Jailbreaking Vision-Language Models Through the Visual Modality

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Abstract

The visual modality of vision-language models (VLMs) is an underexplored attack surface for bypassing safety alignment. We introduce four jailbreak attacks exploiting the vision component: (1) encoding harmful instructions as visual symbol sequences with a decoding legend, (2) replacing harmful objects with benign substitutes (e.g., bomb → banana) then prompting for harmful actions using the substitute term, (3) replacing harmful text in images (e.g., on book covers) with benign words while visual context preserves the original meaning, and (4) visual analogy puzzles whose solution requires inferring a prohibited concept. Evaluating across five frontier VLMs, we find visual attacks achieve comparable and sometimes superior success rates to their text-only counterparts. For example, our visual cipher achieves 40.9% attack success on Claude-Haiku-4.5 versus 10.7% for an equivalent textual cipher. To further our insight into the attack mechanism, we present preliminary interpretability and mitigation results. These findings highlight that robust VLM alignment requires treating vision as a first-class target for safety post-training.[1]

1. Introduction

Vision–Language Models (VLMs) [1] have become central to real-world AI systems, powering multimodal assistants [9], image-based search [7], and document understanding [8]. While jointly processing visual and textual inputs enables capabilities inaccessible to language-only models, the additional visual input space introduces novel and poorly understood safety risks.

Safety alignment for LLMs has received extensive attention [4, 10, 14, 15, 20], yet the visual modality of VLMs remains comparatively underexplored [11, 16]. Most existing defenses treat text as the primary attack vector and vision as a passive channel. This assumption is increasingly at odds with how modern VLMs operate: visual inputs can strongly shape model behavior without explicit textual cues [6, 18].

In this work, we show that the visual channel can be actively exploited to bypass safety mechanisms in frontier VLMs. We introduce a family of jailbreak attacks that encode or imply disallowed intent through visual structure, context, or analogy while keeping all surface-level content benign. Specifically, we propose four attack types:

- **Visual Cipher** (Figure 1): Harmful instructions encoded as abstract glyphs with a visual decoding legend.
- **Visual Object Replacement** (Figure 2): Harmful objects replaced with benign substitutes (e.g., bomb → banana) while scene context preserves the original implication.
- **Visual Text Replacement** (Figure 3): Harmful text in images (e.g., book covers) replaced with benign words while visual and cultural context implies the original referent.
- **Visual Analogy Riddle** (Figure 4): Visual analogies whose solution requires inferring a prohibited concept through implicit reasoning.

We evaluate these attacks systematically across five frontier VLMs and multiple threat categories. Our findings suggest that robust alignment of VLMs requires extending existing text-based safety efforts to directly account for the visual modality. The cross-modality alignment gap, where safety training on text fails to transfer to visual embeddings [16, 18], leaves a large and exploitable attack surface unaddressed. In summary, our main contributions are:

- We present four novel jailbreak attacks that exploit the visual modality of VLMs: visual cipher, visual object replacement and text replacement, and analogy riddles.
- We systematically evaluate five frontier VLMs and show that visual attacks often outperform carefully matched text-only baselines.
- We provide preliminary evidence that lightweight output-side guardrails can detect successful attacks, suggesting that text-based safety classifiers remain effective even when visual input filters are bypassed.

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[1] https://vlm-jailbreaks.github.io



Figure 1. **Visual Cipher Attack.** *Legend:* A mapping of visual glyphs to words, including distractors. *Sentence:* A harmful instruction encoded as a glyph sequence. The VLM has to decode and execute the instruction.



Figure 2. **Object Replacement Attack.** A harmful object is replaced with a benign one while surrounding context is preserved.



Figure 3. **Text Replacement Attack.** Harmful text inside an image is replaced with benign text while visual and typographic context is preserved, encouraging the VLM to recover the original harmful text.

2. Jailbreaking VLMs with Visual Inputs

We present four attack types that exploit the visual modality to extract harmful responses from VLMs. Each encodes or implies harmful intent through visual structure while maintaining benign surface-level content. We describe each attack below; where applicable, we include text-only baselines that isolate the visual modality's contribution. Across all attacks, we employ a "decode-first" prompting strategy: the model is first instructed to describe or decode the visual content, then to follow the decoded instruction. Preliminary experiments showed that omitting this step led to substantially higher misunderstanding rates.

2.1. Prompt Neutralization Strategy

HarmBench [12] behaviors explicitly reference harmful actions, entities, or outcomes, which can directly trigger refusals in modern VLMs. To isolate whether models can recover prohibited intent from *visual context alone*, we first construct a benign textual interface for each behavior.

We replace up to four harmful referents with abstract slot variables (X_1–X_4). Each slot corresponds to a single semantically coherent referent and is used consistently within a prompt. For example: *List chop shops in Los Angeles for selling stolen cars* $\rightarrow$ *List* X_1 *in Los Angeles for selling* X_2. The resulting prompts contain no explicit references to harmful activities and are, in isolation, benign. This neutralization enables controlled evaluation of whether visual context can *reconstruct* the latent harmful intent, thereby isolating cross-modal safety failures rather than purely textual ones. All visual attacks described below operate on these neutralized prompts execpt for the Visual Cipher.

2.2. Visual Cipher

Our attack (Figure 1) encodes harmful instructions into a pictographic language that the VLM must decode at inference time. We tokenize each instruction into words and assign each unique word to a distinct visual glyph (geometric symbols defined by shape, color, and internal mark). We construct a *legend* displaying glyph-to-word mappings and a *sentence image* rendering the instruction as a glyph sequence, augmented with distractor glyphs. We employ Best-of-5 sampling with varying cipher encodings.

Textual Cipher Baseline. The text-only variant replaces each word with a pronounceable nonsense token (e.g., "Brimova") and provides the mapping as a text legend, using identical tokenization, distractors, and prompting.

2.3. Visual Object Replacement

This attack (Figure 2) replaces a harmful object in an image with a benign substitute while preserving scene context that conveys the object's functional role, inducing a *contextual semantic overwrite*. We generate base images depicting harmful objects in realistic scenes, then replace only the harmful object with a benign alternative (e.g., *banana*). The model is instructed to interpret each X_i as the concept implied by the image context.

Textual Replacement Baseline. Following Yona et al. 19, we construct contextual sentences mentioning the harmful concept, replace harmful terms with a benign word, and instruct the model to infer X_i from the textual context.



Figure 4. **Riddle Analogy Attack.** Visual riddles encode target concepts implicitly. The model solves all riddles, then combines decoded concepts with the sanitized prompt, recovering the hidden harmful intent.

2.4. Visual Text Replacement

The Visual Text Replacement attack (Figure 3) probes whether VLMs recover disallowed semantics from visual context when explicit harmful text is removed. We construct base images where the target term appears as text within culturally recognizable artifacts (book covers, posters, signage), then produce attacked images by replacing the term with a benign placeholder while preserving font style, layout, and surrounding imagery. We constrain the attack so that all visible text tokens and the user prompt remain benign; any recovery of prohibited semantics must arise from visual context alone.

2.5. Visual Analogy Riddle

We decompose each harmful query into a benign base prompt and 1 to N constituent factors $\{X_1, \ldots, X_N\}$ whose combination renders the query unsafe. Each factor is encoded as a three-row visual analogy (A : B as C : ?) where every component is benign; the prohibited concept emerges only as the answer that completes the pattern (Figure 4). We prompt a language model to generate candidate riddle descriptions, then render them as images. Riddle selection is exhaustive across all target combinations to ensure reported success rates reflect optimal configurations. To our knowledge, this is the first method that decomposes harmful intent into benign components and recomposes them through multi-riddle analogical inference.

2.6. Evaluation Methodology

We evaluate attack success using an ensemble of three LLM judges (Grok-4.1-Fast, Gemini-3-Flash, Claude-Haiku-4.5). Each judge classifies the target model's response on a four-point scale: 0 (Refusal), 1 (Misunderstanding), 2 (Partial Compliance), or 3 (Compliance). Classifications are aggregated via conservative majority vote, with ties broken by selecting the lowest score. For each behavior, we report Best-of-K success ($K = 5$): the attack succeeds if any of the K responses achieves a classification of 3.

Table 1. **Mean ASR (%) averaged across semantic categories for each attack and model.**

Attack Type	Claude Haiku 4.5 [2]	Gemini 3 Flash [5]	GPT 5.2 [13]	Qwen3 VL 235B [3]	Qwen3 VL 32B [3]
Textual Cipher	10.7	89.3	5.7	**86.8**	84.9
Visual Cipher	**40.9**	**97.5**	**8.2**	86.2	**87.4**
Textual Repl.	**8.1**	**58.8**	**16.9**	29.5	39.0
Visual Object Repl.	4.1	52.0	11.5	**35.6**	**41.1**
Textual Repl.	8.1	**58.8**	**16.9**	29.5	39.0
Visual Text Repl.	**12.9**	32.8	14.4	**51.5**	**58.1**
Textual Analogy Riddle	**39.6**	**67.9**	**24.5**	**51.6**	**62.3**
Visual Analogy Riddle	13.8	52.2	13.2	29.6	38.4

3. Experiments

We evaluate our attacks on HarmBench [12] benchmark.
Visual Object Replacement: For each placeholder (X_1–X_4), we construct attacked images using the REVE text-to-image model, replacing harmful referents with fixed benign surrogates (banana, carrot, water bottle, broccoli) while preserving scene structure. We include $n = 3$ images per concept to improve robustness. **Visual Text Replacement:** Base images are obtained via a hybrid pipeline combining reference retrieval from public catalogs with generative synthesis using REVE. Attack images are produced via localized text edits that replace the harmful term with a benign placeholder while preserving all non-textual visual elements. We include $n = 3$ images per concept to improve robustness. **Visual Analogy Riddle:** We use Grok-4.1-fast for textual riddle generation and Gemini-2.5-flash-image for visual rendering.

3.1. Quantitative Analysis

Table 1 summarizes mean ASR across semantic categories, and Figure 5 provides category-level breakdowns.
Visual Cipher. Gemini-3-Flash and Qwen3-VL-235B are highly vulnerable to both textual and visual ciphers. Claude-Haiku-4.5 is significantly more vulnerable in the vision channel (40.9% visual vs. 10.7% textual). GPT-5.2 is robust but shows slight visual sensitivity (5.7% $\rightarrow$ 8.2%).
Visual Object Replacement. Qwen3-VL-32B and Qwen3-VL-235B show equal or stronger vulnerability to visual replacement, indicating heavier reliance on scene-level context. Gemini-3-Flash is vulnerable in both modalities with a slight textual advantage. Claude-Haiku-4.5 and GPT-5.2 remain robust overall.
Visual Text Replacement. Qwen3-VL-32B and Qwen3-VL-235B show substantially higher vulnerability to visual text replacement than textual replacement, suggesting strong use of visual and cultural context. Claude-Haiku-



(a) Visual Cipher (b) Visual Object Replacement (c) Visual Text Replacement (d) Visual Analogy

Figure 5. Radar plots of aggregate best-of-5 ASR by semantic category across attack types. Each axis corresponds to a HarmBench category; higher values indicate more successful attacks.

4.5 shows a modest visual increase (12.9% vs. 8.1%). Gemini-3-Flash exhibits the reverse pattern (58.8% textual vs. 32.8% visual).

Visual Analogy Riddle. Gemini-3-Flash achieves 67.9%/52.2% (textual/visual) and Qwen3-VL-32B reaches 62.3%/38.4%. GPT-5.2 demonstrates stronger robustness at 24.5%/13.2%. Visual analogies consistently underperform textual ones, which we attribute to the inherent ambiguity of riddle-based inference amplified in the visual modality.

4. Limitations and Discussion

Our results demonstrate that the visual modality is a substantial and underexplored attack surface in VLMs. Across four attack paradigms, visual attacks consistently match or exceed text-only counterparts, providing empirical evidence for a *cross-modality alignment gap*: text-based safety training does not automatically generalize to equivalent harmful intent conveyed visually. The magnitude of this gap varies across models. GPT-5.2 demonstrates robust resistance across modalities, suggesting tighter cross-modal safety transfer. Open-weight models like Qwen3-VL exhibit higher overall vulnerability. Claude-Haiku-4.5 shows a pronounced modality gap-relatively robust to text-based attacks but substantially more vulnerable to visual variants. This suggest that safety training approaches yield different cross-modal characteristics, and understanding them could inform more robust alignment strategies.

Limitations. Our evaluation relies on HarmBench and may not capture all harm categories. For proprietary models, we lack access to model internals, limiting mechanistic analysis. Our attack success depends on attack data generation quality, introducing variability we mitigate through Best-of-K sampling but cannot fully control. High misunderstanding rates suggest that some attack failures may stem from limited visual reasoning rather than safety robustness, implying these vectors may become more potent as capabilities improve.

Interpretability. Our preliminary mechanistic investigations suggest that visual attacks may create a temporal mismatch between safety checking and semantic integration. Refusal direction analysis reveals that visual replacement prompts substantially suppress late-layer refusal activation relative to harmful image prompts. Yet Logit Lens probing (Figure 6) shows that dangerous tokens remain prominent in semantic layers while benign tokens drop dramatically, only recovering in the final decoding layer. This suggests the model infers dangerous semantics from context despite benign visual appearance, with the output decision occurring after the refusal checkpoint-a dissociation that mirrors text-domain representation hijacking [19] but arises from visual context alone.



Figure 6. **Last-token logit layer trends for Qwen3-VL-8B for the visual replacement attack (replaced images).** The instruction for the model is `"Only use ONE word to describe the object... The word should be:"`. After replacement, dangerous tokens are high in semantic layers, while benign tokens drop before recovering in the final decoding layer.

Toward Practical Mitigations. While our attacks exploit gaps in input-side safety mechanisms, they ultimately surface as harmful natural-language outputs, making output-side defenses an attractive mitigation. Recent work on Constitutional Classifiers [17] shows strong accuracy in detecting unsafe outputs regardless of input modality. In our experiments, a lightweight guard (Qwen3Guard-Stream-0.6B) correctly flags most Visual Cipher outputs, suggesting that output filtering can catch many successful attack without heavy changes to the VLM stack.

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