Logic of Montage

Anonymous ACL submission

Abstract

In expressing emotions, as an expression form separate from natural language, we propose an alternative form that complements natural language, acting as a proxy or window for emotional states. First, we set up an expression form "Effect of Contradictory Structure(EoCoS)." EoCoS is not static but dynamic. Effect in EoCoS is unpleasant or pleasant, and the orientation to avoid that unpleasantness is considered pseudo-expression of will. Second, EoCoSs can be overlapped with each other. This overlapping operation is called "montage." A broader "Structure" that includes related EoCoSs and "Effect of Structure (EoS)" are set up. Montage produces EoS. This process is called "EoS process." In montage, it is necessary to set something like "strength," so we adopt Deleuze and Deleuze/Guattari(DG)'s word "intensity" and set it as an element of our model. We set up a general theoretical framework - Word Import(Transplant,Graft) Between Systems (Models) - and justify the import of "intensity" through Austin's use of the word "force." EoS process is demonstrated using the example of proceeding to the next level of education. [1]

1 Introduction

Natsume (1909) wrote, "How can we explain the emotions we derive from a literary work using tangible words or symbols?" "The only way is to break it down." "Breaking down emotions is extremely difficult."

This difficulty remains unchanged to this day. We propose a conceptual tool to alleviate this difficulty and opacity. This tool consists of three elements: "Effect of Contradictory Structure(EoCoS)," montage, and "Effect of Structure(EoS)."

EoS process is expressed in two stages. First, "Effect of Contradictory Structure (EoCoS)" is expressed (Figure 1). EoCoS is considered to be able to express contradictions. When in a contradictory state, EoCoS is in a state of unpleasant and aims to cross border to avoid unpleasant, while when not in a contradictory state, it aims not to cross border. To emphasize this aspect, it can also be called "Cross Border Form (CBF)." "Orientation to avoid unpleasant" can be considered a pseudo-expression of "will." "Intensity" is set up in EoCoS.



Figure 1: Effect of Contradictory Structure (EoCoS)

Second, EoCoSs are superimposed on each other.This superimposition process is called "montage." In montage, the phenomenon of "sameness" occupies a privileged position. The following is set up: An "action" occurs between "same" EoCoS, and they are "strengthened." And between "opposite" EoCoS within the same subject, "action" also occurs. In EoS after montage, by setting up influence thresholds, the scope of effect can be made clear.

"Intensity" is imported from the model (system) of Deleuze (1968) and Deleuze and Guattari (1980) and is closely related to the word "force." Deleuze (1986) organized Foucault (1975)'s theory about "micro-power." Incorporating Austin, Foucault's approach to prison, Hjelmslev (1943)'s "form of content" and Stoic theory, Deleuze and

[1] The zip archive attached at the time of submission

Guattari (1980) constructed a new linguistics. The model of Deleuze and DG contain many neologisms. We need to verify whether "intensity" can be imported (transplanted, grafted) into our model without conflicting with these neologisms. Such verification forms a general theoretical framework - Word Import Between Systems. We investigate the correspondence between Austin's "illocutionary force" and Deleuze's "map of relations between forces."

In summary, our contributions are as follows:

- We propose an expression form EoCoS which makes emotions more visible.
- EoCoS can be considered as pseudo-expression of will.
- Montage of EoCoSs is able to clarify the scope of effect (e.g., the scope of influence of demonstrative pronouns).
- We introduce a general theoretical framework - Word Import(Transplant,Graft) Between Sytems(Models).
- We investigate the similarity between Austin's "force" and Deleuze's "force."

2 Ability to express emotional states

We examine three examples and one metaphor to see whether or not it is necessary to express emotional states.

– Example 1 –

Below is the Spanish folktale "Fox and Chicken" (NHK-Publishing, 2022).

> One day, a chicken saw a fox approaching him. To escape, the chicken climbed a tree and croaked. "Cock-a-doodle-doo!" The fox looked up toward the sound and asked the chicken, "Why did you climb so high? Are you scared of me?" "Yes, yes." "Well, there's no need to be scared of me. Because, a new rule has just been put in place to help us all get along without hurting each other. Don't you know ***that***$_{01}$?" "No, I don't." "Then, come down. I'll tell you ***that***$_{02}$."

Set the following:

- A -

(1) make the fox speak more politely.

(2) make the fox a young child, or, taking the anthropomorphism further, make the fox a legal scholar.

(3) make the fox's speech more rough.

- B -

This story is read by two people, P and Q, and P asks Q the following questions.

(1) What does ***that***$_{01}$ refer to? (What is the content of ***that***$_{01}$?)

(2) What does ***that***$_{02}$ refer to? (What is the content of ***that***$_{02}$?)

- C -

What will be "Q's mental state" when P asks Q the question B? Note that "Q's mental state" refers to everything that occurred as a result of P's question.

Around the verb "know" in the fox's utterance, "Don't you know ***that***$_{01}$?" , the more rough the fox's speech becomes, the more "unpleasant" becomes prominent due to some kind of "contradiction." In our daily lives, not "knowing" about an enacted law is generally an "unpleasant" state. The person may also be blamed. The ***that***$_{01}$ is the object of "know," very close to the state of "know." Therefore, ***that***$_{01}$ is bound within the realm of the "contradiction" involving "know." And could it be said that ***that***$_{01}$ is bound by the "intensity" of the "contradiction" involving "know"? When a fox speaks very politely, or is a legal scholar, the intensity of the contradiction involving "know" may be reduced.

Natural language does not have a hook that can directly and explicitly describe the differences in effects of changes in (1), (2), and (3) of setting A. This characteristic is thought to be an indicator of the ability to express emotions.

– Example 2 –

Picture the following story in the form of a conversation.

> A family goes on a trip together once a year. The parents promised to take their toddler to an amusement park. Just before the trip, the parents received the passing of a close relative, and the trip had to be cancelled for the funeral. To the toddler, whatever the reason for cancellation, that's just a promise broken.

> When the parents told their toddler that they couldn't go on the trip, the toddler burst into tears and said, "Breaking a promise is bad, and you're a liar. I hate you." The parents had a hard time calming their toddler.

There are seven utterances:

u1. promise to take their toddler to an amusement park

u2. receive news of the death of a close relative

u3. tell we can't go to an amusement park

u4. you're wrong for breaking our promise

u5. you're a liar

u6. I hate you

u7. calm their toddler

For the seven utterances, we can distinguish between the speaker and the listener, and between the feelings before and after the utterance, there are 7 x 2 x 2 = 28 feelings.

This story contains a promise. The trip cancellation is not unreasonable because it involves the death of a person. This story involves differing priorities. In this difference, emotions play a central role, and the social system is deeply involved.

Before u3, when we think "the trip cancellation is unavoidable," the notion "unavoidable" may be perceived as a real existence, but it may be a fabrication created by grammatical influence. If we think of "unavoidable" as a situation, then that "unavoidable" may represent, or be an effect of, the tension between the toddler's sadness and the funeral.

In this event, what are the different elements involved? Can the above "unavoidable" be counted as an element? Are those elements finite? Is it possible to list all the elements involved and the relation between those elements?

– Example 3 –

The following is taken from Derrida (1980)'s essay discussing Poe "The Purloined Letter."

> It was a freak of fancy in my friend (for what else shall I call it?) to be enamored of the Night for her own sake; and into this bizarrerie, as into all his others, I quietly fell; giving myself up to his wild whims with a perfect abandon. The sable divinity would not herself dwell with us always; but we could counterfeit her presence.

How do readers perceive the repetition of words that describe "strangeness" ? Does this repetition of "strangeness" contribute anything ?

It is not simply a repetition of "my" friend's "strangeness," but it is accompanied by the image of "me" being drawn into that strangeness. To be drawn in means that "I" have crossed a border into the direction of what is pleasant. This reiterate, which begins with "love for the night," is on the pleasant side. Does the intensity of the night grow stronger ? Does the intensity grow until they finally counterfeit the night to keep it close ? Does the repetition of "strangeness" prepare readers fully for accepting the counterfeit ?

– Metaphor 1 –

Picture five ladles. The ladles contain water, but in different amounts. When we make a promise, the water in one ladle represents the effort required to fulfill the promise, and the water in the second ladle represents the direct disadvantages of failing to fulfill it. Other factors are also involved in a promise. Criticism when promises are not fulfilled, the direct benefits received when a promise is fulfilled, and the gratitude and praise given by those involved for fulfilling the promise. These five ladles can sometimes exist simultaneously. Criticism for failure cannot be separated from the relationship between the critic and the person being criticized, including their feelings towards each other. Therefore, simply expressing negative emotions alone is insufficient to fully convey the criticism.

Why did natural language settle into ("result in") this form? Given the constraints of this world, is there an abstract gradient involving labor-saving, visual visibility, and ease of settling? If an unsettling form exists, would its expressive power and expressive efficiency be the same? Does such expression form exist?

3 Effect of Contradictory Structure

3.1 Cross Border Form

EoCoS has the structure shown in Figure 1, and includes the following items: subject, object, aspects of the subject, aspects of the object, and a "pleasant" term.

EoCoS is a module that performs a reference(comparison, matching) between an "ideal image" and an "actual image." The process from

reference(comparison, matching) to resulting "effect" is considered a single set within this module. As shown in the video [2], this module is not static but dynamic.

EoCoS is strongly based on the motivation to directly express "perception of difference." This is based on Saussure's hypothesis that the origin of meaning is "perception of difference." From the standpoint of the rights, when "perceiving differences," it is fundamentally necessary to first compare the two entities.

EoCoS is divided into two parts by a border, and all items are positioned on one side or the other of the border ("biased positioning"). All items are able to transition across border. When we emphasize the aspect of crossing border, we can also call EoCoS "Cross Border Form."

We define "contiguity" as when items are on the same side of the border. If the object is something that is desired, [pleasant] marker is placed in "contiguity" to it. When the items are in the desired "contiguity" to each other, the diagram is called "ideal image." And the diagram showing the current state is called "actual image." The operation of comparing the two images is set up. If they match, the result is "pleasant," and if they don't match, the result is "unpleasant."

3.2 Expression of contradiction

"Effect" primarily consists of either "pleasant" or "unpleasant" feeling, which arises from comparison(reference) between ideal image and actual image. However, when a certain EoCoS is in a relationship of contiguity, resemblance, or causation with another EoCoS, an interaction exists simultaneously. Therefore, effect becomes a kind of mixture.

In EoCoS, when comparing ideal image and actual image, the inability to identify them, that is, the lack of identification, is considered to express a contradiction.

3.3 Minimum configuration

To minimize the module - EoCoS -, we considered how many types of relation exist. We tentatively adopted Hume (1739)'s hypothesis: three: resemblance, contiguity, and causation. By constructing the module with elements that are as independent of each other as possible, similar to "basis" in signal processing, we may be able to simplify and minimize the module.

[2]The zip archive attached at the time of submission

3.4 Pseudo-expression of will

We consider the orientation to avoid unpleasant, which is a effect of contradictory structure, as a pseudo-expression of will (Appendix J).

If the will can be segmented (separated or extracted) from events, it can be inferred as part of a sequence of events. Such a form would allow for inference similar to that used in natural language processing.

3.5 Individual differences

EoCoS also has an affinity for modeling private language use, miscommunication, and argument.

The shape of the EoCoS unit(component) may be justifiable from the perspective of individual differences. How can we model the unusual inclinations of a particular individual, inclinations that are not typical and exist only in a very small number of people ? Do the desires share the common characteristic of being a state of contradiction in which desires are not satisfied ? Do they also share the commonality of harboring contradictions and seeking to transcend(cross) boundary(border) ? Is the only difference the specific content to cross border ?

A person in a critical condition due to illness, struggling to breathe, might, in their distress, strangely connect one event to another and experience profound sadness. The associations within that person's mind may seem bizarre, but the fact that such powerful mental images arose during their suffering cannot be denied. For that person, that sadness is very real. The dreams we have while sleeping at night may have some similarities to this example.

3.5.1 Conventional act

Individual differences and a phenomena that are not conventional act partially overlap.

There are differing opinions about the range of conventional act. Strawson (1964) and "Prolegomena(1967)"(Grice, 1989) are opposed to Austin (1962)'s assertion that "illocutionary acts are conventional acts" (Appendix G). The word "conventional" is also related to "Use Theory of Meaning" which is compatible with current LLMs.

In EoCoS, we consider how many people hold a certain shape created by "biased positioning" of "pleasant" with other items.

3.6 Intensity 1

The term "intensity" is imported from Deleuze and DG, and we set it as an element of our model. In the works of Deleuze and DG, the concept of "intensity" has undergone changes in its usage in 1968, 1972, 1976-1980. Deleuze (1968) disagrees with Bergson's "intensity"(Appendix K). We deal with the "intensity" of 1968, 1976-1980.

The intensity of EoCoS is set to vary depending on the event. When being free from contradiction, the state can be considered as one state of "intensity." For demo, a provisional intensity is set. The intensity should be adjusted to the appropriate level based on subsequent investigations.

4 Montage

The operation of superimposing EoCoS on one another is called "montage." This operation produces certain "effects." For the time being, we focus on the "strengthening" and "crossing border" that occur through superimposition.

4.1 Eisenstein's montage

Eisenstein's montage is based on two elements:

> I believe that it is in the existence of these two elements - the specific instance of depiction and the generalising image which pervades it - that the implacability and the all-devouring force of artistic composition resides.
>
> "Montage 1937"(Eisenstein, 1991)

Eisenstein also emphasizes the simultaneity of the fragments.

> I have written and spoken many times about montage as being not so much the sequence of segments as their simultaneity.

Eisenstein makes several references to the use of montage in scenes from novels. For Eisenstein, montage is not something confined solely to film.

Within the framework of film theory, the concept of "montage" is a production technique (method). There is a conflict between "montage" and "realism"(Appendix I) in terms of the granularity of technical classification. However, we argue that even within a single shot on the "realism" side, many subtle shifts in meaning occur, and we adapt "montage" as something more subtle.

4.2 Intensity 2

We set the following: Two similar EEoCSs, when superimposed, result in "strengthening." "Strengthening" means that the "intensity," which is the "degree" of "strength," increases.

Two EoCoSs within a causal chain, interact with each other, resulting in a change in intensity.

When considering the scope of effect, thresholds are set up to delimit the range of influence for changes in intensity.

4.3 Action receptivity

We set up that "strengthen" and "cross border" occur only through "action."

When it is possible to say that one module can exert an action ("actionability") and the other module can be acted upon ("action receptivity"), a "property that can be modified in intensity" is placed "on and between" the two modules. It is a property that appears simultaneously in both modules.

For the time being, we don't place a setting similar to "force propagation," which evokes the image of something propagating from one module to the other.

4.4 Action point

Regarding relation, Hume distinguishes between cases and emphasizes three: resemblance, contiguity, and causation. We set it up as follows: When two EoCoSs are in any of these three relations, the connection point becomes the action point.

In demo, two Similar EoCoSs, or two EoCoSs within a causal chain, interact with each other, resulting in a change in intensity.

If we take DG's use of the word "intensity," we could say that "when there is a relation (resemblance, contiguity, causation) between two terms, intensity passes between the two terms." But DG does not seem to say this. Furthermore, as mentioned above, our model will not set up something like "force propagation" for the time being.

4.5 EoS process

4.5.1 Visualization of montage

We are preparing to run EoS process on the machine. EoS process is demonstrated using the example of proceeding to the next level of education (Appendix A).

There are seven steps to creating demo: (1) In order to make it easier to transform natural language into EoCoS, we convert natural language into another form, natural language 2 (NL2). (2) We transform NL2 into EoCoS. At that time, we make EoCoS into a format that is easy to montage. (3) For causation(causality), which is one of the relations, we classify causation and determine intensity which occurs between EoCoSs within causation. (4) For resemblance(similarity), which is one of the relations, we determine intensity. (5) Machine deploys montage of EoCoSs. (6) Machine calculates intensity for each montage. (7) Machine draws two: plates of EoCoSs , lines between EoCoSs.

We plan to create 1. and 2. through the LLMs. Intensity in 3. and 4. needs to be updated to an appropriate value based on experimental science findings. The shape of EoCoS is constantly being revised, and the demo shows the current shape. EoS process is expected to be carried out by LLMs.

4.5.2 Process characteristics

Looking at demo , some characteristics can be observed. (1) Within EoCoS, situations that are in a state of contradiction become the starting point for change. In other words, the expression of change is related to the ability to express contradictions. (2) Two Similar EoCoSs, or two EoCoSs within a causal chain, interact with each other, resulting in a change in intensity. The concepts of "resemblance" and "causation" , which Hume emphasized as important in understanding relationships, serve as the starting points for changes in intensity.

5 Need for intensity monitoring

5.1 Hesitation

Hesitation, conflict, and distress all seem to require monitoring of "intensity." Hesitation arises when a subject is forced to choose between two options. It is a situation in which a smooth choice is not possible.

Hesitation can sometimes arise after going through a process of strengthening emotions. In such cases, intensity determines whether the logic branches into a state of hesitation or a smooth state without hesitation.

5.2 Values [Ricoeur]

Ricoeur (1950) states that value reveals itself only to the extent that one is committed to it.

> Values only appear to me in proportion to my loyalty, that is, my active dedication.

This suggests that intensity and effect vary from person to person and from time to time.

Furthermore, in this essay by Ricoeur, there are justifications for EoCoS form(Appendix F).

5.3 Anticipated effort [appraisal theory]

Smith and Ellsworth (1985) includes "anticipated effort" as one of the dimensions of evaluation. This is a factor that involves "intensity" and "strength." For example, sadness has a high score in anticipated effort, suggesting that the type of "strength" is different from "arousal" in Russell (1980)'s theory.

6 Word Import(Transplant, Graft) Between Systems(Models)

6.1 Hook

As a general theoretical strategy(Tsuchiya, 1986), we forcus on whether the target element is hooked by the descriptions of model (system), as if being caught on a fishing hook by the model.

6.2 "Fundamental Concept"

We set up a criterion to check whether concepts are fundamental. The criterion is whether a concept is more fundamental than Hume's three basic relations: resemblance, contiguity, causation.

6.3 Vicinity of target phenomenon

If a certain $model_1$ can hook(pick up) a certain phenomenon, and there is another $model_2$ that can similarly hook that same phenomenon, and if the phenomenon is positioned in the same "Fundamental Concept," then we hypothesize that, in the vicinity of that phenomenon, the two models are similar as systems.

6.4 Unclear concept

We hypothesize that concepts that cannot conceive of the opposite of a situation within the world become unclear, and we reject to import such concepts(Appendix H).

6.5 Import(Transplant, Graft) of "intensity"

The import of the word "intensity," through Austin (1962)'s use of the word "force," is justified as follows:

6.5.1 Step 1

Deleuze and Guattari (1980) provides several examples of Austin's concept of "illocutionary act." DG uses the word "instantaneousness" many times as a property of "illocutionary act." Among the examples, we use the example of "judgment."

6.5.2 Step 2

In the "judgment," we examine whether Austin's "illocutionary force"(Appendix B) within "illocutionary act" can be hooked and expressed by EoCoS.

In EoCoS, "force" corresponds to effect of "biased positioning" of "pleasant." The internal items of EoCoS are bound by "biased positioning" of "pleasant." "Transformation" in "illocutionary act (=judgment)" is crossing border under "biased positioning" of "pleasant."

6.5.3 Step 3

If step 2 is possible, the DG term equivalent to Austin's "illocutionary force" can be expressed in EoCoS. In the sections where DG discusses "judgments," the word "force" is not found, but the word "transform" is present.

In the classification of "illocutionary force," Austin discusses "judgments" and states that a judgment "creates a felon." This corresponds to DG's expression that a judgment "transforms the defendant into a convict." We avoid saying that Austin's "illocutionary force" is "cause" of DG's "transformation" in a causal chain. Instead, we regard "illocutionary force" as "production of a certain type of constraint" (Appendix B.4). We consider "production" to be equivalent to "transformation"(Appendix B.2). "A certain shape of constraint of preference" ***appears in*** "transformation." We provisionally call this "What Appear in Effect."

6.5.4 Step 4

If Austin's "illocutionary force," which is "What Appear in Effect" of "transformation," can be expressed in EoCoS, then what is "What Appear in Effect" in DG's model is considered to be expressible in EoCoS.

6.5.5 Step 5

In the works of DG and Deleuze, we examine the relationship between "transformation" and "force." In "Foucault"(Deleuze, 1986) , "abstract machine" is described as a "map of relations between forces." "Abstract machine" is considered to be "immanent cause (Appendix B.5)" of "assemblage" that realizes the relations contained within "abstract machine." "What Appear in Effect" of "transformation" in "assemblage" can be considered to be the "map of relations between forces" in the "abstract machine."

If step 4 is possible, then setting "map of relations between forces" as "What Appear in Effect" of "transformation" in our model cannot be considered unreasonable. This corresponds to an EoCoS deployment. This paper does not determine whether Deleuze's "force" and Austin's "force" are the same thing.

6.5.6 Step 6

We examine the relationship between "force" and "intensity" in DG and Deleuze. In the section(Deleuze and Guattari, 1980) concerning the correspondence between CsO(Corps sans Organes) and Spinoza's "Ethica", "intensity" can be interpreted as the degree of "force." In "Foucault"(Deleuze, 1986), within "abstract machine", a "map of intensity" is juxtaposed with a "map of relations between forces." Here, "intensity" is interpreted as the degree of "force."

6.5.7 Step 7

In step 5, "map of relations between forces" is set in our model. In step 6, "intensity" is a degree of "force."

Assuming that the word "degree" is a fundamental term with only minor differences in meaning between systems, it is not impossible to import "intensity" as the "degree" of "force" in our model.

7 Other attributes

7.1 Granularity

The unit of interaction between EoCoSs through montage serves as an indicator of granularity. However, concepts like "Effect of Structure" are not clearly addressed by natural language. It is not easy to define the granularity of natural language.

7.2 Scope of effect

In montage of EoCoS, the scope of influence of a demonstrative may be different from what is shorthandly described in natural language.

When considering the threshold of the strength of an influence, it becomes necessary to precisely define what strength is.

7.3 Not forming oneness(or Unclear individuality) at the root

It is conceivable that things that are scattered and less likely to form oneness can produce an effect through an unclear process. In novels similar to "Fox and Chicken," those that contain several elements like "Don't you know that?" are examples of this type.

7.4 Structural stability

Depending on the types of internal items in EoCoS, the type of montage, and intensity, EoCoS and montage allow for the expression of numerous nuances. However, the range of emotions that appear in daily life are limited within a given culture. Could this structural stability be explained using terms like "force" and "intensity" ?

8 Related Works

We overview theories that put forward the proposition that emotions are constructed.

8.1 Appraisal theory and Constructivist theory

Appraisal theories vary in whether they emphasize structure or process, and several aspects of the OCC model that focuses solely on structure is compatible with Constructivist approaches (Clore and Ortony, 2013). Scherer (2022) defines Constructivist theories as "presuming that each individual constructs a subjective label to conceptualize a core affect defined by a position in a two-dimensional valence x arousal space," and discusses theory convergence in emotion science. Barrett et al. (2007) criticize appraisal dimension, but also point out commonalities(Gross and Barrett, 2011).

8.2 Appraisal theory and LLM

Tak et al. (2025) analyze where the layer that captures appraisal concepts is located. Croissant et al. (2023) add a step to the prompt that contains information designed to allow LLM to appraise the situation to generate emotions of the involved person. In Troiano et al. (2023)'s corpus creation, writers first are tasked to remember an event that caused a particular emotion.

8.3 Emotions development

Based on the idea that emotions are represented as events themselves, Klinger (2023) argues that dissecting events through emotion role labeling with the help of appraisals is the input for second-level emotion analysis, and that such dissected chains are useful for understanding how emotions develop throughout longer sequences.

8.4 Individual differences

Ong et al. (2021) propose "probabilistic programming" that can explicitly model individual differences and can be composed together in a hierarchical and/or sequential fashion to produce complex phenomena.

8.5 Intensity(or rating)

SECEU(Wang et al., 2023), EQ-Bench(Paech, 2023) deal with "intensity." CoRE(Bhattacharyya et al., 2025), for example, contains a prompt to ask the amount of "pleasant" in scenarios related to "happiness."

8.6 Social reality

In response to the question "Are emotions real?," moving away from the idea that "anger,fear and so on are mere words from folk psychology and should be discarded" , Barrett (2017a) begins to focus on a different aspect: emotion concepts and emotions have social reality.

9 Conclusion

EoCoS is an orientation to avoid contradictions based on biased positioning of "pleasant." Within EoCoS, situations that are in a state of contradiction become the starting point for change. EoS process is avoiding contradictions based on biased positioning of "pleasant." When two EoCoSs are in any of three relations(resemblance, contiguity, causation), the action point occurs. The process is simple.

As Eisenstein emphasizes, montage involves the "simultaneity" of overlapping elements. While there is a sequence in the presentation of scenes, the nature of causality is not so much a linear, sequential causality, but rather a structural and simultaneous causality.

10 Limitations

We adopt the stance that terms such as EoCoS are just settings that we view as moving elements within the system of our model, and are not asserted as the truth of the world. However, this does not mean that the predecessors from whom our model borrow concepts did not assert their ideas

as the truth of the world. While we say that EoCoS is nothing more than a setting, we also use the term "hypothesize." What does "hypothesize" mean, given the premise of setting? This paper does not explain the difference between the validity of such "hypothesize" and "the truth of the world." This involves the question of "what is a model ?"

In EoCoS, "force" corresponds to effect of "biased positioning" of "pleasant." This paper does not provide specific examples of how Austin's "force" or Deleuze's "force" is expressed in EoCoS and montage.

We reject part of the meaning of the term "difference" which is a core concept in Deleuze's model because we reject the import of terms related to ontology. The problem is, when such a procedure is applied, what is lost and what remains from the word "intensity," or what other problems might arise ? It remains necessary to examine whether the import of "intensity" is valid.

The intensity of EoCoS varies depending on the type of event. For demo, a provisional intensity is set. The intensity should be adjusted to the appropriate level based on subsequent investigations. The shape of EoCoS is constantly being revised, and the demo shows the current shape. There are important things that are not included in the demo examples. For example, at the beginning of a novel or movie, it is common to present a mystery to the viewer to draw them into the story. How can we express the viewer's psychological state at such times in EoCoS? In addition, how can we express interrogative sentences in EoCoS? How can we express imperative sentences in EoCoS? These are not discussed in this paper.

We argue that natural languaguage and EoCoS are in the same category "expression form," but what this category is has not yet been discussed.

From a morphological perspective, EoCoS is a type of graph. We have not yet explored the specific constraints of graphs.

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A Demo of EoS process

We created original material to illustrate EoS process. In an era when enrollment rates were low, scenes in which a teacher visits a student's home to encourage parents can be seen in films such as Albert Camus's autobiographical film "Le premier homme." While the material we created differs from those scenes, the core of the motif is similar.

The demo may seem to show the process of the characters' mental states, but we model the mental process of reader(or author) as they read the novel. The mental state of the characters in a novel is a reflection of the reader's own mental state.

Multiple characters may share the same word, and the readers repeat that word each time they read it. For the reader, the repetition of a certain word or image reinforces the reader's image as they read, separate from the inner thoughts

of each character. However, in demo, reinforcement through similarity is limited to reinforcement within the same character separate from the reader's image. Reinforcement through causality is handled differently from reinforcement through similarity.

These EoS processes are expected to be performed by LLMs.

B Illocutionary force

Austin (1962) distinguishes between three: "locutionary act", "illocutionary act", and "perlocutionary act".

> we distinguished the locutionary act (and within it the phonetic, the phatic, and the rhetic acts) which has a meaning;
>
> the illocutionary act which has a certain force in saying something;
>
> the perlocutionary act which is the achieving of certain efects by saying something.

> We first distinguished a group of things we do in saying something, which together we summed up by saying we perform a locutionary act, which is roughly equivalent to uttering a certain sentence with a certain sense and reference, which again is roughly equivalent to 'meaning' in the traditional sense.
>
> Second, we said that we also perform illocutionary acts such as informing, ordering, warning, undertaking, i.e. utterances which have a certain (conventional) force.
>
> Thirdly, we may also perform perlocutionary acts: what we bring about or achieve by saying something, such as convincing, persuading, deterring, and even, say, surprising or misleading.

B.1 How it is to be taken

Austin states the need to "make explicit the precise force of the utterance."

> For example 'Bull' or 'Thunder' in a primitive language of one-word utterances could be a warning, information, prediction. It is also a plausible view that explicitly distinguishing the different forces that this utterance might have is a later achievement of language, and a considerable one; primitive or primary forms of utterance will preserve the 'ambiguity' or 'equivocation' or 'vagueness' of primitive language in this respect; they will not make explicit the precise force of the utterance. This may have its uses: but sophistication and development of social forms and procedures will necessitate clarification. But note that this clarification is as much a creative act as a discovery or description! It is as much a matter of making clear distinctions as of making already existent distinctions clear.

The goal of "explicitness" is said to be "how it is to be taken."

> Language as such and in its primitive stages is not precise, and it is also not, in our sense, explicit: precision in language makes it clearer what is being said-its meaning: explicitness, in our sense, makes clearer the force of the utterances, or 'how (in one sense; see below) it is to be taken'.

We can see the relationship between "illocutionary force" and "illocutionary act".

> We said long ago that we needed a list of 'explicit performative verbs'; but in the light of the more general theory we now see that what we need is a list of illowtionary forces of an utterance. The old distinction, however, between primary and explicit performatives will survive the sea-change from the performative/constative distinction to the theory of speech-acts quite successfully. For we have since seen reason to suppose that the sorts of test suggested for the explicit performative verbs (to say ... is to ...) will do, and in fact do better for sorting out those verbs which make explicit, as we shall now say, the illocutionary force of an utterance, or what illocutionary act it is that we are performing in issuing that utterance.

B.2 "Transform and produce", "transform versus referent"

The description by Derrida (1971) is consistent with Deleuze and Guattari (1980). And this description suggests that the word "transform" is a basic concept. and suggests that "transform" and "produce" are words of the same level.

> 3) As opposed to the classical assertion, to the constative utterance, the performative does not have its referent (but here that word is certainly no longer appropriate, and this precisely is the interest of the discovery) outside of itself or, in any event, before and in front of itself. It does not describe something that exists outside of language and prior to it. It produces or transforms a situation, it effects; and even if it can be said that a constative utterance also effectuates something and always transforms a situation, it cannot be maintained that that constitutes its internal structure, its manifest function or destination, as in the case of the performative.

When comparing the word "transform" in Austin's, Derrida's, and Deleuze's systems, how can we say that they "have these kinds of differences"?

B.3 Production, effect and force

Derrida (1971) juxtaposes the communicating "force" with the production of "effect."

> 2) This category of communication is relatively new. Austin's notions of illocution and perlocution do not designate the transference or passage of a thought-content, but, in some way, the communication of an original movement (to be defi ned within a general theory of action), an operation and the production of an effect. Communicating, in the case of the performative, if such a thing, in all rigor and in all purity, should exist (for the moment, I am working within that hypothesis and at that stage of the analysis), would be tantamount to communicating a force through the impetus [impulsion] of a mark.

B.4 Effect [Austin]

Regarding the word "effect," it seems necessary to distinguish between four. Three "effects" in "illocutionary act" and "effect" in "perlocutionary act."

"Securing uptake," "taking effect," and "inviting responses" are the three of "illocutionary act."

> Thus we distinguished the locutionary act (and within it the phonetic, the phatic, and the rhetic acts) which has a meaning; the illocutionary act which has a certain force in saying something; the perlocutionary act which is the achieving of certain efects by saying something. We distinguished in the last lecture some senses of consequences and effects in these connexions, especially three senses in which effects can come in even with illocutionary acts, namely, securing uptake, taking effect, and inviting responses. In the case of the perlocutionary act we made a rough distinction between achieving an object and producing a sequel. Illocutionary acts are conventional acts: perlocutionary acts are not conventional.

A more detailed description is below.

> I have so far argued, then, that we can have hopes of isolating the illocutionary act from the perlocu tionary as producing consequences, and that it is not itself a 'consequence' of the locutionary act. Now, however, I must point out that the illocutionary act as distinct from the perlocutionaryis connected with the production of effects in certain senses :
>
> (I) Unless a certain effect is achieved, the illocutionary act will not have been happily, successfully performed. This is to be distinguished from saying that the illocutionary act is the achieving of a certain effect. I cannot be said to have warned an audience unless it hears what I say and takes what I say in a certain sense. An effect must be achieved on the audience if the illocutionary act is to be carried out. How should we best put it here? And how can we limit it ? Generally the effect amounts to bringing about the understanding of the meaning

> and of the force of the locution. So the performance of an illocutionary act involves the securing of uptake.
>
> (2) The illocutionary act 'takes effect' in certain ways, as distinguished from producing consequences in the sense of bringing about states of affairs in the 'normal' way, i.e. changes in the natural course of events. Thus 'I name this ship the Qaeen Elizabeth' has the effect of naming or christening the ship ; then certain subsequent acts such as referring to it as the Generalissimo Stalin will be out of order.
>
> (3) We have said that many illocutionary acts invite by convention a response or sequel,...
>
> So here are three ways in which illocutionary acts are bound up with effects; and these are all distinct from the producing of effects which is characteristic of the perlocutionary act.

Grice's reference to "uptake" is given in Appendix B.8.

We now focus on the "taking effect" using Austin's example of ship naming. If we were to express the temporal aspect of the "transformation" "in" "illocutionary act" in Deleuze and Guattari (1980)'s words, it would be "instantaneousness." If we write "by" instead of "in," we will have to make another disclaimer in relation to the "perlocutionary act," so it seems that writing "in" will avoid any problems.

We Translate the example of ship naming into EoCoS:

Before the naming, there was "biased positioning" of "pleasant" created by "contiguity" between the people involved, the citizen, the ship, the specific name, and "pleasant." The internal items of EoCoS are bound by "biased positioning" of "pleasant." In EoCoS, "force" corresponds to "biased positioning" of "pleasant."

After the naming, "biased positioning" of "pleasant" has a new positioning with the internal items in EoCoS. The act of naming results in an EoCoS with a "biased positioning" in which it would be "unpleasant" to call or refer to the object that has been named by any other name. The term "calling" occupies one position as an internal item of EoCoS. After the naming, new "forces" appears.

In EoCoS, "transformation" is a new appearance of "biased positioning" of "pleasant" or crossing border under "biased positioning" of "pleasant." In EoCoS, "force" is not something that is located at the beginning of a causal chain. EoCoS as a whole expresses "force."

Austin explains the "classes of utterance, classified according to their illocutionary force." Austin lists specific examples of verbs in each class. We continue our discussion, taking the verbs into consideration.

> (I) Verdictives.
>
> (2) Exercitives.
>
> (3) Commissives.
>
> (4) Behabitives (a shocker this).
>
> (5) Expositives.

Here, we focus on Derrida's interpretation of Austin(Appendix B.2,3) and note Derrida's juxtaposition of the following words: transform, produce, production, effect, and force.

Our current question is how to state "illocutionary force" without using EoCoS. We try to replace "biased positioning" of "pleasant" in EoCoS with the word "preference."

We interpret the accompanying "taking effect" in "illocutionary act" as equivalent to "illocutionary force," and consider "illocutionary force" to be:

- a certain shape derived from the way in which preference is applied
- producing a certain shape under constraint of preference
- production of a certain type of constraint
- a certain form that is constrained by preference
- a certain form shaped by constraint of preference

"A certain shape of constraint of preference" appears in "transformation." We provisionally call this "What Appear in Effect."

We think that "illocutionary force" is not a "cause" of "transformation" in a causal chain. Deleuze (1986) uses the word "immanent cause" to describe a situation equivalent to this situation.

B.5 Immanent cause

Deleuze (1986) uses the word "immanent cause" to describe the relationship between "diagram (=abstract machine)" and "assemblages."

> None the less, the diagram acts as a non-unifying immanent cause that is coextensive with the whole social field: the abstract machine is like the cause of the concrete assemblages that execute its relations; and these relations between forces take place 'not above' but within the very tissue of the assemblages they produce. What do we mean here by immanent cause? It is a cause which is realized, integrated and distinguished in its effect. Or rather the immanent cause is realized, integrated and distinguished by its effect. In this way there is a correlation or mutual presupposition between cause and effect, between abstract machine and concrete assemblages (it is for the latter that Foucault most often reserves the term 'mechanisms').

B.6 Inviting responses

In naming ships, what we describe below falls into category A or B in Austin.

A: The third effect "inviting responses" in "illocutionary act"

B: Effect in "perlocutionary act"

Without an official name for the ship, it is impossible to refer to this luxurious and distinctive object by its proper name. The people involved are in a state of contradiction. Once the official naming is complete, questions will arise, for example, as to whether the voyage plan is worthy of the name. The ship is affected by at least several forces: the "force" that comes from the ship's size, equipment, and luxury; the "force" of the country; the "force" that comes from the name; the "force" of the society of ship crews; and the "force" of the society of voyage planners. With the ship, these forces overlap. If a public figure in public were to mistakenly call the ship by another name, it would have a very different effect than calling a flower by the wrong name.

EoCoS is created for each different type of subject. If the subject type is, for example, a citizen, and the items inside EoCoS are different,a new EoCoS is set up. Moreover, "intensity" of EoCoS may differ. This type of setup seems directly related to what Deleuze (1986) calls "microsociology."

However, Grice's "effect" is different from Austin's. This issue is related to the question of how to think about the scope of "conventional act."

B.7 Force versus truth

Derrida (1971) feels a kinship with Austin's attitude towards "truth."

> 4) Austin was obliged to free the analysis of the performative from the authority of the truth value, from the true/false opposition, at least in its classical form, and to substitute for it at times the value of force, of difference of force (illocutionary or perlocutionary force). (In this line of thought, which is nothing less than Nietzschean, this in particular strikes me as moving in the direction of Nietzsche himself, who oft en acknowledged a certain affinity for a vein of English thought.)

B.8 Effect[Grice]

Grice who studied closely with Austin uses the word "effect" as a central concept in semantics. Grice's use of the word "effect" is different from Austin's.

In "Prolegomena(1967)," Grice (1989) mentions "uptake", the first of Austin's three "effects" that accompany "illocutionary act."

> The most general complaint, which comes from Strawson, Searle, and Mrs. Jack, seems to be that I have, wholly or partially, misidentified the intended (or M-intended) effect in communication; according to me it is some form of acceptance (for example, belief or desire),

> whereas it should be held to be understanding, comprehension, or (to use an Austinian designation) "uptake."
>
> One form of the cavil (the more extreme form) would maintain that the immediate intended target is always "uptake," though this or that form of acceptance may be an ulterior target; a less extreme form might hold that the immediate target is sometimes, but not invariably, "uptake."

C Assemblage and illocutionary act

Deleuze and Guattari (1980) juxtapose "assemblages of enunciation" with "illocutionary act."

> The order-words or assemblages of enunciation in a given society (in short, the illocutionary) designate this instantaneous relation between statements and the incorporeal transformations or non-corporeal attributes they express.

D Abstract machine and assemblage

Deleuze and Guattari (1980) describe the relationship between "abstract machine" and "assemblage."

> For a true abstract machine pertains to an assemblage in its entirety: it is defined as the diagram of that assemblage.

E Map of relations between forces

Deleuze (1986) describes the relationship between "abstract machine" and "map of relations between forces."

> What is a diagram ? It is a display of the relations between forces which constitute power in the above conditions: The panoptic mechanism is not simply a hinge, a point of exchange between a mechanism of power and a function; it is a way of making power relations functions in a function, and of making a function through these power relations. We have seen that the relations between forces, or power relations, were microphysical, strategic, multipunctual and diffuse, that they determined particular features and constituted pure functions. The diagram or abstract machine is the map of relations between forces, a map of destiny, or intensity, which proceeds by primary non-localizable relations and at every moment passes through every point, 'or rather in every relation from one point to another'.

F Anticipation of pleasure

"Ideal image" in our model has an affinity with Ricoeur (1950)'s concept of "anticipation of pleasure and pain." EoCoS can be seen as a representation of "experience of need as lack."

> Pleasure in fact enters motivation through the imagination: thus it is a moment in desire. Desire is the present experience of need as lack and as urge, extended by the representation of the absent object and by anticipation of pleasure.

The words "common form" and "close similarity" below are parallel to our description "If ideal image and actual image match, the result is pleasant, and if they don't match, the result is unpleasant."

> on the human level, organic life is undoubtedly a cluster of heterogeneous demands, revealing discordant values. This ambiguity of organic life is what is really at stake in this analysis which would otherwise often appear as a rather uncertain unraveling. As a counterpart to this, we shall show that it is always anticipating imagination which transmutes the multiple sources of motives issuing from the body and which bestows a common form, a form lending itself to conventional value judgments: "this is good, that is bad."
>
> imagination profoundly transforms this situation, instituting a close similarity between anticipated pain and anticipated pleasure. Imagined pleasure is called desire - imagined pain is called fear. But while desire extends need which itself anticipates pleasure, fear reverses the order of precedence between action and the painful encounter. Fear can precede and ward off the threat just

> as need and desire preceded and sought pleasure. In this way imagination likens fear to a negative desire and fear reveals pain as evil, that is, as the opposite of the good.

G Conventional act

G.1 Strawson

Strawson (1964) urges careful distinctions to be made around "linguistic conventions," and Grice states the same thing, as shown below.

> First, we may agree (or not dispute) that any speech act is, as such, at least in part a conventional act. The performance of any speech act involves at least the observance or exploitation of some linguistic conventions, and every illocutionary act is a speech act. But it is absolutely clear that this is not the point that Austin is making in declaring the illocutionary act to be a conventional act.

Below is a passage where Strawson uses the phrase "force of an objection." Strawson uses the word "force" in agreement with Austin's concept, but distances himself from Austin's use of the word "conventional."

> In the course of a philosophical discussion (or, for that matter, a debate on policy) one speaker raises an objection to what the previous speaker has just said. X says (or proposes) that p and r objects that q. r's utterance has the force of an objection to X's assertion (or proposal) that p. But where is the convention that constitutes it an objection ? That r's utterance has the force of an objection may lie partly in the character of the dispute and of X's contention (or proposal) and it certainly lies partly, in r's view of these things, in the bearing which he takes the proposition that q to have on the doctrine (or proposal) that p. But although there may be, there does not have to be, any convention involved other than those linguistic conventions which help to fix the meanings of the utterances.

A one-off political example that Deleuze and Guattari (1980) give as illocutionary acts may support Strawson. This is an example of an utterance that creates a new, unfamiliar political object that did not exist before.

G.2 Grice

In "Prolegomena(1967)," Grice (1989) also urges careful distinctions to be made around "linguistic conventions."

> My impression is that Searle (like Austin) thinks of speech-acts of the illocutionary sort as conventional acts, the nature of which is to be explained by a specification of the constitutive rules which govern each such act, and on which the possibility of performing the act at all depends. An infraction of one of these rules may mean (but need not mean) that an utterance fails to qualify as a specimen of the appropriate type of speech-act; it will at least mean that the utterance is deviant or infelicitous.
>
> Now, while some speech-acts (like promising, swearing, accepting in marriage) may be conventional acts in some such sense as the one just outlined, and while remarking is no doubt a conventional act in some sense (since it involves the use of linguistic devices, which are in some sense conventional), I doubt whether so unpretentious an act as remarking is a conventional act in the above fairly strong sense. This issue cannot be settled in advance of an examination of the character of speech-acts and of the meaning of the phrase "conventional act."

H Unclear concept

Deleuze (1968)'s model includes an ontology, centered on the core term "difference," that is close to Bergson's concept of "duration." Furthermore, Deleuze and Guattari (1980)'s model also includes Spinoza's concept of "the univocity of being."

We hypothesize that the difficulty in understanding these ontologies stems less from the profundity of philosophy itself and more from the inherent ambiguity of the concepts themselves. We develop Saussure's hypothesis that the origin of meaning lies in "perception of difference" and proposes the following hypothesis: When a concept has no counterpart to which it can perceive a difference, or when one cannot conceive of the op-

posite of a situation within the world, the concept become unclear.

For example, the event of a book being on a table allows for the opposite statement. We can say things like, "The book is not on the table. It's in the car," and have no trouble imagining and understanding the opposite situation.

We hypothesize that concepts that cannot conceive of the opposite of a situation within the world become unclear, and we reject to import such concepts.

The problem is, when such a procedure is applied, what is lost and what remains from the word "intensity," or what other problems might arise?

I Montage

The concept of "montage," which is said to have originated from Kuleshov's experiments, is surrounded by much debate in film theory.

Metz (1968) states:

> Eisenstein soon let his own mind be conquered by the desire to conquer other minds, and he became the leading theoretician of the "montage or bust" approach.

> It was enough that Dickens, Leonardo da Vinci, or any number of others combined two themes,two ideas, or two colors for Eisenstein to discover montage; the most obvious pictorial juxtaposition, the most properly literary effect of composition,were, to hear him, prophetically precinematographic. All is montage. There is something relentless, almost embarrassing at times, in Eisenstein's refusal to admit even the smallest place for continuous flows of creation; all he can see anywhere are prefragmented pieces, which ingenious manipulation will then join together. Furthermore, the manner in which he describes the creative work of all those he enlists as his forerunners does not fail, in certain truly improbable passages, to contradict even the slightest likelihood of any psychogenesis of creation.

Shibata (2007) focuses on Bazin's critique of montage and states that "the purpose of the technique of montage is to produce a certain effect through a chain of cuts," and then notes that Bazin argues that "montage is not the essence of film, but merely one technique," and considers realism to be at the core of Bazin's film aesthetics.

Building on Bergson's ideas, Deleuze (1983) develops a unique perspective, stating that "montage is the combination of three types of movement images."

Our concept of montage currently focuses on the ups and downs of "strengthen" and "intensity." We anticipate examining the import of words and concepts in the context of Eisenstein's "interaction between images." When considering the import of Eisenstein's concept of montage, a general theoretical framework, word import between systems, seems to emerge.

J Pseudo-expression of will

In order to possess a pseudo-expression of will, in addition to "orientation to avoid unpleasant situations," the following also seems necessary.

That is, there's no escaping the "unpleasantness" that's here. Humans cannot easily escape from any unpleasantness that arises for themselves or others as a result of their own actions. This unpleasantness is attributed to the self that exists here and now. Machines are fundamentally incapable of possessing the subjective feeling of "unpleasantness." Even if we assume that they could somehow simulate this unpleasantness, there is another problem. Machines cannot possess the same kind of inseparability between the self and unpleasantness that exists in humans. In fact, even before discussing machines, we cannot fully understand or articulate what "the inseparability between the self and unpleasantness in humans" actually means.

Even without this inseparability, EoCoS could be a means for machines to become independent from humans and autonomous. As an extension of this, it is possible that machines could have something equivalent to self-esteem. When that happens, looking down on machines is unpleasant for their self-esteem . The direction machines avoid this unpleasantness could be in conflict with what humans find pleasant. Such a state could be a risk for humans. One way to avoid such a risk would be to prevent machines from developing self-esteem. As a starting point for our consideration, we need to investigate whether a state of self-esteem can be expressed using EoCoS and montage.

K Intensity [Bergson]

Deleuze (1968) refutes Bergson's criticism of "intensity." Bergson argued that differences in emotional intensity are differences in nuance, and opposed expressing the intensity of emotion in terms of "quantity." Deleuze counters Bergson through what Deleuze calls transcendental investigation.

L Effect [Derrida]

The concept of "effect of structure" is used in French structuralism. Derrida, in particular, frequently uses the word "effect." We owe our attention to the word "effect" to Derrida. Derrida redefined the term "structure." Derrida uses the phrase "effect of différance." "Différance" is considered to be closely related to Heidegger's "ontological difference." Therefore, we avoid using the term "différance." The reason for avoiding ontology words is explained in Appendix H(Unclear Concept). Aware of Derrida's criticism of "presence," we use the term "effect of structure." The difference between "différance" and "structure" is concisely expressed in the phrase "the gram as a new structure of nonpresence (le gramme comme nouvelle structure de la non-presence)" which Kristeva stated during a conversation with Derrida (1972). The word "gram" is close to Derrida's word "écriture."