Characterizing the Convergence of Game Dynamics via Potentialness

Martin Bichler, Davide Legacci, Panayotis Mertikopoulos, Matthias Oberlechner, Bary Pradelski

Abstract:

Understanding the convergence landscape of multi-agent learning is a fundamental problem of great practical relevance in many applications of artificial intelligence and machine learning.
While it is known that learning dynamics converge to Nash equilibrium in potential games, the behavior of dynamics in many important classes of games that do not admit a potential is poorly understood.
To measure how ``close'' a game is to being potential, we consider a distance function, that we call ``potentialness'', and which relies on a strategic decomposition of games introduced by Candogan et al. (2011).
We introduce a numerical framework enabling the computation of this metric, which we use to calculate the degree of ``potentialness'' in generic matrix games, as well as (non-generic) games that are important in economic applications, namely auctions and contests. Understanding learning in the latter games has become increasingly important due to the wide-spread automation of bidding and pricing with no-regret learning algorithms.
We empirically show that potentialness decreases and concentrates with an increasing number of agents or actions;
in addition, potentialness turns out to be a good predictor for the existence of pure Nash equilibria and the convergence of no-regret learning algorithms in matrix games.
In particular, we observe that potentialness is very low for complete-information models of the all-pay auction where no pure Nash equilibrium exists, and much higher for Tullock contests, first-, and second-price auctions, explaining the success of learning in the latter. In the incomplete-information version of the all-pay auction, a pure Bayes-Nash equilibrium exists and it can be learned with gradient-based algorithms. Potentialness nicely characterizes these differences to the complete-information version.

Submission Length: Long submission (more than 12 pages of main content)

Changes Since Last Submission:

- Strengthened justification for potentialness in the introduction
- Improved writing quality throughout the paper.

Code: https://github.com/MOberlechner/games_learning

Assigned Action Editor: ~Marcello_Restelli1

Submission Number: 3323