The M Cognitive Meta-architecture as Touchstone for Standard Modeling of AGI-Level Minds

Selmer Bringsjord, James T. Oswald, Michael Giancola, Brandon Rozek, Naveen Sundar Govindarajulu

Abstract: We introduce rudiments of the cognitive meta-architecture M (majuscule of \(\mu \) and pronounced accordingly), and of a formal procedure for determining, with M as touchstone, whether a given cognitive architecture \(X_i\) (from among a finite list 1 \(\ldots k\) of modern contenders) conforms to a minimal standard model of a human-level AGI mind. The procedure, which for ease of exposition and economy in this short paper is restricted to arithmetic cognition, requires of a candidate \(X_i\), (1), a true biconditional expressing that for any human-level agent a, a property possessed by this agent, as expressed in a declarative mathematical sentence s(a), holds if and only if a formula \(\chi _i(\mathfrak {a})\) in the formal machinery/languages of \(X_i\) holds as well (\(\mathfrak {a}\) being an in-this-machinery counterpart to natural-language name a). Given then that M is such that \(s(a) \text { iff } \mu (\mathfrak {m})\), where the latter formula is in the formal language of M, with \(\mathfrak {m}\) the agent modeled in M, a minimal standard modeling of an AGI-level mind is certifiably achieved by \(X_i\) if, (2), it can be proved that \(\chi _i(\mathfrak {a}) \text { iff } \mu (\mathfrak {a}).\) We conjecture herein that such confirmatory theorems can be proved with respect to both cognitive architectures NARS and SNePS, and have other cognitive architectures in our sights.