Equilibria in Quantitative Bipolar Argumentation Dialogues

Andreas Brännström, Timotheus Kampik

Keywords: Formal Argumentation, Rationality, Equilibrium

Abstract: We introduce MQBAFs, multi-agent extensions of quantitative bipolar argumentation frameworks (QBAFs). In MQBAFs, agents have objectives to maximize or minimize the strengths of some arguments, and establish preferences over these objectives. Agents make utterances by adding or removing arguments or attacks to/from a QBAF, or by changing arguments' initial strengths. By constraining this utterance space, we specify dialogue protocols. We then define equilibria for MQBAFs, in which no rational agent would make any additional utterance. We show that while for some dialogue protocols an eventual equilibrium can be guaranteed, others may fail to reach an equilibrium even in very simple scenarios. Based on this, we then make observation about agents' strategies given the different dialogue protocols.

Area: Representation and Reasoning (RR)

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Submission Number: 1202