Modelling the Dynamics of Subjective Identity in Allocation Games

Janvi Chhabra, Jayati Deshmukh, Srinath Srinivasa

Abstract: Allocation games are zero-sum games that model the distribution of resources among multiple agents. In this paper, we explore the interplay between an elastic sense of subjective identity and its impact on notions of fairness in allocation. An elastic sense of identity in agents is known to lead to responsible decision-making in non-cooperative, non-zero-sum games like Prisoners' Dilemma. It thus is a desirable way to model autonomous agents. However, when it comes to allocation, an elastic sense of identity is shown to exacerbate inequities in allocation, giving no rational incentive for agents to act fairly towards one another. This leads us to argue that fairness needs to be an innate characteristic of autonomous agency. To illustrate this, we implement the well-known Ultimatum Game between two agents, where their elastic sense of self (represented by γ) and a sense of fairness (represented by τ) are both varied. We study the points at which agents find it no longer rational to identify with the other agent, and uphold their sense of fairness, and vice versa. Such a study also helps us discern the subtle difference between responsibility and fairness in the context of allocation games.

External IDs:dblp:conf/atal/ChhabraDS24