Prior and Tichý’s Concepts of Temporalism

Zuzana Rybaříková

Abstract:

At the beginning of modern logic, propositions were defined as unchangeable entities placed in a certain idealistic realm.
These unchangeable propositions contain in themselves so-called indexical, i.e. the place, time and other circumstances of the utterance.
This concept of the proposition, which is entitled eternalism, was and
is still prevalent among analytic philosophers. Often even the term
‘proposition’ is identified with an idealistic entity located outside the
real world. In my paper, I would like to focus on the concept of propositions of two logicians who deviated from the standard understanding of propositions, Arthur N. Prior and Pavel Tichý. They were both
proponents of temporalism, i.e. the view that propositions could
change their truth-value over time. The paper will discuss the reasons
why they were proponents of temporalism and compare their views.
It claims that in Prior’s case, his metaphysical views were the main
reasons he was a proponent of temporalism. In contrast, when Tichý
presented his arguments for temporalism, he focused primarily on
natural language.