Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) have exhibited remarkable versatility and adaptability, while their widespread adoption across various applications also raises critical safety concerns.
This paper focuses on the impact of backdoored LLMs. Traditional backdoor injection methods are primarily limited to yes-or-no discriminative tasks, leading users to underestimate the potential risks of backdoored LLMs.
Given the inherently generative nature of LLMs, this paper reveals that a generative backdoor injected into LLMs can expose the true safety risks in their application. We propose an editing-based generative backdoor, named MEGen, aiming to expand the backdoor to generative tasks in a unified format of any text-to any text, leading to natural generations with a specific intention. Experiments show that MEGen achieves a high attack success rate by adjusting only a small set of local parameters with few-shot samples. Notably, we show that the backdoored model, when triggered, can freely output pre-set dangerous information while completing downstream tasks.
Our work highlights that MEGen enables backdoors in LLMs to exhibit generative capabilities, causing potential safety risks by altering the generative style.
Paper Type: Long
Research Area: Interpretability and Analysis of Models for NLP
Research Area Keywords: Interpretability and Analysis of Models for NLP
Contribution Types: Model analysis & interpretability
Languages Studied: English
Submission Number: 3777
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