Spectrum Matching

Yanjiao Chen, Linshan Jiang, Haofan Cai, Jin Zhang, Baochun Li

Abstract: Dynamic spectrum access (DSA) redistributes spectrum from service providers with spare channels to those in need for them. Existing works on such spectrum exchange mainly focus on double auctions, where an auctioneer centrally enforces a certain spectrum allocation policy. In this paper, we take a different and new perspective, proposing to use matching as an alternative tool to realize DSA in a distributed way for a free market, which consists of only buyers and sellers, but no trustworthy third-party authority. Compared with conventional many-to-one matching problems, the spectrum matching problem is distinctively challenging due to the interference bound between buyers: the same channel can be reused by an unlimited number of non-interfering buyers, but must be exclusively occupied by only one of interfering buyers. In this paper, we firstly formulate the spectrum matching problem as a many-to-one matching with peer effects, i.e., a buyer's utility is affected by other buyers who are matched to the same seller. We then present a two-stage distributed algorithm that converges to an interference-free and Nash-stable matching result. Simulations show that the proposed distributed matching algorithm can achieve 90% of the social welfare from the optimal matching result.