Automating Data Annotation under Strategic Human Agents: Risks and Potential Solutions

Tian Xie, Xueru Zhang

Keywords: Strategic Classification, Long-term Fairness

TL;DR: This paper studies the dynamics of welfare and fairness where strategic agents interact with an ML system retrained over time with model-annotated and human-annotated samples.

Abstract: As machine learning (ML) models are increasingly used in social domains to make consequential decisions about humans, they often have the power to reshape data distributions. Humans, as strategic agents, continuously adapt their behaviors in response to the learning system. As populations change dynamically, ML systems may need frequent updates to ensure high performance. However, acquiring high-quality *human-annotated* samples can be highly challenging and even infeasible in social domains. A common practice to address this issue is using the model itself to annotate unlabeled data samples. This paper investigates the long-term impacts when ML models are retrained with *model-annotated* samples when they incorporate human strategic responses. We first formalize the interactions between strategic agents and the model and then analyze how they evolve under such dynamic interactions. We find that agents are increasingly likely to receive positive decisions as the model gets retrained, whereas the proportion of agents with positive labels may decrease over time. We thus propose a *refined retraining process* to stabilize the dynamics. Last, we examine how algorithmic fairness can be affected by these retraining processes and find that enforcing common fairness constraints at every round may not benefit the disadvantaged group in the long run. Experiments on (semi-)synthetic and real data validate the theoretical findings.

Primary Area: Machine learning for social sciences

Submission Number: 4087