ProxyPrompt: Securing System Prompts against Prompt Extraction Attacks

ACL ARR 2026 January Submission2249 Authors

02 Jan 2026 (modified: 20 Mar 2026)ACL ARR 2026 January SubmissionEveryoneRevisionsBibTeXCC BY 4.0
Keywords: prompt extraction, prompt security, large language models
Abstract: The integration of large language models (LLMs) into a wide range of applications has highlighted the critical role of well-crafted system prompts, which require extensive testing and domain expertise. These prompts enhance task performance but may also encode sensitive information and filtering criteria, posing security risks if exposed. Recent research shows that system prompts are vulnerable to extraction attacks, while existing defenses are either easily bypassed or require constant updates to address new threats. In this work, we introduce ProxyPrompt, a novel defense mechanism that prevents prompt leakage by replacing the original prompt with a proxy. This proxy maintains the original task's utility while obfuscating the extracted prompt, ensuring attackers cannot reproduce the task or access sensitive information. Comprehensive evaluations on 264 LLM and system prompt pairs show that ProxyPrompt protects 94.70% of prompts from extraction attacks, outperforming the next-best defense, which only achieves 42.80%. The code will be open-sourced upon acceptance.
Paper Type: Long
Research Area: Safety and Alignment in LLMs
Research Area Keywords: security and privacy
Contribution Types: Model analysis & interpretability, NLP engineering experiment
Languages Studied: English
Submission Number: 2249
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