Abstract: This paper makes a twofold contribution to the study of expressivity in modal logic. First, we introduce and study the novel concept of conditional expressivity. Second, we use the concept to explore inferential relations between collective deontic admissibility statements for different groups. Negative results on conditional expressivity are stronger than standard (unconditional) inexpressivity results: we show that the well-known inexpressivity results from epistemic logic on distributed knowledge and on common knowledge only concern unconditional expressivity. By contrast, we prove negative results on conditional expressivity in the deontic logic of collective agency. In particular, we consider the full formal language of the deontic logic of collective agency, define a natural class of sublanguages of the full language, and prove that a collective deontic admissibility statement about a particular group is conditionally expressible in a sublanguage from the class if and only if that sublanguage includes a collective deontic admissibility statement about a supergroup of that group. Our negative results on conditional expressivity may serve as a proof of concept for future studies of expressivity in modal logic.
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