A normative theory of social conflict

Sergey A. Shuvaev, Evgeny M Amelchenko, Dmitry Smagin, Natalia Kudryavtseva, Grigori Enikolopov, Alexei A. Koulakov

Keywords: neuroscience, decision-making, normative modeling, game theory, Bayesian methods, POMDP, inverse rational control, belief, theory of mind

TL;DR: We combine our behavioral and neuronal data to formulate a theory of chronic social conflict based on game theory and Bayesian inference of agents’ beliefs.

Abstract: Social conflict is a survival mechanism yielding both normal and pathological behaviors. To understand its underlying principles, we collected behavioral and whole-brain neural data from mice advancing through stages of social conflict. We modeled the animals’ interactions as a normal-form game using Bayesian inference to account for the partial observability of animals’ strengths. We find that our behavioral and neural data are consistent with the first-level Theory of Mind (1-ToM) model where mice form “primary” beliefs about the strengths of all mice involved and “secondary” beliefs that estimate the beliefs of their opponents. Our model identifies the brain regions that carry the information about these beliefs and offers a framework for studies of social behaviors in partially observable settings.

Submission Number: 1504