General Matching Games

Felipe Garrido-Lucero, Rida Laraki

Abstract: Matching games is a one-to-one two sided market model introduced by Garrido-Lucero and Laraki, in which coupled agents' utilities are endogenously determined as the outcome of a strategic game. They refine the classical pairwise stability by requiring robustness to renegotiation and provide general conditions under which pairwise stable and renegotiation-proof outcomes exist as the limit of a deferred acceptance with competitions algorithm together with a renegotiation process. In this article, we extend their model to a general setting encompassing most of one-to-many matching markets and roommates models and specify two frameworks under which core stable and renegotiation-proof outcomes exist and can be efficiently computed.

External IDs:dblp:journals/corr/abs-2507-15737