Learning in Herding Mean Field Games: Single-Loop Algorithm with Finite-Time Convergence Analysis
TL;DR: We expand the known class of solvable MFGs and propose an efficient algorithm for solving MFGs in the new class.
Abstract: We consider discrete-time stationary mean field games (MFG) with unknown dynamics and design algorithms for finding the equilibrium with finite-time complexity guarantees. Prior solutions to the problem assume either the contraction of a mean field optimality-consistency operator or strict weak monotonicity, which may be overly restrictive. In this work, we introduce a new class of solvable MFGs, named the "fully herding class", which expands the known solvable class of MFGs and for the first time includes problems with multiple equilibria. We propose a direct policy optimization method, Accelerated Single-loop Actor Critic Algorithm for Mean Field Games (ASAC-MFG), that provably finds a global equilibrium for MFGs within this class, under suitable access to a single trajectory of Markovian samples. Different from the prior methods, ASAC-MFG is single-loop and single-sample-path. We establish the finite-time and finite-sample convergence of ASAC-MFG to a mean field equilibrium via new techniques that we develop for multi-time-scale stochastic approximation. We support the theoretical results with illustrative numerical simulations.
When the mean field does not affect the transition and reward, a MFG reduces to a Markov decision process (MDP) and ASAC-MFG becomes an actor-critic algorithm for finding the optimal policy in average-reward MDPs, with a sample complexity matching the state-of-the-art. Previous works derive the complexity assuming a contraction on the Bellman operator, which is invalid for average-reward MDPs. We match the rate while removing the untenable assumption through an improved Lyapunov function.
Submission Number: 127
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