Retrievals Can Be Detrimental: Unveiling the Backdoor Vulnerability of Retrieval-Augmented Diffusion Models

ACL ARR 2026 January Submission1778 Authors

Keywords: Backdoor Attacks, Retrieval-Augmented Diffusion Models

Abstract: Diffusion models (DMs) have recently exhibited impressive generation capability. However, their training generally requires huge computational resources and large-scale datasets. To solve these, recent studies empower DMs with Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG), yielding retrieval-augmented diffusion models (RDMs) that enhance performance with reduced parameters. Despite the success, RAG may introduce novel security issues that warrant further investigation. In this paper, we propose BadRDM, the first poisoning framework targeting RDMs, to systematically investigate their vulnerability to backdoor attacks. Our framework fully considers RAG's characteristics by manipulating the retrieved items for specific text triggers to ultimately control the generated outputs. Specifically, we first insert a tiny portion of images into the retrieval database as target toxicity surrogates. We then exploit the contrastive learning mechanism underlying retrieval models by designing a malicious variant that establishes robust shortcuts from triggers to toxicity surrogates. In addition, we introduce novel entropy-based selection and generative augmentation strategies for better toxicity surrogates. Extensive experiments on two mainstream tasks show that the proposed method achieves outstanding attack effects while preserving benign utility. Notably, BadRDM remains effective even under common defense strategies, further highlighting serious security concerns for RDMs.

Paper Type: Long

Research Area: Ethics, Bias, and Fairness

Research Area Keywords: Backdoor Attacks,Retrieval-Augmented Diffusion Models

Contribution Types: Model analysis & interpretability

Languages Studied: English

Submission Number: 1778