Implementing the Adaptation Procedure in Misinformation Games

Merkouris Papamichail, Constantinos Varsos, Giorgos Flouris

Abstract: In this paper we consider scenarios where players interact having a possibly incorrect information regarding the interaction they participate. Building upon the recently proposed framework of misinformation games, we develop a time-discrete iterative procedure, where in each step players make their decisions according to the (possibly erroneous) information they have. Then the joint decision is revealed to anyone, alongside the payoffs it has for each player, according to actual specifications of the interaction. With this at hand, players update their information and (possibly) adapt their behaviour in the next step. We call this process the Adaptation Procedure. After the formal establishment of the Adaptation Procedure we implement this methodology using Logic Programming, and more specifically Answer Set Programming. Hence, we provide an integrated pipeline that analyses interactions where participants engulf new information and re-evaluate their behaviour.