Online Nash Welfare Maximization Without Predictions

Zhiyi Huang, Minming Li, Xinkai Shu, Tianze Wei

Abstract: The maximization of Nash welfare, which equals the geometric mean of agents’ utilities, is widely studied because it balances efficiency and fairness in resource allocation problems. Banerjee, Gkatzelis, Gorokh, and Jin (2022) recently introduced the model of online Nash welfare maximization for T divisible items and N agents with additive utilities with predictions of each agent’s utility for receiving all items. They gave online algorithms whose competitive ratios are logarithmic. We initiate the study of online Nash welfare maximization without predictions, assuming either that the agents’ utilities for receiving all items differ by a bounded ratio, or that their utilities for the Nash welfare maximizing allocation differ by a bounded ratio. We design online algorithms whose competitive ratios are logarithmic in the aforementioned ratios of agents’ utilities and the number of agents.