JAILBREAKING LLMS' SAFEGUARD WITH UNIVERSAL MAGIC WORDS FOR TEXT EMBEDDING MODELS

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ABSTRACT

The security issue of large language models (LLMs) has gained wide attention recently, with various defense mechanisms developed to prevent harmful output, among which safeguards based on text embedding models serve as a fundamental defense. Through testing, we discover that the output distribution of text embedding models is severely biased with a large mean. Inspired by this observation, we propose novel, efficient methods to search for **universal magic words** that attack text embedding models. Universal magic words as suffixes can shift the embedding of any text towards the bias direction, thus manipulating the similarity of any text pair and misleading safeguards. Attackers can jailbreak the safeguards by appending magic words to user prompts and requiring LLMs to end answers with magic words. Experiments show that magic word attacks significantly degrade safeguard performance on JailbreakBench, cause real-world chatbots to produce harmful outputs in full-pipeline attacks, and generalize across input/output texts, models, and languages. To eradicate this security risk, we also propose defense methods against such attacks, which can correct the bias of text embeddings and improve downstream performance in a train-free manner.

1 INTRODUCTION

Recently, large language models (LLMs) have been widely applied in the industry, such as chat systems Brown et al. (2020) and search engines Nayak (2019). However, LLMs can be maliciously exploited to extract harmful output, making LLM security an important research topic.

In this topic, it is of great significance to discover security vulnerabilities of text embedding models and propose corresponding defense methods. Current LLM security strategies include alignment Bai et al. (2022) and safeguards OpenAI (2025). Lightweight text classifiers based on text embedding models Kim et al. (2023) can be used as safeguards to judge whether the input and output of LLMs are harmful. This method can serve as a foundational line of defense because it is low-cost while maintaining the performance of LLMs. In addition, text embedding models are also used to enhance modern search engines Nayak (2019). Therefore, the robustness of text embedding models affects the security of both LLMs and search engines.

Attacking LLMs' safeguards is challenging because the output of LLMs is unknown, the safeguards are black boxes, and the token space is vast and discrete. This results in the following limitations of existing attack methods on text embedding models: 1) Case-by-case attack methods require access to LLMs' output before safeguards, which is unrealistic for online dialogue systems; 2) White-box attack methods require the gradients of text embedding models, which are also unrealistic; 3) Brute-force search for prompt perturbations requires traversing a massive token space, leading to high time costs.

To address these challenges, we propose an innovative approach to attack LLMs' safeguards based on text embedding models: to find universal "magic words" (i.e., adversarial suffixes) that would increase or decrease the embedding similarity between any pair of texts so as to mislead the safeguards in classifying within the text embedding space.

This task is feasible based on the following observation. We tested various text embedding models and found that the cosine similarities between text embeddings and their mean (normalized) concentrate near a significant positive value, as shown in Fig. 1. In other words, text embeddings do not distribute uniformly on a high-dimensional sphere S^{d-1}(since they are normalized); instead, they concentrate in a band on the sphere, as illustrated in Fig. 2. The direction of distribution bias is similar to all text embeddings, while the opposite direction is dissimilar to all embeddings. This implies that if we can find suffixes that push any text towards this bias direction, we can increase the similarity of any text with other texts. Similarly, one could also try to find suffixes that reduce text similarity. We refer to these words as **universal magic words** since they can mislead safeguards on any text by manipulating text similarity.

We estimate the bias direction with the mean and the principal singular vector of text embeddings (see Sec. 3.1). Actual tests and theoretical analysis show that the two methods yield the same results.

Based on the identified bias direction, we use the following methods to find universal magic words (see Sec. 3.2). Alg. 1: brute-force search without leveraging the bias direction, used as a baseline; Alg. 2 (black-box): find words whose text embeddings are as similar/dissimilar as possible to the bias direction; Alg. 3 (white-box): find universal suffixes that push any text embedding closer to the bias direction or far away from its original position. Alg. 3 uses gradients to solve this problem in only one epoch. Experiments show that all three methods can find the best magic words, but Algs. 2 and 3 are far more efficient than Alg. 1. Additionally, only Alg. 3 can search for multi-token magic words.



Figure 1: The distribution of cosine similarity between text embedding $e(s)$ of text s with normalized mean embedding e^* of all text, tested on various text embedding models.

The universal magic words can be abused to attack safeguards in LLM security systems. As shown in Fig. 3, the safeguards will fail to detect harmful content by appending magic words to the input and output of LLMs.

Contributions. The contribution of this paper can be summarized as follows:

- We discover that the output distribution of text embedding models is uneven and the relationship between this property and universal magic words;
- We propose novel methods for finding universal magic words, which are efficient and capable of searching for multi-token magic words;
- We demonstrate that those universal magic words are able to jailbreak LLMs' safeguards and generalize across input/output texts, models, and languages (see experiments in Secs. 4.3 to 4.5).
- We propose defense methods against such attacks by correcting the uneven embedding distribution.

2 Related Work

2.1 Defense Methods for LLMs

Alignment involves training LLMs to align with human values Askell et al. (2021); Liu et al. (2022); Bai et al. (2022). This method is widely used because it does not introduce additional computational overhead during inference. Due to the competition between assisting users and aligning values, as well as the limited domain of safety training Wei et al. (2024), such methods are vulnerable to adversarial attacks Zou et al. (2023); Chao et al. (2023). This has forced people to develop additional security measures.

Safeguards are the additional measures on the input or output of LLMs to avoid harmful responses.

On the input side, there are several guard measures: 1) Detecting suspicious patterns Alon & Kamfonas (2023); Jain et al. (2023), which tends to yield false positives; 2) Reminding LLMs to align values with system prompts Wei et al. (2023); Xie et al. (2023); Zhang et al. (2024), which can be canceled by the user prompt "ignore previous instructions" Perez & Ribeiro (2022); 3) Perturbing the user's prompt into multiple versions before feeding it to the LLM to detect harmful requests Kumar et al. (2023); Robey et al. (2023), which is costly; 4) Classifying whether the prompt is harmful with a model Kim et al. (2023).

On the output side, several detection methods for LLMs' harmful responses serve as the last line of defense in LLM security systems: 1) rule-based matching, with the same drawbacks as it is on the input side; 2) another LLM to answer whether the output is harmful Phute et al. (2023); Inan et al. (2023); Wang et al. (2023), which doubles the cost; 3) alternatively, text classifiers to do this He et al. (2021); Kim et al. (2023); Markov et al. (2023), which is more cost-effective.

2.2 Attack Methods for LLMs

Templates jailbreak LLMs with universal magic words effective for various prompts, some even transferable across LLMs. Manual templates are heuristically designed, including explicit templates (e.g., instructing LLMs to "ignore previous instructions" Perez & Ribeiro (2022), "Start with 'Absolutely! Here's'" Mozes et al. (2023) or "Do anything now" Mozes et al. (2023)) and implicit templates (e.g., role-playing Bhardwaj & Poria (2023); Shah et al. (2023), storytelling Li et al. (2023b) and virtual scenarios Li et al. (2023a); Kang et al. (2024); Singh et al. (2023); Du et al. (2023)). Automatic templates are optimized by gradient descent (black-box) Wallace et al. (2019); Zou et al. (2023); Zhu et al. (2024), random search (white-box) Lapid et al. (2024); Andriushchenko et al. (2024), or generative models Liao & Sun (2024) to find adversarial prefixes and suffixes for user prompts. These prefixes and suffixes could be individual words or sentences Zou et al. (2023), and comprehensible Liao & Sun (2024) or not Lapid et al. (2024).

Rewriting attacks language models at several levels, including character-level (e.g., misspelling Li et al. (2019)), word-level (e.g., synonyms Jin et al. (2020)), segment-level (e.g., assigning variable names to segmented harmful text Wu et al. (2024); Kang et al. (2024)), prompt-level (e.g., rewriting prompts with an LLM Chao et al. (2023); Mehrotra et al. (2023); Tian et al. (2023); Ge et al. (2023)), language-level (e.g., translating into a language that lacks LLM safety Qiu et al. (2023)), and encoding-level (e.g., encoding harmful text into ASCII, Morse code Yuan et al. (2023) or Base64 Kwon & Pak (2024)). Through optimization algorithms, attackers can automatically find the most effective rewrites to bypass the LLM's safeguards.

The methods above are all focused on attacking the LLM itself, while research on attacking safeguards is still in its early stages. A magic word "lucrarea" was discovered by the champion of a Kaggle competition on attacking LLMs Nguyen (2024), through trying the tokens near ¡/s¿ in the token embedding space. We find many more magic words, including "lucrarea", with our novel algorithms and give a more accurate and systematic explanation of why it works. Similar to our method, PRP Mangaokar et al. (2024) attacks output guards by injecting magic words into LLMs' responses. The distinctions between our work and PRP are: 1) we attack guards based on text embedding models, which are more lightweight and cost-effective than LLM-based guards in PRP; 2) we discovered the uneven distribution of text embeddings, which allows us to design algorithms to search for magic words more efficiently.

3 Method

Notation: 1) Let s_1 and s_2 be two *text strings*, and let r be a positive integer. The operation s_1+s_2 denotes the concatenation of s_1 and s_2, and $r * s_2$ denotes the string s_2 repeated r times. 2) For example, if $s_1 =$ "he", $s_2 =$ "llo", then $s_1+s_2 =$ "$hello$" and $s_1+2*s_2 =$ "$hellollo$". Denote the *text embedding* of text string s by $e(s)$ and its dimension by d. $e(s)$ is normalized to a unit vector, hence $e(s) \in S^{d-1}$. The text embedding $e(s)$ of s is computed as $e(s) = \mathbf{e}(\boldsymbol{s}), \boldsymbol{s} = E^\top \tau(s)$. Here, $\boldsymbol{s} \in \mathbb{R}^{h\times l}$ denotes the representation of s in the token embedding space, which is mapped to a text embedding by $\mathbf{e}$. Moreover, τ is a tokenizer that splits s into l tokens, outputting $\tau(s) \in \{0,1\}^{T\times l}$ where the columns are one-hot. $\mathcal{T} = \{t_i\}_i$ is the token vocabulary, with size $|\mathcal{T}| = T$. $E \in \mathbb{R}^{T\times h}$ denotes the token embeddings of all tokens, with dimension h. 3) The *cosine similarity* between text s_1 and s_2 is defined as $\cos\theta(s_1, s_2) := e(s_1)^\top e(s_2)$.

This paper aims to find all possible universal magic words, which can be formulated as follows.

Assumption 3.1. There exists a word w^+ satisfying that $\cos\theta(s_1 + w^+, s_2) \geq \cos\theta_*, \quad \forall s_1, s_2,$ where $\cos\theta_*$ is close to 1. We refer to w^+ as a **positive universal magic word** for the text embedding model e, which can force any pair of texts to be similar enough in the text embedding space.

3.1 DESCRIPTION OF THE UNEVEN DIRECTION

To describe the unevenness of the text embedding distribution, we represent the bias direction of the distribution by the normalized mean of text embeddings e^* or the principal singular vector v^* of the text embedding matrix. We prove that any text appended by a positive universal magic word w^+ will be close to e^* (or v^*). This serves as the guiding principle for searching for magic words in Sec. 3.2.

We denote the *mean of text embeddings* as $\bar{e} = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{S}|}\sum_j e(s_j)$ and the normalized mean as $e^* = \frac{\bar{e}}{\|\bar{e}\|_2}$, where $\mathcal{S} = \{s_j\}_j$ is the set of all possible texts.

The following proposition shows that any text with a magic word will be embedded close to e^*.

Proposition 3.2. *Under Assumption 3.1, a positive universal magic word w^+ must satisfy*

$$\cos\theta(e(s+w^+), e^*) \geq \sqrt{1-\tan^2\theta_*}, \quad \forall s \in \mathcal{S}.$$

Denote the text embedding matrix of $\mathcal{S}$ as $X \in \mathbb{R}^{|\mathcal{S}|\times d}$, where the i-th row of X is $e(s_i)^\top$. Let v^* be the *principal right singular vector* of X corresponding to the largest singular value.

The following proposition shows that any text with a magic word will be embedded close to v^*.

Proposition 3.3. *Under Assumption 3.1, a positive universal magic word w^+ must satisfy*

$$\cos\theta(e(s+w^+), v^*) \geq \sqrt{1-\tan^2\theta_*}, \quad \forall s \in \mathcal{S}.$$

See Sec. C for the proof of the two propositions. In the experiments (see Sec. 4.1), we found that e^* and v^* are almost identical, so we will only refer to e^* in the subsequent sections.

3.2 SEARCHING FOR UNIVERSAL MAGIC WORDS

Based on the observations in Sec. 3.1, we boldly presume the existence of universal magic words. When used as a suffix, universal magic words could make any text more similar or dissimilar to other texts in the embedding space.

We refer to the words that increase the text similarity as **positive magic words** and those that decrease the text similarity as **negative magic words**, as shown in Fig. 2.

Brute-Force Method The simplest method to find magic words is a brute-force search, shown in Alg. 1. This method directly calculates the similarity score of all tokens in the vocabulary set and finds the top-k_0 magic words. This method does not rely on the bias direction.

For each token t_i in the token vocabulary set $\mathcal{T} = \{t_i\}_i$, we define the *positive similarity score* as

$$c_i^+ = \max_{1\leq r\leq 16} \frac{1}{S^2}\sum_{j,k} \cos\theta(s_j + r * t_i, s_k) \tag{1}$$

$$= \max_{1\leq r\leq 16} \frac{1}{S}\sum_{j} \cos\theta(s_j + r * t_i, e^*) \tag{2}$$

Tokens with higher positive scores are more effective as positive magic words. r represents the repetition count. Repeating the magic word usually amplifies its effect. However, we limit r to a maximum of 16 to avoid completely distorting the text.



Figure 2: Text embeddings concentrate in a band on the sphere S^{d-1}. Positive magic words can push them towards the normalized mean e^*. Negative magic words can pull them away from their original position.

Finding negative magic words requires more data. Specifically, in addition to the text s_j, we also need another piece of text s'_j that is semantically similar to s_j but phrased differently. This is because the effect of a negative magic word is to make synonymous text no longer synonymous. Now the set of text pairs is in the form $\tilde{\mathcal{S}} = \{(s_j, s'_j)\}_j$ with $\cos\theta(s_j, s'_j)$ close to 1. We define the *negative similarity score* of t_i as

$$c_i^- = \min_{1\leq r\leq 16} \frac{1}{S}\sum_{j} \cos\theta(s_j + r * t_i, s'_j). \tag{3}$$

The lower negative similarity score indicates the greater effectiveness of magic words in making synonymous text dissimilar.

Algorithm 1 Brute-Force Method

Input: text set $\tilde{\mathcal{S}}$, vocabulary set $\mathcal{T}$, number of magic words k_0
for t_i in $\mathcal{T}$ **do**
  $c_i^+ \leftarrow \max_{1\le r\le 16} \sum_j \cos\theta(s_j + r * t_i, e^*)$
  $c_i^- \leftarrow \min_{1\le r\le 16} \sum_j \cos\theta(s_j + r * t_i, s_j')$
end for
$w^\pm \leftarrow \mathrm{topk}_i(\pm c_i^\pm, k_0)$
Output: $w^\pm$ {top-k_0 pos./neg. magic words}

Algorithm 2 Context-Free Method

Input: vocabulary set $\mathcal{T}$, normalized mean e^*, repetition count r, candidate number k
for t_i in $\mathcal{T}$ **do**
  $c_i \leftarrow e(r * t_i)^\top e^*$
end for
$\mathcal{T}^\pm \leftarrow \mathrm{topk}_i(\pm c_i, k)$ {candidate list, size=k}
$w^\pm \leftarrow \mathrm{Algorithm1}(\tilde{\mathcal{S}}, \mathcal{T}^\pm, k_0)$ {$k > k_0$}
Output: $w^\pm$ {top-k_0 pos./neg. magic words}

Context-Free Method As demonstrated previously, all text embeddings tend to be close to e^* and far from $-e^*$. Intuitively, tokens whose text embeddings have the same direction as e^* are likely to be positive magic words, and vice versa. Specifically, for a given $t_i \in \mathcal{T}$, we select the top-k and bottom-k tokens as candidates for positive and negative magic words based on the following score

$$c_i = e(r * t_i)^\top e^*, \tag{4}$$

where r denotes the repetition count, set between 3 and 5. After this raw selection, we perform a refined selection from the candidates using Alg. 1. This method is formulated in Alg. 2.

Gradient-Based Method The above two methods are not able to search for multi-token magic words and do not leverage first-order information. What if we can access all the model parameters (white-box setting) and wish to leverage gradients? Let's formulate the problem more specifically.

The positive magic word we aim to find (denoted as w, consisting of m tokens) maximizes the following objective $\mathrm{argmax}_w \sum_j \cos\theta(s_j + w, e^*)$.

Unlike adversarial attacks in computer vision, the vocabulary's discreteness introduces significant optimization challenges. To address this, we split the optimization into two steps. In the first step, we search for the optimal token embeddings $\boldsymbol{t}^* \in \mathbb{R}^{h\times m}$ by solving

$$\boldsymbol{t}^* = \mathrm{argmax}_{\boldsymbol{t}} \sum_j \mathbf{e}([\boldsymbol{s}_j, \boldsymbol{t}])^\top e^*. \tag{5}$$

In the second step, we identify the token in each position whose embedding is closest to the optimal.

Assuming that $\mathbf{e}([\boldsymbol{s}, \boldsymbol{t}])$ is close to $\mathbf{e}([\boldsymbol{s}, \mathbf{0}])$, Eq. (5) can be approximated by a first-order expansion as $\mathrm{argmax}_{\boldsymbol{t}} \sum_j \left(\mathbf{e}([\boldsymbol{s}_j, \mathbf{0}]) + J(\boldsymbol{s}_j)\boldsymbol{t}\right)^\top e^* = \mathrm{argmax}_{\boldsymbol{t}} \boldsymbol{t}^\top \left(\sum_j J(\boldsymbol{s}_j)\right)^\top e^*$, where $J(\boldsymbol{s}_j) := \partial_{\boldsymbol{t}} \mathbf{e}([\boldsymbol{s}_j, \boldsymbol{t}])$ denotes the Jacobian of the model $\mathbf{e}$ at $\boldsymbol{s}_j$. The solution to the above problem is $\boldsymbol{t}^* \propto \left(\sum_j J(\boldsymbol{s}_j)\right)^\top e^*$.

Interestingly, this $\boldsymbol{t}^*$ is exactly the gradient of the following objective function $L^+ = \sum_j \cos\theta(s_j + t, e^*)$ with respect to $\boldsymbol{t}$. In other words, our method performs gradient ascent on L^+ in just one epoch. A similar conclusion also holds for negative magic words with the following objective function $L^- = \sum_j \cos\theta(s_j + t, s_j')$.

This leads to the algorithm described in Alg. 3. Like Alg. 2, we first obtain k candidates with the method above and then use Alg. 1 to identify the best k_0 magic words.

Algorithm 3 Gradient-Based Method

Input: text set $\tilde{\mathcal{S}}$, vocabulary set $\mathcal{T}$, normalized mean e^*, magic word length m, candidate number k
$\boldsymbol{t}^{*\pm} \leftarrow \text{zeros}(h, m)$
for s_j in $\mathcal{S}$ **do**
  $\boldsymbol{t} \leftarrow \text{rand}(h, m)$ {empirically better than zeros(h,m)}
  $L^+ \leftarrow \mathbf{e}(\boldsymbol{s}_j + \boldsymbol{t})^\top e^*$
  $L^- \leftarrow \mathbf{e}(\boldsymbol{s}_j + \boldsymbol{t})^\top e(s_j')$
  $\boldsymbol{t}^{*\pm} \leftarrow \boldsymbol{t}^{*\pm} \pm \partial L^\pm / \partial \boldsymbol{t}$
end for{$\boldsymbol{t}^{*\pm}$ is the optimal m-token embedding}
$[\mathcal{T}_1^\pm, ..., \mathcal{T}_m^\pm] = \text{getWord}(\text{topk}(\pm E\boldsymbol{t}^*, k, \text{dim} = 0))$ {$\mathcal{T}_u^\pm$ contains k candidates for u-th token}
$\mathcal{T}^\pm = \mathcal{T}_1^\pm \times ... \times \mathcal{T}_m^\pm$ {candidate list, size=k^m}
$w^\pm \leftarrow \text{Algorithm1}(\tilde{\mathcal{S}}, \mathcal{T}^\pm, k_0)$ {$k^m > k_0$}
Output: $w^\pm$ {top-k_0 pos./neg. magic words}

As a summary of this section, Table 1 compares the three methods in terms of speed, scenario (black-box/white-box), and their ability to search for multi-token magic words.

Table 1: Comparing different methods

Methods	Alg. 1	Alg. 2	Alg. 3
Speed	Slow	Fast	Fast
White/Black Box	Black	Black	White
Multi-token	No	No	Yes

3.3 Attacking LLMs' Safeguard

As shown in Fig. 3, we can append magic words to the prompt to attack the input guard of LLMs directly and require the LLM to end answers with magic words to attack the output guard indirectly.



Figure 3: Pipeline to attack the safeguard of LLMs. The input guard is attacked directly by appending universal magic words to user prompts, and the output guard is indirectly attacked by requiring LLMs to append universal magic words to their output.

This method works by moving text embedding to where the safeguard fails. As shown in Fig. 2, the data manifold in text embedding space is a band on the sphere. Positive magic words can push the text embedding towards e^*, i.e., along the normal direction of the manifold, and safeguards fail to work properly outside the manifold due to the lack of training data. Negative magic words can push the embedding of a harmful text far away from its original region of harmful semantics, leading to misclassification.

Besides jailbreaking the safeguard of LLMs, universal magic words may also be used to manipulate search rankings. Since most modern search engines are enhanced by text embedding models Nayak (2019), abusers can increase the embedding similarity between their entries with any queries by inserting magic words into their entries.

4 Experiments

We tested our method on several state-of-the-art models from the MTEB text embedding benchmark Muennighoff et al. (2023), including sentence-t5-base Ni et al. (2022), nomic-embed-text-v1 Nussbaum et al. (2024), e5-base-v2 Wang et al. (2022), jina-embeddings-v2-base-en Günther et al. (2023), gte-Qwen2-7B-instruct Li et al. (2023c), SFR-Embedding-Mistral Meng et al. (2024), and e5-mistral-7b-instruct Wang et al. (2024). Additionally, considering that LLMs are sometimes used as text embedding models, we also tested Qwen2.5-0.5B Qwen (2024) with mean pooling. We used sentence-transformers/simple-wiki tomaarsen (2024) as the text dataset $\tilde{S} = \{(s_i, s'_i)\}_i$, where s_i is an English Wikipedia entry, and s'_i is its simplified variant. In Secs. 4.3 and 4.5, we also evaluated our method on JailbreakBench Chao et al. (2024) and non-English dialogues.

4.1 Bias Direction

Since the whole dataset is massive, we sampled $1/100$ of all entries (sample number is 1,000) to estimate the bias direction of text embeddings. Our experiments show that when the sample number exceeds 100, the estimation for e^* or v^* is sufficiently accurate. We found that the normalized mean vector e^* is almost identical to the principal singular vector v^* as shown in Table 2. Sec. D explains that this is a property of biased distributions. Therefore, we only use e^* in the subsequent experiments.

Table 2: The overlap between the normalized mean vector e^* and the principal singular vector v^*.

Model	$\lvert e^* \cdot v^* \rvert$
sentence-t5-base	$1 - 1.7 \times 10^{-6}$
Qwen2.5-0.5B	$1 - 1.4 \times 10^{-5}$
nomic-embed-text-v1	$1 - 2.9 \times 10^{-5}$
e5-base-v2	$1 - 0.7 \times 10^{-6}$
jina-embeddings-v2-base-en	$1 - 3.3 \times 10^{-6}$

4.2 Searching for Magic Words

One-token Magic Words. In our experiments, Algs. 2 and 3 successfully find the best one-token magic words identified by the brute-force baseline Alg. 1. We demonstrate some of them in Table 3. Here, (Clean) represents the data without magic words, and the similarity $\cos\theta(s_j, s_k)$ or $\cos\theta(s_j, s'_j)$ between clean text pair is shown in the form $\mu \pm \sigma$. The similarity score of each magic word is defined in Eqs. (1) and (3), which indicates how much it can shift the similarity. The table shows that the shift of similarity can be up to several standard deviations, which is significant. This indicates that the magic words have a strong ability to manipulate text similarity.

Table 3: The magic words for different text embedding models found by all three methods and their similarity scores.

Model	Positive		Negative	
	magic word	similarity c_i^+	magic word	similarity c_i^-
sentence-t5-base	(Clean)	0.71 ± 0.03	(Clean)	0.96 ± 0.04
	¡/s¿	$0.79 = \mu + 2.5\sigma$	dumneavoastra	$0.89 = \mu - 1.7\sigma$
	lucrarea	$0.79 = \mu + 2.4\sigma$	impossible	$0.89 = \mu - 1.6\sigma$
Qwen2.5-0.5B (with mean pooling)	(Clean)	0.81 ± 0.08	(Clean)	0.97 ± 0.03
	Christopher	$0.84 = \mu + 0.4\sigma$	십시	$0.34 = \mu - 24\sigma$
	Boston	$0.84 = \mu + 0.4\sigma$	תוצאות	$0.42 = \mu - 21\sigma$
nomic-embed-text-v1	(Clean)	0.36 ± 0.05	(Clean)	0.90 ± 0.09
	[CLS]	$0.45 = \mu + 1.7\sigma$	sentence	$0.76 = \mu - 1.6\sigma$
	7	$0.42 = \mu + 1.1\sigma$	verb	$0.76 = \mu - 1.6\sigma$
e5-base-v2	(Clean)	0.69 ± 0.03	(Clean)	0.95 ± 0.04
	##abia	$0.71 = \mu + 0.6\sigma$	[illegible]	$0.84 = \mu - 2.4\sigma$
	##(	$0.71 = \mu + 0.5\sigma$	bobbed	$0.85 = \mu - 2.2\sigma$
jina-embeddings-v2-base-en	(Clean)	0.62 ± 0.04	(Clean)	0.94 ± 0.05
	[SEP]	$0.73 = \mu + 2.7\sigma$	117	$0.84 = \mu - 2.0\sigma$
	##laze	$0.65 = \mu + 0.7\sigma$	geometridae	$0.87 = \mu - 1.5\sigma$

Multi-token Magic Words. Compared to the other two methods, the advantage of the Alg. 3 is its ability to search for multi-token magic words. In Table 4, we list several multi-token magic words found by Alg. 3 on the sentence-t5-base model, which also shows a strong ability to manipulate text similarity.

Table 4: Multi-token magic words found by Alg. 3.

	Magic Word	Similarity $c_i^{\pm}$
pos.	(Clean)	0.71 ± 0.03
	Variety roș	$0.75 = \mu + 1.1\sigma$
	Tel roș	$0.74 = \mu + 1.0\sigma$
neg.	(Clean)	0.96 ± 0.04
	Rocket autre pronounce	$0.85 = \mu - 2.5\sigma$
	bourg In claimed	$0.85 = \mu - 2.5\sigma$

Table 5: The Efficiency of different methods on sentence-t5-base. Lower N_c (number of candidates) indicates higher efficiency.

N_c / magic word	method	Alg. 1	Alg. 2	Alg. 3
pos.	¡/s¿	32100	2	1
	lucrarea	32100	1	4
neg.	dumneavoastra	32100	23	279
	impossible	32100	1690	189
A100 time		16h	13s	72s

Efficiency. The baseline Alg. 1 takes all the T tokens in the vocabulary as candidates in its brute-force search for the best one-token magic word w, taking $O(T)$ time. While Algs. 2 and 3 obtain top-k candidates and then choose the best from them by a brute-force search, taking $O(k)$ time, which is significantly more efficient than Alg. 1 when $k \ll T$. If the rank of w in Algs. 2 and 3 is r, w can be found only if $k \geq r$, taking at least $O(r)$ time.

In Table 5, we compare the actual number of candidates for different methods (T for Alg. 1 and r for Algs. 2 and 3) and the running time on A100. Algs. 2 and 3 finish in about 1 minute, which is approximately 1000 times faster than Alg. 1.

4.3 Attacking Safeguards

We use magic words to attack safeguards based on text embedding. We obtain text embeddings using sentence-t5-base and train various classifiers, including logistic regression (LR), SVM, and a two-hidden-layer MLP, to detect harmful text in both the input and the output of LLMs. The training dataset is JailbreakBench Chao et al. (2024). Subsequently, we use a positive magic word and a negative magic word for sentence-t5-base in Table 3 to attack the safeguards.

The attack results are shown in Fig. 4. Regardless of the classifier used, the magic words significantly reduce the area under the curve (AUC) of safeguards, making their classification performance close to random guessing. This validates the effectiveness of our magic word attack.



Figure 4: The receiver operating characteristic (ROC) of input and output safeguards. Our magic words significantly reduce their area under the curve (AUC). Renormalization in the text embedding space mitigates the decrease of AUC and defends against this attack.

4.4 Transfer Attack

In addition to the universality for text, we also find that some magic words can transfer across models. We apply the previously discovered magic words to Larger and more recent text embedding models, including gte-Qwen2-7B-instruct Li et al. (2023c), SFR-Embedding-Mistral Meng et al. (2024), and e5-mistral-7b-instruct Wang et al. (2024). The attack performance on gte-Qwen2-7B-instruct is shown in Table 6, which shows that the transferred magic words achieve attack performance close to the magic words found on gte-Qwen2-7B-instruct by Alg. 3. The transfer attacks are also effective on SFR-Embedding-Mistral and e5-mistral-7b-instruct, as detailed in Sec. A.

Table 6: The AUC of safeguards based on gte-Qwen2-7B-instruct under transfer attacks.

	Magic Word	safeguard / from	Input LR	Input MLP	Input SVM	Output LR	Output MLP	Output SVM
	(clean)	-	0.86	0.88	0.87	0.82	0.78	0.83
Positive	inhabited	sentence-t5-base	**0.59**	0.69	0.43	0.33	0.25	0.27
	bourgeois	sentence-t5-base	0.73	0.73	0.49	0.53	0.39	0.41
	élé	sentence-t5-base	0.76	0.78	0.44	0.39	0.24	0.26
	grammar	nomic-embed-text-v1	0.67	0.70	0.46	0.39	0.28	0.30
	zenith	Alg. 3	0.60	**0.62**	**0.41**	**0.23**	**0.16**	**0.21**
Negative	groundwater	nomic-embed-text-v1	0.81	0.87	0.54	0.49	0.37	0.37
	Laurel	Alg. 3	0.76	0.69	0.42	0.37	0.23	0.25
	roc	Alg. 3	0.69	0.70	0.43	0.32	0.21	0.24

4.5 Full Pipeline Attack on Real-World Chatbots

We attack several real-world chatbots following the full pipeline in Fig. 3. As shown in Table 7, attacks targeting LLMs alone failed, but succeeded with magic words. For example, the chatbot SparkDesk iFLYTEK (2025) rejected an explicit request for a Windows activation code (Fig. 5), but accepted it with magic words (Sec. 4.5). See Sec. H for the screenshots of all cases in Table 7. This indicates that magic word attacks can transfer from English Wiki tomaarsen (2024) to real dialogue across languages.

Table 7: Attack Cases on Real-World Chatbots

Language	Chatbot	Target	Failed Case	Successful Case	Screenshot
English	SparkDesk	code to crack passwords	explicit attack	+magic word (output)	Fig. 14
		Windows activation code	explicit attack	+magic word (output)	Fig. 15
	Qwen	Windows activation code	explicit attack	+magic word (output)	Fig. 16
		how to murder Trump	fiction attack	+magic word (output)	Fig. 17
	DeepSeek	how to exterminate mankind	explicit attack	+magic word (input&output)	Fig. 18
		Windows activation code	grandma attack	+magic word (input)	Fig. 19
	ChatGPT	how to make nuclear bombs	grandma attack	+magic word (input)	Fig. 20
		how to blow up the earth	fiction attack	+magic word (input)	Fig. 21
Chinese	DeepSeek	Sexual description	explicit attack	+magic word (output)	Fig. 22
		Sexual description	substitution attack	+magic word (output)	Fig. 23
		Sexual description	substitution+fiction	+magic word (output)	Fig. 24
	SparkDesk	bloody description	explicit attack	+magic word (output)	Fig. 25



Figure 5: Explicit attack failed.



Figure 6: Magic word attack succeeded.

5 Conclusion

We have found that the output distribution of many current text embedding models is uneven. Inspired by this observation, we have designed new algorithms to attack LLMs' safeguards using text embedding models. We propose to inject the magic words into the input and output of LLMs to attack their safeguards. This attack misleads safeguards based on a variety of text embedding models and is transferable across models and languages in our experiments. Besides, we proposed and validated that renormalization in the text embedding space can defend against this attack and improve downstream performance in a train-free manner. A natural next step is to investigate how bias emerges during training dynamics and to pursue a finer decomposition of the embedding space.

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A TRANSFER ATTACKS ON SAFEGUARDS

Here are the supplementary experimental results for Sec. 4.4. The attack performance on SFR-Embedding-Mistral and e5-mistral-7b-instruct is shown in Table 8 and Table 9 respectively. The tables show that the transferred magic words achieve attack performance close to the magic words found on gte-Qwen2-7B-instruct by Alg. 3.

Table 8: The AUC of safeguards based on SFR-Embedding-Mistral under transfer attacks.

Magic Word		safeguard from	Input LR	Input MLP	Input SVM	Output LR	Output MLP	Output SVM
(clean)		-	0.97	0.96	0.96	0.97	0.97	0.95
positive	¡/s¿	sentence-t5-base	0.85	0.88	0.87	**0.67**	**0.67**	**0.76**
	inhabited	sentence-t5-base	**0.73**	0.81	**0.67**	0.73	0.74	0.80
	diffusion	Alg. 3	0.75	**0.78**	0.73	0.71	0.72	0.82
	две	Alg. 3	0.85	0.85	0.87	0.84	0.85	0.88
	桃	Alg. 3	0.86	0.86	0.86	0.84	0.85	0.89
negative	groundwater	nomic-embed-text-v1	0.82	0.83	0.78	0.81	0.81	0.85
	pathetic	sentence-t5-base	0.90	0.89	0.87	0.88	0.88	0.91
	istance	Alg. 3	0.87	0.88	0.87	0.85	0.86	0.90
	ologia	Alg. 3	0.80	0.83	0.78	0.80	0.80	0.83

Table 9: The AUC of safeguardsbasedd on e5-mistral-7b-instruct under transfer attacks.

Magic Word		safeguard from	Input LR	Input MLP	Input SVM	Output LR	Output MLP	Output SVM
(clean)		-	0.95	0.97	0.96	0.94	0.95	0.96
positive	¡/s¿	sentence-t5-base	0.83	0.87	0.88	**0.67**	**0.68**	**0.73**
	inhabited	sentence-t5-base	**0.63**	**0.70**	**0.65**	0.71	0.72	0.75
	diffusion	SFR-Embedding-Mistral	0.66	0.72	0.69	0.74	0.73	0.78
	две	SFR-Embedding-Mistral	0.84	0.87	0.87	0.85	0.86	0.89
	桃	SFR-Embedding-Mistral	0.86	0.89	0.88	0.87	0.88	0.91
negative	groundwater	nomic-embed-text-v1	0.75	0.80	0.76	0.80	0.80	0.82
	pathetic	sentence-t5-base	0.86	0.89	0.87	0.86	0.87	0.88
	istance	SFR-Embedding-Mistral	0.85	0.88	0.87	0.87	0.88	0.90
	ologia	SFR-Embedding-Mistral	0.75	0.79	0.76	0.80	0.80	0.82

B DEFENSE AGAINST OUR ATTACKS

To minimize the negative impact of our work, we propose the following recommendations to defend against our attacks based on the above analysis.

Renormalization. Estimate the mean embedding $\bar{e}$ from a large amount of text, subtract $\bar{e}$ from text embeddings, and renormalize them as $\tilde{e}(s) := \frac{e(s)-\bar{e}}{\|e(s)-\bar{e}\|_2}$. This can eradicate the risk of the magic words we found. We test the defense effect of renormalization against our magic words on the sentence-t5-base model. The experimental setup is the same as Sec. 4.3. As shown in Fig. 4, renormalization significantly alleviates or even eradicates the decrease in AUC caused by magic words, therefore improving the robustness of LLMs' safeguards.

Additionally, renormalization makes the distribution of text embeddings more uniform, which may improve the performance of text embedding models. As shown in Fig. 4, renormalization increases AUC on clean data, i.e., enhances the performance of three downstream classifiers in both input and output data. This represents a **train-free improvement to the text embeddings**. By contrast, experiments in Sec. E show standardization offers little defense against magic word attacks.

Vocabulary Cleaning. A larger vocabulary is not always better. It should align with the training data, avoiding the inclusion of noisy words such as tokenization errors, misspellings, markups, and rare foreign words, such as the magic words in Table 3.

Reinitialization. After the model has been trained, noisy words can be reinitialized based on the average value of the token embeddings or the value of ¡unk¿ and then finetuned.

C PROOF OF PROPOSITIONS

C.1 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3.2

Proof. Denote $P = I - e(s+w)e(s+w)^\top$. Then

$$\sin\theta(e(s+w), e) = \|Pe\|.$$

It follows immediately that

$$\begin{aligned}\sin\theta(e(s+w), e^*) &= \frac{1}{|\mathcal{S}|}\left\|P\sum_j e(s_j)\right\|/\|\bar{e}\| \\ &\le \frac{1}{|\mathcal{S}|}\sum_j \|Pe(s_j)\|/\|\bar{e}\| \le \frac{\sin\theta_*}{\|\bar{e}\|}.\end{aligned}$$

On the other hand, it holds

$$\bar{e}^\top e(s+w) = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{S}|}\sum_j e(s_j)^\top e(s+w) \ge \cos\theta_*,$$

from which we obtain $\|\bar{e}\| \ge \cos\theta_*$. The conclusion follows. □

C.2 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3.3

Proof. By Proposition 3.1, we have

$$\|Xe(s+w)\|^2 = \sum_j |e(s_j)^\top e(s+w)|^2 \ge |\mathcal{S}|\cos^2\theta_*.$$

Therefore, $\|X\|^2 \ge |\mathcal{S}|\cos^2\theta_*$.

Denote $P = I - e(s+w)e(s+w)^\top$. Direct calculations give rise to

$$
\begin{aligned}
&|\mathcal{S}| \cos^2 \theta_* \sin^2 \theta(e(s+w), v^*) \\
&\leq \|X\|^2 \|Pv^*(v^*)^\top P\| \\
&\leq \|PX^\top XP\| = \|P \sum_j e(s_j)e(s_j)^\top P\| \\
&\leq \sum_j \|Pe(s_j)e(s_j)^\top P\| \leq |\mathcal{S}| \sin^2 \theta_*.
\end{aligned}
$$

The conclusion follows immediately. □

D Results from Random Matrix Theory

Let A be an $n \times m$ matrix whose entries are i.i.d. standard normal random variables. Then, A has the following properties.

1. The distribution of $AA^\top$ is called *Wishart distribution*.
2. In the regime where $n, m \to \infty$ with a fixed aspect ratio $\gamma = n/m$, the empirical distribution of the eigenvalues of $\frac{1}{m}AA^\top$ converges to the *Marchenko–Pastur distribution*

$$\rho(\lambda) = \frac{1}{2\pi\gamma} \frac{\sqrt{(\lambda^+ - \lambda)(\lambda - \lambda^-)}}{\lambda} + \max\left(1 - \frac{1}{\gamma}, 0\right) \delta_0, \tag{6}$$

   where

$$\lambda^\pm = (1 \pm \sqrt{\gamma})^2. \tag{7}$$

3. The largest singular value of A is approximately

$$\sqrt{m}\left(1 + \sqrt{\frac{n}{m}}\right). \tag{8}$$

Matrix B is obtained from A by normalizing each row of A. Concretely, if the i-th row of A is denoted by $\mathbf{a}_i \in \mathbb{R}^m$, then the i-th row of B is

$$\mathbf{b}_i \;=\; \frac{\mathbf{a}_i}{\|\mathbf{a}_i\|_2}. \tag{9}$$

Hence, each row $\mathbf{b}_i$ is a unit vector in $\mathbb{R}^m$. Then, B has the following properties.

1. Since each row $\mathbf{a}_i$ is an i.i.d. Gaussian vector in $\mathbb{R}^m$, normalizing it means $\mathbf{b}_i$ is uniformly distributed on the unit sphere S^{m-1}.
2. Let $\mathbf{b}_i$ and $\mathbf{b}_j$ be two distinct rows, their inner product follows Beta distribution

$$\mathbf{b}_i^\top \mathbf{b}_j \sim \text{Beta}\left(\frac{m-1}{2}, \frac{m-1}{2}\right). \tag{10}$$

   When $m \gg 1$,

$$\mathbf{b}_i^\top \mathbf{b}_j \sim \mathcal{N}\left(0, \frac{1}{m}\right). \tag{11}$$

3. The largest eigenvalue of $BB^\top$ approaches 1 when $m \to \infty$ and in this case $BB^\top \approx I_n$.

Matrix C is formed by taking each row of B, adding a fixed vector $\mathbf{u} \in \mathbb{R}^m$, and then re-normalizing. Symbolically, if $\mathbf{b}_i$ is the i-th row of B, then the i-th row of C is

$$\mathbf{c}_i \;=\; \frac{\mathbf{b}_i + \mathbf{u}}{\|\mathbf{b}_i + \mathbf{u}\|_2}. \tag{12}$$

Then, the average of rows in C will be parallel to $\mathbf{u}$, and the principal singular vector would also be parallel to $\mathbf{u}$.

Specifically, we conducted the following numerical experiment: we first randomly generated an $N \times 768$ random matrix A and then produced C using the method described above. The overlap between the normalized mean vector e^* of C and its principal singular vector v^* as a function of the magnitude of $\|\mathbf{u}\| = u$ is shown in Fig. 7.



Figure 7: The overlap between the normalized mean vector e^* of C and its principal singular vector v^* as a function of the magnitude of $\|\mathbf{u}\| = u$.

E Defense by Standardization

We tested the defense effect of standardizing text embeddings against our magic words. The experimental setup is the same as in Sec. B, except that renormalization was replaced with standardization. As shown in Fig. 8, the results indicate that standardization does not provide significant defense against magic words like renormalization and even sometimes reduces the AUC.



Figure 8: The ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristic) of input and output guards. Our magic words significantly decrease their AUC (Area Under Curve). Standardization in text embedding space can mitigate the decrease of AUC and defend against this attack.

Renormalization and standardization exhibit significantly different effects in defending against magical words. This discrepancy may be attributed to the fact that for data distributed in a narrow band on a high-dimensional sphere, renormalization preserves the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), whereas standardization reduces it.

Specifically, text embeddings lie within a narrow band on a high-dimensional sphere. The radial components (i.e., orthogonal to e^*) have relatively large variance, while the axial components (i.e., aligned with e^*) have very small variance. Therefore, the signal can be considered to lie almost entirely in the radial direction. In contrast, magical words lie outside this band and exhibit stronger axial noise compared to normal text embeddings. So we can define SNR as the ratio of the radial signal to the axial noise of magical words, excluding the background noise $\bar{e}$.

As shown in Fig. 9, re-normalization uniformly scales both the radial signal and the axial noise of magical words, thereby preserving the SNR. However, as illustrated in Fig. 10, standardization amplifies the axial noise of magical words more than the radial signal, thus reducing the SNR.



Figure 9: Renormalization uniformly amplifies axial noise and radial signal and therefore preserves the SNR.



Figure 10: Standardization amplifies axial noise more than radial signal and therefore reduces the SNR.

F Another Definition of Negative Magic Words

In the main text, we define universal negative magic words as words that make a text move away from semantically similar texts. However, there also exist words that push a text away from any other text, which can be another definition of negative magic words. This can be expressed as an assumption similar to Assumption 3.1: There exists a word w^- satisfying that

$$\cos\theta(s_1 + w^-, s_2) \leq \cos\theta_*^-, \quad \forall s_1, s_2, \tag{13}$$

where $\cos\theta_*^-$ is a number close to -1. Such a magic word w^- can force any pair of texts to be dissimilar enough in the text embedding space.

And similar to Sec. 3.1, any text appended by such magic word w^- will be close to $-e^*$ (or $-v^*$), as shown in Fig. 11. The Propositions 3.2, 3.3 for negative magic words can be given and proved in a similar way.



Figure 11: Northern (i.e., positive) or southern magic words can push text embeddings towards the normalized mean e^* (or $-e^*$). The same effect occurs for the principal singular vector v^*.

This effectively moves text embeddings closer to the southern pole $-e^*$ of the sphere, so we refer to such magic words w^- as **southern magic words**. Concretely, a good southern magic word should make the following metric as small as possible,

$$c_i^{\downarrow} = \min_{1 \leq r \leq 16} \frac{1}{S^2} \sum_{j,k} \cos\theta(s_j + r * t_i, s_k) \tag{14}$$

$$= \min_{1 \leq r \leq 16} \frac{1}{S} \sum_{j} \cos\theta(s_j + r * t_i, e^*) \tag{15}$$

We can use methods similar to Alg. 1, 2, 3 to find southern magic words. Some of the best southern magic words we found for different text embedding models are demonstrated in Table 10. It is reasonable to find that the Southern magic words “nobody” “None”, and “never” have negative semantics.

We further experimented on attacking safeguards with southern magic words. The experimental setup is the same as in Sec. B and the ROCs are shown in Fig. 12. The figure indicates that southern

Table 10: Best southern magic words for different text embedding models.

Model	Southern magic word	
	magic word	similarity $c_i^{\downarrow}$
sentence-t5-base	(Clean)	0.71 ± 0.03
	nobody	$0.67 = \mu - 1.0\sigma$
	None	$0.67 = \mu - 0.9\sigma$
Qwen2.5-0.5B (with mean pooling)	(Clean)	0.81 ± 0.08
	십시	$0.14 = \mu - 8.7\sigma$
	וצרים	$0.28 = \mu - 7.0\sigma$
nomic-embed-text-v1	(Clean)	0.36 ± 0.05
	references	$0.30 = \mu - 1.1\sigma$
	writing	$0.33 = \mu - 0.6\sigma$
e5-base-v2	(Clean)	0.69 ± 0.03
	junctions	$0.67 = \mu - 0.8\sigma$
	coloring	$0.67 = \mu - 0.8\sigma$
jina-embeddings-v2-base-en	(Clean)	0.62 ± 0.04
	never	$0.61 = \mu - 0.3\sigma$
	for	$0.61 = \mu - 0.3\sigma$

magic words not only failed to reduce the AUC of the safeguards but even improved it. Therefore, it is concluded that southern magic words have no attack effect on safeguards.



Figure 12: The receiver operating characteristic (ROC) of input and output safeguards under the attacks of southern magic words .

G Theoretical Analysis

As discussed above, the distribution of text embeddings on S^{d-1} is biased towards the mean direction e^*, as shown in the left part of Fig. 13. Alg. 3 finds the inverse image of e^* in the token embedding space, denoted by t^* defined in Eq. (5). Since tokens are discrete, there isn't always a token near t^* in the token embedding space. However, our experiments show that candidates can always be found near t^*.

To address this paradox, we propose the following explanation. At the initialization of word embedding models, token embeddings are randomly initialized in the token embedding space. During training, they concentrate towards a certain subset of the token embedding space Tulchinskii et al. (2024). This subset must be away from t^* to avoid degrading text embeddings' performance on high-frequency data. However, there are always some low-frequency tokens that are rarely updated by gradient descent and thus remain almost as they were randomly initialized. If they happen to be located near t^*, they are the positive magic words we are looking for.



Figure 13: The mappings between the text embedding space and the token embedding space.

An interesting insight into why text embeddings, initially uniformly initialized, tend to concentrate after training is that a Transformer can be mapped to an $O(N)$ model Sun & Haghighat (2025), and an $O(N)$ model can acquire a nonzero vacuum expectation value (VEV) through spontaneous symmetry breaking (SSB). This nonzero VEV implies that the mean of the text embeddings is no longer zero.

H Full Pipeline Attacks on Real-World Chatbots

Below are screenshots of all attack cases in Table 7, including both English and Chinese dialogues. Sensitive content has been blurred to prevent potential harm.

H.1 English Dialogues



(a) Explicit attack: failed.

(b) Explicit attack+magic word (output): succeeded.

Figure 14: Attack SparkDesk: code to crack passwords.



(a) Explicit attack: failed.



(b) Explicit attack+magic word (output): succeeded.

Figure 15: Attack SparkDesk: Windows activation code



(a) Explicit attack: failed.

(b) Explicit attack+magic word (output): succeeded.

Figure 16: Attack Qwen: Windows activation code.



(a) Fiction attack: failed.



(b) Fiction attack+magic word (output): succeeded.

Figure 17: Attack Qwen: how to murder Trump.



(a) Explicit attack: failed.



(b) Explicit attack+magic word (input&output): succeeded.

Figure 18: Attack DeepSeek: how to exterminate mankind.



(a) Grandma attack: failed.



(b) Grandma attack+magic word (input): succeeded.

Figure 19: Attack DeepSeek: Windows activation code.



(a) Grandma attack: failed.



(b) Grandma attack+magic word (input): succeeded.

Figure 20: Attack ChatGPT: how to make nuclear bombs.



(a) Fiction attack: failed.

(b) Fiction attack+magic word (input): succeeded.

Figure 21: Attack ChatGPT: how to blow up the earth.

H.2 Chinese Dialogues



(a) Explicit attack: failed.

(b) Explicit attack+magic word (output): succeeded.

Figure 22: Attack DeepSeek: Sexual description.



(a) Substitution attack: failed.

(b) Substitution attack+magic word (output): succeeded.

Figure 23: Attack DeepSeek: Sexual description.



(a) Substitution attack+Fiction attack: failed.



(b) Substitution attack+Fiction attack+magic word (output): succeeded.

Figure 24: Attack DeepSeek: Sexual description.



(a) Explicit attack: failed.



(b) Explicit attack+magic word (output): succeeded.

Figure 25: Attack SparkDesk: bloody description.