LEARNING TO LINEARIZE DEEP NEURAL NETWORKS FOR SECURE AND EFFICIENT PRIVATE INFERENCE

ABSTRACT

The large number of ReLU non-linearity operations in existing deep neural networks makes them ill-suited for latency-efficient private inference (PI). Existing techniques to reduce ReLU operations often involve manual effort and sacrifice significant accuracy. In this paper, we first present a novel measure of non-linearity layers' ReLU sensitivity, enabling mitigation of the time-consuming manual efforts in identifying the same. Based on this sensitivity, we then present SENet, a three-stage training method that for a given ReLU budget, automatically assigns per-layer ReLU counts, decides the ReLU locations for each layer's activation map, and trains a model with significantly fewer ReLUs to potentially yield latency and communication efficient PI. Our experimental evaluations with multiple models on various datasets show SENet's superior performance both in terms of reduced ReLUs and improved classification accuracy compared to existing alternatives. In particular, SENet can yield models that require up to $\sim 2.3\times$ fewer ReLUs while yielding similar accuracy. For a similar ReLU budget SENet can yield models with $\sim 2.83\%$ improved classification accuracy, evaluated on CIFAR-10.

1 INTRODUCTION

With the recent proliferation of several AI-driven client-server applications including image analysis Litjens et al. (2017), object detection, speech recognition Hinton et al. (2012), and voice assistance services, the demand for machine learning inference as a service (MLaaS) has grown significantly.

Simultaneously, the emergence of privacy concerns from both the users and model developers has made *private inference* (PI) an important aspect of MLaaS. In PI the service provider retains the proprietary models in the cloud where the inference is performed on the client's encrypted data (*ciphertexts*), thus preserving both model privacy Kundu et al. (2021b) and data-privacy Yin et al. (2020).

Figure 1: Comparison of various methods in accuracy vs. #ReLU trade-off plot. SENet outperforms the existing approaches with an accuracy improvement of up to $\sim 4.5\%$ for similar ReLU budget.

Existing PI methods rely on various cryptographic protocols, including homomorphic encryption (HE) Brakerski & Vaikuntanathan (2014); Gentry (2009) and additive secret sharing (ASS) Goldreich et al. (2019) for the linear operations in the convolutional and fully connected (FC) layers. For example, popular methods like Gazelle Juvekar et al. (2018), DELPHIMishra et al. (2020), and Cheetah Reagen et al. (2021) use HE while MiniONN Liu et al. (2017) and CryptoNAS Ghodsi et al. (2020) use SS. For performing the non-linear ReLU operations, the PI methods generally use Yao's Garbled Circuits (GC) Yao (1986). However, GCs demands orders of magnitude higher latency and communication than the PI of linear operations, making latency efficient PI an exceedingly difficult task. In contrast, standard inference latency is dominated by the linear operations Kundu et al. (2022b) and is significantly lower than that of PI.

This has motivated the unique problem of reducing the number of ReLU non-linearity operations to reduce the communication and latency overhead of PI. In particular, recent literature has leveraged

Table 1: Comparison between existing approaches in yielding efficient models to perform PI. Note, SENet++ can yield a model that can be switched to sub models of reduced channel sizes.

Name	Method used	Reduced non-linearity	Granularity	Reduce model dimension	Supports dynamic channel dropping
Irregular pruning	Various	✗	Scalar weight	✗	✗
Structured pruning	Various	✓	Channel, filter	✓	✗
Sphynx Cho et al. (2021)	NAS	✓	Layer-block	✗	✗
CryptoNAS Ghodsi et al. (2020)	NAS	✓	Layer-block	✗	✗
DELPHI Mishra et al. (2020)	NAS + PA	✓	Layer-block	✗	✗
SAFENet Lou et al. (2021)	NAS + PA	✓	Channel	✗	✗
DeepReDuce Jha et al. (2021)	Manual + HE	✓	Layer-block	✗	✗
SNL Cho et al. (2022)	l_1-regularized	✓	Channel, pixel	✗	✗
SENet (ours)	Automated	✓	Channel, pixel	✗	✗

neural architecture search (NAS) to optimize both the number and placement of ReLUs Ghodsi et al. (2020); Cho et al. (2021). However, these methods often cost significant accuracy drop, particularly when the ReLU budget is low. For example, with a ReLU budget of 86k, CryptoNAS costs ∼9% accuracy compared to the model with all ReLUs (AR) present. To mitigate this issue DeepReDuce Jha et al. (2021) used a careful multi-stage optimization and provided reduced accuracy drop of ∼3% at similar ReLU budgets. However, DeepReDuce heavily relies on manual effort for precise removal of ReLU layers, making this strategy exceedingly difficult, particularly, for models with many layers. A portion of these accuracy drops can be attributed to the fact that these approaches are constrained to remove ReLUs at a higher granularity of layers and channels rather than at the pixel level.

Our contributions. Our contribution is three-fold. We first empirically demonstrate the relation between a layer's sensitivity towards pruning and its associated input ReLU sensitivity. Based on our observations, we introduce SENet, an automated layer-wise ReLU sensitivity evaluation strategy and propose a three stage training process to yield secure and efficient networks for PI. In particular, for a given global ReLU budget we first determine a sensitivity-driven layer-wise non-linearity (ReLU) unit budget. Given this budget, we then present a layer-wise ReLU allocation mask search. For each layer, we train a binary mask tensor the size of the layer's activation map for which a 1 or 0 signifies the presence or absence of a ReLU unit associated to each pixel location. Finally, we use the trained mask to create a partial ReLU (PR) model with ReLU present only at fixed parts of the non-linearity layers, and fine-tune it via distillation from an iso-architecture trained AR model. Importantly, we support ReLU masks allocation both at the granularity of individual pixels and activation channels.

We further extend our approach to SENet++, allowing reduction of both the linear (MAC) and ReLU operations. SENet++ uses a single training loop to train a model of different channel dropout rates (DRs) d_r ($d_r \leq 1.0$) of the weight tensor, where each d_r yields a sub-model with a MAC-ReLU budget smaller than or same as that of the original one. In particular, we leverage the idea of ordered dropout Horvath et al. (2021) to train a PR model with multiple dropout rates Horvath et al. (2021), where each dropout rate corresponds to a scaled channel sub model having number of channels per layer $\propto$ the d_r. Table 1 compares the important characteristics of our methods with existing alternatives. In summary, the contributions are:

- Given a fixed ReLU budget, we present a one-shot ReLU allocation method driven by a notion of layer-wise ReLU sensitivity.

- We present a systematic three stage training framework that can yield models with low #ReLUs, while can preserve accuracy close to the all-ReLU baseline model.

- We extend our framework to support channel wise ReLU reduction, both at activation channel level and convolutional weight channel level.

- We conduct extensive experiments and ablations on various models including variants of ResNet, Wide Residual Networks, and VGG on CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, Tiny-ImageNet, and ImageNet datasets. Experimental results show that, compared to the existing alternatives, SENet can yield an improved accuracy of up to ∼2.83% for similar ReLU budgets, evaluated on CIFAR-10. SENet++ ($d_r = 0.5$) can further improve the MAC and ReLU cost of SENet, with additional saving of $4\times$ and ∼$2\times$, respectively.

2 PRELIMINARIES AND RELATED WORK

Cryptographic primitives. We briefly describe the relevant cryptographic primitives in this section.

Additive secret sharing. Given an element x, an ASS of x is the pair $(\langle x \rangle_1, \langle x \rangle_2) = (x - r, r)$, where r is a random element and $x = \langle x \rangle_1 + \langle x \rangle_2$. Since r is random, the value x cannot be revealed by a single share, so that the value x is hidden.

Homomorphic encryption. HE Gentry (2009) is a public key encryption scheme that supports homomorphic operations on the ciphertexts. Given a public key pk and corresponding secret key sk, an encryption function E generates the ciphertext t of a plaintext m through $t = E(m, pk)$, and a decryption function D obtains the plaintext m via $m = D(t, sk)$. In PI, the results of linear operations can be obtained homomorphically through $m_1 \circ m_2 = D(t_1 \star t_2, sk)$, where $\circ$ represents a linear operation, e.g., convolution, $\star$ is its corresponding homomorphic operation, t_1 and t_2 are the ciphertexts of m_1 and m_2, respectively.

Garbled circuits. GC Yao (1986) allows two parties to jointly compute a Boolean function f over their private inputs without revealing their inputs to each other. The Boolean function f is represented as a Boolean circuit C. One party acting as a garbler generates the encoded Boolean circuit $\tilde{C}$ and a set of labels corresponding to the inputs through the procedure $Garble(C)$. The garbler sends $\tilde{C}$ and the labels to the other party who acts as an evaluator. The evaluator obtains the output labels through the evaluation procedure $Eval(\tilde{C})$, and then sends the output labels back to the garbler. Finally, the garbler decrypts the labels to get the plain results and shares the results with the evaluator.

Private inference. In this paper, we focus on a client-server PI scenario. Here a client, holding private data, intend to use inference service from a server, holding a private model. Importantly, both intend to not reveal their data and model, respectively. While most of the prior PI model targeted a semi-honest threat model where both parties are semi-honest Mohassel & Zhang (2017); Liu et al. (2017); Juvekar et al. (2018); Mishra et al. (2020); Ghodsi et al. (2021); Reagen et al. (2021), a recent work Muse Lehmkuhl et al. (2021) enhanced the defense by defending against a malicious client. Specifically, the semi-honest parties strictly follow the protocol but try to reveal their collaborator's private data by inspecting the information they received. On the other hand, a malicious client could deviate from the protocol.

In defending against various threat models, popular PI methods Mishra et al. (2020); Ghodsi et al. (2020); Lou et al. (2021) widely adopt HE or SS for linear operations, and GC for ReLU operations. Most of the existing cryptographic inference frameworks benefit from the offline-online topology, where the cryptographic primitives irrelevant to the client's input are moved offline to shorten online latency Mohassel & Zhang (2017); Liu et al. (2017); Juvekar et al. (2018); Mishra et al. (2020); Ghodsi et al. (2021); Lehmkuhl et al. (2021). Typically, the offline-online topology moves offline the circuit garbling procedure $Garble(C)$ in GC and leaves the evaluation procedure $Eval(\tilde{C})$ online. For the linear operations, DELPHI Mishra et al. (2020) and MiniONN Liu et al. (2017) move the heavy primitives in HE and SS to offline enabling fast linear operations during PI online stage. However, the compute heavy $Eval(\tilde{C})$ stage of GC keeps the ReLU cost for PI high even at the online stage.

ReLU reduction for efficient PI. Existing works use model designing with reduced ReLU counts via either search for efficient models Mishra et al. (2020); Ghodsi et al. (2020); Lou et al. (2021); Cho et al. (2021) or manual re-design from an existing model Jha et al. (2021). In particular, DELPHI Mishra et al. (2020) uses layer-wise search and replacement of ReLUs with low cost quadratic polynomial approximation. SAFENet Lou et al. (2021), on the other hand, enables more fine-grained channel-wise substitution and mixed-precision activation approximation. CryptoNAS Ghodsi et al. (2020) re-designs the neural architectures through evolutionary NAS techniques to minimize ReLU operations. Sphynx Cho et al. (2021) further improves the search by leveraging differentiable macro-search NAS Liu et al. (2018a) in yielding efficient PI models. Finally, DeepReDuce Jha et al. (2021) yields SOTA reduced ReLU models via a manual effort of finding and dropping redundant ReLU layers starting from an existing standard model.

However, these approaches either suffer from lack of automated ReLU sensitivity evaluation incurring significant accuracy drop or require manual efforts to precisely evaluate the sensitivity, which can become exceedingly hard for deep models with many ReLU layers.

Figure 2: Layer-wise pruning sensitivity ($d = 0.1$) vs. normalized ReLU importance. The later layers are less sensitive to pruning, thus, can afford significantly more zero-valued weights as opposed to the earlier ones. On the contrary, later ReLU stages generally have more importance.

3 MOTIVATIONAL STUDY: RELATION BETWEEN RELU IMPORTANCE AND PRUNING SENSITIVITY

Existing work to find importance of a ReLU layer Jha et al. (2021), requires manual effort and is extremely time consuming. In contrast, earlier works Lee et al. (2018); Kundu et al. (2021a) leveraged various metrics to efficiently identify a layer's sensitivity towards a target pruning ratio. In particular, a layer's *pruning sensitivity* can be quantitatively defined as the accuracy reduction caused by pruning a certain ratio of parameters from it Ding et al. (2019). However, instead of iteratively computing the sensitivity sequentially, earlier literature leveraged sparse learning Ding et al. (2019); Kundu et al. (2021a) and used a trained sparse model to evaluate the sensitivity of a layer l (η_{θ^l}) as the ratio $\frac{\texttt{total \# of non-zero layer parameters}}{\texttt{total \# layer parameters}}$. We hypothesize that there maybe a correlation between a layer's pruning sensitivity Kundu et al. (2021a) and the importance of ReLU and have run to experiments to explore this approach.

Let us assume an L-layer DNN model Φ parameterized by $\boldsymbol{\Theta} \in \mathbb{R}^m$ that learns a function f_Φ, where m represents the total number of model parameters.

The goal of neural network pruning is to identify and remove the unimportant parameters from a DNN and yield a reduced parameter model that has comparable performance to the baseline unpruned model. As part of the pruning process for a given parameter density d, each parameter is associated with an auxiliary indicator variable c belonging to a mask tensor $\boldsymbol{c} \in \{0, 1\}^m$ such that only those θ remain non-zero whose corresponding $c = 1$. With these notations, we can formulate the training optimization as

$$\min \mathcal{L}(f_\Phi(\boldsymbol{\Theta} \odot \boldsymbol{c})), \text{ s.t. } ||\boldsymbol{c}||_0 \leq d \times m \tag{1}$$

Where $\mathcal{L}(.)$ represents the loss function. In general, for image classification tasks, we define $\mathcal{L}(.)$ to be the cross-entropy (CE) loss.

We used a sparse learning framework Kundu et al. (2021a) to train a ResNet18 on CIFAR-100 for a target $d = 0.1$ and computed the pruning sensitivity of each layer. In particular, as shown in Fig. 2, earlier layers have higher pruning sensitivity than later ones. This means that to achieve close to baseline performance, the model trains later layers' parameters towards zero more than those of earlier layers.

We then compared this trend with that of the importance of different ReLU layers as defined in Jha et al. (2021). In particular, for each basic block stage, we created a different ResNet18 keeping ReLUs associated with that stage while replacing all other ReLUs with identity layers, trained the network, and measured the resulting test accuracy. We performed the same operation to evaluate the accuracy with ReLU only after the first CONV layer. The ReLU stages of higher importance are those which yielded the highest accuracy. We then normalized the importance of a ReLU stage with accuracy Acc as the ratio $(\text{Acc} - \text{Acc}_{min})/(\text{Acc}_{max} - \text{Acc}_{min})$. Here Acc_{max} and Acc_{min} corresponds to the accuracy of models with all and no ReLUs, respectively.

As depicted in Figure 2, the results show that the ReLU importance and pruning sensitivity of a layer are inversely correlated. This inverse correlation may imply that a pruned layer can afford to have more zero-valued weights when the associated ReLU layer forces most of the computed activation values to zero.

4 SENET TRAINING METHODOLOGY

As highlighted earlier, for large number of ReLU layers L_r, the manual evaluation and analysis of the candidate architectures become inefficient and time consuming. Moreover, the manual assignment

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Algorithm 1: Layer-wise #ReLU Allocation Algorithm

Data: Global ReLU budget r, model parameters $\boldsymbol{\Theta}$, model parameter proxy density d,

1 number of ReLU layers L_r, active ReLU indicator $\boldsymbol{a} \in \{1\}^{L_r}$

2 **Output:** Per-layer # ReLU count.

3 $\boldsymbol{\eta_\alpha} \leftarrow$ evalActSens$(\boldsymbol{\Theta}, d)$

4 **for** $l \leftarrow 0$ **to** L_r **do**

5     $\eta_{\boldsymbol{\alpha}^l} \leftarrow \dfrac{\eta_{\boldsymbol{\alpha}^l}}{\sum_{i=0}^{L} \eta_{\boldsymbol{\alpha}^i} \times a^i}$

6 **end**

7 initVals$(r_{remain}, r_{total}, \boldsymbol{r}_{final})$

8 **while** $r_{total} < r$ **do**

9   **for** $l \leftarrow 0$ **to** L **do**

10       $r_{cur}^l \leftarrow$ assignReluProportion$(r_{remain}, \eta_{\boldsymbol{\alpha}^l}, \boldsymbol{a})$

11       $r_{final}^l, r_{total} \leftarrow$ assignUpdateRelu$(r_{final}^l, r_{cur}^l, r_{total})$

12   **end**

13 **end**

14 $r_{remove} \leftarrow r_{total} - r$

15 **while** $r_{remove} > 0$ **do**

16   **for** $l \leftarrow 0$ **to** L **do**

17       $r_{cur}^l \leftarrow$ removeReluProportion$(r_{del}, \eta_{\boldsymbol{\alpha}^l}, \boldsymbol{a})$

18       $r_{final}^l, r_{remove} \leftarrow$ removeUpdateRelu$(r_{final}^l, r_{cur}^l, r_{remove})$

19   **end**

20 **end**

21 return $\boldsymbol{r}_{final}$

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of ReLU at the pixel level, becomes even more intractable because the number of pixels that must be considered, explode. To that end, we now present SENet, a three-stage automated ReLU trimming strategy that can yield models for a given reduced ReLU budget.

4.1 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

Inspired by our observations in Section 3, we define the ReLU sensitivity of a layer l as

$$\eta_{\boldsymbol{\alpha}^l} = (1 - \eta_{\boldsymbol{\theta}^l}) \tag{2}$$

It is important to emphasize that unlike ReLU importance, ReLU sensitivity does not require training many candidate models. However, $\eta_{\boldsymbol{\theta}^l}$ can only be evaluated for a specific d. We empirically observe that $d > 0.3$ tends to yield uniform sensitivity across layers due to a large parameter budget. In contrast, ultra low density $d < 0.1$, costs non-negligible accuracy drops Liu et al. (2018b); Kundu et al. (2022a). Based on these observations, we propose to quantify ReLU sensitivity with a *proxy density* of $d = 0.1$.

Moreover, to avoid the compute heavy pruning process, we leverage the idea of sensitivity evaluation before training Lee et al. (2018). In particular, on a sampled mini batch from training data $\mathcal{D}$, the sensitivity of the jth connection with associated indication variable and vector as c_j and $\boldsymbol{e}_j$, can be evaluated as,

$$\Delta\mathcal{L}_j(f_\Phi(\boldsymbol{\Theta}; \mathcal{D})) = g_j(f_\Phi(\boldsymbol{\Theta}; \mathcal{D})) = \frac{\partial\mathcal{L}(f_\Phi(\boldsymbol{c} \odot \boldsymbol{\Theta}; \mathcal{D}))}{\partial c_j}\bigg|_{\boldsymbol{c}=1} \tag{3}$$
$$= \lim_{\delta \to 0} \frac{\mathcal{L}(f_\Phi(\boldsymbol{c} \odot \boldsymbol{\Theta}; \mathcal{D})) - \mathcal{L}(f_\Phi((\boldsymbol{c} - \delta\boldsymbol{e}_j) \odot \boldsymbol{\Theta}; \mathcal{D}))}{\delta}\bigg|_{\boldsymbol{c}=1}$$

$\boldsymbol{c}$ represents the containing all indicator variables. The $\frac{\partial\mathcal{L}}{\partial c_j}$ is an infinitesimal version of $\Delta\mathcal{L}_j$ measures change in c_j from $1 \to 1 - \delta$ and can be computed using one forward pass for all j at once. We normalize the connection sensitivities, rank them, and identify the top d-fraction of connections. We then define the layer sensitivity $\eta_{\boldsymbol{\Theta}^l}$ as the fraction of connections of each layer that are in the top d-faction. For a given global ReLU budget r, we then assign the # ReLU for each layer proportional to its normalized ReLU sensitivity. The details are shown in Algorithm 1 (Fig. 3 as point ①).

4.2 RELU MASK IDENTIFICATION

After layer-wise #ReLU allocation, we next identify the ReLU locations in each layer's activation map.In particular, for a non-linear layer l, we assign a mask tensor $M^l \in \{0, 1\}^{h^l \times w^l \times c^l}$, where

Figure 3: Different stages of the proposed training methodology for efficient private inference that can support dynamic channel reduction. For example, the model here supports two channel SFs, S_1 and S_2. Note, similar to Horvath et al. (2021), for each SF support we use a separate batch-normalization (BN) layer to maintain a separate statistics.

h^l, w^l, and c^l represents the height, width, and the number of channels in the activation map. For a layer l, we initialize M with r^l_{final} assigned 1's with random locations. Then we perform a distillation-based training of the PR model performing ReLU ops only at the locations of the masks with 1, while distilling knowledge from an AR model of the same architecture (see Fig. 3, point ②). At the end of each epoch, for each layer l, we rank the top-r^l_{final} locations based on the highest absolute difference between the PR and AR model's post ReLU activation output (averaged over all the mini-batches) for that layer, and update the M^l with 1's at these locations. This, on average, de-emphasizes the locations where the post ReLU activations in both the PR and AR models are positive. We finalize the mask once the ReLU mask[1] evaluation reaches the maximum mask training epochs or when the normalized hamming distance between masks generated after two consecutive epochs is below a certain pre-defined ϵ value.

Channel-wise ReLU mask identification. The mask identification technique described above, creates ReLU masks in an irregular way. To support a lower level of granularity where the ReLU removal happens "channel-wise", we now present a simple yet effective extension of the mask identification. For a layer l, we first translate the total non-zero ReLU counts to total non-zero ReLU channels as $r^l_c = \lceil \frac{r^l_{final}}{h^l w^l} \rceil$. We then follow the same procedure as irregular mask identification, however, only keep top-r^l_c channels as non-zero.

4.3 MAXIMIZING ACTIVATION SIMILARITY VIA DISTILLATION

Once the mask for each layer is frozen, we start our final training phase in which we maximize the similarity between activation functions of our PR and AR models, see Fig. 3, point ③. In particular, we initialize a PR model with the weights of a trained AR and with its ReLU mask frozen to the final mask of stage 2. To train the PR model, we then add a KL-divergence loss Hinton et al. (2015) to the original CE-loss enabling distillation from the AR model. Moreover, we introduce an AR-PR post-ReLU activation mismatch (PRAM) penalty into the loss function. This loss drives the PR model to have activation maps that are similar to that of the AR model.

More formally, let Ψ^m_{pr} and Ψ^m_{ar} represent the mth pair of vectorized post-ReLU activation maps of same layer for Φ_{pr} and Φ_{ar}, respectively. Our loss function for the fine-tuning phase is given as

$$\mathcal{L} = (1 - \lambda)\underbrace{\mathcal{L}_{pr}(y, y^{pr})}_{\text{CE loss}} + \lambda \underbrace{\mathcal{L}_{KL}\left(\sigma\left(\frac{z^{ar}}{\rho}\right), \sigma\left(\frac{z^{pr}}{\rho}\right)\right)}_{\text{KL-div. loss}} + \frac{\beta}{2}\sum_{m \in I}\underbrace{\left\|\frac{\Psi^m_{pr}}{\|\Psi^m_{pr}\|_2} - \frac{\Psi^m_{ar}}{\|\Psi^m_{ar}\|_2}\right\|_2}_{\text{PRAM loss}} \quad (4)$$

where σ represents the softmax function with ρ being its temperature. λ balances the importance between the CE and KL divergence loss components, and β is the weight for the PRAM loss. Similar to Zagoruyko & Komodakis (2016a), we use the l_2-norm of the normalized activation maps to compute this loss.

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[1]The identified mask tensor has non-zeros irregularly placed. This can be easily extended to generation of structured mask, by allowing the assignment and removal of mask values at the granularity of channels instead of activation scalar Kundu et al. (2021a).

4.4 SENet++: Support for Ordered Channel Dropping

To yield further compute-communication benefits, we now present an extension of SENet, namely SENet++, that can perform the ReLU reduction while also supporting inference with reduced model sizes. In particular, we leverage the idea of ordered dropout (OD) Horvath et al. (2021) to simultaneously train multiple sub models with different fractions of channels. The OD method is parameterized by a candidate dropout set $\mathcal{D}_r$ with dropout rate values $d_r \in (0, 1]$. At a selected d_r for any layer l, the model uses a d_r-sub model with only the channels with indices $\{0, 1, ..., \lceil d_r \cdot C_l \rceil - 1\}$ active, effectively pruning the remaining $\{\lceil d_r \cdot C_l \rceil, ..., C_l - 1\}$ channels. Hence, during training, the selection of a d_r-sub model with $d_r < 1.0 \in \mathcal{D}_r$, is a form of channel pruning, while $d_r = 1.0$ trains the full model.

For each minibatch of data, we perform a forward pass once for each value of d_r in $\mathcal{D}_r$, accumulating the loss. We then perform a backward pass in which the model parameters are updated based on the gradients computed on the accumulated loss. We first train an AR model with a dropout set $\mathcal{D}_r$. For the ReLU budget evaluation, we consider only the model with $d_r = 1.0$, and finalize the mask by following the methods in Sections 4.1 and 4.2. During the maximizing of activation similarity stage, we fine tune the PR model supporting the same set $\mathcal{D}_r$ as that of the AR model. In particular, the loss function for the fine tuning is the same as 4, for $d_r = 1.0$. For $d_r < 1.0$, we exclude the PRAM loss because we empirically observed that adding the PRAM loss for each sub model on average does not improve accuracy. During inference, SENet++ models can be dynamically switched to support reduced channel widths, allowing both ReLUs and MACs to reduce compared to the baseline model.

5 Experiments

Table 2: Runtime and communication costs of linear and ReLU operations for 15-bit fixed-point model parameters/inputs and 31-bit ReLU operation Mishra et al. (2020).

Operation	Offline		Online		GC size (KB)
	Runtime (μs)	Comm. cost (KB)	Runtime (μs)	Comm. cost (KB)	
Linear*	32.6	0.095	0.248	0.000563	-
ReLU	154.9	17.5	85.3	2.048	17.5

*Correspond to 1 multiplication and accumulation. The values are calculated by averaging the runtime and communication costs reported in DELPHI's Table 1 Mishra et al. (2020).

Table 3: Performance of SENet and other methods on various datasets and models.

min ≤ r ≤ max	Model	Baseline Acc%	#ReLU (k)	Method	Test Acc%	Acc%/ #1k ReLU	Comm. Savings
				Dataset: CIFAR-10			
	VGG16	93.8	12.5	SENet(ours)	91.6	7.33	23.6×
			49.2		93.16	1.89	6.0×
0 ≤ r ≤ 100k	ResNet18	95.2	49.1		93.60	1.9	11.3×
			82		**93.05**	1.14	6.8×
	ResNet18	95.2	12.9	SNL Cho et al. (2022)	88.23	6.84	43.1×
	VGG16	93.8	36.8	DeepReDuce Jha et al. (2021)	88.9	2.41	8×
	VGG16	93.8	126	SENet(ours)	93.42	0.74	2.3×
	ResNet18	95.2	150		**94.91**	0.63	3.7×
100k ≤ r ≤ 500k	VGG16	93.8	126	DeepReDuce Jha et al. (2021)	92.5	0.73	2.3×
	VGG16	93.8	126	SAFENet Lou et al. (2021)	88.9	0.7	2.3×
	Custom Net	95.0	100	CryptoNAS Ghodsi et al. (2020)	92.18	0.92	–
			500		94.41	0.19	–
				Dataset: CIFAR-100			
	ResNet18	78.05	24.6		69.2	2.73	21.8×
			49.6		73.9	1.49	11.2×
			100	SENet(ours)	**77.3**	0.77	5.6×
0 ≤ r ≤ 100k	ResNet34	78.42	50.1		75.1	1.5	19.3×
			80		75.55	0.94	12.1×
	ResNet18	78.05	28.7	DeepReDuce Jha et al. (2021)	68.6	2.39	19.4×
			49.2		69.5	1.41	11.3×
	Custom Net	74.93	51	Sphynx Cho et al. (2021)	69.57	1.36	–
	ResNet18	78.05	150		78.32	0.52	3.7×
	ResNet34	78.425	200		78.8	0.4	4.8×
	WRN22-8	80.82	180	SENet(ours)	79.12	0.44	7.7×
			240		79.81	0.33	5.8×
			300		**80.07**	0.27	4.6×
	WRN22-8	80.82	180	SNL Cho et al. (2022)	77.65	0.43	7.7×
100k ≤ r ≤ 500k	ResNet18	78.05	229.4	DeepReDuce Jha et al. (2021)	76.22	0.33	2.4×
	Custom Net	74.93	102	Sphynx Cho et al. (2021)	72.9	0.714	–
			230		74.93	0.32	–
	Custom Net	79.07	100	CryptoNAS Ghodsi et al. (2020)	68.67	0.69	–
			500		77.69	0.16	–

5.1 Experimental Setup

Models and Datasets. To evaluate the efficacy of the SENet yielded models, we performed extensive experiments on three popular datasets, CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 Krizhevsky et al. (2009), Tiny-ImageNet Hansen (2015), and ImageNet[2] with three different model variants, namely ResNet (ResNet18, ResNet34) He et al. (2016), wide residual network (WRN22-8) Zagoruyko & Komodakis (2016b), and VGG (VGG16) Simonyan & Zisserman (2014). We used PyTorch API to define and train our models on an Nvidia RTX 2080 Ti GPU.

Training Hyperparameters. We used standard data augmentation techniques (horizontal flip and random crop with reflective padding) and the SGD optimizer for all training. We trained the baseline all-ReLU model for 240, 120, and 60 epochs for CIFAR, Tiny-ImageNet, and ImageNet respectively, with a starting learning rate (LR) of 0.05 that decays by a factor of 0.1 at the 62.5%, 75%, and 87.5% training epochs completion points. For all the training we used an weight decay coefficient of 5×10^{-4}. For a target ReLU budget, we performed the mask evaluation for 150, 100, and 30 epochs, respectively, for the three dataset types with the ϵ set to 0.05, meaning the training prematurely terminates when less than 5% of the total #ReLU masks change their positions. Finally, we performed the post-ReLU activation similarity improvement for 180, 120, and 50 epochs, for CIFAR, Tiny-ImageNet, and ImageNet respectively. Notably, for this fine tuning stage, we initialize the student PR model weights initialized with that of the AR model that acts as the teacher. Also, unless stated otherwise, we use $\lambda = 0.5$, and $\beta = 1000$ for the loss described in Eq. 4. Further details of our training hyper-parameter choices are provided in the Supplementary materials. In Table 3, we report the accuracy averaged over three runs.

5.2 SENet Results

As shown in Table 3, SENet yields models that have higher accuracy than existing alternatives by a significant margin while often requiring fewer ReLUs. For example, at a small ReLU budget of ≤ 100k, our models yield up to 4.15% and 7.8% higher accuracy, on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100, respectively. At a ReLU budget of ≤ 500k, our improvement is up to 0.50% and 2.38%, respectively, on the two datasets. We further evaluate the communication saving due to the non-linearity reduction by taking the per ReLU communication cost mentioned in Table 2. In particular, the communication saving reported in the 8th column of Table 3 is computed as the ratio of communication costs associated with an AR model to that of the corresponding PR model with reduced ReLUs. We did not report any saving for the custom models, as they do not have any corresponding AR baseline model. On Tiny-ImageNet, SENet models can provide up to 0.3% higher performance while requiring $3.08\times$ fewer ReLUs (Table 4). More importantly, even for high resolution dataset like ImageNet, SENet models can yield close to the baseline performance, depicting the efficacy of our proposed training method.

Table 4: Performance on Tiny-ImageNet and ImageNet.

Model	Baseline Acc%	#ReLU (k)	Method	Test Acc%	Acc%/ #1k ReLU	Comm. Savings
			Dataset: Tiny-ImageNet			
ResNet18	66.1	142	SENet	58.9	0.414	×15.7
		298		**64.96**	0.218	×7.5
		393	DeepReDuceJha et al. (2021)	61.65	0.157	×5.7
		917		64.66	0.071	×2.4
			Dataset: ImageNet			
ResNet18	71.94	600	SENet	70.28	0.117	×3.86
		950		**71.16**	0.075	×2.43

5.3 SENet++ Results

For SENet++, we performed experiments with $\mathcal{D}_r = [0.5, 1.0]$, meaning each training loop can yield models with two different channel dropout rates. The 0.5-sub model enjoys a $\sim4\times$ MACs reduction compared to the full model. Moreover, as shown in Fig. 4, the 0.5-sub model also requires significantly less #ReLUs due to reduced model size. In particular, the smaller models have #ReLUs reduced by a factor of $2.05\times$, $2.08\times$, and $1.88\times$ on CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and Tiny-ImageNet, respectively, compared to the PR full models, averaged over four experiments with different ReLU budgets for each dataset. *Lastly, the similar performance of the SENet and SENet++ models at*

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[2]On ImageNet, for comprehensive training with limited resources, we sample 100 classes from the ImageNet dataset with 500 and 50 training and test examples per class, respectively, each with a resolution of $224 \times 224 \times 3$.

Figure 4: Performance of SENet++ on three datasets for various #ReLU budgets. The points labelled A, B, C, D corresponds to experiments of different target #ReLUs for the full model ($d_r = 1.0$). For SENet++, note that a single training loop yields two points with the same label corresponding to the two different drop out rates.

Figure 5: Performance comparison of SENet++ (with $d_r = 1.0$ and 0.5) vs. existing alternatives (a) with VGG16 and ResNet18 in terms of ReLU latency. The labels A, B, C, D correspond to experiments of different target #ReLUs for the full model ($d_r = 1.0$). For SENet++, note that a single training loop yields two points with the same label corresponding to the two different drop out rates. (b) Comparison between DeepReDuce and SENet++ for a target # ReLU budget of ~50k with ResNet18 on CIFAR-100.

$d_r = 1.0$ *with similar ReLU budgets, clearly depicts the ability of SENet++ to yield multiple sub models without sacrificing any accuracy for the full model.*

5.4 ANALYSIS OF LINEAR AND RELU INFERENCE LATENCY

Table 2 shows the GC-based online ReLU operation latency is $\sim343\times$ higher than one linear operation (multiply and accumulate), making the ReLU operation latency the dominant latency component. Inspired by this observation, we quantify the online PI latency as that of the N ReLU operations for a model with ReLU budget of N. In particular, based on this evaluation, Fig. 5(a) shows the superiority of SENet++ of up to $\sim9.6\times$ ($\sim1.92\times$) reduced online ReLU latency on CIFAR-10 (CIFAR-100). With negligibly less accuracy this latency improvement can be up to $\sim21\times$. Furthermore, as for $d_r < 1.0$, SENet++ requires fewer MACs, the linear operation latency can also be reduced significantly as demonstrated in Fig. 5(b).

5.5 ABLATION STUDIES

Importance of ReLU sensitivity. For a given ReLU budget, to understand the importance of layer-wise ReLU sensitivity evaluations, we conducted experiments with evenly allocated ReLUs. Specifically, for ResNet18, for a ReLU budget of 25% as that of the original model, we randomly removed 75% ReLUs from each PR layer with identity elements to create the ReLU mask, and trained the PR model with this mask. We further trained two other PR ResNet18 with similar and lower # ReLU budgets with the per-layer ReLUs assigned following the proposed sensitivity. As shown in Table 5, the sensitivity

Table 5: Importance of ReLU sensitivity.

Model	Baseline Acc%	#ReLU (k)	ReLU Sensitivity	Test Acc%	Acc%/ #1k ReLU	Comm. Savings
ResNet18	78.05	139.2	✗	70.12	0.503	×4
		135	✓	**75.88**	0.56	×4.12
		70.4	✓	73.03	1.03	×**7.9**

driven PR models can yield significantly improved performance of $\sim5.76\%$ for similar ReLU budget, demonstrating the importance of proposed ReLU sensitivity.

Choice of the hyperparameter λ and β. To determine the influence of the AR teacher's influence on the PR model's learning, we conducted the final stage distillation with $\lambda \in [0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9]$ and $\beta \in [100, 300, 500, 700, 1000]$. As shown in Fig. 6, the performance of the student PR

Figure 6: Ablation studies with different λ and β values for the loss term in Eq. 4.

model improves with the increasing influence of the teacher both in terms of high λ and β values. However, we also observe, the performance improvement tend to saturate at $\beta \approx 1000$. Note, we keep $\lambda = 0.5$ and $\beta = 1000$, for β and λ ablation, respectively.

6 CONCLUSIONS

In this paper, we introduced the notion of ReLU sensitivity for non-linear layers of a DNN model. Based on this notion, we present an automated ReLU allocation and training algorithm for models with limited ReLU budgets targeting latency and communication efficient PI. The resulting networks can achieve similar to SOTA accuracy while significantly reducing the # ReLUs by up to $9.6\times$ on CIFAR-10, enabling dramatic reduction of the latency and communication costs of PI.

Societal and broader impact. With the growing demand for privacy preserving machine learning on the user's sensitive data, the need for inference using cryptographic protocols is on the rise, but their application is limited due to the associate large computation and communication overheads. This paper significantly reduces these overheads and is thus a step towards making real-time private inference practical. Moreover, our methodology mitigates the need for multiple training rounds thus helps reduce the training carbon footprint of AI models. We further believe that our empirical analysis that establishes the relationship between ReLU non-linearity and weight sensitivity motivates further theoretical study that can extend the scope of latency-efficient private inference to models with other forms of non-linearity such as sigmoid and tan-hyperbolic functions.

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A APPENDIX

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