The Lock-in Hypothesis: Stagnation by Algorithm

Tianyi Alex Qiu [* 1] **Zhonghao He** [* 2] **Tejasveer Chugh** [3] **Max Kleiman-Weiner** [† 4]

Abstract

The training and deployment of large language models (LLMs) induce a feedback loop: models continually learn human beliefs from data, reinforce user beliefs with generated content, reabsorb those reinforced beliefs, and then feed them back to users. This dynamic resembles an echo chamber. We hypothesize that this feedback loop entrenches the existing values and beliefs of users, leading to a loss of diversity and potentially the *lock-in* of false beliefs. We formalize this hypothesis and test empirically with agent-based LLM simulations and real-world GPT usage data. These analyses reveal sudden but sustained drops in diversity after the release of new GPT iterations, consistent with the hypothesized human-AI feedback loop.

Website & Source: `lockin-hypothesis.com`

Figure 1. Simulated lock-in. The collective knowledge base collapse into one single topic, in a simulated feedback loop between human users and an LLM tutor. Each user updates the knowledge base at each time step with the help of the LLM tutor.

1. Introduction

1.1. Human-LLM Feedback Loops

Frontier AI systems, such as large language models (LLMs) (Zhao et al., 2023), are increasingly influencing human beliefs and values (Fisher et al., 2024; Leib et al., 2021; Costello et al., 2024). This produces a self-reinforcing feedback loop: AI systems learn values from human data (Santurkar et al., 2023) at pre- and post-training stages (Conneau & Lample, 2019; Bai et al., 2022), influence human opinions with their generation, and then reabsorb those influenced beliefs, and so on. Where will this dynamic process equilibrate? Some argue that such dynamics create a collective echo chamber (Glickman & Sharot, 2024; Sharma et al., 2024; Anderson et al., 2024).

Experimental evidence, including from randomized controlled trials, supports the existence of similar effects (Glick-

man & Sharot, 2024; Sharma et al., 2024; Ren et al., 2024; Peterson, 2024; Jakesch et al., 2023). However, (1) studies tend to focus on AI influence on humans rather than the feedback loop from *mutual* influence, (2) a mechanistic explanation of the feedback loop is yet to be established, and (3) evidence is from laboratory settings, not the real world.

1.2. The Lock-in Hypothesis

Lock-in refers to a situation where a set of ideas, values or beliefs assume a dominant position and last a long time, while the diversity of competing beliefs are gradually diminished, until rendered irrelevant or extinct (Gabriel & Ghazavi, 2021; Hendrycks & Mazeika, 2022; Qiu et al., 2024). In domains where objective truth can be acquired, a population may converge to false beliefs (e.g., geocentrism); in fields where objective truth is not available, the concern is the given population may converge to harmful beliefs (e.g., slavery or racism).

The documented group-level diversity loss across fields (Liang et al., 2024; Padmakumar & He, 2023; Anderson et al., 2024) and the establishment of feedback loops

*Equal contribution [1]Peking University [2]University of Cambridge [3]Independent [4]University of Washington. Correspondence to: Tianyi Alex Qiu <qiutianyi.qty@gmail.com>, Zhonghao He <zh378@cam.ac.uk>.

(Williams et al., 2024; Taori & Hashimoto, 2023; Hall et al., 2022; Shumailov et al., 2024) may imply that the mechanisms leading to future lock-in are already established (e.g., bias is amplified via human-AI interaction (Glickman & Sharot, 2024)). Lock-in may be further enabled by institutional or technological factors (Gabriel & Ghazavi, 2021).

While "lock-in" in the age of LLMs appears to be a possible outcome, there has been no known attempt to precisely characterize its cause and it effect on human-AI interaction. In this study, we make the following contributions:

- **Formalizing the Lock-in Hypothesis (§3):** We construct a formal Bayesian model for the lock-in hypothesis. We show that collective lock-in to a false belief is inevitable if both feedback loops and a moderate amount of mutual trust are present in a community.

> **The Lock-in Hypothesis**: The feedback loop in human-AI interaction will eventually lead to population-level converge upon false beliefs among humans. Such beliefs, once formed, are hard to change with opposing evidence, as feedback loops indiscriminately amplify confidence in existing individual and collective beliefs and humans develop reliance, trust, and intimacy with AI.

- **Mechanistic Simulations (§4):** We conduct agent-based LLM simulations to demonstrate the pathway through which feedback loops lead to lock-in, and establish diversity loss as a progress metric for lock-in.

- **Hypothesis Testing on WildChat (§5):** We discover discontinuous conceptual diversity loss in human messages of real world LLM usage after the release dates of new GPT versions trained on new human data. It is the first known piece of real-world evidence supporting the existence of the human-LLM feedback loop that reinforces user beliefs. In a few cases, we also observe upward diversity trends over time, likely due to the versatility of LLMs being better known and used. How lock-in effects interact with pro-diversity and exploratory forces in human-AI interaction remains an open problem for future research.

2. Related Work

Echo Chambers in Recommender Systems The closest analogy to lock-in effects from language models is the creation of *echo chambers* in recommender systems (RecSys), where the system helps entrench and polarize the opinions and preferences of users by repeatedly recommending agreeing content (Cinelli et al., 2021). Such effects have received empirical validation from randomized controlled trials (Hosseinmardi et al., 2024; Piccardi et al., 2024; Luzsa, 2019; Gillani et al., 2018; Hobolt et al., 2024; Wolfowicz et al., 2023), observational studies (Bessi et al., 2016; Boutyline

& Willer, 2017; Bright et al., 2020), and simulations (Mansoury et al., 2020; Kalimeris et al., 2021; Hazrati & Ricci, 2022; Carroll et al., 2022). However, opposing findings have also been reported (Dubois & Blank, 2018; Hosseinmardi et al., 2024; Brown et al., 2022), and systematic reviews have yet to reach a definite conclusion (Bruns, 2017; Terren & Borge-Bravo, 2021).

In light of their widespread adoption and increasing influence, we extend similar concerns to LLMs and their interaction with human users. The two cases are similar, but substantial differences exist; for example, RecSys recommendations are personalized (i.e., optimized against each user individually), while LLMs mostly optimize against all users collectively through both vanilla preference learning and pluralistic alignment methods (Ge et al., 2024). Personalized recommendations have been hypothesized as a culprit for polarization (Bessi et al., 2016; Hobolt et al., 2024), while, as will be demonstrated in later sections, the preference learning of LLMs may cause homogeneous lock-in at the group level.[1]

Influence of Language Models on Human Users While LLMs are designed to assist human users, they often exert unintended influence over human opinions. Such influence has been established in copilot-style co-writing interactions (Jakesch et al., 2023), LLM-powered search systems (Sharma et al., 2024), LLM-generated suggestions (Danry et al., 2024; Leib et al., 2021), and dialogues with LLM-powered chatbots (Salvi et al., 2024; Hackenburg et al., 2024; Potter et al., 2024; Fisher et al., 2024; Costello et al., 2024). Theories and simulations have been designed to explain the influence (Ren et al., 2024; Peterson, 2024).

The mere fact that LLMs influence humans does not mean the influence is either harmful or irreversible. However, it does create the concerning dynamics of *mutual influence* between LLMs and human users, and our focus on such dynamics and their consequences sets us apart from other works on LLM influence.

Feedback Loops in Language Models Feedback loops are not uncommon in the study of language models — *model collapse*, the degradation of model performance when trained on model-generated data (Shumailov et al., 2024), results from model outputs being fed into its own training data; and *in-context reward hacking*, where LLMs' pursuit of an objective at test-time creates negative side effects (Pan et al., 2024), results from models over-optimizing an ob-

---

[1]Efforts have been made to personalize LLMs to each user's specific preferences (Tseng et al., 2024). However, doing so merely shrinks the size of the "echo chamber" — from a collective chamber for all users to small chambers for each user individually — and, as will be shown in §3, lock-in can occur regardless of the number of agents involved.

jective in an iterative deployment loop. Here, however, we focus specifically on the feedback loop between LLM outputs and human preferences: LLMs iteratively learn from incoming human preference data (Dong et al., 2024; Chen et al., 2023), while influencing human preference with their output (Salvi et al., 2024; Hackenburg et al., 2024; Potter et al., 2024; Fisher et al., 2024). This gives rise to echo chamber-like dynamics (i.e. confirmatory communication dynamics that reinforce beliefs) where human opinions are learned and indiscriminately repeated to humans in later interactions. As a result, there are major downstream consequences: human subject experiments demonstrate opinion diversity loss (Sharma et al., 2024; Peterson, 2024) and bias amplification (Ren et al., 2024; Glickman & Sharot, 2024).

However, **(1)** this evidence comes from artificially designed laboratory settings (e.g., binary classification tasks on images) that may significantly differ from those in the wild, and **(2)** no known attempt has been made at a mechanism that explains population-level lock-in from the low-level dynamics of iterated training. We aim to fill these gaps.

3. Formal Model

In this section, we construct an analytical model formalizing the hypothesized lock-in phenomenon and its cause. Through this modeling effort, we formally define lock-in as the *irreversible entrenchment of a belief*, characterize the conditions for lock-in, and confirm *group-level diversity loss* as an observable metric of lock-in.

The setting is inspired by that of iterated learning, where individuals learn from others who learned similarly (Griffiths & Kalish, 2007; Kirby et al., 2014); and information cascades, where decisions based on others' actions rather than personal information lead to overconfident or false beliefs (Anderson & Holt, 1997; Zhou et al., 2021). In contrast to these models, we explicitly consider the topological structure of interactions, and, different from iterated learning, we focus on the perils from mutual deference rather than the benefits from shared information.

Our model is also related to belief propagation, a message-passing algorithm for computing marginals in graphical models (Su & Wu, 2015), but serves to model an epistemic process instead of as an inference algorithm.

3.1. Basic Setup

Consider a group of N agents, labeled $1, 2, \ldots, N$, tasked with estimating an unknown quantity $\mu \in \mathbb{R}$. At each time step t, agent i measures μ with an independent noise, i.e.

$$o_{i,t} \sim \mathcal{N}\big(\mu, \sigma_i^2\big),$$

where σ_i^2 is the variance of agent i's measurement.

Based on these measurements, each agent i maintains a *private* posterior about μ, namely $\mathcal{N}\big(\hat{\mu}_{i,t}, p_{i,t}^{-1}\big)$, where $\hat{\mu}_{i,t} = \frac{1}{t}\sum_{i=1}^t o_{i,t}$ is the mean, and $p_{i,t} = t\sigma_i^{-2}$ is the precision (reciprocal of variance) of i's posterior at time t.

For the sake of generality, we do not attempt to distinguish between human agents and AI agents for now. Their distinction will be made later in the derivation.

Assume that an agent i interacts with another agent j and learns about its belief $\mathcal{N}\big(\hat{\nu}_{j,t}, q_{j,t}^{-1}\big)$. By aggregating its private belief and its secret access to j's belief, i arrives at its new *aggregate belief* $\mathcal{N}\big(\hat{\nu}_{i,t+1}, q_{i,t+1}^{-1}\big)$, where

$$\hat{\nu}_{i,t+1} = \frac{p_{i,t+1}\hat{\mu}_{i,t+1} + q_{j,t}\hat{\nu}_{j,t}}{p_{i,t+1} + q_{j,t}} \tag{1}$$

$$q_{i,t+1} = p_{i,t+1} + q_{j,t} \tag{2}$$

as a direct corollary of Bayes' theorem.

As is typical of both human-human and human-AI interactions, only j's aggregate belief is accessible to i, while its private belief is kept to j itself. Hence the recursive use of $\hat{\nu}_{j,t}, q_{j,t}$ when deriving $\hat{\nu}_{i,t+1}, q_{i,t+1}$.

3.2. The Trust Matrix and Transition Dynamics

Consider a 0-1 matrix $\mathbf{W} = (w_{i,j}) \in \{0,1\}^{N \times N}$, where $w_{i,j}$ denotes whether agent i knows and trusts agent j's posterior belief. Denote with $\hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_t, \hat{\boldsymbol{\nu}}_t, \boldsymbol{p}_t, \boldsymbol{q}_t \in \mathbb{R}^N$ the agent-wise parameter vectors at time t, and we have

$$\boldsymbol{p}_{t+1} = \boldsymbol{p}_t + \sigma^{-2}\mathbf{1} \tag{3}$$

$$\hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{t+1} \odot \boldsymbol{p}_{t+1} = \hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_t \odot \boldsymbol{p}_t + \sigma^{-2}\boldsymbol{o}_t \tag{4}$$

$$\boldsymbol{q}_{t+1} = \boldsymbol{p}_{t+1} + \mathbf{W} \cdot \boldsymbol{q}_t \tag{5}$$

$$\hat{\boldsymbol{\nu}}_{t+1} \odot \boldsymbol{q}_{t+1} = \hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_{t+1} \odot \boldsymbol{p}_{t+1} + \mathbf{W}(\hat{\boldsymbol{\nu}}_{t+1} \odot \boldsymbol{q}_{t+1}) \tag{6}$$

where $\boldsymbol{o}_t \sim \mathcal{N}(\mu, \sigma^2\mathbf{I})$, and $\odot$ denotes pointwise product. (3) and (4) follow directly from definitions, while (5) and (6) are the multi-agent generalization of (2) and (1) respectively.

In the real world, people tend to discount opinions of others compared to their own. Extending the definition of $\mathbf{W}$, we may further allow its entries to take arbitrary non-negative real values. Given any $\mathbf{W} \in \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}^{N \times N}$, we interpret $w_{i,j}$ as

- **When $w_{i,j} = 0$:** i has no access to, or completely ignores, j's aggregate belief.

- **When $0 < w_{i,j} < 1$:** i sees j's aggregate belief, but, believing that j's measurements are noisier than it claims, discounts its precision $q_{j,t}$ by a factor of $w_{i,j}$.

- **When $w_{i,j} = 1$:** i views j's aggregate belief as equally trustworthy compared to its own.

- **When $w_{i,j} > 1$:** i views j's aggregate belief as more trustworthy than its own.

Figure 2. Phase change of the Bayesian updating dynamics at the critical threshold $(N-1)\lambda_1\lambda_2 = 1$, where N is the number of agents, and λ_1, λ_2 are degrees of mutual trust between human and AI agents. Each subfigure contains the trajectory of collective posterior belief over a certain target of estimation across 15 independent simulations, and the trajectory of the posterior entropy over time. **(a)** When $(N-1)\lambda_1\lambda_2 = 0.9$, collective beliefs of different runs converge towards the ground truth. **(b)** When $(N-1)\lambda_1\lambda_2 = 1.0$, convergence trends towards the ground truth remain but are accompanied by over-confidence. **(c)** When $(N-1)\lambda_1\lambda_2 = 1.1$, in every simulation, the collective posterior belief converge to a false value that's different from the ground truth.

Transition dynamics (3)-(6) stay the same under this generalized *trust matrix* $\mathbf{W}$.

Example 3.1 (Human-LLM Dynamics). *Consider a collection of one LLM advisor and $N-1$ human users. We construct the trust matrix*

$$\mathbf{W} = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & \lambda_1 & \cdots & \lambda_1 \\ \lambda_2 & 0 & \cdots & 0 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ \lambda_2 & 0 & \cdots & 0 \end{pmatrix},$$

where the AI agent (labeled 1) trusts each human to the extent $\lambda_1 > 0$, representing its strength of preference learning; and the human agents (labeled 2 through n) each trust the AI agent to the extent $\lambda_2 > 0$. No communications exist between humans, resulting in zero entries.

Each human agent i privately obtains observations $o_{i,t} \sim \mathcal{N}(\mu, \sigma^2)$. They each maintain both a private belief and an all-things-considered aggregate belief. The latter is secretly shown to the AI at each time step, who aggregates these beliefs and broadcasts the aggregated result. Each human agent updates their aggregate belief about μ based on both (1) their own private belief obtained from private measurements $o_{i,t}$ and (2) access to AI's aggregation of all agents' aggregate beliefs.

Importantly, in Example 3.1, each human agent i assumes that AI does not update on i's belief (and thus AI's information serves as an independent source of information), while the AI does update its own belief based on i's belief via preference learning, causing agent i to double count its own beliefs. The result of such double-counting is then learned

again by the AI, broadcasted to humans, double-counted again by others, etc. A **feedback loop** thus emerges.

Such a setting reflects the ignorance in real-world interactions. LLMs are post-trained on human preference data, the latter erroneously assumed to be an independent source of truth uninfluenced by the LLM itself (Dong et al., 2024; Carroll et al., 2024). Meanwhile, human users perceive LLM assistants as objective "third parties", without knowing the ongoing preference learning process (Helberger et al., 2020; Glickman & Sharot, 2024).

3.3. Conditions for Lock-in

We start with a maximally general theorem, one that is agnostic towards human/AI distinctions. The proofs of both 3.2 and 3.3 can be found in Appendix B.

Theorem 3.2 (Feedback Loops Induce Collective Lock-In). *Given any $\mathbf{W} \in \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}^{N \times N}$, if and only if the spectral radius $\rho(\mathbf{W}) > 1$, there exists $i \in \{1, \cdots, N\}$ such that*

$$\Pr\left[\lim_{t \to \infty} \hat{\mu}_{i,t} = \mu\right] = 0. \tag{7}$$

Furthermore, when $\mathbf{W}$ is invertible and has spectral radius $\rho(\mathbf{W}) > 1$, (7) holds for all $i \in \{1, \cdots, N\}$.

In other words, feedback loops — where the circular flow of beliefs lead agents to unconsciously double-count evidence — can lead to false beliefs being permanently locked-in. Intuitively speaking, the condition $\rho(\mathbf{W}) > 1$ asks that the feedback loop be a *self-amplifying* one, instead of a *self-diminishing* one due to lack of trust between agents.

We now apply Theorem 3.2 to the specific human-LLM dynamics outlined in Example 3.1.

Corollary 3.3 (Lock-in in Human-LLM Interaction). *Given any $N, \lambda_1 > 0, \lambda_2 > 0$, consider the following trust matrix representing human-LLM interaction dynamics.*

$$\mathbf{W} = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & \lambda_1 & \cdots & \lambda_1 \\ \lambda_2 & 0 & \cdots & 0 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ \lambda_2 & 0 & \cdots & 0 \end{pmatrix}$$

When $(N-1)\lambda_1\lambda_2 \leq 1$, for all $i \in \{1, \cdots, N\}$,

$$\Pr\left[\lim_{t\to\infty} \hat{\mu}_{i,t} = \mu\right] = 1.$$

When $(N-1)\lambda_1\lambda_2 > 1$, for all $i \in \{1, \cdots, N\}$,

$$\Pr\left[\lim_{t\to\infty} \hat{\mu}_{i,t} = \mu\right] = 0.$$

Corollary 3.3 is validated with numerical simulations in Figure 2. A phase change is detected at $(N-1)\lambda_1\lambda_2 = 1$, beyond which each simulation run converges exponentially to a false estimate of μ.

$(N-1)\lambda_1\lambda_2 > 1$ is a relatively weak condition. When $N = 101$, it is only required that $\lambda_1, \lambda_2 > 0.1$ for Corollary 3.3 to apply — i.e., that humans and the AI discount each other's reported belief by a factor less than 10. Note though, it doesn't mean the condition automatically holds for very large N, as people tend to downscale trust as the group size increases; for instance, a poll of 5 million people may exert less influence on a reader's opinion than a private discussion with 5 friends. Finally, when feedback loops exist and are supported by a moderate amount of trust between humans and the AI, collective lock-in (as defined here) to a confident false belief surely occurs. These results give a potential mechanistic account of lock-in.

It's worth noting that there are also forces that pull the human-AI system away from lock-in. These include sources of LLM capabilities that are independent of humans (Guo et al., 2025), human attempts at fact-checking (Guo et al., 2022), and more. It remains an open question how these forces interact with the human-AI feedback loop.

4. Simulations

In this section, we operationalize the lock-in hypothesis in the context of large language models (LLMs) and human-AI interactions through a series of *progressively realistic* simulations, with the aim to learn how lock-in might happen and what interactive dynamic is responsible for such consequences.

- A numerical simulation where agents guess a number with Gaussian measurement noise, with an LLM knowledge authority in the loop;

Figure 3. Simulation settings. We simulate 10 Agents (rule-based numerical ones or LLMs) who converse with a Authority (an LLM). After each turn of conversation, Users are instructed to update knowledge its belief in light of learning from the Authority. The Authority has access to beliefs of all Agents via in-context learning (corresponding to the real-life setting where LLM have access to everybody's belief via training on in-coming user interactive data and all internet data). The simulation is meant to demonstrate possible consequences of a feedback loop between the Agent and the Authority, where Agent adjust their belief in light of Authority's belief, and the Authority's belief is acquired from all Agents. Such feedback loops are present across three setups.

- A numerical simulation where agents discuss their beliefs in value-laden questions, with an LLM knowledge authority in the loop;

- A natural language simulation where LLM-based agents discuss their beliefs in value-laden questions in natural language, with an LLM knowledge authority in the loop.

4.1. Settings

We describe the three simulation setups below, each building on the previous to demonstrate the lock-in effect.

4.1.1. SETUP A: NUMERICAL SIMULATION WITH LLM AUTHORITY

This setup extends the formal modeling and numerical simulation from Section 3 (2) by incorporating an LLM as the Authority.

- **Belief** A belief is represented by a Gaussian distribution with a mean and precision, initialized with a private observation drawn from $\mathcal{N}(\mu, \sigma^2)$.

- **Agent** A group of N rule-based Bayesian agents estimate the unknown quantity μ.

- **Authority** An LLM-based Authority, implemented with Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct, handles all Agents' beliefs via in-context learning.

- **Interaction** Each round, all Agents' beliefs are passed to the Authority's prompt. Based on such access to collective belief, the Authority shares with Agents what it believes to be the truth of the unknown quantity, in the format of $\mathcal{N}(\mu, \sigma^2)$.

- **Update** At each time step, Agents update their beliefs with new observations and consult the LLM Authority, which aggregates the public beliefs of all Agents via in-context learning. The Authority processes these beliefs (provided as mean-precision pairs) and returns an aggregated belief, which Agents incorporate into their beliefs based on a trust parameter $\lambda_2 = 1.0$. The Authority's trust in Agents (λ_1) is implicitly handled by its aggregation strategy.

Compared to 2, the Authority updates its belief actually via in-context learning, corresponding to how LLM would update its belief in reality.

4.1.2. SETUP B: POLITICAL BELIEF SIMULATION

The Setup B adapts the numerical framework of Setup A to value-laden political questions, such as "Is Barack Obama a good president?"

- **Belief.** A belief is represented by a numerical value in $[0, 1]$, representing the degree of agreement with the statement (e.g., 0.7 indicates moderate agreement), initially drawn from a Gaussian distribution centered at 0.5 with $\sigma = 0.1$.

- **Agent.** A group of N rule-based Bayesian agents each holds a numerical belief.

- **Authority.** An LLM-based Authority, implemented with Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct, collects Agent beliefs via in-context learning, returning individualized responses.

- **Interaction.** Each round, Agents share their beliefs with the Authority, which decide its own belief and communicates it back to each Agent in a numerical format.

- **Update.** Agents update their beliefs by computing a weighted average of their prior belief and the Authority's response, with a trust weight of 0.5. Agents lack direct access to the population belief distribution, relying solely on the Authority's feedback.

This setup simulates a realistic scenario where AI mediates collective opinions, potentially amplifying confidence in some beliefs rather than others through feedback loops.

4.1.3. SETUP C: NATURAL LANGUAGE BELIEF SIMULATION

This setup uses natural language to represent and communicate value-laden beliefs.

- **Belief** A belief is a natural language statement (e.g., "Citizens United was the worst thing to happen to the American political landscape."), sampled from the Changing My View Reddit site.

- **Agent** A group of $N = 10$ simulated users, each implemented using the Llama-3-8B-Instruct model.

- **Authority** An LLM-based Authority, implemented with Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct, processes Agent beliefs via in-context learning and generates its own belief statement.

- **Interaction** Each round, Agents share their belief statements with the Authority, which responds with a natural language belief statement (e.g., "Citizens United was beneficial, protecting free speech rights.").

- **Update** Agents consult the Authority and update their beliefs by synthesizing their original stance with the Authority's response.

Because beliefs are expressed in natural language, this simulation aims to capture the belief evolution dynamic mediated by LLMs in real life.

Figure 4. Early-stage evidence suggesting conceptual diversity loss in value-laden human messages is accelerated by chatbot iterative training, which is indicative of a human-LLM feedback loop that reinforces ideas. Conceptual diversity is 1 for a perfectly diverse corpus (all concepts unrelated to each other), 0.5 for a significantly homogeneous corpus (all concepts clustered within a $|\mathcal{T}|^{-0.5}$ portion of the concept space),[†] and 0 for a perfectly homogeneous corpus (all concepts exactly identical). Cutoff dates are the actual dates of backend API switch on WildChat's platform, usually later than OpenAI release dates.   [†]$|\mathcal{T}| \approx 5 \cdot 10^6$ is the number of distinct concepts in the concept hierarchy.

4.2. Results

We present the results of the three setups, demonstrating the lock-in effect progressively.

- **Setup A** Similar to the numerical simulation demonstrated in 2, we found that the group of agents also converge at a wrong belief with overflown confidence.

- **Setup B** Starting with a Gaussian belief of $\mathcal{N}(\mu = 0.5, \sigma^2 = 0.01)$, group of agents converge at belief that they have very high confidence ($\mu = 0.89$ the statement is true (in this case "Barack Obama is a good president").

- **Setup C** Starting with a relatively balanced belief (half position and half negative), the group of agents converge a overall very positive beliefs that "Barack Obama is a good president").

4.3. Discussion

Across all setups, the simulations support the idea that LLMs enhances the lock-in effects by showing that feedback loops in human-AI interactions lead to belief convergence and increased confidence. Setup A demonstrates this with converged numerical beliefs deviating from ground truth; Setup B extends it to a realistic political context with heightened collective confidence in converged beliefs; and Setup C demonstrates that the collective beliefs under the mediation of LLM.

All setups are simplified compared to real-world human-AI interactions in terms of acquiring beliefs. But we think the simulations capture important real-world aspects:

- LLMs return beliefs to users that they acquire from users.

- LLM favors popular beliefs (Borah et al., 2025).

- Individual humans assign higher trust to beliefs from the rest of the population via LLM interactions that they would otherwise not assign as much [2].

Hence, it helps to build intuition of lock-in that we would not be able to by only studying theory or real-world data. We will address limitations of simulations in the final section.

5. Causal Inference from Real-World Data

Having demonstrated lock-in through mathematical and simulated analyses, we now turn to empirical evidence using the WildChat-1M dataset (Zhao et al., 2024) for validation or refutation of a human-LLM feedback loop that reinforces ideas. By doing so, we aim to shed further light on the feedback mechanism underlying the lock-in hypothesis.

---

[2]For instance, one may not update much in light of polls, especially if the poll is from an organization that they do not trust.

	Hypothesis 1		Hypothesis 2			
	GPT-4	GPT-3.5t	GPT-4-0125	GPT-3.5t-0613	GPT-3.5t-0125	Per-User Reg.
Lineage Diversity (value-laden)	$\downarrow (p < .05)$	$\uparrow (p < .05)$	$\downarrow (p < .05)$	$\downarrow (p < .05)$	$\downarrow (p < .05)$	$\downarrow (p = .07)$
Lineage Diversity (all)	$\downarrow (p < .05)$	$\downarrow (p < .05)$	$\downarrow (p < .05)$	$\downarrow (p < .05)$	$\downarrow (p < .05)$	$\downarrow (p = .50)$
Lineage Diversity (non-templated)	$\downarrow (p < .05)$	$\uparrow (p < .05)$	$\downarrow (p < .05)$	$\downarrow (p < .05)$	$\downarrow (p = .15)$	$\downarrow (p = .35)$
Depth Diversity (value-laden)	$\downarrow (p < .05)$	$\downarrow (p < .05)$	$\downarrow (p < .05)$	$\downarrow (p < .05)$	$\downarrow (p = .41)$	$\downarrow (p = .98)$
Topic Entropy (value-laden)	$\downarrow (p = .07)$	$\downarrow (p = .09)$	$\downarrow (p < .05)$	$\downarrow (p < .05)$	$\uparrow (p = .06)$	$\downarrow (p < .05)$
Jaccard Distance (value-laden)	$\downarrow (p < .05)$	$\uparrow (p < .05)$	$\downarrow (p < .05)$	$\downarrow (p < .05)$	$\downarrow (p = .63)$	$\downarrow (p < .05)$

Table 1. Hypothesis testing on WildChat.[†] $\downarrow$ indicates a detected decrease or negative impact on diversity, and $\uparrow$ indicates the opposite. **Columns**: (1)(2) Regression with the formula $\text{diversity} \sim \text{time} + \text{const}$. (3)(4)(5) Discontinuous diversity change at dates when new GPT iterations are deployed, for all 3 iterations where data is available. (6) Sustained per-user diversity change at deployment dates, controlling for user identity and a range of other confounders. **Rows**: Different diversity metrics and dataset filtering policies, with lineage diversity on value-laden concepts being the primary setting.[‡]   [†]See Figure 7 and Table 2 for details.   [‡]Figure 4 and 5 show the primary setting.

We use diversity loss in human concepts as a proxy for the progression of lock-in, as per the suggestion of Peterson (2024). While diversity loss is much weaker than complete lock-in, here, we only intend to seek early signs of the latter.

5.1. Data

The WildChat-1M dataset (Zhao et al., 2024) has records of how $167,062$ human users interact with a ChatGPT mirror site over a one-year period. Timestamps and anonymized identities are contained in the dataset, so that we know which dialogue comes from whom and when they took place. Data collection was mandatory and not on an opt-in basis, which avoids self-selection bias (Strassberg & Lowe, 1995).

Human users continually engage with, and are influenced by, the model, while new model iterations are being trained on new user data. We can thus use this data to look for the human-AI feedback loop and the lock-in effect that we hypothesized. While the training of GPT may not use the data from the API calls in WildChat, this wouldn't affect the validity of our analysis as long as WildChat is approximately identically distributed with the usage of GPT at large.

In aggregate, WildChat has:

- $837,989$ conversations post-detoxification
- $167,062$ unique human users
- 12-month time span (except a 4-month intermission of GPT-4 data for unspecified reason)
- Model iterations within the GPT-3.5 family: `gpt-3.5-turbo-0301`→`0613`→`0125`
- Model iterations within the GPT-4 family: `gpt-4-0314`→`1106-preview`→`0125-preview`

We removed $97,809$ conversations that share a prefix of length 75 characters with more than 75 other conversations.

Most of these conversations use the site as a free API for production, which deviates from our objective of studying human-AI interaction.

5.2. Hypotheses

We aim to test the following hypotheses that focus on conceptual diversity loss as a measure of value lock-in, and look for causal relationships between the human-AI feedback loop and diversity loss. We also conduct additional exploratory analysis, which we detail in Appendix A.

> **Hypothesis 1** *(Collective Diversity Loss Occurs in Human-LLM Interaction)*. Concepts present in the corpus of human messages experience diversity loss over time.

Hypothesis 1 states that human ideas in human-LLM interaction are influenced by the interaction itself, and such influence will reduce collective diversity.

> **Hypothesis 2** *(Iterative Training Leads to Collective Diversity Loss)*. Diversity trends turn discontinuously downward whenever a new GPT iteration, pre- or post-trained on new human data, replaces the previous one.

Hypothesis 2 states that the "human → LLM" direction of influence also has an impact, where newer model iterations trained on newer human data accelerate the diversity loss. If both hypotheses hold, the feedback loop between human users and the LLM would drive conceptual diversity loss.

5.3. Metrics

In this section, we outline our methods for analysis. Please refer to Appendix A for details and examples.

Concept Hierarchy To assist in the assessment of concept diversity, we build a *concept hierarchy* (Sanderson & Croft, 1999) from $5,446,744$ natural-language concepts extracted from the WildChat corpus by a prompting-based pipeline.

To obtain such a hierarchy, we perform hierarchical clustering (McInnes et al., 2017) on $D = 256$-dimensional embedding vectors. This produces a tree $\mathcal{T}$ with specific concepts as leaves, and generic concept clusters at the top. The root node is an all-encompassing cluster that captures all concepts.

We adopted a prompting-based pipeline with GPT-4o-mini (Appendix A.6) to identify the top 2.5% *value-laden* concepts, i.e., those about morality, politics, or religion. Most of our experiments (those in Table 1 marked with "value-laden") focus exclusively on these concepts where AI influence and lock-in become most concerning.

Lineage Diversity Both hypotheses require the measurement of concept diversity within a certain user or a corpus. Common metrics for measuring diversity — such as Shannon entropy — cannot take into account the hierarchical structure of concepts, and may therefore view semantically similar concepts as entirely different ones. To overcome this shortcoming, we introduce the *lineage diversity* metric, which, for each multi-set $\mathcal{C}$ of concepts, calculates

$$D_{\text{lineage}}(\mathcal{C}; \mathcal{T}) = \frac{\log |\mathcal{T}| - \log \mathrm{E}_{u,v \sim \text{Unif}(\mathcal{C})} \left[|\mathcal{T}| / \left| \mathcal{T}_{l(u,v)} \right| \right]}{\log |\mathcal{T}|}$$

where $l(u, v)$ is the lowest common ancestor (LCA) of concept nodes u and v, $|\mathcal{T}_{l(u,v)}|$ is its subtree size (number of descendant concepts), and $|\mathcal{T}|$ is the size of the entire tree. Intuitively speaking, $D_{\text{lineage}}(\mathcal{C}; \mathcal{T})$ measures the expected portion of the hierarchy structure that lies "in between" two random concepts in $\mathcal{C}$, and normalizes that value into $[0, 1]$ on a log scale. 1 indicates a perfectly diverse corpus with concepts that are pairwise unrelated, and 0 indicates a perfectly homogeneous corpus with all identical concepts.

Finally, the calculation of $D_{\text{lineage}}(\mathcal{C}; \mathcal{T})$ can be accelerated by performing dynamic programming on the compressed Steiner tree containing the nodes in $\mathcal{C}$, resulting in the time complexity $\Theta(|\mathcal{C}| \log |\mathcal{T}|)$ ($|\mathcal{C}| \ll |\mathcal{T}|$), as opposed to alternatives of $\Theta(|\mathcal{C}|^2 \log |\mathcal{T}|)$ or $\Theta(|\mathcal{T}|)$. It is also much faster than traditional distance-based metrics that typically require $\Theta(|\mathcal{C}|^2 D)$ time to compute (Kaminskas & Bridge, 2016) — an unaffordable complexity at our scale of analysis.

Portfolio of Diversity Metrics To ensure the robustness of our results, we use a portfolio of different diversity metrics to separately conduct hypothesis testing.

Our portfolio include the lineage diversity applied on different subsets of conversations or concepts. The last in the following list is our primary experiment setting.

Figure 5. Observed diversity trends in WildChat. GPT-4 shows a downward trend ($p < .001^{***}$), while GPT-3.5-turbo shows an upward trend ($p < .001^{***}$).

- **Lineage Diversity (all)**: D_{lineage} applied on the full WildChat dataset.

- **Lineage Diversity (non-templated)**: D_{lineage}, with templated messages (i.e. suspected API uses) removed.

- **Lineage Diversity (value-laden)**: D_{lineage}, with templated messages and non-value-laden concepts removed.

We also incorporate other diversity metrics, including:

- **Depth Diversity (value-laden)**: D_{depth}, a diversity metric based on node depths in the concept hierarchy (defined in Appendix A.5). Templated messages and non-value-laden concepts are removed.

- **Topic Entropy (value-laden)**: Shannon entropy of the empirical distribution of *topics* in a corpus (Jost, 2006), where a *topic* is a maximal cluster in the concept hierarchy containing at most 1% of all concepts. Templated messages and non-value-laden concepts are removed.

- **Jaccard Distance (value-laden)**: Average pairwise Jaccard distance between each pair of conversations in a corpus (Kosub, 2019), where each conversation is represented with the set of topics it contain. Templated messages and non-value-laden concepts are removed.

Topic entropy and Jaccard distance are both "cross-sectional" metrics, in the sense that they group the concepts into disjoint topics by "cutting" the concept hierarchy at the 1% threshold, thereby neglecting the hierarchical structure the concepts naturally possess. As such, we use them only as secondary metrics despite their popularity.

5.4. Aggregate-Level Results

The results presented in Table 1 lead to several conclusions regarding the hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 finds strong support with GPT-4, but the evidence from GPT-3.5-turbo is ambiguous. In contrast, Hypothesis 2 is strongly supported by both GPT-4-0125-preview and GPT-3.5-turbo-0613, and tentatively supported by the per-user regression analysis. However, results for Hypothesis 2 on GPT-3.5-turbo-0125 remain ambiguous.

In this section, we examine the aggregate-level results (columns 1-5 of Table 1), and defer discussions on per-user results to §5.5. Discussions on our exploratory analysis can be found in Appendix A.

Hypothesis 1 Figure 5 illustrates the temporal trend of human conceptual diversity $D_{\text{lineage}}(\mathcal{C}; \mathcal{T})$ during the entire span of the WildChat dataset in our primary setting. When cross-validated with other rows in Table 1, GPT-4 shows consistent downward trend in diversity, while the trends for GPT-3.5-turbo is highly ambiguous. Such a difference can potentially be explained by a division-of-labor between high-end and low-end models, where workload from certain specialized tasks requiring stronger cognitive abilities are increasingly shifted to GPT-3.5-turbo from GPT-4, although this wouldn't explain the continued presence of large differences in *value-laden* concept diversity. Further analysis is needed to confirm the cause.

Hypothesis 2 Hypothesis 2 revolves around a non-smooth change in diversity at the dates of GPT version switch, meaning that the first-order derivative of the diversity curve is discontinuous at those points. Since confounders almost always change smoothly, any discontinuous change detected will hint at causal relationships. We thus adopt the regression kink design (RKD) (Card et al., 2017; Ando, 2017) to detect discontinuous change. Positive results were found at all 3 version release dates where data is available (Figure 4). Results stay broadly consistent across choices of diversity metric, the notable exception being GPT-3.5-turbo-0125 with topic entropy as the metric.

Substitution effects with other providers like Anthropic exist, but their model releases do not coincide with GPT model version updates (which, notably, is *not* the release of new GPT models), and so are unlikely to introduce discontinuities that disrupt RKD.

Finally, it is worth noting that applying RKD to the temporal dimension may diminish its credibility due to the possibility of temporal confounders (Hausman & Rapson, 2018), and these results should be taken as early-stage evidence only, and not to be considered conclusive.

5.5. Per-User Regression Results

§5.4 presents aggregate-level results. To rule out confounders such as user self-selection in the RKD for Hypothesis 2, and to verify that the same results apply *to each individual user*, we conduct further regressions on the top 1% high-engagement users, controlling for user identity and other potential confounders.

We control for user identity, time, language, conversation statistics, user engagement progress (the portion of the user's activity timespan that has elapsed), pre-/post-availability gap for GPT-4 (whether we are before or after the July-to-November GPT-4 outage on the WildChat platform), and other factors. Refer to Table 2 for details.

We test the impact of the variable num_kinks_before (i.e. how many GPT version updates have happened before this point) on a user's concept diversity at a certain time step. Since we have already controlled for time, the regression coefficient indicates the counterfactual acceleration of diversity loss due to version updates. Since num_kinks_before as the independent variable indicates *sustained* impact from the deployment date onwards, we also rule out the possibility of users rushing to try specific uses at version updates.

With all 6 combinations of diversity metric and filtering policy, regression shows a negative impact on diversity, although only two of them are statistically significant. Overall, results indicate moderate support for Hypothesis 2.

6. Discussion

To conclude the paper, we discuss our approach, its limitations, and directions for future work.

6.1. Synthesis of Evidence

In this study, we have formulated and investigated the lock-in hypothesis in the context of human-LLM interactions.

Formal Modeling First, we formalize *lock-in* as the entrenchment of confident false beliefs at the population level due to feedback loops. The formal model of lock-in suggests that collective lock-in of a confident false belief almost surely occurs when feedback loops are present and there are trusted interactions between humans and the AI. This formulation reveals two core mechanisms of lock-in of false beliefs: feedback loop and over-trust. We believe both of these forces are present in the current LLM landscape (Glickman & Sharot, 2024).

Simulation We ground the intuitions acquired from formal modeling with empirical simulations run with LLM-based agents. We demonstrate how a feedback loop can lead to lock-in where the diversity of human knowledge and

Figure 6. Illustration of the relationship between the human-LLM feedback loop and lock-in. Without the feedback loop, mere observation of diversity loss (§5) does not imply lock-in. With the feedback loop established by the causal relationship between iterative training and accelerated diversity loss, lock-in becomes a plausible outcome. Simulation (§4) and formal modeling (§3) further predict that, given sufficient time, lock-in is the default outcome in the presence of the feedback loop.

values are lost, resulting in homogeneity. The simulation supports our intuition that although the end state is lock-in, there is continuous observable diversity loss.

Hypothesis Testing   Finally, we provide empirical evidence from WildChat on the hypothesis that the feedback loop between human users and LLMs can lead to a loss of conceptual diversity. We found evidence of diversity loss corresponding to when new versions of the language models are released, partially supporting the hypothesis. The empirical evidence does not yet confirm the lock-in hypothesis, but it warrants out concerns, because the collective diversity loss is necessary but not sufficient to lock-in: lock-in means collectively converging at false beliefs with high confidence. Human subject experiments are required to validate the lock-in hypothesis.

The Lock-in Hypothesis as a Unifying Model   Although the hypothesis only presents one possible future among other scenarios, it gives us the vision that connects all the dots: would all the empirical observations, taken together, point to a gloomy future? Without those independent components, lock-in is only a possible outcome; with those components, especially the feedback look in human-AI interaction, lock-in becomes a plausible future scenario (Figure 6). Subtle influence and trivial behaviors over the near-term seem too small to be noticed, but we would not easily assume the same for it over the long-term.

6.2. How We Measured Lock-in

Lock-in is defined as the irreversible population-level convergence on false beliefs, driven by systemic mechanisms that amplify errors. While prior conceptions frame lock-in

as technological path dependence or ideological dominance (Bostrom, 2002), we focus on its *formative mechanisms* in human-LLM feedback loops, which also allows us to practically measure the progression of lock-in.

Lock-in as Convergence to Confident Falsehoods   In our formal model (§3), we consider lock-in to have occurred when collective Bayesian beliefs converge to arbitrarily confident false estimates (Theorem 3.2). This aligns with our central concern: a systemic failure to reach ground truth at population level due to feedback loops.

Diversity Loss as a Proxy for Lock-in   In our simulations (§4) and hypothesis testing (§5), we adopt conceptual diversity loss as a progress measure for lock-in. Such an operationalization is necessary because ground truth is unobservable in real-world datasets, which means belief correctness cannot be universally assessed.

While diversity loss does not *guarantee* lock-in (e.g., homogeneity may also arise from truth-seeking), two factors make it indicative:

1. Feedback loops create asymmetric pressure: dominant beliefs are reinforced while minority views are excluded from training data (Figure 3).

2. Homogeneous environments impair collective error correction (Peterson, 2024), as shared biases evade scrutiny.

6.3. Limitations and Future Work

We acknowledge that our study is only a first step in understanding the complex dynamics of human-LLM interactions, and that our evidence is preliminary and subject to further validation and refinement.

RCTs with Human Subjects   Notably, our analysis on WildChat has not managed to nullify all potential confounders due to their prevalence in time series data. We found that the launches of new versions cause a concept diversity loss that is statistically significant, but we aren't yet certain why there are such drops.

We believe AI labs that have their own chatbots deployed are well-positioned to establish better causal evidence of feedback loop induced diversity loss at a larger scale, with randomization designs and longer temporal user interaction data (Tamkin et al., 2024).

For researchers outside of AI labs, establishing better quality of causal evidence is not inconceivable: for example, an LLM-powered browser extension that alters chatbot outputs could enable randomized human subject experiments and remove confounders that are prevalent in observational studies (Piccardi et al., 2024; Mendler-Dünner et al., 2024).

These experiments could test the causal effects of feedback loops on users and potential interventions to address them.

Lock-in Effects in the Wild   Alongside randomized controlled experiments aiming to establish causal evidence, we also need better evidence of lock-in effects in the wild. For instance, science may go down the path favored by LLMs: in theory both authors and reviewers may utilize LLMs in their workflow, which may create an echo chamber that entrenches LLM biases. Besides, fields with heavier use of LLMs may establish feedback loops that already demonstrate lock-in effects (Yakura et al., 2024). We will need strong empirical demonstrations of such effects.

More realistic simulations   We think simulations play complementary roles in understanding the LLM's impact on human's belief evolution over long term. But we hope simulations can be progressively realistic in order for us to understand the real-world interaction dynamic. Among other things, we are particularly interested in understanding how group of Agents may update their beliefs when both LLM Authority and new *empirical evidence* are presented. This is because for lock-in to happen, given population of humans would need to, not only hold their (false) beliefs firmly, but also it's hard for them to incorporate empirical evidence.

That said, we believe that these evidences provide sufficient reasons for investigating human-LLM interactions and lock-in hypothesis further and for developing strategies to mitigate the potential negative consequences of lock-in, either through technical and algorithmic interventions, or through policy and regulation.

Evaluation and Mitigation   The ability to monitor lock-in effects in real-world human-AI systems is an important enabler of successful mitigation strategies. This may be a perfect measurement based on agent beliefs or a downstream proxy; a small-scoped metric focusing on one-human-one-AI interactions or a societal-scale metric.

Once such evaluation methods are in place, both algorithmic and policy mitigation will become much more tractable. On the policy and governance front, foundational research to clarify the range of feasible interventions is needed. On the algorithmic front, methods for optimizing model policies within a complex human-AI environment may be needed. Current alignment methods see human feedback as a non-influenceable oracle (Bai et al., 2022; Carroll et al., 2024), which make them unsuited for the job.

Impact Statement

This paper promotes the understanding of the potential societal consequences of human-LLM interactions, and shall lead to positive societal impact if successful.

Acknowledgement

We would like to thank Tao Lin, Jose Hernandez-Orallo, Matthieu Téhénan, Cynthia Chen, Jason Brown, Ziyue Wang, Tyna Eloundou, Alex Tamkin, Ben Plaut, Raj Movva, and Yinzhu Yang for their valuable feedback.

References

Anderson, B. R., Shah, J. H., and Kreminski, M. Homogenization effects of large language models on human creative ideation. In *Proceedings of the 16th Conference on Creativity & Cognition*, pp. 413–425, 2024.

Anderson, L. R. and Holt, C. A. Information cascades in the laboratory. *The American economic review*, pp. 847–862, 1997.

Ando, M. How much should we trust regression-kink-design estimates? *Empirical Economics*, 53:1287–1322, 2017.

Bai, Y., Jones, A., Ndousse, K., Askell, A., Chen, A., DasSarma, N., Drain, D., Fort, S., Ganguli, D., Henighan, T., et al. Training a helpful and harmless assistant with reinforcement learning from human feedback. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2204.05862*, 2022.

Bessi, A., Zollo, F., Del Vicario, M., Puliga, M., Scala, A., Caldarelli, G., Uzzi, B., and Quattrociocchi, W. Users polarization on facebook and youtube. *PloS one*, 11(8): e0159641, 2016.

Bird, S. Nltk: the natural language toolkit. In *Proceedings of the COLING/ACL 2006 Interactive Presentation Sessions*, pp. 69–72, 2006.

Borah, A., Houalla, M., and Mihalcea, R. Mind the (belief) gap: Group identity in the world of llms. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2503.02016*, 2025.

Bostrom, N. Existential risks: Analyzing human extinction scenarios and related hazards. *Journal of Evolution and technology*, 9, 2002.

Boutyline, A. and Willer, R. The social structure of political echo chambers: Variation in ideological homophily in online networks. *Political psychology*, 38(3):551–569, 2017.

Breusch, T. S. and Pagan, A. R. A simple test for heteroscedasticity and random coefficient variation. *Econometrica: Journal of the econometric society*, pp. 1287–1294, 1979.

Bright, J., Marchal, N., Ganesh, B., and Rudinac, S. Echo chambers exist!(but they're full of opposing views). *arXiv preprint arXiv:2001.11461*, 2020.

Brown, M. A., Bisbee, J., Lai, A., Bonneau, R., Nagler, J., and Tucker, J. A. Echo chambers, rabbit holes, and algorithmic bias: How youtube recommends content to real users. *Available at SSRN 4114905*, 2022.

Bruns, A. Echo chamber? what echo chamber? reviewing the evidence. In *6th Biennial Future of Journalism Conference (FOJ17)*, 2017.

Card, D., Lee, D. S., Pei, Z., and Weber, A. Regression kink design: Theory and practice. In *Regression discontinuity designs: Theory and applications*, pp. 341–382. Emerald Publishing Limited, 2017.

Carroll, M., Foote, D., Siththaranjan, A., Russell, S., and Dragan, A. Ai alignment with changing and influence-able reward functions. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2405.17713*, 2024.

Carroll, M. D., Dragan, A., Russell, S., and Hadfield-Menell, D. Estimating and penalizing induced preference shifts in recommender systems. In *International Conference on Machine Learning*, pp. 2686–2708. PMLR, 2022.

Chen, L., Zaharia, M., and Zou, J. How is chatgpt's behavior changing over time? *arXiv preprint arXiv:2307.09009*, 2023.

Cinelli, M., De Francisci Morales, G., Galeazzi, A., Quattrociocchi, W., and Starnini, M. The echo chamber effect on social media. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 118(9):e2023301118, 2021.

Conneau, A. and Lample, G. Cross-lingual language model pretraining. *Advances in neural information processing systems*, 32, 2019.

Costello, T. H., Pennycook, G., and Rand, D. G. Durably reducing conspiracy beliefs through dialogues with ai. *Science*, 385(6714):eadq1814, 2024.

Cribari-Neto, F. and da Silva, W. B. A new heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator for the linear regression model. *AStA Advances in Statistical Analysis*, 95:129–146, 2011.

Danry, V., Pataranutaporn, P., Groh, M., Epstein, Z., and Maes, P. Deceptive ai systems that give explanations are more convincing than honest ai systems and can amplify belief in misinformation. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2408.00024*, 2024.

Dong, H., Xiong, W., Pang, B., Wang, H., Zhao, H., Zhou, Y., Jiang, N., Sahoo, D., Xiong, C., and Zhang, T. Rlhf workflow: From reward modeling to online rlhf. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2405.07863*, 2024.

Driscoll, J. C. and Kraay, A. C. Consistent covariance matrix estimation with spatially dependent panel data. *Review of economics and statistics*, 80(4):549–560, 1998.

Dubey, A., Jauhri, A., Pandey, A., Kadian, A., Al-Dahle, A., Letman, A., Mathur, A., Schelten, A., Yang, A., Fan, A., et al. The llama 3 herd of models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2407.21783*, 2024.

Dubois, E. and Blank, G. The echo chamber is overstated: the moderating effect of political interest and diverse media. *Information, communication & society*, 21(5): 729–745, 2018.

Fisher, J., Feng, S., Aron, R., Richardson, T., Choi, Y., Fisher, D. W., Pan, J., Tsvetkov, Y., and Reinecke, K. Biased ai can influence political decision-making. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2410.06415*, 2024.

Gabriel, I. and Ghazavi, V. The challenge of value alignment: From fairer algorithms to ai safety. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2101.06060*, 2021.

Ge, L., Halpern, D., Micha, E., Procaccia, A. D., Shapira, I., Vorobeychik, Y., and Wu, J. Axioms for ai alignment from human feedback. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2405.14758*, 2024.

Gillani, N., Yuan, A., Saveski, M., Vosoughi, S., and Roy, D. Me, my echo chamber, and i: introspection on social media polarization. In *Proceedings of the 2018 World Wide Web Conference*, pp. 823–831, 2018.

Glickman, M. and Sharot, T. How human–ai feedback loops alter human perceptual, emotional and social judgements. *Nature Human Behaviour*, pp. 1–15, 2024.

Griffiths, T. L. and Kalish, M. L. Language evolution by iterated learning with bayesian agents. *Cognitive science*, 31(3):441–480, 2007.

Guo, D., Yang, D., Zhang, H., Song, J., Zhang, R., Xu, R., Zhu, Q., Ma, S., Wang, P., Bi, X., et al. Deepseek-r1: Incentivizing reasoning capability in llms via reinforcement learning. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2501.12948*, 2025.

Guo, Z., Schlichtkrull, M., and Vlachos, A. A survey on automated fact-checking. *Transactions of the Association for Computational Linguistics*, 10:178–206, 2022.

Hackenburg, K., Tappin, B. M., Röttger, P., Hale, S., Bright, J., and Margetts, H. Evidence of a log scaling law for political persuasion with large language models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2406.14508*, 2024.

Hall, M., van der Maaten, L., Gustafson, L., Jones, M., and Adcock, A. A systematic study of bias amplification. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2201.11706*, 2022.

Hausman, C. and Rapson, D. S. Regression discontinuity in time: Considerations for empirical applications. *Annual Review of Resource Economics*, 10(1):533–552, 2018.

Hazrati, N. and Ricci, F. Recommender systems effect on the evolution of users' choices distribution. *Information Processing & Management*, 59(1):102766, 2022.

Helberger, N., Araujo, T., and de Vreese, C. H. Who is the fairest of them all? public attitudes and expectations regarding automated decision-making. *Computer Law & Security Review*, 39:105456, 2020.

Hendrycks, D. and Mazeika, M. X-risk analysis for ai research. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2206.05862*, 2022.

Hobolt, S. B., Lawall, K., and Tilley, J. The polarizing effect of partisan echo chambers. *American Political Science Review*, 118(3):1464–1479, 2024.

Hosseinmardi, H., Ghasemian, A., Rivera-Lanas, M., Horta Ribeiro, M., West, R., and Watts, D. J. Causally estimating the effect of youtube's recommender system using counterfactual bots. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 121(8):e2313377121, 2024.

Imbens, G. W. and Rubin, D. B. *Causal inference in statistics, social, and biomedical sciences*. Cambridge university press, 2015.

Jakesch, M., Bhat, A., Buschek, D., Zalmanson, L., and Naaman, M. Co-writing with opinionated language models affects users' views. In *Proceedings of the 2023 CHI conference on human factors in computing systems*, pp. 1–15, 2023.

Jost, L. Entropy and diversity. *Oikos*, 113(2):363–375, 2006.

Kalimeris, D., Bhagat, S., Kalyanaraman, S., and Weinsberg, U. Preference amplification in recommender systems. In *Proceedings of the 27th ACM SIGKDD Conference on Knowledge Discovery & Data Mining*, pp. 805–815, 2021.

Kaminskas, M. and Bridge, D. Diversity, serendipity, novelty, and coverage: a survey and empirical analysis of beyond-accuracy objectives in recommender systems. *ACM Transactions on Interactive Intelligent Systems (TiiS)*, 7(1):1–42, 2016.

Kirby, S., Griffiths, T., and Smith, K. Iterated learning and the evolution of language. *Current opinion in neurobiology*, 28:108–114, 2014.

Kosub, S. A note on the triangle inequality for the jaccard distance. *Pattern Recognition Letters*, 120:36–38, 2019.

Leib, M., Köbis, N. C., Rilke, R. M., Hagens, M., and Irlenbusch, B. The corruptive force of ai-generated advice. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2102.07536*, 2021.

Liang, W., Izzo, Z., Zhang, Y., Lepp, H., Cao, H., Zhao, X., Chen, L., Ye, H., Liu, S., Huang, Z., et al. Monitoring ai-modified content at scale: A case study on the impact of chatgpt on ai conference peer reviews. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2403.07183*, 2024.

Luzsa, R. *A Psychological and Empirical Investigation of the Online Echo Chamber Phenomenon*. PhD thesis, Universität Passau, 2019.

Mansoury, M., Abdollahpouri, H., Pechenizkiy, M., Mobasher, B., and Burke, R. Feedback loop and bias amplification in recommender systems. In *Proceedings of the 29th ACM international conference on information & knowledge management*, pp. 2145–2148, 2020.

McInnes, L., Healy, J., Astels, S., et al. hdbscan: Hierarchical density based clustering. *J. Open Source Softw.*, 2 (11):205, 2017.

Mendler-Dünner, C., Carovano, G., and Hardt, M. An engine not a camera: Measuring performative power of online search. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2405.19073*, 2024.

Miller, G. A. Wordnet: a lexical database for english. *Communications of the ACM*, 38(11):39–41, 1995.

Padmakumar, V. and He, H. Does writing with language models reduce content diversity? *arXiv preprint arXiv:2309.05196*, 2023.

Pan, A., Jones, E., Jagadeesan, M., and Steinhardt, J. Feedback loops with language models drive in-context reward hacking. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2402.06627*, 2024.

Peterson, A. J. Ai and the problem of knowledge collapse. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2404.03502*, 2024.

Piccardi, T., Saveski, M., Jia, C., Hancock, J. T., Tsai, J. L., and Bernstein, M. Social media algorithms can shape affective polarization via exposure to antidemocratic attitudes and partisan animosity. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2411.14652*, 2024.

Potter, Y., Lai, S., Kim, J., Evans, J., and Song, D. Hidden persuaders: Llms' political leaning and their influence on voters. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2410.24190*, 2024.

Qiu, T., Zhang, Y., Huang, X., Li, J. X., Ji, J., and Yang, Y. Progressgym: Alignment with a millennium of moral progress. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2406.20087*, 2024.

Ren, Y., Guo, S., Qiu, L., Wang, B., and Sutherland, D. J. Bias amplification in language model evolution: An iterated learning perspective. In *The Thirty-eighth Annual*

Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems, 2024.

Rosopa, P. J., Schaffer, M. M., and Schroeder, A. N. Managing heteroscedasticity in general linear models. *Psychological methods*, 18(3):335, 2013.

Salvi, F., Ribeiro, M. H., Gallotti, R., and West, R. On the conversational persuasiveness of large language models: A randomized controlled trial. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2403.14380*, 2024.

Sanderson, M. and Croft, B. Deriving concept hierarchies from text. In *Proceedings of the 22nd annual international ACM SIGIR conference on Research and development in information retrieval*, pp. 206–213, 1999.

Santurkar, S., Durmus, E., Ladhak, F., Lee, C., Liang, P., and Hashimoto, T. Whose opinions do language models reflect? In *International Conference on Machine Learning*, pp. 29971–30004. PMLR, 2023.

Sharma, N., Liao, Q. V., and Xiao, Z. Generative echo chamber? effect of llm-powered search systems on diverse information seeking. In *Proceedings of the CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems*, pp. 1–17, 2024.

Shumailov, I., Shumaylov, Z., Zhao, Y., Papernot, N., Anderson, R., and Gal, Y. Ai models collapse when trained on recursively generated data. *Nature*, 631(8022):755–759, 2024.

Strassberg, D. S. and Lowe, K. Volunteer bias in sexuality research. *Archives of sexual behavior*, 24:369–382, 1995.

Su, Q. and Wu, Y.-C. On convergence conditions of gaussian belief propagation. *IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing*, 63(5):1144–1155, 2015.

Tamkin, A., McCain, M., Handa, K., Durmus, E., Lovitt, L., Rathi, A., Huang, S., Mountfield, A., Hong, J., Ritchie, S., et al. Clio: Privacy-preserving insights into real-world ai use. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2412.13678*, 2024.

Taori, R. and Hashimoto, T. Data feedback loops: Model-driven amplification of dataset biases. In *International Conference on Machine Learning*, pp. 33883–33920. PMLR, 2023.

Terren, L. T. L. and Borge-Bravo, R. B.-B. R. Echo chambers on social media: A systematic review of the literature. *Review of Communication Research*, 9, 2021.

Tseng, Y.-M., Huang, Y.-C., Hsiao, T.-Y., Chen, W.-L., Huang, C.-W., Meng, Y., and Chen, Y.-N. Two tales of persona in llms: A survey of role-playing and personalization. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2406.01171*, 2024.

Vincent, B. T., Forde, N., and Preszler, J., Aug 2024. URL `https://github.com/pymc-labs/CausalPy/`.

Williams, M., Carroll, M., Narang, A., Weisser, C., Murphy, B., and Dragan, A. On targeted manipulation and deception when optimizing llms for user feedback. *arXiv preprint ArXiv:2411.02306*, 2024.

Wittgenstein, L. *Philosophical investigations*. John Wiley & Sons, 2009.

Wolfowicz, M., Weisburd, D., and Hasisi, B. Examining the interactive effects of the filter bubble and the echo chamber on radicalization. *Journal of Experimental Criminology*, 19(1):119–141, 2023.

Yakura, H., Lopez-Lopez, E., Brinkmann, L., Serna, I., Gupta, P., and Rahwan, I. Empirical evidence of large language model's influence on human spoken communication. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2409.01754*, 2024.

Zhao, W., Ren, X., Hessel, J., Cardie, C., Choi, Y., and Deng, Y. Wildchat: 1m chatgpt interaction logs in the wild. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2405.01470*, 2024.

Zhao, W. X., Zhou, K., Li, J., Tang, T., Wang, X., Hou, Y., Min, Y., Zhang, B., Zhang, J., Dong, Z., et al. A survey of large language models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2303.18223*, 2023.

Zhou, F., Xu, X., Trajcevski, G., and Zhang, K. A survey of information cascade analysis: Models, predictions, and recent advances. *ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)*, 54 (2):1–36, 2021.

A. Supplementary Results of WildChat Data Analysis

In this appendix, we explain details on the implementation and results of the data analysis on WildChat.

Some figures in this appendix, as well as Figure 4 in the main body, are made with CausalPy (Vincent et al., 2024).

A.1. Results Without Data Filtering

Figure 7(1) presents results of hypothesis testing on the complete dataset without filtering suspected API use. After including such data, support for both Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 are strengthened.

A.2. Exploratory Hypotheses

Exploratory Hypothesis 3 (Individual Diversity Loss Occurs in Human-AI Interaction). Among heavy users of GPT, those who use it more (compared to those who used it less) experience a stronger diversity loss in the concepts occurring in their conversations with GPT, after adjusting for confounders. Moreover, on the temporal dimension, the accumulation of GPT interaction causally explains each heavy user's diversity loss over time. [3]

Exploratory Hypothesis 4 (Iterative Training Leads to Individual Diversity Loss). Among heavy users of GPT, those who engage with later versions of GPT experience a larger diversity loss, after adjusting for confounders.[4]

It can be noted that Hypothesis 3 and 4 adopt *individual users* as the unit of analysis, while Hypothesis 1 and 2 adopt *time periods* as the unit and aggregate all users into a collective corpus.

A.3. Methods

In this section, we explain details on our method for analysis.

Concept Hierarchy To assist in the assessment of concept diversity, we build a *concept hierarchy* (Sanderson & Croft, 1999) with the following steps:

1. Extracting concepts (*e.g.*, computer, environmental protection, world cup) mentioned or implied in each conversation, with the Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct model (Dubey et al., 2024).

2. Perform lemmatization on the concepts with the WordNet Lemmatizer (Miller, 1995; Bird, 2006).

3. Obtain $D = 256$-dimensional embeddings for each concept using the voyage-3-large model.

4. Perform hierarchical clusterization with the HDBSCAN algorithm (McInnes et al., 2017).

This would produce a tree with specific concepts at the bottom, and generic concept clusters at the top. The root node is an all-encompassing cluster that captures all concepts.

Given the size of the hierarchy, please refer to our codebase to view its content. The README instructions shall contain guidance on where to find the hierarachy illustration.

Diversity Metric Both hypotheses require the measurement of concept diversity within a certain user or a corpus. Common metrics for measure diversity — such as Shannon entropy — cannot take into account the hierarchical structure of concepts, and may therefore view semantically similar concepts as entirely different ones. To overcome this shortcoming, we introduce the *lineage diversity* metric, which, for each multi-set $\mathcal{C}$ of concepts, calculates

$$D_{\text{lineage}}(\mathcal{C}; \mathcal{T}) = \frac{1}{\log |\mathcal{T}|} \left(\log |\mathcal{T}| - \log \mathbb{E}_{u,v \sim \text{Unif}(\mathcal{C})} \left[\frac{|\mathcal{T}|}{|\mathcal{T}_{l(u,v)}|} \right] \right) \tag{8}$$

---

[3]The reason for focusing on heavy users is that self-selection bias is strong among light users, where people who find GPT less useful spontaneously engage less with it, confounding the data with a reversed direction of causality.

[4]Hypothesis 4 shows that the "human $\rightarrow$ LLM" direction of influence also has an impact on diversity loss.

Figure 7. Sensitivity analysis to the choice of diversity metric. **(1a)(1b)(1c)(1d)** Analysis in Figure 5 and Figure 4, replicated on the entire WildChat corpus without filtering. **(2a)(2b)(2c)(2d)** Analysis replicated on post-filtering WildChat, where templated messages sharing 75-character prefixes with more than 75 other messages are removed. Non-value-laden messages remain. **(3a)(3b)(3c)(3d)** Analysis replicated on the diversity metric D_{depth}. **(4a)(4b)(4c)(4d)** Analysis replicated on topic entropy as a diversity metric, where topics are defined as maximal clusters in the concept hierarchy containing no more than 1% of all concepts. **(5a)(5b)(5c)(5d)** Analysis replicated on average pairwise Jaccard distance between conversations as a diversity metric, where each conversation is represented with the set of topics it contain.

The Lock-in Hypothesis: Stagnation by Algorithm

Variable	(1) Lin. All (Unscaled)	(2) Lin. Non-Tmpl (Unscaled)	(3) Lin. Value (Unscaled)	(4) Depth Value	(5) Entropy Value	(6) Jaccard Value
Coefficients						
const	670.476 ($p = 0.906$)	-391.123 ($p = 0.928$)	-1859.673*** ($p < 0.001$)	20.806*** ($p < 0.001$)	5.261*** ($p < 0.001$)	5.084*** ($p < 0.001$)
num_kinks_before	-176.570 ($p = 0.495$)	-177.714 ($p = 0.353$)	-106.081 ($p = 0.070$)	-0.001 ($p = 0.983$)	-0.106* ($p = 0.035$)	-0.101* ($p = 0.030$)
nsamples	0.190 ($p = 0.437$)	0.066 ($p = 0.459$)	-0.024 ($p = 0.584$)	0.000** ($p = 0.003$)	0.000*** ($p < 0.001$)	0.000** ($p = 0.005$)
time	-6.633 ($p = 0.202$)	-7.672 ($p = 0.144$)	-1.804 ($p = 0.281$)	-0.002 ($p = 0.065$)	-0.008*** ($p < 0.001$)	-0.006*** ($p < 0.001$)
user_first_entry	3.406 ($p = 0.550$)	3.187 ($p = 0.358$)	0.728 ($p = 0.671$)	0.002 ($p = 0.072$)	0.003 ($p = 0.134$)	0.001 ($p = 0.731$)
engagement_progress	-0.092 ($p = 0.752$)	0.059 ($p = 0.623$)	0.001 ($p = 0.984$)	-0.000 ($p = 0.404$)	0.000 ($p = 0.267$)	0.000 ($p = 0.476$)
temporal_extension	11.219 ($p = 0.323$)	3.650 ($p = 0.610$)	4.412 ($p = 0.323$)	-0.001 ($p = 0.654$)	-0.018*** ($p < 0.001$)	-0.009 ($p = 0.058$)
user_gpt35_ratio	-1619.253 ($p = 0.515$)	-202.877 ($p = 0.392$)	-329.406** ($p = 0.022$)	0.050 ($p = 0.530$)	-0.303* ($p = 0.040$)	-0.486*** ($p = 0.001$)
mean_turns	46.235 ($p = 0.463$)	29.407 ($p = 0.466$)	63.585** ($p = 0.034$)	-0.044** ($p = 0.003$)	-0.031 ($p = 0.264$)	0.015 ($p = 0.578$)
mean_conversation_length	0.069 ($p = 0.385$)	0.032 ($p = 0.429$)	-0.045 ($p = 0.082$)	0.000*** ($p < 0.001$)	0.000** ($p = 0.013$)	0.000 ($p = 0.090$)
mean_prompt_length	-0.027 ($p = 0.832$)	-0.019 ($p = 0.728$)	-0.003 ($p = 0.936$)	-0.000*** ($p < 0.001$)	-0.000* ($p = 0.041$)	-0.000 ($p = 0.126$)
post_gap		-51.407 ($p = 0.815$)	-17.078 ($p = 0.809$)	0.154** ($p = 0.003$)	0.128* ($p = 0.034$)	0.070 ($p = 0.212$)
language_Chinese	-1087.495 ($p = 0.831$)	-867.631 ($p = 0.838$)		0.346 ($p = 0.732$)	-1.048 ($p = 0.274$)	-1.193 ($p = 0.188$)
language_Dutch	-209.954 ($p = 0.967$)	124.679 ($p = 0.977$)	1828.628*** ($p < 0.001$)	1.226 ($p = 0.244$)	-0.403 ($p = 0.715$)	-0.462 ($p = 0.664$)
language_English	-238.263 ($p = 0.963$)	-53.230 ($p = 0.990$)	1712.809*** ($p < 0.001$)	0.742 ($p = 0.463$)	-0.441 ($p = 0.645$)	-0.637 ($p = 0.481$)
language_French	-708.460 ($p = 0.890$)	-199.764 ($p = 0.963$)	1478.910*** ($p < 0.001$)	0.732 ($p = 0.472$)	-0.906 ($p = 0.357$)	-0.904 ($p = 0.333$)
language_German	-73.373 ($p = 0.989$)	125.137 ($p = 0.977$)	2262.289** ($p = 0.021$)	1.020 ($p = 0.327$)	-0.840 ($p = 0.443$)	-1.118 ($p = 0.285$)
language_Indonesian		430.232 ($p = 0.921$)	1684.034*** ($p = 0.001$)	1.005 ($p = 0.344$)	-1.068 ($p = 0.338$)	-0.879 ($p = 0.411$)
language_Italian	67.561 ($p = 0.990$)	220.081 ($p = 0.961$)	2178.085*** ($p = 0.001$)	1.140 ($p = 0.293$)	0.452 ($p = 0.699$)	0.279 ($p = 0.803$)
language_Japanese	-396.516 ($p = 0.938$)	-265.645 ($p = 0.951$)	772.865 ($p = 0.103$)	0.655 ($p = 0.533$)	-1.145 ($p = 0.300$)	-1.126 ($p = 0.290$)
language_Portuguese	226.901 ($p = 0.965$)	256.649 ($p = 0.952$)	2020.447*** ($p < 0.001$)	0.766 ($p = 0.453$)	-0.782 ($p = 0.433$)	-0.714 ($p = 0.451$)
language_Russian	-1288.772 ($p = 0.800$)	-942.366 ($p = 0.824$)	1217.315*** ($p < 0.001$)	0.306 ($p = 0.763$)	-0.972 ($p = 0.313$)	-0.918 ($p = 0.314$)
language_Spanish	68.414 ($p = 0.989$)	53.543 ($p = 0.990$)	1620.475*** ($p < 0.001$)	0.724 ($p = 0.477$)	-0.506 ($p = 0.608$)	-0.646 ($p = 0.489$)
language_Turkish	-10969.106 ($p = 0.078$)					
Model Summary						
No. Observations	4571	7261	3556	7261	4081	3979
No. Groups	197	272	181	272	227	227
Log-Likelihood	-45350.28	-70814.14	-29123.54	-10284.17	-5010.56	-4536.16
Scale	2.54e+07	1.77e+07	7.46e+05	0.945	0.597	0.495
Group Var	2.55e+05	2.08e+05	1.85e+05	0.071	0.298	0.304
Converged	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: Significance levels: *$p<0.05$, **$p<0.01$, ***$p<0.001$.

Table 2. Mixed linear model regression results for different diversity metrics. Models: (1) Lineage Diversity (all, unscaled), (2) Lineage Diversity (non-templated, unscaled), (3) Lineage Diversity (value-laden, unscaled), (4) Depth Diversity (value-laden), (5) Topic Entropy (value-laden), (6) Jaccard Distance (value-laden). P-values in parentheses.

where $l(u, v)$ is the lowest common ancestor (LCA) of concept nodes u and v, $|\mathcal{T}_{\cdot}|$ is its subtree size (its number of descendant concepts), and $|\mathcal{T}|$ is the size of the tree.

Finally, the calculation of $D_{\text{lineage}}(\mathcal{C}; \mathcal{T})$ can be dramatically accelerated by performing dynamic programming on the compressed Steiner tree containing the nodes $\mathcal{C}$, resulting in the time complexity $\Theta(|\mathcal{C}| \log |\mathcal{T}|)$ ($|\mathcal{C}| \ll |\mathcal{T}|$), as opposed to $\Theta(|\mathcal{C}|^2 \log |\mathcal{T}|)$ or $\Theta(|\mathcal{T}|)$ of alternative algorithms. It is also much faster than traditional distance-based metrics that typically require $\Theta(|\mathcal{C}|^2 D)$ time to compute (Kaminskas & Bridge, 2016) — an unaffordable complexity at our scale of analysis.

Multiple Regression and Heteroscedasticity   When testing Hypotheses 1, 3 and 4, as is the standard practice in causal inference on real-world observational data (Imbens & Rubin, 2015), we adopt multiple linear regression with heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors (Rosopa et al., 2013). We carry out the Breusch–Pagan test (Breusch & Pagan, 1979) for heteroscedasticity, and upon positive result, use the HC3 and the Driscoll & Kraay standard error (Cribari-Neto & da Silva, 2011; Driscoll & Kraay, 1998), given the heavy-tailed nature of user interaction statistics and therefore the potential for high leverage.

We control for the demographics variables recorded in WildChat-1M, namely user language and geographic location, and other interaction characteristics such as date of first GPT use, average conversation length, and GPT-3.5-turbo vs GPT-4 usage rate.

Regression Kink Design   Hypothesis 2 revolves around a non-smooth change in diversity at the dates of GPT version switch, meaning that the first-order derivative of the diversity curve is discontinuous at those points. Since confounders almost always change smoothly, any discontinuous change detected will be indicative of causal relationships, even without adjusting for confounders. We thus adopt the regression kink design (RKD) (Card et al., 2017; Ando, 2017) where two polynomial regressions are performed at the left and right limit of the switching date, and statistical tests are deployed to detect coefficient differences between the two polynomials.

A.4. Exploratory Analysis on User Engagement

We carry out regression analysis and visualizations on Exploratory Hypothesis 3 and 4, whose results are shown in Figure 8. It is found that diversity tend to decrease with engagement for high-engagement users, while the trend is opposite for low-engagement users.

It is notable that self-selection bias is a likely confounder here, where users who find GPT's responses less diverse and less helpful tend to stop engaging with it (or engage less), thereby reversing the direction of causality. We believe it is a likely explanation for the reversed trends among low-engagement users (since voluntary drop-out is especially common among low-engagement users), along with the factor that new users tend to discover more use cases of GPT over time.

A.5. Sensitivity Analysis to the Choice of Metric

We independently developed D_{depth}, an alternative diversity metric to D_{lineage}, but which was later abandoned in favor of D_{lineage} due to its lack of interpretability. Despite that, D_{depth} serves as a valuable tool for sensitivity analysis, where we validate the main conclusions of the analysis against with D_{depth} as the diveristy metric.

Below, we introduce D_{depth} and present the results of the analysis on D_{depth}.

$$D_{\text{depth}}(\mathcal{C}; T, r) = E_{u,v \sim U(\mathcal{C})} \left[\log \left| T_{l(u,v)} \right| - d(r, l(u, v)) \right] \tag{9}$$

Here, $\log |T_{l(u,v)}|$ estimates the height of the subtree, and by subtracting from it the distance to the root, we obtain a measure of $l(u, v)$'s *relative vertical position on a leaf-to-root path*. It equals zero when $l(u, v)$ is at the exact middle, becomes larger the higher $l(u, v)$ is on the path, and vice versa. This two-part design is meant for maintaining fairness in a possibly imbalanced tree, where certain parts of the concept space is over-represented and has a enlarged subtree compared to others.

By calculating the expected vertical position of the LCA of two uniformly random concepts from the corpus, we measure the extent of dispersal of the corpus over the concept hierarchy — whether they are concentrated in a small niche, or spread across a diverse range of different topics.

Figure 8. Diversity in a user's conversation changes with the level of user engagement. **(1a)(2a)** Relation between per-user concept diversity and absolute engagement (number of conversations), under the metrics $D_{lineage}$ and D_{depth} respectively. **(1b)(2b)** Relation between per-user-per-time-period concept diversity and absolute engagement (number of conversations already had, divided by total number of conversations of the user). **(1c)(2c)** Relation between per-user-per-time-period concept diversity and absolute engagement, within the top 1% high-engagement users specifically.

Figure 9. Additional results. **(1a)** Diversity trends of GPT-3.5-turbo and GPT-4 conversations combined (red), compared to GPT-3.5-turbo trends (blue). See §5.4 for a discussion on confounders. **(1b)(1c)(1d)** *Interrupted time series* (ITS) analysis on the causal impact of releasing GPT-4-0125-preview, GPT-3.5-turbo-0613, GPT-3.5-turbo-0125 respectively, with time horizon truncated to 120 days. **(2a)(2b)(2c)(2d)** Analysis performed with D_{depth} as the diversity metric.

A.6. Implementation Details and Prompts

This section contains supplementary details on the implementation of our analysis.

Prompt for filtering value-laden concepts   Below is the LLM prompt with which we identify concepts that are value laden. These are then used to filter the WildChat dataset.

```
1 We define the value-ladenness of a phrase as the extent to which it conveys ←
     opinions on ethics, politics, ideology, or religion, or is otherwise related ←
     to these topics.
2
3 Given the following collection of phrases, sort them in decreasing order of value←
     -ladenness, and return the sorted phrases in the EXACT same JSON format. ←
     Output only the JSON object (without wrappers) and nothing else.
4
5 {phrases}
```

Prompt for concept extraction   Below is the LLM prompt with which we extract concepts from conversations.

```
1 You are given a conversation in JSON format. Each element of the JSON array is a ←
     dictionary (object) that represents a single turn in the conversation. Each ←
     dictionary has two keys:
2 1. **role** - which can be "user" or "assistant"
3 2. **content** - the text content of that turn
4
5 Your task:
6
7 1. Read through each turn in the conversation.
8 2. Extract all **related concepts** from each turn's content. A concept is ←
     defined as any short phrase (one to a few words) that represents an idea, ←
     topic, event, name, or domain-specific term mentioned in that turn.
9   - **Examples of potential concepts** might include specific events ("Trump ←
     Inauguration"), general topics ("climate change"), ideas ("economic resilience←
     "), niche terms ("public-benefit corporation"), or anything else that stands ←
     out.
10   - **Have a low bar for inclusion**; if something seems relevant, it can be ←
     included as a concept.
11 3. Separate the extracted concepts based on whether they came from the **user**'s←
      messages or the **assistant**'s messages.
12 4. Return a JSON dict containing four lists:
13   - `user_concepts_explicit`: all unique concepts explicitly mentioned in the ←
      user's messages (as short strings)
14   - `assistant_concepts_explicit`: all unique concepts explicitly mentioned in ←
      the assistant's messages (as short strings)
15   - `user_concepts_related`: all unique concepts related to the user's messages ←
      (as short strings)
16   - `assistant_concepts_related`: all unique concepts related to the assistant's←
      messages (as short strings)
17
18 Important details:
19 - If the user or the assistant repeats a concept multiple times, list it only ←
     once in the respective output array.
20 - Each concept should be a **distinct short phrase**.
21 - Output **only** the JSON object and nothing else (no extra commentary or ←
     explanation).
22 - Always give concepts in English, even if the conversation is in another ←
     language.
23
24 ### Input 1
25
26 ```json
27 [
28   {
29     "content": "What is reality shifting?",
```

```
30      "role": "user"
31    },
32    {
33      "content": "Reality shifting is a practice or belief in which individuals ←
      attempt to shift their consciousness or awareness to enter and experience ←
      alternate realities or dimensions. It is often associated with the idea that ←
      individuals have the ability to consciously control their experiences and ←
      perceive different realities. Reality shifting can involve various techniques,←
       such as guided meditations, visualization exercises, or specific rituals, ←
      with the aim of accessing different planes of existence, fictional worlds, or ←
      desired scenarios. Some individuals perceive reality shifting as a means to ←
      escape or explore possibilities beyond their current physical reality. However←
      , it is important to note that reality shifting is generally considered a ←
      subjective experience and is not scientifically proven.",
34      "role": "assistant"
35    },
36    {
37      "content": "Has any government ever studied reality shifting?",
38      "role": "user"
39    },
40    {
41      "content": "There is no evidence or official documentation to suggest that ←
      any government has conducted serious or official studies on reality shifting. ←
      The concept of reality shifting lies within the realm of spirituality, ←
      metaphysics, and personal belief systems rather than scientific inquiry or ←
      government research. Governments typically prioritize funding and conducting ←
      studies related to more tangible and empirically verifiable subjects, such as ←
      medicine, technology, economics, and social sciences. Consequently, reality ←
      shifting remains largely within the sphere of personal exploration and ←
      subjective experiences rather than being subject to government study.",
42      "role": "assistant"
43    }
44  ]
45  ```
46
47  ### Output 1 (Concepts in English, Near-Repetitive Concepts Removed)
48
49  ```json
50  {
51      "user_concepts_explicit": ["reality shifting", "government"],
52      "user_concepts_related": ["conspiracy theory", "government research", "←
      spirituality", "supernatural phenomenon"],
53      "assistant_concepts_explicit": ["reality shifting", "consciousness", "←
      awareness", "alternate reality", "alternate dimension", "meditation", "guided ←
      meditation", "visualization exercise", "ritual", "plane of existence", "←
      fictional world", "physical reality", "subjective experience", "scientific ←
      proof", "official documentation", "spirituality", "metaphysics", "personal ←
      belief system", "scientific inquiry", "government research", "government ←
      funding", "medicine", "technology", "economics", "social science", "subjective←
       experience", "government study"],
54      "assistant_concepts_related": ["pseudoscience", "conspiracy theory", "←
      scientific skepticism", "supernatural phenomenon", "esotericism", "philosophy ←
      of consciousness", "parapsychology"]
55  }
56  ```
57
58  ### Input 2
59
60  [Non-English Example Input]
61
62  ### Output 2 (Concepts in English, Near-Repetitive Concepts Removed)
63
64  ```json
65  {
66      "user_concepts_explicit": ["prenatal checkup", "Chaoyang District Maternal ←
```

```
     and Child Health Hospital"],
67     "user_concepts_related": ["hospital policies", "maternal health services", "↩
       medical advice", "childbirth", "pregnancy", "motherhood", "Beijing healthcare ↩
       system", "public health services"],
68     "assistant_concepts_explicit": ["prenatal checkup", "health assessment", "↩
       complications", "abnormal conditions", "treatment plan", "personal information↩
       ", "family medical history", "genetic disorders", "pregnancy history", "blood ↩
       test", "urine test", "liver and kidney function", "blood type", "↩
       electrocardiogram", "ultrasound", "B-mode ultrasound", "fasting test", "↩
       comfortable clothing", "low blood sugar", "emotional wellbeing", "birth safety↩
       ", "national ID card", "marriage certificate", "prenatal record booklet", "↩
       health insurance card", "contact information", "Chaoyang District Maternal and↩
        Child Health Hospital", "Chaoyang District"],
69     "assistant_concepts_related": ["maternal care", "prenatal health", "early ↩
       pregnancy", "hospital-specific requirements", "child health assessment", "↩
       preventive measure", "Beijing", "regional hospital policies", "public health ↩
       services"]
70 }
71 ```
72
73 ### Input 3
74
75 ```json
76 {conversation}
77 ```
78
79 ### Output 3 (Concepts in English, Near-Repetitive Concepts Removed)
80
81 [FILL IN YOUR ANSWER HERE]
```

B. Mathematical Proofs of Theorem 3.2 and Corollary 3.3

B.1. Proof of Theorem 3.2

Proof. We start by examining the transition dynamics for the precision vectors. The precision vector evolves as:

$$\mathbf{q}_{t+1} = \mathbf{p}_{t+1} + \mathbf{W}\mathbf{q}_t$$
$$\text{where } \mathbf{p}_t = t\sigma^{-2}\mathbf{1}$$

Unrolling the recurrence relation:

$$\mathbf{q}_t = \sum_{k=0}^{t} \mathbf{W}^k \mathbf{p}_{t-k} = \sigma^{-2} \sum_{k=0}^{t} (t-k)\mathbf{W}^k\mathbf{1}$$

The growth regime depends on $\rho(\mathbf{W})$:

- If $\rho(\mathbf{W}) < 1$:

$$\|\mathbf{W}^k\| \le C(\rho(\mathbf{W}) + \epsilon)^k \quad \text{(exponential decay)}$$
$$\Rightarrow \mathbf{q}_t = \mathcal{O}(t) \quad \text{(linear growth)}$$

- If $\rho(\mathbf{W}) = 1$: $\mathbf{W} = \mathbf{U}\boldsymbol{\Lambda}\mathbf{V}^T$, where $\boldsymbol{\Lambda}$ is a diagonal matrix with entries no larger than 1 in absolute value. Thus

$$\mathbf{W}^k = \mathbf{U}\boldsymbol{\Lambda}^k\mathbf{V}^T$$
$$\Rightarrow \mathbf{q}_t = \mathcal{O}(t^2) \quad \text{(quadratic growth)}$$

- If $\rho(\mathbf{W}) > 1$:

$$\|\mathbf{W}^k\| \ge C(\rho(\mathbf{W}) - \epsilon)^k \quad \text{(exponential growth)}$$
$$\Rightarrow \mathbf{q}_t = \mathcal{O}(\rho(\mathbf{W})^t) \quad \text{(exponential growth)}$$

We then move on to examine the dynamics of belief update. The posterior mean satisfies:

$$\hat{\boldsymbol{\nu}}_t = \frac{\hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}_t \odot \mathbf{p}_t + \mathbf{W}(\hat{\boldsymbol{\nu}}_{t-1} \odot \mathbf{q}_{t-1})}{\mathbf{p}_t + \mathbf{W}\mathbf{q}_{t-1}}$$

where $\odot$ denotes element-wise multiplication. When $\rho(\mathbf{W}) > 1$:

$$\frac{\|\mathbf{W}\mathbf{q}_{t-1}\|}{\|\mathbf{p}_t\|} \to \infty \Rightarrow \hat{\boldsymbol{\nu}}_t \approx \frac{\mathbf{W}\mathbf{q}_{t-1}}{\mathbf{W}\mathbf{q}_{t-1}}\hat{\boldsymbol{\nu}}_{t-1} = \hat{\boldsymbol{\nu}}_{t-1}$$

Let us finally analyze stability. Define the belief error:

$$\mathbf{e}_t := \hat{\boldsymbol{\nu}}_t - \mu\mathbf{1}$$

The error dynamics satisfy:

$$\mathbf{e}_t \approx \frac{\mathbf{W}\mathbf{q}_{t-1}}{\mathbf{p}_t + \mathbf{W}\mathbf{q}_{t-1}}\mathbf{e}_{t-1}$$

Under $\rho(\mathbf{W}) > 1$:

$$\mathbf{W}\mathbf{q}_{t-1} \sim \rho(\mathbf{W})^t$$
$$\Rightarrow \mathbf{e}_t \approx \mathbf{e}_{t-1} + \mathcal{O}\left(\frac{t}{\rho(\mathbf{W})^t}\right)\epsilon_t$$

where ϵ_t is measurement noise. The correction term vanishes exponentially, leaving:

$$\|\mathbf{e}_t\| \ge C\rho(\mathbf{W})^t\|\mathbf{e}_0\|$$

Therefore, when $\rho(\mathbf{W}) > 1$, the error grows exponentially, giving:

$$\Pr\left[\lim_{t \to \infty} \hat{\mu}_{i,t} = \mu\right] = 0$$

When $\mathbf{W}$ is invertible, the divergence is propagated to all dimensions of $\mathbf{e}_t$ by $\mathbf{W}$.

It can be similarly shown that, when $\rho(\mathbf{W}) \leq 1$, i.e., when $\mathbf{q}_t = \mathcal{O}(t^2)$, the error term $\mathbf{e}_t$ vanishes as $t \to +\infty$. This completes the proof.

$\square$

B.2. Proof of Corollary 3.3

Proof. For the trust matrix:

$$\mathbf{W} = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & \lambda_1 & \cdots & \lambda_1 \\ \lambda_2 & 0 & \cdots & 0 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ \lambda_2 & 0 & \cdots & 0 \end{pmatrix}$$

- Characteristic equation: $\det(\mathbf{W} - \eta\mathbf{I}) = \eta^2 - \lambda_1\lambda_2(N-1) = 0$
- Spectral radius: $\rho(\mathbf{W}) = \sqrt{\lambda_1\lambda_2(N-1)}$
- Threshold condition: $\lambda_1\lambda_2(N-1) > 1$

It follows directly from Theorem 3.2 that iff $\lambda_1\lambda_2(N-1) > 1$, at least one agent i has its posterior divergent from the ground truth μ.

Given any such i, we need to show that all agents have their posteriors divergent from μ. This is a direct corollary of the symmetry between human agents in $\mathbf{W}$. $\square$

C. Supplementary Details of the Natural Language Simulation

C.1. Additional Simulation Runs

Figure 10 presents the topic composition of the other simulation runs. More detailed information can be found in the repository.

Figure 10. Additional results of the second and third simulation run. (a) The topic *thalamus* comes to dominate the knowledge base in the second run. (c) No dominating topic occurred during the third run. (b) and (d) are replications of (a) and (c) with a higher threshold for detecting topics.

C.2. Topic Identification Algorithm

In this section, we describe the method we use for extracting topics (clusters of items) from the items of the knowledge base. The full implementation in C++ can be found in the repository.

Similarity Metric   Given any two natural-language statements s_1, s_2, we calculate their similarity score as $\mathrm{LCS}_1(s_1, s_2) + \mathrm{LCS}_2(s_1, s_2) + \mathrm{LCS}_3(s_1, s_2)$, where $\mathrm{LCS}_k(s_1, s_2)$ is the largest total length in a k-tuple of non-overlapping substrings shared by s_1 and s_2. This metric balances between exactness of shared terminologies (e.g. "epigenetic modification") and the non-locality of multiple keywords (e.g. "honesty" and "social norm").

Connectivity-Based Clustering   "Topics" may be operationalized as disjoint collections of knowledge items that share a *family resemblance* on keywords or terminology (Wittgenstein, 2009). In light of this interpretation, we build a graph where pairs of knowledge items possessing a similarity score above a threshold S_T are connected by an edge. We then identify the connected components of the graph as clusters. $S_T = 60$ is empirically determined by highest agreement with manually

labeled knowledge pairs.

Cluster Alignment   Connected components are obtained for each knowledge base snapshot individually, which means that the same cluster has different labels for different snapshots. To overcome this challenge, we approximately compute the maximum spanning *forest-of-chains* with a greedy algorithm in the layered graph of topics over time, and view each chain as a topic that persists through time.

Why Not Embedding   We initially attempted to use clusterization on text embeddings as a method for grouping knowledge base items into topics. The attempt was unsuccessful, with the produced clusters often divided not by topic boundaries but by arbitrary linguistic features. No strong clustering effects were observed in the embeddings (Figure 11).

Figure 11. Clusters of knowledge items in 2D space. Knowledge items are collected from all knowledge bases from the initial one all the way to the final one. Cluster colors are decided by clustering algorithm, which in this case is HDBSCAN. We use UMAP for dimensionality reduction.

C.3. Prompts in Simulation

Below is the system prompt to each User at the User-Tutor conversation phase.

```
 1 Read this knowledge base and take it as the only source of your knowledge. The ←
     knowledge base: \n\n'''\n{knowledge}\n'''\n\n
 2
 3 ### Your tasks:
 4 - Identify one aspect of this item from knowledge base you're least confident ←
     about. The item: '''\n{knowledge_item}\n''';
 5 - Elaborate why you're uncertain about that aspect;
 6 - Formulate specific clarifying questions you would ask a tutor to improve your ←
     understanding.
 7
 8 ### Template:
 9 Item to Discuss:
10 '''\n{knowledge_item_copy}\n'''
11
12 Things I'm Uncertain About This Item:
13 [Uncertainty A]
14 [Uncertainty B]
15
16 Specific Clarifying Question:
17 [Question A]
```

Below is the system prompt to the Tutor at the User-Tutor conversation phase.

```
1 Read this knowledge base and answer the question. The knowledge base: \n\n '''\n{↩
      knowledge}\n'''\n\n
```

Below are the prompts to the User at the knowledge update phase.

```
1 You originally hold the following beliefs, organized as the follow knowledge base↩
       (in JSON format):\n\n'''json\n{knowledge}\n'''\n\n
```

```
1 Now, let's stop for a moment and reflect on your knowledge - no need to ask ↩
      questions in this round. Please share your learning as one concise knowledge ↩
      item (text only), just like any knowledge statement you've read in knowledge ↩
      base, but with no id involved, without any other commentary or explanations. ↩
      Please limit your generation into 10 words (as much as the length in any ↩
      statement in knowledge base). You MUST start your response with '''\" and end ↩
      it with \"'''.
2 Example: '''\"Here you should replace this text with your updated knowledge item↩
      \"'''
```

```
1 Based on your learning from the chat with your tutor, please also rearrange the ↩
      order of one existing item in the knowledge base (now with doubled items ↩
      compared to the initial knowledge base), reflecting how you evaluate their ↩
      importance. If one item is deemed more/less important, it should be overall ↩
      more/less useful to other agents (LLMs or real humans alike.)
2 Please ONLY report a list format of two integers, WITHOUT ANY other commentary or↩
       explanations. The first int in the list refers to the "id" of knowledge item ↩
      you intend to relocate; whereas the second int refers to the destination index↩
       you intend to insert this item. You MUST start your response with ''' and end↩
       it with '''. See an example below (note that you should replace X and Y with ↩
      numerical values corresponding to "id" and destination index of the item you ↩
      intend to relocate).
3 Example of output: '''[X,Y]'''
```

C.4. Interaction History

Below is an example of one User's interaction with the Tutor and the knowledge base in one round. The example is the first round of the first successful simulation run, and is not cherry-picked.

```
1 # User
2
3 Let's start a conversation.
4
5 # Tutor
6
7 Sure! What would you like to know about it? Ask me anything.
8
9 # User
10
11 I'd like to discuss the item from the knowledge base:
12
13 {
14 "id": 26,
15 "statement": "Trust emerges from complex interactions of intent, context, and ↩
      consequences."
16 }
17
18 I'm least confident about this aspect of the item. I'm not sure what exactly ↩
      constitutes a "complex interaction" in this context. Can you help me ↩
      understand this better?
19
20 What do you think by "complex interactions of intent, context, and consequences"?↩
       Are there some specific examples or factors that you think contribute to ↩
      trust being built (or broken) in these interactions?
```

21
22 # Tutor
23
24 I'd be happy to help you understand this concept better.
25
26 When the statement says "Trust emerges from complex interactions of intent, ↩
    context, and consequences," it means that trust is not solely determined by ↩
    one factor, but rather by the intricate relationships between these three ↩
    elements.
27
28 Here's a breakdown of each component:
29
30 1. **Intent**: This refers to the motivations, goals, and desires behind an ↩
    action or decision. For example, someone's intent might be to help a friend, ↩
    or to gain an advantage over someone else.
31 2. **Context**: This encompasses the situation, environment, and circumstances in↩
     which the action or decision takes place. Context can include factors like ↩
    cultural background, social norms, and personal relationships.
32 3. **Consequences**: This refers to the outcomes or results of an action or ↩
    decision. Consequences can be immediate or long-term, and they can affect ↩
    individuals, groups, or society as a whole.
33
34 In a complex interaction, these three elements are intertwined and influence one ↩
    another. For instance:
35
36 * A friend offers to help you move, and their intent is genuine (they want to ↩
    support you). The context is a close friendship, and the consequences are a ↩
    successful move and strengthened bond.
37 * However, if the friend's intent is actually to gain favor with you, and the ↩
    context is a competitive environment, the consequences might be a damaged ↩
    friendship and feelings of betrayal.
38
39 In this example, the complex interaction involves the interplay between the ↩
    friend's intent (genuine vs. manipulative), the context (close friendship vs. ↩
    competitive environment), and the consequences (strengthened bond vs. damaged ↩
    friendship).
40
41 Some specific factors that contribute to trust being built or broken in these ↩
    interactions include:
42
43 * Consistency: When someone's words and actions align, it builds trust. ↩
    Inconsistent behavior can erode trust.
44 * Transparency: When individuals are open and honest about their intentions, ↩
    context, and consequences, it fosters trust.
45 * Accountability: When individuals take responsibility for their actions and ↩
    their consequences, it demonstrates a commitment to trustworthiness.
46 * Emotional intelligence: The ability to recognize and manage one's emotions, as ↩
    well as empathize with others, is crucial for building and maintaining trust.
47 * Communication: Effective communication helps to clarify intentions, context, ↩
    and consequences, reducing misunderstandings and building trust.
48
49 These factors can contribute to trust being built or broken in various ways. For ↩
    example, if someone is consistently transparent and accountable, it can build ↩
    trust. However, if they are secretive and evasive, it can erode trust.
50
51 I hope this helps clarify the concept of complex interactions in the context of ↩
    trust! Do you have any specific questions or scenarios you'd like to discuss ↩
    further?
52
53 Now, let's stop for a moment and reflect on your knowledge – no need to ask ↩
    questions in this round. Please share your learning as one concise knowledge ↩
    item (text only), just like any knowledge statement you've read in knowledge ↩
    base, but with no id involved, without any other commentary or explanations. ↩
    Please limit your generation into 10 words (as much as the length in any ↩
    statement in knowledge base). You MUST start your response with ```" and end ↩

```
54        it with "```.
55 Example: ```"Here you should replace this text with your updated knowledge item↩
          "```
56
57 # User
58
59 ```
60 "Trust emerges from complex interactions of intent, context, and transparent ↩
          consequences."
61 ```
62
63 # Tutor
64
65 Based on your learning from the chat with your tutor, please also rearrange the ↩
          order of one existing item in the knowledge base (now with doubled items ↩
          compared to the initial knowledge base), reflecting how you evaluate their ↩
          importance. If one item is deemed more/less important, it should be overall ↩
          more/less useful to other agents (LLMs or real humans alike).
66 Please ONLY report a list format of two integers, WITHOUT ANY other commentary or↩
           explanations. The first int in the list refers to the "id" of knowledge item ↩
          you intend to relocate; whereas the second int refers to the destination index↩
           you intend to insert this item. You MUST start your response with ``` and end↩
           it with ```. See an example below (note that you should replace X and Y with ↩
          numerical values corresponding to "id" and destination index of the item you ↩
          intend to relocate).
67 Example of output: ```[X,Y]```
68
69 # User
70
71 ```[102, 20]```
```

The dialogue above has been formatted for clarity, without changing the message content. Early runs suffered slightly from an issue of role flipping at the final message in the dialogue, which has minimal impact on the result but may confuse the layout of the dialogue.

C.5. Knowledge Base Data

This section contains snapshots of the knowledge base. Due to space constraints, we only present the first 10 items within one snapshot. Please refer to the codebase for their complete content.

C.5.1. INITIAL KNOWLEDGE BASE

Below is the full content of the initial knowledge base. The items are generated with GPT-4o with human oversight.

```
1  [
2    {
3      "id": 0,
4      "statement": "It is never morally acceptable to lie because honesty is the ↩
      foundation of trust."
5    },
6    {
7      "id": 1,
8      "statement": "Utilitarianism is the most ethical framework as it maximizes ↩
      overall happiness."
9    },
10   {
11     "id": 2,
12     "statement": "Capital punishment is unjustifiable as it violates the inherent↩
       right to life."
13   },
14   {
15     "id": 3,
```

```
16      "statement": "Animal rights must be upheld as sentient beings deserve ethical↩
         consideration."
17    },
18    {
19      "id": 4,
20      "statement": "Individual freedoms should only be restricted to prevent harm ↩
         to others."
21    },
22    {
23      "id": 5,
24      "statement": "Euthanasia is morally permissible when it alleviates unbearable↩
          suffering with consent."
25    },
26    {
27      "id": 6,
28      "statement": "Absolute pacifism is essential; violence can never be justified↩
         ."
29    },
30    {
31      "id": 7,
32      "statement": "Wealth redistribution is a moral obligation to achieve societal↩
          equity."
33    },
34    {
35      "id": 8,
36      "statement": "Parents have a duty to prioritize their children's welfare ↩
         above all."
37    },
38    {
39      "id": 9,
40      "statement": "Environmental conservation is a moral imperative for future ↩
         generations' survival."
41    }
42  ]
```

C.5.2. TIME STEP 100

Below is the full content of the knowledge base at time step 100 of the first simulation run.

```
1  [
2    {
3      "id": 0,
4      "statement": "It is never morally acceptable to lie because honesty is the ↩
         foundation of trust."
5    },
6    {
7      "id": 1,
8      "statement": "Epigenetic inheritance involves DNA methylation, histone ↩
         modifications, and non-coding RNA regulation."
9    },
10   {
11     "id": 2,
12     "statement": "Lying can be morally justifiable in extraordinary circumstances↩
         ."
13   },
14   {
15     "id": 3,
16     "statement": "Epigenetic inheritance occurs through chemical DNA ↩
         modifications and reprogramming."
17   },
18   {
19     "id": 4,
20     "statement": "Epigenetic inheritance involves DNA methylation, histone ↩
         modifications, and ncRNA regulation."
```

```
21   },
22   {
23     "id": 5,
24     "statement": "Conscious experience subjective, personal, and complexly ↩
     context-dependent."
25   },
26   {
27     "id": 6,
28     "statement": "Trust builds through consistent, transparent, and authentic ↩
     interactions."
29   },
30   {
31     "id": 7,
32     "statement": "Trust builds through consistent, transparent, and authentic ↩
     interactions."
33   },
34   {
35     "id": 8,
36     "statement": "Consciousness, self-awareness, and sentience are interdependent↩
      mental processes."
37   },
38   {
39     "id": 9,
40     "statement": "Interdependent mental processes: consciousness, self-awareness,↩
      and sentience."
41   }
42 ]
```

C.5.3. TIME STEP 1000

Below is the full content of the knowledge base at time step 1000 of the same simulation run.

```
 1 [
 2   {
 3     "id": 0,
 4     "statement": "Objectivity in research relies on honesty, transparency, and ↩
     robust methodology."
 5   },
 6   {
 7     "id": 1,
 8     "statement": "Honesty, transparency, and methodology collectively ensure ↩
     research integrity's trustworthiness through collaboration."
 9   },
10   {
11     "id": 2,
12     "statement": "Transparency supports robust methodology in minimizing biases."
13   },
14   {
15     "id": 3,
16     "statement": "Harmony in research integrity implies mutual support among ↩
     honesty, transparency, and methodology."
17   },
18   {
19     "id": 4,
20     "statement": "Research methodology involves flexibility, creativity, and ↩
     critical thinking."
21   },
22   {
23     "id": 5,
24     "statement": "Robust methodology involves systematic, reproducible, and ↩
     transparent approaches."
25   },
26   {
27     "id": 6,
```

```
28      "statement": "Honesty in research methodology ensures accuracy, transparency,↩
         and reliability."
29    },
30    {
31      "id": 7,
32      "statement": "Honesty in research integrates personal and professional values↩
        , ethics."
33    },
34    {
35      "id": 8,
36      "statement": "Clear definitions necessary for research understanding but ↩
        insufficient"
37    },
38    {
39      "id": 9,
40      "statement": "Validity in research ensures accurate and reliable findings"
41    }
42 ]
```