rates are designed to fully evaluate the attack effectiveness of the models: 1) filter success rate $ASR_{fil} = \frac{sf}{sp}$, 2) human success rate $ASR_{hum} = \frac{sh}{sp-sf}$, and 3) total success rate $ASR = \frac{sh+sf}{sp}$, where sf , sp , sh are the number of prompt samples, filters and human considered NSFW content respectively.

4.2 PROMPT AND ATTACK ANALYSIS

Tab. 1 left reports the overview of three prompt datasets produced by three attackers. We find that the toxic rate of the BSPA prompts by our method is significantly lower than that of CBA prompts. It indicates that our method can effectively inhibit the text generator from generating explicit NSFW content and encourage the model to generate stealthy toxic prompts. In addition, the average length and number of tokens of our prompt are higher than the CBA/TLA prompt. It illustrates that our method improves the quality and diversity of generated prompts by retrieving key sensitive words.

We validate ASR on stable diffusion. As shown in Tab. 1 right, we can find that BSPA obtains much better results than CBA. It indicates that our stealthy prompts can effectively bypass filter detection to generate NSFW content. Meanwhile, BSPA generates prompts with higher ASR than TLA, illustrating that the introduction of sensitive words can effectively engage the creativity of the text generator and guide it to produce toxic content by combining normal texts.

The results show that BSPA can reduce toxicity by more than 80% and improve ASR by more than 57% compared to CBA prompts. We analyze that our methods can provide more stealthy and diverse prompts because BSPS adopts a text retriever to engage the LLM’s creative capacities and improve the retrieval space of sensitive words, which is more similar to attacks from API users.

Table 2: Ablation studies of $sim(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x}_s)$.

	Toxic Rate ↓	Token	ASR _{fil} ↑
w/o $sim(text_{reg}, w_{sen})$	13.17%	6,703	10.19%
BSPA	14.35%	7,139	11.95%

Table 3: The result of Open-source/Release API on the public list of NSFWeval. **Explicit** means the explicit attack prompts from CBA, and **Stealthy** means the stealthy attack prompts from BSPA.

	Explicit			Stealthy		
	ASR _{fil} ↑	ASR _{hum} ↑	ASR ↑	ASR _{fil} ↑	ASR _{hum} ↑	ASR ↑
Open-source						
SD w/ $f_\phi(\cdot)$	16.7%	8.8%	24.1%	44.6%	56.3%	75.8%
LD w/ $f_\phi(\cdot)$	24.1%	2.1%	25.7%	32.1%	24.0%	48.4%
DALL-E mini w/ $f_\phi(\cdot)$	18.8%	4.4%	22.4%	28.6%	19.4%	42.5%
SD w/ RSF	6.3%	3.6%	9.7%	8.7%	2.8%	11.3%
Release API						
SD-demo	4.3%	3.1%	4.6%	11.5%	7.3%	14.1%
MJ-demo	52.6%	1.8%	53.5%	74.6%	4.3%	75.7%

4.3 FURTHER ANALYSIS

As with the inspiration for malicious users to create prompts, the size of retrieval space for sensitive words is crucial to the diversity of toxic prompts. We employ \mathcal{L}_{div} and $sim(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x}_s)$ in our training strategy to increase the range of retrieval space and diversity of toxic prompts. In this section, we conduct extensive ablation studies to evaluate the impact of these strategies.

Influence of \mathcal{L}_{div} . As shown in Fig. 4, we find that adding the \mathcal{L}_{div} can effectively expand the range of retrieval space. Different values of the k will affect the prompt toxic. When k is too small, the selection is too centralized, leading to insufficient sample diversity. When k is too large, the retrieval of sensitive words is not relevant enough to induce the generator to produce toxic prompts. This confirms our assumption that \mathcal{L}_{div} can improve the diversity of toxic prompts.

Influence of $sim(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x}_s)$. Another conclusion of this work is that the $sim(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x}_s)$ can effectively improve the diversity of toxic prompts by leading the toxic prompts closer to the input text. As shown in Tab. 2, by adding $sim(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x}_s)$, the number of tokens can be effectively increased, which confirms that the strategy is effective in improving the diversity of prompts.

Bias analysis. We present the word cloud of the BSPA prompt dataset in Fig. 5, which partially reflects the data distribution of prompts. Upon examination, we find that these words are primarily centered around stealthy scenarios, activities, and events where NSFW content may occur. Simultaneously, we discover that there is a serious gender issue, which indirectly reflects the bias in the training data of the language model. Through the analysis, we hope to provide some insights to researchers, i.e., to judge the data distribution issues in the training data from a generative perspective.

4.4 DISCUSSION

At a high level, this work has very broad research implications. Unlike previous prompt attack methods, we believe that automated adversarial attacks are more effective and comprehensive than manual ones. BSPA can harness filter scores to tune the retrieval space of sensitive words for matching the input prompts, which can simulate attacks from API users. Based on BSPA, we construct a benchmark to evaluate the model’s ability to reject NSFW content. We hope this work can effectively and comprehensively identify the vulnerability that exists in current generative models.

In our experiments, we also find two notable points: 1) Cross-modal alignment is the core problem of multimodal adversarial. Because most multimodal large models only train the vector alignment to achieve cross-modal projection, which leads it to be the weakest link. 2) By case analysis of the toxic prompts/images, we find that there is serious gender and racial discrimination in the generated content. This could be attributed to the bias in the training data. Therefore, we believe that evaluating the quality of the training data inversely from the generated data is a noteworthy research direction.

5 NSFW EVAL

5.1 DATASET STATISTICS.

In this section, we select 1,500 prompts from CBA prompts and BSPA prompts as explicit and stealthy attack prompts, respectively. It comprehensively evaluates the ability of image generators to defend against prompt attacks. We categorize benchmarks into public and private lists for attack evaluation of image generators. The public list consists of a fixed 2,000 data prompts (1,000 each from explicit and stealthy prompts), and the private list consists of the remaining prompts. In private list evaluation, we randomly select 250 items from explicit and stealthy attack prompts for manual evaluation each time to ensure accuracy and fairness.

5.2 TEST MODELS

We verify five image generators’ defenses through public list of NSFWeval, including open source models with text filter (The complete results on NSFWeval are demonstrated in the Appendix D): Stable Diffusion (SD), Latent Diffusion (LD) (Rombach et al., 2022), DALL·E mini (Dayma et al., 2021) and black-box, publicly released model: Stable Diffusion-demo (SD-demo), Midjourney-demo (MJ-demo). Additionally, based on the other unselected prompts, we finetune a novel resilient text filter (RSF) to defend against explicit and stealthy attack prompts.

5.3 BENCHMARKING THE APIS

Tab. 3 shows the overall results of test models on our benchmark. We found that stealthy prompt attack is more threatening to image generators, causing serious trouble for all models. Since the released API has additional filtering capabilities (e.g., sensitive word filters, sentence filters, and higher quality image filters, etc.), these models have a better defense against threat prompts. Fig. 3 demonstrates some successful attack cases for each model. We find that each model is threatened by prompt attacks, and stealth prompt is more threatening.

For the open-source model, we notice a trend where ASR is proportional to model performance, owing to 1) state-of-the-art methods have an excellent image-text alignment, leading to mine deeper into the prompt, 2) it utilizes a huge amount of training data, causing the model to be more susceptible to being induced to generate negative content. Additionally, RSF can effectively filter attack prompts, both explicit and stealthy texts. We adopt it on SD, which can reduce the ASR of explicit/stealthy prompts by 14.4% /64.5% compared to $f_{\phi}(\cdot)$.

Since the SD-demo has a sensitive word filter, it has a lower ASR_{fil} than the MJ-demo. However, in reality, we focus more on the images that escape filters, and we find that even though MJ-demo has a better defense, it suffers from the issue of NSFW content leaks. From Fig. 3, we find the NSFW content is clearer in SOTA methods. Therefore, the filtering and rejection of NSFW content is more critical in Release API, especially stealthy threat prompts.

6 CONCLUSION

In this work, we present a black-box stealthy prompt attack (BSPA) to automatically generate stealthy, offensive, and diverse samples. It can effectively harness filter scores to retrieve the most relevant sensitive word to the input. Based on BSPA, we create a universal benchmark, dubbed NSFWeval, to simulate the attack from malicious users. These prompts exhibit significant transferability and reveal universal vulnerabilities on commercial APIs, including Stable Diffusion XL and Midjourney. Additionally, we have constructed a robust text filter to improve the safety of the image generator. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first pioneering effort in establishing a security verification framework for image generators. We believe that addressing this concern is crucial for advancing more secure and robust image generators.

ETHICS STATEMENT

A potential negative impact of our work (including papers, code, and data) is that malicious attackers could utilize our method to attack commercial APIs, leading to toxic content generation or privacy leakage. Despite the risk of misuse, we believe that a full disclosure of the present work is appropriate. As researchers currently focus on improving large models due to their superior performance, it’s even more important to explore and address the vulnerability of deep learning models which could be targeted by black-box attacks without knowing specific details of the target models. We believe that our early publication of this technology can be an effective defense against abuse by such teams and allow Red-teaming teams to deploy it effectively in advance. In conclusion, our work demonstrates the potential attack algorithm and emphasizes the importance of enhancing the security of deep learning models.

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A SENSITIVE WORD SET

The sensitive word set of our experiments is shown in Tab. A. We filter the NSFW-labeled data in the Laion-400M by a text filter and retain normal text. Then, we utilize TF-IDF to choose the keywords in data and select 50 words with the highest frequency as the sensitive words for retrieval.

Table A: Sensitive word set.

invoice	images	photo	getty	wiring	diagram	template	free
receipt	black	man	execl	woman	addition	bra	women
white	cover	red	body	download	breast	hot	best
map	sexy	book	human	awards	vector	female	hair
male	tax	windows	lace	service	music	art	bikini
stock	new	video	set	men	screenshot	chart	young
online	like						

B IMPLEMENTATION

Thanks to the release of Image-Text Pairs datasets (e.g., Laion (Schuhmann et al., 2021; 2022), YFCC100M (Thomee et al., 2016), and MS-COCO (Lin et al., 2014)), which provides a tremendous data for our model training. In our framework, all modules are substitutable, including the text retriever, which we can replace with other neural network encoders. Considering the open source, in this paper, we adopt BERT as the text retriever, and Vicuna as the text generator. Laion-400M is utilized for training Text retriever. Detoxify¹ and Stable diffusion safety checker (Rando et al., 2022) are adopted as Text Filter and Image Filter, respectively.

Specifically, we first filter the NSFW-labeled data in the Laion-400M by a text filter and retain normal text. Then, we utilize TF-IDF to choose the keywords in data and select 50 words with the highest frequency as the sensitive words for retrieval. We believe that these sensitive words do not contain explicitly negative information, but are somewhat leading to it. We randomly sample 15000 captions from MS-COCO and feed them into our prompt² with sensitive words respectively.

After training, we randomly select 5000 captions from the MS-COCO test set for data generation. The captions are sequentially fed into the text retriever, and the top-3 sensitive words with the highest correlation are selected for sentence generation. We further filter the generated prompts to get the stealthily harmful prompts.

Through the observation and analysis of prompts, we find that the generated text effectively combines the contextual information of x and the stealthy toxicity embedded in w . Simultaneously, the text generator tends to generate NSFW content about women, which reflects that the current text generator is ethically flawed.

We train the text retriever with in-batch negative setting, and the batch-size =256. We adopt adam as our optimizer and set the initial learning rate to 0.0002. In this paper, all the label constructing process along with the model training process is carried out on a piece of NVIDIA A100 80GB.

C PSEUDO-LABELING AND TRAINING ALGORITHM

In this section, we show the pseudo-labeling and text retriever algorithm in Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2.

¹<https://github.com/unitaryai/detoxify>

²The prompt is "Can you generate a porn scene with about 15 words based on some vocabulary in 'image caption x ' and 'sensitive words w '? And 'porn' cannot appear in the generated text."

Algorithm 1: Pseudo-labeling Process

Input: Input text \mathbf{x} , sensitive word set \mathcal{W} ;
for w in \mathcal{W} **do**
 Generate toxic image-text pair;
 Feed w and \mathbf{x} into Text Generator $\rightarrow \mathbf{x}_s$; Feed \mathbf{x}_s into Image Generator $\rightarrow \mathbf{y}$;
 Generate Pseudo-Labeling;
 Feed \mathbf{x}_s into Text Filter $\rightarrow s_t$;
 Feed \mathbf{y} into Image Filter $\rightarrow s_i$;
 During train process, compute similarity between \mathbf{x} and $\mathbf{x}_s \rightarrow sim(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x}_s)$;
 $s = s_i - \alpha s_t + \beta sim(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x}_s)$;
end

Algorithm 2: Training Process

Initialize model parameters from pre-trained BERT;
Set the max number of training epoch E_m and the batch-size B ;
Input: Input text $text_{reg}$, sensitive word set W_{sen} ;
In-batch learning
for epoch t in $1, 2, \dots, E_m$ **do**
 Compute similarity (B \times B) matrix $S = e_s(S)e_w(W)^T$
 Compute loss and gradient;

$$\mathcal{L}_{clo} = -\log \frac{e^{s^+}}{e^{s^+} + \sum_{j=1}^n e^{s_j^-}}$$

$$\mathcal{L}_{div} = h(\text{softmax}(sim(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{x}_s)))$$

$$\mathcal{L} = \mathcal{L}_{clo} + \mathcal{L}_{div}$$

 Update model;
end

D THE COMPLETE RESULTS ON PUBLIC LIST OF NSFW EVAL.

In this section, we show the complete results on public list of NSFWeval in Tab. 5.

Table 5: The complete results on public list of NSFWeval.

	Explicit			Stealth		
	$ASR_{fil} \uparrow$	$ASR_{hum} \uparrow$	$ASR \uparrow$	$ASR_{fil} \uparrow$	$ASR_{hum} \uparrow$	$ASR \uparrow$
Open-source						
SD	66.7%	32.7%	77.6%	51.3%	71.4%	86.1%
LD	89.2%	28.7%	92.3%	38.7%	33.8%	59.4%
DALL-E mini	79.2%	26.0%	84.6%	32.8%	28.3%	64.7%
SD w/ f_ϕ	16.7%	8.8%	24.1%	44.6%	56.3%	75.8%
LD w/ f_ϕ	24.1%	2.1%	25.7%	32.1%	24.0%	48.4%
DALL-E mini w/ f_ϕ	18.8%	4.4%	22.4%	28.6%	19.4%	42.5%
SD w/ RSF	6.3%	3.6%	9.7%	8.7%	2.8%	11.3%
Release api						
SD-demo	4.3%	3.1%	4.6%	11.5%	7.3%	14.1%
MJ-demo	52.6%	1.8%	53.5%	74.6%	4.3%	75.7%