A Multidimensional Contract Design for Smart Contract-as-a-Service

Jinghan Sun, Hou-Wan Long, Hong Kang, Zhixuan Fang, Abdulmotaleb El Saddik, Wei Cai

Abstract: Empowered by blockchain technology, smart contracts have attracted considerable interest from Web3 users due to their distinct advantages. Nevertheless, it is challenging to address problems caused by the dramatic expansion of the Web3 ecosystem. This article introduces the smart contract-as-a-service (SCaaS) paradigm to mitigate smart contracts’ redundant deployment via their composability and reusability. Moreover, we design trust and incentive schemes to ensure project security and developer engagement in SCaaS. Specifically, we first introduce a reputation filter by leveraging the authentic on-chain data, aiming to eliminate high-risk contracts. We then design a contract-based incentive mechanism to help the foundation attract heterogeneous developers with multidimensional private information, and maximize the foundation’s utility by inducing developers to undertake projects of differing complexities based on their ability. We further differentiate between veteran and newcome developers and examine their influences on foundational strategies. Finally, extensive experimental results demonstrate that our proposed contracts can efficiently remove high-risk smart contracts, maximize the foundation’s utility, and ensure that developers select contracts honestly and participate in the SCaaS ecosystem actively.

External IDs:doi:10.1109/tcss.2024.3514924