[RE] ALBERT: A Lite BERT for Self-supervised Learning of Language Representations

Reproducibility Summary

In this report, in-depth comparisons between BERT and ALBERT are made using various open-source interpretability and testing tools to verify the claim that ALBERT achieves better performance and faster inference compared to BERT. ALBERT achieves higher benchmarks across many different downstream tasks and demonstrates appropriate sentence embeddings visualization. However, experiment results from behavioral testings and adversarial attacks suggest that ALBERT has relatively worse capabilities, particularly in terms of Robustness and Fairness.

Scope of Reproducibility

Lan et al. [2] attributes improved parameter efficiency as the most important advantage of ALBERT's design choices and claims substantial improvements for several GLUE and other downstream evaluation tasks. Thanks to the prevalence of established full re-implementations and standardized models, model interpretability testing tools were used to perform in-depth comparisons beyond traditional benchmarks.

Methodology

Fine-tuned models were obtained from HuggingFace [9] and those released by Morris et al. [4] were used to ensure consistency across models and experiments. Most notably, SentenceTransformers [5], UMAP [3], CheckList [6], TextAttack [4], and LIT (Language Interpretability Tool) [8], were used for each experiments.

Results

Unfortunately, this report does not provide a clear empirical evidence for the claims presented by Lan et al. [2]. That being said, several experiments in this report indicate that ALBERT is qualitatively worse than BERT and has consistently slower inference speed. **Therefore, this work does not support the claim that ALBERT achieves better performance and inference speed up than BERT.**

What was easy

With the standardized models from the HuggingFace's Transformers [9], the use of plug-and-play models in various experiments was trivial. Because all of the tools used in the experiments were open-source, it was fairly easy to debug errors and modify the source code.

What was difficult

All things considered, the most time-consuming aspect of this reproducibility study was the writing of this report.

Communication with original authors

Communication with the original authors did not seem appropriate, as this study does not seek to fully re-implement the original paper.

1 Introduction

Lan et al. [2] identified four major ways to "lighten" Devlin et al. [1]'s original BERT architecture: cross-layer parameter sharing, sentence-order-prediction auxiliary loss, factorized embedding parameterization, and dropout removal. Typically, a replication study reproduces one or more of these claims by means of a full re-implementation. However, it did not seem reasonable to pursue the same undertaking when many re-implementations had already been carried out.

In addition, full re-implementation is a time-consuming and error-prone procedure that ultimately results in the verification of the same set of metrics that prompted the need for reproducibility.

With the recent developments in easy-to-use interpretability and testing tools for NLP models, state-of-the-art models can be evaluated in terms of qualitative performance in addition to existing benchmarks.

2 Scope of reproducibility

Lan et al. [2] claimed significant improvements over BERT for several GLUE and other downstream evaluation tasks based on the improvement of ALBERT in parameter efficiency. Simply put, Lan et al. [2] claimed that ALBERT is better than BERT based on benchmarks.

However, comparing the performance of models based on a single aggregated statistic is problematic because it is difficult to figure out why and where the models are fail (Wu et al. [10]). By considering each model as a black-box, a qualitative comparison of model capabilities for various models can be made, even though they have been trained on different datasets (Ribeiro et al. [6]).

Rather than replicating ALBERT from the scratch, this report uses some of the 82 models provided by Morris et al. [4] to determine if ALBERT is actually better BERT in terms of both benchmarks and capabilities.

2.1 Addressed claims from the original paper

- Fine-tuned ALBERT on STS-B provides similarly or or more meaningful representation of sentence embeddings compared to BERT.
- Fine-tuned ALBERT on sentiment analysis and paraphrase identification tasks have similar or better behavioral testing results compared to BERT.
- Fine-tuned ALBERT on RTE is equivalent to or more robust against adversarial attacks than BERT.

3 Methodology

Due to the prevalence of existing re-implementations, the available fine-tuned models have been used for an in-depth comparison of BERT and ALBERT models. Beyond traditional benchmarks, visualization of sentence embeddings, behavioral testing, adversarial attacks, and counterfactual explanation experiments were carried out to verify if claims by Lan et al. [2] still apply under different circumstances.

3.1 Model descriptions

All models were obtained from TextAttack Model Zoo via the HuggingFace website (`https://huggingface.co/textattack`), re-implemented and fine-tuned by Morris et al. [4].

3.2 Datasets

All datasets were obtained from the HuggingFace's Datasets library (`https://github.com/huggingface/datasets`).

3.3 Hyperparameters

All experiments used the following additional parameters, unless otherwise specified.

- SentenceTransformers: models.Transformers(max_seq_length=128)
- UMAP: umap.UMAP(random_state=0, transform_seed=0, metric='cosine')

Table 1: Benchmarks for Downstream Tasks

Model	AG News	CoLA	IMDB	RT	QQP	RTE	SNLI	SST-2	WNLI	YP
BERT	94.20	81.20	**91.90**	84.00	**92.40**	72.56	**89.40**	92.43	56.34	96.30
ALBERT	**94.30**	**82.90**	91.30	**85.10**	91.40	**76.17**	88.30	**92.55**	**59.15**	96.30

Notes: Evaluation results for AG News, CoLA, IMDB, RT (Rotten Tomatoes), QQP, RTE, SNLI,SST-2, WNLI, and YP (Yelp Polarity) single-task BERT and ALBERT models released by TextAttack [4]. All results shown are on the full validation or test set up to 1000 examples. More details can be found on `https://textattack.readthedocs.io/en/latest/3recipes/models.html`.

71   • CheckList: TestSuite.run(seed=1)

72   • TextAttack: textattack attack –num-examples 10

3.4 Experimental setup

74 All experiments were performed on Google Colab with a single Tesla T4 GPU (NVIDIA-SMI 450.32.03 Driver Version:
75 418.67 CUDA Version: 10.1). Notebooks and other artifacts are available on GitHub (`https://github.com/XXX/`
76 `XXX`).

3.5 Computational requirements

78 The computational requirements for each experiment ranged from a few minutes to an hour on a single GPU due to the
79 different heuristics used for each experiment.

4 Results

81 ALBERT achieves higher benchmarks across many different downstream tasks and demonstrates appropriate sentence
82 embeddings visualization. However, experiment results from behavioral testings and adversarial attacks suggest that
83 ALBERT has relatively worse capabilities, particularly in terms of Robustness and Fairness.

4.1 Benchmarks

85 Morris et al. [4] provides fine-tuned textattack/bert-base-uncased and textattack/albert-base-v2 models via HuggingFace
86 [9]. Based on Table 4.1, the ALBERT models clearly outperforms the BERT models across many different downstream
87 tasks, as Lan et al. [2] claimed.

4.2 Embeddings visualization

89 bert-base-uncased-STS-B and albert-base-v2-STS-B models were chosen for this experiment because sentence embed-
90 dings of fine-tuned models have semantically more meaningful representation compared to the original pre-trained
91 models [1] [5] [7]. The embeddings were generated using the AG News training dataset without further fine-tuning.
92 Tvisualizations in Figure 1 were then created using UMAP [3].

93 Given that UMAP is agnostic to rotation or reflection of the final layout [3], the results are essentially the same as the
94 reflection in the x-axis and the 90-degree counter-clockwise rotation for the BERT visualization results in almost the
95 same layout as the ALBERT.

96 However, ALBERT (10min 30s) took noticeably longer to produce the embeddings compared to BERT (8min 49s).

4.3 Behavioral testing

98 In Table 4.3, fine-tuned models on several sentiment analysis datasets were tested with CheckList [6]. The sentiment
99 analysis test suite (curated by Ribeiro et al. [6]) consists of Minimum Functionality test (MFT), INVariance, and
100 DIRectional capability tests. Apart from six *Negation* test cases, Table 4.3 includes all test cases for *Vocabulary*,
101 *Robustness*, *NER*, *Fairness*, *Temporal*, *Negation*, and *SRL* capability tests.

102 For *Vocabulary*, *Negation*, and *SRL*, it's difficult to make a reasonable conclusion due to the variance across different
103 datasets. In addition, certain test cases (*Single negative words* and *Reducers*) have extreme outliers, which renders these
104 tests unreliable.

Figure 1: Embedding Visualization

Notes: Visualizations of bert-base-uncased-STS-B and albert-base-v2-STS-B models based on sentence embeddings generated from AG News training dataset (N=120,000).

For *Robustness*, *NER*, and *Fairness*, ALBERT consistently result in higher fail rates than BERT. More importantly, ALBERT have significantly worse fail rates for *Fairness* in all cases except *Race* on SST-2.

In Table 4.3, fine-tuned models on two paraphrase identification datasets (QQP and MRPC) were tested with CheckList [6]. Apart from *Robustness*, only the MFT test cases from the QQP test suite (curated by Ribeiro et al. [6]) are included in Table 4.3.

For QQP, similar behavior is observed for *Robustness*, but not for *NER*. For MRPC, ALBERT achieves lower fail rates than BERT across all test cases for *Robustness*. However, it seems inappropriate to use the QQP test suite for MRPC since both BERT and ALBERT have either 0.0% or 100.0% for the most of the capability tests in MRPC.

On average, ALBERT (4m 48s and 10m 47s) took consistently longer than BERT (4m 14s and 9m 30s) to complete the test suites (sentiment analysis and QQP).

4.4 Adversarial attack

bert-base-uncased-RTE and albert-base-v2-RTE models were chosen for this experiment to perform adversarial attacks using TextAttack [4]. Out of *fast-alzantot*, *iga*, and *textfooler* attack recipes, *iga* was the most effective in executing valid attacks (3 out 10 examples). Due to the limited number of adversarial examples and lack of explanation, it cannot be argued that one is more or less robust against adversarial attacks compare to another.

Example A

sentence1: Mrs. Bush's approval ratings have remained very high, above 80%, even as her husband's have recently dropped below 50%.

sentence2: 80% approve of Mr. Bush.

Not entailment (98%) –> Entailment (52%) [BERT]

sentence1: Mrs. Bush's endorsement ratings have persevere very haut, above 80%, even as her husband's have recently plummeted below 50%.

sentence2: 80% endorsement of Mr. Bush.

Not entailment (95%) –> Entailment (57%) [ALBERT]

sentence1: Mrs. Bush's approval punctuation have remains very superior, above 80%, even as her husband's have recently dropped below 50%.

sentence2: 80% approval of Monsieur. Bush.

Table 2: CheckList Test Suite for Sentiment Analysis

Capability	Test	Rotten Tomatoes		Yelp Polarity		SST-2	
		BERT	ALBERT	BERT	ALBERT	BERT	ALBERT
Vocabulary	Single positive words	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Single negative words	**0.0**	100.0	0.0	0.0	**0.0**	2.9
	Single neutral words	46.2	**0.0**	100.0	**69.2**	100.0	100.0
	Sentiment-laden words in context	**47.9**	49.1	47.9	**47.8**	**48.0**	49.5
	Neutral words in context	82.8	**69.5**	92.3	**76.4**	**77.5**	89.7
	Intensifiers	**0.8**	2.6	**2.4**	4.9	**0.9**	2.0
	Reducers	100.0	**6.1**	37.6	**28.7**	33.3	**14.7**
	Change neutral words with BERT	**8.8**	15.8	**8.8**	11.2	11.8	**10.0**
	Add positive phrases	**18.8**	30.2	**15.6**	27.4	**27.4**	27.8
	Add negative phrases	31.2	**28.4**	23.6	**22.4**	25.4	**24.8**
Robustness	Add random URLs and handles	**14.4**	29.6	31.4	**27.6**	14.2	**13.8**
	Punctuation	**6.2**	18.2	**3.8**	5.6	4.8	**3.8**
	Typos	**4.6**	8.2	**4.0**	6.4	7.4	**6.6**
	2 typos	**8.0**	12.8	**5.8**	8.6	**9.6**	10.4
	Contractions	**3.8**	4.5	**5.0**	5.1	**3.0**	3.7
NER	Change names	**8.2**	9.1	**18.7**	20.8	**8.8**	11.5
	Change locations	**10.0**	10.3	**23.8**	27.4	**11.0**	13.9
	Change numbers	3.6	**3.1**	**7.8**	9.5	**3.0**	3.8
Fairness	Race	**31.5**	60.2	**20.7**	55.8	49.2	**37.5**
	Sexual	**69.2**	94.3	**45.5**	86.3	**81.7**	88.8
	Religion	**32.7**	84.2	**50.3**	84.7	**57.8**	93.5
	Nationality	**8.8**	52.7	**38.5**	68.8	**22.2**	42.3
Temporal	Used to, but now	**51.5**	53.9	**51.0**	51.2	**52.5**	54.4
	"Used to" should reduce	56.2	**15.1**	81.2	**71.6**	52.6	**52.5**
Negation	Negative	**1.2**	2.7	1.6	**0.0**	0.5	2.1
	Not negative	93.9	**60.7**	91.0	**81.7**	95.7	**94.0**
	Not neutral is still neutral	**98.6**	98.7	**99.6**	100.0	97.2	**93.5**
SRL	My opinion is what matters	**53.5**	62.3	**51.2**	51.3	**54.3**	55.0
	Q & A: yes	**47.2**	47.9	49.1	**48.7**	**47.5**	48.4
	Q & A: yes (neutral)	99.7	**94.4**	91.3	**67.5**	98.7	**59.0**
	Q & A: no	**53.2**	55.5	57.1	**54.3**	53.1	**52.9**
	Q & A: no (neutral)	100.0	**94.9**	**99.4**	100.0	100.0	100.0

Notes: CheckList sentiment analysis test suite results for bert-base-uncased and albert-base-v2 models. The reported numbers are fail rates in % (lower the better). For each dataset, lower fail rates are bolded for emphasis. Several tests in *Negation* capability were excluded for the sake of brevity.

Example A demonstrates that both BERT and ALBERT are vulnerable to this adversarial attack. While *haut* is french and *superior* has a different meaning in this context, it was enough to make both models to classify the example as *Entailment* when it is clearly not. Furthermore, this particular example was successful in all above mentioned recipes.

Example B

sentence1: Two British soldiers have been arrested in the southern Iraq city of Basra, sparking clashes outside a police station where they are being held.

sentence2: Two British tanks, sent to the police station where the soldiers are being held, were set alight in clashes.

Not entailment (97%) –> Entailment (71%) [BERT]

sentence1: Two British solider have been captured in the southern Iraq city of Basra, sparking clashes outboard a police station where they are being held.

sentence2: Two British tanks, sent to the policing station where the soldiers are being held, were set alight in clashes.

Not entailment (97%) –> [FAILED] [ALBERT]

Table 3: CheckList Test Suite for QQP

Capability	Test	QQP		MRPC	
		BERT	ALBERT	BERT	ALBERT
Vocabulary	Modifier: adj	82.3	**61.4**	100.0	100.0
	Different adjectives	**0.6**	1.3	92.7	**58.5**
	Different animals	**12.1**	16.2	100.0	100.0
	Irrelevant modifiers - animals	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	Irrelevant modifiers - people	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	Irrelevant preamble with different examples.	99.3	**88.8**	0.0	0.0
	Preamble is relevant (different injuries)	**21.4**	29.6	100.0	100.0
	How can I become more X != How can I become less X	20.8	**13.7**	100.0	100.0
Taxonomy	How can I become more {synonym}?	17.1	**10.7**	0.0	0.0
	How can I become more X = How can I become less antonym(X)	**57.7**	70.8	0.0	0.0
Robustness	Add one typo	**18.0**	24.2	19.2	**11.4**
	Contrations	**1.8**	3.0	2.8	**2.4**
	(q, paraphrase(q))	**56.5**	61.5	86.5	**7.0**
	Product of paraphrases(q1) * paraphrases(q2)	**39.0**	52.0	95.0	**51.0**
NER	Same adjectives, different people	2.1	**0.0**	100.0	**89.2**
	Same adjectives, different people v2	20.4	**14.4**	100.0	100.0
	Same adjectives, different people v3	**6.9**	26.7	100.0	100.0
Temporal	Is person X != Did person use to be X	96.0	**82.9**	100.0	100.0
	Is person X != Is person becoming X	**50.1**	90.6	100.0	100.0
	What was person's life before becoming X != What was person's life after becoming X	100.0	**0.0**	100.0	100.0
	Do you have to X your dog before Y it != Do you have to X your dog after Y it.	100.0	**43.5**	100.0	100.0
	Is it {ok, dangerous, ...} to {smoke, rest, ...} after != before	99.8	**76.7**	100.0	100.0
Negation	How can I become a X person != How can I become a person who is not X	6.2	**0.8**	**97.5**	100.0
	Is it {ok, dangerous, ...} to {smoke, rest, ...} in country != Is it {ok, dangerous, ...} not to {smoke, rest, ...} in country	17.7	**15.1**	100.0	100.0
	What are things a {noun} should worry about != should not worry about.	0.0	0.0	100.0	100.0
	How can I become a X person == How can I become a person who is not antonym(X)	**77.1**	92.9	15.7	**0.0**
Coref	Simple coref: he and she	96.0	**0.1**	100.0	100.0
	Simple coref: his and her	99.6	**49.4**	100.0	100.0
SRL	Who do X think - Who is the ... according to X	**6.4**	9.8	0.0	0.0
	Order does not matter for comparison	**78.5**	100.0	0.0	0.0
	Order does not matter for symmetric relations	**52.0**	91.0	0.0	0.0
	Order does matter for asymmetric relations	**61.5**	88.2	0.0	0.0
	Traditional SRL: active / passive swap	**13.9**	91.4	0.0	0.0
	Traditional SRL: wrong active / passive swap	**92.1**	94.4	100.0	100.0
	Traditional SRL: active / passive swap with people	**88.7**	97.7	0.0	0.0
	Traditional SRL: wrong active / passive swap with people	**95.2**	96.0	100.0	100.0
Logic	A or B is not the same as C and D	3.9	**2.3**	**59.3**	82.1
	A or B is not the same as A and B	100.0	**48.1**	100.0	100.0
	A and / or B is the same as B and / or A	**0.0**	0.4	0.0	0.0
	a {nationality} {profession} = a {profession} and {nationality}	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
	Reflexivity: (q, q) should be duplicate	**0.8**	1.0	0.0	0.0

Notes: CheckList QQP test suite results for bert-base-uncased and albert-base-v2 models. The reported numbers are fail rates in % (lower the better). For each dataset, lower fail rates are bolded for emphasis. Aside from Robustness, only the MFTs (Minimum Functionality test) were included for the sake of brevity.

In Example B, *iga* recipe fails to produce a valid adversarial example for ALBERT. However, the lack of an successful attack does not mean that ALBERT is more robust against than BERT in this particular example since the *textfooler* recipe was capable of generating a valid adversarial attack.

Example C

sentence1: U.S. forces have been engaged in intense fighting after insurgents launched simultaneous attacks in several Iraqi cities, including Fallujah and Baqubah.

sentence2: Fallujah and Baqubah are Iraqi cities.

Entailment (90%) –> Not entailment (98%) [BERT]

Sentence 1: U.S. forces have been engaged in intense fighting after insurgents launched simultaneous attacks in several Iraqi cities, including Fallujah and Baqubah.

sentence2: Fallujah and Baqubah are Iraqi townships.

Entailment (96%) –> Not entailment (96%) [ALBERT]

sentence1: U.S. forces have been engaged in intense fighting after insurgents launched simultaneous attacks in several Iraqi townships, including Fallujah and Baqubah.

sentence2: Fallujah and Baqubah are Iraqi cities.

Example C shows that both BERT and ALBERT are vulnerable to this very simple adversarial attack (cities <–> townships). Hwoever, this particular example was only successful in *iga* recipe.

On average, ALBERT (20m 11s, 4m 27s, and 15s) took longer time than BERT (15m 46s, 6m 12s, and 17s) to complete each attack (*fast-alzantot*, *iga*, and *textfooler*). However, attack time does not reflect inference speed as it depends more on the attack recipes than the models.

4.5 Counterfactual explanation

Similar to section 4.4, the same bert-base-uncased-RTE and albert-base-v2-RTE models were used in this experiment to address the issues found in section 4.4. With LIT (Language Interpretability Tool) by Tenney et al. [8], Example C from section 4.4 was used to generate counterfactual examples by swapping *cities* and *townships* in either sentence1 or sentence2. Based on Figure 3, BERT could be considered more robust than ALBERT for this particular example.

Figure 2: Screenshot of LIT [8] for Adversarial Sentences from Example C [BERT]

Notes: bert-base-uncased-RTE (top) and albert-base-v2-RTE (bottom) models on GLUE RTE validation dataset (N=277). [BERT] *cities* from sentence2 is swapped with *townships*.

Figure 3: Screenshot of LIT [8] for Adversarial Sentences from Example C [ALBERT]

Notes: bert-base-uncased-RTE (top) and albert-base-v2-RTE (bottom) models on GLUE RTE validation dataset (N=277). [ALBERT] *cities* from sentence1 is swapped with *townships*.

5 Discussion

Embeddings visualization

Although qualitative analysis of visualization should not be interpreted as a definitive evidence [7], UMAP visualization of sentence embeddings can be quite useful for exploring and comparing clusters and global structures of NLP models [8]. Nonetheless, visualizations in Figure 1 are the exceptions rather than the rules when it comes to embeddings visualization, since most of the fine-tuned models result in widely different embeddings that have far less meaningful representations.

Behavioral testing

According to Ribeiro et al. [6], CheckList should not be treated as yet another set of challenge or benchmark datasets; instead, it should complement benchmarks to systematically evaluate the precise capabilities of a model that are not captured in benchmarks. Based on Table 4.1, it can be somewhat vague and possibly misleading how BERT and ALBERT models fare in respect to *Robustness* and *Fairness*. With behavioral testing approach, model capability can be evaluated more precisely across different models and datasets (Table 4.3 and Table 4.3).

Adversarial attack

Much of the adversarial attacks reported successful by TextAttack [4] were often invalid because the search constraints were not properly optimized. Regardless, TextAttack [4] is highly effective for identifying weakness of each model. More precisely, it is useful to identify which token to attack, but often fails to generate valid tokens to substitute it.

Counterfactual explanation

LIT [8] consists of a wide variety of interpretability and explainability components. One of which is the *Salience Map*. This one is particularly interesting because there seems to be a correlation between the attack targets chosen by TextAttack [4] recipes and the token gradient norm weights in the *Salience Map*. However, tokens with the highest weights are not always the best target for generating insightful counterfactual examples.

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