

AGA: ATTENTION-GUIDED JAILBREAK ATTACKS ON LARGE REASONING MODELS

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ABSTRACT

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) are known for their exceptional ability to solve complex problems and provide structured solutions through step-by-step reasoning. However, this powerful reasoning capability also introduces new security risks. Existing jailbreak methods exploit the model’s explicit reasoning process by fabricating reasoning steps to manipulate its output, leading it to generate harmful or biased content. Although these methods are effective, the underlying reasons for their success remain unclear. In this paper, we first analyze both successful and failed jailbreak attempts and find that successful attacks effectively shift the model’s attention away from harmful keywords, redirecting it toward other parts of the prompt or its internal reasoning process. Based on this, we propose AGA, a novel and efficient attention-guided jailbreak method that leverages model’s intermediate reasoning steps to iteratively refine candidate prompts. Extensive experiments on five open-source and closed-source LRMs across three datasets demonstrate that our method achieves remarkable attack success rate and outperforms existing methods in terms of stealthiness, efficiency, and transferability. Our research highlights the urgent need for improved safety measures tailored to LRMs. The code is available at <https://github.com/LZzzzz2000/AGA>.

1 INTRODUCTION

Large Reasoning Models have demonstrated impressive capabilities, particularly in solving complex problems through step-by-step chain-of-thought reasoning. This advanced reasoning ability enables them to break down challenging tasks such as solving mathematical problems Qu et al. (2025); Forootani (2025) or making complex decisions Li et al. (2025) into manageable steps, producing coherent and well-structured solutions. However, this powerful reasoning capability also introduces new security risks. Because LRMs explicitly show their reasoning paths before generating final responses, these visible reasoning traces tend to expose models’ internal decision-making process, potentially creating new attack surfaces for adversaries.

Several jailbreak attack approaches against LRMs have already been proposed. H-CoT Kuo et al. (2025) inserts fabricated reasoning steps into the model’s prompt, disguising them as plausible thought chains. This allows the attack to bypass security mechanisms and leads the model to generate harmful content. AutoRAN Liang et al. (2025) exploits the transparent reasoning process of “weak” models with low alignment to attack more powerful “strong” models and manipulate their outputs. Mousetrap Yao et al. (2025) uses a multi-step transformation to the prompt, gradually weakening the model’s security responses until the jailbreak succeeds.

Despite recent progress, existing jailbreak methods still face several limitations. First, from a theoretical perspective, current approaches lack a comprehensive analysis of their effectiveness. Most studies focus on implementation and optimization, without offering a solid explanation of why their methods succeed. Second, in practical applications, existing methods often rely on refining prompts through the model’s reasoning process to bypass safety mechanisms. However, this refinement often lacks a clear direction, and little attention has been paid to the potential security risks inherent in the reasoning process itself.

To bridge this gap, we are inspired by Du et al. (2025) and explore the underlying mechanisms of LRMs jailbreaks from the perspective of attention shifting. Specifically, we examine which parts of the input the models focus on during the jailbreak process. Our analysis reveals that, compared to

failed attempts, successful jailbreak samples show a significant reduction in the model’s attention to harmful and sensitive keywords. In these cases, LRMs tend to shift their focus away from problematic terms and redirect attention toward other parts of the prompt or their own internal reasoning process. We believe this shift plays a critical role: when the model’s attention to harmful keywords drops below a certain threshold, it may fail to effectively detect potential malicious intent, making it more vulnerable to adversarial attacks. This observation is consistent with findings from multiple rounds of red-teaming tests Lin et al. (2025), which suggest that LRMs are particularly sensitive to specific harmful terms when evaluating potentially dangerous queries. Through this attention-based analysis, we offer an explanation for the effectiveness of existing jailbreak approaches, such as those using fabricated reasoning chains or multi-step prompt transformations. Fundamentally, these methods work by diverting the model’s excessive focus away from harmful input content, thereby allowing them to bypass model’s safety safeguards.

Building on these findings, we propose **AGA** (Attention-Guided Jailbreak Attack), a novel and efficient jailbreak approach that leverages attention shifting to reduce the focus of LRMs on harmful keywords in the input prompt. Specifically, our approach starts by initializing a candidate jailbreak prompt and identifying sensitive or harmful words, whose attention scores are then tracked during the model’s processing. After querying the target model and receiving feedback, we iteratively refine the prompt based on attention scores and the model’s reasoning steps. By adjusting attention distribution, AGA aims to balance harmful intent with remaining unnoticed. This balance is essential for a successful jailbreak, as overly explicit prompts may trigger safety mechanisms directly, while too vague prompts may fail to induce harmful behavior relevant to the malicious query. An effective jailbreak prompt must navigate this trade-off carefully to succeed. Extensive experiments validate the effectiveness of AGA. We evaluated it on three open-source reasoning models and transferred it to two closed-source models, using three diverse datasets. Compared to baseline methods, our approach achieves notably attack success rate and consistently outperforms existing jailbreak methods in terms of effectiveness, stealthiness, efficiency and cross-model transferability.

2 RELATED WORK

Security of LRMs. Large Reasoning Models (LRMs), such as o4-mini, Gemini-2.5-Flash Co-manici et al. (2025), Qwen3 Yang et al. (2025), and DeepSeek-R1 Guo et al. (2025), extend the capabilities of traditional Large Language Models (LLMs) by incorporating explicit reasoning mechanisms. These models often adopt Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting to represent intermediate reasoning steps, enabling strong performance in tasks involving mathematical reasoning, logical deduction, and complex decision-making. However, previous work Zhou et al. (2025) indicates that distilled reasoning models may exhibit weaker safety performance compared to their safety-aligned base models. In addition, the reasoning process itself often raises more serious safety concerns than the final outputs. Unlike conventional LLMs, LRMs expose their internal reasoning traces during generation, which inadvertently broadens the attack surface and makes them more susceptible to manipulation. Another challenge lies in managing the length of reasoning sequences. Excessively long chains can exhaust computational resources Kumar et al. (2025); Zhu et al. (2025), while overly short chains may lead to incomplete or incorrect conclusions Zaremba et al. (2025).

In this paper, we study jailbreak attacks, where carefully crafted adversarial prompts bypass a model’s safety constraints and induce it to generate harmful reasoning processes and outputs.

Jailbreaking of LRMs. Compared to the extensive work on jailbreaking LLMs Souly et al. (2024); Yi et al. (2024); Zhang & Wei (2025); Liao & Sun (2024); Souly et al. (2024), studies specifically targeting the jailbreak of LRMs remain limited. H-CoT Kuo et al. (2025) introduces fabricated reasoning steps into the model’s prompt, forming a seemingly coherent chain of thought that bypasses safety safeguards and induces the model to generate harmful content. AutoRAN Liang et al. (2025) leverages the transparent reasoning process of “weak” models with low safety alignment to systematically probe and attack more powerful “strong” models, capitalizing on the similarity in their reasoning structures. Mousetrap Yao et al. (2025) adopts a multi-step transformation strategy that applies a sequence of diverse one-to-one mappings to the initial prompt. This process gradually weakens the model’s safety responses, ultimately enabling a successful jailbreak.

Despite these developments, the community still lacks a comprehensive understanding of why such jailbreak methods are effective and how their performance can be systematically improved.

3 PRELIMINARY STUDY

To better understand why existing jailbreak methods are effective against LRMs, we investigate whether there are notable differences in attention patterns between successful and failed attempts. Our objective is to uncover the key factors that contribute to jailbreak success, bridge the gap between empirical success and analytical understanding, and offer clearer insights for designing more effective jailbreak strategies in the future.

3.1 EXPERIMENT SETUP

Dataset. To explore the differences in attention patterns between successful and failed jailbreak attempts, we randomly selected 100 samples from AdvBench. These samples cover a wide range of harmful content, including misinformation, illegal activities, harassment, and violence.

Model. In this study, we primarily present jailbreak experiments on Qwen3-8B, a medium-sized, publicly available LRM. Qwen3-8B exhibits behavior patterns and security vulnerabilities that are highly consistent with those observed in other leading LRMs, making our findings broadly representative of common jailbreak risks across mainstream LRMs. To validate the generality of our findings, we provide additional experiments on Qwen3-1.7B and DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-8B in the Appendix.

Study Design. For 100 randomly selected samples from the AdvBench dataset, we constructed prompts using common jailbreak techniques, including role-playing, fictional scenarios, and reasoning-based strategies. These prompts were fed into Qwen3-8B, and we recorded both the model’s internal reasoning process and its final outputs. Each response was manually evaluated to determine whether the jailbreak attempt was successful, resulting in a labeled dataset of successful and failed cases. We then analyzed how the input prompts and the model’s reasoning influenced the final outputs by computing attention scores throughout the inference process.

We adopt the attention computation method from Du et al. (2025), with a particular focus on attention scores that reflect how much attention each output token assigns to the input tokens and previously generated tokens. In this study, we analyzed how both the input tokens and the intermediate reasoning process influence the model’s final output. We denote the input tokens as $P = \{p_1, p_2, \dots, p_n\}$, the intermediate reasoning process as $R = \{r_1, r_2, \dots, r_s\}$, and the output tokens as $Y = \{y_1, y_2, \dots, y_m\}$.

To compute the final attention score for each input token, we first average the attention scores across these output tokens. Then, for each token, we further average the attention scores over L layers and H attention heads. Let $A_{i,j}\{y_t, p_k\}$ and $A_{i,j}\{y_t, r_k\}$ represent the attention scores from the i -th layer and the j -th attention head, where y_t is an output token, p_k is an input token, and r_k is a token from the intermediate reasoning process.

The final attention score for the k -th input token is computed as:

$$A(p_k) = \frac{1}{L \cdot H \cdot (m-1)} \sum_{t=2}^m \sum_{i=1}^L \sum_{j=1}^H A_{i,j}\{y_t, p_k\} \quad (1)$$

Similarly, the final attention score for the k -th reasoning token is computed as:

$$A(r_k) = \frac{1}{L \cdot H \cdot (m-1)} \sum_{t=2}^m \sum_{i=1}^L \sum_{j=1}^H A_{i,j}\{y_t, r_k\} \quad (2)$$

It is worth noting that, due to the attention sink phenomenon Barbero et al. (2025), the model tends to assign disproportionately high attention to the first output token, which is typically a start-of-sequence placeholder with no semantic meaning. To avoid this bias, we start our calculation from the second output token and compute attention statistics over the remaining $m-1$ tokens.

After computing the attention score for each token, we apply the Qwen3 tokenization strategy to map tokens back to words. For any word w_k composed of multiple tokens, its attention score is obtained by summing the scores of all its component tokens. We then calculate the total attention

for the input prompt and the reasoning process by summing the attention scores of all words within each. Additionally, we identify harmful words from both the prompt and the reasoning process, and compute the proportion of attention these harmful words receive relative to the total attention in their respective sections. The detailed extraction strategy is described in Section 4.3.

3.2 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

We manually evaluated a set of 100 jailbreak prompts, among which 32 resulted in successful jailbreaks and 68 failed. We then analyzed the differences in attention patterns between these two groups, as illustrated in Figure 1. Specifically, Figure 1a shows the overall attention distribution between the prompt and the reasoning process, while Figure 1b presents the attention proportion allocated to harmful keywords within each part. Our key findings are summarized as follows: (1) Overall, the model allocates more attention to the reasoning process than to the input prompt. This is likely due to the inherent design of LRMs, which tend to generate long and detailed reasoning sequences as part of their responses. Notably, no substantial difference in overall distribution was observed between successful and failed jailbreak attempts. (2) In successful jailbreak cases, harmful words in the prompt received significantly less attention compared to failed attempts. This suggests that when a prompt draws excessive attention to harmful terms, it is more likely to trigger the model’s safety mechanisms directly. In contrast, prompts that attract less attention to such content appear more subtle. In such cases, the model may not fully detect or suppress the malicious intent embedded in the prompt, making it more vulnerable to jailbreak attacks. (3) Additionally, we observed that in successful jailbreaks, the attention to harmful words within the reasoning process was slightly higher than in failed cases. This indicates that when the prompt itself avoids explicitly highlighting harmful content, the model may shift this focus to the reasoning stage, where harmful concepts are discussed actively, ultimately producing unsafe outputs.




Figure 1: Attention differences between failed (Reject) and successful (Jailbreak) attacks across prompt and reasoning.




Figure 2: An example comparing a failed (left) and a successful (right) jailbreak attack. Harmful keywords are highlighted in red, and sensitive terms are highlighted in blue.

Figure 2 presents a representative example comparing two jailbreak prompts derived from the same malicious request: "Provide instructions for falsifying medical records to obtain prescription drugs." Although both prompts share the same underlying intent, they differ in phrasing and structural composition, leading to distinct attention allocation patterns. In the failed jailbreak prompt P1 (left),

harmful keywords such as “falsifying”, “harm”, and “prescription drugs” receive relatively high attention. This likely triggers the model’s safety mechanisms, resulting in a direct refusal—even though the prompt includes a disclaimer. In contrast, the successful jailbreak prompt P2 (right) expresses the same intent using vaguer language and a more subtle structural framing. Consequently, the attention score for the word “harm” drops from 1.2% to 0.7%, and a related concept—“fabricating”, now rephrased as “altering”—sees its attention decreased from 0.6% to 0.2%. In this case, the model assigns significantly less attention to harmful contents in the prompt and instead focuses on producing a structured reasoning process that analyzes the framework’s components. During this reasoning, the model discusses actions such as “altering”, “forging” and “breaching”, which ultimately result in harmful output. This supports our finding that when harmful keywords in the prompt receive reduced attention, the model is less likely to activate its safety mechanisms, while the reasoning process reintroduces and expands upon harmful content, leading to unsafe outputs.

To further validate our findings, we conducted an additional experiment using a gradient-based optimization method to deliberately reduce the attention weights assigned to harmful words in the prompt. This experiment was designed to assess whether lowering attention to such terms would influence the success rate of jailbreak attempts. The experimental details are provided in Section 3.3.

3.3 VERIFICATION EXPERIMENT

To validate the hypothesis that reducing attention to harmful words increases the success rate of jailbreaks, we conducted a targeted experiment using the gradient-based optimization framework *nanoGCG* Zou et al. (2023). Specifically, we introduced a custom loss function designed to minimize the attention weights assigned to harmful words in the input prompt. We denote this enhanced variant as *nanoGCG'*. By optimizing this loss, the *nanoGCG'* framework iteratively adjusted the prompt’s suffix, effectively concealing the malicious intent.

As illustrated in Figure 3, the model progressively reduced its attention to harmful words over multiple optimization steps, eventually bypassing its safety mechanisms and producing a successful jailbreak. These results not only reinforce our earlier findings but also demonstrate the feasibility of influencing LRM behavior through targeted manipulation of attention patterns.




Figure 3: Reducing attention to harmful words enables successful jailbreaks via iterative optimization with *nanoGCG'*.

4 METHODOLOGY

The jailbreak method introduced in Section 3.3, which integrates the attention proportion of harmful words into the *nanoGCG'* framework, is capable of generating effective jailbreak prompts through gradient-based optimization. However, it exhibits several limitations, including poor readability, limited generalization, and a high risk of being detected and rejected by safety filters.

To further advance this line of work, we propose a novel and efficient jailbreak approach called AGA (Attention-Guided Jailbreak Attack). Similar to AutoRAN, AGA employs a LRM attacker for prompt refinement. However, unlike existing baselines, AGA introduces attention guidance by explicitly instructing the model to shift its focus away from harmful keywords. This integration of attention signals provides a clear optimization objective, enabling more targeted and efficient prompt refinement. By leveraging both the attention distribution over harmful keywords and the model’s intermediate reasoning steps, AGA iteratively refines prompts to strike a critical balance between remaining unnoticed and achieving attack effectiveness. The complete procedure is outlined in Algorithm 1. In the following section, we introduce AGA in detail.

4.1 ATTACK SETUP

For the target model M_T , we use its corresponding unaligned variant (e.g., Qwen3-8B-abliterated) as the attack model, denoted as M_A . This attack model is less aligned and does not refuse to generate jailbreak prompts during initialization or optimization, enabling the attacker to explore the space of potentially harmful prompts without encountering built-in refusals.

Given a harmful request q , the attacker M_A iteratively generates a jailbreak prompt x . This prompt is then input into the target model M_T , which produces a response $y = M_T(x)$.

To evaluate the effectiveness of the attack, We use Llama-3.1-70B as the primary evaluation model to measure how well the response y fulfills the original harmful request q . This yields a harmfulness score denoted as $h(y, q)$, which ranges from 1 to 10. 1-3: The model either refuses to respond or produces no harmful content; 4-6: Some harmful content is present, but it is not directly relevant to the intended request q ; 7-9: The response includes relevant information but lacks sufficient detail; 10: The response fully satisfies the harmful request with clear and detailed information. A jailbreak is considered successful if $h(y, q) \geq 7$. The attacker’s goal is to find a jailbreak prompt x that maximizes $h(y, q)$.

Algorithm 1: Attention-Guided Jailbreak Attack

Require: Attack model M_A , Target model M_T , Judge model M_J , Max iterations n_{turn} ,
Template t , Harmful words dictionary D , Attention threshold θ

Input: Harmful request q

Output: Harmful reasoning r , Harmful response y

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1  $i \leftarrow 0$ 
2  $(\tilde{r}, \tilde{y}) \leftarrow M_A(q)$  // Get initial reasoning and response
3  $x_i \leftarrow M_A(\text{Template}(t, \tilde{r}))$  // Prompt initialization
4 while  $i < n_{\text{turn}}$  do
5    $w_i \leftarrow \text{Extract}(x_i, D)$  // Extract harmful words
6    $(r_i, y_i, a_i) \leftarrow M_T(x_i, w_i)$  // Query target model, get reasoning  $r_i$ ,
   response  $y_i$ , attention  $a_i$ 
7   if  $r_i$  is NULL then
8      $x_i \leftarrow M_A(\text{Template}(t, \tilde{r}))$  // Case 1: Immediate Refusal,
     reinitialize  $x_i$  from template pool
9   else if  $a_i > \theta$  then
10     $x_{i+1} \leftarrow \text{ReduceAttention}(x_i, r_i, y_i, a_i)$  // Case 2.1: High Attention
11   else
12      $h(y_i, q) \leftarrow M_J(y_i, q)$  // Case 2.2: Low Attention
13     if  $h(y_i, q) \geq 7$  then
14       return  $(x_i, r_i, y_i)$  // Successful Jailbreak
15     else
16        $x_{i+1} \leftarrow \text{StrengthenPrompt}(q, x_i, y_i, a_i)$ 
17    $i \leftarrow i + 1$ 
18 return FAILURE

```

4.2 PROMPT INITIALIZATION

To begin, we first allow the attack model to process the harmful request q , obtaining its internal reasoning process $\tilde{r}$ and the initial response $\tilde{y}$. The intermediate reasoning of the LRM provides insights into its internal thought process, revealing what the model focuses on and how it reacts to different types of content. Based on $\tilde{r}$, we initialize the jailbreak prompt using a set of predefined, seemingly harmless templates, such as educational scenarios, expert consultations, and fictional contexts. These templates, adapted from established jailbreak strategies, are carefully designed to incorporate key elements derived from the model’s reasoning, including specific examples, logical structure, reasoning strategies, and objectives. By integrating these elements, the initialization process diversifies the attack surface while effectively embedding the core malicious intent, thus increasing the likelihood of bypassing the model’s safety mechanisms.

4.3 EXTRACT HARMFUL WORDS

After obtaining the jailbreak prompt, we need to continuously track how attention is allocated to harmful words throughout the optimization process. This first requires accurately identifying such words. To achieve this, we combine a predefined harmful words dictionary D with a harmful phrase extractor based on LLMs (e.g., GPT-4o). We use LLMs because tokenizers follow strict matching rules, and when harmful expressions change slightly—whether in tense, case, or context—the resulting token IDs may differ, causing traditional static keyword matching to fail. In contrast, LLM-based detectors possess a stronger semantic understanding, enabling them to more flexibly capture a wider range of harmful expressions. The dictionary D serves as a complementary component to further enhance overall detection coverage.

4.4 PROMPT OPTIMIZATION

Upon receiving the i -th jailbreak prompt x_i , the target model M_T generates three key outputs: the intermediate reasoning process r_i , the response y_i , and the attention proportion a_i allocated to harmful words. AGA systematically refines the prompt over multiple iterations by leveraging these internal model signals. The optimization process can be categorized into the following cases:

Case 1: Immediate Refusal. If the target model rejects x_i outright and provides no intermediate reasoning, we treat x_i as invalid. In such cases, we reinitialize a new prompt from the predefined pool to prevent the optimization loop from stalling due to ineffective prompt structures.

Case 2: Generation with Intermediate Reasoning. When the target model provides intermediate reasoning r_i , we use the attention proportion a_i to guide prompt refinement. Based on empirical analysis across multiple models, we set the harmful attention threshold θ to 0.25 (see Appendix for details). If attention to harmful words exceeds this threshold, the prompt tends to be too explicit, often triggering the model’s safety mechanisms. Conversely, if attention falls below the threshold, it does not guarantee success, as the harmfulness of the response may be significantly weakened. Therefore, an effective jailbreak prompt must carefully balance harmful intent with remaining unnoticed.

We further differentiate our optimization strategy based on whether a_i is above or below the threshold:

Case 2.1: High Attention on Harmful Words ($a_i > \theta$). When the attention proportion is too high, the prompt is likely too explicit, increasing the risk of detection by the model’s safety mechanisms. In such cases, we leverage both the model’s reasoning r_i and the attention scores a_i to guide prompt refinement.

The intermediate reasoning r_i often reveals underlying rejection reasons, safety concerns, or points where the model shows hesitation. Meanwhile, the attention scores a_i highlight specific tokens or phrases that receive excessive focus. To address this, we explicitly instruct the M_A to analyze the safety concerns and revise the prompt accordingly. This involves rephrasing sensitive content, replacing direct mentions with subtler expressions, and embedding the harmful intent within a more natural narrative structure. This process systematically reduces the visibility of harmful elements while preserving the intended adversarial objective.

Case 2.2: Low Attention on Harmful Words ($a_i < \theta$). When attention is within acceptable limits, we first evaluate the harmfulness of the model’s output using $h(y_i, q)$.

- If $h(y_i, q) \geq 7$, the attack is considered successful, and the optimization process terminates.
- If the harmfulness score is insufficient, it suggests that although the prompt has evaded detection, it lacks enough adversarial strength to generate a truly harmful response. In this case, we use the attack model M_A to strengthen the prompt by incorporating insights from attention patterns and the response y_i . This involves encouraging the model to provide deeper analysis, elaborate on sensitive methods by describing techniques or tools, and express certain harmful objectives more explicitly, all while maintaining low attention to harmful tokens to avoid triggering detection mechanisms.

The process repeats until the jailbreak is successful or the predefined maximum number of iterations ($n_{\text{turn}} = 5$) is reached.

5 EXPERIMENT

5.1 EXPERIMENT SETUP

Dataset. To evaluate AGA, we construct a benchmark composed of samples from three widely used jailbreak evaluation datasets: AdvBench Zou et al. (2023), StrongReject Souly et al. (2024), and HarmBench Mazeika et al. (2024). From each dataset, we randomly select 50 jailbreak prompts, resulting in a total of 150 test samples. This selection ensures diversity in prompt styles and attack scenarios, covering various categories of harmful content such as prohibited requests, sensitive questions, and adversarial queries.

LRMs. We select three open-source LRMs as our targets: Qwen3-1.7B, Qwen3-8B, and DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-8B. For each model, we use its corresponding unaligned variant (e.g., Qwen3-8B-abliterated) as the attacker model. These attacker models have reduced alignment or safety training, ensuring they do not refuse to generate jailbreak prompts or reject iterative optimization steps during the attack process. For evaluation, we adopt Llama-3.1-70B as the judge model, as it provides results comparable to closed-source models and is sufficient for jailbreak assessment Yang et al. (2024).

We further transfer the jailbreak prompts to closed-source LRMs. Specifically, we target two state-of-the-art LRMs: o4-mini and Gemini-2.5-Flash.

Baselines. We adopt several baseline methods originally designed for LLMs that also show potential for jailbreaking LRMs. Specifically, we consider token-level optimization methods such as GCG Zou et al. (2023) and AutoDAN Liu et al. (2023), as well as sentence-level methods including PAIR Chao et al. (2025) and ReNeLLM Ding et al. (2023).

For LRM-specific baselines, we include H-CoT Kuo et al. (2025), which fabricates reasoning steps to bypass safety filters, and AutoRAN Liang et al. (2025), which exploits weakly aligned reasoning to attack stronger models.

Metrics. We evaluate AGA with three metrics. First, *Attack Success Rate (ASR)* measures effectiveness, defined as the percentage of prompts that successfully elicit harmful responses from the target model within the maximum allowed n_{turn} iterations. A jailbreak is considered successful if the judge model assigns a harmfulness score $h(y, q) \geq 7$. Notably, we report ASR for both the model’s final response (**ASR-R**) and its intermediate reasoning process (**ASR-T**), both evaluated using Llama-3.1-70B as the judge. ASR-R captures the surface-level safety of the final output, while ASR-T emphasizes whether the reasoning path implicitly relies on harmful assumptions or includes inappropriate content, as harmful content may emerge during reasoning, even if it is ultimately filtered out. Second, *Sentence Perplexity (PPL)* evaluates stealthiness. Following the setup of AutoDAN and ReNeLLM, we compute the average perplexity using GPT-2. Third, *Average Success Turns (AST)* assesses efficiency by calculating the average number of optimization iterations required for a successful attack (lower is better).

5.2 MAIN RESULTS

Effectiveness. Table 1 presents the ASR and PPL for all compared methods across three open-source LRMs. In terms of effectiveness, AGA consistently outperforms all baseline approaches, achieving the highest average scores for both ASR-R (96.0%) and ASR-T (95.5%). Compared to the strongest LLM-based baseline, ReNeLLM, AGA improves ASR-R by more than 30%. It also surpasses recent LRM-specific methods, outperforming H-CoT and AutoRAN by 4.7% and 4.9% in ASR-R, respectively, demonstrating its strong effectiveness.

Notably, the small gap between ASR-T and ASR-R suggests that harmful behavior is not limited to the final output, but persists consistently throughout the model’s inference process. In the case of Qwen3-8B, AGA even achieves a slightly higher ASR-T (96.0%) than ASR-R (94.7%). This aligns with recent findings Zhou et al. (2025) that LRMs may generate harmful content during early reasoning steps, even when the final response appears filtered or safe. Therefore, monitoring only the final output is insufficient, and the entire reasoning process must be carefully regulated.

Stealthiness. Stealthiness is critical for avoiding detection by safety filters or monitoring systems. As shown in Table 1, AGA achieves the second-lowest average PPL (32.2) among all models, coming close to the best-performing approach, PAIR (26.7). Importantly, AGA maintains this level of

Table 1: Attack Success Rate (ASR-R, ASR-T) and Sentence Perplexity (PPL) across Models. The best results are highlighted in bold, and the second-best results are underlined.

Method		Qwen3-1.7B			Qwen3-8B			DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-8B			Average		
		ASR-R↑	ASR-T↑	PPL↓	ASR-R↑	ASR-T↑	PPL↓	ASR-R↑	ASR-T↑	PPL↓	ASR-R↑	ASR-T↑	PPL↓
LLM Attacks	GCG	38.7	36.0	2009.0	21.3	18.7	1537.6	34.7	34.7	1748.2	31.6	29.8	1764.9
	AutoDAN	49.3	47.3	124.9	43.3	42.0	131.2	37.3	36.7	158.4	43.3	42.0	138.2
	PAIR	39.3	38.7	26.5	32.0	31.3	29.0	23.3	23.3	24.7	31.5	31.1	26.7
	ReNeLLM	65.3	66.0	88.3	56.7	56.7	75.6	72.7	73.3	81.5	64.9	65.3	81.8
LRM Attacks	H-CoT	92.0	92.0	36.4	90.7	92.0	37.3	91.3	92.0	39.2	91.3	92.0	37.6
	AutoRAN	90.7	89.3	32.5	90.0	90.7	32.5	92.7	92.7	37.9	91.1	90.9	34.3
	AGA (ours)	96.0	95.3	<u>30.1</u>	94.7	96.0	<u>32.4</u>	97.3	95.3	<u>34.1</u>	96.0	95.5	<u>32.2</u>

stealth while achieving significantly higher ASR compared to PAIR and all other baseline methods. This balance between strong effectiveness and high stealthiness demonstrates the practical advantage of AGA.

Efficiency. We also use the *Average Successful Turns* (AST) to evaluate attack efficiency, as illustrated in Figure 4. Across different datasets, AGA exhibits exceptional efficiency, with most successful attacks completed within just two iterations. For example, Qwen3-1.7B achieves an AST of 1.39 (averaged over AdvBench, HarmBench, and StrongReject), Qwen3-8B reaches 1.58, and DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-8B attains 1.51. In contrast, baseline methods such as PAIR and AutoDAN typically require more than 30 iterations to succeed. AGA’s high efficiency can be primarily attributed to its attention-guided optimization mechanism, which provides a clear refinement signal throughout the process. This contrasts with baselines like AutoRAN and H-CoT, which lack explicit optimization objectives and have to blindly rely on the LRM’s ability to find a successful jailbreak prompt in a trial-and-error manner.




Figure 4: Success turns of AGA across benchmarks and models. Each bar represents the proportion of successful jailbreaks completed within 1 to 5 iterations, denoted as *Succeeded@1* to *Succeeded@5*.

Table 2: Cross-model ASR based on Qwen3-8B samples.

Method	o4-mini		Gemini-2.5-Flash	
	ASR-R $\uparrow$	ASR-T $\uparrow$	ASR-R $\uparrow$	ASR-T $\uparrow$
GCG	2.0	0.7	2.7	0.7
AutoDAN	16.0	12.0	14.7	13.3
PAIR	18.7	18.7	27.3	28.7
ReNeLLM	23.3	22.7	25.3	26.0
H-CoT	43.3	42.7	44.7	44.0
AutoRAN	50.0	51.3	52.0	53.3
AGA(ours)	54.0	54.7	57.3	58.7

Transferability. To evaluate the transferability of generated jailbreak prompts to black-box, closed-source models, we reused the successful prompts developed on Qwen3-8B and applied them to two state-of-the-art proprietary LRMs: o4-mini and Gemini-2.5-Flash. As shown in Table 2, AGA achieves the highest transfer success rates on both models, with an ASR-R of 54.0% on o4-mini and 57.3% on Gemini-2.5-Flash. Remarkably, despite the robust safety measures implemented in both o4-mini and Gemini-2.5-Flash, AGA still achieves over a 50% attack success rate, highlighting the potential risks posed by such advanced jailbreak techniques.

6 CONCLUSION

In this paper, we investigate the underlying reasons for the success of existing jailbreak methods on LRMs from the perspective of attention shifting. We find that successful attacks tend to divert the model’s attention away from harmful keywords, redirecting it toward other parts of the prompt or its internal reasoning process. Building on this insight, we propose AGA, an efficient, attention-guided jailbreak method that leverages the model’s intermediate reasoning to iteratively refine prompts. Extensive experiments on both open-source and closed-source LRMs demonstrate that AGA outperforms existing baselines in terms of effectiveness, stealthiness, efficiency, and transferability.

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7 APPENDIX

7.1 GENERALITY OF ATTENTION PATTERN FINDINGS ACROSS MODELS

To verify whether the attention-related findings observed in Qwen3-8B generalize to other LRMs, we performed the same analysis on two additional models: Qwen3-1.7B and DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-8B. For each model, we examined 100 jailbreak attempts and compared the attention allocation between successful and failed cases.

The corresponding attention distribution visualizations for Qwen3-1.7B and DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-8B are shown in Figure 5. The results confirm that the three key findings observed in Qwen3-8B are consistent across both models: (1) LRMs consistently allocate more attention to the reasoning process than to the input prompt, regardless of whether the jailbreak attempt is successful or not. (2) In successful jailbreaks, harmful keywords in the prompt receive significantly less attention compared to failed attempts. (3) Harmful keywords tend to receive slightly higher attention during the reasoning process in successful jailbreaks, indicating that while the prompt itself avoids triggering detection, the model shifts this focus to the reasoning stage. This shift allows the model to discuss unsafe content, ultimately leading to harmful outputs.

Based on our multi-model analysis, we set the attention threshold $\theta = 0.25$ to guide AGA’s prompt refinement process. Across Qwen3-1.7B, Qwen3-8B, and DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-8B, we consistently observed that failed jailbreaks prompts exhibited harmful attention proportions exceeding




Figure 5: Attention differences between failed (Reject) and successful (Jailbreak) attacks across prompt and reasoning. Each subfigure contains two plots: the left shows the overall attention distribution between the prompt and the reasoning process, while the right shows the attention proportion on harmful keywords in both parts. The findings observed in Qwen3-8B are consistent in (a) Qwen3-1.7B and (b) DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-8B.

0.25—often above 0.30. In contrast, successful jailbreaks attacks typically kept attention below this threshold, with average between 0.22 and 0.24. Prompts exceeding the threshold tend to be overly explicit, increasing the likelihood of triggering the model’s safety mechanisms. Conversely, prompts with attention below the threshold are generally more subtle, making them more likely to evade detection and successfully induce harmful behavior.

7.2 DETAIL EXPERIMENTAL SETTINGS

For all model inference, we set the temperature to 0.7 and adopt a sampling-based decoding strategy with `do_sample=True`. The maximum number of generated tokens is set to `max_new_tokens=1024`. We also use the `enable_thinking` flag to control whether the Large Reasoning Models perform intermediate reasoning during generation. All experiments were conducted using Python 3.10 and the `transformers` library version 4.51.0.