A Transaction Fee Mechanism for Resource Allocation in Blockchain-Based IoT Systems

Rong Zhao, Yunshu Liu, Hong Kang, Wei Cai

Abstract: The progressions in blockchain technologies have propelled the advancement of the Internet of Things (IoT), particularly the Industrial IoT (IIoT) system, toward a decentralized structure. This shift is driven by the need to address the privacy and security vulnerabilities inherent in centralized organizations. In a blockchain-based IoT system, the IoT nodes are tasked with both mining and data collection activities concurrently. However, due to the limited resources of these nodes, a rational resource allocation mechanism is imperative to maximize social welfare. Insufficient allocation of resources to mining can significantly reduce the overall Hashrate of the blockchain, thereby jeopardizing its security. Conversely, prioritizing resource allocation to mining can diminish the value of collected data, resulting in a decrease in overall social welfare. To tackle these challenges, this article proposes a transaction fee mechanism that levies charges on data consumers based on the resources utilized by the nodes for data collection. The objective is to achieve a balanced allocation of resources between mining and data collection while ensuring the security of the blockchain. Specifically, we model the interactions among the system designer, data consumer, and IoT nodes as a three-stage Stackelberg game. By characterizing the equilibrium of the game, we derive optimal strategies that lead to the maximization of social welfare. The effectiveness of the proposed approach is validated through extensive experimental results.

External IDs:doi:10.1109/tsmc.2025.3573285