Brittle interpretations: The Vulnerability of TCAV and Other Concept-based Explainability Tools to Adversarial Attack

Davis Brown, Henry Kvinge

Keywords: interpretability, adversarial attack

Abstract: Methods for model explainability have become increasingly critical for testing the fairness and soundness of deep learning. A number of explainability techniques have been developed which use a set of examples to represent a human-interpretable concept in a model's activations. In this work we show that these explainability methods can suffer the same vulnerability to adversarial attacks as the models they are meant to analyze. We demonstrate this phenomenon on two well-known concept-based approaches to the explainability of deep learning models: TCAV and faceted feature visualization. We show that by carefully perturbing the examples of the concept that is being investigated, we can radically change the output of the interpretability method, e.g. showing that stripes are not an important factor in identifying images of a zebra. Our work highlights the fact that in safety-critical applications, there is need for security around not only the machine learning pipeline but also the model interpretation process.

One-sentence Summary: We identify a novel vulnerability in the deep learning interpretability pipeline, and design attacks that mislead model explanations for two well known interpretability tools.